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DOWÓD NA ISTNIENIE BOGA Z ANALIZY RUCHU (DOWÓD KINETYCZNY)
Dowód na istnienie BogaThe reason for demonstrating the existence of God nowadays
It has been rather commonly assumed that the conviction that God exists depends on one’s worldview; is something subjective or private and not to be intruded. Moreover, the very fact of God’s existence happens to be deemed but a problem of faith, and the faith understood as “a matter of conscience” (whatever the meaning of the latter), not, consequently, to be settled objectively. The very terms used appear to be affected by some vagueness. Consequently, every attempt to prove the thesis in question might be perceived as breaching the integrity of one’s “consciousness” or intruding into the very personal, possibly with the objective to dominate over, or tamper with, the “personality” made up of some “ideas”.
According to Thomas Aquinas, the statement “God exists” is not an article of faith. It is a preamble or prerequisite thereof. The reason seems to be plain enough:
Thus, so as to believe in God, it is indispensable to have first a notion of Him really existing. According to Thomas, every man’s natural intellect (not even directed by science) whilst observing the natural order of things, tends to conceive a conviction as to the existence of an Author of the order. Both faith and science (philosophy) renders this conviction accurate and complete.
(Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum Fidei, 1622: La foi, don du ciel, suppose (est postérieure à) la revélation; elle ne peut donc pas convenablement être alléguée vis-a-vis d’un athée en preuve de l’existence de Dieu (Cf DS 2812). Denzinger, 1622. 1: Reason can prove with certitude the existence of God and the infinity of His perfections. Faith, a heavenly gift, is posterior to revelation; hence it cannot be brought forward against an atheist to prove the existence of God. Denzinger, 1650. 2: Reason can prove with certitude the existence of God, the spirituality of the soul, the freedom of man. Faith is posterior to revelation, and hence it cannot be conveniently alleged to prove the existence of God to an atheist. Denzinger, 1651. 3: The reason precedes faith … (The Sources of Catholic Dogma, transl. by R. J. Deferrari, Loreto Publications).
Neither can Bible provide an argument for the existence of God, albeit it provides an argument of God’s gratuitous existence in the world for those who admit His existence as such first.
In Thomas, the order of the natural world and its personal cognizance is meant. Now, what happens to be called science nowadays (in an exceptionally grotesque manner appropriated by e.g. Marxism) is far from being the competence of the individual and natural reason. Moreover, the “world” many believe to live in is but an artificial or “virtual” one, and created by man. The only order to be perceived there is that instilled therein by its creators. Now, the aim of the present book is to substantiate the statement “God exists” in both natural individual intellect and the natural order of things.
When accepting this statement, humans obtain,
True, the statement happens to make humans accept Revelation, but it is only because this acceptance is free par excellence, and is experienced personally as such. The acceptance is not emotionally motivated. The cognizance in question is completely disengaged in the sense of being harbored due to sheer observation of the world. Nay, it is but one and only knowledge stamped with the mark of absolute freedom – all the others cognitive acts being engaged in the fabric of the “human” world in some way. Hildegard of Bingen says: We cannot live in a world that is not our own, in a world that is interpreted for us by others.
The question arises as to the foundation of the freedom in question. Generally speaking, it is the cognizance that allows a man to determine his position in the world and to make decisions at all. From ages, it has been questioned how far a personal freedom is permitted to advance. And the simple answer reads: as far as it is not to conflict with another freedom. The answer must be called simplistic, because the freedom has been imagined to be material endowed with properties of bodies (expanding), whereas
In the first book of “Metaphysics”, Aristotle speaks of a science that gives the maximum of freedom just because it is most intellectual:
Needless to say, the certitude understood in such a way is – in the era of postmodernism – rejected a priori. Similarly, the possibility is precluded
in the way Aristotle thought it achievable. To be free is, according to him, tantamount to being for one’s own sake, and the science must be called free that is sought after for its own sake, which is the case with metaphysics. Now, the science demonstrates the existence of God, but every cognizance of God broadly speaking shares in the same characteristics to some extent.
The West European rationality has been founded on the Greek conviction that the universe was cognoscible, which is, however, not tantamount to that the world was “rational” (Hegel) or “textual” (Heidegger). The world was not meant to be a (crooked) mirror we look at ourselves in. Man is a micro-cosmos (Democritus), but not conversely: the world must not be a projection of our self. The natural processes occurring therein are ordered (although some particular objects might be incidental to each other indeed). The processes are understandable definitely, and this due to regarding them from a cognitive distance. The cognition is firm and immovable, which was traditionally called certitude. Especially, the truths concerning the ultimate must be unshakable. They cannot “evolve”; “be updated” etc. The absolutely firm (in the supernatural order) has been called in Lumen gentium (25) infallibilitas in definienda doctrina de fide vel moribus (this infallibility … in defining doctrine of faith and morals). Moreover: definitiones eius ex sese, et non ex consensu Ecclesiae, irreformabiles merito dicuntur (therefore his [Pope’s] definitions, of themselves, and not from the consent of the Church, are justly styled irreformable).
According to Vaticanum II, the doctrinal statements of the Church have peremptory and immovable character: “The Second Vatican Council neither changed nor intended to change this doctrine, rather it developed, deepened and more fully explained it.” (Congregazione per la Dottrina della Fede, 29 giugno 2007, AAS 99 (2007).
A sequence of events might be seen (superficially) as “dynamical” or “unpredictable”, but human dignity and rationality demands regarding an order in the moved and variable. A scientist lives in the changing world too, but assumes a distance thereto as soon as decisive conclusions have been arrived at. Restlessness of imagination might be assessed as a deplorable signum temporis. Peace of mind (¢tar£xia) is not a “good” much appreciated on the contemporary “free market of thinking”. However, the peace of mind is the only basis for knowledge. We would like to understand the changing world, but the understanding is impossible without occupying an immovable (unchanging) coign of vantage. The understanding might be called a measuring of motion in an analogical sense of the word. Thus, we see the Creator (the First Cause) behind the veil of creatures, or at least some particular causes behind appearances. Aristotle compares in his Protrepticus the philosopher to the mythical Lynkeus, who saw through non-transparent objects. The classical philosopher searches for what is behind the immediately given (Heraclitus, frg. 1; 54; 123).
The search is the basis of freedom, which – due to the aforementioned “behind” – is not opposed to the laws of nature. A stone can be thrown this or that direction, but it is absolutely certain that it undergoes the universal law of gravitation then. Hence, the Aristotelian distinction between motus violentus and motus naturalis appears to be pointed. The natural motion is analyzed in the kinetic proof of the existence of God. Artifacts, on the other hand, are rather “compelled” to implement a plan devised by humans (a “violence” is inflicted on nature this way to the extent the plan lacks the desirable rationality). Some stones laid in a certain (which is to say: human) order lay foundations (stiften as German phenomenologists say) for a structure. Still, they depend totally on human will in their “existence” (and cannot be called after Hegel an “objective being”). Each of us is directly responsible for the effects of his/her actions in the physical world (although the world does on obey the “dictates of reason” in the way Kant imagined). The responsibility cannot be evaded or shifted institutionally. Only the First Cause can (really) absolve from it, because of what He really is: Transcendent towards the world.
Without some knowledge on the direction we would be unable to see this perspective of our life. St Augustin uses a “naturalist” expression to describe this direction of the human mind (my weight is my love; it carries me wherever I may go; Confessiones 13, 9, 10).
albeit some inner disorder in it might make it move towards unworthy (“material”) objects.
The name of Thomas Aquinas has been adduced, because when searching a rational demonstration of the existence of God it seems to be only natural to turn towards the epoch when – as never before and after – the natural individual intellect was appreciated. For it is in the Middle Ages that Universities were founded and the foundations laid for the edifice of science about to be raised subsequently. In particular, it is in the 12th and 13th centuries that great scholastic systems were built. Thomas’s system was the most perfect of them.
In vain are then books to be sought written so “readily” as those of the “rationalist” – Voltaire. In vain are texts to be sought juggling with images and suggestive. In vain is the appreciation to be sought of phantasy and emotions. Both were stipulated to serve the individual natural intellect, which added up to serving nobody else and being absolutely free. The tongue of scholasticism is that of the distance towards the world (no matter how understood); that of no yielding to its influence, especially when the “human” world is meant bound to dominate over the animal in man, i.e. his/her emotions. For “man’s dignity demands that he act according to a knowing and free choice (secundum consciam et liberam electionem agat)that is personally motivated and prompted from within (ab intra motus et inductus), not under blind internal impulse (caeco impulsu interno) nor by mere external pressure (externa coactione). Man achieves such dignity when, emancipating himself from all captivity to passion (sese ab omni passionum captivitate liberans), he pursues his goal … (Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, Gaudium et spes, promulgated by His Holiness, Pope Paul VI on December 7, 1965, ch.17). And “the assent of faith (fidei assensus ) is by no means a blind action of the mind (motus animi cæcus)” (The Dogmatic Decrees of the Vatican Council Concerning the Catholic Faith and the Church of Christ. A.D. 1870, Chapter III. On Faith. English translation from Archbishop Manning).
The medieval intellectualism was unique to a degree, but its archetype was the Greek parrhesia already. 24 centuries have passed since the term was coined in the ancient Greece. The spell of time makes it difficult to realize the precise meaning thereof. For it is not only the freedom of speech, but the freedom to express the most personal in us – the freedom of word. Humans try to articulate everything that happens to be conceived in the deepest strata of their intellects. In fact, as the human nature is intellectual, the Greek imperative of living according to nature amounts to the same; the deepest in man is the very intellectual, as Aristotle has it. The freedom to unfold actively the deepest in man is just parrhesia. The Greek idiom crossed the boundaries of the ancient pagan Greece. The word occurs 31 times in the New Testament. Since is means: to speak the truth for the common good, it means: “boldness”, “confidence” and “trust” also; the truth we want to share with others.
Freedom of speech must be neatly distinguished from freedom of thought as the latter happens to be understood as the license of contesting every definite guise of thought, to the effect of foiling every attempt of petrifying thoughts in the intellect and obliterating every word conceived in the intellect. For that is tantamount to destroying the basis of life and living space for human beings. Awkwardly as a space may appear to be used (and the freedom abused), it is not without a great damage, or at least, a great pain inflicted upon those who (ab-)used it, that a structure of human words happens be shattered. For the most arrogant is the attempt to “knock down” the structure and to try and “build from scratch”.
Freedom of thought understood as a license to offend (even those irrational) convictions of others is not that much freedom as rather boorishness. Freedom of word (freedom of speech) is a desire to cherish every sparkle of truth (no matter how tiny), when preserving mutual respect, even towards those regarded as entertaining downright wrong ideas. For we cannot in advance be absolutely certain, whether our own views are adequate. This attitude was meant by the intellectualism of the Middle Ages. Never was it attempted to silence or shout down the convictions regarded as wrong. To the contrary: even those apparently inconvenient were systematically analyzed and thoroughly questioned. “Respect and love ought to be extended also to those who think or act differently than we do (reverentia et amor erga adversarios) …. In fact, the more deeply we come to understand their ways of thinking through such courtesy and love (humanitate et caritate modos sentiendi eorum intimius comprehendemus), the more easily will we be able to enter into dialogue with them. This love and good will, to be sure, must in no way render us indifferent to truth and goodness (indifferentes erga veritatem et bonum nos reddere). … it is necessary to distinguish between error (distinguere oportet inter errorem), which always merits repudiation (semper reiciendum), and the person in error (et errantem), who never loses the dignity of being a person (qui dignitatem personae iugiter servat) even when he is flawed by false or inadequate religious notions (falsis minusve accuratis notionibus religiosis inquinatur)”. (Gaudium et spes, 28).
Par-rhesia, however, is “speaking of all” or “speaking of the whole”, also. Moreover, the whole in question may be understood as (in the Greek philosophy) – the world. This adds up to broadening the scope of interest of philosophy maximally. Alas, the attitude had been lost in the centuries following this spate of intellectual activity and the right for confidence (for parrhesia is that too) in the unshakable truth denied.
That is why, when coping with the problem of the existence of God, it is convenient to hark back to the medieval heritage of the West. It cannot be expected of anyone to accept such an (“unmodern”) assessment of the medieval bequest as adequate in advance. Neither could it be demanded of anybody to undertake the systematical survey of medieval texts on his/her own, so as to ascertain as for their value. The objective of the present book is to show this value in concreto (possibly in quotations) when advancing step by step towards the objective set down at the beginning.
Since the death of St Thomas (more than seven centuries ago), science has developed significantly, and the very dynamics of the development has been believed to be founded on the opposition towards the “backward” Dark Ages. Now, it remains to show how, and to which degree, the achievements of the Middle Ages possibly exercised real (albeit unhidden) influence upon the development in question.
Thomas Aquinas is deemed a theologian first of all. Now, in this book his theology is but parenthetically addressed. We focus on his philosophy, which is neatly and methodologically distinguished by Thomas himself (the philosopher) from theology. In other words: the natural basis of theology is “theologics” (the term coined by Aristotle). We can concentrate on the ground floor without taking into account the upper storey of his intellectual edifice. The founder of metaphysics (theologics) was Aristotle (Metaph., VI, c. 1, 1026a 18-21). He was Thomas’s master, too; the Philosopher with the capital “P”. For the philosopher, the ultimate objective of science is the cognizance of God (Theos). In the present book, we shall address the views of Aristotle (the advocate of natural reason) as often as only possible. As however, the distinction in question was generally abandoned (to the detriment of both philosophy and theology) some purely theological problems will be addressed (as entangled in philosophical thought) nonetheless.
The absence of philosophy as such or the philosophy setting such ambitious objectives as those proposed by Aristotle is clearly perceptible nowadays. Many physicists tried to tackle philosophical problems; apparently bearing the testimony to that philosophy is the kind of human rationality not sufficiently explored until now. Thomas called metaphysics the natural wisdom everyone tends to obtain, for “the intellectual nature of the human person (personae intellectualis natura) is perfected by wisdom and needs to be (per sapientiam perficitur et perficienda est), … Our era needs such wisdom more than bygone ages … For the future of the world stands in peril unless wiser men are forthcoming (nisi sapientiores suscitentur homines)”. (Gaudium et spes, 15).
In the present book, we focus on the theoretical demonstration of the existence of God. But if so, it is impossible to answer the question of the usefulness of this knowledge. Accordingly, the title of this chapter is meant to address the nature of the fundamental (which is to say: not subordinate to another end) aspirations of human intellect. To ask “what for” in this context is as preposterous as to ask “what for we may feel pleasure”. The bliss of the contemplation the Aristotelian philosophy promises surpasses all what is useful only. The cognizance we are speaking of is a kind of intellectual fulfilment. But there might be some particular obstacles on the way. Every science, according to Aristotle, concerns universals, and the science in question concerns the universal Cause of the good. But on the other hand, the universal value whatsoever can be contested for some reason, and some special difficulty appear; all the more so as it is just universal, i.e. precious. That is why the question of the reason of the demonstration of the existence of God had to be put forward.
In the present book, the problem of the existence of God is undertaken, because this knowledge (metaphysics) is valuable as such; is worth choosing for its own sake. The problem is addressed despite the very disengagement being commonly assessed worthless nowadays. Or rather to the contrary: the problem is addressed because it seems necessary to restore a no-reductive, non-utilitarian dimension of human life.
There is something beyond what is normally acknowledged as valuable. The problem is that it was lost sight of.
Humans experience their being free to the extent they approach God, Who is absolutely free. To be and to live so (freely) excludes every imperfection, e.g. being ill or ill-natured. Being affected so can befall anyone and it seems reasonable to remove the obstacles when advancing towards the End. The approach to It philosophy proposes might seem reasonably modest; it is no ethics (albeit, according to Thomas, it is the best remedy for the spiritual illness called sorrow). Neither for that matter is it theology. The latter teaches to listen to the steps of the approaching God. In metaphysics, we can delineate the Way to the End, but we cannot pave it. Seeing what is worth choosing might be a token of liberty. But to be chosen is the source of freedom. Metaphysics shows but a possibility of being chosen.
Thomas uses the word “via” (way) when speaking of the modes of the demonstration in question. “The existence of God can be proved on five ways” he says. The kinetic poof is the first one. What is its relation to the other four? Can (or possibly: ought to) exist the other “ways” also? We cannot as yet answer these questions. Let it suffice to say that the analysis of motion seems to be the most convenient and apt for modern type of rationality, which was – parenthetically speaking – the case with scholastics, too. According to Thomas, the Way from motion is more apparent than the others. That is why, searching for a rational proof, we undertake the analysis of motion. Nevertheless, the other “Ways” will be mentioned in the following chapters, too. Thomas’ First Way is a continuation of Aristotle’s proof for the existence of the Unmoved Mover. It is called the cosmological argument for the existence of God.
Addressing the aforementioned heritage of the Western Civilization is not to be understood as defending anachronistic views cherished in antiquity and for some time thereafter concerning the no-existence of void, infinite velocity of light, geocentric system, etc. They are nothing save signs (or examples). It is proper for the Aristotelian Physics to use both demonstrations strictly speaking and argumentations through signs. If so, it is possible, and sometimes indispensable to interpret those signs according to what is necessary for science as such, albeit verbally contrary to what Aristotle himself (perhaps wrongly) deemed to be demonstration sensu stricto.
To sum up: we face a problem of the pivotal importance for the rational human nature. We happen to face this problem now, no matter how much
Harking back towards the past, we could find possible solutions of the problem; solutions that must not be overlooked, underestimated or disregarded in advance – which is to say: “silenced”, no matter how much the “now” seems to be “superior”.
Form of the proof of the existence of God
The kinetic proof of the existence of God assumes in Thomas the following form:
The points (1) – (4) of the proof belong directly to the science called by Aristotle “physics”, which (for the sake of clarity and so as to distinguish it from physics commonly so called nowadays) will be subsequently called scientia naturalis or Physica (or Physics with the capital “P”). The point (5) does not belong to scientia naturalis, for the complement of the proof is wrought by metaphysics, which, consequently, stamps it with its own characteristic, so that the proof as such (as a whole) belongs to metaphysics itself. (Aristotle, in the 1st and 12th book of “Metaphysics”, states that metaphysics as such is oriented towards the cognizance of God – the Prime Mover appears to be the Prime Being).
The reason seems to be plain enough: scientia naturalis considers being in motion, whereas metaphysics – being as such. Consequently, scientia naturalis demonstrates the existence of the first moving principle, whereas metaphysics demonstrates the existence of the First Being. Notwithstanding important differences in how Thomas and Aristotle proceed in metaphysics, the very fact that the subject matter thereof is being as such makes it that we prove the existence of a Being that is the absolute act; absolute perfection (which is included in the notion of the first being) and not merely a factor making the cosmic motion actual. For, notwithstanding whether form is regarded as the absolute perfection (as in Aristotle), or is solely a principium thereof (as in Thomas), the actuality of being (connected with form after all) is the subject matter of metaphysics.
The proof in question is called by Thomas “more apparent” (manifestior via) than the others, which is (as mentioned above) connected with the fact that its starting point is the most evident one, motion being the most salient feature of the outer world we observe. To avoid misunderstanding, it should be pointed out just now that motion (or a motion) is to be understood as an event, fact, phenomenon, which is in the perfect accordance with what Thomas and Aristotle say themselves. Still, obvious as motion may appear and identical with the fact, the precise relation of motion in general to facts, events, etc., is to be settled, all the more so as the precise notion of fact is far from being plain nowadays, and the existence of naked facts happens to be even rejected. Still, as has been said above, “we cannot live in the interpreted world”. There is “no hard evidence” of God’s existence, but there is
No direct evidence of God’s existence is normally (according Thomas) accessible to humans. We can know Him but indirectly, by the proxy of a demonstration. There might be some evidence for/against the existence of anything at all, as far as the starting point of an inquiry is concerned. But the conclusions are peremptory nonetheless. No arguments raised “against” the existence of God ought to be ignored on purpose, unless formulated in the way making a constructive dialogue impossible.
Albeit the bulk of the demonstration is to be found in the two last books of the Aristotelian “Physics” and its mere complement – in the last book of “Metaphysics” (and the whole proof in a concise form occupies just several lines of Thomas’ “Summa Theologiae”), nevertheless, according to Thomas, it is metaphysics that is entirely responsible for the validity of the proof (in its totality). In other words: the natural cognizance of God involves all parts of philosophy, to the effect that philosophy in all its guises (those modern included) is in some way related to the problem of the cognizance in question. In consequence, we ought to undertake a polemic with those threads of modern philosophy that might appear to be less distinctly interwoven into the tissue of the fabric of classical philosophy. On the other hand, “Summa contra Gentiles” is directed against philosophical errors, and the proof in question is adduced there in a more detailed form. But in fact, the Summa was written rather for heathens than against them. No matter how obstinately clung to, the errors can never become those who harbor them. People should be given an opportunity to be liberated from errors. The openness of mind (mentioned above) dominates in the Summa.
In the present book, the extent of the proof is far from being justified by stringent scientific requirements. The extent of the book might appear disproportionate to the concise syllogism adduced above. The proof as presented here may appear even prolix. Its extent is only justified by the fact that, historically speaking, the terms involved underwent such a significant change of meaning, that they should be revaluated (their value restored), which cannot be done without addressing problems but indirectly connected with the proof. First of all, the very term of motion is meant.
Can God’s existence be demonstrated?
It remains to clarify the significance of the term: “demonstration”. The term is meant to correspond to the Latin demonstratio and the Greek apodeixis. Now, the notion of apodeixis is clarified in “Posterior Analytics” by Aristotle. It is such an argumentation that generates science. Science, in turn, consists in knowing both that something is such-and-such and that it impossible to be otherwise (Analitica Posteriora, I, c. 2).
Following the etymology of both the Latin and Greek word, it can be said that a demonstrating, nay, even, pointing out to something is meant here. True, scientific demonstration cannot consist in pointing, say, with a finger, because particular things (only possible to be pointed at literally) are not the subject matter of science, and the very science consists in the dematerialization of (and departing from the particulars endowed with) sensual data. Consequently, when speaking of apodeixis an analogy is used, similarly as when saying “in the light of …” apparently not the physical light is meant, but something that spawns the effect in the immaterial mind somehow similar to effect of natural light, instead. To communicate anything to anybody, the terms are to be used that transcend the spatiotemporal, and apt to be evaluated in other material circumstances, remaining, nonetheless, the same. In this sense, the notion of dematerialization is an essential characteristic of science.
However, there is a science in which demonstrating could be understood almost literally, viz. mathematics, as the subject matter thereof is put before our mind with such a clarity that it makes us believe that the intellect of each one induvial envisages the same. The reason of this illusion is that mathematical objects are grasped in imagination, and the imagined can be, in a sense, pointed at. Some (as Avicenna and Kant) even believed in the imagination being “creative”, as the objects imagined are, indeed, “created” within the imagination, whereas the material circumstances are but a rough “approximation” of an idea imagined in such a way. However, if searching for the genesis of the ideas (which was dropped by Kant), a kind of dematerialization of those circumstances is to be expected. Perhaps, it is because of that feature of science in general that Claudius Ptolemeus (Syntaxis Mathematica, I, Ch. 1) ascribed the term of demonstration to mathematics first of all and situated it in a vaster paradigm of science. The science is nowadays called exact, apparently because of the acuteness of the ideas imagined, the very dematerialization not being so salient now as it happened to be when mathematics tended to ascertain its own position in the edifice of science.
Now, should the demonstration in question be supposed “exact” in the contemporary sense, some serious misapprehensions might appear. For, according to Thomas, both scientia naturalis and metaphysics differ distinctly (as to the method too) from mathematics. The former does so, because its subject matter is closer to the physical circumstances accepted as a margin of uncertainty of the laws universal to a degree, which is to say: the extent of their validity is as universal as how universally the nature is considered. The latter does so, because – to the contrary – it transcends both the material and imagined (Thomas, De Trinitate, 6, 1, 2, c). Using the same, universal method in them three leads to some unlawful extrapolation of a given system of statements upon the realm foreign to it. Should we regard the mathematical method as exemplary, none of the two others can be shaped after the exemplar. None of them, too, is “exact” in the sense commonly assumed nowadays nor, consequently, can they become more “scientific” or “exact”. The three aforementioned sciences are situated by Aristotle in the scheme of theoretical science on their own terms; and it is because they differ as to the method essentially that they happen to be no less deign the name of science than mathematics itself is.
Contemporarily, many people believe that mathematics is the most universal and precise mode of thinking, whereas other sciences are to be fashioned after this paradigm. They are believed to approximate the paradigm as far as being experimental. “Indeed today’s progress in science and technology (artiumque technicarum) can foster a certain exclusive emphasis on observable data, and an agnosticism about everything else (phaenomenismo et agnosticismo favere potest). For the methods of investigation (methodus investigandi) which these sciences use can be wrongly considered as the supreme rule of seeking the whole truth (immerito pro suprema totius veritatis inveniendae regula habetur). By virtue of their methods these sciences cannot penetrate to the intimate notion of things (ad intimas rerum rationes penetrare nequeunt). Indeed the danger is present that man, confiding too much in the discoveries of today (inventis hodiernis nimis fidens), may think that he is sufficient unto himself (se sibi sufficere) and no longer seek the higher things (altiora amplius iam non quaerat)”. (Gaudium et spes, 57).
Still, the very belief is not as universal as its object is supposed to be; it is historically founded. For phenomenalism and agnosticism are less “scientific” than commonly supposed. It was due to Kant that the exact sciences were alleged “higher”. A comparative normally implies a relation. Now, the problem is that the relation of mathematical objects to nature was blurred. The reason must be found in the Kantian Critique, which tried to answer the so-called transcendental (universal) questions. So, can the Critique replace (the traditional) metaphysics? It might be doubted as another (if you like) transcendental question was omitted and no less important than the four listed by Kant: “Are spatial and temporal variations equivalent?” If they are not, the reason should be given.
Obviously, time and displacement can be seized as coordinates in the Cartesian coordinate system. But real events are permitted to occur only in what Special Theory of Relativity calls the “cone of future” (a sector of that system). The causal relation cannot be reversed, whereas no direction seems to be privileged in an abstract Cartesian coordinate system. We can imagine (and delineate) “time travelling”, but the fact that (contrary to what agnosticism claimed) the causal relation is real makes such a movement a sheer play of imagination.
The Kantian assumption might be challenged right enough: the variety of place does not change the modality of being, whereas that of time does so: the past evets are necessary, whereas the future ones are (or might be) contingent.
The problem of the modalities of being (necessary, possible, impossible) was tackled by Avicenna. But it was only Thomas who managed to solve it. All modalities of being are included in the subject matter of metaphysics (being as such).
Kantians must put up with the possibly of the existence of Who assists the motion of the universe (intelligent design), which is considerably less than the demonstration of the real existence of the transcendent God.
Moreover, another aspect of the problem is to be pointed out. The mathematical demonstrations are those a priori. Should the problem be put in the terms of classical philosophy, it must be said that they lead from causes to effects. The “essence” of circle is a “cause” of its having certain properties. Moreover, due to the very fact that the subject matter of mathematics is grasped in imagination, it is grasped completely, for the intellect embraces the imagination. Consequently, mathematical objects are embraced by the human mind. Now, these both features are unacceptable in the case of the demonstration in question. The demonstrating of the existence of God is not the demonstrating of His cause, for God is commonly and appropriately understood not to have any cause at all. Neither can the fact of His existence (the factuality of everything possibly manifesting Him) be grasped completely, for we face the restrictions and weakness of our intellect when facing what surpasses it infinitely. The problem is mentioned in the 2nd book of Aristotle’s “Metaphysics”. In other words: there is another mode of the dematerialization of sensual data than that used in mathematics. Moreover, scientia naturalis and metaphysics do not proceed from causes to effects, but to the contrary: they conclude the existence of causes when observing the material objects (effects).
The problem can be expressed in the tongue of Aristotle and Thomas as follows: demonstratio quia (syllogismos tou hoti) (demonstrating that something exists), is used in the proof, neatly to be distinguished from demonstratio propter quid (syllogismos tou dioti) (demonstrating a cause of the existent fact). The fact that God exists is to be explained, but the fact is not spawn by any being. In “Posterior Analytics” (Bk. I, Ch. 13), Aristotle adduces downright banal examples of the former kind of demonstration, which testifies to that a sheer logical problem is faced here. In consequence, we cannot have a cognizance whatsoever, why God must exist, save in the sense that we must accept His existence, were our intellectual inquiry to advance towards the ultimate boundaries possibly accessible to human intellect. So, the statement “God must exist” (if taken literally) is nonsense; at best, it is but a colloquialism to be understood in the terms of the necessity of demonstration. The very necessity makes for it to be scientific par excellence.
The methodological context of the terms used here shall be clarified. For not a cognizance whatsoever is meant, but that generating certitude, i.e. the stability and firmness of the words conceived in our intellect. Every human activity is dynamic to the extent its foundations are firm and immovable. According to Thomas, the intellect is the foundation of freedom. The cognizance in question generates the maximum of freedom, often envied, taunted and despised just because of its firmness. Consequently,
(Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum Fidei, 1622). (Le raisonnement peut prouver avec certitude l’existence de Dieu et l’infinité de ses perfections; Cf DS 2812). "Our holy mother, the Church, holds and teaches that God, the first principle and last end of all things, can be known with certainty from the created world by the natural light of human reason." (Catechism of the Catholic Church, 36).
There is another problem yet. Demonstratio quia happens to be described by Thomas as demonstratio per signum. Now, as the proof in question is scientific par excellence (in the sense presented in “Posterior Analytics”), one should distinguish two types of demonstratio quia. The demonstration through a sign is bereft of a stringent scientific value, albeit not of a certain heuristic one. Addressing the matter at hand in the terms of the latter, we could imagine a house carefully arranged and ordered. It is only natural to assume that there exists an author of the order, an order not being likely to appear all by itself. No less natural is it to assume the author to be a person, for an order stems from an intellect, which makes for anybody to be a person. Now, it cannot be doubted that the natural world appears as an order, so that the natural intellect is prone to assume the existence of somebody that is its author. The assumption is as firm as not to be easily eradicable. It requires a considerable amount of energy on the part of the advocates of the co-called “scientific worldview” or rationalism to root it out. Indeed, we face here the human thought half-way to its fulfillment; to assuming a firm rational guise and yet really susceptible. The proof which is rational par excellence is about to appear but later on in the climate of the aforementioned parrhesia. To the contrary, the assumption that the order of things is completely casual is not that much irrational as rather antirational and downright destructive; its obtruding force must be foiled, because parrhesia is meant to defend human intellect; not to defend those who please to attack it. The former assumption, on the other hand, is fostered by every undebauched intellect, even if unguided by science or religion (Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, c. 38). For demonstratio per signum is just an argumentation endowed with a certain verisimilitude. Consequently, it should be distinguished from demonstratio quia, being but
whereas the latter is the stringent argumentation concerning the relation of everything that appears in a certain order (either in a certain sequence or in a certain objective connections) to its Cause.
As the notion of the order of the Universe has been mentioned, it should be pointed out that the proof from finality of the world is somehow symmetrical to the kinetic proof. For every moving moves towards some end. The very term of end (in English) is affected by an equivocation, which, might hint to a hidden kinship of the notions involved. The same is the case with the Latin finis and Greek telos. The motion terminates in what proper to it, i.e. natural, and expected to correspond to this kind of motion. The demonstration of the existence of the First Mover is, consequently, the same as the demonstration of the existence of the Author of the order the universe.
The verisimilitude of the proof from finality was even granted by Kant – the destroyer of metaphysics and the founder of agnosticism. Still, according to Kant, the proof from finality is that of the existence of an Architect, not of the Creator of the world as traditionally assumed before him. The core of Kant’s reasoning seems to apply to those (pre-scientific) convictions mentioned above, albeit its conclusions rash and unjustified. The existence of order of a house can be admitted without assuming the author thereof being a maker of the things ordered in a certain manner. Indeed, the assumption that the ordering must be identical with the creating could appear queer, for we do not expect e.g. a watchmaker to produce the material used, and, as not even material (e.g. the material used by a watchmaker) can be created by him, all the less so could matter as such. But as was mentioned above, the criticism is addressed by Kant at the demonstratio per signum. For a sign taken from the human world was used, and humans are not expected to procure the material for their artefacts, if the material is to be understood as completely rough. Still, Kant did not take pains to survey the proof from finality as presented in the stringent scientific form; i.e. to define all the terms used. A layman can, for the time being, put up with a sign; a scientist is not allowed to do so. In fact, the philosophical notion of bodies had not been clarified. It might have appeared clear to Kant, but is not indeed, and (historically speaking) accepted from a medieval thinker writing in Arabic – Avicebron, and passed it on, subsequently, to Avicenna and Descartes. Avicebron assumed the existence of a form common to all the material things, and called it “corporeity”. The existence of “corporeity” was by no means obvious to Aristotle, the forms of bodies being different, including those elementary. If fact, the charge of a particle is no less elementary than its mass. It is but a unity in variety that constitutes the world – not its allegedly deepest stratum. Similarly, in Thomas, the variety of elementary forms makes for the structured unity of the universe to appear. Now, the finality in question appears first of all in the tendency to assume and preserve a given elementary form. Should it be otherwise, the mythical matter devised by Avicebron and Kant must prove non-cognoscible, for it is the formal in things that makes them cognoscible at all. The conclusion was, parenthetically speaking, accepted by epigones of Kant, to the effect that the shapeless material of the universe “evolved” in an unforeseeable direction, at random, bluntly speaking. No inconvenience was foreign to the Kantian world; nay, the only rational was to be demanded from a creator of the human world. The problem is that the “creator” has proved not to live up to those demanding expectations. The “human” has proved to be antihuman.
Following the footsteps of Aristotle, we are entitled to ask what tends to accept a given elementary form. According to Aristotle, it is prime matter that does so. Some happen to say that, according to Aristotle, prime mater is eternal and uncreated. As can be easily gathered from the aforesaid, a Kantian pattern of thinking had been adopted here; the pattern foreign to Aristotle himself. True, prime matter might have been eternal, but the very fact of its tending towards elementary forms should be accounted for. The tension in question stems from somebody (or, at least, from something). According to deists and Kant, the “bodies” can dispense with a “creator”, which, however, is not the case in Aristotle, for putting aside the problem when or if a tendency in question begins (time being implied in the biblical Genesis), it must originate from a source, albeit not necessarily from a given point of time. The world might have been created from eternity, and Aristotle accepted such a possibility. No matter how the First Moving is called, the very fact of the existence and endurance of natural forms must be accounted for, the motion being not that much that of the “matter” (Buridan, Descartes) as the tension towards forms whatsoever, those elementary included.
Thus, the problem is that of the equivocation included in the term of “eternity”. The world might well have been “eternal” in the sense of the infinite series of events being theoretically possible (Aristotle did not know the first sentence of the Genesis). But this world would not be co-eternal to God nonetheless. God’s eternity is God’s life and the fact was admitted by Aristotle himself. This life cannot unfold parallelly to the existence of the world, which is to say: it precedes it absolutely and is creative thereof. The word of “creation” was not used by Aristotle, but the sense of his own words is plain enough.
Moreover, the very notion of the existence of God should be clarified. Now, the fact that God exists is meant here, similar to the fact of, say, the existence of atoms or the ancient Troy. What exactly was demonstrated by Schliemann? Apparently, some evidence (some facts cognitively ordered) led with a considerable amount of probability towards the acceptance of the existence of Troy. Many before Schliemann regarded Troy as an output of poetical imagination and “created” by Homer. “Schliemann’s dream” unfolded following the relations of things more easily perceptible towards the object whose existence was but inferred. Probably, the existence of Troy might be rejected someday, should the existence of objects occur which might render the cognizance in question unsubstantiated. It is not the case with the fact in question.
But it is impossible to occur objects that would render the conclusion of the proof void, for the objects of metaphysics are not affected by a contingency of the spatiotemporal. A scientific proof, according to “Posterior Analytics” is necessary in general, and the conclusion we are speaking of is scientific par excellence. The necessary relation of the world to something beyond (transcendent) is proved, which might be something before but does not need to. Consequently, the existence of God is to be understood as the co-existence of the world with its transcendental Cause; the co-existence asymmetrical, as God can exist without any of His possible effects, whereas things must not exist without Him.
When speaking of the fact that is undeniable, it is to be distinguished between rational arguments that could be advanced against the statement, and the arguments raised to undermine objective truth (its cognoscibility) as such. True, forming the statement in question might appear subjectively difficult, the subjective being understood either as human subject as such or the human subjectivity historically formed. If the former is the case, the affectual in humans make them unwilling to accept this conclusion. The conclusion is meant to overcome the animal (emotional) in men and to liberate the intellectual. Emotions cling to particulars, and the general source of good might be overlooked. The general reason why it could be the case is the weakness of human intellect; it is prone to yield to emotions and be sluggish in seeking for absolute freedom. Moreover, the weakness was pampered and the human subjectivity created hostile to the very outlooks of obtaining the definite truth. Consequently, these “historical” difficulties are to be addressed to the extent the truth might be extricated therefrom after all. For all its being hostile to the intellect, it is impossible for the subjectivism to attack reason without some reasoning. Such a reasoning is indirectly addressed in the book. When advancing towards the end, the obstacles waylaid must be removed, albeit no exceptional importance attached to what they are in themselves.
The scientific status of the proof of the existence of God
On the preceding pages, the problem whether, and possibly in what sense, the existence of God could be proved scientifically, was addressed. In other words: are scientia naturalis and metaphysics to be deemed sciences as commonly understood nowadays, i.e. in the sense modern physics and mathematics are? To put in otherwise: granted (as it seems to be only natural) that mathematics and physics are theoretical sciences, might (or possibly should) it be assumed that besides the two aforementioned there are some no less theoretical ones yet? Are we allowed to assume that there is one genus of theory and the four species thereof?
The problem might be tackled from another point of view, viz. that of classical philosophy (which seems to be more general one) as follows: why physics and mathematics are to be regarded as theoretical sciences, i.e. those of an absolutely universal value? If tackled so, the problem appears to be, to the contrary, that of how the notion of theory is to be understood in the most general terms. The fact that mathematics proved to be a convenient means to get to know the physical world is not an answer, as the answer was formulated in historical terms, which are contingent. Similarly as when any historical problem is being coped with, some circumstances might have been overlooked and as effective as unheeded. Possibly, some day we would awaken to the fact of our being bereft of the precious means of cognizance of physical works just because we have forgotten how to use it effectively. Consequently, the problem reads, why mathematics proved to be efficient at all, and we cannot put up with pointing out historical events that seem to bear testimony to its efficiency. Moreover, the very problem might have appeared impossible to be solved at all (Bourbaki), notwithstanding the fact that the future of science is at stake.
Still, when solved it would have enabled us to set down boundaries in which mathematics could be applied to the cognizance of physical world. Or to the contrary: the very problem might be tackled successfully when embarked upon from the point of view of boundaries in question. The problem does not need to be regarded as abstract: we can simply ask what is between our mind (and ideas in it) and the physical world? The lack of such like considerations seems to be perceptible nowadays, for the boundaries of science must not be trespassed as is the case with popular science ideas that people the imagination of an ordinary “consumer” of scientific ideas.
The problem of neat distinctions in the matter at hand is connected with that, since Kant, metaphysics has been believed to hamper the progress of science. Scientia naturalis, according to Maritain, had been disposed of even earlier. Let us accept, for the sake of argument, that metaphysics did so, indeed (the sense of “hampering” will be elucidated next). Now, according to Aristotle, metaphysis is theoretical par excellence, so that it is obvious that every attempt to use its conclusions in accumulating the so-called material values (which is meant by progress) is doomed to failure. If something is a theory, it cannot become a praxis. Or to formulate the problem even more distinctly: possibly, every theory as such is bound to hamper the progress if the latter be understood in the aforementioned manner (A theory can gather conclusions, but not values, obviously enough). This assessment of theory seems to chime in with modern thinking; for pragmatism seems to be the token of modernity indeed. So, the status of theory as such is in fact questioned. But if so, the theoretical physics too that could happen not to live up to such like “expectations”. Theoretical physics proved to be of practical value, which, however, is but indirectly connected with how it developed itself. Paradoxically, the very fact that a theory is about to be used practically is likely to destroy and frustrate the inner dynamics thereof, which is to say: hamper the actual progress of scientific discovery. For if a science is being used, the one who is dedicated to it wholeheartedly might be used also. As can be easily seen, progress does not need to be understood in the commonly accepted manner. For the personal progress (making for the dynamics of life) seems to be prior to the social one. Similarly, the life scientific is the one of a scientist first of all. Now, the dynamics in question is connected rather with the disinterested (theoretical) pursuit of truth.
As it hampers the “progress” of the accumulation of “values”, metaphysics curbs the utilitarian attitude towards science and life in general. Still, as it is impossible to disregard practical issues, the problem of theory is the problem of the equilibrium between the two aforementioned aspects of human activity. Until about the turn of the 20th century the equilibrium still existed. Theory hampered effectively attempts to reduce man to the status of homo faber, which is, however, not the case nowadays. The equilibrium has been destroyed to the detriment of: (1) theoretical physics, (2) man as such, i.e. rational being not to be treated instrumentally, (3) the praxis that had been drawing its vital forces from the unhampered theoretical activity. A scientist is likely to forget – as least for the time being – about how his theory could be used practically, regarding it as simply beautiful, and when reminded of the practical importunately, loses the interest in life and activity at all.
“Within the individual person there develops rather frequently an imbalance (in ipsa persona frequentius oritur inaequilibrium) between an intellect which is modern in practical matters and a theoretical system of thought (theoreticam cogitandi rationem: regard for theoretical considerations) which [or: who] can neither master (subigere) the sum total of its [or: their] ideas, nor arrange them adequately into a synthesis (neque in syntheses [plural] apte ordinare valet)” … “because of development coming so rapidly and often in a disorderly fashion (tam rapida rerum mutatio inordinate saepe progrediens)”. (Gaudium et spes, 8).
Metaphysics (effectively present in human mind at least till the turn of the 20th century) hampered the “progress” if understood in the aforementioned manner. Or, it hampered the unbridled greed for using everything precious and beautiful in human activity for the benefit of the practical.
Metaphysics cannot be used directly. Still, there is an “anthropological” aspect of the science. According to Cicero, (in “De finibus bonorum et malorum”) “for man, there is no cause for philosophizing except (in order) that he be happy” – as quoted by Augustine. For St. Augustine the final purpose of all learning is the acquisition of happiness in God. Nulla est homini causa philosophandi, nisi ut beatus sit, he says in De civitate Dei 19. 13. The same at core is said by Aristotle in the 10th book of „Nicomachean Ethics” and the 12th book of “Metaphysics”. Now, humans are happy if fulfilled and of dynamic personality – full of inner freedom. The freedom in question is given by metaphysics (Metaphysica, I c. 2, 982b 25 ss.). Now, it is impossible to use anybody’s happiness practically. A person if free can both build the welfare state and make his own garden. To the contrary, it seems to be obvious that some can profit materially from the others being unhappy, e.g. poor or miserable. A material profit can be drawn from bringing people out of poverty and misery, provided the bringing out be never accomplished and serve those bringing out, not those brought out. That is a special kind of “charity”.
Consequently, everything depends on whether the acclaimed progress is devised in advance or left to the unhampered activity of humans. The theory as such fosters the latter one, whereas the former undermines the very freedom and activity in advance. So, the problem of theory is to be thought over anew. It will be attempted in the present book.
Once the status of a given theory is set down, it is possible (using analogy) to adopt its conclusions to another one. The distinctions must not be blurred, but on the other hand, it is possible to use analogy when clothing a given system of statements in the tongue of another science. This is in perfect accordance with what is said by Aristotle in “Posterior Analytics”.
The scientific requirements must be met; the boundaries are not to be trespassed, which, however, does not add up to isolating sciences from each other. Indeed, according to Aristotle, all kinds of knowledge are hierarchically structured and ordered, which is expressed in the term hypotithemenai. To put it in the tongue of scholasticism: they are subalternatae. The data of an “inferior” science are interpreted in the tongue of the “superior” one (subalternans). Consequently, if an inferior one puts up with the statement that it is so-and-so (i.e. with a fact particular to a degree, or a particular coexistence of objects), it remains to prove in the superior one why it so, and, eventually to prove – so to say – the “absolute fact”, i.e. the absolute correlation of everything in the physical world, and the fact that the universe (as a whole) depends (as to its being) on the Outer Side. A science is superior to the degree it departs from particulars and advances towards the immaterial. Now, as the relations of the material are besides the material (not being material themselves), they are retraceable to the Source of the order.
Averroes naively supposed that the totality the highest science faced consisted in its knowing literally all the objects, and attaining the highest possible state of “consciousness”. Averroists, in turn, deemed the ultimate beatitude of man to consist in such a cognition. According to Thomas, the totality understood as that of the entirety of objects is impossible to be known for human intellect, and the ideal unrealistic. The relations of the material or the relation of everything physical to its Transcendent Cause can be known nonetheless. The knowledge, in turn, is pivotal for man.
Now, the theory in question gives some rest.
For us humans, it is easier to define things; to grasp an object as immaterial. Nevertheless, the most perfect intellectual cognizance consists in seizing relations as such i.e. forming judgments instead of definitions (intellectualiter procedere). Now, this is proper to metaphysics. It is metaphysics that sheds a light upon conclusions (judges them) otherwise deemed peremptory if viewed in a particular aspect only (Contra Gentiles, II, c. 4, n. 5). Nevertheless,
The words happen to be perplexed, i.e. disarranged. It may appear easier to destroy them totally than order them patiently. A medication can succeed in killing bacteria along with their carrier, and it is a “perfect” treatment, in a sense.
When speaking of the cognizance of causes, a science is to be mentioned that gets to know the Ultimate Cause of everything, impossible to be known in any particular science directly. Intellectualiter procedere is tantamount to resigning from imagining the relation in question (imaginatio est omnino reliquenda). Thus, no spatial and temporal terms are of importance in coping with the problem of the existence of God. They might be provisionally used, but never taken literally. However, should we try to avail ourselves of the imagination after all, we must turn to particular sciences so as to “illustrate” the otherwise totally “abstract”.
The name of God
The expression: “the philosophical proof of the existence of God” is likely to jar upon the minds of those who are used to turning to God with the simple act of the intellect, without analyzing it. It could probably seem to them that the philosophy was about to intrude upon their very personal relation towards God. People happen (not very often, alas, nowadays though), or at least used to be ascertained as to the existence of God, and every attempt to tamper with this certitude is to be duly regarded as unacceptable. Now, the philosophical proof of the existence of God is not meant to be such an attempt.
God is not the subject matter of metaphysics; indeed, He is not subject to any reasoning at all. The proof in question is the opposite: it subjects human reason to what eventually appears to be God, according to what St Paul says: “… pulling down of fortifications, destroying counsels, And every height that exhalteth itself against the knowledge of God, and bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ”. (1 Cor 10. 4, 5; Thomas, In Trin., q. 2, a. 4. c.). The reasoning tries to “exalt itself” only if disordered, which becomes an occasion to pride. (Thomas, Summa Theol., II-II, q. 82, a. 3 ad 3). Theoretically, a simple act of the intellect can trigger a simple act of the will. Now, the problem is that the act of human intellect is practically never simple, and the affects that follow are, consequently, emotional rather than volitional (the emotional in humans is rather hopelessly perplexed and only analyzable in the light of the ultimate end of human life, which can be willed, but never fancied or sensed). A special kind of reasoning metaphysics offers is meant to simplify all objects of the ordinary cognition when subsumed under a universal formula of the subject matter of metaphysics: being qua being. Thus, the complex can become simple.
Humans, albeit being rational beings (i.e. that endowed with the intellect and will) and able to address their desires (and possibly their thoughts, too) to God directly, are material beings too, which is to say: their being rational is a hostage to what is material they live in. The acts of intellect are accomplished in material circumstances, and it is only obvious that man is free to the extent of being rational, whereas, the physical in him or around him happens to be unyielding to his personal wishes (which was somehow excessively underscored by Neo-Platonists). Especially, it is the case with language. There are two aspects of a sign: the immaterial significance, and the physical carrier thereof. Paradoxically, words happen to be destitute as soon as spoken or written (which is to say: clad with the material). They happed – to use the words of the 7th Epistle by Plato – “powerless”. Perhaps, the problem of Platonism is not so much that of “idealism” as that of being aware of the weakness (susceptibility) of the spiritual in man. For, as all the material is in perpetual change, the attitude of a man towards God, may happen to share the same dole of instability, too. Durable and pure as it is, it might have been fragmented along with material circumstances we live in. Both natural and artificial objects are meat, although it are not mainly the former that pose such a threat. Natural things show more distinctly their dependence upon God, whereas the same things when forced into an artificial set devised for a practical purpose, are bound to blur the aforementioned relation altogether. “Modern civilization itself often complicates (difficiliorem reddere potest) the approach (accessum) to God not for any essential reason but because it is so heavily engrossed in earthly affairs (nimis rebus terrestribus intricata)”. (Gaudium et spes, 19).
Savages are not likely to be atheists, just because their human world (i.e. the artificial one raised by them) is quite unsophisticated and unprepossessing, not able to “compete” with the natural. They are theists, although God is far from being seen by them distinctly enough. Nay, His essence might be fragmented into a variety of objects called “gods”. If, consequently, nature appears to pose an obstacle to the cognizance in question, all the more the “human” world does so. Indeed, there happen to exists “many gods”; nay, they may be so many that the very notion of deity disappears. We can seize the problem philosophically:
Moreover, not even the very name of the ultimate needs to be used: is suffices to justify all human desires as equally acceptable. Thus man happens to “create” gods. There are as many gods as many are obstacles that separate humans from the real God.
The problem of the name proper to God appears distinctly in the so-called rationalism. Indeed, the rationalistic ideas of God may appear abhorrent to many, rightly enough. For it is not the transcendent God that is meant, but the idea of God devised by “specialists”. There is, according to Hegel, a good infinity, to be contrasted with the bad, transcendent one. Good means “tame” here. The Hegelian infinity stems from the human world; harmless and friendly. Hegel’s Absolute Sprit is a synthesis of the human mind and the “world” created by it. As a conclusion comes the statement by Feuerbach and Marx that it was man who “created” God, which is true, to a degree, because the created had been the “idea of god”.
The relation of a man towards Gog might be, theoretically speaking, quite simple. However, due to his existence in the world (understood in either of the aforementioned meanings) it is never practically simple. The act in question is complex to the degree how one’s actual existence in the world happens to be complex. The existence could be not only complex, but complicated or even perplexed. One’s attention and desirers happen to be “distracted”, i.e. led astray from the only deign to be desired at all. Consequently, the relation in question seems to be that of a wanderer (viator), and the very relation appears to be a pathway (via). The pathways happen to be winding, fraught with obstacles and snares. Every step advanced towards the ultimate is likely to fall upon unstable ground.
The problem may be illustrated as follows. Apparently, when speaking of the proof in question, a certain order of things (to be proved) is meant. The problem can be, however, envisaged not only from the, so to say, “objective” point of view, i.e. that of things as existing besides our mind. It could be addressed in terms of them occurring to us in a certain sequence. Obviously, there is an order in anybody’s life, viz. that of one’s objectives. But the latter are not meant if asking about what happens to us, it are real objects that occur to us; objects as natural as being practically out-of-control. The problem, accordingly, reads: is there any order in things apart from that brought about by humans? Is the occurrence of, say, a disease to be regarded as “planned” or foreseen by anybody for the sake of good that might possibly issue? Is the sequence of natural objects to be regarded as casual? Is the order of the world only to be found if the existence of the “human” world is meant?
Now, the notion of via implies the order to be present in any spell of human life, no matter how arbitrarily severed. The objects that do not bear upon the Ultimate, at least indirectly, do not exist at all. So,
Moreover, the very sequence is far from being a “movie”. The “producer” is far too intelligent as to produce “images” in an arbitrarily devised manner.
The advocates of modern atheism “maintain that it gives man freedom to be an end unto himself, the sole artisan and creator of his own history (propriae suae historiae solus artifex et demiurgus). They claim that this freedom cannot be reconciled with the affirmation of a Lord Who is author and purpose of all things (Domini, omnium rerum auctoris et finis), or at least that this freedom makes such an affirmation altogether superfluous. Favoring this doctrine can be the sense of power which modern technical progress generates in man”. (Gaudium et spes, 20).
The philosophical proof of the existence of God presented in the present book is not that much concerned with its absolute value as such (this being sufficiently substantiated by Thomas himself) but with its validity when uttered nowadays, i.e. in the tongue that evolved in the direction probably completely unforeseen by Thomas himself. The circumstances are meant downright hostile to human intellect and parrhesia; the circumstances likely to foil any attempt to achieve the intellectual fulfillment in question. In other words: it is about words that happen to be devaluated or even forged on purpose (analogically as a genuine tender), so that the efficiency of the proof in question does not appear as salient as it might have done otherwise.
Still, we do not depart from the philosophical background in which the proof had been originally formulated. It is only stated that the complexity of the aforementioned background nowadays is impossible to be ignored and incomparably lager than that of the Middle Ages.
The proof as presented in Summa Contra Gentiles does not require any amendment. Neither does it require any philosophical commentary at all. Its objective validity was already stated above. It is only typical of Thomas’s all texts to be pellucid as such. If, however, its validity happens to be questioned now, it is only because of the tongue used. In other words: the masters of manipulation demand importunately to force it into categories proved to be efficient enough to manipulate people. In this sense the proof does require a commentary. It is about revaluating the words used; about restoring their proper validity.
Some allegedly “outdated” views (e.g. the infinite velocity of light, the geocentric system, etc.) are being adduced with a malicious joy so as to prove that the proof in question is but a historical curiosity, and worthless in the era when a secondary school pupil knows “more” than the masters of the “Dark Ages”.
The attempt seems to be clever, but cleverness is not wisdom. Wisdom is about the maximum of intellectual effort put in the understanding a given idea thoroughly, in the climate of the aforementioned parrhesia. It is about not putting up with some preconceived ideas, which, in fact, may prove to be superstitions. It can be, for instance, attempted to elucidate what the idea of natural place really means, notwithstanding its “backwardness” taken for granted. It is about not reading texts superficially.
Each one of the five ways ends with the statement: “and this everyone understands to be God” (et hoc omnes nominant Deum). This (hoc) is the philosophical counterpart of the theological (or religious) notion.
The statement “and this everyone understands to be God” deserves a closer regard. The way we name God is meant. Now, it seems to be obvious that e.g. polytheists use the name otherwise. In general, people hardly ever agree completely when naming anything whatsoever. Perhaps it is because of ignorance, or (possibly more often than not) because of the manipulation efficient nowadays to a degree. In consequence, the name of God seems to be affected by the same ambiguity as all the others. Is, then, Thomas right in assuming that all the people name God in the same manner?
Apparently, not all those are meant that please to say about God anything at all, but those who take pains to name God appropriately (with the openness of mind mentioned above). Consequently, the name of God is neither univocal (as e.g. that of circle) – otherwise Wittgenstein would not be able to label it as senseless – nor is it equivocal, permitted to be used at whim. The name is analogical. When speaking of analogy a kind of relation is meant. If taken in a narrower scope, two lines might appear parallel. When, however, viewed from a more distant point of view, the same might appear to intersect at some point, previously overlooked. It the same with ideas: they might appear as equivocal, having nothing in common when regarded in a narrow scope, but to overlap when taken more generally. All human acts, when regarded from the most general coign of vantage, happen to focus on something ultimate. All human acts of cognizance, provided they are not restricted to a particular aspect, concentrate on the ultimate. It is about not to be narrow-minded, but open to ultimate cognitive possibilities.
Naming God or invoking His name is connected, first of all, with prayer. The name was mentioned as a religious counterpart of the philosophical one; otherwise, the latter (as “abstract”) would be hardly understandable. Broadly speaking, the very naming of God might be connected this way or the other with a prayer. Now, the proof in question does not need to be addressed to atheists or agnostics only. Those who believe in God might be interested, too. For it is because of the character of language (mentioned above) that they might harbor doubts as regards the existence of God. The cause is the tongue, not they themselves. “We live at the mercy of a malevolent word” Joseph Conrad wrote. The human heart might adhere to God, the mind, at the same time, falling prey of an ideologization and raising doubts. The idiosyncrasy towards intellect is bound to appear, for the intellect is susceptible to ideologization and really vulnerable if untrained by philosophy. That is why the natural intellect should be perfected and disciplined.
In the modern world “… there is a growing exchange of ideas (dum idearum communicatio augetur), but the very words by which key concepts (magni momenti conceptus) are expressed take on quite different meanings in diverse ideological systems (in distinctis ideologiis). Finally, man painstakingly searches for a better world, without a corresponding spiritual advancement. Influenced by such a variety of complexities (implexis condicionibus affecti), many of our contemporaries are kept from accurately identifying permanent values (valores perennes vere dignoscant) and adjusting them properly to fresh discoveries. As a result, buffeted between hope and anxiety (inter spem et angorem agitati) and pressing one another with questions about the present course of events, they are burdened down with uneasiness (inquietudine premuntur). This same course of events leads men to look for answers; indeed, it forces them to do so”. (Gaudium et spes, 4).
Clement of Alexandria was right in observing that philosophy must be a guardian of the vineyard. Fideism, to the contrary, yields to anybody that pleases to attack faith. If human intellect had been an accessory of our life, and possibly disposable, fideism would have been right in resigning from attempts to defend faith in such a way, i.e. intellectually. But the nature of man (which is rational) is not to be disregarded, because there is no other basis of the supernatural (possibly simple) save the natural (perfected by science). In consequence, to render people destitute of this (scientific) reasoning is tantamount to abandon them to any (apparent) reasoning. The so-called rationalism is meant. Rationalism has no right to be called rational strictly speaking, and the fact is easily perceptible in Pascal. This rationalist ended up with heartrending complaints about the frailty of human existence and of human mind too. But the matter at hand is far from being grotesque; the very name of being rational should have been denied to the co-called rationalism, and the omission proved to be detrimental for human rationality. The very name of being rational must, therefore, for the sake of accuracy, be denied to those who, as testified by history, attack reason instead of fostering the unhampered spiritual human activity. (philosophi qui vocantur [… dicta] ab eis tanquam ab iniustis possessoribus in usum nostrum vindicanda sunt. Habent enim doctrinae gentilium quaedam simulata et superstitiosa figmenta. Augustinus, De Doctrina Christiana, II, c. 25; ML 32, 840).
Disregarded as it well may be, the fact is that people happen to cherish doubts as to the existence of God. Disregarding a disease is a poor method to treat it. The existence in question is, in a sense, the presence of God in the world. But in philosophy, the actuality of His effects is meant only. So, (strictly speaking) “the existence of God” is not the same as “God’s existence”. The latter concerns God directly (including all modes of existence in the world chosen freely by Him; the former concerns the necessity of the fact of His existence (known indirectly through His natural effects). To put it otherwise: the efficacy in causing things is meant, because, generally speaking, all (material) effects are to be taken into account. In the notion of effect, the dependence upon God is meant (the so called “matter”, included). The latter is to be pointed out distinctly, because, since Kant, it has been assumed that nature (“matter”) and the spiritual (“the idea” of God) have to be neatly severed. The sphere of the “spiritual” was devised so to be irreconcilable with that of the material (no matter how vaguely understood).
The problem may be illustrated thus. It is obvious that material things cause material effects. Am I, consequently, right in assuming that my prayer is directed to a Cause efficient enough to thwart any physical action? E.g. in this way: “Deliver me from my enemies, O my God; and defend me from them that rise up against me. Deliver me from them that work iniquity, and save me from bloody men”. Ps. 58, 2-3; and: Ps. 30, 13; Ps. 70, 4; Ps. 139, 2; Ps. 143, 11 (Douay-Rheims; Vulgate). Do not get me wrong. The problem is whether it is possible, not whether it happens according to what I wish. Metaphysics analyses such a possibility.
But then a more prominent possibility can be identified too, and a positive one. Not only can God thwart evil but spawn good also, viz. move our will towards Him, which is incomparably more. According to Thomas, “the enemies” are to be understood as any obstacles on the way to God, those in us (in our mind) included. The physical enemies (of the beatitude) are only efficient to the extent the sensual in us cooperates with them. So, the problem is to simplify and to rectify the affectual in humans so as to be simple-hearted towards God, but acutely conscious of what is hampering the actual relation to God.
Metaphysics addresses the very presence of God in the physical world. To put it on a razor’s edge: if God had been powerless in causing all the effects (and abolishing definitely all consequences of sins in us), then, in the sense accepted here, the prayer would have fallen on the deaf ears. It would be addressed to the “idea” of “god”, to the “weak” deity of Transcendentalism. To be precise: the idea of the weak God may happen to be cherished recklessly without considering all its destructive power. Some are not perspicacious enough to see it. Nay, they may happen to play with it, taking it superficially, whereas the practice of their life does not follow this idea. The idea might have been devised by transcendentalists as a seasoning of some hackneyed and rigid considerations. However, as the old adage says: “one man’s food another man’s poison”. The idea of the weak God can be safely “consumed” by those not keen enough on ascertaining the precise purport of the words. Still, the same idea may be poisonous to those more prone to theoretical thinking. People are considerably different in this respect, which is to say: the fact deserves to be considered accordingly. The very fact of some being prone to philosophizing is not a sufficient cause to condemn such a tendency, as it cannot (and should not for that matter too) be eradicated. The intellect of some happens to be really vulnerable (because of its being inquisitive), and a victim is not to be blamed for crossing the path of a criminal. It is inhuman to assume that some are predestined to be victims just because they are not callous enough.
People happen to be somehow indirectly aware of the existence of God; of His being both present in the world and hidden beyond it; they happen to be dimly aware of them not-being-at-the-end of their life when living down all its imperfections.
The nominal definition of God, mentioned above (“and this everyone understands to be God”) is de facto a definition of Providence. In the physical world, the causes are envisaged that spawn the physical effects. Now,
On the other hand, the philosophical ideas of God differ significantly, and it is just because of the philosophies being, in fact, different. Nevertheless, due to its being analogical the notion in question could be extricated from any system of thought, no matter how perplexed. In other words: the same object of notion is meant notwithstanding how precisely and how accurately it happens to be seized. True, some ideas may, at least for a layman, be bereft of practical value right enough. Their falsity is not proved; it is nonetheless, perceived as a dissonance. Such like ideas when engrafted in one’s mind make him/her simply feel uncomfortable. Are, consequently, laymen entitled to reject these ideas just because them being perceived as irksome? Are they free to reject them, or, to the contrary, are philosophers entitled to disseminate any thoughts just because of their variety and the ideas should be tamely accepted by nonprofessionals? Is a philosopher’s activity freer than that of e.g. a shoemaker? It can be doubted, because it is possible to live with a sore foot, whereas miscarried ideas of God might result in the complete ruin of life.
There is, moreover, another feature of the rationalistic idea in question yet. The ideas are exclusive. They are those of specialists. If so, the question arises whether they deserve being treated as seriously as the ideas of other sciences are. The negative answer is given only too often, and it was hardly anything else to be expected. The idea in question results in compromising philosophy in the eyes of non-philosophers. The latter are not to be blamed as the very fact of the name of God being analogical makes it that everybody, to some extent, is a right judge in the matter at hand. Nay, the name in question seems to be most inclusive of all human words.
God is – according to the aforementioned definition – someone responsible for the existence of all things, people being “things” in philosophical sense of the word. Had it been otherwise, it would have been a “god” (a “tribal god”, or the “idea of god”).
The proper name of God (revealed in Tetragrammaton; Ex. 6. 2) means at the same time “our God” (Deut. 6. 4) and Pure Being (Ex. 4. 14). In Tetragrammaton, a unique transformation of the verb TO BE (hājâ(h)) occurred. All things but God are something apart from just being (existing). That is why they can possibly sever us from God, WHO IS absolutely speaking. Their “something” must be reflected upon, so that the Pure Being might be known. Classical philosophy opens this possibility. The revealed truth that God is Pure Being was called by Thomas haec sublimis veritas.
People are not likely to doubt the existence of particular objects. It is not the case with the relations of things. They might be either disregarded or overlooked on purpose, because a kind of responsibility is required – difficult and demanding. Now, the philosophy in the sense accepted here demonstrates the relation of both things to each other and the relation of them all (each and every) to their transcendent Cause. The dependence is not the same as being subordinate to the whim of an autocrat or despot of the Arabic Ash’arites and Ockham.
and possibly to be elucidated. If God’s “omnipotence” had been as absolute as annihilating the efficacy of nature, all sciences would be either superfluous or uncertain, for they regard nature indeed. The inference is clear if the problem is posed in the metaphysical, uncompromising terms.
Paradoxically, the dependence on the Ultimate is tantamount to being ultimately independent of anything else, the human (“human bondage” as Maugham puts it) included. The independence is another name of freedom, and it is because of it that metaphysics happens to be begrudged. The freedom of word (freedom of speech) is meant, first of all; the freedom to express every word, and the word of faith, possibly, too.
When speaking of the fact of God’s existence, it can be falsely assumed (as in Wittgenstein) that “facts” are equal, just because possible to be expressed by the same “is”. For, according to Brentano, every statement including a verb (the statement de secundo adiacente) could be transformed into a statement including the complement (predicate) “is” (the statement de tertio adiacente). Had it been the case, the statement: “it rains” could have been replaced by the statement: “it is raining”, which, however, is apparently at odds with the English grammar. These statements are not equivalent, because the former is more general, whereas the latter is but temporary. To put it in other words: were we about to use “is” after all, it would be necessary to determine to which extent a given statement is general. The validity of statements is meant. Now, the statement “God exists” is most pregnant with meaning (and most general, in a sense), just because the Ultimate Cause acts more dynamically and spawns more, nay, all the possible, effects in the world.
Human natural desire to know God
The first words of “Metaphysics” by Aristotle (the book regarded as the main branch of philosophy) speak of man’s natural desire to know causes. Consequently, it is to be expected just of metaphysics that this desire finds fulfillment and human rational nature – its perfection.
However, a paradox is being faced here, which is addressed on the following pages of the book. For the cognizance of causes, and that of the First Cause especially, seems to surpass the natural intellectual capacities of man. Human mind seems to cope better with what is evidently proportionate to it. Positivists radicalized this stance, claiming that the cognizance of causes is altogether impossible to man, and the objective not that of science. Instead, we should put up with the cognizance of a sheer sequence of events, the sequence in question not being a law properly speaking.
Cognitive minimalism had already been ascribed by Aristotle to Simonides of Keos. Simonides was not a philosopher. To the contrary, the whole tradition of the Greek philosophy before Aristotle had been oriented towards the cognizance of causes, called first archai, and later on aitia. “Metaphysics” by Aristotle is but a crowning of this tradition.
Simonides was a poet, and many deemed philosophy to be a kind of poetry afterwards, as poets competed in uttering general truths with philosophers. Thus, philosophy happened to be regarded with condescension; especially, the maximalist one. Moreover, the program of (Neo-) positivism was stamped with the mark of downright hostility towards metaphysics. The program proved to be, albeit defined in this respect not clearly enough, anti-philosophical. At the same time, the program was proclaimed to be that of science and its rights to be vindicated. Thus, the problem of science happened to be connected, at least indirectly, with the problem of man’s natural desire for intellectual fulfillment and with his rational nature, too. Are we entitled to claim, if so many objections have been raised, that man is a rational being to the effect of the cognizance of causes, and the First Cause especially, being natural to him and about to be objectively (as in any other science) founded?
Not only positivists did attack metaphysics. Martin Heidegger assaulted the traditional definition of man: animal rationale (zîon lÒgon œcon; zôon lógon échōn) from the point of view of the so-called fundamental ontology devised to replace (as the highest science) metaphysics. The cognizance of the objective truth was targeted.
It seems to be rather obvious that the cognizance of material objects is easier to man than that of e.g. mathematical ones. However, to be precise, it should be noticed that, according to Thomas, the cognizance of no matter what objects is that of universals that happen to exist in particulars (Super De Trinitate, Pars 3 q. 5 a. 3 co. 1), whereas the particulars themselves are rather sensed than known, properly speaking. That is because the formal in them is only cognoscible, and the formal is shared in (or participated by) particulars. The letter might be grasped literally speaking, albeit not grasped intellectually.
However, due to the weakness of the human mind, metaphysics was, according to Kant, not that much difficult but rather completely inaccessible to man and proper to spirits instead (devoid of matter and having the intellect possibly not connected with body). Consequently, Kant described ironically the metaphysician as a spirit-seer (Geisterseher).
Aristotle, as has been said, was not unaware of the problem. He did not put up with quoting Simonides, but addressed the difficulty methodically, perhaps just because the minimalism was likely to appear “sober”. Moreover, his remarks have the universal value and not restricted to Antiquity. The same line of reasoning may be adopted when discussing any criticism of metaphysics at all, including those that were about to issue after his death, e.g. that of Francis Bacon.
The problem of the weakness of human intellect was metaphorically presented in the 2nd (not authentic) book of “Metaphysics”. Still, the very problem to which extent the cognizance of causes is accessible to man is being tackled throughout the whole text of “Metaphysics”. This is especially the case with the cognizance of the Ultimate Cause. This cause must be devoid of matter at all, to the effect that the weakness in question should be (if ever) especially noticeable here. In other words: the possible objections in this matter are most likely to bear a resemblance of truth when the cognizance of God is meant. The cognizance would have appeared superhuman – non humana possessio.
However, following the footsteps of Aristotle, Thomas points out that but a tiny amount of knowledge achieved in metaphysics (the most precious of sciences), and that concerning the First Cause especially, is incomparably more valuable than all the ordinary knowledge (Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 66 a. 5 ad 3).
The problem is that of whether the animal in man can possibly be subjugated to the spiritual in him (and the spiritual in humans be free), and might be formulated as follows: Utrum in divinis sit omnino imaginatio relinquenda (Super De Trinitate, pars 3 q. 6 pr. 2. Secundo). Is, indeed, the imagination to be put aside as metaphysics demands it for the sake of human dignity? For it is the imagination in man that is shared with beasts, apparently unable to get to know God at all. The problem, consequently reads: are humans any superior to beasts or rather beasts gulled by the prospect of what is inaccessible to them at all?
The imagination, as can be easily known from introspection, plays a capital role in human understanding. According to Thomas, when about to understand anything, we form an image so as to illustrate the otherwise purely spiritual, devoid of any material “clothes” (Contra Gentiles, lib. 2 cap. 73 n. 36). Now, were metaphysics to resign from using the imagination, it would have been unable (as it seems) to reason in the manner proper to man.
Moreover, the very resigning from the imagination could have impoverished the contemporary man’s mind in particular, as the visualization seems to play the pivotal role in learning. The contemporary culture seems to be that of image. Accordingly, the origins of human species on the earth have been assessed as connected with the occurrence of rock paintings. Thus, metaphysics would have been an unreal project in general, and nocuous especially for the contemporary psyche, which is that of a consumer of the image culture.
Still, the problem of human nature has not been solved by reducing it to imagination, and hardly anything else was to be expected as the problem seems to be far more intricate than possible to be pictured in such a manner. Consequently, the problem of cognizance as such remains unsolved too, as it remains unclear in which sense (and to which extent) human nature is rational and able to put up a firm edifice of science in general. In other words: the idea of the consumer of the image culture may well appear attractive, whereas not being adequate definition of man in the least. Man remains a riddle to him himself, which is to say: the mystery of man is not likely to be solved in depicting images.
Hegel provided a solution. A man is rational to the extent of him being socialized, and, consequently, the individual intellect is but an oxymoron. The statement was not original, as already formulated in the 12th century by the Arab thinker Averroes. Hegel was apparently quite unaware of this historical bequest. The idea of collective psyche may sound more sophisticated than that of one and the same intellect shared by all men, but is thus no more original.
Masters, however, must not be ignored, for Averroes and his medieval disciples were perspicacious enough to see the problem in more general terms. The problem is that of how an individual man might attain the happiness (as imagined by Averroists), because the notorious bliss of being-social (uniformed; “globalized” as dreamt of contemporarily) is a happiness. The problem was put in general (philosophical) terms as follows: How is it possible to a man to attain the super-individual intellect? (continuatio intellectus possibilis cum homine). For, albeit a man was deemed by them but a beast, a certain dynamics of his life was to be expected from attaining the “intellect” in question. But the problem of being-socialized, or (historically speaking) that of hominization, was tackled diachronically. Thus, no matter whether the ontogenesis or phylogenesis was meant, the problem happened to be imagined rather that understood, and scarcely anything was to be expected of seizing it in the terms of time (a sequence is considerably less than a cause). It was just the case with Hegel. History provided some particular circumstances that happened to contribute to the socialization in question. The “consciousness” appeared to be that of elites, and possibly of those engaged in the project to build “a better place to live in” for a society. But in fact, persons are really socialized to the extent they contribute to the common good in a unique (not uniform) manner. The contribution is a gift. Social-ism is the opposite.
Historical terms are of restricted value only. Averroes himself was an Aristotelian, and even Hegel ended up his “Encyclopedia” with the extensive quotation from the 12th book of “Metaphysics” by Aristotle. Now, according to Aristotle, history is the least philosophical of all sciences. Consequently, for the sake of accuracy we should try to embark upon the solution from the point of view of the intellect, putting aside, at least for the time being, the ontological status of the intellect.
Let us resort to a mental experiment. Let us forget for a moment that we are individuals. Nay, it seems to be only natural to man to focus on the others. The statement is advocated even by psychologists-materialists. The paradox of Neoplatonism, in turn, consists in defining the Other as that being met in the depth of our mind. Be that as it may, Aristotle in “Metaphysics” focused on the understood instead of on who understands. And, perhaps, it is just as well. Perhaps, individuals are free to define themselves in the mirror of eternity the latter being accessible (even according to Averroists) to the intellect. Is not everybody to be trusted in assessing his own identity in such a way? Are we (each of us) not rational so that we are able to define anything at all, our subjectivity included? Is man not to be trusted to pass the adequate statement as regards who, or what, he/she really is? Are we not permitted to believe that a universal statement concerning human nature is thus bound to be passed?
Anyway, Aristotle himself stated that the intellectual fulfillment of each one of us (no matter how marginalized in actual circumstances) consists in the contemplation of God. True, the contemplation is rather experienced than reflected upon, first of all. The Philosopher (Aristotle) reflected on it in the perfect manner. But on the other hand, are we not (nobody excluded) “philosophers” by nature in the sense of being able to grasp the same truth at least in our own tongue; the terms of an objective value to a degree?
However, not matter how neatly seized, the truth as regards the ultimate in our lives is the difficult one, just because the idea put forward is far from being mundane. The fact was noted by Aristotle himself. Moreover, it could have seemed that the idea is a violation of the animal in man and thus “inhuman” in a sense. On the contrary, the animal in man is easier to come to fulfillment. Similarly, the concepts when imagined seem to be plain, whereas those unimaginable – mushy. It would be the case with mathematics too, no matter how abstract the ideas proposed appeared to be. For we can always say that it is so because of them being complex, and not because of them being of another nature than the other objects imagined. Perhaps, indeed, mathematics cannot dispense of the imagined. But not metaphysics so. True, Thomas says that the intellect forms an image so as to seize the intellectual, but he nonetheless claims that metaphysics rather judges the imagined than yields to its suggestion. Moreover, being complex does not need to be understood as being manifold. The very nature of man is complex to the effect the rational in him being, as it were, hostage to the material – the fact excessively enhanced by Neo-Platonists.
Neo-positivism, in turn, intended (or least claimed to do so) to pay a tribute to mathematics, assuming tacitly, by the same token, that the only to be understood is that which could be imagined. And, as the imagination seems to be of a less stable nature than the intellect, Stanislaw Kaminski duly compared the science of Neo-Positivism to a ship never dropping an anchor and ever put adrift. To the contrary, the Aristotelian science seems to be the way to a harbor, and the harbor, in turn, may open to an interior, an (unknown) land to be explored.
The problem if envisaged from the pragmatic point of view (or from the anthropological one) is that of the human existence being hopelessly bereft of any firm foundation at all; being bereft of quietude, as the contemplation (fulfillment) is a quietude. Being uniformly socialized, in turn, is but being a hostage to the prejudices possibly fostered by many, not likely to be less superstitious just because of being espoused by many. Averroes had at least a glimpse into the problem, seeing the problem of the aforementioned “continuation” (of an individual with the common psyche) as being of objective importance. It is preposterous to assume that ideas no matter how queer could be safely produced to the market of thought and then judged according to how they may improve the welfare state in praxis. Some “values” (similar to those noted in the stock exchange) are proposed and none of them supposed to be regarded as objectively valid. The very fact of the so-called Western Values (the modern ones are in fact no more an heir to the European genuine tradition) being so similar to those material ones, and, in fact, subservient to them, decides of them being not natural but institutional instead. They are assumed to be “valid” to the extent they contribute to the “building a better world to live in”. The material prosperity is meant there. Moreover, the very idea that a state should improve moral and spiritual condition of the citizens sounds bizarre. Parliamentary rule, in turn, is about representing material interests of groups and not about bringing up citizens or instilling universal values instead of those of practical importance only.
Obvious as it may appear,
To the contrary, the idea of state as that implementing moral order was indissolubly connected with the ancient Greek poleis.
Heraclitus says: “The wise speaking must be founded on what is common good, even more than poleis are, because all laws are fed by the unique divine one, who commands abundantly, but remains inexhaustible” (frg. 114).
The first European Constitution (The Polish Constitution of 3 May), in turn, began with the invocation of the Triune God. The idea underpinning it was that of solidarity, not of competing in producing “values” of any sort whatsoever. The idea is not that of positive law at all (which will be shown in CHAPTER II. 3). To be quite precise: objective values are not to be assaulted, but, at the same time, we (as humans and deign of happiness) have unshakable right to defend their being objective, and, consequently, not to “evolve” along with everything called values in the material sense. Being objective is tantamount to being principles, and the latter term seems to be more appropriate. The Greek archai are meant, because principles are in Greek at the same time political power. Aristotle began “Nicomachean Ethics” with the statement that the rational in man is a hostage to a society in which it could possibly come to fulfillment. It seems to be rather obvious that such like “societies” as Nazi or Communist are rather herds instead, just because of them being totally ideologized and rejecting the rational in man.
Consequently, Averroism is neither unique nor perhaps the best interpretation of Aristotelianism. Perhaps, the very animal in man is to be subjugated to the rational in him and the Ultimate Cause to be sought for Her own sake by each one individual. Nay, the very fabric of values seems to be underpinned by the notion of the objective order including eventually the presence of the Ultimate Cause of the universe.
As metaphysics is the natural fulfilment, Étienne Gilson duly described man as animal metaphysicum, to the effect of the animal in man being totally subordinated to the intellectual in him. Sartre perhaps exaggerated man’s natural ability for auto-defining and claimed his essence being not that much difficult to grasp but rather unsettled or even of fleeting character. No doubt, man is a riddle not easy to be solved. Thus, it remains open to define oneself and possibly redefine when solving this riddle. Ultimately, each one of us is capable of redefining oneself if facing the Ultimate Cause. Nay, the cognizance of the Ultimate Cause is incomparably easier for a man than the cognizance of him himself. To understand himself man should first of all understand the ultimate object of his activity. Being complex man should define him/herself according to what is superior although not easily perceptible at first glance. The matter seems to be plain. It is impossible, according to Aristotle, to get to know anything at all save by its act. Now, being a riddle is being in dark as to the possible extent of one’s activities. These activities are to be accomplished first, and then, by a way of reflection, the cognizance comes of the principle of the actions, viz. the cognitive faculty of the intellect. Consequently, as no other activity is to be comparable with that of the intellect, man should be defined according to his highest power – the intellect. That is why Aristotle named the intellect the man himself.
Still, the riddle of man is far from being solved definitely yet. Even if the intellect is the highest in man, it is difficult to assess appropriately its ultimate possibilities. Let us resort to an example. Apparently, human hand is the most perfect instrument to be found in nature. Still, if without some tools, as e.g. a needle or a pen, its perfection does not seem to be salient. Consequently, we can ask what instruments of intellect make it appear to be perfect. Obviously, the intellect of a scientist is commanding because of the habit of science in him. There are different habits, according to the diversity of human competencies. However, we can ask what the most primitive instrument is, i.e. the most primitive habit of intellect. Habits happen to be disregarded according to how obvious their presence may appear. It demands a special perspicacity to unearth the most primitive habit of the intellect.
According to Thomas, it is being as seized by the intellect. Being is the natural habitual knowledge of man: natural “habit”. It is the proper or natural object of the intellect (Contra Gentiles, lib. 2 cap. 83 n. 29).
It is just metaphysics that reflects methodologically upon the primitive data of the intellect. As, however, human nature is complex (and humans are not pure intellects), the reflection implies a certain involvement of the sensual. Still, the sensual in man is rather to be judged than followed. The primitive data in question are to be clarified, i.e. clad in sings, which are to some extent connected with the sensual.
Generally speaking, any principle, no matter how particular, is likely to be overlooked and taken for granted. It is, however, especially the case with metaphysics; as the principle is out of its very nature most primitive. Still, when clarified, it becomes the proper subject matter of the highest science – ens inquantum est ens – being as such.
It is proper to principle as such to render activities that issue dynamic. It is the case e.g. with morals.
Analogically, in sciences, their scopes and objectives are formed to the extent they stem from the firm and unshakable principles. On the contrary, if the principles are unstable, the whole edifice that is supposed to be raised will be shaky. Now, were we about to grasp the most universal principles, the edifice of science about to come would be firm and the dynamics of the activity of this science as great as only possible for human nature. That is what was meant by absolute freedom. The desire for the ultimate, i.e. maximum of freedom is, however, substantiated in – so to say – a concrete subject: the Cause of the subject of metaphysics.
If cut off the Ultimate Source humans anticipate death. “God designed the human machine to run on Himself. He Himself is the fuel our spirits were designed to feed on. There is no other”. (C. S. Lewis)
The principles happen to be assaulted, taunted, and begrudged, just because the activities that issue therefrom – so to say – “accuse” the mediocrity and inertia of ordinary consumers (consumption being the opposite to activity). One cannot remain totally indifferent towards the ultimate. Even if attacking the very possibility of attaining it, one unwillingly testifies to the special attitude towards is. Thus, it is – so to say – “desired” indirectly at least. The nature cannot be deceived; the rational in man cannot be regarded indifferently. One seeks for the cognizance of the whole (the totality of being) even when assaulting every attempt to achieve it.
People are fulfilled if following the very natural in them; the right and duty are perfectly harmonized therein. “… all men are bound to seek the truth, especially in what concerns God … , and to embrace the truth they come to know, and to hold fast to it.” Dignitatis humanae, 1. So, the unshakable truth gained in the past, called tradition is to be observed also.
The problem is that of the natural reason. The supernatural is (if ever) about to come subsequently and first of all met personally. Thomas’s stance in this respect is that of natural reason. The Aristotelian stance – which is rather obvious – could not have been other than just natural. So, why a theologian (the Christian theologian) addresses the views of a pagan? A Christian has the Writ at his disposal. Why to put aside the word of God and focus on the words of a man instead?
Apparently, it was not because of the word of God being – under Thomas’s eyes – of problematic value. Still, a problem exists. There is a problem, nay; there are problems and as many as many may be obstacles severing us from the ultimate goal of our life. The problem was pointed out distinctly by Dionysius Areopagite. Things overshadow (problematize; proballontai) the transcendent. Material things happen to obtrude themselves upon the spiritual desire. Similarly, material signs are likely to distract our concentrating on the ultimate. And there is but one remedy: the material and the sings must be neutralized, i.e. seized in a special manner, not just as materials but as beings properly speaking (ens inquantum est ens). Thus, the proper place of metaphysics in human life becomes visible. Its objective is to annihilate the blight of verbiage and phenomena. To annihilate, i.e. to show theoretically the way to the ultimate. For objects can not only overshadow It; they can foreshadow It also. The ambiguity was noted by Dionysius.
Thus, it is less the problem of the word (or words) than the problem how we grasp them. The word of God is understandable as such. The problem is with us who might be unable to hear it distinctly enough. Not, however, human nature is to be blamed as rather its disorder, and, consequently, a natural remedy is to be sought therein. This remedy is provided by metaphysics – the ultimate natural wisdom of man.
Still, the task of the highest science is far from being easy. Plato testified to this in the 7th Epistle. Our words happen to be defenseless and destitute in the very moment they get clad with the material signs. Aristotle was not only a sage; he was a prudent man, too. The way he composed his “Metaphysics” bears a testimony to it. The style is terse and lapidary. The possible assaults are prudently anticipated. Aristotle was a strict judge. A sober knower of human nature was far from being condescending to its weakness. Metaphysics must be so, too. It must be strict, unsympathetic and exacting. It must be so for the sake of the purity of human nature and life. Thomas followed suit. The strict judgment as to the real historical condition of man is indispensable. Metaphysics must pass this judgment.
The attitude was unique. Thomas’s metaphysics was not – properly speaking – Christian. Expected to be a fulcrum of Christianity
John Duns Scotus took up another way of philosophizing. His metaphysics was meant to be Christian. Instead of assuming a neutral foundation for the word of God, Scotus thought it advisable to guarantee the correctness of its conclusions in advance. The attempt, as the history testifies, prover to be a failure. Originally, metaphysics was meant to be Christian, but – paradoxically – Christianity became (as in Kant) “rationalized” instead. The paroxysm of this tendency came in the 20th century (Bultmann, Heidegger). Scotus mingled de facto theology and philosophy to the detriment of them both. Thomas separated them, and both theology and philosophy profited. Historically speaking, rationalism originated just after Thomas’s philosophy had been condemned – three years after his death. A special kind of “piety” inspired the bishops that regarded Thomas’s philosophy as pagan. And – paradoxically – rationalism is a special kind of piety, too, nay a religion of its own. The title of one of the most important works by Kant testifies it: “Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason”. The boundaries proved to be a bondage and the advocates of rationalism the proponents of the modern slavery. Nothing else was to be expected:
Scotus was a theologian, nay, he willed to be a theologian only. Unfortunately, his bequest had been accepted in its least valuable aspect. Scotus stipulated that being should be the adequate object of the intellect. The stance was understandable as that of a theologian. God is the plenitude of being, and a trace of being as such must be found in any act of cognizance. Being adequate is tantamount to bearing upon something. According to Aristotle, judgments are adequate just because of their bearing upon naked facts and the natural classes of beings. Thus, the problem of natural things appears (as mentioned above). According to Aristotle, science is a relative. The relation is asymmetrical: the science bears upon the natural, but not conversely. Similarly as Plato, Scotus regarded this relation with suspicion. Once turned away from what seemed to be most precious (the being as such) a man was not likely to return from the wrong pathway. So, the correctness must have been guaranteed in advance. Being adequate in Scotus’s sense means being inadequate to all the natural, i.e. being severed from the natural as such. Consequently, a kind of dualism appears. There are “reality” and “consciousness” and opposed to each other. “Realists” may fight the “idealists” and conversely, and no prospect of victory is to be expected on both sides, just because they had been separated and no real relation between them believed to be possible. The belief is true enough as there is no relation whatsoever between “reality” and “consciousness” if each one taken in bulk; nay, none of them is capable of existing all by itself. Both are in fact complex (the world is such, as things are simply different, and ideas in our mind manifold, too). The problem is that of analogy. There is a real relation between a science and the subject thereof. We are able to grasp categories, albeit not things taken indiscriminately. Science consists just in taking them discriminately. We can define man or witness, but the definition of white man is – properly speaking – nonsensical. Presently if attempted, it falls prey to an equivocation. The whiteness if connected with manhood produces the idea of the “white race”, whereas witness as such is neutral. The more complex and unsettled the ideas happen to be the more unexpected and bizarre the meaning connected with them. Idealists relish in producing such like ideas calling them profound. And they are profound at least in the sense of muddy water being unfathomable. Profound as the desire for the ultimate may be, the direction towards it must be proposed as distinctly as only possible. Otherwise the danger of this desire being instrumentalized appears.
Consequently, we must accept – for the sake of possibly of human existence – a kind of relation between the ideas and the natural things. The relation, however, is only of restricted validity. The necessary restrictions are provided either by science or by the habitual practical knowledge, the prudence. Once the boundaries amongst ideas are blurred, their relation to the natural becomes problematic. This is the problem that Dionysius had in mind.
It is impossible to live in a world deprived of order and there is no other way of setting it up than by means of its particular constituents, i.e. relations. A Christian accepts an order of its own. That was the case with John Duns Scotus, too. The rhythm of a Christian’s life is measured by the stability of its order. Especially, the order of Divine Relations i.e. Divine Persons is meant (2 P 1. 4). The bulk of Scotus’s main work (“Ordinatio”) is dedicated to the problem of the Divine Relations. Scotus focused directly upon the most precious. Perhaps, it was just because he believed to have found a direct way to the plenitude of Christian life. Perhaps, he was right in a sense. However, it proved to be detrimental for the natural reason and natural bearing of human life. Or, possibly, human nature in Scotus came to light in quite different guise. Scotus’s way was natural in the sense quite unexpected, and totally non-philosophical.
Thus, he contradicted all theologians of this time. Unfortunately, the most precious feature of his thought had been disregarded and replaced by the philosophy that was in fact nothing save a theologism. Philosophy had been credited with too much. One can live in the world of ordered ideas but ideas cannot live on its own. But they were expected to do so by those who followed suit.
It is but judgment that can be – properly speaking – adequate. No ideas can be “virtual” in the sense imagined by Scotus, viz. containing in themselves a kind of dynamics or “life”. The subject matter of metaphysics is not an exception. “Adequate” is tantamount to “aright”. Now, no fundamental option whatsoever can guarantee in advance the correctness of the conclusions of the highest science. One cannot “decree” their validity. The conclusions of the (supreme) science are valid to the extent they are properly extricated from principles, the latter being accessible to all, the “pagans” included. This term is not meant to be offensive. Moreover, being an atheist need not be tantamount to being dense or stupid. The ways of human life happen to be intricate and the proof in question is meant to extricate them. Metaphysics is a challenge. It is the challenge for putting up with an Ersatz of life instead of searching for its plenitude.
Human activity unfolds, in general, between principles and ends (which are conclusions of science or imperatives of prudence in morals). As was said above, the very name of principles (archai) was elaborated by Greeks. The concrete came first, and principle was, originally, understood literally as beginning. If taken literally, a human pathway begins from a certain point (the beginning) and leads to a certain end. The latter term is affected in Latin and Greek by the same (meaningful) equivocation as in English. Apparently, the end, when viewed in more general terms, is an objective. The problem of metaphysics and its ultimate end (the cognizance of God) consists in the principles being less perceptible than those practically connected with some material circumstances. Consequently, the objective of the highest science appears to some as problematic. Human nature itself can be a problem, but it is not because of its highest power – the intellect. The difficulty consists in transcending the material circumstances connected in praxis with every human activity. Transcending does not mean abandoning. To the contrary, human activity as such; its dynamics; is measured according to the stability of its natural principles.
The weakness of human life is a deplorable fact. Facts are not to be disregarded, which, however, does not add up to condescension. A degraded existence is to be pitied. The degradation, however, is to be challenged, and that because of humanity. Words happen to change their meaning. To be casual sounds rather innocuous. But being casual is in fact the most nocuous imaginable. A murderer kills for the sake of money. The reason is, possibly, to be understood and the man to be convinced than human life is more valuable than money. It is not the case with being casual. If acting at random, a man turns a deaf ear to all possible persuasion. If bereft of the most precious objective of his life, he/she acts without discretion, without objectives to be possibly corrected. There is a great difference between losing the sight of the Ultimate because of the weakness and turning away from it out of ideological motives. Ideology is in fact nothing else that idolatry, and the effects of idolatry were (according to Thomas; Comm. Ad Rom. C. 1, Lect. 8) distinctly presented in Rom 1. 26, 27. Idols can be manifold, just as many as many are ideas bereft on purpose of the principle and end. They are demanded not to be judged, and to be “free” in harming people. The idols are, first of all the images. The first commandment forbade having similitude of God (Book of Exodus, Chapter 20; Douay-Rheims Bible; S. Thomae, Contra Gentiles, lib. 3, cap. 120 n. 24). Not however, an icon directing always beyond. The Person Scotus genially pointed out.
The image culture coaxes the meanest in man, taunting, at the same time, the most precious in him. Activity that issues is restless, as the image culture can spawn nothing save uneasiness.
The TRUE Icon, (imago et initium … Ecclesiae in futuro saeculo consummandae, Lumen gentium. 68), “Her-being-toward”, is a way “beyond” (Cf Denzinger, 3274).
The human intellect cannot be deceived in its operation save by the presence of the sensual; by the disorder of motion.
Movement is free to the extent it approaches the First Principle. The peace wrought by it is firm and everlasting. It is “eternal” by the participation of the Life of Who is solely eternal of WHO-IS, and has opened possibility “that God may be all in all” (Cor 15. 28), for He operates thus (Cor 12. 6).
S. Thomas comments In 1 Cor 12:1-6 (12-1) upon v.6: “and there are varieties of working, but it is the same God who inspires them all in every one”:
And In 1 Cor 15:20-28 (15-3) upon v. 28: “When all things are subjected to him, then the Son himself will also be subjected to him who put all things under him, that God may be everything to every one”:
It was observed, some time ago, that the Pauline “omnia in omnibus” (everything to everyone) is a summary of the history of philosophy. Not only does metaphysics consider the relation of all things to their Transcendental Cause, but the bearing of the whole human gender on its Ultimate End too; nay, the relation of the totality of human existence to God.
The Apostle’s words: “omnibus omnia factus sum” (I became all things to all men; Douay-Rheims Bible) (1 Cor 9, 22) apply primarily to the aforementioned Icon of the Church. Otherwise, the subsequent „ut omnes salvum facerem” (Vulgata Clementina) (that I might save all; Douay-Rheims Bible) would be hardly understandable: no one is able to procure the salvation of the whole human gender except One Who adheres to God totally and unreservedly. The salvation is “universal” as far as the Greek pantëj (pántōs) (the adverb means: “at all”) is considered equivalent to the Latin “omnes” (the adjective means: “all”). The mode of salvation is incomparably more important that sheer statistics. (The latter can be but imagined; the integrity can be experienced.) The mode is both unique and universal. The one and only possible pathway (the Intermediary) to God the Savior has been shown (Cf S. Tromp, Corpus Christi quod est Ecclesia, pp. 382, 383.)
Averroes was honest enough to stipulate that the accumulation of the so-called material values should be that of ideas apt to connect us with the object of happiness. The total “aggregate” of “ideas” is, however, practically unachievable, which was, in fact, admitted by Latin Averroists, subsequently. It is not because of ideas, but because of their supposed accumulation (disorder). Ideas (or rather words) cannot be accumulated, properly speaking. They can be ordered so that they demonstrate the pathway toward the Ultimate. To the contrary, if viewed as a possible “aggregate” (or “accumulation”) they are bound to be reduced to the status of the so-called material values.
Deprived of the Ultimate outlook of his existence, man is bound to degrade himself. According to Averroists, man is but a beast. Perhaps for some, beasts of burden are desirable for achieving “practical” objectives. The problem is, however, that for a long run no man is capable of bearing a yoke; of being enslaved and degraded. If treated instrumentally, man is not likely to work effectively. The very dynamics of human existence depends on how deep its principles are and how great its outlooks are.
Stating this we do not advocate rights of religion whatsoever. To the contrary, the right of man’s self-defining is advocated here. Religion is a possibility open to anyone. But everybody is free to discover this possibility on his/her own. The religion of Enlightenment does not grant such a possibility. The modern theologism demands importunately unrestricted obedience. The rationalized religion was devised by Kant, Hegel, Bultmann and Heidegger. The worship of humanity had been introduced by Comte (Le Grand Être - the “great being” is an idol to be worshiped). In a grotesque guise the idea of “human” eschatology appears in Marx.
Severing theology and philosophy is indispensable for human freedom. Act of faith is individual and no one can be replaced by anyone in passing it.
It has been asked how far one’s freedom extends. The answer: “to the extent it does not breach the rights of the others” is silly. For society is not a herd of beasts competing in the accumulation of the so-called values. Freedom if achieved by one individual boosts the freedom of all the others. The first European constitution proclaimed the idea of solidarity, not of competition. The same word “Solidarity” was spoken out some 200 years later in the same country, in Poland. Moreover, “This solidarity must be constantly increased until that day on which it will be brought to perfection (consummabitur)”. (Gaudium et spes, 32: Verbum Incarnatum et solidarietas humana).
Freedom does not consist in creating a private or a tribal Lebensraum. Freedom does not consist in silencing or shouting down the others. It does not consist in importunate images being forced upon the most susceptible and vulnerable. The so-called “films”, advertisement and “music” are meant. Freedom is not about shouting at all. It is about listening instead. And the most vulnerable and susceptible are to be heard of, first of all. Neither does science consist in accumulating ideas; it is rather about rendering them as plain as only possible, which is – parenthetically speaking – contrary to treating its conclusions as a market value. Freedom is not about ideas being boisterous, but about them being ordered. The solidarity demands listening to those possibly deprived of mental agility, e.g. those mentally handicapped, who are no less humans that all the others. Consequently, they are not to be deprived of the Ultimate outlooks of human existence. When listening to some idiotic chattering, one can always ask in what the cognizance of God consists in minds of those unable to chatter at all. Apparently, the God of silence is met in their hearts. The solidarity demands that we learn from those disabled how to meet God in silence.
We all are to be taught in this way. Nature abhors the void. If bereft of the traditional science of God, a European turns to some kind of “meditation” or “contemplation” stemming mostly from the East. Nay, even Islam is a better receipt for happiness that the religion of Enlightenment. The Greek foundations of our civilization have been almost totally destroyed by the fundamentalism of Enlightenment. A rationalistic religion has been introduced, intolerant and harnessing the most precious in man to the preposterous chariot of progress.
It is not the problem of material progress though. The matter is far from being possibly grasped in economic terms. Let us consider the problem of advertisement. The advertisements put next to roads pose a considerable danger to human life as they deconcentrate drivers. But, are advertisements necessary for capitalism at all? Leseferism thrived in the second part of the 19th century. Advertisements practically did not exist then. Capitalism, as seems to be obvious, can easily dispense with advertisements at all. One can, consequently, ask to what purpose they exist. Apparently not economic reasons are taken into account. The reasons are ideological, and the ideology in question claims to have invented the best way to boost economy. It has not. It has invented the way to render human activity hackneyed. Those “brought up” in such a way may be versatile to a restricted extent but not efficient by the same token. The casual and unpredictable cannot replace freedom.
If deprived of the Ultimate perspective of his existence humans get uneasy, restless and despaired.
The Word of God and human words
The subject matter of the present book is not “The kinetic proof of the existence of God in the works of Thomas Aquinas”. We aim at demonstrating the absolute validity of the statement in question; its universal value we owe to Thomas and the efficacy of his reasoning seven centuries after his death. However, we are indebted to the historians of philosophy too. Fernand van Steenberghen tackled the problem of the source experience addressed in the first premise of the proof in question: “Motion is the most apparent phenomenon to be perceived in the world” (Cf FORM OF THE PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD). Now, the problem arises as to the precise meaning of the “most apparent”.
The Aristotelian statement “whoever does not understand something definite, does not understand anything at all” is, historically speaking, as stringent as often quoted. Still, the problem is whence this perfect understanding stems. It requires some studiousness not to overlook possible solutions of universal and modern problems in the texts studied. For the “the source experience” sounds modern enough to say the least of it.
Fernand van Steenberghen (Le problème de l’existence de Dieu dans les écrits de S. Thomas d’Aquin) states that the causality principle was used in the proof by Thomas de facto, albeit not de iure and the possible objections raised against it had been definitively refuted by Garrigou-Lagrange, (Dieu: Son existence et sa nature, pp. 248-260). The only problem, according to Steenberghen, might have been posed by the term “moveri” (being moved), viz. the alleged petitio principii included therein. Still, the problem had been addressed by Steenberghen himself (p. 114-115). It was Verbeke who saw in the principle “omne quod movetur ab alio movetur” a tautology. Steenberghen’s counterargument adds up to pointing out that an object is meant distinct from the motion as such to the effect that no verbal reiteration is made. True, the remark made by Thomas about the motion of the sun was (according to Steenberghen) awkward, but nothing more. Still, it seems that Steenberghen assumes a priori too much. The remark about the sun is not so much awkward but rather typical of what is primitive in our cognizance of facts. For we do not originally know what the subject of motion in question is. We do not know what the motion is to be attributed to, and that is as it must be. Aristotle’s notorious views concerning the alleged fact of the motion of the sun are not so much “unscientific” (as Steenberghen claims) but rather, so to say, pre-scientific, because they are meant to present naked facts. The fact is that something moves and this was indeed stated by Thomas and Aristotle. The use of English testifies the same. The statement “it is moving” is equivocal as the verb used may be either transitive (and thus denotes the moving; e.g.: “it is a moving sight”) or intransitive (and thus denotes the moved; e.g.: “this thing is not at rest”). The situation is only typical of any common day tongue, and the language of science is meant to remove the equivocation and to clarify the previously indistinct. The problem was addressed by Aristotle in the first chapter of “Physics”. The objective of science consists in distinguishing the moving and the moved; a fact if grasped distinctly is really identical with that grasped indistinctly, and the statement is by no means a simple reiteration of what was previously seized vaguely only.
There is no tautology, nay, there is an opposition between what is seized indistinctly first and what is grasped by the intellect in science subsequently. According to Steenberghen, “moveri” does not imply the notion of the cause of motion, because, in his opinion, the formula “omne quod movetur” is tantamount to the “omne quod mutatur” (p. 177). Thus, Steenberghen wrongly identifies motion and mutation. His reasoning follows, as it seems, this way: there is something and its motion is distinct therefrom, so that the reason of motion is to be accounted for as not included in the notion of “something” moved. The reasoning (if it should be interpreted so) is wrong. Tacitly, the direct cognizance of a subject is assumed, and the motion was but an accident thereof. There is too much assumed a priori. There is no evidence that the primarily perceived is something, a subject. (In fact, a subject is cognoscible to the extent it is actualized by an accident at least). We attribute the sensed to a subject, to be sure, but not something already known, which is de facto assumed by Steenberghen. The problem of how correctly we attribute the sensed to a subject is by no means trivial. In fact, it is the proper task of science to attribute it in the right way, i.e. to clarify the previously indistinct. The moving and the moved are originally intertwined. Should there be a tautology, a reasoning must have been adopted first. And it was, according to Thomas, Averroes who saw a reasoning in the process described in the first chapter of “Physics”. The reasoning must accept distinctly something about to be defined, which, however, is not the case with what is really originally perceived (according to Aristotle). Should it be otherwise, “something” in question would have been at the same time a thing and a sign – which is apparently absurd. The so-call hermeneutic circle issues, which might have been a curiosity but is really destructive for science, because it leaves no other way of cognizance than that of a verbal interpretation personal and quite masterful.
The problem seems to be plain as to the natural order of things and signs, but it is by no means obvious that the natural could satisfy each intellect. Perhaps, Averroists were “dissatisfied” in a special manner. Perhaps, the “source experience” we are speaking of need not be the experience of natural objects we hope to clarify in philosophy. The current of events analyzed in it leads to a Source, but the nature of the Source cannot be elucidated in philosophy. That is why some might have been dissatisfied with (classical) philosophy. Natural wisdom might have seemed insufficient.
In Summa Theologica (I, 19, 5, c) Thomas addresses a theological problem of the divine will and cognition, and something similar to the parts and the whole present in the human language appears there (The parts of a sentence are indented to form a whole). Actually, neither whole nor parts can possibly exist in God and the terms are inadequate if taken literally. There are no parts in God, because He is absolutely simple. However, we can distinguish the end of His will (which is identical with Him) and the means leading to It (creatures). The latter are manifold and that accounts for them being somehow similar to “parts”. Generally speaking, it is the problem of the relation between the creatures and the Creator. Both are understood and willed by God, but not in the same way. Similarly in us, the end of actions is to be distinguished from what leads to it (means) and the premises from conclusions. Otherwise, there would be a vicious circle in human actions. Analogically, as it seems, the same would apply to God. However, being aware of the infinite distance between the human understanding (and will), and the divine one and avoiding any guise of anthropomorphism, one might underscore the simplicity of the divine actions so much that deny their rationality. This, however, is deadly to science, for the means mentioned above are just the subject matter of sciences. If God’s will had been as “absolutely” simple as the end willed undistinguishable (by reason) from what leads to the end, all knowledge would have vanished. If God had been as “omnipotent” (unpredictable) as Ockham imagined, all that happens in the world would have had no other reason and cause than the “will” of God. If God had acted without reason and consequence, all sciences would be superfluous, and the knowledge of God – impossible.
Now, if they are not so, this is because there is a consequence in God’s actions and the consequence is the subject matter of sciences. The secondary causes remain in a define proportion (as means to the end do) to the First Cause and that accounts for the rational structure of the universe. God wills unconditionally the end (identical with Him) only, but the means conditionally (i.e. with respect to It) (universa propter Seipsum operatus est Dominus). (S. Thomas, Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 8 q. 5 a. 3 expos.).
But a purely theological difficulty, and thus a very serious one appears as to what Revelation says. The Revealed is God, the Second Divine Person. Is then, a reason in God’s action here too, and the Word a part similar to any human word describable in relation to a totality (as it should be in science)? Is the revealed the language (the logos but not the Logos) as Islam and Gadamer have it? Thus, two approaches appeared. Some (Saint Anselm) posed the question: Cur Deus Homo, so as to “be always ready to convince any one who demands of them a reason of that hope which is in us”. The others (Cassirer) yielded to mythical thinking and the philosophy of symbolic forms appeared. Now, albeit the reason of the existence of the Word in the world cannot be explored in the human manner (and the Word cannot be reduced to a “mythical form”), the very fact that it exists must be knowable after all. This accounts for the autonomy and authenticity of both science and religion. Otherwise, an awkward hybrid of them both would issue, and neither of them would be what it ought to.
Historically speaking, the problem is that of Islam and its influence broadly speaking. The beginnings of the Arab philosophy are marked by the fundamental question raised by the Muʼtazilites: is Quran a real physical being or something uncreated instead? If the former is the case, some signs exist in nature, and conversely: nature itself might be considered as consisting of signs. The problem does not exist in Christianity. Bible is the word of God as far as it speaks of the Word of God, i.e. the Divine Person (J 5. 39; Luc 24. 27), which is treated in the first chapter of The Gospel According to John and the first chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews. It is, according to Thomas, not possible save for God alone to make a thing a sign, which is, naturally, not tantamount to creating things out of the spoken words. Normally, signs and things are but relatively loosely connected. Prophet Ahias divided his garment into twelve parts, which was prefiguration of the division of the Kingdom of Israel (1 Kings, 11. 30), and the garment was made a real sign as tending towards The Word of God. The Word of God is real, but no ideas can produce real effects on their own. No sign can become a thing.
The reasoning proposed by Averroes was tacitly assumed in modern philosophy influenced by Islam. But in fact, neither objects nor ideas are endowed with the power to make themselves visible. The first visible is but dimly perceived and not clad in words.
Let us resort to an example. I see some waves when standing on the sea-shore. Apparently, I perceive something, because the cognizance cannot be objectless. Still, it is preposterous to believe that I tell one wave from the other. A sailor must distinguish objects to the extent it is possible and needed. A scientist does so, too. Some ideas prove to be convenient for describing effectively the motion of water. But it is not the case with a casual passer-by. The first perceived is undistinguished and it is perhaps just what attracts our attention. Another example: for an object to be real it must correspond to the characteristics of its species. A dead animal is not an animal properly speaking, because to be an animal is tantamount to being able to act as a living thing. Now, suppose I see a leafless tree in the winter. Am I right in assuming that I see a definite object? The tree might be dead, and there is no possibility to ascertain as to the fact before the spring comes and normal natural actions appear (unless perchance the branches are completely dry, which, however, is not seen at first glance). The tree moves its braches when stirred by the wind, and perhaps being moved in such a way boosts the vegetation of the tree if alive (animated). But it demands a special effort to get to know the principle of motion, because I am not able to tell the living tree from a withered one at first glance. If withered, a tree is not real and no real object consequently. Thus, only biotic matter and decaying one is seen, properly speaking. The first seen has but a tiny amount of entity.
A kind of transformation of comic energy occurs at the border of reality and the words. The “is” of a statement might (and should) correspond to the “is” of the facts, but no word can correspond to things, i.e. denote them. The problem of the Arab mediaeval philosophy consisted in trying to settle the relation of the two realms. In fact, this philosophy originated from therefrom. But as it had failed to, and the problem remained unsolved, it bequeathed the incertitude to the modernity. In Ockham, who rejected the Greek naturalism and espoused the idea of the Orient Despot governing the universe, the theory of supposition (designation) appeared. No absolute Despot attaches importance to what he has promised; to the words. The God of the Arab and modern philosophy would be either unpredictable or so weak that able to assist only the cosmic processes without imposing them laws (and judgments), i.e. without providing them with a definite order. The world would have been deprived of the real perfection of being.
Aristotle accepts a relative validity of the views of the ancient Eleatians. Motion is a nonbeing. But Parmenides advanced too far. Motion is a non being relatively only, i.e. with respect to the end of motion which terminates it as its act. The assumption that motion did not exist is unjustified, but Parmenides noticed something really important. The fundamental opposition of being and nonbeing is made visible as soon as we analyze the fact of motion. So, the principle of non-contradiction is, as it were, substantiated in the physical world. The principle of non-contradiction is absolutely first. We can imagine a world with no motion, but cannot conceive a world without it being opposed to what it is not – non-being. The phenomenon of motion is primarily sensed, but, subsequently, analyzed by the intellect. Had we been deprived of senses, the world would remain non-cognoscible for us, unless some other source of intellectual cognizance were accessible. Our words are, first of all, the words describing motion.
Albeit metaphysics considers being as such and uses the language being (and happens to be accused of the vagueness of statements), no special metaphysical experience exists. Not that much being is intuited first, but rather being-in-motion perceived naturally. Motion aims at perfection in general. Now since being perfect is tantamount to being in the full sense of the word, metaphysics proves to be a natural complement of the consideration of motion.
Humans are unable to get to know this sense of being by natural means. They can desire this fullness of being and that is why intentionality applies to the acts of the will, but cannot apply to cognitive acts.
The relation of metaphysics and theology becomes visible. Some claimed that metaphysics is more general than theology because it considers being as such whereas God (the subject of theology) is a being. So, is theology more general, anyway? It is, because there is a notion more general than motion and applicable to God first of all. It is the word of procession. Divine Persons proceed; the Second one says: “Ego ex Deo processi et veni”; (™xÁlqon kaˆ ¼kw; exêlthon kai hékō). (Thomas, De potentia, q. 10 a. 1 s.c. 1. Sed contra. Est quod dicit filius Ioan. cap. VIII, 42). Motion, however, is ascribable to God metaphorically only (e.g. in the Book of Wisdom). The Word of God proceeds from eternity (Ps. 2. 7) and is what creation was mirrored in (things “processerunt a Deo”; Summa I, q. 44). To be precise: things are defective similitudes of the Supreme Reality.
The names we use can never mirror any reality.
It is impossible to correlate signs or ideas with (concrete) things. But it is desirable to try and correlate real definitions with the classes of things instead, because it are not concepts that denote, but real definitions. (Summa Theologiæ, I, q. 13. a. 1, c; Aristotle, Peri Hermeneias, c. 1, 16 a 13 -14.). (“words relate to things through the medium of the intellectual conception”).
Aristotle’s argumentation seems to be convincing enough from purely natural point of view. However, the point of view of the natural intellect has been incessantly ignored by the so-called rationalism. The reason of the fact must be accounted for. What might have been proved by the pertinacity in sticking to the exploded errors? What might have been proved by the continuity of this line of reasoning? The continuation (la durée de la conscience) might be assessed, after Bergson, as a mark of that type of thinking. In fact, Descartes already noticed that in case a rationalist ceases to think, his/her identity will be destroyed. (Meditationes, II, 27; “for perhaps it would even happen, if I should wholly cease to think, that I should at the same time altogether cease to be” (Meditations on First Philosophy, transl. by John Veitch, II. 6).
There existed but one historical event when the reconciliation of the Word and nature occurred. The human nature was united to the Divine Word. The event transcended the natural course of events and could not be rationalized or cut according to the natural human understanding or expectations. All misapprehensions of the rationalist philosophy, affected by its Arab ancestor, consisted in an assumption that man is able to reproduce this unique historical event with natural means; to bridge the gap between words and things after assuming some ideas supposed to be fertile enough to be reproducible in the real world. But no human word is able to trigger a natural process. True, the understanding of principles (the general and knowable tendency of nature towards existence is such a principle) originates in the human mind just as natural process do and this makes understanding similar to generation. The inner word can be conceived in the human mind indeed. But this occurs independently of the human will, because willing implies a preceding intellection. No ideas (without the human will implementing them) can be so pregnant to be able to create a better world to live in. It is unworkable and all attempts to do this must lead to idolatry.
It is possible to demonstrate the existence of God with natural means of the intellect. However, Enchiridion says that human intellect can state something more besides. Apart from knowing the Transcendent Cause of the universe with certitude, it can discover the authenticity of the Revelation too. The unique historical event (the Incarnation) must be concerned first of all.
Reasoning, in general, is valid to the extent the continuation of premises and conclusions is visible. Albeit unfolding along the path of dialectics (so highly appreciated by Hegel) rationalist thinking shows a continuity. There is, at the beginnings of the eternal aporia of rationalism, a unique fact of equaling a word with a nature. For the divine Word assumed the human nature indeed.
The fact was unique and completely non-understandable from purely naturalist point of view. Nevertheless, it has been posing a constant challenge to the natural intellect and the challenge had been incessantly tried to be faced. In vain were some efforts undertaken to copy this unique event in the rationalist way. They were as uninterrupted as fatally doomed to failure. The witness given by rationalism is priceless here (… quia testimonium adversarii efficacius est; Thomas, In Trin., q. 2, a. 4. ad 8).
The cognizance of this historical event might be connected with the experience of the inner human time; with how humans tried to narrate it (historein in Greek). If we transcend metaphysical thinking in this unforeseen direction, we face the continuity of experience that can render the historical event in question as present to the contemporary man as for those who witnessed it with their own eyes. The continuity testifies to that the problem of the relation of the word to the reality must have remained unsolved, and that it must have been put forward despite the impossibility to solve it. This is the unique rationalist experience. The experience of what in fact was “transcending the boundaries of the pure reason” was inevitable.
It is a natural rational evidence of that there is (and there was in history) something transcending the natural intellect. It is the natural evidence of the veracity of Revelation (Denzinger, 2768: Nous promettons pour aujourd’hui et pour l’avenir: [4.] que la raison ne puisse acquérir une vraie et pleine certitude des motifs de crédibilité, c’est--dire de ces motifs qui rendent la révélation divine évidemment croyable ...). (Denzinger, 1790: “God has willed that to the internal aids of the Holy Spirit there should be joined external proofs of His revelation, namely: divine facts …”. We can speak (after Denzinger, 1794) of “he divine external aid for the fulfillment of the duty of Faith. For to the Catholic Church along belong all those many and marvelous things which have been divinely arranged for the evident credibility of the Christian faith…. The Church … is a very great and perpetual motive of credibility, and an incontestable witness of its own divine mission.”
The “source experience” of rationalism (relating directly signs to what they were supposed to denote; relating “ideas” to “reality”) is in fact nothing but some vague experience of the Ultimate Source. Two things are irreconcilable in rationalism: the fact of its existence and the actual purport of this type of thinking. The transcendental (“linguistic”) starting point of the supreme science took up by Averroes, Descartes and Husserl delineates the vicious circle of the type of thinking; of this way of the intellect. Ideas are not “virtual” (since bereft of life), but the revealed Word is Life itself. Even the tiniest vestige thereof left in the human soul compels to seek after Life Itself. The human being-on-the-way is in fact being-toward-It and only understandable if the presence of the Divine Word in human history is retraced as to its beginning and possible end.