TOWARDS THE SOURCES OF THE MODERN RELATIVISM OF VALUES

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Preface

I

The problem of the end of the human life happens to be commonly associated with the future, albeit the future is then rather advanced into than intended. Still, the horizon of life might be broadened by turning into the past also, and a more abstract meaning of the end be taken into account. The past Aristotle speaks of is a philosophical one, because stamped with the mark of irreversibility and necessity. A philosopher turns to the memorized so as to elucidate it and to abstract the necessary from the temporal, and the philosophers-to-be are invited to follow. The turning is a personal vital act. The majority of those who were about to read Aristotle (in the centuries after his death in 322 a.Ch. n.) failed to understand him perfectly, nonetheless.

His philosophy had come into oblivion for a considerable time until Avicenna (980-1037) "discovered" it *in his own manner*. There is no "turning" (to the phantasms about to be illuminated) but *awaiting the illumination* from a Transcendental Cosmic Intelligence instead. Cosmology substituted metaphysics in the places Avicenna had failed to understand it.

The illumination was perpetual, but awaiting (obviously enough) – temporal. Nay, the whole possible perfection of man consisted in a constant approaching the Intelligence. There was in Avicenna, a feeble trace of immortality in man, but eagerly disposed of in those who (as Averroes) followed. The more man approaches the Transcendental Intelligence, the less personal his/her existence. The illumination was called by Avicenna himself Enlightenment, whereas the countermovement of man: "evolution", in those who followed. The progress of "humanity" is as global as depersonalized. For the sake of "the existential nature" projected into the future the biological one should be "improved", "changed" or simply exterminated.

The problem of the end belongs to ethics, but is, first of all, a metaphysical one. The stance of those who embraced the idea of the Enlightenment (e.g. Kant) is anti-metaphysical as far as the traditional metaphysics of Aristotle is concerned and replaced with the Arab one. Avicenna imbued it with the amalgam of "mysticism" and cosmology. The stance is, however, not only anti-metaphysical, for it is "revolutionary" in ethics too, and it is as it must have been: there no room for ethics in Avicenna independent of his "metaphysics of cosmos". The Transcendental Cosmic Intelligence is a source of truth and good *indiscriminately*. If advancing towards the Unique, all individuals might or even must (in Averroes) lose their personal identity. No room for moral responsibility was left.

There is no ethics in Avicenna independent of cosmology. There could be no ethics in any system which abandons the difference between good and truth, but the distinction must have been dropped in a "cosmology", in which the forms of the comic intelligence are good and true *at the same time*. There is no room – generally speaking – for the multiplicity

(specificity) of sciences (their subject matters and principles must be uniform), so that e.g. an excellent mathematician would be, at the same, time an unquestionable moral authority.

Good if known moves the (human) will. Truth if willed moves the (human) intellect. Consequently, truth is *a value with respect to the intellect*, whereas good *is the value with respect to the will*. *Good if not proved to be true can be anything. Truth if not loved for being truth is a curiosity.*

The acts of the will and the intellect in a personal life are intertwined and thus the lifeline proves to be *circular*. On the way towards the End, we might meet some gratuitous promptings of God (the *special* illumination Augustine speaks of) before our life-line proves to be definitely closed. The beatified adhere to God (The End) immovably by the intellect and their will rests in the End.

The lifeline of the advocates of Enlightenment is *linear*. It is a progress into a depersonalized future. Good and truth are "forms" alike. There is no scientific discovery in the sense of the disinterested pursuit of truth for its own sake, and no moral personal progress based on the theoretical knowledge of principles. Existential engagement and indoctrination has replaced them both.

The life-line of the ancient Greeks was circular too. Odysseus was the icon of the return to the homeland. He had known it before embarking on the return journey. Christians do not know the Homeland perfectly if on the way, but direct their steps thereto rationally nonetheless. They turn to the past (so that even the heathen past was highly appreciated by them) so as to ascertain themselves of the right direction of life. The past (if known) is a *master*. The future (if elucidated by the light of the known past) is *mastered*.

The past as such need not to be "obsolete" and the values "improved", for an *independent, i.e. abstracting*, intellect. The future is personal (not globalized) if good is related to the will and truth to the intellect. The two powers (the intellect and the will) are *diverse*, although their acts are intertwined in a morally mature person so as to render his/her life-line integrated.

In Kant, Lotze and Scheler, the distinction was dropped and the consequences proved catastrophic to ethics, philosophy and theology. *The distinction must be restored*. May the following pages contribute to this objective.

II

It is not difficult to ascribe a definite meaning to the word "worthless". Some products, if slovenly made, are so and some books if drawn up not diligently also. Moreover, even men happen to be called worthless, and the sense of expression is clear, even if its use questionable. It is so, because in a narrow horizon of life only (made up of products and books) the "worthless" might be identified with the useless. The problem appears in the moment a horizon broadens and some objects appear in it which are not things in the ordinary sense of the word. Humans are "not (ordinary) things", but it is not clear, at first glance, why they must not to be so. Descartes understood the problem in terms of the privation of extension: "thinking" defines man, whereas the extension is proper to bodies. But in fact, it is a problem of what *lies beyond* the no matter how much extended, or, otherwise: what is of

itself discontinuous, but makes for what depends upon it to appear to be continuous. No humans are ever hopelessly worthless, because always able to find a new mode of producing.

Useful objects act just as they are expected or demanded to, but humans do not so; their actions are "unpredictable" in both positive and negative sense of the word. The fact that e.g. an employee does not behave in the way an employer demands him to, might be irritating, because his/her actions are "useless" in that case. Still, the most unpredictable, in the human history, proved to be, at the same time, the most inspiring. It was not so in a narrow perspective of the useful, but in some broader one. A "discontinuity" in the normal train of work appears along with the unpredictable and the fact would have been only deplorable if the work must have been organized by sheer imperatives without what justifies them.

Material objects (if useful) are perfectly obedient. Otherwise (in work) obstruction begets aggression, which is justifiable if directed against inanimate things, but less so if directed towards those living ones (especially against humans). Material objects are directed by commands (depostico principatu), but persons often refuse to be directed so, and the problem is, to which extent they may be permitted to.

The justification of the "unpredictable" results from the need to transgress utilitarian values. No matter how harshly demanded "to do what they are told" people are likely to ask the awkward "why". The useful is a means to an end, and the question "why" concerns the end. The employer sees a particular end, and demands the employees to conform. Still, no matter how much appreciated, a *particular* end can never become *the end as such*, and an employee might always prove to be more than a worker: a quaint creature which asks "unwelcome" questions just for the sake of knowing, not for the sake of producing. Before being an employee or employer, man is first a rational being and the question of the principle and the end must pop up sooner or later. The continuation of acting seems indispensable, but a work without a possibility to find a new (more convenient) beginning, becomes routine; the duty – compulsion, and the exertion (if not premediated) – uneconomical.

The foundations of the "continuity" (of the civilization) *were laid* in the time when Cistercian monks realized they are more than employees and employers. The scope of their existence extended beyond the useful. They saw the End and principles clearly enough not to bother their superiors with unpredictable questions. The questions were in fact answered in a prayer which preceded and crowned the ordinary activity. *The foundations* of the "continuity" (of the civilization) *were shatter* in the moment some (following David Hume) disavowed the "monkish virtues".

The value of e.g. a phone on a desert island equals zero, because this object is deprived of its normal "context" it can only "exist" in: a source of energy, transmitter, and the like. The configuration of those "secondary" objects in a big city is taken for granted, but is not natural for that reason. The objects might always prove to be "alien" someday or in some new circumstances.

The configuration in question is commonly sensed rather than reflected upon. The presence of a totality in which a phone, a car, computer, etc. exist in harmony is taken for granted for those focused on the objectives close and immanent to human existence, until some cracks in the structure of material culture appear. Moreover, the very reflection on the fact of the "relativity" of the parts: on their dependence on the totality, might be deemed unwelcome, because lacking optimism needed to build without precautions and questioning.

The producing might be well carried out by means of a "particular wisdom" (envisaging a particular end), but the general reflection is needed too and performed by the general wisdom (metaphysics and theology is that). The products happen to be more and more intricate and, for that reason, imposing. They might raise admiration akin to worship. Is, then, the admiration, creative of "values"?

The admiration metaphysics begins with is expressed rather in a naive "why" than in an idolatrous "how excellent". A clue to *understanding* the complex prevents from *the worship* of the complex. Something analyzable cannot be *unconditionally* admired. It cannot become a "deity". It can be *useful.*

The value of book might be problematic for some who does not know the language it has been written in. Literary languages do not die at the rate natural ones do nowadays. Still, is it possible that the treasures of the past would come into oblivion in the moment "a key to understanding" them is lost or replaced by a "hermeneutical key" without an objective value. Moreover, before dying physically, they become "worthless" for the 21th century's consumer of the ordinary goods. Some excellent performances of the old music (of e.g. Palestrina or Sheppard) has appeared recently. Splendid as they are, they are, nonetheless, deprived of their natural context they used to exist in: the church, for they are, in fact, pieces of religious music. This music is practically almost dead for those deafened (as Witold Lutosławski observed) by listening to the so called "music". Books, if not useful, were advised to be burned (by David Hume), which was the case in the Nazi Germany and the Maoist China, but they rot in libraries even before actually destroyed.

The market value of a good is clear (if measured), and its lack, similarly. The further, however, we depart from the useful, the more problematic a value might seem.

It is only natural for a man to discard of the objects he/she deems useless in his/her life. Their value is easy to asses, because related to few objects only. Something "not fitting" is even esthetically perceptible as such. The more capacious, however, the realm of life, the more apprehensive we naturally are of what might be "of use" after all. It is, however, not the problem of extension, but the problem of what lies *beyond the extended* in any manner.

Contemporarily, many objects traditionally assessed as priceless have been regarded as worthless, because serving no practical purpose. Some works of art might be collected out of snobbery, but they hardly ever become part of one's natural environment of life. Giuseppe Verdi composed a "pop music" of his time. Nowadays, this music seems to be elitist.

Discarding of objects perceived as uncomfortable in one's home is reasonable as long as the load bearing walls and fundaments remain untouched (do not seem "uncomfortable"). In my private life, useful values *seem* practical, but can prove eventually impracticable, because:

1) they might prove unsustainable for my home;
2) "my private judgment" happens to be replaced by a commercial assessment I am forced (this or the way) to accept;
3) "my home" (defined by the homestead) I live in becomes "a house I live in" defined by its market value.

The useful is always predicated with respect to something definite, although the fact well might go unnoticed. Means are useful with respect to their ends, and they both are to be called values, although in a different (analogical) sense. The motion towards a point *A* passes a point *B*, and both are, for that reason, aimed at: either primarily or secondarily. The useful *B* precedes *B* the honest *A*, but the honest *A* precedes *in natural order* the useful *B*. Good as such and science for its own sake precede naturally particular goods, and professional (particular) competencies respectively. No one believes that e.g. a tree can exist without its roots and a building without a fundament, probably because the objects are small and not commanding enough. Still, many believe that the structure of the Civilization can exist without fundaments sustaining it, or at best, they acknowledge the necessity of natural resources to sustain it. The building, however, is unsustainable, without *respecting human rational and free nature* first of all.

The useful is realizable with respect to an end, but the end might be a means with respect to the other one also. The problem of the ultimate end arises. A certain point of reference must be accepted, even by those who deny it is needed. Beyond and before any particular wisdom, wisdom as such (theology and metaphysics) must exist so as to legitimize the validity of any particular knowledge. Metaphysics of Aristotle states the existence of a twofold end: the one immanent to the human existence and the other transcendent. The natural progress of life consists in transcending any actual level of human immanence on the way towards the Transcendent (God). Metaphysics (with its proof of the existence of God) closes the immanence and prepares to the contemplation (the rest in the End). *The contemplated is transcendent*. The "pagan" "theologics" Aristotle spoke of was open to the Revelation, which was about to appear *actually* three centuries after Aristotle's death. It was, as it were, "expected" before. The contrary was the case with the modernity. The Critique of Kant is (was supposed to be) supreme because disposing of the transcendent. In it, a form of totality was immanent to the human existence, and all expectations confined to the immanent.

A naive relativism espoused by Protagoras (homo mensura) was replaced by a sophisticated one. Man is a gauge of good and evil; of truth and false not as an individual, but, as a form of the totality called humanity. It is not about the simplistic: "do what you please", but about a dogmatic: "do what you can only do for destroying the «obsolete», the «unmodern» the «traditional»".

Classical wisdom is open to the Transcendence. There is an immanent principle (intellect and will) of the progress, but the Transcendent God is a principle too because (as Augustine says) the Transcendent God is more intimately present to us than our innermost selves. It is God only who can move (as its Creator) human intellect and will without compelling it. The modern society is demanded to be open to extending towards the form of a totality called humanity *forced upon* it institutionally.

A private home is private as far as defending from intruders. The ways the private happens be infringed upon multiply along with the complexity of the achievements of modernity. They are difficult to anticipate, but must be so nonetheless, if the structure is to be preserved. It is not about any apprehension or phobia, but about understanding the necessary relation of the private to the universal; of the useful to the end. The supreme science (metaphysics) can do the job. The Western Civilization is unique, but its uniqueness is

consequent upon the universality of the Greek Philosophy, Roman Law and Christianity. Without that unique fundament the society is open to destruction.

Our homelands are private in a sense too. Without what defines their identity, their fundaments cannot be preserved, and the useful in them, consequently too. The most private (human body), however, must be defined in an analogical sense also. If treated as useful, it is debased. The female body is exceptional and most vulnerable in that respect. It is a sanctuary of a new life to come. It happens to be treated as a market value, and its commercialization equals its degradation. "Clinics" and "films" contribute to GDP because taxed. But there will be not future generations able to consume the "taxes", unless, perchance, "the intruders" take their place.

There is no philosophy and theology in the traditional sense commonly known nowadays, but the human immanence and Weltanschauung with respect to the aforementioned totality instead. Scheler claimed that values in general are grasped in the act of intuition (Anschauung). They could be distorted (misapprehended) if a particular Anschaung (intuition) does not chime in with the total Weltanschauung; the World-Intuition; so to say.

Some truths happen to be intuitively known if despaired or neglected to be analyzed. The intuition, in that case, replaces science. Science teaches us to use things rationally, but the supreme one (metaphysics and theology) settles a point of reference the useful is assessed against. Neither of them two is a Weltanschauung for that reason nonetheless. No matter how extended, the intuition can never cease to be what it originally was: the lack of knowledge; a *substitute* thereof. Science is about principles, but about "extension" secondarily only, viz. in so far as the knowledge of the principles extends (analogically speaking) to more objects, or rather (properly speaking) to more effects. The universal cannot be so because all-encompassing, but because justifiable in the light of the principles. Philosophy and theology are about principles, and contain the cognizance of causes and effects potentially. The "universal intuition" is anoxymoron. Intuition as such cannot pretend to be more than subjective, and the subjective in question is in no way "ennobled" if, after Kant, called all-encompassing, global and transcendental.

Such an extension is, however, a principle underlying the Kantian "ethics". The so called "common will" shall be law-giving if expressed simultaneously by who partake thereof. In Kant, it is expressed in the present time only, and the problem is how to assess the present without the reference to the past (and the future to master).

The present might be believed to be intuited (as in Bergson) but extremely difficult to define. A mathematical point might *represent* a moment in a graph. But we do not live on "the axes of coordinates" if passing several "Nows" of our life. Neither, for that matter, do we live in the Cartesian three dimensional space (modern physics falsified the assumption). The vital motion and the moments of it are idealized (simplified) in the graph. The life (and motion in general) (to Aristotle's mind) unfolds towards a perfection, which can be called "a point of reference" in a sense, and intended because understood, but never intuited. There are some values placed on the axes of coordinates, but we do not live in such an idealized world. The real values have a diachronic character; they are assessed and checked with respect to the past, and directed to future to be mastered, because understood.

The axes of coordinates can be (believed to be) grasped or intuited in what seems to be one and all-encompassing act of intuition. But the real objects cannot be known so, and all the less the world supposed to be a "totality".

It is preposterous to believe that a proper place I occupy in the world is known adequately by dint of an all-encompassing intuition; i.e. setting a part against the totality. To be sure, some importune images of the world events happen to fill up our imagination so densely that the private we live in might seem, after our being "saturated" so, a chunk of that totality. The man is, however, defined by his rationality, not by the imagination. It seems indispensable to define the relation of "the private" to "the universal". Kant tried to do this in a strange manner.

The principle of production might be called (to use his own terms) the hypothetical imperative of the effective action. E.g. to achieve the success one should work diligently and be circumspect. ("If you want to … you should …"). Still, the subordinate sentence (beginning with "if") might include immoral goal also, e.g. in: "if you want to cheat, you should be careful not to be noticed". Briefly, all hypothetical imperatives are somehow suspicious, just because being hypothetical. The simplest way to dispose of the problem seemed to discard imperatives of any "ifs" and to leave a naked "shall". "You should": notwithstanding the costs, your personal inconveniences and discomfort. This imperative seemed to guard of injustice which (as known) undermines even the foundations of the effective production. In fact, it does the opposite, for the subjective (even if extended to the dimensions of an all-encompassing "should"), can never trigger free actions. It can never stem from the deepest conviction, which is deep and own because of being a response to the naive "why".

No matter what Kant thought to be expedient, "conditionals" are normal for human reasoning. Moreover, the "intuition" (improperly so called) has in Aristotle (in his Second Analytics) its proper place, because subservient to these "conditionals" only.

A naked "it is just so" (not to be questioned) seems simple, but a statement is always problematic and questionable until a medium term is shifted between its subject and its predicate (complement). The medium term is "intuited", but never exists on its own, because it serves to build a syllogism (a "conditional") so as to justify ("explain") the conclusion.

There are two types of syllogisms ("conditionals") in Aristotle and Thomas: the syllogisms of science and the syllogisms of operation. They both depart from principles. In *theoretical* particular sciences definitions are principles, but the definitions themselves must be formed in a universal science. In it, the principles must be "more" than definitions, because otherwise regressuss ad infinitum looms. The supreme science tackles the being with the lowercase letter (if it is metaphysics), or Being with the upper case letter (if it is theology). But being is indefinable at all. The principle of definition must not be definition itself. Still, the knowledge of principles provides the definitions most important for life. The ultimate conclusion of the supreme science (metaphysics) is thus the principle of the subordinate science: ethics. The conclusion reads: "there is a Supreme Being existing beyond the world". The same conclusion if applied to ethics (as a principle) reads: "there is beatitude for you in store in God no matter how much you are entangled in the human immanence". Minor premises (accepted from the moral low) allow advancing conclusions, which are, at the same time, imperatives. The scheme applies, obviously enough, to particular sciences. E.g., in

producing, an imperative of building a bridge must be preceded by the knowledge of principles (strength of materials), which are, in that case, drawn from theoretical physics. Analogically, so as to build a useful life, a principle is needed too: a firm notion the Supreme Being in which true human beatitude lies.

The categorical imperative in Kant is not a conclusion. It is universal, but not abstracted; it is (supposed to be) all encompassing, but not really related to any particular instance it could verify in. The imperative is deprived of energy which transforms objects in nature, but *imagined* to be a force which demands bodies to obey *its* laws. It is "weak" with respect to the real, because lying in the sphere of the "ideal" loosely connected with it only (this "vector value" must be directed to an ideal terminal point). The morality of acting is witnessed, but not effected.

The moral subject must be conscious of both moral obligations resting on him and of him/her existing in particular circumstances. The energy of acting must be stored before. The supreme science shows the mode it can be done.

It is impossible (even for those espousing phenomenalism) to think without seizing causes of/beneath the phenomena they see. Aristotle calls the seizing the "intuition" (anchinoia; eustochia) in *a specific* sense. The Aristotelian "intuition" consists, in fact, in grasping causes which are about to serve as medium terms to build syllogisms.

A phenomenalist grasps causes too, because no man can exist without reasoning, but the problem is what he/she does with the knowledge afterwards. Intuitionists try to extend their intuitions onto a totality called consciousness. In it, a particular phenomenon is presumed to have its proper place. But in the constant flux of consciousness, the phenomena can appear disconnected only. If not analyzed, they are merely juxtaposed. *The stream of consciousness is a degraded syllogism*. In it, a *constant flux* of values is not only possible, but, in fact, *inevitable*. In syllogisms, *only discrete values* of premises can appear.

The "continuity" of the human existence is a problem and not easily solvable. The unity of consciousness cannot guarantee it. The life-line happens to be continuous only if integrated by dint of syllogisms. It is *wholly integrated* if the ultimate conclusion is met: "There is a Supreme Cause beyond particular facts".

Kant denied the possibility of the necessary proof of the existence of God. Some specious arguments were adduced to substantiate the claim of the "impossibility". They are false, but more than that, because destructive for human existence, and undermining its very foundations. Without the main premise: "there is beatitude for you in God, no matter how handicapped or debased you chance to be", the way out of the maze of the common life is impossible.

Two options are possible in a practical Kantianism: either the life will be integrated by imperatives and compulsion only, or a vague ideal accepted with a connivance for "the radical evil inherent in human nature" which must be tolerated because inevitable. This way, the restrictive ethics is practically matched with e.g. Freudianism.

The Kantian humanity is a closed and self-relying entity without a transcendence to be tested against. In a famous saying by Husserl, "consciousness" does not need anything to exist (nulla re indiget ad existendum). It does not need any human person to exist.

There is a “humanity” to be worshiped, but no human persons cognoscible as individual substances (agnosticism precludes the possibility). There is an “ideal”, and some victims to be put on its altar. Human persons are this.

The intuitions of values are not distorted because misplaced, but just because being “intuitions”. Some insights into causes were wrongly supposed to be intuitions. *The only possible hierarchy of values results from the rational reflection on the foundations of nature in which human rational and free nature is eminent.*

III

“All modern theories of value share the premise that values as such, and moral values in particular, are only subjective phenomena in man’s mind which have no independent meaning and existence. Values, according to this view, are but the projections of our desires and feelings. «What is desired is good, what is abhorred is bad.» Reality as such, without human desires and emotions, is supposed to be entirely value-free”.[1] Scheler calls it the subjectivization of values. The creed for subjectivism reads: “All values … are only relative and «subjective»—they vary with the individual, with desire, race, people, etc.”.[2]

They could be objective (immutable), if the idea of the *human consciousness* did not replace the personal intellect. They had been immutable before it happened. Scheler refuses, however, to admit the fact.

The collective consciousness Avicenna speaks of results from illuminating the human mind by the transcendental Giver of Forms; the Agent Intellect (Aql al-Fa'al or Wahib al-Suwar).The enlightenment was *originally* meant to guarantee the objectivity (the “sense”) of the cognition. *Eventually*, however, it did the opposite.

Avicenna claims that it is impossible to prove the existence of God in the way Aristotle did. Consequently, in Avicenna to some extent, and those who followed explicitly, the existence of the Supreme (Being) is but a postulate. The underdetermination of its status of being allows ascribing it any optional being. It might be yearned and desired and the desire supposed to be creative of its subject. It might be an idea, but it is uncertain whether endowed with reality in the normal sense of the word (ideas in Plato are real). In Descartes, “objective reality” appears instead. Furthermore, in those who followed, a subjective reality takes its place (the objective reality proves to be contrary to what the very etymology suggests).

The idea of God is “constructed” (in Locke) in the human mind . Anyhow, agnosticism prevents calling God a Person and the nominalist “arithmetic” prevents calling him the Trinity. The objective reality Descartes speaks of in his Meditations (the one defended by Scheler) is a quaint reality indeed. It is not real in the ordinary sense of the word. It is neither the entity of reason nor the entity of nature, but a “third one” (natura tertia of

[1] Max Scheler, Ressentiment, transl. by Louis A. Coser from the text of 1915. p. 69
chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://mercaba.org/SANLUIS/Filosofia/autores/Contempor%C3%A1nea/Scheller/Ressentiment.pdf
access 2025-11-16.

[2] Ibid. p. 70.

Avicenna's metaphysics) above them both, emanating from the depths of Cosmos. Everything can, in fact, be called "objective". Marxists and phenomenologists alike speak of the supreme value, albeit the former openly reject theism. Originally (in Scotus), the "supreme" was the Divine Intellect. As, however, it was formally different from His will, his notorious "formal difference" occasioned variegated opinions about the "supreme". The spiritual was deprived of the reality in the ordinary sense of the word.

The idea of the "spiritual heritage of Europe" is broad enough to include the subjectivist stance. A "non-theistic spirituality" could be contained within it along with traditional one, even if the stances seem to contradict each other. The enlightenment spirituality might be a non-theistic spirituality, but the Kantian philosophical idea of "the religion within the bounds of bare reason" is capacious enough to include a "particular" Christian spirituality in the sense it demands it to be just particular. Modernists were proud of adjusting the "particular" to the requirements of the enlightened reason, but there was, in fact, nothing to boast of, as the enlightenment spirituality is no less particular than the Muslim one. The Arab tradition cannot be a priori supposed to be superior to the European one.

Especially, creationism cannot be reconciled with emanationism (resp. evolutionism), unless, perchance, underhandedly deprived of its original meaning. The supreme of the Avicennian tradition is creative in a metaphorical sense only, as Avicenna's "creation" unfolds out of necessity. The supreme of this tradition is formal only; it is not creative in those who followed Avicenna. God is formal (the supreme value) in phenomenology only, because Husserl explicitly demands "bracketing" God's real (traditionally accepted) existence. A "modern" idea of a "tame" deity cannot be reconciled with the notion of God the Creator and the supreme Judge of man. Deists imagined that after created a good "breaks off" the Good itself and the distance makes for discontinuity (God's absence in the world). *Originally* (in Avicenna) God is distant only, because a good (no matter how distant) emanates in the *present* time, and the past (perfect) only could account for the discontinuity. According, however, to Saint Gregory and Saint Augustine, the creation is continuous, in a sense different Emanationists imagined. The world would have ceased to exist in the twinkling of an eye if "broken off" and not sustained by the power of God.

The reality, in the normal sense of the word, is natural and perceived in the present time we live in. Still, John Duns Scotus abhorred the Greek naturalism, and tried to correct it by dint of the Avicennian (un-Greek) paradigm. The endeavor proved futile in the end, but, as long as sticking to the theological principles, the stance seemed provisionally defendable. Scotus failed to distinguish metaphysics and theology, which eventually proved deadly to them both, although, for a time, prevented from some grave errors.

The influence of the Scotus on phenomenology has been commonly acknowledged. It is not incidental that Scheler resorts – so as to abrogate subjectivism – to what he calls "Christianity". So as to repeal subjectivism, the objectivism of religion was needed. The notion of the Christian values appears, but they are *specifically* Christian really, because they serve philosophy in the way Kant and Hegel thought it advisable. The religion serves in Scotus to building a "Christian philosophy", but in those who follow: to "rationalize" Christianity. The Christian values were subordinate to philosophy (in the way Averroists deemed advisable). Traditionally, the philosophy was demanded to be a handmaiden of theology. Now, it claimed the right to be *the opposite*.

Scheler is not a declared Kantian; he rejects the form the philosophical enlightenment assumed in the 18th century, because he accuses it of "the vulgar community" which replaced "the desirable objectivity". The "extreme" objectivity of the enlightenment only was untenable.

> …the philosophy of the Enlightenment has pushed this substitution of "generality" or "general validity" for "objectivity" to the utmost extreme. In all problems of value—whether they concern law, the state, religion, economy, science, or art—that which all men can produce and judge takes on the importance of an "ideal" by which we should measure the concrete and positive creations of civilization. The meaning of the expression "generally human" is endowed with the highest value.[3]

Nevertheless, he accepts the idea of the Enlightenment as such, for the "revelation" he speaks of harmonizes with the idea of general philosophical illumination:

> In this formal sense, *"revelation" is a fundamental concept of epistemology and of every genuine human civilization. It necessarily appears wherever competence in the knowledge of truths and values …* Quite independently of its specific meaning and significance in positive religions, the concept of "revelation" has a place in the system of objectivism: it indicates that objective truths and values which presuppose a highly developed gift of cognition and feeling can be communicated to another group that has no organ for their original apprehension. This group must "believe" what others "see."[4]

If the "revelation" were "constitutive for human thinking", it could never be supernatural, but "rational" only.

Christianity is not likely to profit from being treated instrumentally. Some may, to be sure, proud of finding a common language with an acknowledged philosopher. The price, however, of the acknowledgement is extremely high. The supreme value (in the sense proposed by phenomenology) cannot be creative in the strong sense of the word, whereas the Supreme Being Thomas speaks of is supreme only because being creative.

As a child, Thomas used to ask repeatedly the same (naïve) question: "what is God?". Now, God is (to his adult mind) "that on which my whole existence depends". He is so *really*, no matter, whether desired, respected, expected … etc. He is really present in the world despite of what people might think of Him. He is not "immanent" to human existence. He exists outside human "consciousness."

The Christian values might be defended philosophically, but the philosopher remains a minister of the Truth then. Justin the Martyr called Christianity a perfect philosophy perhaps because of an equivocation included in the notion of "the love of wisdom". Normally, wisdom is desired as something precious-for-me (deemed to be so). But in broader sense of the word, "the wisdom is loved" for the sake of wisdom; not for the sake of who profits from it, and "the love" is, then, taken in its proper meaning.

Christ is the Wisdom of God, as St Paul states, and the "Christian", in the most natural sense of the word, is what belongs to Christ (a Person). The perfectly Christian, in

[3] Ibid. p. 71.

[4] Ibid. p. 72.

turn, is what belongs to Him perfectly. Love of *the Personal* Truth is the essence of the Christian wisdom: we love ourselves for Him this way (we want to be His inheritance); to-be-for-Him.

The price of the rejection of this dependence is accepting "universal human values"; the "human bondage". This yoke of man slavery is, according to Hegel a way to "freedom". The yoke of *divine* slavery gives *genuine* freedom.

> We ought to be to Jesus Christ and to serve Him not only as mercenary servants, but as loving slaves, who, by an effect of great love, give themselves up to serve Him in the quality of slaves, for the simple honour of belonging to Him. Before Baptism we were the slaves of the devil; Baptism has made us the slaves of Jesus Christ: Christians must needs be either the slaves of the devil or the slaves of Jesus Christ.[5]

The Christian values are the modes of perfect subjection to Christ himself.

The Supreme must be as creative, as all values are. A restricted scope of creativity appears in human affairs too. Humans cannot, to be sure, "create a better world to live in", because the manner the world has been created is the best, but they can create pathways of the "return" to the Supreme. Perhaps, the pathway is neither a being of reason nor a self-subsisting being of nature, but is not, nonetheless, an objective being, Avicenna thought it to be.

A verbal declaration of objectivism is void and supports rather than abrogates the stance of subjectivism, for it gives it an instrument to prove that the latter is more self-coherent than the postulated objectivism ever may be.

One of the most important achievements of Thomas is drawing a sharp dividing line between philosophy and theology. God is the subject matter of theology, but *He cannot be the subject matter of metaphysics* (the first philosophy). The most important in the latter is the proof of the existence of God. Now, we cannot turn to God so as to "ask" Him whether he exists really. In theology, God's existence is accepted and in prayer too, but philosophy is a natural wisdom and we cannot turn to a principle so as to prove the principle. A vicious circle is inevitable for all those who confuse the subject matters of the both sciences.

We turn to what we know perfectly to be not God so as to ascertain ourselves as to the existence of who exists beyond what we turn to, and "beyond any doubt" also. The conviction that He exits may be originally weak or undermined, and it belongs to philosophy to confirm the conviction (to serve so). We turn to nature and the turning, if rational, is bound to be of use, for it is impossible not to find some "traces" of God's presence in the world if it is analyzed diligently enough.

The turning to nature seemed somehow suspicious for traditional Neo-Platonists. The *desire* for material goods debases human mind, indeed, but the turning is not coveting. Metaphysics is a desire for knowledge for its own sake, and the desire for wisdom is accompanied by the aversion from what is opposed to it. Things happen to be opposed because endowed with different qualities, and coveting them is irrational indeed. Still, science (in general) is opposed (as a relative) to what it passes judgments on. If judged, things

[5] A Treatise on the True Devotion to the Blessed Virgin. By Louis-Marie, Grignon de Montfort. Translated from the original french by Frederick William Faber, priest of the oratory. London 1863.

happen to be rejected and on the pathway to the End some objects passed by. All things as far as contingent, might lead astray from the ultimate end. They are contingent as long as not actually related to it, which is mostly the case with what is produced *by man*. There is, however, in the very core of nature *created by God,* the necessary too. There is no mechanical necessity in nature Avicenna was praised for having "discovered", but a conditional necessity Aristotle speaks of. It serves to build a rational pathway to God. All steps on the pathway might be called values. God is not a necessary being in the way Avicenna thought Him to be, but the perfect necessity in *the mode* of His action exists, no doubt. The world might have been better, but it could not be made out of better wisdom. Metaphysics discovers the scheme in the core of nature.

Contrary to what nominalists may claim, God may not create a chaos. It is impossible, because not becoming His perfection. The way of return to Him is marked by definite values.

IV

From amongst several persons regarding the same e.g. tree, one may regard it taxonomically, the other from an economic point of view, the other – from an aesthetical one, whereas yet another may pass it indifferently. The indifference *seems* to be the least precious way of regarding. Still, no one of those who see this tree and not only look upon it (anschauen), will deny they all see the same tree, regardless of how they regard it. Had it not been the case, they would never be able to try and look upon it closer or anew. The problem of values is, to some extent, the problem of how perfectly a real thing is regarded.

We regard the same thing, although, perhaps, not always diligently enough, so that the thing happens to be named (and judged) carelessly too. Still, all those regards are supposed to be comparable and referable to a better or the best one. The effects of what we see are discussed first of all, but a sincere dialogue must end with a definition of the thing, which crowns it.

Definition is, according to Aristotle, a shortening of reasoning, and Plato defines it as a dialogue of the soul with itself. It seems rather easy to define a tree, but defining the mode the tree is regarded comes with some difficultly.

In the era of Postmodernism, the Aristotelian concept of dialogue (reasoning) and the definition is likely to meet with a vehement protest. "No regards can be privileged". The principle of the so called untranslatability of languages has been dogmatically accepted. Various tongues and various regards which are expressed by them, could not (allegedly) be measured with an objective gauge. The yardstick must be (supposedly) a regard itself and no regard could (to that modern sentiment) be privileged, unless, obviously, it be the dogma in question.

In might be doubted if anybody (a declared Postmodernist included) can observe the principle (the dogma) in his/her private life. In it, some thoughts must be discriminated so as to express their opposites. The communication does not consist in a uniformization of any language, and the Postmodernist critique of the so called meta-narration would be justified if directed against it. But Postmodernism is a unification itself as it demands total relativity

without proving the reason of the demand. The tongue we use is an instrument to express what has been previously conceived mentally. It is not an autonomous entity. A thought conceived in the mind corresponds to how a thing it is related to mind (is regarded). Things and thoughts are, thus, naturally different, albeit the thought is (should be) really related to what is actually beyond the scope of the mental activity. No tongue, to be sure, should be so privileged to reject a priori the others, but none, on the other hand, a priori rejected so as to make room for the others. The openness of mind demands both openness and self-possession of mind. Some thoughts must be judged or rejected (discriminated) in the end. Without discrimination human life is not possible.

Plato's dialogues are paradigmatic in that respect. Plato, apparently, did not deem the only fault of his adversary to be using a language he disliked. But on the other hand, without setting this language against his own (without confronting the two), only a monologue would be possible. Without a sober judgment on the opposite stance, the dialogue would be impossible. The judgment is far cry from silencing the opposite; it is rather a hazard of expressing one's views in the face of a potentially inimical opponent. One's own opinions, if expressed, are, in a sense, at the mercy of who is expected to accept them at least provisionally (as hypotheses), and is expected not to reject them *emotionally* right away. *Various opinions* on the *same topic* are constitutive of the honest dialogue.[6] A minimum must be observed and no breaching of e.g. grammatical rules admissible. Still, the more ambitious a dialogue, the more demanding the boundary conditions are. A common denominator must exist for various opinions.

The dogma in question demands the opposite, i.e. existing – so to say – separate worlds. If tongues are untranslatable, everyone is doomed to live in a seclusion of his/her "private" thinking. Sticking to the dogma is a kind of solipsism.

The one perfectly acquainted with e.g. Kant would know "a Kantian logics" different to the e.g. Kierkegaardian one, but could never relate and examine one system against the other. Moreover, he/she could not account for her/his someday having become a Kantian (or whatever else), which he/she *should* account for, as the knowledge he/she possesses apparently is not inborn, unless, perchance, the birth of consciousness out of the crude state of "sub-consciousness" be called so.

The words we read or hear are set against what we have personally understood on our own. Understanding is not born out of reading, but must precede it. Otherwise, instead of a

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[6] Metaph., III, c. 1.

[995α] [24]ἀνάγκη πρὸς τὴν ἐπιζητουμένην ἐπιστήμην ἐπελθεῖν ἡμᾶς [25] πρῶτον περὶ ὧν ἀπορῆσαιδεῖ πρῶτον:ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὅσα τε περὶ αὐτῶν ἄλλως ὑπειλήφασί τινες, κἂν εἴ τι χωρὶς τούτων τυγχάνει παρεωραμένον. ἔστι δὲ τοῖς εὐπορῆσαι βουλομένοις προῦργου τὸ διαπορῆσαι καλῶς: ἡ γὰρ ὕστερον εὐπορία λύσις τῶν πρότερον ἀπορουμένων ἐστί, λύειν δ᾽ οὐκ [30] ἔστιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὸν δεσμόν, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ τῆς διανοίας ἀπορία δηλοῖ τοῦτο περὶ τοῦ πράγματος: ᾗ γὰρ ἀπορεῖ, ταύτῃ παραπλήσιον πέπονθε τοῖς δεδεμένοις: ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀμφοτέρως προελθεῖν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν. διὸ δεῖ τὰς δυσχερείας τεθεωρηκέναι πάσας πρότερον, τούτων τε χάριν καὶ διὰ τὸ τοὺς [35] ζητοῦντας ἄνευ τοῦ διαπορῆσαι πρῶτον ὁμοίους εἶναι τοῖς ποῖ δεῖ βαδίζειν ἀγνοοῦσι, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις οὐδ᾽ εἴ ποτε τὸ ζητούμενον εὕρηκεν ἢ μὴ γιγνώσκειν:
[995β] [1] τὸ γὰρ τέλος τούτῳ μὲν οὐ δῆλον τῷ δὲ προηπορηκότι δῆλον. ἔτι δὲ βέλτιον ἀνάγκη ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ κρῖναι τὸν ὥσπερ ἀντιδίκων καὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων λόγων ἀκηκοότα πάντων.

critical judgment sheer repetitive formulas (proper to some particular systems) would replace critical thinking.

The principle of untranslatability of languages is not as modern as it might seem. It was born in the Middle Ages. In Scotus (and those who followed) two things account for the value of a given system: the original intuition of being and the self-consistence of the system built on it. The former is the most private and the least communicable, whereas the latter must be as general as only possible. Friedrich Nietzsche was praised for the former; Hegel – admired for the later. The problem how to match them both was so serious that deemed philosophically insolvable.

Scotus managed to match the two, but he was a theologian. The intuition of being (originating philosophy) was needed so as to come to the cognition of (the Supreme) Being (crowning philosophical thinking). Still, if following that tradition, we should be aware that a philosophy we would like to advance is but a copy of *a* theology and the latter might be completely different to the original Scotian one.

The objective value of a system is practically accepted in the very moment the system is addressed. The uniqueness of a system is apparently suggested in the very moment a scholarly work is published. Although beginning with the standard: "the philosophy of …", or "the notion of …. according to …" (which might imply the relativity of its content), its being comparable is tactility assumed by the mere fact that this stance has been preferred to the others (has been chosen as a subject). If reading a book I prefer it, in fact, to many others, because it is impossible to perform many activities at the same time. Several acts must be "discriminated" if the only one chosen is being advanced.

The objective value of a system might be measured at least by the print run of a book; its quotation index; the number of who visit the Web Site. The problem is, thus, not of the values being possibly incomparable (since the economic ones are comparable obviously enough), but whether the economic ones are the only worth taking into account. The public resonance a book gained is not always reducible to the economy of gain.

The utility values are *some* values and important to some extent, but if applied to the really precious, nay, to the priceless, they prove to be unfitting. The modern and acknowledged in our time (of the 20s of the 20th century) will, most probably be hopelessly obsolete after, say, 100 years, just because being popular now. To the contrary, some books stood the challenge of time, which can be stated even from a "modern" point of view. The influence Scotus exerted prompted some to call him "a master of our times". A quaint master, nevertheless, as his system is hardly understandable without the discussion on the univocity of being he was carrying out with Henry of Gent, and, first of all, his vehement opposition to the "real distinction" of the act of existence and the essence of created being advocated by Thomas Aquinas.

Postmodernism happens to be called "the philosophy of the end of philosophy", but should be, in fact, called that of the end of *a* philosophy. Some 300 years had passed since Descartes had published his Mediations (and a new philosophy had originated), and Husserl's Mediations (a commentary) made the end of the era. A grandiose name survived, but no philosophers deserving it. A new beginning will be only possible if what has been carelessly neglected proves really inspiring.

Philosophy is – according to Aristotle – the most general science, not because meta-narrative (in advancing importunately clamorous views), but because – so to say – anti-narrative, i.e. resorting to the yet unspoken – for the sake of speaking about what is most difficult to speak of.

There is – paradoxically – no "philosophy of Aristotle", by philosophy regarded from the vantage point of Aristotle (although some other points of view might prove theoretically better). It is not privileged a priori, but a posteriori preferable to the modern ones, because better elaborated intellectually. Aristotle does not speak *about statements*, but in most general terms (in Metaphysics[7]) *about things* the statements are supposed to represent. Apparently, the laws discovered by e.g. Newton did not come to existence in the moment he published his Principia Mathematica. Laws of nature exist always, albeit are often disregarded.

Should the principle of untranslatability of languages be granted, no philosophers (in the old sense of the word), but specialists (from Kant, Heidegger, Hegel, etc.) will exist. Each system would be, in that case, a closed totality hermetically separated from the others. A personal *interest* might replace the *disinterested* pursuit of truth as such, but it cannot be called philosophy any more.

There are two opposite stances in philosophy. Either a direct contact with nature is preferred and a primitive kind of realism guaranteed so, or the Hegelian disdain for nature demanded so as make us civilized beings, but Idealists after all. The stances are contrary, but we have not to choose between them, because they both depart from the same problematic presupposition. A rationalist would say: "If I had to choose between what I have learnt to be scientifically proved, and the testimony of my own eyes, I would prefer the former". An advocate of the common sense would say: "Some ideas are so stupid that only intellectuals believe them" (George Orwell); "There is nothing so absurd but some philosopher has said it" (Cicero);[8] or in general: "All theories are of no practical account, as they create problems instead of solving those practical ones; the theorists busy themselves with the dry and abstract".

Theories are abstract, and might be so in a pejorative sense, all depending on what kind of abstraction we have in mind. It is only natural for a scientist to disregard *sometimes* the testimony of his eyes, as long as he is concentrated on the regarded and analyzed, but it is inadmissible to disregard *facts as a rule*.

In two ways can we abstract. It is unbecoming to abstract from a thing a property which is not really severed from it. However, it is not a mistake to abstract from a thing (abstrahere per intellectum) a property which is not severed from it (quae non sunt abstracta secundum rem). Accordingly, when the intellect is said to be false when it understands a thing

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[7] Metaph., I, c. 2.

[982α][20] ὑπολήψεις τοιαύτας καὶ τοσαύτας ἔχομεν περὶ τῆς σοφίας καὶ τῶν σοφῶν: τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν πάντα ἐπίστασθαι τῷ μάλιστα ἔχοντι τὴν καθόλου ἐπιστήμην ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν οὗτος γὰρ οἶδέ πως πάντα τὰ ὑποκείμενα, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ χαλεπώτατα ταῦτα γνωρίζειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τὰ μάλιστα [25] καθόλου (πορρωτάτω γὰρ τῶν αἰσθήσεών ἐστιν)

[8] De Divinatione bk. 2, ch. 119

otherwise than as it is, it so if the composition of real objects is meant, but it not so if referring to the mode of understanding (Summa theol., I, 85, 1 ad 1).[9]

The abstraction Aristotle speaks of does not break contact with nature, as science is not about putting on horse-blinders; it is about broadening the scope of interest, which *might be accidentally* connected with disregarding a particular fact, but can never add up to the Hegelian "so much the worse for the facts" (if they falsify a theory). Between the Scylla of Rationalism and Charybdis of Naturalism, a rational Naturalism of Aristotle is to be chosen.

Every statement has a definite value: it is either true or false. In a dialogue, however, statements are being presented "approaching" the truth because those who espouse them do so indeed. We do not violate the law of the third excluded if postulating a "compromise" in a dialogue. Sometimes, albeit bereft of the objective value, a statement might have a hermeneutic one, provided it is uttered sincerely and without pretense, with the only hope to obtain the objective truth. *The value of the form of the dialogue* consists in both the tongue being shared by those discussing problems, and opposite opinions being hoped to be reconciled.

V. Existing for the proper act and perfection

The most precious is, perhaps, the most difficult to name, and the very names imposed to the unique appear, in the end, as common as the originally fashionable slogans are bound to become someday. Love has been defined by Thomas (after Aristotle) as "willing the good (of what is *undoubtedly* true) for another (person; *chosen from* others)". Still, according to Marcel and Levinas, love is rather being-for another than acting-for him/her. Descartes facilitated the shift identifying man (res cogitans) with his attribute (cogitation includes acting).

Allegedly, you cannot truly "be" unless being "for others"; in the relationship (availability; *disponibilité*) with other people. True existence consists in your giving yourself to others. Apparently, one happens to have e.g. a fever, and to infect (give it to) others, but feverish ideas are (presumed to be) not had this way, even if they prove to be more toxic than any knowable diseases. The ideas were supposed to make us (humans), which is preposterous after all, as as some of them might prove abhorrent no less for us than for others. We are free to feel the abhorrence, and *obliged to give* the genuine ones only we *have discerned* from the debauched ones.

The idea of disponibilité is set in a backdrop of the Hegelian tradition of thinking. Sartre contrasts (after Hegel) Being-in-itself **(***en-soi***)** and Being-for-itself **(***pour-soi***).** The former is fixed and predetermined (which no existence must be) and lacks consciousness and

[9] Summa Theologiae I, q. 85 a. 1 ad 1.

The Summa Theologiæ of St. Thomas Aquinas, Second and Revised Edition, 1920, Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, MARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ.

Access 2026-11-03 https://aquinas.cc/en/la/~ST.I.Q85.A1.C

self-awareness (which every existence must be). Those living inauthentically, in the realm of the Being-in-itself **(***en-soi***),** fall into Bad Faith (*mauvaise foi*), whatever the meaning of the "faith". The authentic life of "being" is (in Marcel) the spiritual existence for others. This "being" is experienced rather than measured.

It has appeared to many (under the practical influence of Existentialism) that the cognition of what is important-to-me is more valuable than that of what is important per se. The existence is (according to Sartre) more valuable because projected into the future.

The categories of thinking we use (if capacious enough) seem to testify to the openness of mind, but on the other hand, no one of them is capacious enough to cease to be what it is of itself: a category which schematizes existence instead of seizing it directly. A concept found in a philosophical book might be an instrument (and the cognition of existence believed to be accurate), but the instrument itself is incapable of acting on its own.

The rejection of any category whatsoever is a category of thinking itself. Although believed to be a philosophy of life, the modern philosophy is by no means a "living philosophy", as no book can live on its own. Bocheński observed that Être et Neant consists of elaborate and pedant phenomenological analyses. At best, some "vivid insights" into the mystery of being might be believed to be obtained by means of those analyses. Signs as such are bereft of life. In Scholasticism, signs are counter-divided to causes. Man uses them, because *he* is a cause and nothing else can be expected of them than their usefulness.

Hegelianism was attacked, but Hegelianism itself was far from being a philosophy of object. Nay, since Hegel, it has been believed that no naked (i.e. "un-interpreted") facts" could exist, which is to say: the interpretation of what is important-to-me has precedence over what is important per se. Objectivism in Hegel takes a form of Objective Idealism. The Idealism saved him from the vulgar Subjectivism (which was about to ensue subsequently nonetheless) by assuming that the subjective and the objective definitely melt in the "absolute" philosophy: an assumption ridiculous enough to compromise Objectivism as such.

It is difficult to remain an Existentialist even if decided to. Albert Camus and Jean Paul Sartre (both declared Existentialists) argued vehemently over the factual state of Communism in the Soviet Russia. For Camus, facts were obvious enough to unveil the murderous nature of Communism. Not for Sartre so. He believed in the nobleness of ideas and the fact that they were so important-for-him overshadowed the otherwise *apparent* facts. The generosity of the observer seemed to impart the generosity on the observed. The importance of what happened independently of the observant eye of a modern philosopher seemed of no account in the end.

Existentialism was born from the direct opposition to Hegelianism, but its practical consequences reached far beyond the history of philosophy. Two categories: *an sich sein* and *für sich sein* fuse together in Hegel, but were severed in Sartre to the detriment not only of the Objective Idealism, but (what is incomparably more important) to the detriment of Objectivism as such, which was jettisoned by philosophers long before Hegel, and preserved only in a crippled form in Christian Wolff. Apparently opposite, the two systems (Existentialism and Hegelianism) are, nonetheless, heirs to the same tradition initiated several years after the death of Thomas Aquinas by John Duns Scotus.

It is difficult to say, whether the Existentialist stance is rather theoretical than practical or the other way round. Perhaps it tries to be both at the same time and that is why it cannot

be either. The practical philosophy (for being practical and practicable) accepts (from the theoretical one) premises from which an imperative of acting in concerto is drawn. The "egotist orientation" phenomenology speaks of precludes this possibility (the "existential engagement" does the same). Without rational premises of acting no action can be reasonable and moral. So as to be-a-good-for-me a thing must, first of all, be for good everybody at all, i.e. universal.

Life wisdom is expected to sort out problems faced in life. The true wisdom is that because applicable to particular circumstances. But in the Kantian tradition, the applicability has been prohibited. The applicable must, first of all, be universal and the application in question consists in drawing conclusions from the (moral) principles: the activity infeasible in the philosophy of life. The latter is, consequently, the most impracticable possible.

Philosophical ideas exist in philosophical books only, but their worth is measured according to how accurately they represent what transcends them. Thus, the problem is, whether they can (conversely) serve as premises of the moral reflection on the transcendent we face when acting. Those "breaking" and "modern" ones do not even pretend to be analytic in this sense. At best, they are expected to produce some splendid effects *in minds*: without concerning with the transcendent reality.

The application of principles demands knowing (them being) principles. Humanity ("to be a man") and the proper accidents accruing to it (i.e. befitting the man as such) are principles. They both, however, exist outside the scope of the immediately given. They are not phenomena.

Animals much more than humans live without analyzing the phenomena. In fact, the supreme in them; the animal instinct; is synthetic rather (as the Verstand in Kant) than analytic. Animals do not analyze, because the supreme in them is subordinate a priori to the good of the species (or an ecosystem). Thus however, the scope of their existence is carved to the dimensions of this environment.

The existence in the world of phenomena is impossible for any creature. No e.g. a bee can live on the mere sense of flowers. There can, however, exist in humans a preposterous desire of becoming part of totality called nature in the way Schelling prescribed. A synthesis of (a part of) matter sustains *a specific* and *a particular* form of life (nutrition is that). A synthesis of a *totality* would have *destroyed every specific form* of life and nature. Man cannot become an animal, but can dream of becoming it nonetheless. The infantile sentimentality towards animals is a token of that destructive attitude. Husserl speaks of the "animal consciousness" in his Ideas I, and Logical Investigations. Consciousness is synthetizing indeed, but not definite specific (natural) outcome can issue therefrom.

Dreaming about a bestial existence (a paradise lost of J. J. Rousseau) is infantile but more than that. There is, to be sure, a kind of "Transformism" readable in the idea of the modern consciousness. Evolution Darwin and Spencer speak of consists in a movement called progress, but it is unclear, why the movement must be a progress (improvement) and not the opposite. The second law of thermodynamics suggests rather that in a closed (immanent) reality "energetic death" is unavoidable. Species in the human mind are *originally* immutable, because dependent on things outside it (they are abstracted therefrom), but they are *confusable* in the human imagination nonetheless. Such a "growth of entropy" occurred in

some “philosophical” minds indeed. In the idea of the end of “Anthropocene” as well as in that of transhumanism, the degradation of the Greek rationality seems to crown that evolution.

The dream of becoming a beast is unrealizable in humans, but unethical too. The “infeasible” equals the “immoral” in that case. If e.g. a horse had fancied being a bird, the fancy would have proved disastrous to its equinity. Such like “hybrids” (Pegasuses) existed in the mythical imagination, but if they appeared in the minds of Evolutionists (Empedocles was this in antiquity), they stemmed from mythology. We cannot imagine what it is like for an animal to dream about becoming *a specifically better* animal, but we can observe what it is like for an animal to exist in a world deprived of its natural and unchangeable properties, because the contaminated environment is destructive for the animal existence. Animals wiped out of the environment do no act immorally because destroyed, but the destruction of the environment is immoral, obviously enough.

The endeavor to “transcend the nature” might be sound if nature is firm and sustainable enough, but the problem is how to find a proper way leading to the transcendence and perfection at the same time. “Change in life” might by for better or worse. Admiration: a *slight* annoyance at not seeing things clearly enough and their Source behind them, begets philosophy. Science can only be born from the perception of the privation of *knowledge*; not from the sensation of an “existential privation” (Weltschmerz). The panic anxiety born from our losing the proper place in the world make us try and escape from the nature blindfolded. We do not in fact intuit (before the end of existence) anything save our being lost. The anxiety begets “philosophy” in Hegel and Heidegger only. Commonly, it wreaks havoc on the real existence.

Thomas did not know Darwin, but know the problem Darwin faced: that of Neo-Platonism in general. Blurring the strict boundaries of being is a philosophical problem indeed. Man can marvel of being something better that just a man (out of pride) or at least something else than just a man, perhaps out of boredom or anxiety. However, seeing a film or reading a book depicting e.g. a banquet we are by no means saturated by the images. Similarly, our imagination is not able to cause real change in our nature. Our intellect is able to transcend our nature intentionally i.e., retrace the *cause* of our-being-a-definite-nature. Obviously, it is not tantamount *to become* that nature. Man cannot be a cause of his own existence. He cannot, accordingly, meliorate his nature. For to be what he is not, he must have ceased to exist first, for there is “a void” between mine and your being; between being an ape and being a man. There must be a proportion between a cause and an effect and the relation never reversed. Two persons can generate a child because none of them is capable of doing it alone, and no other (the third) needed to do so. On the other hand, the effect (the child) cannot have more or less specific being than the causes (the parents). It must be, then, either a man or a woman in the *adult* life. The separate thing is that he/she can be perversely denied right to puberty. Those two are per se properties of man. Some properties might be changed, for I can decide to live e.g. in Portugal instead of Britain. But I cannot decide to live nowhere, for it presupposes to cease to exist in a place whatsoever, i.e. to cease to exist in the proper (philosophically speaking) sense.

The enemy of God desired to be like God. He was proud but was not a fool. He did not desire (as Thomas observes) to change his nature, which would have been preposterous. The satanic intellect was lucid enough to make out the impossibility. It is not the case with humans

as there is in them the "creative imagination" besides the intellect. It can be deceived and the idea of Transhumanism can appear. There can be pride in man too, but suicidal one, and a desire can arise to become what he is not and cannot be. Superficially only, to change one's nature seems more ambitious than to change one personality or one's character or moral value. In fact, to change the latter is more demanding and precisely for that reason less attractive. One can be mistaken that, following the creative imagination, he is able to achieve more than by following the stringent rules of the intellect and the moral law.

In The Razor's Edge, Maugham described an addict. Every time intoxicated with opium he "felt" the mystery of being at hand. Alas, he was not able to grasp the mystery; to clothe it with words; to speak and write about it. It was a dream and nothing else. Apparently, yielding to drug addiction and phantasies leads to the degeneration of life. Paradoxically, however, the very degeneration happens to be joined with the sentiment of "betterment". In fact, every imaginary evolution of nature *as such* consists in degradation of *a particular* nature. Ultimately, the nonexistence follows, but even then, the naked fact that someone existed for, say, 40 years in the past cannot be changed.

One specific and particular nature is sustained by the other, for killing (causing nonexistence) is needed for a predator for feeding on its pray. The aggression is a "virtue" of a wolf, which kills, but fearfulness is a "virtue" of a hare, for it prevents being killed. There are particular "virtues" and particular (specific) natures too. There is no one natura naturata (as Averroists, Spinoza and Schelling supposed). The good for a wolf is killing; the good of a hare is not being killed. Special per se properties follow upon particular natures. The same applies mutatis mutandis to man. Aggression as such is natural, albeit if not moderated by reason is immoral. The same is the case with fearfulness. Once the boundaries of specific natures are blurred, a distinction of what behooves this or that nature will be blurred, and relativism will follow. In Schelling, only one totality of nature exists. In it, subconscious (unbewusst) spirit is latent as a sui generis property of the totality of nature. The properties of particular natures were mingled first and then a right was usurped to deduce the spiritual from the depth of the unconscious. The uncertainty of the outcome equals the relativism; the usurpation of the right to call into existence the spiritual (the formal) in man equals Totalitarianism. Those two seem to be organically coupled.

The beginning of the history of man was marked by the spectacular choice between returning to the Source on the way chosen by the Source, or – contrary – on the way chosen by man. Assimilation to God has – accordingly – a twofold sense. Either we try to assimilate to Him respecting the natural and supernatural given us by him, or we reject the proposal and try to imitate actions totally unworkable to man.

Creating a world is the exclusive prerogative of the Creator (with the capital "C"). Justifying the man is also. But in the 19th century the so called humanism claimed the right to create a "better world to live in" and a better idea of God suited to modern requirements of the so called contemporary man. The Word of God illuminates all the created. The "words" of the philosophers of Enlightenment were meant to show a better way: leading to what transcended nature in the sense of destroying it first. Transhumanism happens to be coupled with the most heinous attacks on the biological nature. The "supernatural" of the modernity becomes unnatural, because the fabric of the *diverse* natures was marred by some vague intuition of the totality in which *no specific nature can exist*.

In a child, its "instinct" (which suggests what is good-for-it) works relatively well. Still, according as it grows up or is expected (demanded) to do so, it partakes of reason receptive of the forms of things. Thinking follows them being actually possessed and discerned. The spiritual in (the grown up) humans is related to the animal in them, because the rational form of life is, at the same time, a natural (animal) form of their existence. The awareness of the receptive and the acting in its mind (the complementary acts of reasoning) improves *its* (the child's) awareness of "its" being *irrevocably him or her*, i.e. endowed with a body serving this difference.

The role of what was supposed to be the instinct in humans diminishes as far as it partakes of the universal reason. There is a twofold reason in man. The particular reason (1) is called so (a reason) for the mere possibility of partaking in the universal reason (2). The particular reason is a sense faculty (an "instinct"), whereas the universal one is spiritual and immaterial one. This "instinct" can be either *worse or better* than the animal one, all depending on (the mode of) partaking of the universal reason.

Some ideas both "creative" and absurd can appear in the particular reason if separated from the universal one. The oneiric is, obviously, unrealizable, but the endeavor to realize it is immoral. Acting is not a compromise between the fancied and the crude reality, but results from understanding the real relation between the thought and the thought of.

Man is capable of counting and the actual level of the civilization development is, to some extent, measured by the fact of using "huge" numerals. Still, in animals, admittedly, some counting is possible too. E.g. two eggs in a nest is less than three. The animal ability allows constructing an elementary equation e.g. in a form: 1 + 1 = 2. Still, a *debauched* particular reason is able to construct a debauched equation: 1+1 = 56 (2014). The ability must be called so because contrary to reason. No cause can produce more being than actually possessed of. A specific duality cannot beget more than the similarly specific duality.

The impossible in the (non-rational) nature is immoral in the rational being. The price payed for harboring "love for animals" is depriving love of its original meaning: a disinterested gift animal can neither understand nor accept.

Can, then, being-for-me be worse than being indifferent? It might be indeed, because:

1) The indifference towards what is importunately forced upon us is a virtue. Advertisements are so. Indifference is "cynical" from the point of view of the advertising, but that point of view is subjective. Being indifferent equals, in that case, being freed from the importunate;
2) Some news happen to be presented so as not to leave us indifferent. Perhaps (again), the indifference is "culpable" and "immoral" in the Hegelian sense of the word, but wholly profitable for those who refuse to partake. Emotions push us towards what we otherwise (if indifferent) would have never done. If moved ("impressed", "touched") a body loses its equilibrium and acts so as to restore it. The emotions act similarly. The e-motion is aimed at restoring the balance if shattered. Thus however, the motion appears to be forced and contrary to freedom. We must not be indifferent to the plight of the innocent. But we *should remain indifferent to the way* the plight is presented if the evil is pictured as powerful as inevitable, and the fact of the existence of Who actually controls every evil in the world by His Providence is lost sight of;

3) John Paul II compared the calling of artists to the acting of the biblical dogs licking Lazarus' wounds. The moral obligation to alleviate the pain, by showing that it is bound to vanish, rests on them;
4) The contact with nature consists in being indifferent to how the nature can be used; it consists in disinterested observing;
5) The indifference (stoics speak of) is a foretaste of true beatitude as long as the indifference concerns means compared with the end (them being used freely), and the cognizance of the useful in relation to the absolutely good makes us less concerned with the useful;
6) The media facts are not facts in the ordinary sense of the word. The ordinary sense of "something existing regardless of what/whether we think about it" was rejected by Hegel and Kuhn. The *imaginative* facts exist in a make believe world of theirs. Now, being indifferent to the imaginative which annoys us is a virtue. It is prudent to be personally indifferent so, but compassionate to render the others (the "impressed", "thrilled" and "shocked") to be indifferent also.

Metaphysics is purely theoretical, but its conclusions, nonetheless, applicable to the practical science (ethics first of all). There is the Ultimate: with the lower case or the capital latter, all depending on whether beatitude is meant, or the Cause thereof. There is an end of the human life, but it is more than just the last beat of the heart. The causal relation of the happiness to what lies beyond suggests that it is a new beginning.

Reaching the end in an ordinary sense of the word could be dull if the existence had consisted in variety of actions. E.g. the sense of hunger is explicable (for some) only by contrast to that of satiety, and so on. Heraclitus *seemed* to endorse the conviction, but he adds, nevertheless, that Logos dominates over the opposites. The variety of sensations seems to provide entertainment, but in a rational being it is bound to produce nauseam in the end. No one (no matter how intent to) can dispose of his rational nature.

The desire for good-for-me is not love properly speaking. Love consists in the will to offer a good for someone else. We do not love God, because in need of the gift or the Giver, but we rather desire to-be-good-for God, and as good as only possible. The moral perfection and, first of all, the work to obtain it is a gift and a yardstick of the genuine love.

The subject matter of the Aristotelian ethics is not a good for me, because it can always run the danger of being a good *exclusively* for me. It is a good potentially accessible for everybody.

Human life is (might be) value, but never the supreme one. Nay, the highest love consists in *sacrificing the life*. The sacrifice is a personal act, but it might be a social one under some circumstances also. A commander might lavish with the blood of the soldiers, which is laudable as far as the right to do so is rationally conceded to him and he shares in solidarity the dangers with the rank and file. Still, in a society built after the fashion of the military the right is being usurped.

Our being desired, on the other hand, is not a value at all. The emotional addiction is an Ersatz of the genuine love. Some pretend to love animals because having rendered them not self-reliant and wholly dependent on them. The sentiment of being needed might be pleasant to some, but it is either sadistic if desired at all expense (pushed to the extreme), or at

least infantile if pampered. It is childish if cherished towards animals, but immoral if so with regard to humans. If an animal could have been "happy", it must have been wild and independent (not protected). The independence, to be sure, as such is not a mark of humanity, but is prerequisite to return love (the ability of giving on one's own and liberally is properly human).

There it, nevertheless, a place for the notion of being-for in the classical philosophy.

> …the entire universe is constituted by all creatures, as a whole consists of its parts.
> Now if we wish to assign an end to any whole, and to the parts of that whole, we shall find, first, that *each and every part exists for the sake of its proper act*, as the eye for the act of seeing; second, that *less honorable parts exist for the more honorable*, as the senses for the intellect, the lungs for the heart; and, third, that *all parts are for the perfection of the whole*, as the matter for the form, since the parts are, as it were, the matter of the whole. Furthermore, *the whole man is on account of an extrinsic end, that end being the fruition of God*.
> So, therefore, *in the parts of the universe also every creature exists for its own proper act and perfection, and the less noble for the nobler, as those creatures that are less noble than man exist for the sake of man, whilst each and every creature exists for the perfection of the entire universe. Furthermore, the entire universe, with all its parts, is ordained towards God as its end, inasmuch as it imitates, as it were, and shows forth the Divine goodness, to the glory of God*. Reasonable creatures, however, have in some special and higher manner God as their end, since they can attain to Him by their own operations, by knowing and loving Him. Thus it is plain that the Divine goodness is the end of all corporeal things.[10]

No one can prove anyone's "existence" (Kierkegaard) should the existence be understood as being-there (in a place). Metaphysics proves the existence of God indeed i.e. the necessary relation of what exists in any manner (of what partakes of the proper act of existence) to the Fullness of Being. The existence of, say, this man, is contingent and out of the scope of the science because not being created out of necessity. But metaphysics is not concerned with the "fundamental": "why there is something rather than nothing" (Leibniz). It regards the necessary relation of a nature to its proper act of existence and the necessary relation of what exists to its Cause of existence (God). Nothing exists out of necessity, but everything endeavors to exist and does so out of necessity, albeit the endeavor is thwarted in the moment of death. Science deals with the necessary and morals too. The fact that God exists is necessary, albeit He Himself does not exist out of necessity, but out of His nature.

The first thing we perceive is just that: the general tendency to being; strife for existence, not to be confounded with the notorious strive for survival. The latter characterizes demo-liberal society and Darwin believed that nature must behave similarly.

Once the essence of a thing is defined and a thing established to be a transcendent (i.e. independent of the mind) being, all that is befitting or not befitting (its per se accidents) might

[10] Summa Theologiae I, q. 65 a. 2 c.
The Summa Theologiæ of St. Thomas Aquinas, Second and Revised Edition, 1920, Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, MARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ.

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be established. They are unchangeable, because e.g. to be-in-place (in general) is a necessary condition of man's existence as such. Being-in-*a*-place does not define him (as Heidegger supposed), and being-in-place is not tantamount to being in the three dimensional space. This (general condition) is, nonetheless, prerequisite for his being definable. In the common day language, "to exist" (in English and Latin too) is equivocal. Either it means to occupy a place, or to participate in/of its own act of existence. The former seems to be the common sense mark of the (human) life, as "to displace" or to "root out" adds up to destroying. The latter, however (found in Thomas) is the strict and philosophical notion of being. Sophisticated as it may appear, it is sometimes indispensable for those denied the right of the proper place to live in.

Apparently, Darwin (and some practical Darwinists some centuries earlier) mistook the real existence (created by God) for the existence in the three dimensional space it can be removed from so as to give way to the "better" one. The three dimensional space Darwin's "species" were supposed to exist in is imaginable, no doubt. In mathematics, points and figures exist in the imagination, but real things do not exist therein. Development and freedom in the *physical* world does not consist in eliminating the "worse" but in creating commonweal equally shareable by anyone. A degenerated intellect adopted a flawed principle, because every principle is valid only in a science it belongs too. The imaginable cannot dominate over the intellectual, and is does not in mathematics, as the imagination is rigorously directed by a special kind of abstraction therein, but does dominate in those idolatrously cherishing mathematics. Science exists in the human mind only and is demanded to be checked; not cherished.

Elimination is but accidentally connected with the principle of striving for the fullness of being. First, in anyone, some vices must be eliminated so as to gain virtues, and errors detected opposed to truth.

Two categories are of pivotal importance to ethics. Justice consists in rendering "to each what rightfully belongs to him" (suum cuique). No society can be preserved without it. However, a make believe society only can exist without *defining* the terms: "each", "what" "right" and "to belong". Moreover, no society can be *founded* without a disinterested gift (good) offered to somebody. The love of benevolence consists in disinterested giving. In both virtues "somebody" (a substance endowed with reason and will) and something (a good quality) define the act of giving. Man is a substance par excellence, for excelled and defined by reason. Indeed, he was excelled so (exalted) by the Source of his being, which amounts to that the ultimate "exaltation" cannot be procured save by the Source. A definite algorithm of "exaltation" was required. We cannot comprehend God, but we must possess virtues (the habits; "what is had") which allow obtaining the perfection. The most important ones are justice and love of benevolence.

No matter how perfect, man is not his own end. There exists an Ultimate Transcendent Cause which gives existence (creates) and, by the same token, attracts the created to Himself. The end is seen more or less clearly, but the whole worth of human existence on earth depends on seeing it as well as only possible and acting accordingly. There are good qualities in man which allow him advancing the path of virtue, and the evil ones leading him astray. We cannot know them intuitively. The intuition (if it should be called so) regards only the Source (in the afterlife), whereas the paths leading to the Source must be discerned; which is

impossible without reasoning. The good understood is the proper subject matter of ethics: the science on the way towards the Perfection.

There must be one metaphysics only. The metaphysics was discovered by Aristotle, and we read *his* "Metaphysics" so as to get to know the supreme knowledge. Analogically, there is but one hierarchy of values, but not equally accepted by all. Metaphysics was born in Greece indeed, but there is not a Greek metaphysics (different from the other "national" ones). The "sensitivity" (natural to all, but not reflected upon by all in the same degree) of Greeks was unique enough to call every supreme science by this Greek name (μεταφυσικά). Analogically, there is but one hierarchy of values, but not all perceiving it acutely enough. There are, accordingly, the Western Values, founded on the Greek philosophy, Roman law and Christianity, but some bizarre European Values founded on rejecting them all and based on the principle of total relativity. Aristotle was no doubt "an enemy of the open (i.e. relativistic) society", as Popper rightly observed. The open society is a degenerated one.

VI. Thingness of real things

There was Chaos at the beginning, according to *mythology*. There was no beginning, as the world is perpetual and the Logos in it – eternal, according to Heraclitus, *the philosopher*. "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God", *according to the Revelation*. "He was in the world, and the world was made by him, and the world knew him not." The pathway of philosophy is, at least potentially, the way to faith, as its definitions are logoi (in plural), and Logos is the Word (of God), and the principle is the first philosophical (abstract) term for (a concrete) beginning. The movement (the way) of mythological imagination leads to chaos only.

The movement of the particles of the dust in the air might be regarded – with a good approximation – as chaotic. The world of Democritus the atomist consisted of such like particles. Man, however, is (according to him) a microcosm which mirrors the macrocosm. The thought was great, but bereft of a footing, as it seems that thoughts (of a microcosm) must move "spontaneously" and without any order like particles of the macrocosm do. Ontological atomism happened to be abandoned in the centuries to come, but "the philosophy of chaos" remained attractive.

Every written book must be an ordered set of propositions. Albeit no book by Democritus has survived, we do not doubt that they all must have been drawn up diligently, since Plato deemed him a dangerous enemy. Now, the claim that "atoms of the mind" (moving in the same way any atoms do) might assume an elaborated form of a written book seems bizarre.

The movement of the objects comparable with the dimensions of the human body might be displayed graphically. Bodies are things, obviously enough and depictable. Still, besides these elementary ones, there are (according to Thomas) some more formal beings too. The human mind animates the human body. This mind (apart from its being the form of this body) accepts (intentionally) forms of things which otherwise exist independently of it. It is a microcosm indeed, due to the power to focus in itself formal perfections dispersed in the

material world. The cognoscitive things are more perfect than those non-cognoscitive ones.[11] Matter, according to Aristotle, is disordered as long as it fails to participate of a form, and material things (for that reason) *might appear* to be disordered too. The order appears in the human mind more or less distinctly. It is, however, discovered in it, not "produced", as Kant claimed.

Plato (the Spiritualist) opposed Democritus so vehemently that he even tried to silence his name. But Neo-Platonists understood the cognizance as mirroring (real) things. The exemplar ideas of theirs were not, to be sure, material things, but the idea of "reflecting" was bequeathed to the posterity, the Materialist one included. The most simplistic guise of philosophical "realism" was – paradoxically – inspired by the idea of this "mirroring" in Lenin. The image of a thing would be reflected in the mind; photographed by it.

It goes without saying that a form (albeit not necessarily: a reflected form) of a thing exists in an animal mind (in its memory), for the animal pursues an object imagined and memorized as if it were present to it. The form is "schematized" in it, i.e. subsumed under some inborn categories in a way Kant well, roughly speaking, described. Still, the inborn categories are proper to animals; not to humans; as there is no such "schematism" to be found in the human mind. The forms intentionally accepted in it undergo multifarious changes, contrary to the "instinctive", animal ones. The human cognitive form might be either better or worse than that of animals (all depending on how, and if, ordered). Words can be ordered, but gathered at random too. In an animal, death follows the disorder *immediately*. In man, *the death is postponed* and the agony pictured in the imagination. Some written words pretend even to be deep, because tragic this way.

The cognitive form of the animal mind rests in it *relatively* firmly. The debauched forms of human mind burden it. The yoke of "new ideas" weighs heavily upon those exposed to the novelty naively received. The firmness and immutability of the form existing in the animal mind is a condition of the animal survival. In the human mind, the forms might be "purified" by the intellect (the upper part of the mind) so that they can rest in it immovably at all: usque ad aeternum. In between them both, the forms of thinking "emancipated" from the natural order, predict the inevitable doom.

Scientific forms are ordered perfectly, and the scientific book is drawn up the best. The firmness of the forms *in general* depends on the order notions appear in our mind.

Apart from those, however, undoubtedly immaterial, there are, allegedly in the human mind, those "presenting themselves in their *corporeal* self-presence" (Husserl) also. The mind becomes, in that case, rather "consciousness" than a cognitive faculty *proper to man*. Husserl (in his Logical Investigations and Ideas I) does not deem "consciousness" proper to man, as there is, allegedly, "animal consciousness" also. "Consciousness" should be called, in the scholastic terminology, "particular reason": a *sensitive* faculty of man, and similar to the animal instinct. Phenomenology is concerned with that faculty only. Apart from wholly

[11] Summa Theologiae I, q. 14 a. 1 c. […] cognoscentia a non cognoscentibus in hoc distinguuntur, quia non cognoscentia nihil habent nisi formam suam tantum; sed cognoscens natum est habere formam etiam rei alterius, nam species cogniti est in cognoscente. Unde manifestum est quod natura rei non cognoscentis est magis coarctata et limitata, natura autem rerum cognoscentium habet maiorem amplitudinem et extensionem.

ordered sequence of concepts (proper to the universal reason), there appears, in the mind, that "spontaneous" and "creative" too. Besides abstract notions we have "philosophical ideas" too. Cartesians called them modes of "consciousness". Now, the form not wholly purified and dematerialized must prove to be a form of destruction in the end. Man, availing himself thereof would be a quaint animal indeed, because "conscious" of the inevitable death and destruction (as Heidegger rightly observes).

The forms of the particular reason are, to some extent at least, "chaotic". They are ordered in so far they partake of the universal reason. The order reflects the definite sequence they appear in the mind. The fact that this or that person is met first one day might be well (deemed) incidental. Still, the order the properties of being appear in our mind is by no means incidental. Various beings might *seem* to be not necessarily connected. There is, however, a definite connection of the forms of the original thinking.

The human imagination happens to be stimulated by casual impulses, and the train of thinking interrupted by them. We do not impose the order upon the imagined (Kant), but we suffer privation of the form really, if exposed to chaotic stimuli.

Forms cannot be "immediately given", because *true* (i.e. discriminative) judgments are not deducible from *pure* concepts (which is indispensable for science). Some particular objects *might seem* to occur to our senses without any order, but the line of rational life begins with a principle. It is extremely difficult to retrace the origin of the rational in man, but Thomas does it in one of his most famous texts.

> I answer that when investigating the nature of anything, one should make the same kind of analysis as he makes when he *reduces a proposition to certain self-evident principles*. Otherwise, both types of knowledge will become involved in an infinite regress, and science and *our knowledge of things will perish*.
>
> Now, as Avicenna says, *that which the intellect first conceives as, in a way, the most evident, and to which it reduces all its concepts, is being*. Consequently, all the other conceptions of the intellect are had by additions to being. But nothing can be added to being as though it were something not included in being—in the way that a difference is added to a genus or an accident to a subject—for every reality is essentially a being. The Philosopher has shown this by proving that being cannot be a genus. Yet, in this sense, some predicates may be said to add to being inasmuch as *they express a mode of being not expressed by the term "being."* This happens in two ways.
>
> First, the mode expressed is a certain *special manner of being*; for there are different grades of being according to which we speak when we speak of different levels of existence, and according to these grades *different things are classified*. Consequently, "substance" does not add a difference to being by signifying some reality added to it, but "substance" simply expresses a special manner of existing, namely, as a being in itself. The same is true of the other classes of existents.
>
> Second, some are said to add to being because *the mode they express is one that is common, and consequent upon every being*. This mode can be taken in two ways: first, in so far as it follows upon every being considered absolutely [1]; second, in so far as it follows upon every being considered in relation to another [2]. In the first, the term is used in two ways, because it expresses something in the being either affirmatively [1a] or negatively [1b]. We can, however, find nothing that can be *predicated of every being affirmatively and, at the same time, absolutely*, with the exception of its essence by which the being is said to be. *To express*

> *this, the term "thing" is used*; for, according to Avicenna, *thing differs from being because being gets its name from to-be* [1aα], *but thing expresses the quiddity or essence of the being* [1aβ]. There is, however, *a negation consequent upon every being considered absolutely: its undividedness, and this is expressed by "one." For the "one" is simply undivided being* [1b].
> If the mode of being is taken in the second way—according to the relation of one being to another [2]—we find a twofold use. The first is based on *the distinction of one being from another, and this distinctness is expressed by the word "something," which implies, as it were, "some other thing."* [2a] For, just as a being is said to be "one" in so far as it is without division in itself, so *it is said to be "something" in so far as it is divided from others*. The second division is based on the correspondence one being has with another [2b]. This is possible only if there is something which is such that it agrees with every being. Such a being is *the soul, which, as is said in On the Soul, in some way is all things*. The soul, however, has both knowing and appetitive powers. *"Good" expresses the correspondence of being to the appetitive power, for, and so we note in the Ethics, the good is that which all desire* [2bα]. *"True" expresses the correspondence of being to the knowing power* [2bα], *for all knowing is produced by an assimilation of the knower to the thing known, so that assimilation is said to be the cause of knowledge.*[12]

The general mode of cognition has been presented.

Some special mode of cognition might consist in subsuming the sense data under some categories indeed, albeit never in the way Kant imagined to be paradigmatic to man as such. There are not a priori categories of human mind, but the a priori order of the *created* universe, happens to be discovered by man. Categorization is secondary to the primitive intellection of what transcends all categories ("the mode … common and consequent upon every being"). Convertibles of being (Thomas speaks of) are sometimes called nowadays "transcendental properties of being". They do not, however, schematize nor "regulate" our cognition in the way Kant imagined. They precede *temporarily* (in our intellect's activity) the schematized and categorized.

Aristotle enumerates ten categories of being. The first one is that of substance, but, paradoxically, the first is more than just a category. We get to know the substance (the nature) of e.g. a man. But it would be impossible to know it *perfectly* without our intellect being able to grasp the thingness of things in general first [1aβ]. The thingness; the thing being real (rem esse) is more than a category, as it is a transcendental property of being (the property of its being definable). The nature of man (and for that matter of any species at all) would have been indefinable, had we been unable to grasp the thingness of things before getting to know special things ("special manner of being").

Man (horse, flower, etc.) can be defined at least in the sense proposed in a dictionary. Still, dictionaries make do with nominal definitions. We discern two notions this way, i.e. do not to confuse two *meanings.* We can even discern two images of some species if presented. But *we cannot discern two real things that way*: using words or images. Equipped with

[12] De veritate, q. 1 a. 1 c.
Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, MARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ.
Access 2026-10-29 https://aquinas.cc/la/en/

nominal definitions and perhaps pictures too, we turn to the real world, but we cannot be certain that we find in it the objects which could correspond to them. It is but probable that the imagined could mirror the real; it is not certain. Verbal and imaginative approximations do not even aspire to certitude, but are rather used so as to master the objects for *some time*. Approximations might be useful to some extent indeed, but the problem arises if a man (a "thing" endowed with personal dignity) appears amongst the objects. Perhaps, some relish in mastering them, but no one (unless perchance debased) relish in *being mastered*.

Science (according to Aristotle) is stamped with the mark of certainty, and the human dignified (rational) existence should be so also. It provides us with *real* definitions in which the defining identifies with the defined. "In dictionaries" (and in books also) we distinguish *concepts*. When living in the real world however, we grasp (intentionally) real things ("the quiddity or *essence of the being*" [1aβ]), because having perceived them first to be diverse ("«something» in so far as … divided from others" [2a]) and undivided in se (the "undividedness expressed by «one»." [1b]) first. Knowing a thing to be real (its thingness) is preceded by knowing it to be identical with itself and diverse to others, but first: to be in general, because "that which the intellect first conceives as … the most evident, and to which it reduces all its concepts, is being".

The majority of people do not understand the notion of being. The majority of philosophers after Scotus failed to understand *the proper significance* of being. "To be one" and to be diverse are, perhaps, "intuitively" known, but never as exactly as in the text De Veritate quoted above. The exactness, however, of seizing these three notions is prerequisite to knowing real things instead of some approximations of knowledge.

The majority of people are not philosophers, but they might be so, at least in the sense of contemplating (without analyzing) some detailed analyses carried out by philosophers. We relish in breathing clear air, and abhor the contaminated one. We feel pleasure at embracing some proved ideas even if unable to fully analyze them. Gilson calls man "a metaphysical being", which is true in the sense the primitive notions of: being, diversity, oneness, reality, are grasped by all, and used more or less effectively too, albeit sometimes by those "learning" philosophy only.

We do not need to be physicians so as to breathe, digest, and perform other natural activities. We need air to breathe and the notion of being to think and to act, but we do not need to analyze them. Yet, we cannot breathe *the idea of air* and we *cannot live on the phenomena*. Sache Husserl speaks of are not things (res) Thomas speaks of. We can only sustain our existence by things known and defined in the way Aristotle proposed. We cannot live "approximately" as the miserable Schrödinger's cat did. We can *imagine* a cat in a situation Schrödinger put it, but the imagination is not understanding.

The intellect discovers the firm foundations of knowledge and life. The social in man follows upon the rational in him. If socialized *rationally* men can raise a firm building of knowledge based on the intellectual principles. Is socialized after the Hegelian manner (if "socialists") people yield to a "spontaneous" play of imagination and destroy what have been built before. The civilization advances in, so to say, two opposed directions. The constructive, conservative and ordered movement is accompanied by a shadow of "social progress" destroying the achieved. The advocates of the latter accuse the former of "fundamentalism". The border between them both is not always that of different persons and characters. More

often than not, the borderline is drawn within a particular microcosm. A scientist, gifted and deserved for society, might (someday) desire to be more than just a scientist. Some imagine philosophy to be just that: a meta-science; perhaps even poetry. In consequence, some "philosophy" of a doubtful value embraced by a scientist mars his otherwise indubitable achievements. It was the case with the Copenhagen School really, but the phenomenon has been occurring since the 14th century incessantly.

It would seem that two persons I meet one day meet accidentally only. Still, a conversation they carry out is a fact I see. Is it an "atomic fact" (Wittgenstein) i.e. disconnected to the others? Had the dialogue been wholly incidental, it would have been inconceivable that definite outcome could issue (e.g. a book is this). There is no common "consciousness" two persons partake of at random, but one definite mind diverse to the other and imparting to it a definite knowledge. They both share in the same biological and rational, at the same time, nature of man. Still, they discuss, because diverse and opposing some opinions. Otherwise any dialog would have been impossible.

The real definition; the cognition of defining proprieties of a being is prerequisite to the cognition of secondary proprieties of a being: its being such and such with respect to human intellect stating facts ("the correspondence of being to the knowing power" [2bα]), and the human will implementing facts in the rationally planned life ("the correspondence of being to the appetitive power" [2bα]). *The real definition is a source of (discovering) values; both the values of statements and the moral values. Its object is the value itself.*

The sequence of the cognition of the convertibles of being is this: being, diversity, oneness,[13] thingness, truth, good. Sometimes beauty is added, as the perception of what is agreeable. The ultimate truth of scientific statements depends on the previously known convertibles of being. The same is the case with moral values.

The cognition of truth comes relatively lately, but the election of good even later. We can desire, to be sure, truth (knowledge), and (conversely) know what is good, for the truth is the good of the intellect and the good is true if known by the intellect. We cannot, however, desire and know at the same time. The order must be preserved.

Some activities might seem as disordered as spontaneous. Those merely chaotic are commonly despised (as "unaesthetic"). Still, the strict order proposed above is not commonly accepted.[14]

The fact that e.g. a Brown reads a book in a park might be (deemed) incidental, or at least not necessary because lacking constraint. *Pragmatically*, some activities are treated as

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[13] Summa Theologiae I q. 11 a. 2 ad 4 … quod primo cadit in intellectu ens; secundo, quod hoc ens non est illud ens, et sic secundo apprehendimus divisionem; tertio, unum; quarto, multitudinem.

[14] De veritate, q. 21 a. 3 c. Et ita plura includit in se ratio boni quam ratio veri, et se habet quodammodo per additionem ad illam; et sic bonum praesupponit verum, verum autem praesupponit unum, cum veri ratio ex apprehensione intellectus perficiatur; unumquodque autem intelligibile est in quantum est unum; qui enim non intelligit unum, nihil intelligit, ut dicit philosophus in IV Metaph. Unde istorum nominum transcendentium talis est ordo, si secundum se considerentur, quod post ens est unum, deinde verum post unum, et deinde post verum bonum. Si autem attendatur ordo inter verum et bonum ex parte perfectibilium, sic e converso bonum est naturaliter prius quam verum, duplici ratione.

incidental, which is *provisionally* acceptable. Still, science and moral responsibility begins in the moment the incidental gives way to the necessary.

The fact that Brown reads a book …, is not necessary (should not be so), because Brown is not compelled to reading. However, in the activities called by Thomas "human ones" (actiones humanae)[15] a *conditional* necessity (called the necessity of the end also) appears nonetheless. It is not incidental (indifferent) *how* Brown reads the book. It might be read superficially, critically, diligently. Brown can, moreover, be distracted in reading (it can happen to him). Reading and, for that matter, any other activity is part of the general pathway of Brown's life. With respect to the end to be obtained, all activities, otherwise deemed incidental, are valuable or not; are conditionally necessary. Reading books which are amoral, defamatory or false results in disrupting the integrity of life-line, a pathway towards the Plentitude.

Obtaining the end (the beatitude in God) is conditioned by actions completed in a certain order. It might be (for the time being) assumed that meeting one of many persons in a given day is purely incidental (Kant thought it was incidental at all). Still, if the spell of time is extending from "the one day" to "the one life", the meeting of diverse persons becomes less and less incidental. In the early childhood, we get to know persons in a certain order, and it seems that the sequence should be ordered by the bonds of familiar proximity. A child must be "sensible" to this proximity, which is to say: open to being. The cognition of diversity ("no one but he/she") follows. Then: "the sense" of the one (and unique) being related thus to him/her. Ultimately: the cognition of nature shared in common with the relatives. In the adult life, the statements (the relation to truth), and decisions (the relation to good) follow.

Nominalists assumed, as the first principle, the awareness of one's existence. True, no one can doubt his/her one existence *if asked pointblank.* Still, hardly ever, are we asked such like (quaint) questions. The self-consciousness is by no means the first principle.[16] We need first an act of the intellect directed towards *a transcendent being* so as to reflect on it, and, in the end, come to the conviction that the act must have been completed by an existing person. In a dialogue *X is* conscious of *Y* being real first. The "*self*-consciousness" comes as a reflection. In any activity (e.g. the aforementioned "reading"), the order of principles is to be observed.

The natural order of principles and the natural law based on them (Decalogue) comes first. We do not obey it because forced so by a whimsical deity of nominalists, but because the will of God is identical with His nature and His nature is Pure Existence (Being per se), which chimes in what we get to know first: natural principles. The first understood is being and thus a foretaste of the perfect life to be found in the Plenitude of Being (God).

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[15] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 1 a. 1 c. Illae ergo actiones proprie humanae dicuntur, quae ex voluntate deliberata procedunt. Si quae autem aliae actiones homini conveniant, possunt dici quidem hominis actiones; sed non proprie humanae, cum non sint hominis inquantum est homo. Manifestum est autem quod omnes actiones quae procedunt ab aliqua potentia, causantur ab ea secundum rationem sui obiecti.

[16] De veritate, q. 1 a. 5 ad 5 … Intellectus enim potest intelligere se non esse et se non intelligere, quamvis numquam intelligat sine hoc quod sit vel intelligat; non enim oportet quod quidquid intellectus intelligendo habet, intelligendo intelligat, quia non semper reflectitur super se ipsum …

Some human features and actions might seem incidental indeed. Still, upon closer consideration, the otherwise thought to be incidental reveals some traits of the definite. Some human features are to be called properties, and some of them are indissolubly connected with human nature. Masculinity and femininity is such a proper accident (accidens proprium) of humans. Ability to laugh (the example often adduced by Thomas) is another one. We discard improprieties, because knowing them not to behoove a man. Laugh is *a sense* of impropriety. Only those in the know can laugh at an anecdote. A trace of reasoning lurks hidden in the sense of risibility. Yet, the sense of disproportion implies the sense of "proportion" and the intellect might be called so in a sense. The proper accidents reveal to us the proper nature and the decisive, i.e. defining property of man: his rationality. No animal is endowed with the sense of risibility for it is unable "to sense" disproportion. Human proper accidents are at the border of the essential property of man: his rationality.

All other categories partake of the aforementioned necessity to some extent. Human accidents appertain to a specific form of humanity. E.g. the quantity attached to human species must span between, say, 0,5 and 2,7 m. in an adult person. Gulliver's Travels were impossibility, because a man of a "tiny" or "huge" body could not have prepared phantasms to be elucidated by the intellect (which defines his humanity). The human body is (according to Thomas) endowed with "the best complexion". For it to be a microcosm indeed, it must be proportioned to the macrocosm, for "the soul … as is said in On the Soul, *in some way is all things*."

Similarly, being in a place or being in a relation might seem incidental to some extent only. It is impossible for a man to live on the Earth humanly without calling a piece of it his homeland. It is impossible to come to existence without being in relation to those who are (for this reason) duly called (in English) relations (relatives).

Due to the cognizance of the main propriety of man (his rationality) we are able to form the real (not only the nominal and provisional) definition of man. In it, we seize the thingness (rem esse) of man. The definition is peremptory (unchangeable) because before knowing the thingness we get to know its being indivisible in se, because its being definitely diverse and not to be confused with others. We know, moreover, and first of all, its being as such.

The ability to form some conditionally necessary statements and the ability to make rational decisions stems from (our being conscious of) a thing of a definite nature. We get to know some necessary facts, and, consequently, we desire to get through the factual without losing the bearings of life. Unfortunately, the notion of "necessary facts" seemed an oxymoron for those who followed Hegel.

Every man desires: food water, shelter and some (perhaps less necessary) things so as to obtain the ultimate end of his/her life, or at least not to lose it at once. Some "material" goods are, perhaps not necessary. But the problem is not that of "materiality", but of how we get to know *good in general*, and its solution depends on how/if we find the first Source of good as such. In philosophy, the Source of good is identified with the source of being, because the properties of God are identical with His nature. On the natural way, the mind retraces the first Source of being departing from the most primitive "sense" of being. Everything occurring to us is a being. Everything should, then, lead to the *Plenitude* of Being.

Philosophy is not the only, neither, for that matter, the best (the safest) way to answer the question of the source. For a believer, the Source of good must be the Self-Subsisting Good. The truth, nonetheless, is revealed, and accepting the Revelation depends (partially) on the human free will (nemo credit nisi volens, "no one believes unless they are willing", as Augustine has it). From a purely rational point of view, the acceptance must be as eager as thankful. But few only (as Thomas says) follow reason in their life. In the human history, the acceptance was denied in many ways.

The majority of what "Brown" is likely to read is rejection; not acceptance. Let us adduce (for the time being) one instance only. Reading is (commonly) deemed entertainment; a distraction. The latter word sounds pretty innocent, but its etymology unveils its gruesome significance. People happen to be distracted i.e. led astray from the most precious. The mythical Sinis carried out "a distraction" before killed by the Athenian hero, Theseus. He tied people to two pine trees that he bent down to the ground, then let the trees go, tearing his victims apart; "distracting" their bodies so. For some extent at least, the modern entertainment might play a similar role. Our body is not "distracted", but our psyche (the emotional in man) can be so indeed. All the more so, the rational plan of life.

Several situations described in "the book Brown reads" are purely hypothetical. They might have occurred or not; they existed first in the imagination of the writer.[17] Still, amongst books read eagerly even nowadays, there are some pretending to be more than casual; to contain wisdom, albeit (as in Sartre) the dividing line between the literature and philosophy (the wisdom) is difficult to draw. The enmity of Plato towards the "literature" is perfectly known, but almost commonly denounced nowadays. According to Plato, "poets" rather dissuade people from Truth than persuade them thereto. Indeed, it was philosophy (not poetry) which (as Clemens' praeparatio evangelica) prepared the ancient mind to the acceptance of the Revelation.

A book read nowadays scarcely ever persuades to Truth. Even a modern commentary to, or a modern translation of, the holy Writ is likely to lead astray from God. All the more so a "philosophical" book. It can be written by a declared atheist, and in this case the frankness is as laudable as the objectives discardable. But a "book about God" can be also written by a disguised enemy of His, who, either for the lack audacity or out of the shrewdness shirks declaring his/her true objectives.

Aristotle's attitude towards poetry is not as negative as that of Plato. With predilection, he quotes maxims of ancient poets, a trace of an old and forgotten wisdom. He is open to any empirical source of wisdom. Thomas advances a step further. The maxims of the poets do not concern him very much and the quotation from Aeneid in Summa is rather casual. Still, he hardly ever rejects opinions on God in bulk, even if they smack of a bad poetry (which was the case with e.g. David of Dinant). Had he lived in our times, he most probably would undertake polemic with the opponents of Truth. (Marx, Feuerbach, Freud opposed it, but could not help advancing at least partially rational arguments fighting against

[17] De veritate, q. 9 a. 5 c. […] quandoque contingit aliqua nobis manifestari per locutionem, ex quibus intellectus nullo modo ad intelligendum magis roboratur; sicut cum recitantur mihi aliquae historiae […] huiusmodi enim indifferenter possunt cognosci et ignorari ab eo qui habet debilem intellectum et fortem.

the most rational). He would do so not for the sake of argument, but for the sake of liberating the minds of casual readers from the toxins sifted into their minds unheeded. He does not live now, but we have his books, and a moral duty, consequently too, to use them in defense of the Truth.

Thales of Miletus and the first ones called themselves "the wise". Since Pythagoras, however, a more modest name of "the lover of wisdom" (philo-sophos) has been preferred. Modesty and magnanimity are difficult to match albeit magnanimity seems to be indispensable for those who search truth for its own sake and the whole value of philosophy consists in matching the two. Since Peter Damian (died in 1072) philosophy itself has been called the handmaiden of theology: which was regarded either as a praise or an outrage: all depending on the way philosophers understood (and partook of) modesty and magnanimity.

In Thomas, both theology and philosophy are called wisdom, albeit in a different sense. The subject matter of theology is God Himself, but the subject matter of philosophy is a "modest: "there is the Supreme beyond the world dependent on It". Yet, the learned (in them both) are in no way privileged towards the simple. The *supernatural* gift of wisdom (the aptitude to obey the promptings of the Holy Spirit) enables simple and learned Christian alike to penetrate into the depths of God in the way no education permits. The distinction seems to be pivotal, but the word of wisdom was used insouciantly and abused in fact.

Plato answered the question of the origins of good pointing out to the Exemplary Good. Thomas says that he was rather inspired to the statement by the Old Testament than entitled (as a philosopher) to pass the justified judgment. The distinction between the wisdom of the Scripture and the wisdom of philosophers[18] is essential for them both so as to remain what they should be: sciences. Since Plato, the distinction has happened to be blurred (by his "interpreters") many times.

The Philosophy of Plato (and all the more of Platonists) is not what it must have been: a natural wisdom. In Plato, the source of being and truth are identical. Perhaps, truth and good have the same source really, but the fact cannot be taken for granted a priori. The goodness of nature (if analyzed carefully) points out to the Goodness of its Cause: existing beyond the nature. Theologically speaking, God has left providentially some traces of His existence in the world so as to encourage people to search for Him existing beyond the world. We cannot, however, (in philosophy) use the knowledge about God so to ascertain us as to His existence. A vicious circle in any "ontological proof" is evident. Most probably, Plato did not read the Old Testament after all, but might have been prompted to the cognizance of God by some supernatural stimuli.

If, to the contrary, philosophy and theology were *formally* identical, they both would cease to be what they should be. They could have been called sciences in metaphorical sense only.

The Scripture is the word of God and the task of theology consist in elucidating its sense. The word of God is unique and incomparable with other words. In it, otherwise than in

[18] Super De Trinitate, pars 3 q. 5 a. 4 c. Sic ergo theologia sive scientia divina est duplex. Una, in qua considerantur res divinae non tamquam subiectum scientiae, sed tamquam principia subiecti, et talis est theologia, quam philosophi prosequuntur, quae alio nomine metaphysica dicitur. Alia vero, quae ipsas res divinas considerat propter se ipsas ut subiectum scientiae et haec est theologia, quae in sacra Scriptura traditur.

human books, one sentence has manifold meanings. Equivocation begets confusion in human books; philosophy included; but it is not the case with the Scripture. Both theologians and philosophers should be aware of it. Nevertheless, a significant part of philosophy ("hermeneutics") tried to imitate the Scripture, and some (pretending to be theologians) advanced some "unique" sense of the Scripture.

Language is, as shown above, not a key to reality unless words in it are defined in way Aristotle proposed. Language is not a means of understanding, but a means to impart the understood to the others. Still, some attempts to use it so were made by Plato himself. A mere prefix "autos" (αὐτός) added to any specific word would render it "ideal".[19] E.g. man as such (τὸ αὐτοάνθρωπος: ipse homo) from: "autos" and "anthropos".[20] Similarly, with the idea of Good. It is hardly believable, that a mere prefix would suffice to raise the mind from the sensual to the spiritual. There is, to be sure, the good itself (Metaph., III, c. 2) identifiable with God, but not in the sense Plato supposed (Ethics, I, c. 6). It is rather the Self-Subsisting Good than Good Itself.

Plato's philosophy inspired so many philosophers (Whitehead) that it may be doubted that all who called themselves thus inspired remained philosophers yet. Ideas (since Descartes) produced in the minds of philosophers had been inspiring indeed, until Postmodernism proved the paradigm barren.

The first known by all is, according to Thomas, naturally begotten in the intellect, otherwise it could have not been begotten, but thought out only. It is not any idea. All natural activities partake of the first as far as natural. From the point of view of theology, the known so is inborn to man and concreated with him by God the creator as a first clue as to the future direction of life. The first known is being. The ultimately known should be the Being. Thomas calls it Ipsum Esse Subsistens.[21]

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[19] H. Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, sv. αὐτός, p. 125a. 6-14.

[20] Metaph., XIII, c. 5, 1079b 31-35
ἔσται τε πλείω παραδείγματα τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ὥστε καὶ εἴδη,
οἷον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῷον καὶ τὸ δίπουν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ
αὐτοάνθρωπος. ἔτι οὐ μόνον τῶν αἰσθητῶν παραδείγματα
τὰ εἴδη ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτῶν, οἷον τὸ γένος τῶν ὡς γένους
εἰδῶν· ὥστε τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται παράδειγμα καὶ εἰκών.

[21] Summa Theologiae I, q. 4 a. 2 c. […] Deus sit ipsum esse subsistens, nihil de perfectione essendi potest ei deesse. Omnium autem perfectiones pertinent ad perfectionem essendi, secundum hoc enim aliqua perfecta sunt, quod aliquo modo esse habent.; Summa Theologiae I, q. 4 a. 2 ad 3; Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 19 n. 3.

Summa Theologiae I, q. 7 a. 1 c. Illud autem quod est maxime formale omnium, est ipsum esse, ut ex superioribus patet. Cum igitur esse divinum non sit esse receptum in aliquo, sed ipse sit suum esse subsistens, ut supra ostensum est; manifestum est quod ipse Deus sit infinitus et perfectus.

Summa Theologiae I, q. 11 a. 4 c. Utrumque autem competit Deo. Est enim maxime ens, inquantum est non habens aliquod esse determinatum per aliquam naturam cui adveniat, sed est ipsum esse subsistens, omnibus modis indeterminatum. Est autem maxime indivisum, inquantum neque dividitur actu neque potentia, secundum quemcunque modum divisionis, cum sit omnibus modis simplex, ut supra ostensum est.

Summa Theologiae I, q. 12 a. 4 c. Solius autem Dei proprius modus essendi est, ut sit suum esse subsistens.

Brown, reading a book, can compare its contents with the principle and the end of human life. A "naive" question about principle and the childlike desire for the plenitude can arise in the minds of the greatest philosophers only. Those "pagans", as Thomas say, stood at the threshold of the Mystery. Unable to trespass the threshold they felt a kind of anxiety. The believer is freed from it if adheres to the Plenitude.[22]

Both attitudes are not highly estimated on "the free market of thinking" nowadays. They are, however, essential for the genuine philosophy. It is a "handmaiden" in the sense it prepares to trespass the threshold; to accept the Revelation and defend the accepted against the enemies of the human beatitude. The revealed is in the perfect accordance with nature, and for this reason cannot be identified with it.

Aristotle, as assumed, was a pagan. Still, "being a pagan" might be understood either in the sense of not being a Christian yet, or not being a Christian already. It was *supposed* that Aristotle was a pagan in the first sense of the word, albeit he was not on the latter, for he did not, like modern men, turn his back to the Revelation. Yet, the supposition that he was so in the first sense of the word might be false also. We are social beings because being rational. What we cannot achieve by our own power, we are able to achieve with the support of our friends. The friendship which joined Thomas and Aristotle was an eternal bond of spiritual kinship.

Aristotle is not only a guide for natural reason on its way towards the Plenitude, but also a director of the natural reason if it has been led astray from the Truth; all the more authentically, the more he is deemed "a pagan".

The question of the origin of good is answered by Aristotle in the philosophical language. The modern question of values is less strictly formulated and the ambiguity of the answer is always possible. The problem of values might be understood in the light of the old problem of universals. "Realists" and "nominalists" advanced their own opinions, which, however, could never become as necessary statements as Posterior Analytics demands. The problem of universals is not, nevertheless, a logical one. In the first chapter of Physics as well as in Metaphysics, Aristotle tackles the problem of forming real definitions. Thomas elaborates on the problem in the adduced text of De Veritate. Now, "modern values" are modern in the sense the definitions of modernity are nominal. Nominalism separates minds from reality and the so called "cage of consciousness" appears in them. The contrary ("realist") stance is, however, untenable. The intellectual does not exist (as "realists" assumed) in reality on its own. The real definitions in which the defined identifies with the defining are the only reasonable alternative. Theologically speaking, the values are "traces" of

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Summa Theologiae I, q. 44 a. 1 c. Ostensum est autem supra, cum de divina simplicitate ageretur, quod Deus est ipsum esse per se subsistens. Et iterum ostensum est quod esse subsistens non potest esse nisi unum, sicut si albedo esset subsistens, non posset esse nisi una, cum albedines multiplicentur secundum recipientia. Relinquitur ergo quod omnia alia a Deo non sint suum esse, sed participant esse.

[22] Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 48 n. 16 In quo satis apparet quantam angustiam patiebantur hinc inde eorum praeclara ingenia. A quibus angustiis liberabimur si ponamus, secundum probationes praemissas, hominem ad veram felicitatem post hanc vitam pervenire posse, anima hominis immortali existente in quo statu anima intelliget per modum quo intelligunt substantiae separatae, sicut in secundo huius operis ostensum est.

the Divine dispersed in nature, but carefully gathered by the abstracting intellect, which forms the real definitions.

From the same (theological) point of view, it might be said that the sense of being-for-me can only be elucidated by the Pure Being and for a believer only. The believers, however, are a minority. The way towards the Revelation is open to all (according to the Scripture), since the judgment as to the veracity of the Revelation can be passed by any unprejudiced intellect. Paradoxically then, the way of philosophy is more universal in a sense.[23]

Three main values happen to be adduced: Truth, Good and Beauty (Stróżewski). Still, the status of the latter is not nowadays absolutely certain. It might be deemed a convertible property of being as long as esthetical judgment is objective, but is not commonly admitted to be this nowadays. The sense of pulchritude is the most vivid, but, at the same time, seems the most subjective one. We cannot, as it seems, deny anybody the right to that subjective judgment.

If the three are *equally* values, the first two will be as *unstable* as the third one might be. If everyone can be granted a license to entertain his/her own esthetical tastes, everyone one (by the parity of reasoning) is entitled to call moral and true what he/she pleases.

Pulchra sunt quae visa placent (beautiful things are those which please when seen), Thomas says. If beauty is a value, it can only be in the sense of "pleasing when seen"; not in the sense of "pleasing so much that desired". The desires are, really, hardly definable, whereas the notion of *the lack of any desire apart from the desire to see* is quite clear.

> Beauty and goodness in a thing are identical fundamentally; for they are based upon the same thing, namely, the form; and consequently goodness is praised as beauty. But they differ logically, for goodness properly relates to the appetite (goodness being what all things desire); and therefore it has the aspect of an end (the appetite being a kind of movement towards a thing). On the other hand, beauty relates to the cognitive faculty; for beautiful things are those which please when seen. Hence beauty consists in due proportion; for the senses delight in things duly proportioned, as in what is after their own kind—because even sense is a sort of reason, just as is every cognitive faculty. Now since knowledge is by assimilation, and similarity relates to form, beauty properly belongs to the nature of a formal cause.[24]

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[23] Contra Gent., I, c. 2, nr 3, 4 […] quidam eorum [singulorum errantium], ut Mahumetistae et Pagani, non conveniunt nobiscum in auctoritate alicuius Scripturae, per quam possint convinci, sicut contra Iudaeos disputare possumus per vetus testamentum, contra haereticos per novum. Hi vero neutrum recipiunt. Unde necesse est ad naturalem rationem recurrere, cui omnes assentire coguntur. Quae tamen in rebus divinis deficiens est.

[24] Summa Theologiae I, q. 5 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod pulchrum et bonum in subiecto quidem sunt idem, quia super eandem rem fundantur, scilicet super formam, et propter hoc, bonum laudatur ut pulchrum. Sed ratione differunt. Nam bonum proprie respicit appetitum, est enim bonum quod omnia appetunt. Et ideo habet rationem finis, nam appetitus est quasi quidam motus ad rem. Pulchrum autem respicit vim cognoscitivam, pulchra enim dicuntur quae visa placent. Unde pulchrum in debita proportione consistit, quia sensus delectatur in rebus debite proportionatis, sicut in sibi similibus; nam et sensus ratio quaedam est, et omnis virtus cognoscitiva. Et quia cognitio fit per assimilationem, similitudo autem respicit formam, pulchrum proprie pertinet ad rationem causae formalis.

Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province,

The pleasing is not, as it would seem, subjective. The joy is the last of eleven main affects enumerated by Thomas. It is a counterpart of the first one: love. Both (and only these) can be ascribed to God. God "hates" or "repents" in the sense the effects of the human hatred and repentance being somehow similar to those divine. Still, He is Love out of his essence, and love is necessarily followed by joy. Joy is then, a privileged emotion in man (a trace of divinity appears in it).

Philosophy is not born from any of these affections. It is born out of admiration and the admiration is a kind of fear. A moderate fear is (contrary to what stoics say) a virtue of the disciplined mind. The disciplined are anxious not to lose the most precious. A similar virtue is the fear of God. Philosophy is born from the fear of the "unknown" and the yearning for the "Unknown". This fear is a virtue, similarly as the fear of Lord is: being anxious not to lose the bond with God. It is *the outcome* of both philosophy and theology (contemplation) only that begets joy. The pathway of them both is rational, because aimed directly at the End. The rationality of the other "endeavors" of man is not certain. Many activities lead astray from the End. The contemplation lulls desires similarly as joy does. It is, according to Thomas, preposterous too gauge the authenticity of joy by a desire it begets incidentally only.

The esthetical perception (joy) is about rest; not about being circumspect. The majority of people are not philosophers, but this majority can always contemplate the conclusions *classical* philosophy provides and abide by them: without calling anything to doubt. Aristotle says that emotional immaturity stands in the way of the philosophical enquiry. Instead, wisdom (without reasoning) is born in a slowly ripening mind when it rests (Physics, bk. VII, Ch. 3) contemplating the truth – without analyzing it.

The pleasing begets calmness, and *lulls* the desire.

> The beautiful is the same as the good, and they differ in aspect only. For since good is what all seek, the notion of good is that which calms the desire; while the notion of the beautiful is that which calms the desire, by being seen or known. Consequently those senses chiefly regard the beautiful, which are the most cognitive, viz., sight and hearing, as ministering to reason; for we speak of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds. But in reference to the other objects of the other senses, we do not use the expression beautiful, for we do not speak of beautiful tastes, and beautiful odors. Thus it is evident that beauty adds to goodness a relation to the cognitive faculty: so that good means that which simply pleases the appetite; while the beautiful is something pleasant to apprehend.[25]

The Psalm 50 is about repentance. Words in it seem to be commonly used, but the configuration of the words renders the text extremely difficult to understand *fully*. Augustine

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[25] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 27 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod pulchrum est idem bono, sola ratione differens. Cum enim bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, de ratione boni est quod in eo quietetur appetitus, sed ad rationem pulchri pertinet quod in eius aspectu seu cognitione quietetur appetitus. Unde et illi sensus praecipue respiciunt pulchrum, qui maxime cognoscitivi sunt, scilicet visus et auditus rationi deservientes, dicimus enim pulchra visibilia et pulchros sonos. In sensibilibus autem aliorum sensuum, non utimur nomine pulchritudinis, non enim dicimus pulchros sapores aut odores. Et sic patet quod pulchrum addit supra bonum, quendam ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam, ita quod bonum dicatur id quod simpliciter complacet appetitui; pulchrum autem dicatur id cuius ipsa apprehensio placet.

and Thomas wrote commentaries, and we can avail ourselves of them when trying to understand the text as it deserves. Still, the way of the theological analysis is laborious (and the philosophical one also). It is by no means a "beautiful activity". Joy crowns the activity if honestly performed. But the way is somehow opposite to the end. Desire for knowledge for its own sake is accompanied by the labor of discipline.

An elementary knowledge of Latin and a silent abode suffices to contemplate the beauty of Miserere by Giorgio Allegri. We are not theologians when listening, but we consume the joy of contemplation when elated by this music: an unscientific commentary to Psalm 50.

Is this music elitist? It is in a sense. It is not "popular" and vulgar, to be sure. We are born to contemplate the stars Anaxagoras says, not to consume the common. An inner integrity is born from the joy of contemplation; from a *genuine* music. We do not perceive unity thematically, but live it through instead. The philosophy of unity (Neo-Platonism) was perfectly aware of this role of the art. Unfortunately, it was, first of all, a philosophy of unity.

Something definite is, first of all, a unity. The undivided, obviously enough, cannot be "multiplied"; "updated" and – generally speaking – tampered with like "modern values" happened to be. Still, the precise notion of unity is not easily understandable, and Neo-Platonists perhaps simplified the problem after all. The mathematical unity is incomparably clearer than the philosophical, and many resort to it when speaking of the unity in general. The mathematical unity is, however, a surrogate of the unity metaphysics speaks of. It can save us from a total relativism, but for a time only.

Qui non intelligit aliquid unum nihil intelligit.[26]

> …according to the Philosopher, whoever does not understand a thing which is one does not understand anything at all. A thing is one, however, by being undivided in itself and distinct from others. Hence, whoever knows a thing must know its distinction from other things. But the first basis of distinction lies in affirmation and negation. Therefore, whoever knows an affirmation must know its negation.

Before knowing the essence of a thing, we know it to be one (undivided in se). This, however, is preceded by the cognizance of its being diverse to others (expressed in the non-contradiction principle; principium complexum), and first of all, by knowing principium incomplexum: being. A definite judgment about essence is preceded by the knowledge of the first principles. It is, in turn, indispensable for ascribing any proprieties to a definite thing. The true statements about facts express such like proprieties, and this truth is decisive for getting to know goods called moral values. Good is a human propriety. Some states behoove the human dignity; the others do not. The good if understood is an objective value.

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[26] De veritate, q. 2 a. 15 c. Responsio. Dicendum quod, secundum Philosophum in IV Metaphysicae, qui non intelligit aliquid unum nihil intelligit; per hoc autem aliquid est unum quod est in se indivisum et ab aliis distinctum; unde oportet quod quicumque cognoscit aliquid quod sciat distinctionem eius ab aliis; prima autem ratio distinctionis est in affirmatione et negatione; et ideo oportet quod quicumque scit affirmationem cognoscat negationem; et quia privatio nihil aliud est quam negatio subiectum habens, ut dicitur in IV Metaphysicae, et *alterum contrariorum semper est privatio*, ut dicitur in eodem (et) in I Physicorum, inde est quod ex hoc ipso quod cognoscitur aliquid cognoscitur eius privatio et eius contrarium.

A purely philosophical stance has been presented in Thomas, but philosophy and mathematics melt together in some systems supposed to be philosophical and, at the same time, scientific, because (allegedly) ennobled by the "queen of the sciences". Mathematical objects are of objective value and cannot (contrary to what J. St. Mill claimed) "evolve". The equation: 1+1=2, is true always, independently of the characteristics of the mind (the equation appears in) supposed to undergo evolution.

Plato espoused Mathematicism perhaps at least partially out of the fear of sophistics. Ideal numbers do not change; are immutable. Still, the *real* numbers (mathematics, not philosophy speaks of) are multipliable into infinity. The same might befall the values fashioned after their manner in the end.

The ambivalent character of Neo-Platonism might be illustrated by the fate of Husserl's philosophy. A gifted mathematician, he tried to fashion philosophy after the manner of the "exact" science. "Every eidos has its mathematical dimension" he says (in Ideas I). Husserl was not a relativist when we wrote the book (in 1913), but shortly before he died (in 1938) he paved the way for Postmodernism. His philosophy was drifting ("evolving") incessantly in that direction.

In Neo-Platonism, the hierarchy of values is pictured as a cone with the Supreme One at the top (God was supposed to be this). The hierarchy of goods Aristotle, "the pagan" speaks of (De Caelo, bk. II Ch. 12) is different. There are, so to say, "two cones" with a common base. The First Being is perfect and for this reason simple. The most imperfect being (the prime matter) is "simple" because *imperfect*. David of Dinant confused the two meanings, and his consequence in pursuing the flawed principles astonishes even nowadays. God possesses the supreme perfection out of his nature. The prime matter is deprived of any perfection until it partakes of any specific form. Between the two poles, the created universe displays various forms of (getting to) perfection.

Material things perform but few activities, but are unable to obtain the supreme perfection at all. They desire to (the world is teleologically structured), but the desire is thwarted by their destruction. As the elementary activities are scarce, they are easily analyzable, and the sciences which get to know them are, for this reason, called "exact".

A little less perfect than the Creator, the supreme creatures need but few actions so as to attain the supreme perfection. They are called angels in the Scripture. They differ as to the level of their (intellectual) nature and the multiplicity of actions needed for beatitude. This hierarchy is *descending* towards the "basis". From the other pole, animated bodies perform more activities than elementary ones; those better animated are more complex and their perfection even resembles remotely a true beatitude. This hierarchy is *ascending* towards the "basis".

Now, between the two opposites, at the "basis" of the two cones, the human existence unfolds. Humans undertake many more activities than the elementary or even animal bodies do. By them, however, they can attain, albeit with extreme difficulty, what "bodies" cannot attain at all. They can attain the same as angels can,[27] but need more actions thereto. Their life is more "complicated".

[27] Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 57 n. 5 Hinc est quod Matth. 22-30, dominus hominibus repromittit gloriam Angelorum: erunt, inquit, de hominibus loquens, sicut Angeli Dei in caelo. Et Apoc. 20,

The complexity might be even a vice. Civilization, obviously enough, advances towards a complexity, but on the other hand, "a complexity without simplicity" is a debauched one. There must be an end set down before multiplying the activities. At the border of sensuality and rationality, the so called particular reason can emancipate from the abstracting reason and produce values ad infinitum in the way Heidegger proposed. Humans can build, and pave the way towards the Supreme. They can, however, raise up a labyrinth too, in which some happen to be hopelessly lost.

"Thinking in categories of" has always a problematic value even if the categories are "exact" and successful (in technology, for instance). Products of industry are more and more complicated (albeit still "exactly" analyzable), but the complexity is not tantamount to their objective value. Those "complex" have, obviously, more commercial value, but from the point of view of the end to be obtained, they sometimes have no value at all, or are even anti-values. The same is the case with "ideas" elaborated on in books. The world presented in modern books might well be more complex than that of e.g. Homer or Shakespeare, but the complexity is not a gauge of their value. Values – in a broader and "nominal" sense of the word (presented above) – are "created" by man. The real ones are, to the contrary, created by God, or rather concreated with things they define. If defined, they prove to be but means to the End. The undefined, to the contrary, is likely to be taken for the end, and for this reason, to be worshiped if forgotten to be "exactly" analyzable. The worship of the made, produced (created so) is idolatry.

Cynicism: the defiance to acknowledge the miracles of (human) industry and to worship the Hegelian "good infinity" is a (unmodern) virtue indeed. But on the other hand, contemporarily, the direct contact with nature (despised by Hegel) happens to be more estimated than the complexity of the Civilization. Without nature which sustains the Civilization its structure is poised in the air. First of all, nonetheless, the intellectual nature is of concern. The unpredictable in nature allures. The first knowable is just this: the unnamed because name-giving, and enticing because accompanied by yearning for the Unnamed. By the first principles true values are discerned from those "nominalist" ones.

Species sunt sicut numeri (species are like numbers),[28] but are not number properly speaking. The specific in a science is not multipliable in the way real members are. There is a

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eadem mensura hominis et Angeli esse perhibetur. Propter quod et fere ubique in sacra Scriptura Angeli in forma hominum describuntur: vel in toto, sicut patet de Angelis qui apparuerunt Abrahae in similitudine virorum, Gen. 18-2; vel in parte, sicut patet de animalibus, Ezech. 1-8, de quibus dicitur quod manus hominis erant sub pennis eorum.

Summa Theologiae I, q. 20 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod naturam humanam assumptam a Dei verbo in persona Christi, secundum praedicta, Deus plus amat quam omnes Angelos, et melior est, maxime ratione unionis. Sed loquendo de humana natura communiter, eam angelicae comparando, secundum ordinem ad gratiam et gloriam, aequalitas invenitur; cum eadem sit mensura hominis et Angeli, ut dicitur Apoc. XXI; ita tamen quod quidam Angeli quibusdam hominibus, et quidam homines quibusdam Angelis, quantum ad hoc, potiores inveniuntur. Sed quantum ad conditionem naturae, Angelus est melior homine.

[28] Contra Gentiles, lib. 4 cap. 41 n. 3 Est autem impossibile quod alicui speciei in sua integritate iam constitutae aliquid extraneum uniatur in unitatem naturae, nisi species solvatur. Cum enim species sint sicut numeri, in quibus quaelibet unitas addita vel subtracta variat speciem si quid ad speciem iam perfectam addatur, necesse est iam aliam speciem esse: sicut si substantiae animatae tantum addatur sensibile, erit alia species; nam animal et

Supreme Being creative of all values, but not to be called the supreme unity in the way Neo-Platonists tried to, nor the supreme value related to the others by the mere fact of being "supreme". All things are related to God, but the reverse relation does not exists save in the reason. The hierarchy of values is discoverable, because all sciences are hierarchically ordered – with the supreme – metaphysics at the top. It is not imaginable, as mathematical graphs are. The hierarchy of goods of De Caelo, bk. II Ch. 12, is rather paradoxical than imaginable.

Species are like numbers, because unity added or subtracted varies the species. Aristotle does not admit the possibility of adding and subtracting anything *in nature*. "Adding and subtracting" are to be understood to occur in the mind only. Being undivided in se (being one) is knowable by dint of stating diversity first (its not being another being); and the stating might be called "adding and subtracting" indeed. Aristotle uses a comparison and the unity he addresses must not be understood to be that of mathematical entities. *Species do not vary in nature, and values cannot also*. The actual state of a science, or rather: *the actual state of the mind approaching the definite* in the science *varies* indeed. There is not, on the other hand, "any amount of entity" measurable in nature. Things cannot evolve. A mathematical function (if differentiable) can assume continuous values, but things are not "differentiable" this way. The natural species are diverse. The real good assumes discrete values only.

There are no numbers in nature, and things do not come to existence by means of addition (of e.g. atoms). The origin of species occurs in our mind only, for similitudes (species) of things appear in it really if abstracted from matter.

We cannot (and should not try to) offer a person the indefinite. It is contrary to love. Good, the convertible of being, is relative in the sense only, it has (should have) a certain relation to a nature able to sustain it and perfectible by it. We chose something definite for the sake of a person we love. Acting is (should be if really human) preceded by knowing. E.g. a physician borrows the theoretical knowledge from microbiology. "Spontaneous" actions are in that case simply immoral.

Practical wisdom happens to be appreciated, which is justifiable as long as "the practical" is not identified with the "pragmatic" and ignored to be related to the end. The "speculative", in that case, would have been but loosely connected with the practical. Wisdom is about the end, and the cognizance of the end depends on purely theoretical considerations.

Metaphysics is a science about God, but God is not its subject matter. To the contrary, its whole value consists in us (philosophers) being subjected to God. God is the subject matter of theology, but for this reason only it partakes of the knowledge of God freely imparted to us by the Revelation.

Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of the divine knowledge, for the divine can be either known or knowing. The latter knowledge had been not taken into account until some three centuries after Aristotle's death God offered His own knowledge to men.

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planta diversae species sunt. Contingit tamen id quod non est de integritate speciei, in aliquo individuo sub illa specie contento reperiri: sicut album et vestitum in Socrate vel Platone, aut digitus sextus, vel aliquid huiusmodi.

Everything stems from God and everything should return to Him in/on the way He himself determined, i.e. without changing anybody's nature. We are on the way from the natural to the supernatural, but for the way to be what it must be (a way) both the natural and the supernatural must remain distinguished.

There are objects on the way commonly called goods or values, but they are not necessarily real goods only because named so. Good is befitting a given immutable nature. Natural goods are identical for all men, because man is a social being. There are, to the contrary, no such like natural good common to *all* animals. The human mind is unrestricted and no man to be excluded from the community unless, perchance, attacking the very core of the community. The animal mind, on the other hand, is restricted to a given ecosystem and to a given species. The death of an herbivore is good for a carnivore. Their goods are specific and of restricted value only. They are competitive. Yet, the specific in man is, at the same time, general, because all men are equal with respect to their ultimate end. They are not equal to each other, because differently endowed by nature. They are, however, given an obligation along with the endowment to share the private with the others in a definite manner.

We love authentically if willing a real good to somebody. The intended is an immanent good (for it is conceived in the mind), but the recipient of the good is transcendent. This metaphysical distinction of a twofold end (τινός; τινί: Metaph. XII, c.7, 1072ba 1-14) applies to both metaphysics and ethics.

Animals cannot be given love, because the human love does not exist in the animal world. A wounded animal, if pitied, is harmed, because an animal illness is a natural way to death which liberates from the prolonged suffering. Postponing this *animal* death is but a refined cruelty.

There are many privations in human life and essentially deferent to those animal ones: in respect to the end. The end of the animal life is its terminus. The end of man's life is a new beginning. Man is capax Dei (capable of God), whereas animals are not. The ultimate destiny of man consists in the indissoluble union with God. There are some beings inferior to man (animals) unable to obtain this end (beatitude), and some superior, potentially privileged in this respect (angels). *All human means on the way leading to the ultimate perfection are to be called values.*

VII. Diversity and individuality

Boethius defined a person as an individual substance of rational nature. In the definition, natural properties of being are included (harmonized). Diversity and individuality are amongst them. Persons are more than just "points on the map of the imaginary universe"; drawn, but unable to act by themselves; ignorant of both the principle and the end of their existence.

Although the notion of being had not appeared in the Greek philosophy before Parmenides, it played a pivotal role in Plato and Aristotle. Aristotle accepts the primacy of the principle of non-contradiction (the principle of diversity) expressed in the terms of being and non being ("it is impossible to be and not to be at the same time". This principle in Thomas is called the complex one (principium complexum), whereas the being (understood) – the incomplex

principle (principium incomplexum). The latter, however, does not appear in Aristotle save indirectly only. The bequest of Parmenides might have been a cause.

In Metaphysics, Aristotle proves that being must not be a genus.[29] Thus he opposes Plato's "Parmenides" and "Sophists". We are able to define the value of any object of the intellect and the will, because this value is founded in being, and the first principle of thinking we grasp is being. But we cannot define anything peremptorily if dividing being-genus into its alleged parts (species). The method of dividing (diaresis) is proper for mathematics (or perhaps for the set theory also), and both Aristotle and Thomas objected that the method was unduly extrapolated onto the physical. Mathematics applies to nature, and we obtain thus what Aristotle calls scientia media: a science in-between philosophy of nature and mathematics.[30] In nature, circles, squares and lines do not exit, albeit they are useful idealizations of physical objects. Especially, the nature of man, if "idealized" thus, is schematized. Apparently, man is not a "part" of the three dimensional space for a mere reason of his body having dimensions. The "realm of human existence" might be taken either metaphorically (if imagined only) or analogically if taken philosophically. Be that as it may, the "realm" and "extension" are not to taken intuitively: imagined instead of being understood.

Being is but a methodological genus. The subject matter of metaphysics is being as such (τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν)[31]. The notion of genos (γένος ὑποκείμενον) belongs to the general

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[29] Metaph., III, c. 3 998b 22.

De potentia, q. 7 a. 3 c. […] nihil ponitur in genere secundum esse suum, sed ratione quidditatis suae; quod ex hoc patet, quia esse uniuscuiusque est ei proprium, et distinctum ab esse cuiuslibet alterius rei; sed ratio substantiae potest esse communis: propter hoc etiam philosophus dicit, quod ens non est genus.

De principiis naturae, cap. 6 Et ideo ens dicitur per prius de substantia, et per posterius de aliis. Et ideo ens non est genus substantiae et quantitatis, quia nullum genus praedicatur per prius et posterius de suis speciebus, sed praedicatur analogice. Et hoc est quod diximus quod substantia et quantitas differunt genere, sed sunt idem analogia.

Summa Theologiae I, q. 3 a. 5 c. Secundo, quia, cum esse Dei sit eius essentia, ut ostensum est, si Deus esset in aliquo genere, oporteret quod genus eius esset ens, nam genus significat essentiam rei, cum praedicetur in eo quod quid est. Ostendit autem philosophus in III Metaphys. quod ens non potest esse genus alicuius, omne enim genus habet differentias quae sunt extra essentiam generis; nulla autem differentia posset inveniri, quae esset extra ens; quia non ens non potest esse differentia. Unde relinquitur quod Deus non sit in genere.

Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 5 l. 9 n. 5 Nihil autem posset esse extra essentiam entis, quod per additionem ad ens aliquam speciem entis constituat: nam quod est extra ens, nihil est, et differentia esse non potest. Unde in tertio huius probavit philosophus, quod ens, genus esse non potest.

[30] Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 1 l. 13 n. 2 Quod autem mathematica dicuntur esse sine motu, referendum est ad illas scientias, quae sunt pure mathematicae, sicut arithmetica et geometria. Astrologia enim considerat motum, quia astrologia est media scientia inter mathematicam et naturalem. Principia enim sua astrologia et aliae mediae applicant ad res naturales, ut patet secundo physicorum.

[31] Metaph., IV, c. 2, 1003a 21-32
Ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τις ἣ θεωρεῖ τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν καὶ τὰ τούτῳ
ὑπάρχοντα καθ' αὑτό. αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν οὐδεμιᾷ τῶν ἐν μέρει
λεγομένων ἡ αὐτή· οὐδεμία γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπισκοπεῖ
καθόλου περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὄν, ἀλλὰ μέρος αὐτοῦ τι ἀποτε-
μόμεναι περὶ τούτου θεωροῦσι τὸ συμβεβηκός, οἷον αἱ μαθη-

methodology of science. Each one has a proper subject matter not to be confounded with the others. Methods must not be confounded also.

The notion of being seems, upon closer consideration (proper for a philosopher), to inhere in every ordinary notion. Various types of acting (expressed in verbs) are in fact various modalities of being. On the other hand, various subjects (named with nouns) acting this way participate in being, and, consequently, are to be called beings through participation. The similar might be (analogically) observed as to the other "parts of the sentence". The only problem is how to generalize the notion of being so that it might encompass all those modalities of being. The first principle (this notion) contains the other potentially, but being (in general) is not, for that reason, a "container" of beings (in plural); is not a genus divisible into its species, which was in fact assumed by Plato. The first principle contains in itself *potentially* what is dependent on it, but does not "contain" (literally) anything like sets do, or, e.g. water contains microelements. "To contain" has one common-day meaning, but another one too: less easily legible. Philosophy elaborates upon abstract meanings (which was the case also with the Latin "finis" or "principium" or the English "end".

The problem how to name the principle of naming without a vicious circle is especially visible in English. "Being" might be translated into Latin as ens (present participle in the middle age Latin corresponding to the classical Greek τὸ ὄν), or esse (infinitive). Ens participates of existence, but is identical with it only in the Universal Source of being (God).

All people grasp the principle, but few only understand the name of being. All the less, the notion of the subject matter of metaphysics (ens inquantum est ens) is understandable to all. All people seize being and use the principle more or less effectively, because everything they normally get to know is *a* being. The air we breathe in and the soil we stand on sustains our existence, albeit normally we do not reflect upon the fact and take it for granted. The first and general instrument of thinking might well go unnoticed just because being first and general.

Science must reflect as long as theses articulated in it are supposed to have a definitive value. In the common-day tongue, we happen to utter some statements of little value, because we do not reflect upon the principles deeply enough. The statements of the science are valuable, because they are related to the principle of valuing. The Archimedean point (such a base) gives the strength and freedom to our actions and proportionally so to how deeply we reflect upon the principle. Now metaphysics performs a "total reflection" since it addresses the absolutely first principle. *Valuing is not creating*. Nietzsche was wrong. We create a realm of freedom *discovering* the first principles; laying hold of them; finding in them a firm footing.

We digest food without knowing the physiology of human body. A doctor must know it if demanded to cure e.g. dyspepsia. But even then he assists nature instead of replacing it.

ματικαὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ἀκρο-
τάτας αἰτίας ζητοῦμεν, δῆλον ὡς φύσεώς τινος αὐτὰς
ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καθ' αὑτήν. εἰ οὖν καὶ οἱ τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν
ὄντων ζητοῦντες ταύτας τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐζήτουν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ
στοιχεῖα τοῦ ὄντος εἶναι μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀλλ' ᾗ
ὄν· διὸ καὶ ἡμῖν τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὂν τὰς πρώτας αἰτίας
ληπτέον.

The intellect and the will are natural faculties of man. Using them fully, everyone "creates" in the direct proportion to how deeply he reflects.

Each person creates as much as he/she reflects. He/she does it *in the world given to him, but not created by him*. Metaphysics directs the intellect to the Fullness of Being (to God), recurring to the first natural principles *created in us without us*. Its proper method is judgment (iudicium; χωρισμός), which might be called valuing in a broader sense only. Values are midway between the first principles of our thinking and the First Principle of our being – God.

Man is a "metaphysical animal" (Gilson) not because he comes to existence with a hidden inborne knowledge, as Plato supposed, but because he is able to name, in his own words, the same as a metaphysician ex professo names strictly. Being as such is the subject matter of metaphysics, but being the principle is the natural object of the intellect (naturale obiectum intellectus).[32] When Thomas says: that which the intellect first conceives as, in a way, the most evident, and to which it reduces all its concepts, is being (quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quod conceptiones omnes resolvit, est ens),[33] he has in mind a man who is a metaphysician in spe only.

After Aristotle and before Thomas Arab philosophers reflected upon the problem of being. In his early work, De ente et essentia, Thomas adduces the name of the most famous of them, Avicenna, twelve times. But in the later works also, the authority of Avicenna is adduced so as to (as it seemed) bolster the primacy of the principle of being. The full quotation from De Veritate reads as follows:

> Now, as Avicenna says, that which the intellect first conceives as, in a way, the most evident, and to which it reduces all its concepts, is being. Consequently, all the other conceptions of the intellect are had by additions to being. But nothing can be added to being as though it were something not included in being—in the way that a difference is added to a genus or an accident to a subject—for every reality is essentially a being. The Philosopher has shown this by proving that being cannot be a genus. Yet, in this sense, some predicates may be said to add to being inasmuch as they express a mode of being not expressed by the term "being".[34]

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[32] Contra Gentiles, lib. 2 cap. 83 n. 29 Adhuc. Cum natura semper ordinetur ad unum, unius virtutis oportet esse naturaliter unum obiectum: sicut visus colorem, et auditus sonum. Intellectus igitur cum sit una vis, est eius unum naturale obiectum, cuius per se et naturaliter cognitionem habet. Hoc autem oportet esse id sub quo comprehenduntur omnia ab intellectu cognita: sicut sub colore comprehenduntur omnes colores, qui sunt per se visibiles. Quod non est aliud quam ens. Naturaliter igitur intellectus noster cognoscit ens, et ea quae sunt per se entis inquantum huiusmodi; in qua cognitione fundatur primorum principiorum notitia, ut non esse simul affirmare et negare, et alia huiusmodi. Haec igitur sola principia intellectus noster naturaliter cognoscit, conclusiones autem per ipsa: sicut per colorem cognoscit visus tam communia quam sensibilia per accidens.

[33] De veritate, q. 1 a. 1 c. Dicendum, quod sicut in demonstrabilibus oportet fieri reductionem in aliqua principia per se intellectui nota, ita investigando quid est unumquodque; alias utrobique in infinitum iretur, et sic periret omnino scientia et cognitio rerum. Illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quod conceptiones omnes resolvit, est ens, ut Avicenna dicit in principio suae metaphysicae. Unde oportet quod omnes aliae conceptiones intellectus accipiantur ex additione ad ens.

[34] De veriate, 1, 1, On truth. Trans. by Dominican Fathers
Access 2026-10-29 https://aquinas.cc/la/en/
De veritate, q. 1 a. 1 c.

No wonder that Thomas was suspected to be influenced by Avicenna there.

In the Metaphysics from the "Book of Heeling" (al Shifa), in the Latin Middle Age translation, we read: omnes homines imaginant certitudinem entis: "all people imagine the certitude of being". Now, there is the essential difference between Avicenna's "imagination" and Thomas' intellect. Signs are normally imagined, whereas being is outside our mind (and "imagination"), because its being grasped is tantamount to the intellect being unilaterally related to it. Signs happen to be imagined, but concepts understood only. We understand them because we define their content and they contain judgments proper to definitions. E.g. courage can be imagined, i.e. exemplified by a concrete instance or a person whose character mirrors the virtue. The other moral values also were supposed to be intuited because exemplified that way. Still, the act of judgment (the core of the genuine definition of a value) cannot be intuited.

Two persons are diverse and thus incomparable. Two set of notions they harbor *are* comparable and their characters (virtues and vices) also. We are fully entitled to compare various philosophical systems, but we are mistaken if we suppose that the comparison enables us to discover the first universally valid principles. Our pathway to the Fullness of Being leads through beings that are diverse (not different only).

The complex principle is a principle of diversity. Metaphysics begins with it, and comes to the universally valid conclusions. Contrasting notions and ideas might be useful, no doubt, but auxiliary only to the main task of metaphysics: *the cognizance of being outside signs*.

Having in mind the fact, we compare what Avicenna and Thomas say about the first principle. The conclusions will not give insight into the mystery of being, but will be of some *auxiliary* value nonetheless.

The Arab philosophy is not necessarily the philosophy of Islam, although it might have been influenced by it. Philosophy is not a religion. Still, the objects of them both overlap to some extent.[35] Either we try to get to know God by means of the natural faculty of the intellect, or we are helped (if at loss) by the gracious assistance of God himself. Our thoughts and deeds (as was said before) are rooted in the first principles, but are related to the Ultimate End of our existence. Revelation (and grace) – their assistance – guarantee *the actual* cognizance of the universality of principles which otherwise could have been tailored to the capacity of our feeble (ignorant) intellect.

Christians believe in the merciful Father of all men, but some believe in a tribal and vengeful deity. Some hate falsehood and imagine that, by the same token, they love truth.

[35] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 4 n. 4 Secundum inconveniens est quod illi qui ad praedictae veritatis inventionem pervenirent, vix post longum tempus pertingerent. Tum propter huius veritatis profunditatem, ad quam capiendam per viam rationis non nisi post longum exercitium intellectus humanus idoneus invenitur. Tum etiam propter multa quae praeexiguntur, ut dictum est. Tum etiam propter hoc quod tempore iuventutis, dum diversis motibus passionum anima fluctuat, non est apta ad tam altae veritatis cognitionem, sed in quiescendo fit prudens et sciens, ut dicitur in VII Physic. Remaneret igitur humanum genus, si sola rationis via ad Deum cognoscendum pateret, in maximis ignorantiae tenebris: cum Dei cognitio, quae homines maxime perfectos et bonos facit, non nisi quibusdam paucis, et his etiam post temporis longitudinem proveniret.

Violence was recommended by some as a means to propagate the "truth".[36] Christians do not believe because of noble mind and character, but because their nobleness and character (if really present) had been created by the merciful God even before they even tried to think about Him so as He deserved it. Moreover, Muslims seem to worship Al Quran, and the problem whether it was created by God was never decidedly solved. Christians worship The Word of God and the majuscule denotes the Second Person of Trinity, whereas the worship of the Writ ("Scripture" is normally written with a majuscule, but "word" with the minuscule only) would have been an act of idolatry, for idolatry is defined as the worship of the created instead of the Creator. We must transcend signs and the imagined, so as to reach to the Transcendent God, but the modern Phenomenalism (influenced by Avicenna) dissuades. As long as closed in an enchanted circle of signs, we remain in fact in a sphere of its influence.

Some (Gilson first of all) speak of the Christian philosophy, albeit the expression seems to be chosen unluckily. The philosophy of Thomas is Christian in the sense of being universal, but the "pagan" one can (potentially) be universal too and lead to the acceptance of the Revelation. The "pagan" intellect renders justice to the created nature (as in Plato's Phairdos), since it is just to judge the nature according to what it really is: a creature.

The pagan philosophy of Aristotle says incomparably more about the *real* God than some philosophers, who chanced to be Christians e.g. in the 19th century. So as to stand at the threshold of the faith (and preserve it also) we must reach to the first principles – accessible to all. Perhaps, a "pagan" mind is a criterion of their universality.

Metaphysics *a* science, but it is *the* architectonic and fundamental one also. It was discovered (as Aristotle has it) after some particular sciences concerned with some particular forms of being.[37] Should we, after Kant and Scotus, say that science has accumulated over centuries, we must, nevertheless, observe that the progress was not a sheer aggregation, and no sets of scientific values obtained, but a hierarchy with the first science at the top recurring to the first principles known naturally and immovably.

Each science has its proper subject matter and a pseudo-scientific Holism must be excluded. Nonetheless, by means of analogy, a hierarchical structure is obtained instead of a sheer juxtaposition. This is the case in Aristotle and Thomas, but the modernity followed Scotus who rejected the theory of the analogy of being and replaced it with the so called "univocity of being". In Scotus, the divine intellect was the only source of wisdom, and no secondary sources (created by the transcendent God) to be found in nature. There was, in those who followed, but one transcendental source of science, and people wise, because audacious enough to seize for it (sapere ausi), rather than disciplined.

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[36] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 6 n. 7 Documenta etiam veritatis non attulit nisi quae de facili a quolibet mediocriter sapiente naturali ingenio cognosci possint: quin potius vera quae docuit multis fabulis et falsissimis doctrinis immiscuit. Signa etiam non adhibuit supernaturaliter facta, quibus solis divinae inspirationi conveniens testimonium adhibetur, dum operatio visibilis quae non potest esse nisi divina, ostendit doctorem veritatis invisibiliter inspiratum: sed dixit se in armorum potentia missum, quae signa etiam latronibus et tyrannis non desunt. Ei etiam non aliqui sapientes, in rebus divinis et humanis exercitati, a principio crediderunt: sed homines bestiales in desertis morantes, omnis doctrinae divinae prorsus ignari, per quorum multitudinem alios armorum violentia in suam legem coegit.

[37] Metaph., I, c. 1, 981b 13-23.

Scotus, a theologian, saw a horizon of the accumulation. The supreme science (metaphysics of his) is ascending towards the Source of being, which, however, in Scotus, is identified with the Source of cognoscibility. The natural could not be, in his eyes, an instrument (a fundament to stand on) for the cognition of God. There is a vicious circle, in fact, for we need God so as to get to know God. In his Treaty on the First Principle, Scotus *tries* to prove the existence of God. The Treaty contains some 100 pages of elaborated analyses. In his Theoremata he says that the proof is impossible, and all analyses doomed to failure in the end. The Scotean tradition followed the latter stance.

The subject matter of Metaphysics in Thomas is a basis to builds on, and its formula (ens inquatum *est* ens) reflects the fact. A significant omission appears in Scotus' ens inquantum ens. According to Scotus, the "inquantum" of the formula means either reduplication or specification. He does not take into account the possibility of *reflection*. Indeed, if we begin with a vague intuition of being only, our antinaturalism will forbid reflecting on the primitive datum and elucidating it. In Aristotle and Thomas, the agent intellect (a personal faculty of cognition proper to any man) elucidates the primitive data. In those who followed Scotus and Avicenna, human cognition is participation of/in the collective consciousness, and the participation is meant literally as obtaining a chunk of a greater whole. Man becomes what he/she should be due to the General (impersonal) Enlightenment. A "supernatural" Reich der Zwecke (Kant) appears: "a communion of values" without a natural basis to sustain it and without the End to turn to after obtaining those values. In the era of Enlightenment, the collective consciousness accumulates data by means of extension. The set theory replaces both metaphysics and axiology.

According to Thomas, each individual natural being participates, first of all, of/in its own act of existence.[38] The fact is reflected upon in metaphysics and a universal mode of partaking in existence discovered.[39]

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[38] De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 1 c. Hoc autem non potest dici de aliquo alio: sicut enim impossibile est intelligere quod sint plures albedines separatae; sed si esset albedo separata ab omni subiecto et recipiente, esset una tantum; ita impossibile est quod sit ipsum esse subsistens nisi unum tantum. Omne igitur quod est post primum ens, cum non sit suum esse, habet esse in aliquo receptum, per quod ipsum esse contrahitur; et sic in quolibet creato aliud est natura rei quae participat esse, et aliud ipsum esse participatum. Et cum quaelibet res participet per assimilationem primum actum in quantum habet esse, necesse est quod esse participatum in unoquoque comparetur ad naturam participantem ipsum, sicut actus ad potentiam.

[39] Summa Theologiae I, q. 44 a. 2 c. Respondeo dicendum quod antiqui philosophi paulatim, et quasi pedetentim, intraverunt in cognitionem veritatis. A principio enim, quasi grossiores existentes, non existimabant esse entia nisi corpora sensibilia. Quorum qui ponebant in eis motum, non considerabant motum nisi secundum aliqua accidentia, ut puta secundum raritatem et densitatem, congregationem et segregationem. Et supponentes ipsam substantiam corporum increatam, assignabant aliquas causas huiusmodi accidentalium transmutationum, ut puta amicitiam, litem, intellectum, aut aliquid huiusmodi. Ulterius vero procedentes, distinxerunt per intellectum inter formam substantialem et materiam, quam ponebant increatam; et perceperunt transmutationem fieri in corporibus secundum formas essentiales. Quarum transmutationum quasdam causas universaliores ponebant, ut obliquum circulum, secundum Aristotelem, vel ideas, secundum Platonem. Sed considerandum est quod materia per formam contrahitur ad determinatam speciem; sicut substantia alicuius speciei per accidens ei adveniens contrahitur ad determinatum modum essendi, ut homo contrahitur per album. Utrique igitur consideraverunt ens particulari quadam consideratione, vel inquantum est hoc ens, vel inquantum est tale ens. Et sic rebus causas agentes particulares assignaverunt. Et ulterius aliqui erexerunt se ad considerandum ens

> Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 37 q. 1 a. 2 c. … ens invenitur in pluribus secundum prius et posterius. Illud tamen verissime et primo dicitur ens cujus esse est ipsum quod est, quia esse ejus non est receptum, sed per se subsistens. In omnibus autem quae secundum prius et posterius dicuntur, primum eorum quae sunt, potest esse causa; et per se dictum, est causa ejus quod per participationem dicitur: et ideo oportet quod illud ens quod non per participationem alicujus esse quod sit aliud quam ipsum, dicitur ens (quod primum inter entia est), sit causa omnium aliorum entium. Alia autem entia dicuntur per posterius, inquantum aliquod esse participant quod non est idem quod ipsa sunt; et haec procedunt usque ad ultima entium; ita quod quamcumque rationem essendi aliquid habeat, non sit sibi nisi a Deo; sed defectus essendi sit ei a seipso.
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> … we find being in many things in prior and posterior respects. Now, that is most truly and primarily called a "being" whose to-be is what it itself is, since its to-be is not received, but subsisting through itself. Further, in all things that we speak of in prior and posterior respects, the first of them can be the cause, and what is called such essentially is the cause of what is called such by way of participation. Thus, the being that is called a "being" not by participating in any to-be that is other than itself—this is the first among beings—must be the cause of all other beings. Other beings, in turn, are called such in a posterior manner, inasmuch as they participate in a to-be that is not the same thing as they themselves are. These proceed down to the last of beings such that no matter what account of existing a thing possesses, it does not have it but from God, whereas a deficiency of existing belongs to it from itself. (Fathers of the English Dominican Province).

Universal as it is, metaphysics is, nonetheless, a science proceeding according to the requirements of Posterior Analytics (otherwise it could have not been supreme, for supremacy implies a relation). Each science deduces the properties of its subject matter availing itself of its proper method. In metaphysics too, properties of being are analyzed (per se accidentia entis).[40] A particular science departs from the definition of its subject matter as from a

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inquantum est ens, et consideraverunt causam rerum, non solum secundum quod sunt haec vel talia, sed secundum quod sunt entia. Hoc igitur quod est causa rerum inquantum sunt entia, oportet esse causam rerum, non solum secundum quod sunt talia per formas accidentales, nec secundum quod sunt haec per formas substantiales, sed etiam secundum omne illud quod pertinet ad esse illorum quocumque modo. Et sic oportet ponere etiam materiam primam creatam ab universali causa entium.

[40] Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 4 l. 1 n. 1 Tertio ostendit quod haec est scientia quae prae manibus habetur, ibi, quoniam autem principia etc. Quia vero scientia non solum debet speculari subiectum, sed etiam subiecto per se accidentia: ideo dicit primo, quod est quaedam scientia, quae speculatur ens secundum quod ens, sicut subiectum, et speculatur ea quae insunt enti per se, idest entis per se accidentia.

Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 4 l. 1 n. 3 Quae enim sunt per se accidentia inferioris, per accidens se habent ad superius, sicut per se accidentia hominis non sunt per se accidentia animalis. Necessitas autem huius scientiae quae speculatur ens et per se accidentia entis, ex hoc apparet, quia huiusmodi non debent ignota remanere, cum ex eis aliorum dependeat cognitio; sicut ex cognitione communium dependet cognitio rerum propriarum.

Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 4 l. 4 n. 2 Eius est considerare primas passiones entis, cuius est considerare ens secundum quod est ens. Sed praedicta omnia sunt per se accidentia entis et unius secundum quod huiusmodi. Sicut enim numerus, inquantum huiusmodi, habet proprias passiones, ut superfluum, aequale, commensuratum et huiusmodi, quorum quaedam insunt alicui numero absolute, ut par et impar, quaedam uni per comparationem ad alterum, ut aequale: et etiam substantia habet proprias passiones ut firmum, idest corpus, et alia huiusmodi.

principle. Metaphysics departs from the cognition of the first principles mentioned above. The value of each scientific definition, and the value of any human acting – its being-towards-God – is established, because metaphysics is the first philosophy governing particular sciences. The subject matters of particular sciences are diverse, but the general science allows comparing them by dint of analogy.

The subject matters of particular sciences are – strictly speaking – diverse rather than different, for they are ordered by the principle of diversity: the non-contradiction principle. On the other hand, things differ (are contrary) if subsumed under a common denominator. E.g. in biology different degrees of animal perfection are compared, departing from the most elementary ones up to the perfect animality of man. In metaphysics too, we can compare various stances on the primacy of the principle of being, as Gilson does it in his Être et Essence, having, however, in mind that the common denominator is, in this case, the stance of the supreme science elaborated upon by Thomas (an Aristotle so some extent also).

> Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 17 q. 1 a. 1 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum, quod secundum philosophum in 10 Metaph. non est idem esse diversum et esse differens: quia differens ad aliquid dicitur (unde oportet omne differens, proprie loquendo, aliquo differre); diversum autem absolute dicitur; unde quae diversa sunt, non oportet aliquo diversa esse, sed seipsis: si enim oporteret omnia diversa in aliquo differre, in infinitum abiretur; et ideo oportet devenire ad prima simplicia, quae seipsis diversa sunt, ut patet in differentiis, quibus species distinguuntur.
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> According to the Philosopher in the Metaphysics 10, to be "other than" and to be "different" are not the same. For "different" is said in reference to something, so everything that differs, properly speaking, must differ in something. But "other than" is said absolutely, so things that are other than one another need not be other than one another by anything except themselves. For if all things that are other than one another had to differ in something, this would go back to infinity. Thus, we must arrive at primary simple things that are other by themselves, as is clear in the case of the differences by which species are distinguished.
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> Summa Theologiae I, q. 3 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod simplicia non differunt aliquibus aliis differentiis, hoc enim compositorum est. Homo enim et equus differunt rationali et irrationali differentiis, quae quidem differentiae non differunt amplius ab invicem aliis differentiis. Unde, *si fiat vis in verbo, non proprie dicuntur differre, sed diversa esse, nam, secundum philosophum X Metaphys., diversum absolute dicitur, sed omne differens aliquo differt*.
>
> Simple things do not differ by added differences—for this is the property of compounds. Thus man and horse differ by their differences, rational and irrational; which differences, however, do not differ from each other by other differences. Hence, to be quite accurate, it is better to say that they are, not different, but diverse. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph.

Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 4 l. 4 n. 18 Et per hoc patet, quod illa scientia non solum est considerativa substantiarum, sed etiam accidentium, cum de utrisque ens praedicetur. Et est considerativa eorum quae dicta sunt, scilicet eiusdem et diversi, similis et dissimilis, aequalis et inaequalis, negationis et privationis, et contrariorum; quae supra diximus esse per se entis accidentia. Et non solum est considerativa istorum, de quibus ostensum est singillatim propriis rationibus, quae cadunt in consideratione huius scientiae; sed etiam considerat de priori et posteriori, genere et specie, toto et parte, et aliis huiusmodi, pari ratione, quia haec etiam sunt accidentia entis inquantum est ens.

x), *things which are diverse are absolutely distinct, but things which are different differ by something*.[41]

In the modern times, discovering new existential possibilities added up to an extension (or contestation) of the significance of what had been previously established. Before Aristotle, a diversification of knowledge had led to Metaphysics. After Scotus, differentiations without a point of reference were about lead to systems opposed to each other and to the destruction: of metaphysics first, and particular sciences subsequently too. Thus e.g. Ockham was opposed to Scotus; Locke to Descartes; Kierkegaard to Hegel, Husserl to scientism. The paradigm has been exhausted in Postmodernism.

Now, the subject matter of philosophy (the supreme science) is not philosophy (Hegel) but the natural being and its being-towards-the-plenitude-of-Being. On the way (in the natural world) we meet individuals which are diverse as beings, but different in some accidental respects only. Cultures, opinions and values can be compared, but persons are incomparable, because diverse.

Some distinctions have been presented above. We do not, however, claim that objective truth is obtainable by means of sheer contrasting opposed opinions. There was a supposition at the beginning and the readily legible one. Thomas' system of the supreme science was accepted to be this point of reference: a bequest hidden and underestimated in the years after Thomas' death. For the time being (in this introduction) we suppose the stance to be firm and unshakable. In the end, it will be tried to prove the value of this stance. We try to get to know real things, and philosophical systems serve the purpose better or worse.

The problem of relativism consists not only in its openly avowed objectives (undermining the principles), but in a certain mode of thinking too. Simplifications prevent to understand things deeply, and to seize Thomas' views as precisely as they deserve to. The opponents of scholasticism in modernity abhor neat distinctions. We will try to restore them.

The veracity of Thomas' system is not unquestionable, but questioning demands understanding it precisely first. The supposition (mentioned above) must be (finally) proved also. It cannot be done in the introduction, but the problem must be announced in it. It is, however, almost certain, even now, that the fates of Thomism and metaphysics are joined. Most probably, rejecting Thomism equals rejecting metaphysics, and, ultimately, yielding to relativism also.

Relativism is (partly) a philosophical stance, which could be (supposed to be) true. Still, in the present book, it will be proved to be false, because resulting from rush conclusions. After refuting the critique, the main instrument of obtaining the objective truth will appear. After removing filth from a precious artifact we will see its original beauty.

Contrary notions might be gathered under one heading and analyzed subsequently. The method was adopted in Disputed Questions by Thomas (and in Summa Theologiae to some extent also). Thomas, as Chenu observes, hardly ever rejects an objection en bloc. He

[41] *The Summa Theologiæ of St. Thomas Aquinas* Second and Revised Edition, 1920; Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province

Access 2026-10-29 http://www.newadvent.org/summa/

rather proves its relative validity, which is possible after determining the aspect of cognition it (relatively) verifies in. Different views seem to be opposed and thus irreconcilable. However, if set in their proper contexts, they appear to belong to diverse methodological aspects of science and verifiable relatively. The "methodology of diversity" prevents relativism, *restricting the scope of relativity*.

The method is not the notorious "benevolent interpretation" imputed to Thomas. E.g. the theory of redition (return) from the mediaeval Liber de Causes and repeated some centuries later by Hegel (unconscious, apparently, of the inheritance), does not verify in the theory of cognition. Cognizance does not consist in the "Entäußerung" and "Erinnerung", and no "benevolence" is needed to state the fact. It is to be understood about potentiality actualized within a being: a form pours out existence on it, and retains it next. The animal form does it for, say, some forty years only and afterwards the existence vanishes (is "dispersed"). It is not the case with the rational form on man, and all the less with intellectual form of an angel. The power of existence "returns" to its source immediately (in angels), or indirectly and partially, in man. Before resurrection, our body shares the common lot of animals, but even now a "part" of the potentially of human being prevents a total "dispersion" of its existence.

There are, in Aristotle, four species of ἀντικείμενα (opposites) and the problem of "differentiation" might be regarded from this philosophical coin of vantage. Science is concerned with contraries and ἐνάντια (contraria) are the third species of ἀντικείμενα. We differentiate between them not, however, putting up with "quotations", nor do we formulate our own stance against the form (of truth) or its privation (the second species of ἀντικείμενα) only. The *objective* cognizance is possible due to using the non-contradiction principle expressed in the terms of *the first* species of ἀντικείμενα. Thus, however, science appears to be a relative (the fourth species of ἀντικείμενα). Its whole being consists in its being related to what it is not: a transcendent being. The "impossibility" of phenomenology appears to be a fact of the classical philosophy. The thought does not "go and return" (towards and from an object). The intellect remains within our mind, but after reflecting upon an object it knows it is totally related to it.

People happen to entertain opinions and some believe that their variety is a token of the wealth of culture. The material wealth was believed to be improved by allowing forming some philosophical reveries which could create a vaster room for the common-day activity ("inspire" it so). Now a variety without order is disorder; a chaos. Metaphysics orders the system of notions and its value as the first philosophy is proved in the moment sciences are "ordered" i.e. *related* and opposed to the real things. This "relativism" is the only acceptable one. It is an objective gauge of the validity of statements.

Thus, the central problem of philosophy after Kant seems to be solved: in what way the object stands before the subject. "The subject" in Kant, Schelling and Hegel was a transcendental one, but in the years to come after the "collapse" of the German idealism it became a vulgar subjectivity: a foundation of moral and intellectual relativity. Hardly anything else was to be expected after confusing the diverse aspects of cognizance and their proper *subject matters*. Hegel believed in that history had ended in the moment he finished his Phenomenology of Spirit, for it was meant to be an absolute system. In fact, a new era began instead; that of relativism.

Science is in opposition to the real being, but the opposition might be called a constructive one. To the contrary, opposing some particular views without a prospect of obtaining knowledge besides and beyond controversies proves sterile.

Veritatem meditabitur guttur meum, et labia mea detestabuntur impium. Prov. 8.7. "My mouth shall meditate truth, and my lips shall hate impiety". These words open Summa against Pagans by Thomas Aquinas.

> Now it belongs to the same thing to pursue one contrary and to remove the other: thus medicine, which effects health, removes sickness. Hence, just as it belongs to a wise man primarily to meditate on the first principle and speak of it to others, so it belongs to him to refute contrary falsehood (Fathers of the English Dominican Province). [42]

The question of primacy is pivotal. Falsity is to be impugned to the extent only it impedes the cognition of the objective truth. Otherwise, verbal controversies are to be dropped. The aim is to "regain the real world" (Krąpiec), and if the opponents were to say: "nothing had been lost" it should be answered: Men might be not conscious of having lost the most precious. Once it had been stated that "The understanding must not … be supplied with wings, but rather hung with weights, to keep it from leaping and flying" (Francis Bacon), people were deceived into believing that a hackneyed activity is normal and desirable, whereas the absolute one unachievable. Freedom might be absolute (and metaphysics in Aristotle is a "realm of freedom" indeed) as far as it departs from the cognition of being through participation and arrives at the cognition of the Fullness of Being (JHWH of the Book of Exodus).[43] It gives freedom without license and stamina without arrogance.

The fourth book of Metaphysics is dedicated to the defense of the non-contradiction principle. A significant (reformist) part of the modern philosophy was (after Descartes) dedicated to its destruction. "Dialecticians and sophists assume the same guise as the philosopher, for sophistic is Wisdom which exists only in semblance" (Metaph., IV, c. 2, 1004b 18-19).[44]

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[42] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 1 n. 6 Eiusdem autem est unum contrariorum prosequi et aliud refutare sicut medicina, quae sanitatem operatur, aegritudinem excludit. Unde sicut sapientis est veritatem praecipue de primo principio meditari et aliis disserere, ita eius est falsitatem contrariam impugnare.

[43] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 22 n. 9 Amplius. Omnis res est per hoc quod habet esse. Nulla igitur res cuius essentia non est suum esse, est per essentiam suam, sed participatione alicuius, scilicet ipsius esse. Quod autem est per participationem alicuius, non potest esse primum ens: quia id quod aliquid participat ad hoc quod sit, est eo prius. Deus autem est primum ens, quo nihil est prius. Dei igitur essentia est suum esse.

Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 22 n. 10 Hanc autem sublimem veritatem Moyses a domino est edoctus, qui cum quaereret a domino, Exod. 3 dicens: *si dixerint ad me filii Israel, quod nomen eius? Quid dicam eis?* Dominus respondit: *ego sum qui sum. Sic dices filiis Israel: qui est misit me ad vos, ostendens suum proprium nomen esse qui est.* Quodlibet autem nomen est institutum ad significandum naturam seu essentiam alicuius rei. Unde relinquitur quod ipsum divinum esse est sua essentia vel natura.

[44] Metaphysics By Aristotle, Translated by W. D. Ross
Access 2026-10-29 https://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics.1.i.html

A true philosopher defines objects; the apparent one rejects defining. The cognition of essence (and its definition) is impossible without using the non-contradiction principle. As was mentioned above, Thomas distinguishes between general and special mode of being. The classical philosophy considers the convertibles of being: its being outside mind, its being undivided in se and divided from others, its being a nature, and, ultimately, its *having a determinate scientific and moral value*. The universality of the cognizance of the general modes of being was lost in modernity, and the relativism of values ensued.

There is, at the beginning of human cognition, a principle, equally cognoscible to all. There were, to Scotus mind, *different intuitions* of being and many separate systems built on them. Some particular "intuitions" seemed (to many) legitimize new philosophical systems. There was, allegedly, a logic proper to Kant and perhaps slightly different to that proper to e.g. Husserl. Those "great" were believed to be endowed with strength of mind sufficient to build on the "intuitions" some self-consistent systems. In a printed book, concepts must be ordered, and the so called "contradiction principle" necessary for a self-consistent artificial system; otherwise they spawn confusion and weariness of mind. Still, it is a minimum condition only. The (so called) "contradiction principle" is insufficient. The *non*-contradiction principle is known *naturally*, and able to beget unshakable certitude instead of some imposing artificial structures of particular systems.

The "great" systems of thought were, allegedly, closed entities, and a specialization needed to get to know each of them apart from others. A dogma of non-translatability of philosophical tongues appeared in Quine. No statement, as it seemed, could be drawn from a special context and juxtaposes to others (the method incessantly used in Thomas' Disputed Questions). The languages were untranslatable, because various intuitions of being seemed to guide those using them, at the outset, in totally different directions.

The dogma would have been what it was supposed to be (a dogma), had it not been a sentiment and controversial one born in the mind of Scotus at the turn of the 14th century. The theory of the univocity of being (a theory of self-consistency) was complementary in Scotus to the theory if intuitive cognition. Since Parmenides, it had been believed that the intellect identifies with the intellectually grasped (ταὐτὸν δ' ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὕνεκεν ἔστι νόημα. Frg. 8. 34), and the most obvious manner of "identification" seemed, to many, be that of intuition.

Aristotle says that the intellect identifies with the intellectually grasped only after performing abstraction on the sense data. Before it, it faces diverse objects, and to some extent even as alien as to raise in us admiration. After we have performed the abstraction, we must retain the fact in the mind. Without accepting the primacy of non-contradiction principle, the real world (the transcendent one) must be "lost" and replaced by an enchanted circle of phenomena.

The intuitionism might, as it seems, be justified by the so called identity principle. In Kant's Critique, non-contradiction principle is said to be secondary to identity principle, and Intuition (Anschauung) legitimizes the scientific values of statements. In Schelling, the principle A≡A plays a pivotal role. His "System" was supposed to be an absolute philosophy and it was an absolute project indeed, as it dreams of achieving the unique prerogative of Absolute Being. In God only, the act of cognition is totally identical with its object.

Wishing to be like God might seem "ambitious", but, in fact, is only preposterous. If any knowledge were deducible from Schelling's principle, anything at all could be called knowledge: without an objective gauge to falsify the otherwise falsifiable.

Avicenna does not accept the primacy of the non-contradiction principle, but the primacy of the principle of three excluded instead. Thus however, the primacy of the being the principle (the incomplex principle) was undermined and a gate open to a "creativity" of mind.

Everything is definable peremptorily only after accepting the principle of the defining: the non-contradiction principle. Real definitions can only be deduced from the "principle of reality". In Schelling, any cognizance (which is to say: anything even remotely resembling true cognizance) can be deduced from his *apparent* principle.

Thomas says that we are able to form quasi-definitions of fantastical beings, but never says that we can form a real definition of what does not exist. Paradoxically, the further we depart form the primitive sense data, respecting, at the same time, the rule of reflection, the closer we come to the mystery of being, because then the true nature of knowledge (its being related strictly to what exists outside the mind) appears more clearly.

Scholastic Disputed Questions address special problems and special philosophical systems. The method adopted follows Book III of Metaphysics by Aristotle rather than the 12th century's "Sic et Non" by Abelard. It is not about "logic of discovery", but about the specific natures knowable to exist outside the mind and approached from various philosophical stances. The fact is unacceptable for a proponent of nominalism.

Each authority quoted in Objections contributed to the ordered system the supreme science, although the opponents quoting them might have understood their words improperly, after all. Ecclesiastical authorities were preferred in Thomas' Summa, but secular ones (included Avicenna) adduced also. Avicenna might have erred, but Thomas utilizes his work so that the polemic (if any) is constructive; the case almost impossible in an era appreciative of clashing opinions.

Our situation (our era) – almost eight centuries after Thomas' death – is different. Traditional authorities have been questioned and no stone left untouched. But on the other hand, we have the authority of Thomas (auctoritas auctoritatum) instead, which seem to recompense the loss, and it is perhaps as it should be: beyond authorities (in plural; in general) whatever the one transcendent reality (of principles) and the Transcendent Cause (of the world) is to be sought. The former is a natural gauge of statements, the latter – the Ultimate One. The authority of Thomas *might be* of use.

Modernity, however, affected, to some extent, even our contemporary approach to Thomas himself. The practical criterion of the value of an interpretation might be the attitude to the primacy of the non-contradiction principle. Preferring the phrase: "the contradiction principle" might equal to not accepting the primacy. The so called identity principle happens to replace it. The principle was supposed to be included in the so called existential judgments. That concepts relate to the essence of a thing whereas judgements to its existence, is Thomas' stance indeed. The problem is that the latter do no precede abstraction. So as to avoid verbal quarrels, it can be admitted that existential judgments might be understood as referring to the "participle" sense of being mentioned above. Still, the term of existential judgments occurs in

Husserl (a notorious Idealist), but does not in Thomas (contrary to what Gilson claims in his book about Scotus).

In the spirit of "modernity", Aristotle was incriminated of the so called essentialism, which, however, amounts to a queer: the founder of metaphysics laid foundations for a false metaphysics. Significantly, the boldest interpretation of his system (provided by Susanne Mansion) was, at the same time, the most controversial one. Ascribing to Aristotle the theory of existential judgments is problematic, to say the least of it.

Some believe that anything conceivable can be defined so that defining as such might lead to concepts ("ideas") only loosely connected with reality, and Aristotle was blamed for endorsing de facto this type of "Conceptualism".

Thomas says that quasi-definitions of fantastic beings ("ideas") might be given, but never a definition of what is impossible to exist. Still, in the spirit of Scotism, it was (the fact openly admitted by Gilson) supposed that the further we depart from the original cognition, the more we are in danger of falling into snares of idealism. Krąpiec speaks in this context about a "true cognition" preferable to the "cognition of truth".

The problem of idealism is serious, no doubt. It is a modern problem first of all. Our life, in the beginning of the 21th century, differs considerably from that of, say, a 19th century's peasant. Our contact with nature is so scarce that a preposterous desire shows up nowadays to partake of the totality called nature (restore the contact with "reality" in bulk). No need to say, this "Naturalism" is far cry from that proposed by Aristotle, who speaks of *diversified* nature. Participation, in the modern sense, consists in taking part of a greater totality, and "reality" might be believed to be this. But "taking part" this way is proper to the set theory, and not applicable to being.

We participate in the public life, and the defiance seems to be tantamount to cynicism and immorality. Hegel despised the peasants' labor, because he despised nature as such. Verbally opposed, Schelling lays foundations for the unscientific Holism. They both, however, share in common the conviction that no transcendent Creative Cause of nature should be sought beyond the immediately given and beyond the nature.

The contact with nature (before "reformers"; before their "achievements") was the contact with the real being independent of our thinking (not affected by it). A peasant, perfectly conscious of his existence's being dependent on nature could not think of nature as dependent on what he wished it to be.

The immediate contact with nature was a standard for the majority of people some centuries before. "Our contemporary world", to the contrary, is the "artificial one". Even the advocates of ecologism force, in fact, an idealized picture of nature. The urban life (with its labor) seems nowadays to be superior to the rural one (the uncouth one).

There is, to be sure, a mystery of being included in nature, although discoverable only to a rational being, i.e. the one endowed with both the intellectual and corporeal nature matched uniquely. The mystery of the human body (its fertility) is unique also. Animals (and plants too) are fertile (to be sure), but they cannot retrace the "first and the last" progeny of the human species; cannot understand the source and the end of their fertility. In a commercialized ("urban") society, human body is commercialized and subject to Ideologization also.

If the real (definition of) nature is known, and responsible actions follow, no harm can be done to anybody. If the so-called egotist orientation (initiated by phenomenology) is adopted, the harm is bound to happen sooner or later.

The problem of idealism is, in a sense, the problem of ("free") mental activity. Women are scarcely ever creative of new ideas, and all the less the "shocking" ones, but always rather suspicious of any "theories". The suspicion might be justified or not; all depending on the sense of the "theory". The prevalently masculine creativity used to be, in the past, counterbalanced by the feminine conservatism and humanity profited. The wealth of nature demands preserving this diversity. The theory must be certain and conservative at the same time, contrary to the meaning commonly attached to the term.

Some modern Thomas' interpreters speak of "transcendental" properties of being, which is justifiable as far as the properties of being in general "transcend" special categories of being indeed (sunt de transcendentibus, as Thomas has it, and normally uses the term of "convertibles" of being instead). Without what transcends particular systems of thinking (their specific categories) towards the architectonic system of the first philosophy, comparing various systems would be impossible. It is undesirable indeed for those whose "philosophy of life" consists in studying a special philosophical system. To the contrary, universal values of the architectonic science are sought for their own sake. If there is no trans-categorial system above particular categories of thinking, and the "particular" is tantamount to "private" and "no to be intruded from without", checking the validity of particular systems will prove unachievable. The fact might be profitable for a philosopher but compromises philosophy as such.

Moreover, if any philosopher is free to accomplish an original intuition of being, there will be no clear criteria (as those in Posterior Analytics by Aristotle) to discern an apparent philosophy from the genuine one; to know whether this or that system is being a philosophy yet or it has ceased to be any at all. The name of philosophy is used and abused in modernity, perhaps out of snobbery, as e.g. in the "philosophy of clothing". Anyone can pretend to be a philosopher (to be this in his/her own eyes), for everyone is (allegedly) free to accomplish the initiating intuition of being. Judgment is discriminative, and, according to Thomas, the proper method of metaphysics. Judging, however, has been forbidden by the spirit of modernity.

The untranslatability of philosophical languages is in fact another name of intellectual relativism. If anyone is free to regard the world in his/her own manner, everyone one is free to build his/her specific system of values (providing one's intellect is strong enough to avoid inner inconsistencies). The "system", however, without an objective natural basis unnoticeably becomes a set. Systems are potentially open to analyses; whereas no reductive analytical judgment is possible in respect to "sets" (their principles are vague).

There is, in fact, no intuition of being, but some "original sentiments" happen to direct our train of thinking indeed. The fact might be only deplorable, but wholly acceptable for those rejecting en bloc an "outdated mediaeval intellectualism". The set of values raised on the basis of the basic (dominating) sentiments must harmonize with those sentiments. It is appraised as "modern individualism", but is in fact its opposite, since emotion are easily tapered with e.g. by media the sentiments might roused in. It is the intellect only which is immune to such a treatment.

It is, then, worthwhile to think over the exact meaning of the phrase: "everyone is free to choose …" (the creed of Individualism); to set it in a broader context of what individuals really are.

The problem of universals did not, apparently, pop out in the British Empiricism. The stance of David Hume was anticipated by Nicholas of Autrecourt and other followers of Ockham. The statement that "only individuals exist" is generally true, but not tantamount to that "individuals" are knowable intuitively as Scotus and Ockham thought. The content of the notion of "individuals" is by no means clear. It can be, properly speaking, said only that individual *things* exist, but in this case it is implied that a thingness of a thing is known to exist along with the individuals, which is obviously denied by nominalists. Nominalism happened to be matched with atomism, but could be, for that matter, matched with any speculative system. The claim that "only atoms exist" is speculative rather than scientific, and problematic as e.g. photons (and waves in general) are not atoms. Atomism is in fact but a questionable attempt at building a (queer) ontology. Still, without any such like attempts, the main contention of nominalism ("only individuals exist") cannot be maintained.

The main contention of nominalism is justified in that no mirror correlation between signs (in the intellect) and things (in reality) exists, which Plato seemed to claim in his Phaedo. Still, a scheme of acting in nature exists really, because e.g. a horse can beget a horse only, whereas it cannot beget e.g. a daffodil. The same mutatis mutandis observes in the relation of nature to the intellect.

Natural procreation consists in a specimen of a given species coming to existence, and there is a relation between a begetting horse and a begotten one, the relation founded on the very begetting. The claim that "only individuals exist …", should be completed by "…on their own", because relations are real, even if individualized in specimens of a given species only.

"A thing begets its resemblance in the human intellect"[45] in an analogous way it begets its corporeal resemblance in nature. Science consists in the intellect being unilaterally related to a thing via its thingness enabling it to generate (science and progeny alike). The thingness is abstracted from the individual material circumstances.

A strong electric field (of *elementary* bodies) creates real electron-positron pairs (Schwinger effect; photon-mediated pair production). Analogically, a potential of energy emanates from a complex/perfect being and happens to be substantiated either by a new material being of the same species, or a concept of this species born in the intellect. A thing must exist in nature before existing in the intellect.

The statement is, however, unacceptable from the point of view of phenomenology. Husserl denies any causal relation between the real and the mind. There is, indeed, no such a

[45] De veritate, q. 1 a. 10 ad s.c. 3 Ad tertium dicendum, quod duplex est perfectio; scilicet prima, et secunda: prima perfectio est forma uniuscuiusque, per quam habet esse; unde ab ea nulla res destituitur dum manet; secunda perfectio est operatio, quae est finis rei, vel id per quod ad finem devenitur et hac perfectione interdum res destituitur. Ex prima autem perfectione resultat ratio veri in rebus; ex hoc enim quod res formam habet, artem divini intellectus imitatur, et sui notitiam in anima gignit. Sed ex perfectione secunda consequitur in ipsa ratio bonitatis, quae consurgit ex fine; et ideo malum simpliciter invenitur in rebus, non autem falsum.

relation as William de Fontaines thought it to be (a physical one). Things are known potentially first, but actually too by dint of the abstracting intellect.

The "second beginning" of the Greek philosophy is marked by the famous Parmenidean: Thinking and the thought of are identical (quoted above). Various interpretations of the statement were proposed. According to Aristotle, the Parmenidean equation versifies absolutely in God only.[46] According to Thomas, the act of the divine intellect is identical with its object, because in God everything is God. In God only essence is identical with acting. In creatures, to the contrary, the equation holds true conditionally only. Humans act, because unable to find in themselves the plenitude they naturally desire. A being trough participation is naturally oriented towards Being per se.

The so called modern philosophy is marked with the stamp of Agnosticisms. Thingness of a thing "must" be unknowable because to be known has been equaled to exist in the so called consciousness. Trying to get to know (to bring into consciousness) what is in nature (beyond consciousness) seemed to imply contradiction.

Phenomenalism modified the sense of the phrase "everyone is free to…" According to J. St. Mill, "no one is free" in the sense of possessing freedom in his *biological* nature (the free will), but should try to be so *beyond* nature. Since Kant, the notion of biological nature has begun to be replaced by the "existential nature"; the one raised above the level of the crude nature and "supernatural" in a sense. In the world of the phenomena no transcendent and objective natural criteria of the value of statements and activities might exist. Paradoxically, Husserl calling to "return to the things themselves" *in consciousness* demanded turning back to things existing *beyond consciousness* – in nature. Is, then, "everyone is free to…" act in the natural world? Of course, not. One is free in the world of phenomena only.

The phenomena are seen only, and the "unseen" seems to be of no importance. The two week embryo is as tiny as a pinhead. It is almost invisible, albeit the heart of loving mother perceives the effects of its existence nonetheless. The perception is perhaps closest to intuition. The handicapped, no doubt, might be deprived of concern. They are not strong enough to claim their rights before the tribunal of the "consciousness". Still, and contrary to what Husserl says, the consciousness is not absolute being (nulla re indiget ad existendum). The Absolute Judge only decides about the life and death.

"The unnoticed does not exist". Perhaps it is a simplistic interpretation of the philosophy of subject, but one can hardly demand of a layman an intellectual refinement. Ordinary people consume only the poisoned fruits of the "refinement" and are culpable only for not noticing the fact.

If "everyone is *absolutely* free …", the unpredictable as well as incidental might follow. Still, the Necessary Being exists above things supposed to exist incidentally only. Things are incidental only to the extent they fail to lead to the first source of being.

The problem of the freedom of expression is raised in this context. According to the advocates of Liberalism, the offender should be protected, whereas the offended is "free to…" repel the offence only. If something hurts, the offended might be regarded as squeamish and thus culpable. Being sensible does not seem to be a commonly accepted value nowadays,

[46] Metaph. XII, c. 9, 1074b 15-1075a 5.

although Conrad (some 100 years before) claimed that intelligence is but a kind of susceptibility. In Iliad, Priam is reproved by his wife of "having an iron heart". He is not (in these words) appraised for being tough, but rebuked for being callous and stupid.

Intellection is about "accepting" (πάθειν τι), as Aristotle has it. In the world of importune advertisements, the sensibility is not appraised. In it, people happen to be exalted for being "strong" i.e. callous enough to sustain a constant flux of hatred and absurdity sifted into their minds.

The Polish poet and writer, Cyprian Kamil Norwid, distinguished between the freedom of expression and the freedom of the word (the latter collocation does not exist in English, but its use seems to be indispensable in philosophy). Some "negative" emotions are often expressed so as to depress those who are exposed to their toxicity. Sometimes "communication" consists in bringing down an adversary rather that bringing out a new idea. The expression of envy is obviously aimed at destruction, and other forms of expression (if not rational) might be similarly destructive. The word, to the contrary, is begotten rather than forced upon. Monsters exist in nature, but nature as such aims at perfection.

The name of perfection is, according to Aristotle, analogous. Every being aims at perfection (the one proper to its species), which is to say: it aims at partaking in the divine, albeit the striving is not crowned with the equal success for all. The natural perfection of man is, on the one hand, most difficult to obtain, since man's defining perfection, the intellect, is often despised, but on the other hand, superior to all purely animal forms of perfection. No animal can be, properly speaking, happy, because the horizon of its life is confined to several years, whereas the beatitude demands the consciousness of its unloseability.

Every living being begets so as to participate in the Perfect fertility of the Supreme Being. In man, fertility must be especially protected by the institution of the indissoluble marriage. People pass on to future generations not only their genotype, but values also. The upbringing consists in begetting the words of wisdom and fidelity in human hearts so as to pave the way for the Ultimate. Enriched be genuine values, man strives for the perfection unattainable to other animals; the not sensed one. We partake fully of God's perfection by the intellect and will only.

We direct our steps towards the ultimate, but the latter might be written with a minuscule or majuscule, all depending on how high the objective of the life is placed. Valuable (i.e. genuine) words are free because they set us free in the striving for the Ultimate with the capital "U". Some valuable words are bequeathed to us by our ancestors. We need not be (for the time being) philosophers so as to appreciate the value of writings by Aristotle and Thomas. Albeit unable to analyze the texts fully, we feel inner peace when contemplating their words (Physica. VII, c. 3, 247b-247a).

Enriched by the valuable words, we direct our footsteps towards the perfection attainable for a rational animal only. The anticipation of the fulfillment begets peace. The anticipation of the ultimate destruction begets anxiety.

The man of the Paleolithic era had many ways to embark upon leading to different directions. One of them had led him to the ancient Greece, another one – to the ancient Egypt, the other ones to: the pre-Columbian America, the old China, India, etc. The ways were many, for the directions of the migration of the human species were many too. However, there was one point of departure. Some 40,000 years ago Homo Sapiens appeared in Africa. The Bible

says of the Eden located probably there. People migrated and were dispersed all over the Earth. Still, the very act of migration was accompanied by at least a vague consciousness of the homeland being lost at the outset. Departing more and more from the original place of the proximity with God man *should* sense the fact of being deprived of something infinitely precious all the more acutely, and dissatisfied with any (no matter how rich) abode.[47]

"We look for new heavens and a new earth according to his promises, in which justice dwelleth" (2 Pt 3.13) (Novos vero caelos, et novam terram secundum promissa ipsius exspectamus, in quibus justitia habitat), although we do not expect any physical place, which must be, by nature, alien from the original place. We try to "return" to the homeland, albeit paradoxically, the nature of the homeland is not yet known distinctly enough.[48]

Embarking on any way must have been connected with a risk and some fear. In close contact with nature, the "prehistoric man" felt incomparably more authentically than the 21th century humans. But the man of the Paleolithic era must not feel but one: anxiety. The modern one feels it more and more acutely.

Fear is one of eleven main emotions enumerated by Thomas. It is not "negative", however, as all emotions are potentially referable to the fulfillment. There is, nevertheless, an exception; an emotion so pathological that called emotion problematically only. Love and peace are positive no doubt, and other nine can be positive if reduced in due order to them. But there is an affect which bars the way to fulfillment: anxiety.

Peoples when migrating mixed with each other. Physically nigh as they were, they were different as to their "origins", and even enthralled. Now, according to Hegel and Heidegger, civilization as such is not the way to the transcendent God, but a closed entity engendered by a culture-generating sentiment of anxiety (born of war). In the Bible, the fear of Lord is a sentiment of not being in the homeland. Timor separationis ("being anxious not to

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[47] Augustinus, In Psalmum 105, Enarratio; 22. [v 24.] Et pro nihilo habuerunt terram desiderabilem. Sed numquid viderant eam? Quomodo ergo pro nihilo, quam non viderant, habuerunt, nisi quomodo sequitur: Nec crediderunt in verbis eius? Profecto nisi terra illa significaret aliquid magnum, quae terra dicebatur fluens lac et mel, per quod visibile sacramentum ad invisibilem gratiam regnumque coelorum duceret eos qui mirabilia eius intellegebant; nullo modo isti culparentur, quia pro nihilo habuerunt illam terram, cuius temporale regnum etiam nos pro nihilo habere debemus, ut Ierusalem liberam matrem nostram, quae in coelis est, vere desiderabilem diligamus. Sed potius hic infidelitas merito redarguitur, quia in eo quod terram desiderabilem pro nihilo habuerunt, verbis Dei non crediderunt, per quaedam parva ducentis ad magna, et festinantes beari temporalibus rebus, quas secundum carnem sapiebant, non sustinuerunt, sicut supra dictum est, consilium eius.

[48] Augustine, 20. "Yea, they thought scorn of that pleasant land". But had they seen it? How then could they scorn that which they had not seen, except as the following words explain, "and believed not in His words." Indeed, unless that land which was styled the land that flowed with milk and honey, signified something great, through which, as by a visible token, He was leading those who understood His wondrous works to invisible grace and the kingdom of heaven, they could not be blamed for scorning that land, whose temporal kingdom we also ought to esteem as nothing, that we may love that Jerusalem which is free, the mother of us all, which is in heaven, and truly to be desired. But rather unbelief is here reproved, since they gave no credence to the words of God, who was leading them to great things through small things, and hastening to bless themselves with temporal things, which they carnally savoured of, they "abided not His counsel," as is said above.
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lose the Source of everlasting beatitude") is *a virtue* (Thomas). In Hegel, the Lord (Herr) is potentially Totalitarian civic structure cemented by anxiety.

Fear is good as long as prompting attacking the evil faced so (braving it). Aggression in this sense is natural, because we cannot pursue good without repelling evils. The institutional constraint aims at extinguishing all forms of "violence" (pretends to be so generous), but in fact stifles every sparkle of the natural energy in man oriented towards the plenitude of life. In nature, aggressive bears exist only, and the aggression sustains life. In modern world, "teddy bears" are preferable.

The way embarked upon is called iter in Latin and it should be an itinerary to God indeed. Still, the acting (proceeding on the way) unfolds is space and time (via) and the way we advance thus happens to be a ground we tread upon. On our itinerary to God, we use some material objects subservient to us. In Hegel, the servitude of *men* brought together (by chance or by force) in one place makes for a civilization to appear. In Heidegger, in turn, the very human being is defined by being a place (Dasein). The objects produced by man should and could be defined by their localization. But the contention that man (by a mere fact of producing the produced) should be defined accordingly is problematic, to say the least of it. Means used by man must be in a place, but man – defining the place – must regard it from distance.

Material objects have material values, and, if used by humans, have their market value also. The value of humans happens, in a libertarian society, to be assessed accordingly: proportionally of how effectively they produce. Moreover, the production happens to be (albeit perhaps should not so) be connected with hazard and unpredictability. Producing proceeds sometimes by way of trial and error, and the progress of civilization, in that paradigm, was expected to unfold similarly. Some bizarre or ever preposterous projects of humanity are brought to the intellectual market supposed to be free, albeit bereft of reason. The free movement of man (the rational creature) is directed towards God. The free movement of labor as such is directed to some preposterous projects of humanity. Their value might, allegedly, be checked only by way of trial and error. We are morally entitled to experiment on material object and on animals perhaps too. But it is totally immoral to experiment on people. The way without a rational direction is a way to anarchy and destruction.

Throughout 40,000 years of human exile and return, man happened to blunder into many queer places and many difficulties. To various extent, the exile and return was accompanied by a vague sentiment of the paradise lost and the hope of return to the true homeland. The drama of human existence unfolds between these two points. Man need not to be a philosopher or a theologian so as to feel a discomfort at being lost in a place alien to him/her. The exile is the bereavement of the Word of God; a peace is sometimes felt in the consciousness of His proximity.

Everyone (each individual) is free to achieve the fulfillment. Nay, his/her nature ("every-oneness") might be (in some simplification) defined by the proximity to the fulfillment. Still, the sense of individuality (of the "every-oneness") is dependent upon philosophical, not verbal distinctions. It cannot be solved in the way nominalists tried to.

In the classical philosophy, everyone is free, because endowed with the same immutable rational nature. The sense of humanity is not elucidated by enumeration of

empirically perceived features proposed by nominalists and advanced by e.g. sociology of psychology. Every time a nominalist presents an ontologically "weak" notion of humanity, he is, albeit often unwillingly so, forced to adopt a special assumption beyond the scope of pure logic and beyond the empirically given phenomena too. Scientism claims that everything consists of atoms, but the claim is unscientific apparently enough, because some physical objects are not atoms (e.g. waves, the field of gravitational potential, etc.). Condillac claimed that man is but a bundle of sentiments – without a nature to sustain them. Were the unbearable "metaphysical" assumptions avoided this way? Nothing of the sort. Atoms/sensations were in fact supposed to exist in the strong sense of the word. Still, if atoms were unimpeded to move along their own paths (free to do so), the buddle of atoms (an aggregate of them) could not be free, just because being a bundle. In J. St. Mill, thoughts are free in that way, i.e. they should advance unimpeded, but man is denied freedom (the free will), because unable to master them. Mill *had to* deny personal liberty (personal integrity) just because he unconditionally affirms "the freedom" of some autonomous "substructures" a person is supposed to be built of. If some "psychic individuals" ("substructures") are given "freedom" (tantamount to spontaneity), persons have *to be denied* freedom.

The "bundle of sentiments" (or atoms) cannot be responsible. The movement of the "atoms" is sufficiently surveyed by physics, and no room for rational ethics left. The "bundle of sentiments" should not be punished, for it is "unhuman", as humans have been defined by some elementary substances (were the aggregates thereof). Nor for that matter, should he/she be educated, because education and moral rigor is contrary to spontaneity: the movement of "particles" of which consists a totality definable provisionally only.

There is no privileged direction in the three dimensional space. Still, civilization as such consists in choosing a definite direction. Various civilizations are valued and estimated according to how effectively they lead to God. Some places (e.g. the Nazi Germany or the Soviet Russia) were handicapped in comparison to other privileged ones (e.g. the Paris University in the 13th century).

We do not advance towards the Ultimate alone. We are aimed or impeded by each other. The wisdom aids, the malice and stupidity hampers.

The Revelation, moreover, teaches us that we are helped on our way to the Ultimate by the Perfect Man – a Way itself, but the End at the same time, because of his manhood being accepted by God. There is, moreover, a terra desiderablis, the Man appeared in: His Mother, a Perfect Woman. She is a unique way for us to embrace, because of Her human nature pure enough to be assumed by God. Augustine comments on the Psalm 85 as follows:

> 10. "Truth hath sprung out of the earth, and righteousness hath looked down from heaven" (ver. 11). "Truth hath sprung out of the earth:" Christ is born of a woman. The Son of God hath come forth of the flesh. What is truth? The Son of God. What is the earth? Flesh. Ask whence Christ was born, and thou seest that "Truth is sprung out of the earth." But the Truth which sprang out of the earth was before the earth, and by It the heaven and the earth were made: but in order that righteousness might look down from heaven, that is, in order that men might be justified by Divine grace, Truth was born of the Virgin Mary; that He might be able to offer a sacrifice to justify them, the sacrifice of suffering, the sacrifice of the Cross. And how could He offer a sacrifice for our sins, except He died? How could He die, except He received from us that wherein He might die; that is, unless He received from us mortal flesh,

> Christ could not have died: because the Word of God dieth not, Godhead dieth not, the Virtue and Wisdom of God doth not die. How should He offer a sacrifice, a healing victim, if He died not? How should He die, unless He clothed Himself with flesh? How should He put on flesh, except truth sprang out of the earth?[49]

There are various objectives to follow in the ordinary life and various means proportionate to obtain them. An animal might be supposed to be happy because in the proper place and in proper somatic condition. Man, to the contrary, is never happy that way. In De Caelo, Aristotle says that human objectives are (should be if rational and natural) incomparably more ambitious (Bk. II, Ch. 12, 292a – 292b). That the perfection of a nature is to be sought beyond that nature, is a condition common to every creature whose actions complete the incompleteness of its existence. It is, however, special to human nature to search and find the objective beyond all created nature. The objective is supernatural.

The supernatural to man is natural to God. The supernatural is a gift. It is not about our being formally inferior to some superior nature. Some persons (angels) endowed with a superior intellectual nature are, by the mere fact of being created "there", better *than* us-humans. But it is by no means certain that they are, by the same token, better *for* us. Being good – contrary to what Neo-Platonists say – consists in free giving; in a voluntary act. The pure intelligences are capable of giving, but are not, by the fact of being capable, actually giving and merciful for us-humans.

Boethius of Dacia and other Averroists before and afterwards claimed that the ultimate perfection of humans consists in a union with what is immediately (formally) superior to us – the so called Separate Intelligence. In the Middle Ages, some tried to identify them with angels, albeit Scripture contradicts the assumption. In the modern time, Kant, Hegel, Comte and many others, identified it with the collective consciousness of humanity.

Being formally (out of nature) better is by no means the same as being good by will. The disinterested gift of the Perfect Man was preceded by the heroic Fiat of His Mother and opened to us the merciful perspective of obtaining the Ultimate; the Return. But the exile was procured by an action of who claimed to be similar to God not by acting along with Him (His grace), but by his nature. He claimed to be superior on his own.

> [The rebellious Angel] did not desire equality simply with regard to the substance of the desired object, namely, such that it would will to have as much goodness as God has. Rather, it desired equality in a qualified sense, namely, as regards the mode of possession. For in God

[49] 15. [vers.12.] *Veritas de terra orta est, et justitia de coelo prospexit. Veritas de terra orta est:* Christus de femina natus est. *Veritas de terra orta est:* Filius Dei de carne processit. Quid est veritas? Filius Dei. Quid est terra? Caro. Interroga unde natus est Christus, et vides quia *veritas de terra orta est*. Sed haec veritas quae orta est de terra, erat ante terram, et per ipsam factum est coelum et terra; sed ut jusititia de coelo prospiceret, id est, ut justificarentur homines divina gratia, veritas nata est de Maria virgine; ut posset pro illis justificandis offerre sacrificium, sacrificium passionis, sacrificium crucis. Et unde offerret sacrificium pro peccatis nostris, nisi moreretur? unde autem moreretur, nisi a nobis acciperet ubi moreretur? Id est, nisi a nobis sumeret carnem mortalem, Christus mori non posset; quia Verbum non moritur, divinitas non moritur, Virtus et Sapientia Dei non moritur. Quomodo offerret sacrificium victimam salutarem, si non moreretur? Quomodo autem moreretur, nisi carnem indueret? Quomodo carnem indueret, nisi veritas de terra oriretur? *Veritas de terra orta est, et justitia de coelo prospexit.*

> there is a goodness or beatitude that he has by his nature, and from this nature there is poured out to a creature every beatitude and goodness. So *the angel, seeing the dignity of its nature by which it excelled all other created things, willed that beatitude and goodness flow from it to all lower things.* It also willed to arrive at the perfection of beatitude through its own natural endowments. Thus, it is said that it willed to have without merit what it would have had by its merits if it had stood firm. Nor even with regard to the mode of possession did it will to be equal to God simply. For it did not will to have beatitude from itself or to be the first one pouring it into others. Rather, what it willed, it willed to have from God and under God insofar as he works in every nature (Fathers of the English Dominican Province).[50]

Formally better than man, he desired to be a necessary intermediary. He was created so as to be a transparent means leading to God, but desired intransparency and self-excellence. He wanted to be supernatural for man by sheer fact of being ontologically superior.

> Evil consists not only in the privation of a form, but also in the privation of [the proper] mode and order. Hence, evil in the act of the will stems not only from its object (albeit it gives an action a "form" through which evil is willed indeed), but also in subtracting of the proper mode and order [of the act]. E.g. *from the mere fact of willing good, man is not preserving, at the same time, the due mode and order [of action]. Devils' sin was of this kind. For he did not desire some evil (he did desire some good convenient for him), but he desired it inordinately and immoderately.* He did not desire it to obtain by the aid of the divine grace, but through his own strength. The desire exceeded, as it did, the [natural] mode of his condition (Fathers of the English Dominican Province).[51]

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[50] Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 5 q. 1 a. 2 c. […] Angelus […] non appetiit aequalitatem simpliciter quantum ad substantiam desiderati, ut scilicet vellet tantam bonitatem habere quantam Deus habet; sed tamen appetiit aequalitatem secundum quid, scilicet quantum ad modum habendi. Bonitas autem sive beatitudo est in Deo, quam habet per suam naturam, et a qua omnis creaturae beatitudo et bonitas transfunditur. Videns ergo Angelus dignitatem naturae suae, qua creaturis ceteris praeeminebat, voluit a se beatitudinem et bonitatem in omnia inferiora derivari; voluit etiam per sua naturalia in perfectionem beatitudinis pervenire: et ideo dicitur, quod sine merito habere voluit hoc quod ex meritis habiturus esset si perstitisset. Nec etiam quantum ad modum habendi, simpliciter Deo aequiparari voluit: non enim voluit a se beatitudinem habere, nec esse primum in alios transfundens; sed a Deo et sub Deo, secundum quod ipse in omni natura operatur.

[51] De malo, q. 16 a. 2 c.; De malo, q. 16 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum, quod secundum Augustinum in Lib. de natura boni, malum non solum consistit in privatione speciei, sed etiam in privatione modi et ordinis. Unde malum in actu voluntatis non solum est ex obiecto, quod dat speciem actui per hoc quod aliquis velit malum, sed etiam ex subtractione debiti modi vel ordinis ipsius actus; puta, si aliquis in hoc ipso quod vult bonum, non servat debitum modum et ordinem. Et tale fuit Daemonis peccatum, quo factus est malus. Non enim appetiit aliquod malum, sed quoddam bonum sibi conveniens; inordinate tamen et immoderate illud appetiit, quia scilicet non appetiit illud ut assequendum per divinam gratiam, sed per propriam virtutem: quod excedebat modum suae conditionis, ut Dionysius dicit cap. IV de Divin. Nomin.: aversio ergo Daemonibus est malum, in quantum scilicet eorum appetitus avertit se a directione superioris regulae: et convenientium ipsis excessus, in quantum scilicet appetendo bona convenientia modum suum excesserunt. Semper autem in peccato defectus intellectus (vel rationis) et voluntatis proportionabiliter se concomitantur. Unde non oportet ponere in primo peccato Daemonis talem defectum intellectus, ut aliquid falsum existimaverit, puta aliquod malum esse bonum; sed in hoc quod defecit ab apprehensione suae regulae, et ordinis eius.

He desired to be good *in respect* to man (to give him good in a "special" manner), as if that good were his own, and not gratuitously given by God. In effect, be failed to be good *for* man. Some theologians spoke, in this context, of "phantasia proterva", a debauched intellect degenerated to the level of a beast, which is, however, *best applicable to man*. The ideologies of modernity claim in fact to be supernatural for individual men; they propagate "the unnatural" equaled to the *unnatural.* They are neither philosophy nor theology, but a bizarre amalgam of them both.

Being "supernatural" in the sense of the word proposed by the advocates of modern humanity, is to be free to advance in any direction. The idea of "open society" forbids in fact any definite directions and the "divine" one especially. Allured by instigation of who envied his beatitude in God, man desired the similitude to God inordinately, and the human nature degenerated so that even the contrary to his animal nature appeared. The notorious progress of humanity is destitute of any direction unless the direction of dropping all directions might be called a direction. *Deprived of the unique objective integrating his/her personality, man advances into the unknown future: mentally disintegrated and lost.*

"Everyone" of the modern relativism is, in fact, precipitating blindfolded into an abyss of absurd, destruction and despair.

Chapter I. THE PRINCIPLE OF NUMBER

1. The number value

The equilibrium between the supply and demand seems to describe adequately economic values. However, it was supposed that the demand for the consumable and the supply for it *in general* should exist in all human relations, no matter how specific and complex, and values definable accordingly. Hermann Rudolf Lotze, advancing that notion of values, used the term of consumption (geniessen). Material goods (not only food) happen to be consumed that way because used. But all spiritual goods (ideas) could be imagined to be consumable this way also. The metabolism of information Kępiński speaks of is a form of consumption.

The mathematical equation is as simple as clear. Social relations (the supply and demand for any goods) were supposed to be so perspicuous also. However, a question might be asked whether the mathematical model explains the relations or rather simplifies them. Some values were deemed "superior" because posed at a superior place, but if they are superior really, they might be *qualitatively* different, and being posed at any place could not change any nature.

Some books are said to include the so called universal human values. A writer creates, obviously, a book, but it is unclear whether the value included therein is, by a mere fact of being included, *immanent* to the book or rather referable to what exists beyond it and beyond the writer's mind too. An under-determination lurks in the notion of the human creativity, and

all the more so as the objects concerned are (deemed) superior. Universal human values are supposed to inhere in the classics of philosophy, literature, and perhaps, in the constitutions of states also. Still, if inherent to any "vehicle of values" (which is created) the values could be (as Nietzsche thought) re-created in the future. In other words: they can be "modernized"; "updated"; "improved", or simply: *relativized*.

Mathematics is often regarded as a queen of sciences, and the mathematical method is credited with so much value that deemed applicable universally. Mathematicism had appeared in philosophy since Pythagoras and Parmenides and was about to, in the centuries to come, be widely adopted by philosophers. However, according to Thomas, mathematics is *a specific* science. Albeit called by Aristotle himself a "mathematical philosophy", it was counter-divided to the philosophy of nature and metaphysics. Mathematics is specific because it adopts a specific method different to both the philosophy of nature and the "theological philosophy" called nowadays metaphysics. The mathematical method used to be extrapolated, but that happened to the detriment of science as such, because burring distinctions spawns chaos. Nature is knowable by dint of mathematics *in some respect*, but perhaps *not known comprehensively* after all, which concerns in particular the *human* nature, which is far from being numerable and measurable in the way the elementary bodies are.

In antiquity, Heraclitus came to be known for the famous "the same is the way up and down" (frg. 60), which could be called a "metaphysical equation" in a sense. We come to existence and hope to return to whence we came from. The trajectory of an elementary body is as simple as its mathematical graph. Plato, however, (albeit a mathematician himself) stated (Phaedo 108A) that the-way-beyond is neither plain not simple. Some relatively simple social relations only might appear to be parts of a regular curve of the social progress, but the parts constitutive of that supposedly regular curve – individual persons – advance the way up (and progress) in a way that cannot measured with a yardstick of the exact science.

The trajectory of an elementary body is differentiable (and its parts knowable), provided the function describing the movement is continuous. Conversely, the line integral (curvilinear integral) can be constituted out of these parts. The trajectory of a material body existing (for some time) in the gravitational field of the Erath is a parabola, provided the field is not quantized. Now, the human body is neither elementary nor the form it is constituted by (the rational soul) is continuous in the way space must be. The acts of reasoning and deciding follow upon each other, but their "elements" are discrete (discontinuous) and the stream of consciousness phenomenology speaks of cannot exist at all.

We cannot act save changing the position of our body towards the material objects. The rational (and moral) action must consist in a precisely measured positioning of our body. Still, suffering consists in an in-dis-position of our body, which poses as special challenge. Acting is incomparably more difficult if it faces a privation (passion is that) instead of something positively definable. Deprived of the power to act, man happens to be unable to understand the sense of suffering on his/her own. The sense of privation is only legible in the light of formality which repels it. God is pure formality. *Genuine* theoretical philosophy is "indifferent" towards a particular privation, for it concerns universals only. It can define privation, and can repel a particular privation indirectly, viz. via reflection. Thus it proves to be a unique inspiration for ethics.

Mathematics is unable to define privation at all, because it is most formal. A point is *something* in mathematics only, whereas its status of being must be defined in terms of the *privation of continuity*. Similarly, the *natural* activity of the intellect cannot be defined in terms of the uninterrupted sequence of "Nows" (points of time) in the stream of consciousness phenomenology speaks of. A consciousness of "Nows" (if possible) must have been that of privations. Supposedly, the "realistic" phenomenology devised by Heidegger was such a consciousness of privation (of death first of all), but that consciousness seems to be morbid. Similarly, in the so called border situations Existentialists speak of, the consciousness of privation appears: death, suffering, guilt are privations indeed: they were supposed to give a privileged insight into the mystery of existence. The insight, however (in any) would be incommunicable.

Mathematics was believed to be perfectly precise because exact, but it is, nonetheless, *not precise enough* to define the position of our body. Edmund Husserl (following the old tradition of mathematicism) regarded the existence of the mathematical ideatum as a chance for human existence. He rejected the way Scientism used mathematics (to his mind, it abused it), but claimed that he can avail himself of it better; for building (so to say) an exact trajectory of the human existence.

Neo-Platonists (in the 3rd century AD) developed the philosophy of unity founded by Parmenides and Plato. The idea of Emanationism was founded upon the assumption of the continuous displacement of the cosmic energy. Avicenna (980-1038) replaced the idea of Emanation with that of (the general) Enlightenment. Several centuries had passed, when, (after strenuous polemics) the idea of this *Arab* enlightenment took its roots in *Europe*.

Between the beginning and the end of the human life a continuous line can be drawn or imagined at least. Perhaps, it would be not as simple as that of e.g. the trajectory an electron is, but, if human body consisted of atoms (because "only atoms are real"), and there were no substance to sustain them (as they exist on their own), the trajectory of the human existence could be – at least theoretically – analyzable up to its simplest elements. That had been believed before Avicenna, who modified the traditional scheme after all. According to him, the trajectory of the human existence stretches out towards a transcendental ideal. There was always something strange about the "analyzing", because the analyzing ("engine"; substance; mind) had been tacitly assumed to be a structure privileged to others (the analyzed) and more sophisticated than ordinary aggregates of atoms. Avicenna, so as to explain the status of the human mind, adopted the idea of the Enlightenment. Light was supposed to be immaterial and the "analyzing engine", consequently, also.

A primitive atomism (e.g. of the Arab Asharites) might have lost its attractiveness after Avicenna, but atomism as such does not need to be understood in Materialist terms only. In the era if the "European" Enlightenment, a "psychological atomism" devised by Condillac appeared too. The "Condillac Man" (the "statue") was made up of sensations (such like "particles"). They are, to be sure, different to the atoms normally so called, but they are, nonetheless, mechanically gathered into an "aggregate" called human psyche. Human minds can be understood by breaking them down into elementary units (sensations), which combine so as to form more complex mental structures.

There are, on the one side (of the equation) mechanical impulses, but on the other, some impressions, viz. reactions. Reactions, normally, could be provoked, and thus emotions

tampered with. Mechanism according to which the modern media work can be summarized in these terms. Consumers are not expected to be independent, nay, they are *demanded* to be "spontaneous" i.e. to react in a way desirable from the point of view of those who provide the material goods. The mechanism precludes the possibility of any constructive and *critical* assessment of the objective facts. Those "witnessed" (advertised) count more than those "naked" ones.

There is a supply and demand (an equation) between the ideas proposed and consumed, but the problem remains by whom the equation itself has been constructed. Justice demands *a special* equality. Aequitas (equity) in Latin means the equality between what is to be done and what is expected as a reward. It regards the *unchangeable laws of nature*. Not even God the Creator can breach the laws of nature, for that does not behoove His intellectual nature. This existential equation is created by God Himself and is, then, unchangeable. There is – generally – in nature acting and reacting, although not as simple as described by Hook's Law. There is justice (sensu largo) in nature for its harmony consists in equilibrium indeed. The laws of nature are combined with the rights of those acting according to nature and partaking of its perfection. The artificial structures (such like "equations"), on the other hand, are constructed by men and imitative of the preexisting harmony as far only as the human constructing unfolds according to *the human rational nature*. Now greed, contrary to the notorious: "the greed for the lack of a better word is good" is unnatural, because reversing the natural relation between the end (sought for its own sake) and the means (money is sought for the sake of the end). Means are definable by the relation to the end only. Marxists were consequential in their contention to "create a better world to live in" and claiming the right and power to "improve" the nature, i.e. equal it to what they desired of it, although their "creativity" has spawned natural disasters only (gruesome and grotesque at the same time). Nowadays, half-hearted socialists, content themselves with "improving" the *human* nature; with creating the human "environment" of life. If the elements constitutive thereof had existed in the way atomists/sensualists believed them to, the objective would have been realizable. The assumption, however, is based on ignoring nature as such (its specific diversity). Especially, if human *rational* nature is ignored, the authenticity of human existence will be sought in emotions. They fluctuate like prices on an unstable market do, and can be subject to manipulation also.

The one who knows the mechanism of manipulation is not affected by it personally (directly). He/she is privileged there in comparison to the ordinary consumers, and even to the ordinary producers in a state regulated economy. The one who knows the working principle of a machine is more than just a cog in its wheel. The elite is above the ordinary consumers. The success of the manipulation depends of how effectively consumers (and possibly producers too) are persuaded to the rightfulness of the scheme.

There is, to be sure, a modest palace allotted to the "private conscience" in the scheme, although the place seems precarious. "Private conscience" is prevented from becoming consciousness (creative of community). Conscience, in the traditional sense of the word (almost extinct nowadays), means moral awareness of one's responsibility *shared with the others*. There is no such like participation in a society made up of *atomized* individuals. The place must be (decreed to be) modest, and must not be part of the way towards the Transcendence (the Creator and the End of the human existence) *integrating the personal*

existence. "Religion must be private" and "separated from the state", which is strange indeed, as the authentic religion consists in depending on the Creator, and the creation cannot be "private" unless some tribal deity were to replace the Universal One. The individual rational mind does not, in that scheme, integrate the trajectory of human existence (its co-existence in nature), for it is but loosely connected with nature. Moral commandments cannot be, to Luther's mind, realized in the physical world (the Scripture contradicts the claim), but "witnessed" only. In the sphere of the "profane" man is expected to act in the modern way, but at the same time, encouraged to cherish a hope that everything private (no matter how heinous) would be pardoned "in a lump-sum manner", provided it occasions in any way the progress**.**

The continuity of every perfect form of life is a problem, and the more grave, the more perfect is the life (hoped to be). The perfect is easily destructible; the elementary is not. The protection of animals is being carried out, but the effective protection of man's humanity (of the human spiritual dignity) has been despaired to be obtained. In fact, humans are the most endangered species in the world; not *physically*, but *spiritually*. Infantile solaces ("music"; "films" etc.) are procured so as to prevent the despair from erupting and destroying the desirable equilibrium, albeit the structure raised against (or even: despite the laws of) nature cannot endure for any longer spell of time.

On the both sides of a mathematical equation (used frequently for describing social relations) real number might be placed. The human existence, albeit complex, would have been analyzable with those numbers. But real numbers are *infinitely divisible*, so that the analysis would advance in infinitum too. It might have never ended. The human body and human existence too, were supposed to be thus infinitely analyzable.

The assumption that the constituents of the human existence must be similar to numbers is disputable, to say the least of it. The natural body is normally palpable. The ideal objects mathematics speaks of are not. The bodily existence of e.g. a dog is as obvious as the harm possibly done to it if infringed upon. But numbers written on a school board can be wiped off without harming anybody.

The elementary particles happen to be defined operationally, and thus the answer to the question about the status of being of mathematical objects avoided. But the (supposed) aggregate of the particles is real in the *ordinary* sense of the word. The *natural* conviction that an organic body is more than just a sum of particles; that it is integral without being integrated; prevents from harming it. The constituents of the bodies (supposed to be real) are, to the contrary, integrated without its sum being integral. The deplorable fate of the notorious Schrödinger's cat can befall anybody.

Senses, contrary to what Hutcherson and Smith say, are indifferent to the real integral (indivisible) substances (the human person is this, first of all). The empathy is, generally, self-centered; it *needs* some objects for its fulfillment. In some cases, it would even resort to constructing them (to making some people pitiable so as to pity them). The *effective* mercy, on the other hand, needs (wills) the opposite: the nonexistence of evil in any form. In a nanny state, the handicapped could be created so as to prove the generosity of the creators.

Matter is – according to Aristotle – one of the four causes. Although discovered first, it is by no means the most important one. Aristotle objects to Pythagoreans an actual Materialism, all the more deplorable as the principles they possessed would allow them

ascending to some superior causes. Mathematics is a splendid triumph of the human intellect over the disordered and the emotional. Still, it is but a step towards the supreme. By dint of analogy we are able to discover a *substantial* form of being, after having realized that the forms mathematics speaks of are accidental only (they cannot exist on their own). Unfortunately, many philosophers stuck on the way to the supreme; they grew old in a particular wisdom out of complacency or self-confidence, and failed to ascend to the science supreme in the natural order: metaphysics.

Man is real because possessed of his natural form (which gives him existence), whereas "unreal" if dissected into "particles". The actual disintegration of the human body (in a "clinic") is normally preceded by the idea of disintegration Materialism advances.

Our bodies stretch out in the three dimensional space, in the way, approximately, geometric solids do. But they stretch out (extend) into the future too, and that dimension of the human existence cannot be placed on the axis of the coordinates, because there is no quantitative relation between the past and the future. The past events are *necessary*; the future ones are *continent*. The necessary and the possible are modalities of *being as such*; not the modalities of the *quantitative being*.

Pythagoreans (and the contemporary advocates of the scientism too) accept the formal value of the mathematical method in describing the matter of the world, but fail to account for the source of the existence of the matter. The mind of an experimenter is not, apparently, that source, albeit those who "developed" Kantianism (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel) seemed to think so.

Anyway, the human mind is "formal" and cannot be "material" because it is able to comprehend the immaterial objects (and all immovable objects for that matter too), whereas a material object can comprehend another one for a time only. A glass contains some portion of water, but it can easily break; it is even biodegradable, for some 400,000 years will suffice to dissolve in into the elementary matter. It is not the case with the human mind.

Man is, moreover, formally different to other animals, as no one of them is able to conceive a mathematical theorem. It is really interesting whence the power stems. The very relation of the mathematical objects to the human intellect is not describable in mathematical terms. So as to gather forms (of the objects to be known) firmly and immovably (as Thomas has it), the human mind must be more formal; nay, *the most formal possible* existing in the material world. "Human mind is not a body because it can comprehend all bodies" Thomas says. The intellectual in man is a formal principle of being, whereas the cognitive forms appear in it accidentally only.

The quantitative forms vary monotonically, but the human mind does not so. It is impossible to be more (or less), and the principle of the third excluded falsifies the sentiment fostered by Gabriel Marcel. A child is not a 50% man only because of a small body (or because of fragile emotional structure). It must not be disrespected because small (some days after the natural conception), because the disrespect is as irrational as unhuman. Emotions can stifle the voice of reason (conscience) for a time only, but it is infeasible to disrespect the vulnerable in a wider horizon of time (that proper to man as such). State laws can be disrespectful (irrational) *for some time* indeed, and the time in question is that needed for their own destruction. Man is a rational being and thus constitutive of every firm community, which is then, rather a feminine than masculine community. Men are often creative of some

bizarre forms of existence, but women, as a rule, skeptical of that creativity. *Her*-conscience (practical reason), is incomparably more sensitive of the tiniest forms of the *real* human life and *conservative thereof* than *his*-conscience. Without this natural feminine conservatism, it could have never be asserted that "The unborn is considered to have been born" (nasciturus pro iam nato habetur); a child's existence must be protected.

The relations of the family proximity have natural precedence over those economic ones. Apparently, no economic ratio exists between the gift of life and the obedience due to parents (because of the fact of being born). The "faces" (individual forms) of a child's relatives are perceived by it to be diverse in their being ("not-mine"), but at the same time (for the very reason they give life/being) naturally nigh, for they communicate the specific nature sharable with the relatives ("my" nature). The relations are not reducible to the spatial ones. Our being thus formally related (our being relatives) is normally known as the first obvious fact in our life.

The other facts (the natural relations existing in nature) come to be known along with broadening the scope of personal existence. The cognitive forms one is possessed of are not deducible from anybody's mind (as Kant supposed). Had it been the case, the principle of existence would have identified with the principle of knowing and man would have been creative of reality. Even Kant shrank from admitting the stance enthusiastically accepted at the eve of his dead by Fichte. Man was about to imitate God the Artisan; the Creator of the world; to the point of identifying with Him. In God, really, forms (ideas) are creative of the world. But the forms of cognition we (humans, the creatures) naturally accept must "fill the empty space" left in our being because of the mere fact of our being created and not self-sufficient.

The line of existence of this or that man originates from (an individual or specific) form. What we can imagine (or expect) to be actual continuity of our existence (its being stretched into the future, which we would like to call our own) depends on the relations to beings different to our individual being, but at the same time, naturally perfective of it, because endowed with a specific form. The relations are not quantitative. The co-existence (a continuity of a sort) with beings in general (with those endowed with natural forms) depends on discrete (discontinuous) acts of the intellect and the will. The acts are not disconnected, but at the same time, not connected in the way a line points are connected on a graph.

A personal form of existence actuates this body, but the accidental and communicable forms of cognition actuate (perfect) the others too – accidentally. Words spoken aloud and *distinctly*, but at the same time, amiably (blunt words) are perfective of genuine life (different to the make-believe life advertised only). There something "between" the intellect and the will of who teaches and who is taught: the good of the intellect. The good when known is the principle of acting. Everything naturally aims at good, but humans aim at it intentionally i.e. rationally in their mature life.

In the such like "existential equation", the intellectual striving for good as such should be posed on the one side, and the good intended, but really existing on the other side of the "=" symbol. The good attracts the human will and does it perfectly if understood. Its attraction makes for the integrity of the human existence.

There was a "mathematics of reality" thought out by Pythagoreans, but Heraclitean equation also: "The way up and the way down are one and the same". Things come from God and

return to Him.[52] Human life, since originating from God, must end in God also. Still, without the Revelation the precise meaning of the "return" is not easily legible. Perhaps, we would not be able to advance further that Aristotle did. Maybe, he stood on the threshold of the Mystery without the power to trespass it.

There were, however, some who claimed to be Aristotelians but refused to try to trespass it (rejected a priori the mere possibility). According to Averroes, the Revelation is a myth, and the reflection on it (unduly supposed to be rational) is, in fact, a spoiled mixture of philosophy and mythology, disastrous for the genuine philosophy, but fueling fanaticism of the unlearned only. The reflection had been before him called theology, but it fell into disgrace due to the reformer. The aversion to *rational* theology nowadays testifies to how "popular" Averroes' stance is now, even in those who do not even know the name of their "discreet" preceptor. The very name of the Arab thinker had been unknown before Renan's "Averroès et l'Averroïsme" was published in 1882, but the core of his teaching had been popularized by Kant and Hegel, who themselves were wholly unaware to be heirs to the tradition. There is (allegedly) no personal principle in man able to define the equality between what is and what is to be done; between the thought of and the existing in the natural world; between the principle of human existence and its end. Man is (to their minds) but a beast, and the best can be offered him is the ephemeral participation of the collective consciousness of humanity. The horizon of life closes with one's death. Marsilius' of Padua (the Averroist) Defensor Pacis ("The Defender of Peace" published in 1324) was enthusiastically heralded as a groundbreaking political treatise arguing for popular sovereignty and separation of church and a secular state. Placing ultimate power with the citizens was believed to cause it. There was, however, but one precondition for the "peace": men should make do with multiplying material goods. The spiritual and the material in man were separated to the effect the former was but an ideal. There is, according to Kant, the moral perfection on the one side of the "eschatological" equation and happiness on the other. His idea of Summum Bonum is founded upon the need to *match them formally*. God is not real in the normal sense of the word, but the *Idea of God* is needed (instrumantalized) for a modern "humanist" so as "to make the world a better place to live in".

Scales might be an allegory of human life. There is good done on the one scale and the reward on the other. In Kant, they identified "formally", because the possibility has been precluded they might be so *effectively*: be the Supreme *Judge*. Judgment, in general, is nowadays commonly regarded as harmful, not because unjust, but because not pampering human animality.

Human fragility might be pardoned, but not pampered. God loves humans not because they are miserable, but so as to render them non-miserable (loves them effectively; not

[52] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 1 n. 4 Finis autem ultimus uniuscuiusque rei est qui intenditur a primo auctore vel motore ipsius. Primus autem auctor et motor universi est intellectus, ut infra ostendetur. Oportet igitur ultimum finem universi esse bonum intellectus. Hoc autem est veritas. Oportet igitur veritatem esse ultimum finem totius universi; et circa eius considerationem principaliter sapientiam insistere. Et ideo ad veritatis manifestationem divina sapientia carne induta se venisse in mundum testatur, dicens, Ioan. 18-37: *ego in hoc natus sum, et ad hoc veni in mundum, ut testimonium perhibeam veritati*.

"emotionally"). Two Psalms follows in close connection. In the Psalm 6, mercy is implored upon the unjust, but in the next one, just judgment asked for upon the one *liberated effectively* from the injustice. God's mercy justifies a man, and then, he/she might be justly judged without being condemned. Some people relish in the awareness of them being needed and the others wholly dependent upon their "benevolence", but God cannot be imagined to act anthropomorphically.

The life equilibrium might be difficult to obtain indeed, but the natural in man (his reason and the will) demands such an equilibrium nonetheless; between the objective state of affairs and the just judgment about them; between the good intended in the mind and the realization thereof in the material world. Averroism is alien to the classic culture, because equity (in Latin) is the same as justice, and cannot be reduced to an "equality" of *the thought out and the realized in the human world* only. It regards *the created before man*, and created for him (not to be "improved") so that it might be cultivated (as the Garden of Eden was). There is, on one side, the actually creative power of God, and, on the other, the (possibly) honest man's striving to response to God's acting. This is the most fundamental "equation of life".

There is, indeed, a relation between the done and the expected, but not as simple as the supply and demand. There a blatant "quantitative" disproportion between the done and the received in the authentic creation of: poets, philosophers and scientists. They cannot be justly awarded now. But the disproportion is even vaster if *the divine* creation of the totality of existence is concerned. The loving expects to be loved back.

> …Jesus Christ wishes to receive some fruits from our wretched selves, namely, our good works, because those good works belong to Him alone : Creati in operibus bonis in Christo Jesu, — "Created in good works in Christ Jesus," — which words show both that Jesus Christ is the sole principle, and ought to be the sole end of all our good works, and also that we ought to serve Him, not as servants on wages, but as slaves of love.[53]

Merits equal the rewards not because of the efficacy of the second causes (men are this) but because of the power they are effectively given by the First Cause. Man is able to return this way to where he/she came from.

> … some say that one can merit eternal life not condignly but congruously. But others say that one can merit eternal life through the acts of the virtues even condignly. Now, someone is said to merit condignly when we find an equality between the reward and the merit according to a right estimation, whereas someone is said to merit only congruously when we do not find such equality, but instead a gift is given, solely according to the giver's liberality, that befits the giver.
>
> Now, it seems that both sides are correct in a certain regard. For there are two kinds of "equality": equality of quantity and equality of proportion. We do not merit eternal life condignly from acts of the virtues according to equality of quantity. For there is not as much

[53] Louis-Marie Grignon de Montfort, Treatise on the True Devotion to the Blessed Virgin , transl. by F. W. Faber, London 1863.
Access 2026-10-29 https://librivox.org/a-treatise-on-the-true-devotion-to-the-blessed-virgin-by-louis-marie-grignon-de-montfort/

good in the quantity of an act of virtue as there is in the reward of glory, which is its end. But according to equality of proportion we do merit eternal life condignly. For we take note of equality of proportion when A is to B as C is to D. Now, to grant eternal life is not greater for God than to show forth an act of virtue is for us. Rather, as the former is congruous to him, so also the latter is to us. Thus, we find a kind of equality of proportion between God rewarding and man meriting, as long as the reward is referred to the same genus as the merit, so that if the reward is one that exceeds every faculty of human nature, as eternal life does, then the merit also is through an act of the kind that reflects the good of the habit divinely infused, configuring us to God.

Even so, those who say that we can merit eternal life condignly seem to be more correct. For there are two species of justice, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 5, namely, distributive and commutative justice. The latter is in contracts such as buying and selling, and regards arithmetic equality, which has the intention of equality of quantity. Distributive justice regards geometric equality, which is equality of proportion. Now, rendering the reward to merits preserves more the form of distribution, since one renders to each according to his works, than the form of commutation, since God receives nothing from us, although we sometimes find it said metaphorically by the saints that the kingdom of heaven is bought by good works, inasmuch as God accepts our works as receiving them. Thus, it is more correct to say that we merit condignly than that we do not merit condignly.[54]

2. Axioms. Axiology. The zero value. The point of reference

The notion of values is nowadays indispensable. The notion of values fashioned after the manner of the measurement values is to be *wholly disposed of.*

Values are maesured in physics against a point of reference, which can be e.g. the zero point of an ammeter scale. The ammeter, however, must be scaled itself.

Immanuel Kant deemed exact sciences to be paradigmatic for all human knowledge. Ethics (his Critique of the Practical Reason) should be (to his mind) exempted, but Kant assumed some a priori conditions for it nevertheless, typical of the scheme of thinking he *generally* adopted. Nowadays, the influence Kant exerted upon the methodology of exact sciences is deemed unimportant, whereas the influence on the humanities – huge. The a priori

[54] Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 27 q. 1 a. 3 c. Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Access 20126-1029 https://aquinas.cc/la/en/

Summa Theologiae I-IIae q. 114 a. 3 c. Respondeo dicendum quod opus meritorium hominis dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo, secundum quod procedit ex libero arbitrio; alio modo, secundum quod procedit ex gratia spiritus sancti. Si consideretur secundum substantiam operis, et secundum quod procedit ex libero arbitrio, sic non potest ibi esse condignitas, propter maximam inaequalitatem. Sed est ibi congruitas, propter quandam aequalitatem proportionis, videtur enim congruum ut homini operanti secundum suam virtutem, Deus recompenset secundum excellentiam suae virtutis. Si autem loquamur de opere meritorio secundum quod procedit ex gratia spiritus sancti, sic est meritorium vitae aeternae ex condigno. Sic enim valor meriti attenditur secundum virtutem spiritus sancti moventis nos in vitam aeternam; secundum illud Ioan. IV, *fiet in eo fons aquae salientis in vitam aeternam*. Attenditur etiam pretium operis secundum dignitatem gratiae, per quam homo, consors factus divinae naturae, adoptatur in filium Dei, cui debetur hereditas ex ipso iure adoptionis, secundum illud Rom. VIII, *si filii, et heredes*.

conditions had been set down in his Critique of Pure Reason. Experience (Erfahrung) was identified with cognition. The only problem of the exactness consisted in the adequate scaling of the apparatus of the Erfahrung, which was in fact (deemed) the human mind. In the second Chapter of his "Transcendental Annalistic" we read:

> Among the many conceptions, which make up the very variegated web of human cognition, some are destined for pure use à priori, independent of all experience; and their title to be so employed always requires a deduction, inasmuch as, to justify such use of them, proofs from experience are not sufficient; but it is necessary to know how these conceptions can apply to objects without being derived from experience. I term, therefore, an examination of the manner in which conceptions can apply à priori to objects, the transcendental deduction of conceptions.

The objects of Erfahrung are schematized, because (naked) facts are of no account. Emblematic distinction between facts and "objects not derived from experience" appears. The latter (the pure categories of reason), in the years to come, were to be identified with values, and understood legalistically.

> Teachers of jurisprudence, when speaking of rights and claims, distinguish in a cause the question of right (quid juris) from the question of fact (quid facti).[55]

The measurement values are read on the screen of the measurement apparatus. Human mind had to be such an apparatus. Values "exist" on "the scale", which was by Scotus (the Kant of the Middle Ages) called the objective being. The task of the philosophy (of Critique) consisted in detecting them.

Kant made do with twelve pure concepts, but those who followed suit did not attach much importance to that number, which might have seemed strange to Kant himself, who regraded the "deduction of pure concepts" as the most important task of the Critique. Apparently, the categories were considerably more in Kantianism than Kant himself supposed them to be. The transcendental deduction of categories was replaced in Husserl by the eidetic reduction (its scope broadened so). Not only pure categories might be "intuited" so to say "ideally" (i.e. without senses). Values might be so also.

A point of reference is needed for the deduction or the reduction. For Kant and Husserl alike, it was the identity principle albeit specifically understood. Schelling seized it concisely: "the self as self is absolutely eternal". The transcendental Ego is that point of reference.

It is considerably more than the old Neo-Platonists said. The identity principle was by them hypostasized as the One (the Good itself). The stance was anticipated in Plato's Politeia already. The absolute Good (the hypostasized mathematical Unity) is a source of both

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[55] The Critique of Pure Reason, by Immanuel Kant, translated by J. M. D. Meiklejohn
Access 2026-10-29 https://www.gutenberg.org/files/4280/4280-h/4280-h.htm
First division. Transcendental logic. Transcendental analytic. Book I,
Chapter II. Of the Deduction of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding
Section I. Of the Principles of a Transcendental Deduction in general § 9.

existence and cognition. They both were understood in terms of participation (in/of the Unity). God (the absolute Unity) is the absolute measure.

Not for Husserl so. So as to perform the eidetic reduction (so as to obtain an insight into the "eternity") the naive cosmology of the old Neo-Platonists was to be jettisoned and a "suspension" (epoché) of all existence and cognition (the One-Good of the old Neo-Platonists included) to be accomplished. Husserl did not, apparently, admit the possibility that God might be something more than the Unity. In consequence, he demanded bracketing God's existence as such.

It was, paradoxically, both a continuation and correction of the traditional stance. In the old Neo-Platonism, God (the Unity) was super-existent so that the objective of the maximalist philosophy was transcending all the existent so as to reach to the Source, which might be called "bracketing" in a sense. But on the other hand, from the Unity, there emanates being, and the notion of emanation did not seem to satisfy the modern Neo-Platonists. The concept of the general illumination replaced it. Still, not until the beginning of the 20th century it had been known that the concept stemmed from the Arab mediaeval philosophy. The source was transcendental; not transcendent.

The One of the "reduced" Neo-Platonism is (in Kant) the transcendental unity of apperception:

> The "I think" must accompany all my representations … All the diversity or manifold content of intuition, has … a necessary relation to the "I think," in the subject in which this diversity is found. …"I think," must necessarily be capable of accompanying all our representations. It is in all acts of consciousness one and the same … The unity of this apperception I call the transcendental unity of self-consciousness … the manifold representations which are given in an intuition would not all of them be my representations, if they did not all belong to one self-consciousness … the empirical consciousness which accompanies different representations is in itself fragmentary and disunited, and without relation to the identity of the subject. … only because I can connect a variety of given representations in one consciousness, is it possible that I can represent to myself the identity of consciousness in these representations … "I unite them in one self-consciousness, or can at least so unite them"; … I can comprehend the variety of my representations in one consciousness … Synthetical unity of the manifold in intuitions, as given à priori, is therefore the foundation of the identity of apperception itself, … This principle is the highest in all human cognition. All general conceptions—as such—depend, for their existence, on the analytical unity of consciousness. … the synthetical unity of apperception is the highest point with which we must connect every operation of the understanding, …
>
> This fundamental principle of the necessary unity of apperception is indeed an identical, and therefore analytical, proposition … I am … conscious of my identical self, in relation to all the variety of representations given to me in an intuition…[56]

The identity principle (or the principle of identity) had seemed to the Neo-Platonist of old the touchstone of knowledge, as it was transcendent. But in Kant the reformist the unexpected

[56] Ibid. Of the Originally Synthetical Unity of Apperception § 12.

"there is no knowledge apart from that deducible from the identity principle *in me*" appeared. The identity principle is a tautology in mathematics, but was expected to more than that in philosophy. It seems to be barren, as no truth could be deduced therefrom, although (paradoxically) it proved to be "creative", as *any "truths" whatever* could be deduced therefrom. The *subjective* self-consciousness seems to justify any categories deducible therefrom. No one system of them might be privileged, but all included, which is to say: accepted as far as the actual form of the *social* consciousness permits.

Kant's Transcendental Annalistic was *supposed* to be a synthesis of all types of cognition, but *proved* to be a source of confusion and disintegration. The "synthesis" might be identified with Weltanschauung. Philosophy (the Critique) was supposed to be exact (because assimilated to mathematics), but the assimilation proved rather it to be redundant. Since Wolff (Kant's immediate predecessor) several parts of philosophy had emancipated from the universal one. In Husserl, the theory of cognition (phenomenology) was the only remnant of the old philosophy. It had been supposed to be genuine because exact (strenge) until Cognitivism appeared and the last safe abode of the philosophy was annexed.

That development does not, of course, testify *directly* to that science as such suffered from abandoning metaphysics, because specialization must be (as it seemed to many) of practical use in science as such, whereas the universal one might (and happened to) be regarded as unmodern as unneeded.

The specialization seems to foster development. Still, the actual lack of the integrating principle (the identity principle cannot be that) makes it that the development might prove to be as fast as feverish and chaotic. Specialists cannot check specialists, but without checking nothing is safe. A universal (at least to some degree) point of reference is needed. The transcendent frame of reference is needed for checking what is immanent to any special form of activity. The transcendental principle proved sterile and "exploded" (as Husserl would have said) so that the tradition it had originated from must be questioned too.

Traditional (in Aristotle) metaphysis was an architectonic science. Paradoxically, albeit sought for its own sake (as wisdom must be) it proved to be inspiring and profitable for any particular science. This is the case especially with ethics. No rational ethics can exist without metaphysics.

The old Neo-Platonists identified the One with God. According to Plato, God is the measure: "much more so than – as some say – humans are". Still, in the theory of participation Plato espoused a danger lurks, which Plato himself, probably, would have tried to avoid.

Partaking, if understood literally as "taking part", might lead to rejecting the transcendence of God the Measure. For e.g., liquids, a gallon must be a measure of the same (homogeneous) nature to the measured liquids (must contain them physically). What was expected to be transcendent (choristón) might become unawares immanent to human existence, which was apparently contrary to Plato's intentions. The objective measure cannot be immanent, but the co called transcendence in imminence (such an oxymoron used by Husserl himself) was such a gauge. That idea was enthusiastically espoused by Modernists.

God might be a measure, and He *must be* so as far as He judges ("measures" so) human deeds. The act is that of the Acting. A homogeneous measure can be used

instrumentally by those who avail themselves of it. God must not be so. He is not immanent to human consciousness; He cannot be used.

God judges and gives Commandments either directly (in the Decalogue) or indirectly: in the form of natural law. The predicates of the Commandments are values in a sense. E.g. family is a value as far as defined in the light of the fourth and sixth Commandment. True, it can be defined without the Commandments (being used directly), but it cannot be defined *contrary* to them, because the natural law contains the same as the Decalogue does. Philosophers (and all those availing themselves of the natural reason for that matter too) can define the family rationally, but are not permitted to *re*-define it rationalistically, i.e. freely. Values, if deprived of their real definitions, become "philosophical" ideas, which are both unclear and miscarried forms of thinking.

Philosophy concerns, in general, the laws of nature, but their principle(s) too. For a *genuine* scientist, there is always something "beyond" the actual scope of interest: both challenging and inspiring. The a priori restrictions would render the scientific activity hackneyed. For the most *ambitious* scientist, there is something "beyond" the actual scope of particular sciences. Human reason does not "dictate" the laws of nature, and if it had been able to, the nature would degenerate. Divine intellect does set down the laws of nature (although does not "dictate" nor tyrannize the nature). God is just because consequent in His acting. Metaphysics is all about that justice of God: the conditional necessity to be found in nature created by God. The consequence of God 's acting is a fundament of both natural laws and rights.

The juridical notion of God does not seem to be much to the taste of the modern "humanism" and "inclusivism", perhaps (partly at least) because the judgment was supposed to be directed *against* (some) humans (and some felt hurt). In fact, it is but accidentally so. Some are rejected indeed if clinging obstinately and emotionally to the evil done and refuse to abnegate it. Still, they can set aside conscience if erroneous, because no man (contrary to what Descartes said) is conscience/consciousness and it can be deposed if wrong. He *must* set it aside, should it be wrongly formed; it is neither the supreme measure, nor a voice of God in the human soul. God rejects directly the evil, but those who adhere to it pertinaciously: consequently only. Moreover, he rejects for the sake of the wronged so as to liberate them from being wronged. Everyone is free to abandon the wrong (either all by oneself or aided by God, who never refuses the aid if asked for), but no one is free to call the evil good and vice versa. Good and evil are opposites, like being and nonbeing are. Blurring the distinction does not improve the lot of humans. Metaphysics (the natural reason) exists for the sake of maintaining and advancing as many necessary distinctions as possible, because they are needed for human existence.

God is a measure, but a transcendent one, which is to say: not homogeneous and not to be understood in quantitative terms. Commandments are definitions and the conclusions the true philosophy advances are so also. The *effective* unity of God makes for the validity of every definition, judgment and equation (unites the opposites), albeit normally the definitions come before the cognizance of the Supreme Truth (we unite them in *our* mind before stating the existence of Who unites the opposites in *nature*). The Commandments are given directly, although normally (without the aid of the Revelation), we define things first, without taking into account the ultimate source of the meaning of the definitions. The cognizance of the

source is mediated by the cognizance of nature. E.g. a chemist departs from the principles of chemistry and does not need to take *actually* into account the existence of the First Principle, because the presence of the secondary ones suffices. But he cannot *eventually* contradict the validity of the First Principle, because thus (although indirectly only) he undermines the validity of the secondary principles.

Augustine says, that the ideas of God show what things should be apart from what they actually are in the physical world.[57] But the ideas are not known directly, and Augustine himself was apparently at a loss trying to define their role in the natural human cognition. Aristotle's doctrine on that matter had not been known until the beginning of the 13th century. Philosophy of nature was reborn then. The existence of God and His attributes comes after defining natures with the aid of principles of their specific unity. There is always a closer principle (axiom) of the unity of a definition. In the 14th century, nominalists jettisoned the principles of real definitions. Instead of the non-contradiction principle, the aforementioned identity principle had been adopted. The individual self-awareness was allegedly indubitable too and they both combined so as to "create" the realm of self-consciousness.

We are, according to Thomas, first conscious of things being real before coming to the conviction that it is us who perceive them to be real. We know being before knowing us to know being. The supreme principle (if really supreme, i.e. respective of its inferiors) does not diminish the efficacy of the proximate principles. It does not preclude the necessity of a specific reflection, but does preclude the possibility of carrying out a reflection without an object of the reflection. The European science has been built on the conviction that specific principles are knowable before knowing the supreme. The non-contradiction principle is used by them all effectively, but tackled thematically in metaphysics (the supreme science) only.

Values are hardly definable by a hypostasized Unity, but are altogether undefinable and evanescent if the transcendental unity of apperception were to replace it. They are stable, only if the first axiom – the non-contradiction principle has been used: the principle of the unity (of definitions). The principle is of the Neo-Platonist Unity is of little value there. The Kantian "Ich denke" is of no value at all.

Philosophers *abstract* from the way the natural law was proposed in the Decalogue, but Rationalists only *reject* it when pretending to be philosophers. God is the principle of principles, which is known as the ultimate conclusion metaphysics arrives at, but naturally some proper (no absolutely universal) principles are known first. Obviously, *a* principle cannot falsify *the* Supreme Principle (or vice versa). For instance, no physicist needs to address the existence of God so as to come to valid conclusions of his own science. Still, no one of them can falsify the existence of God using particular principles (the statements he utters are of the value restricted to that science). A truth cannot contradict the Truth Itself.

The Kantian Critique tried to undermine the validity of the proof of the existence of God, and human consciousness was about to replace it. Critique and metaphysics both claim to be universal, but the former is universal only in the sense a Weltanschauung or ideology might be.

Philosophy does not need to be Christian so as to be of use for Christians; or anti-Christian, so as to be a genuinely independent. A specific (philosophical) cognizance of God

[57] De Trinitate, lib. XII, Ch. 2.

is offered in it, which is scarce, but certain; certain, because scarce. It is inferior to the supernatural gift of wisdom, but more "inclusive" in a sense. We-humans cannot create the (supernatural) gift in a human soul oriented to a supernatural end. God can create only; and He re-creates human existence using some instrumental agents in the work of the recreation. We must try and procure the existence of the instruments. We can – by means of the natural reason – persuade those in doubt or despair as to the existence of the Supreme Judge who liberates peremptorily from any evil.

In Euclidean Geometry, axioms are principles i.e. the point of reference we need in science. Generally however, an axiom (ἀξίωμα) is a principle from which reasoning (in general) is deduced (Posterior Analytics, I, c. 10, 76b 32-34; c. 2, 72a 17; c. 7, 75a 41; Metaph., III c. 2, 997a 10-11). In empirical sciences, the role of axioms (ἀξιώματα) is played by definitions. (Posterior Analytics, II, c. 3). Everything is judged according to them, which is to say: conclusions are deduced therefrom.[58] This effectives of principles was denied in Neo-Positivism, and the existence of nominal definitions granted only, viz. those which clarify only the significance of the notions. The existence of real definitions has been rejected, and, consequently, the relation to what decides about the existence or nonexistence of anything whatever; what determines what a thing is, i.e. sets down its value (ἀξίωμα) in objective terms. This value is determined by the first axiom: the non-contradiction principle (Metaphysics, IV, c. 3, 1005b 33).

Were we to accept (after Leibniz and Kant) the primacy of the so called identity principle, providing a definition other than a nominal one would be impossible. The real definitions must (according to Aristotle) determine – so to say – "a degree of entity" of a nature defined.[59] The degree could be called a value sensu largo. The predicates

[58] Sent. Metaphysicae, lib. 11 l. 7 n. 10. Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem ostendit differentiam mathematicae ad naturalem; et dicit, quod cum ita sit quod necessarium sit unicuique scientiarum cognoscere aliqualiter quod quid est, et uti eo quasi principio ad demonstrandum, oportet quod secundum diversum modum definitionis diversificentur scientiae. Et ita ad cognoscendum qualiter scientia naturalis differat ab aliis, oportet non latere quem modum servet naturalis in definiendo, et qualiter sit sumenda definitio in scientia naturali; utrum scilicet sicut definitur simum, aut sicut definitur concavum.

[59] Summa Theologiae I, q. 50 a. 2 ad 1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod differentia est quae constituit speciem. Unumquodque autem constituitur in specie, secundum quod determinatur ad aliquem specialem gradum in entibus, quia species rerum sunt sicut numeri, qui differunt per additionem et subtractionem unitatis, ut dicitur in VIII Metaphys. In rebus autem materialibus aliud est quod determinat ad specialem gradum, scilicet forma, et aliud quod determinatur, scilicet materia, unde ab alio sumitur genus, et ab alio differentia.

De virtutibus, q. 5 a. 3 c. Differentia enim huiusmodi principii speciem variat, et ideo, si hoc principio esset additio vel subtractio, ex necessitate species variaretur. Unde et philosophus dicit in VIII Metaph. quod species rerum sunt sicut numeri, in quibus unitas addita vel subtracta variat speciem. Quaedam vero formae sunt quae sortiuntur speciem per aliquid suae essentiae, sicut omnes formae absolutae, sive sint substantiales sive accidentales; et in talibus impossibile est quod in eadem specie secundum hunc modum una forma maior alia inveniatur, non enim est una albedo secundum se considerata, magis albedo quam alia.

Contra Gentiles, lib. 2 cap. 44 n. 9. [...]secundum philosophum, species rerum sunt sicut numeri, quorum unus alteri addit aut minuit. Sic igitur, si fuerunt a principio multae substantiae rationales creatae, oportet quod fuerit in eis gradus diversitas.

(complements) included in Commandments define the moral humanity of man, but predicates included in real definitions in general are values "measured" according to some (albeit perchance not yet clearly visible) point of reference; according to a principle most general, but, at the same time, the best readily accessible for all.

Still, the principle of cognizance is not to be identified with the principle of being. The existence of God (the Supreme Principle of being) is demonstrated departing from a principle which is better known for us, albeit most knowable in itself (Metaph., II, c. 2; Phys., I, c. 1). This, however, might seem to some inadmissible and accusing Aristotle's philosophy for "paganism" wholly justifiable. Could really the principle of the demonstration in question be something – so to say – "more important" for us than the existence of God? In fact, *it must* be so.

In John Duns Scot's (Christian) philosophy, two "worlds" exist: the one issuing from God's intellect and the other forthcoming from God's will, but only the former can be the subject matter of metaphysics. In Husserl (the continuator) two spheres exist in parallel. The first was allotted to necessary truths: *vérités de raison* (Leibniz); *relations of ideas* (Hume); the second – to the contingent beings: *vérités de fait* (Leibniz); *matters of facts* (Hume). The latter (in Scotus) was totally dependent on Gods will and, consequently, not analyzable for the human intellect. The stance was pushed to the extreme in the decades to come. For both the Arab Asharites and the European nominalists the will of "Allah" might be as capricious as unpredictable. The advocates of so called doctrine of the absolute omnipotence of God claim that He can undertake even absurd actions, which is, apparently, a blatant anthropomorphism. Humans can act so if their actions are unworthy of their ultimate destiny; if they live in the world of dreams and hopes for the unrealizable, and the success seems to be a compromise between the dreamt of and the factual. The *rational* hope is a mode of transcending the profane (and the factual), viz. the effort to cope with it (to brave it).

John Duns Scotus tries (as a philosopher) to prove the existence of God for the sake of defense of faith (in his Treaty). However, those who followed suit some 400 years later and reread his thought anew, intended to prove the opposite: the impossibility of the proof of the existence of God (suggested in Scotus' Theoremata). The Scotean doctrine was about to be interpreted so as to make room for *philosophical* faith with the transcendental unity of apperception taking place of God.

The intentions of the Founder and the followers might have been diametrically different, but the fact is that the outcome was only to be foreseeable at the beginning. If torn apart from the natural principles concreated in the world along with the world, the human intellect is bound to blunder into any difficulties whatsoever, open atheism and relativism included. The "relations of ideas" seem to live on their own. Apparently, they do not live biological life, like mathematical beings cannot either. At best, they might be hoped to find a (modest) place for God in the philosophy of a Christian philosopher, if the philosophy assimilates to prayer, and he/she turns a blind eye to that that the principles adopted at the outset contradict in fact what he/she has believed in. They (the principles) contradict it (the Principle) openly e.g. in Sartre and Heidegger (they intend to contradict it). The intention is unnatural, however, because suicidal (cutting off the roots of nature). It is bound to decline in the end, because the very nature of human thinking (its self-consistency too) consists in being incessantly upheld by the creative act of God present in the physical world. God is present in

it effectively, but (so to say) discreetly also, so that the presence cannot give the principle of the rational proof of His existence. There is a difference between Thomas' ratiocinatio (reasoning) and cogitatio proper to Cartesians (pointed out by M. A. Krąpiec). Relations of ideas are not fashioned after the requirements of the natural intellect.

Values, in the sense proposed by Lotze and Scheler, must be arranged in a linear sequence, for they exist but in such a relation to their quasi mathematical principle (unity); they lead to the One (a Principle), albeit its oncological status is so uncertain that the majuscule in its name problematic too. To the contrary, the life line of an ordinary man is never as straight as might be expected of that point of view. The material circumstances of the moral actions multiply so much that they are difficult to analyze (they seemed to Kant unanalyzable at all). The difficulty consists (firstly) in abstracting the necessary from the contingent, and (secondly) in applying the abstracted to particular circumstances (the particular equals, in this case, the specific).

The *true* creation is, out of necessity, the *continuous* creation. The material world which surrounds us is being incessantly created by God. The fact might be not obvious enough because of either culpable or inculpable ignorance. In the "world" full of chaos and pseudo-definitions, a sentiment might arise that the world besets us, which might be true as to the artificial world; the one produced by man: the world of "ideas" i.e. imaginations which have emancipated from the dominion of the intellect. God creates everything in a definite order, but the order of what was created by man might prove a disorder in the end.

It might be supposed that God "touches" us (creating so), which might be true, but an equivocation included in the "touching" must be avoided nonetheless. E.g. a tree can touch a house, although the house wall is apparently unconscious of the fact. The touching is the same as pressure in that case. To the contrary, if touched physically, man (an animal too) is conscious of being touched because possessing *the sense* of touch. Analogically, the fact that God acts in our life might be as unheeded as a physical pressure must be for an inanimate object, because His actions cannot be sensed indeed. God acts effectively, but we cannot feel His action. We can understand them to some degree, which is to say; perceive them but indirectly.

In spite of all appearances, we are not able to "feel God". Erleben (living through) is a precarious Ersatz of the genuine life. Sometimes, the effects of God's actions are directly perceived, but the fact that they are not so as a rule is tantamount to that we always should be ready to accept His actions, despite the fact we cannot perceive them.

"Secular ethics of the laity" bids us to live in two separate worlds: of facts and values: separable from each other, although the latter should be "inclusive" enough so as to annex (pragmatically) the sphere of the profane and render it "humanistically" sacred. The aforementioned principle of number seems to justify that proceeding.

The world full of chaos "exists" in films. Allegedly, the film industry contributes hugely the economy. It supports millions of jobs, and some might believe that it supports human life as such, even if violent sciences provoke violent crimes. "Economy first", but what comes next to the principle? Is it really able to boost the economy itself?

The ability depends on the possibility to consume of what has been ("freely") "created" and described in terms of (inclusive) values. The ability to consume is the same as the ability to feel pleasure, which, however, is not a constant datum, but varies along with the

interior stamina of a human soul. On the other hand, degrading the inner integrity of the human personality leads (according to Thomas) to impairing the ability to feel pleasure. The degraded psyche is scarcely able to feel anything as intensely as a sound one. *From a purely economic* point of view, "boosting" economy in the way some imagined so splendid must lead – in a perspective of a generation – to psychologic impairment of the potential consumers. The growth might prove bogus. It might be a success for a period of an elected power, but must be disaster for the state, which must survive *several* "periods".

Economic growth seemed to be so obvious a value that free movement of labor was stipulated to be inclusive enough not to disqualify any movement of human body, especially if engaged in a scenic performance. But is the content of what is commonly promoted by media a value really, or some contents *could not be values at all* (and must be called anti-values instead)? The immoral *normally* aroused disgust, but the modern humanism is inclusive/tolerant of (what used to be sensed) distasteful. Those who have lost the sense of impropriety because accustomed to tolerate it in any guise have lost, at the same time, the sense of propriety. What objective criterion should be adduced in this case?

The Kantian world of duty is so unreal that people normally either abandon it or try to "modernize" it. The scope of validity of those values is but an ideal: "Reich der Zwecke (freilich nur ein Ideal) heißen kann". Good should have been done, had we been not hopelessly invalid to actualize it. That frame of mind bids to tolerate even the apparent evil. The *real* criterion, to the contrary, should be "discriminative": transcendent and effective at the same time.

In the world which is "banally real" the values of objects are assessed according to e.g. the prices they get on the free market. The life as such consists in measuring (either justly or unjustly) the objects we see. The average price often testifies to how precious (ἄξιος) an object is. Boosting the growth might sound modern but the idea behind it is as old as the Greek Sophistic. According to Protagoras, effectiveness is the just measure of objects. Trasymachus goes a step further: justice is the interest of the stronger. Violent scenes beget violent crimes and the "producers" profit from the suffering of the weak (which is rather obvious), but they beget the *feeling of helplessness*, which is less evident, for otherwise those claiming justice for the harmed would have not been accused of promoting the so called "hate speech". The only justification of this accusation is that claiming justice as such is "unhuman" in the "human world". The aggression promoted by media is a *refined* violence, but violence nonetheless. *Ordinary* violence seems to be almost innocent in comparison with that sophisticated one which impairs the ability to resist the aggression. Violence is nothing if repelled at once, but its strength grows proportionally to how the power to resist is being removed.

The economic values are some values, which must be realistically admitted, but not commensurable to those in the eminent sense of the word. The "eminent" is not tantamount to "higher" in that case. The useful is *a* good, but as different to *the* good as such, as e.g. a way to London must differ from London itself. The way is never the end of the way. Things are values in relation to the Self-Subsisting Good, and material values are means with respect to the immaterial proximity of God. The way might be *imagined* in terms of approaching, but the nighness is in fact our being wholeheartedly committed (subject) to the End.

One and the same thing (assessed according to its market value) has in fact different values depending on how a given person uses it in achieving the supreme good. The ability to consume goods varies in the way economy is unable to assess. The "demand" is not measurable, because those morally strong are able to consume, whereas the morally impaired are not. Should the economy come "first", it would be as weak as those so totally engaged in the economic growth that unable to draw strength from without. The mechanism of free market works as long as people are willing to work at all (some abhor any effort, which becomes their "second nature"). The mechanism of fostering the "equality" might work for a time, albeit "all pretences soon fall to the ground like fragile flowers, and nothing counterfeit can be lasting".[60]

In the world of material contingent beings, some objects happen to have values, or can gain them if – to use Heidegger's term – they are at hand (zuhanden). The strata of nickel beneath the crust of the earth are – for the time being – "worthless" because not at hand, but must not be so, as they can – someday – be at hand. The material value they would obtain then is, according to many, the only reasonable one. An Idealist would reject the claim, but a specific realism (espoused by Heidegger) seems to accept it after all. New existential possibilities (Gegebenheit) depend in fact on what is at hand.

No matter whether an Idealist or "realist", the phenomenologist claims that things are something-for-me rather than something-in-se (they follow Kant here). The claim is, according to Aristotle, preposterous: things are what they are and independently of what we think about them or decide to do with them. Conversely, what we think and act (its value) is gauged against the transcendent reality.

Heidegger is a realist but a quaint one, because emotivism is the basis of his realism. Values (Gegebenheit) appear in the background of what is (first) at hand (zuhanden) and then, exists as a possibility (vorhanden). Acting precedes understanding. Being thrown (geworfen) into the world man feels the influence the world exerts upon him, and the whole virtue of the realist phenomenologist consists in being open to that influence. Now feelings are passive indeed as the very etymology of the Latin passio and Greek πάθος testifies. We are not able not to hear importune "music" or advertisements, albeit we can try and concentrate on our activity despite being attacked emotionally so.

It is commonly known that the modern idealism was initiated by Descartes' Meditations. However, they occasioned Emotivism too, because of a special role allotted by Descartes to what he called "the will" (Meditation IV, 57). Man is on the image of God according to "the will". The traditional stance was changed, because Augustine says that he/she is so secundum mentem; i.e. according to how the intellect understands and prompts the acts of the will. Now, separated from what naturally informs it, the will must act – so to say – blindfolded. Irrationalism (a Janus visage of rationalism) of Heidegger, Schopenhauer, Fichte, Freud, Bergson were bound to appear "on the map" of the modern Cartesianism

[60] Cicero, De officiis, II, XII.: ficta omnia celeriter tamquam flosculi decidunt, nec simulatum potest quicquam esse diuturnum.
English translation by Walter Miller, London: William Heinemann, New York: The Macmillan co. mcmxiii
Access 2026-10-29 https://www.gutenberg.org/files/47001/47001-h/47001-h.htm#Pg167

sooner or later. It does not need to be admitted that man is the measure (Protagoras), but his/her act initiating new existential possibilities could be this after all.

We tell one thing (and place) from another, because we have certain knowledge about the fact. For human acting to be human indeed it must be purposeful and, consequently rationally motivated. Knowledge is the principle of act and the order cannot be reversed. Now, the *genuine* knowledge is so if expressed in definitions, which are principles.

Not only does the moral definition determine the moral humanity of man. Definitions, in general, determine our mode of being in the world befitting the dignity of human person. Real definitions are meant, because those nominal ones are sheer approximations and no one can live and act "approximately".

Definitions are principles (points of reference), albeit they need not to be the absolute frame of reference. Specific definitions play a specific role in specific realms of life and intellectual activities. Particular (specific) sciences use particular principles. Still, human existence as such cannot be "particular" and the need for an order above the variegated shows up urgent. An architectonic science is needed above particular sciences, but for it to be architectonic is must not be a "critique" (it must not be purely formal). It must justify the content of the definitions and cannot content itself with "pure" i.e. formal concepts. It must be *effective* apart from being supreme.

The Aristotelian metaphysics is architectonic indeed, because the first principle (the non-contradiction principle) renders the definitions real i.e. expresses their content in terms of being and non being.

Species defined in such a manner are "like numbers" (sunt sicut numeri), because they have certain value measured by the non-contradiction principle apart from that they have a binary value of veracity and falsity.

Defining consists in telling one from another; a cause from the effect; a being from what is about to come to being. Individuals, in turn, are not definable as such unless defining be taken in a broader sense. This way, the sense of a human existence is defined by the relation to its Ultimate End. People have a unique value "in the eyes of God", albeit we normally are not in a position to see "with God's" eyes, as Hegel thought it possible: the divine of his is a substitute of the real God.

We all (the declared Idealists included) live in the real world, albeit some try in vain to live in a glass bubble of "pure (Idealistic) concepts" and are less concerned with the real world. Its order is discoverable in the way Aristotle proposed: after abstracting the universal from the sense data. When abstracting, however, we do not cut the ties with the real. Abstracting consists in representing a "state of entity" of objects, which must be known for rational (dignified) existence in the world.

God is not only a Unity or the Supreme. First of all, He is (out of His nature) the Self-Subsisting Being and the attributes normally ascribed to Him must be understood in this context. The way to Him leads through the world which might seem to be "a mixture" of being and nonbeing, for perfections and privations are a tissue of our existence indeed. Thus, the way towards the Supreme could not be as straight as a line (must not be imagined so). The way to Him is peremptorily measured by God Himself, but the possibly of seeing the way from this privileged coign of vantage is precluded to man.

The first metaphysical principle, if adopted (adjusted) to ethics reads: being is good and desirable; evil is to be shunned; which might, to be sure, seem a platitude until we, nonetheless, realize that the name of good and evil happens to be attributed to incidental objects. The task of metaphysics consists in attributing it aright.

Things are valuable if defined. Human life is valuable in the perspective of its consummation in God; otherwise it would have been worthless. The life of an excellent scientist seems to be more valuable than that of an addict nonetheless, because we normally restrict the scope of our interest to a particular realm of life (and do not see perspectives for the handicapped). In it, a misfit object might (or even must) appear to be out-of-place and thus abhorrent. Privation is aesthetically abhorrent, which is natural. Still, living aesthetically is impossible, and the attempt even immoral. Aesthetics of a scientific model might be well a sufficient motive for *a particular* discovery. In general line of life, however, it is insufficient.

An ordinary measure is homogeneous with the measured (is immanent to the realm of activity in question). The sense of the unfitting seems to be indispensable for effective acting in a particular realm of life. However, and paradoxically enough, the real, coupled with its (otherwise necessary) specification, must shrink *incessantly*, because the restriction seems to define it. For a *comprehensive* development, the specification (its effectiveness) must be accompanied by generalization, and vice versa as Holism (the lack of specification) is unscientific.

The two "directions" seem to be contrary, and they may be so *in a particular* aspect indeed, but they do not contradict each other, if set in the context of being (of the ultimate). They are reconcilable therein. The Latin Civilization is defined both by the necessary discipline of discovery (and non-toleration for mistakes), and the desirable inclusivity.

Beethoven stemmed from a family which could have been regarded (in the "modern" categories) as "pathological". Under modern eyes, his existence might have seemed unwanted (only three of his seven siblings reached their maturity). His existence was a desperate fight for perfection completely non understandable for those who would like to live "happily". The Kreutzer Sonata is a manifesto of the stamina of life (its arpeggios extremely energetic), but people do not understand it nowadays, for they prefer "nice music" instead. The existence of his achievements is unwanted indeed, and it is as it must be, for acting follows being (operari sequitur esse), and Beethoven's works must share the lot of his "unfitting" existence. Physical existence of the most refine artist is as out-of-place as his artistic achievements, which is almost inevitable, because the acknowledgment would require rejection of the Ersatz imitating the genuine music: something people do not dare to do now. Still, the rejection of the vile is a necessary price paid for the acknowledgment of the precious (ἄξιος).

It is scarcely possible that a Beethoven could be born in our times, but it is impossible that he might work in them. There is, to be sure, in the "modern society" a modest place allotted to those in plight, but they can never fight their way through it and find a unique value of life departing from privation (braving it). A handicapped child must remain a cripple, and the best offered to him is a newspeak to cover its humiliation. "Disabled" must not be ill-treated. An overprotective mother is in need of an object of her "empathy" and does not want her child to be self-reliant. A nanny state is, however, more than that, because *creative* and not only protective of the existence of the disabled. For to care for the poor (and to prove one's "generosity" in caring for them), the poor should be as poor and as many as only

possible. So as to care for the potentially mistreated, the reason for mistreating is to be created first. The modern "education" consists in such like "creativity": a child is (allegedly) given an opportunity to define his/her identity, but *forced* to try to do that first. Rationed charity is a caricature of the real one.

The real charity begets strength and new possibilities. Its Ersatz begets the realms of degradation and despair. Some hope to profit from it, and they may so indeed *for a time*. But shrewdness is not wisdom; hypocrisy is not sanctity.

The genuine love is, first of all intellectual (it is dilection). A privation must be understood, but not pitied for the sake of the psychological wellbeing of the pitying. For those in need, the best life possibility consists in embarking on his/her *arduous* way towards the ultimate. The chance to reach it happens to be scarcely perceptible, and spotting it demands much effort. The personal abilities in making it out differ considerably. It is not sufficient to will (to desire) good. It is indispensable to will (to seek for it) in a best manner possible. The motivation of a good deed can be itself bad. The emotional motivation is, at best, casual.

In this context the famous beginning of Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals can be adduced. "There is nothing it is possible to think of anywhere in the world, or indeed anything at all outside it, that can be held to be good without limitation, excepting only a good will" (A. W. Wood). Is it really?

The goodness of the will depends on the discretion of reason. A statement might be true, but it does not suffice for it to be scientific (ethics is a science too). In science, contrary to the ordinary experience, modalities of being (possible; impossible; necessary) are regarded. A naked "it has been done" must be replaced with the accurate: "it must have been done" (in natural sciences), or: "it is to be done" (in ethics). Still, the necessary truths have been compromised in sciences since Kant, and the notorious categorical imperative meant to replace them in ethics. The necessity of end (the conditional one) is concerned in both ethics and natural sciences. "For you to be happy, you should ….". "For something to exist, a cause is needed". This inference is the tissue of both science and the genuine life activity.

Bias of Priene (one of the Seven Sages) said: Do not seek for the impossible. Thomas tackles the problem in a detailed reasoning. Dreaming for the impossible is infantile, true; but the problem is that we might assess something recklessly as impossible whereas it is impossible in some respect only. Peter Damian (in the Middle Ages) claimed that God is able to annihilate the past events, which is, at the first glance, absurd, but it is really impossible for man to know *comprehensively* what is possible, albeit it is natural, and necessary sometimes too for him to know comprehensively the impossible. Prayer might affect the (past) events superficially deemed peremptorily closed. We can pray (according to Thomas) for the salvation of those passed away, for the *divine* prescience of the prayer in the moment of one's death might render it blessed. God cannot act *against* nature for it does not behoove *His Nature*, but can act *besides* it. The fact must remain non understandable in the Neo-Platonic paradigm of the One and the linear sequence of what stems from it.

God is infinitely more "sensible" (without sensing) to the feeble traces of good than humans, but the personal wills differ in that respect considerably too. The will is good if premeditated, and the mode of the premeditation defines its goodness. Two persons might

well want (will, desire) the same, but their willing differs according to how deeply motivated it is by their intellects.

A womanly heart is infinitely more sensible for the feeble traces of coming life than the masculine one. No need to say, it "measures" it with infinitely more accuracy than the prenatal diagnoses apparatuses do.

Those who see nature beneath phenomena, see things better, and will them better, consequently, too. For the eye of a casual observer, a person might be finished, but after "bracketing" the immediately given (by dint of abstraction) new possibilities might appear nonetheless.

The yardstick immanent for our consciousness is always unjust and precluding new possibilities. The real development (both in personal and social aspect) unfolds at the border of the possible and the impossible. A judgment might be either true or false in a given aspect, but even if true, is might be inadequate if the possibility of the supreme judgment is precluded.

The "good will" is fact but the first primitive impulse towards good in general inborn to us, because concreated along with us. Still, for the will to be *actually* good, the impulse must be *specified by reasoning*. Children love their parents "unconditionally" indeed (and their parents teach them to love, but learn, in a sense, to love unconditionally also), but we must grow up in the end and cannot live by "intuitions" of the good. Special circumstances must be taken into account to render the will actually good, even if they appear alien and unhomely. A "new beginning" is often a privation to cope with; to brave it *manly*. Women are naturally conservative of life; men are naturally (predestined to) facing the unhomely which endangers their homes.

Totally new possibilities might be discovered in the light of the first principle (the non-contradiction principle), but generally, the authentic life consists in annexing the sphere of what *seemed* to be impossible in the constant effort of the intellect reaching to the first principles.

The philosopher lives at the border of being and non being (Plato: Symposion, Phaedo), because he tackles them both thematically. He assesses the essential value of anything setting it against the principles. The value is discovered thus, but not settled (setzen) or founded (stiften) (as Husserl has sit). A sophist, on the contrary, lives in the murk of nonbeing (Plato). The nonbeing (if approaching) begets anxiety. A sophist lives down his/her existential anxieties, communicating them "altruistically" to the others. Relativism appears this way. The role of the genuine philosophy consists in telling what is from what is not; what *seems* to exist from what exits *really*; what *is said to be* from what *is independently* of whether said or thought or given in any way, for that matter too) or not. It consists in "bracketing" the existential strength of nonbeing by tackling it *indifferently*.

According to Plato, philosophy consists in desire for being (possibly with the capital "B") (Phaedo, X, 65 C). Still, on the way to the plenitude of being, we encounter beings through participation, for the very fact of not-being-at-the-end equals existing through participation. Things are not half-beings (the principle of excluded middle forbids it), but are, nonetheless, stamped with the mark of privation which almost inevitably follows their being in potentiality, as being in potentiality is so with regard for both perfection and privation.

Contrary to what Plato thought himself, privation cannot be identified with potentiality (Physcis, Bk. I, in calce).

There might be a "zero point" in our life indeed, but not identifiable with a total privation, and thus not to be taken literally, like a point defined by the privation of a continuous line. That zero point happens to be connected with some privations, but it is essentially rather potential being; a starting point for the pathway towards the plenitude of being; a foretaste of it.

The existential judgment (the identity principle) as proposed in the Kantian Ich denke is, apparently of no use as a real principle. It might be even doubted whether any existential judgment, in the way Brentano proposed, precedes ordinary judgments. The claim of the 14th century nominalists (and those who followed suit) that the self-consciousness is a principle is untenable. There was (there *is*) but One Man wholly entitled to utter the existential judgment in the form: "I Am", because He was (He *is*) more than a man; his human nature was (*is*) sustained by the Divine Person who justly says of Himself: "I Am Who Am" (S. Thomae In Joan. c. 8., lect. 3, nr 1179).

Ordinary people (if frank with themselves) are about to pass some judgments (regarding their selves) in the form: I am happy, glad, … but more often than not: I am in doubt, sad, annoyed …

There is a noticeable difference between German and English in that respect. "Self-conscious" means: "uncomfortable because apprehensive of what might be said by someone"; whereas in German selbstbewusst means self-confident (the opposite). English is more realist and modest in that case, because the intellectual humility is prerequisite for the honest quest for truth, whereas the arrogant self-confidence is a straight way to error.[61] We seek for the knowable *beyond* our mind (and beyond the immediately given for that matter too), as anyone of us should *be conscious* of his/her restricted intellectual abilities so as to be certain in the end than they have been overcome.

Presumption is a mother of errors, but an excess of confidence (of hope) can be so too. There is no golden means in the object of a theological virtue (for God is infinite), but a means is need so as to cherish *some* hopes and to cherish them *some way*. In that manner, an excess of hope is undesirable. Praesumptio videtur importare quandam immoderantiam spei.[62]

The non-contradiction principle is natural for us on the quest for the truth. According to it, we measure the value of the said and the done. The principle is, at the same time, the principle of the cosmic order.

Definitions are formed by dint of that principle both in science and on our way towards God. We exist through participation for the mere fact of being created. The con-created in us (the principles; primordia) are to be multiplied both in the order of nature of grace.

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[61] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 5 n. 4. Alia etiam utilitas inde provenit, scilicet praesumptionis repressio, quae est mater erroris. Sunt enim quidam tantum de suo ingenio praesumentes ut totam rerum naturam se reputent suo intellectu posse metiri, aestimantes scilicet totum esse verum quod eis videtur et falsum quod eis non videtur.

[62] Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 21 a. 1 c.

Notions do not exist apart from those who form them. Christian values (Scheler seems to misinterpret anyhow) are included in the Doctrinal Definitions of the Catholic Church. Man is potentially able to form definitions concerning his natural realm of life. As to those transcending it, some assistance from beyond is needed so as to render them infallible.

The ultimate gauge of our existence is the Supreme Judge. Normally however, ordinary judgments suffice to form true statements concerning *a* being different from the opposed nonbeing. Science is founded on that principle (the non-contradiction principle). The laws of nature are absolutely unchangeable. If e.g. an animal refuses to eat, it must die. The inference is not so blatant in human affairs (humans hope to be more "tolerant" than nature is). Admittedly, the intolerance must be acknowledged in technics, for a mere negligence *is bound* to cause disaster. The more, however, we depart from the ordinary, the more confidently we happen to hope for some "exceptions". Some hope to "create a better world to live in", albeit it is visible with a naked eyed the humans *destroy* nature every time they try to "improve" or "protect" it. Deeds of God are perfect. Deeds of men happen to approach only the exemplar.

The impossible (and dreams) is not a chance for human existence, but a snare for human naivety. Still, no matter how perplexed, man can always find a way out: if not on his/her own, then, eventually, with the assistance of his/her Best Friend. If asked He will never refuse the assistance. It is His Nature to be and to act so.

3. Openness

Values, if seized according to the requirements of the Kantian ethics, are bereft of relation to the physical world. Apparently, if witnessed only, they are not related to facts like e.g. material objects are to each other. The physical appears before the eyes of an existentially engaged witness as alien to his/her idealized world.

In the *all-encompassing* perspective of the *ultimate* end, the naked facts might appear alien indeed, but the perspective results from *integrating* the whole web of facts; not from ignoring them. The relations *amongst* material objects constitute the tissue of the mathematical objects, because they are immaterial. The relations *between* material objects constitute the tissue of the philosophy of nature (and ethics too); they are immaterial too, but they *are paired* as causes and effects must be, whereas the relations amongst objects are purely formal and freely multipliable. Mathematics allows isolating them, whereas causes and effects must not be so.

Facts and objects, if "isolated", are alien, but the isolating is (contrary to what Wittgenstein thought) the mode of *human* producing (not the mode of being). Humans produce (produzieren), as Kant rightly observed, *forcing* an artificial form upon natural material. Producing must be – out of its nature – open to the "infinitely possible modifications".

Experience (empeiria Aristotle speaks of) is not Erfahrung (Kant speaks of) and not productive of objects, but cognizant of those already exiting (called into existence). God the creator "produces" (producit res in esse) without compulsion. The best ruler of the world governs gently. His Wisdom "reacheth therefore from end to end mightily, and ordereth all

things sweetly".[63] The *divine* producing is different to the human one. The latter consists in separating objects from the crude nature. Now, if the producing had been definitive of human nature, human "existential" nature should be severed from the biological one also. Demiurgic culture would assume the form of social compulsion. Emotions would the object of manipulation.

In the physical world, causal relations determine the sequence of the objects ("before our eyes"). The sequence is not (contrary to what Kant assumed) casual. In the world of human imagination only, a linear sequence of objects and values (Reich der Zwecke) is possible, and deprived of the causal correlation.

Natural science identifies causes when observing the effects. Normally, it is impossible to deduce possible effects from given causes, unless formal causes mathematics speaks of are meant. Still, the existential human nature was supposed to be a principle from which some effects are deducible. From the form of "humanity" given a priori the future possibilities could be drawn in the way e.g. properties of the triangle are deducible from its nature.

The openness to the future (and disrespect for the past) seems to define the so called Western Values (they are "western" de nomine only). No set of values is to be "discriminated" in the perspective of a globalized humanity.

Aristotle was duly called by Popper an enemy of the open society. He must have been called so, because the quantitative borders amongst bodies (the subject matter of mathematics) are not, according to him, an autonomous entity, and the values fashioned after the measurable are not representative of what things really are in relation to the ultimate. Their *mutual* quantitative relations must be *open to the infinite multiplication*. The world Aristotle speaks of is finite, and being finite this way means being perfect.

Aristotle is the enemy of then open society *nowadays*, but he was not so in the moment he died. 322 year after his death God himself opened for humans the gates of the eternity, and Aristotle seems to have had a dim forbidding of the possibility (Metaphysics, I, c. 2; XII, c. 10). The human acts of the intellect and the will are finite, as they terminate in the Immovable Mover (God), but God's inner life is itself infinite, albeit not in the way the set theory thinks only possible. This openness of Aristotle's mind was about to be fully acknowledged in Europe in the 13th century.

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[63] Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 97 n. 10. Patet ergo ex dictis quod, cum per divinam providentiam rebus creatis diversa accidentia, et actiones et passiones, et collocationes distribuantur, non hoc absque ratione accidit. Hinc est quod sacra Scriptura rerum productionem et gubernationem sapientiae et prudentiae divinae attribuit. Dicitur enim Prov. 3-19 *dominus sapientia fundavit terram, stabilivit caelos prudentia. Sapientia illius eruperunt abyssi, et nubes rore concrescunt*. Et Sap. 8-1 dicitur de Dei sapientia quod *attingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter*. Et 11-21 eiusdem dicitur: *omnia in mensura, numero et pondere disposuisti*: ut per *mensuram* quantitatem, sive modum aut gradum perfectionis uniuscuiusque rei intelligamus; per *numerum* vero pluralitatem et diversitatem specierum, consequentem ex diversis perfectionis gradibus; per *pondus* vero inclinationes diversas ad proprios fines et operationes, et agentia et patientia, et accidentia quae sequuntur distinctionem specierum.

Leibniz objects that Aristotle was not open to the value of the past, but in fact he was skeptical of its absolute value only. He discusses and criticizes the predecessors fiercely, but the discussion is substantive and presupposes a thorough knowledge of the past combined with the love for truth and those who could possibly get to know it. The beginning of Metaphysics is a lecture on the achievements of the predecessors, and make up the first history of philosophy. Two *last* books of his Metaphysics only are dedicated to the polemics with mathematicism, which in fact excludes the maximalist philosophy. Excessive admiration of any science is itself unscientific, and mathematics (for all its value) cannot be exempted. The ideal, if reduced to the mathematical, is open really to infinite modifications. There are infinitely many number values between whichever two *numbers*. The borders amongst *physical* bodies do not exist, albeit they can be pictured: idealized so. In nature, (contrary to what Plato claims in Timaeus), geometric solids do not exists at all.

Still, some believed that the mathematical beings exist in some special world of theirs. Neo-Platonists believed in that light travels in straight lines, and the doctrine of emanation is based on the assumption. The latter, however, proved to be false in the 20th century. There is no physical entity which might be called a ray of light. Nor can it travel into an infinite open space for that matter too.

Light *proceeds*, but does not behave (save metaphorically only). In the phenomenal world only, things can "behave" in a certain manner. Analogically, people proceed (in courts; in actions), but the way "they behave" when proceeding is of no real importance. The term of the "moral conduct" is understandable, whereas the "moral behavior" is not. People proceed physically treading step by step, and the stages of the proceeding are discrete (discriminative of what must be trodden on). The proceeding cannot be "open" in the way a geometrical line is open to infinity. According to Thomas, "the motion of the human will is discontinuous" (Summa, I, 95, 1 ad 5). There are but discrete (discriminative) acts of the human intellect and the will, and a monotonic progress into "the future" is possible in the imagination only.

Aristotle, however, was the enemy, because following Plato, who was the *main* enemy. The ideal numbers (and his ideal society too) are not changeable. There were ten of them, and not multipliable like ordinary numbers must be. Consequently, the morals fashioned after this ideal could not be tampered with also. Thus, a certain ambivalence appears in Plato's stance. There is the Supreme Good and identifiable (as Thomas says) with the Immoveable Mover, but no rational proof of His existence. The proof would require abandoning the mathematical method and adopting that proper to metaphysics only (as it was the case with Aristotle).

Plato did not manage to build the proof as the reasoning demands *the ordered sequence of discrete and discontinuous acts of the intellect.* Still, his dialogues testify to that the manner Aristotle did it after all was the only acceptable. This seems to be a sufficient reason to call him "an enemy" indeed. The horizon of the human hope is by no means "open". Humans tend to a definite end.

Albeit bitterly critiqued by Popper, Plato is claimed to be the master of the modern idealism nonetheless. Still, the claim is hardly admissible. There is an essential difference between the ideal Plato *identified* with physis and the ideas *opposed* to the physis (nature) in those who followed Descartes. Nature does not admit "improvement", whereas the ideas thought out by Cartesians are "improvements" themselves. A particular system of an idealist

might be a closed entity of his own, but a reader invited to participate after all, and thus ideas in general must undergo constant modifications (Husserl's philosophical life testifies the best to the fact). The modern idealism is defined by the "creativity" of the idealists who think out some new worlds of their invention (Krąpiec, Kowalczyk and Gogacz define idealism in these terms). If thwarted in his creativity (Gogacz says) an idealist feels deeply offended and complains about the lack of openness and intolerance. Some might even resort to the scarecrow of totalitarianism so as to bolster the persuasiveness of the complaints.

The essence of totalitarianism consists not in unity, but in a – sui generis – "democratization" of power over the weak and defenseless; of the power to oppress them. Totalitarian demagogues came to power this way. The attractiveness of totalitarianism consists in egalitarianism; in the possibility being open to oppress *some* victims. The possibility was made accessible to many. Normally (in the "closed" society) one's power is legitimized by his/her moral quality to lead the less endowed and weaker to the valuable end. Still, for those deprived of this quality and unwilling, at the same time, to seek for it, an Ersatz of the legitimate power: the violence seemed alluring, because "testifying" to their alleged superiority.

Two things seem to define the genuine philosophy: the consequence in pursuing the objective of a comprehensive system and openness to the objections of those who do not agree unreservedly. The concentration on what one does seems to imply rejection of what disturbs it, so that combing the two attitudes in philosophy seems unworkable. In fact, it is but *extremely difficult*.

The scholastic Disputed Questions testify to that the match is possible after all. Thomas' Summa (built on the same principle as the Disputed Questions were) seems a masterpiece of the intellectual structure.

The Questions (and Summa) begin (in each part of their substructure) from objections. The compactness of the structure proves to be in no way undermined by them, but – paradoxically – wrought by their open articulation. Thomas was open to free discussion in the way unimaginable in modernity. Aristotle was his master here. Contrary to those who preceded, he began his treaties with addressing difficulties (apories) so as to come to *infallible* conclusions after solving them. "We must first attack those subjects about which it is necessary to raise questions before the truth is established". Aristotle gives (as Thomas has it[64]) in Metaphysics (bk. III) four arguments in support of this thesis:

> [1] … a difficulty about some subject is related to the mind as a physical knot is to the body, and manifests the same effect. For insofar as the mind is puzzled about some subject, it experiences something similar to those who are tightly bound. For just as one whose feet are tied cannot move forward on an earthly road, in a similar way one who is puzzled, and whose mind is bound, as it were, cannot move forward on the road of speculative knowledge. Therefore, just as one who wishes to loosen a physical knot must first of all inspect the knot and the way in which it is tied, in a similar way one who wants to solve a problem must first survey all the difficulties and the reasons for them. **[**339].
>
> [2] those who wish to investigate the truth without first considering the problem are like those who do not know where they are going. This is true for this reason: just as the end of a journey

[64] S. Thomae, In Metaphysicam Aristotelis, III, lect. 1.

> is the goal intended by one who travels on foot, in a similar way the solution of a problem is the goal intended by one who is seeking the truth. But it is evident that one who does not know where he is going cannot go there directly, except perhaps by chance. Therefore, neither can one seek the truth directly unless he first sees the problem. **[**340.]
> [3] one who is ignorant of where he is going does not know whether he should stop or go further when he reaches his appointed goal, in a similar way one who does not know beforehand the problem whose solution marks the terminus of his search cannot know when he finds the truth which he is seeking and when not. For he does not know what the goal of his investigations is. But this is evident to one who knew the problem beforehand. **[**341].
> [4] just as one can pass judgment in a lawsuit only if he hears the arguments on both sides, in a similar way one who has to pass judgment on a philosophy is necessarily in a better position to do so if he will hear all the arguments, as it were, of the disputants. **[**342].

Thomas recapitulates:

> Now it must be noted that it was for these reasons that Aristotle was accustomed, in nearly all his works, to set forth the problems which emerge before investigating and establishing what is true. But while in other works Aristotle sets down the problems one at a time in order to establish the truth about each one, in this work he sets forth all the problems at once, and afterwards in the proper order establishes the things that are true. The reason for this is that other sciences consider the truth in a particular way, and therefore it belongs to them to raise problems of a particular kind about individual truths. But just as it belongs to this science to make a universal study of truth, so also does it belong to it to discuss all the problems which pertain to the truth. Therefore, it does not discuss its problems one at a time, but all at once. **[**343].

Aristotle had reversed the past paradigm of science existing before (creative of ideas), so that his own system might be deemed perfective of what preceded:

> … he does not proceed to investigate the truth in the same order as the other philosophers did. For he begins with things that are sensible and evident and proceeds to those which are separate from matter, … but the other philosophers wanted to apply intelligible and abstract principles to sensible things. Hence, because he did not intend to establish the truth in the same order as that followed by the other philosophers, and from whose views these problems arise, he therefore decided to give first all the problems in a separate section, and afterwards to solve these problems in their proper order. **[**344] (Dominican Fathers).

The stance came to be known as the philosophical realism.

A dialogue precedes the definite guise of knowledge, but it can unfold only in an atmosphere of the mutual respect for those who participate. The modern "Individualism" seems to preclude the possibility. There is a philosophy of dialogue in it, but nothing even remotely resembling the vivid dialogue of the Free Disputes carried out in the 13th century.

The mutual respect is a baseline condition of honest dialogue, but other preconditions must be necessarily imposed. In Plato and Aristotle alike, unconditional love of truth for its own sake is the condition; the love for truth which is "neither mine nor yours" but simply is (the common good). The truth might be found even in the most naïve questions and no one must be prohibited to advance them.

There is, to be sure, a place for infinity in the human existence, but not identifiable with *the indefinite progress*. The end of the definite progress is the plenitude to be found in God. Not an Idea of God is meant forced upon those dearly attached to their own ideas. The *real* God exists beyond the (created) nature, but endowed with his own nature nonetheless. His nature is infinite, but not in the way the set theory proposes. It is not the infinity of number, but the infinity of perfections which is the property of the Supreme Being. Attaining the Immovable makes it possible for humans to partake of (to be open to) the infinite actuality of God's existence.

4. A self-moving number

Plato defined man is the self-moving number. In the centuries to come – prone to a "creative interpretation" – this pseudo-definition equaled the description of human nature in quantitative terms.

Defining anything in the way Plato did allows regrouping the terms of the alleged definitions freely. The regrouping is justified in mathematics, but in syllogisms (begetting infallible knowledge, Anal. Post, I c. 2) proves to be begging the question (petitio principii). However, the definition of the human nature must exemplary (and a possible error prominent in it), because counting (acting proper to man after all) was in Plato both the object and the mode of seizing it.

> … those who would demonstrate through convertible terms the '*quod quid'* of some thing (say, ***what is a soul***, or ***what is man***, or ***anything else*** of this sort), necessarily commit the fault of begging the question. And he cites as an example Plato's definition of soul. For since the soul is alive and is the body's ***cause of being alive***, it follows that it differs from the body in the fact that the body lives in virtue of some cause other than itself, but the soul lives in virtue of itself. But Plato posited that number is the substance of all things: for he failed to distinguish between one, which is converted with being and refers to the substance of that of which it is predicated, and one which is the principle of number. As a consequence, it followed that the soul as to its substance is a number, just as any other thing containing many things in itself. Likewise Plato posited that to live is one of the ways of being moved. For the living are distinguished from the non-living on two scores, namely, sense and movement, as it is stated in *On the Soul* I. Furthermore, he asserted that sensing or knowing is one way of being moved. Thus, therefore, he said that the soul is ***a self-moving number*** in addition to saying that the soul is ***its own cause of being alive***. Consequently, if anyone desired to prove what a soul is, namely, that it is something which is its own cause of being alive, and assumed as middle that the soul is a number which moves itself, it would be ***necessary to beg*** this, namely, that the soul is a self-moving number, such that this is ***identical*** with the soul as being its '*quod quid*'. Otherwise, it would not follow, if something is the '*quod quia'* of self-moving number, that it is the '*quod quid'* of the soul itself (Dominican Fathers).

Is, then, a "philosophical equation" impossible at all? Contrary to what might appear, it is not. Everything depends, in this case, on how the technical Aristotelian term of ἀντιστρέφεσθαι is seized. Taken in a narrow sense, the "ἀντιστρέφεσθαι", is about regrouping and must lead to tautology. Taken in a boarder sense, it is productive of genuine reasoning. The terms *A*, *B*, *C* of the perfect syllogism must be convertible (ἀντιστρέφεσθαι) indeed, but not equal in

their extent. The terms are convertible in the sense unity is convertible with being, and they are both with the thingness of a thing (its nature).

Two things must combine in a perfect reasoning: the unity of a thought and the diversity of objects that make up the unity. A sentence begins with a capital latter and ends with the full stop. It is *one sentence,* albeit made up of several words. The same, mutatis mutandis, concerns a *necessary* statement (such a sentence). It is a result of reasoning (the conclusion of a syllogism). Words, if ordered, are productive of the unity of one thought encompassing them all.

The problem how to express one (and definite) thought by several words is by no means trivial. Two opposite stances are possible, and they are both false because extreme. Either, following Schelling, we assume tautology as the only legitimate form of thing (and we disregard the natural manifold constituents of human thinking), or we gather words at random (spontaneously). Some "free expressed thoughts" will resemble then a heap of garbage.

The unity (the compactness) of a reasoning and its real purport, at the same time, is guaranteed by the use of the *convertibles of being* ("transcendentals"); it is impossible, however, without using the non-contradiction principle.

Plato is furthest from relativism, but the principles he adopted (if "interpreted") might lead to it. If life had been the same as counting, the computing machines would have been living in a sense too. Conversely: the human mind would have been nothing more than a machine and "programmable" freely. Plato did not draw the conclusion, but the modern Neo-Platonist did. The sophisticated form the "programmable intelligence" has assumed nowadays facilitates the conclusion.

In Phaedrus, the human soul is stated to be both unchangeable and immortal. We are but at the outset of a long journey. The next step was done by Neo-Platonists, and especially, by Avicenna.

According to him, the (immortal) life is not becoming to man out of necessity (the human soul; his spirit; cannot be defined so). Aristotle says that man is mortal, but he has the animal life in mind only (the animal life must cease someday, which is rather obvious). Still, the scientific in man (his Logos) must not cease to exist at all. Both Plato and Aristotle prove that man is more than an animal, because possessing the unchangeable knowledge formulated in definitions. Its individual substratum must be unchangeable too. Avicenna does not seem to agree.

According to him, it is God only, who gives being and unity to the human nature (to his quiddity). Both are "transcendental" in the sense they are added to what "emanates" from God out of necessity. Human essence (and all quiddities too) emanate from the Divine Unity via the so called Dator Formarum (different from God and issuing from His essence out of necessity). The Unity (of God) is at the top of the universe, and emanation consists in multiplying the previously united. The process of multiplication characteristic of Emanationism (and of its modern mutation, Evolutionism, for that matter too) might be called a life sui generis (elan vital). Now if process "lives" and is self-conscious, those partaking thereof are living secondarily only.

Thomas quotes Avicenna many times and acknowledges his contribution to philosophy also, but rejects the claim that being and unity might be "added" to essences and creating might consist in the divine Placet to what is otherwise necessary. Thomas sets

himself aside with Aristotle (the "essentialist") *against* Avicenna *in this respect*, albeit in the Summa I, 44, 2, he alludes to some "who arose to the consideration of being as being" (and improved the Aristotelian stance so). The "some" must have been those who followed Avicenna some way.

In his Commentary to Metaphysics, Thomas says that being and unity are somehow (in one aspect) similar *to proper accidents* of natures (they issue from them out of necessity unlike "ordinary" accidents), albeit, from another point of view (disregarded by Aristotle), they are *proper effects* of the Self-Subsisting being (God).

> **556**. … it must be noted that Avicenna felt differently [scil. than Aristotle] about this; for he said that the terms "being" and "one" do not signify a thing's substance, but something added to it. …
> **557**. He spoke in the same way of "one," because he thought that the one which is interchangeable with being and the one which is the principle of number are the same. And the "one" which is the principle of number must signify a reality added to the substance; otherwise, number, since it is composed of ones, would not be a species of quantity, which is an accident added to substance. He said that this kind of "one" is interchangeable with "being," not in the sense that it signifies the very substance of a thing or being, but in the sense that it signifies an accident belonging to every being, just as the ability to laugh belongs to every man.
> **558**. … he does not seem to be right, for even though a thing's existence is other than its essence, it should not be understood to be something added to its essence after the manner of an accident, but something established, as it were, by the principles of the essence. Hence the term "being," which is applied to a thing by reason of its very existence, designates the same thing as the term applied to it by reason of its essence.
> **559**. … the unity which is limited to a special genus of being—discrete quantity—does not seem to be interchangeable with universal being. For, if unity is a proper and *per se* accident of being, it must be caused by the principles of being as being, just as any proper accident is caused by the principles of its subject. But it is not reasonable that something having a particular mode of being should be adequately accounted for by the common principles of being as being. It cannot be true, then, that something which belongs to a definite genus and species is an accident of every being.
> **560**. … the unity which is interchangeable with being signifies being itself, adding to it the notion of undividedness … (Dominican Fathers).

Apparently, a unity can be "added" to a unity only, but is *constitutive of the real being*: it is nothing else than its indivisibility. Neither is being "contingent" save from the divine perspective (normally inaccessible to man). In the nature, we see that everything intends to be. Being might be fragile, but "to exist" is defined by this necessary tending. It might be thwarted (in the moment of death or destruction), but the fact that it had existed cannot be changed. Everything tends to being and unity out of necessity, and it shuns its own decomposition as it does shun its non-existence. The unity and being is rather (so to say) "extracted" from natures (by God), and convertible with natures so, than "added" to them. The point is that, according to Avicenna, being and unity might be well convertible to each other (be transcendental), but are not convertible with essence: thingness of things. The very idea that "existence is contingent" (to essence) precludes the possibility.

The next step towards relativism was about to be done some centuries later: in the moment Avicenna's "transcendental" thought took its roots in Europe. Kant claimed that objects of mathematics are given in "a pure intuition" of time. Mathematics was, to Kant's mind, paradigmatic for human thinking so that reasoning almost identifies with counting.

Heidegger (and to some extent Hegel before him also) "defines" human existence in terms of temporality (Zeitigung). Thus, the future gains the preponderance over the past; the "modern" over the "obsolete"; for the mere reason of obtaining a privileged place on the graph of the time development. It was implied that the change must be the progress and must advance into a "better future", albeit no one could have been right in assuming that it must so in – say – Germany in its 1920s. Normally, a change for better is as possible as that for the worse. Is time, then, "wisest"? Aristotle quotes Paros claiming the opposite; i.e. that it might be the most stupid.

Everyone in his/her – say – 70s experiences demise of the intellectual and vital strength, although they do not degrade simultaneously, for the latter follows the former. Our personal life consists in opposing the process as much as possible (even if it cannot be reversed). If the "totality" (the society) had had to exist on its own (independently of those who form it), it must have yielded to a similar process (the growth of the social entropy). Children need not oppose the demise, because endowed with the abundance of the stamina of life. Adults, however, are not; neither must they be childish imagining that they are.

In the natural course of events, a senile debility affects both individuals and societies. There is but one resource not to yield to destruction and so efficient that even able to reverse the demise: "thy youth shall be renewed like the eagle's" (renovabitur ut aquilae juventus tua; Psalm 102. 5).

> The eagle is said, after it becometh overpowered with bodily age, to be incapable of taking food …
> it will be after its old age like a young eagle; the vigour of all its limbs returneth, the lustre of its plumage, the guidance of its wings, it flieth aloft as before, a sort of resurrection taketh place in it. … this … signifieth to us the resurrection; … the eagle is not restored unto immortality, but we are unto eternal life; … Presume not therefore on thy strength: the firmness of the rock rubbeth off thy old age: for that Rock was Christ. In Christ our youth shall be restored like that of the eagle.…[65]

Psalm 91. 11. says: "…my horn shall be exalted like that of the unicorn: and my old age in plentiful mercy (Et exaltabitur sicut unicornis cornu meum, et senectus mea in misericordia uberi).

> … our old age is the last season in our lives, so the whole of what the body of Christ at present suffereth in labours, in cares, in watchings, in hunger, in thirst, in stumbling-blocks, in wickednesses, in tribulations, is its youth: its old age, that is, its last days, will be in joy. And beware, beloved, that ye think not death meant also, in that he hath spoken of old age: for man groweth old in the flesh for this reason, that he may die. The old age of the Church will be

[65] Augustine, On Psalms; comment. ad locum.
Access 2026-10-29 Philip Schaff: NPNF1-08. St. Augustine: Exposition on the Book of Psalms - Christian Classics Ethereal Library

> white with good works, but it shall not decay through death. What the head of the old man is, that our works will be. Ye see how the head groweth old, and whiteneth, as fast as old age approacheth. Thou sometimes dost seek in the head of one who groweth old duly in his own course a black hair, yet thou findest it not: thus when our life shall have been such, that the blackness of sins may be sought, and none found, that old age is youthful, is green, and ever will be green. Ye have heard of the grass of sinners, hear ye of the old age of the righteous: "My old age shall be in the fathers of mercy."[66]

"They who are youthful become elders in light, in holiness, in experience, and in wisdom; and will arrive in a few years at the fullness of the age of Jesus Christ".[67]

The source of life (motion) of the soul is to be sough beyond it.

5. Nature and Reich. The hierarchy and the asyndeton of values

Some things are (should be) assessed as precocious (cari; axioi) and a science (axiology) is needed which could assess their objective value. The judgments concerning the precious (the valuable) should be objectively valid, i.e. they must regard the necessary connection of natural objects: human persons and their natural properties. The "egotist orientation" phenomenology speaks of consists in rejection of both the necessary and the natural. It was supposed to be more than ordinary subjectivism, because the status of its "reduced" Ego seemed to be methodologically confirmed, but it allows, nevertheless, a possible shift of the meaning of the subjectivity. Albeit corroborated by a method special to phenomenology (the phenomenological reduction called epoché), its objects are immanent to it and thus exposed to relativisation. The "popular" interpretation of phenomenology leads to relativism.

Some objects are judged and chosen, and thus they constitute the tissue of the rational life, but it is essential to give a reason, *why* they are judged and chosen, which, however, is impossible without adopting objective criteria of the judgments. In them, immaterial relations of objects are represented, possibly referable to the Ultimate Principle of the correlation of all objects of the physical world. The objective in question is the necessary connection of facts; not the objective being Scotus (and the followers) speak of. Naked essences cannot be the subject matter of any science.

The scientific judgment is a statement with a complement (predicate), which might be called value if referred to what it defines. Now, the existential testimony, Heidegger speaks

[66] Ibid.

[67] Louis-Marie Grignon de Montfort, Treatise on the True Devotion to the Blessed Virgin , transl. by F. W. Faber, London 1863.
Access 2026-10-29 https://librivox.org/a-treatise-on-the-true-devotion-to-the-blessed-virgin-by-louis-marie-grignon-de-montfort/

of, [68] precludes the possibility of seizing the necessary connection of facts. The "existential" in that case, proves to be the opposite of the scientific. Despite what Positivists say, science as such is about the necessary and causal correlation of objects, even if they appear first as phenomena only.[69] The connection is objective in science and cannot be subjective.

Aristotle speaks of the necessity of facts. Some sentences (if formed in the manner the scientific judgments must be) might be necessarily connected so that they prove to be, in the end, the premises of a syllogism.[70] The contrary must be the case with the predicates isolated from what they could have otherwise defined. Values in the sense proposed by Lotze and Scheler must not be complements.

Scheler criticizes Kant's formalism, but philosophizes, nonetheless, in the spirit of Kantianism (adopts Kant's principles). Scheler speaks of the table of values (a matter of ethics), but the form of this table came to existence in the Kantian Reich der Zwecke; the Reich of the philosophical (ethical) Immanentism.

In Kant, several law-giving moral subjects affirm (albeit differently as to the extent of their humanity) what might be regarded in fact as values. The values are quantitative as to their nature and endowed thus with a certain extent (Reichweite). The moral subject testifies them, and is, thus, more or less valuable.[71]

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[68] Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, Blackwell Oxford UK Cambridge USA, 1962.

[Being and Time 311] … Dasein gives testimony, from its ownmost potentiality for-Being, as to a possible authenticity of its existence, so that it not only makes known that in an existentiell manner such authenticity is possible, but demands this of itself.

[69] E. Husserl, Ideas, § 47; Remark.

[70] Contra Gentiles, lib. 2 cap. 31 n. 6. Praeterea. Ostensum est supra quod absoluta necessitas in rebus creatis non est per ordinem ad primum principium quod per se necesse est esse, scilicet Deum, sed per ordinem ad alias causas, quae non sunt per se necesse-esse. Necessitas autem ordinis ad id quod non est per se necesse esse, non cogit aliquid semper fuisse: sequitur enim, si aliquid currit, quod moveatur; non tamen necesse est quod semper motum fuerit, quia ipsum currere non est per se necessarium.

Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 138 n. 3. Est autem et alia necessitas ex fine: sicut cum dicitur alicui necesse esse habere navem ut transeat mare.

[71] Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Riga 1785
Access 2024-10-27 https://www.projekt-gutenberg.org/kant/sitte/titlepage.html

Zweiter Abschnitt. Übergang von der populären sittlichen Weltweisheit zur Metaphysik der Sitten

Ich verstehe aber unter einem Reiche die systematische Verbindung verschiedener vernünftiger Wesen durch gemeinschaftliche Gesetze. […]. Denn vernünftige Wesen stehen alle unter dem Gesetz, dass jedes derselben sich selbst und alle andere niemals bloß als Mittel, sondern jederzeit zugleich als Zweck an sich selbst behandeln solle. Hierdurch aber entspringt eine systematische Verbindung vernünftiger Wesen durch gemeinschaftliche Objektive Gesetze, d. i. ein Reich, welches, weil diese Gesetze eben die Beziehung dieser Wesen auf einander als Zwecke und Mittel zur Absicht haben, ein Reich der Zwecke (freilich nur ein Ideal) heißen kann. Es gehört aber ein vernünftiges Wesen als Glied zum Reiche der Zwecke, wenn es darin zwar allgemein gesetzgebend, aber auch diesen Gesetzen selbst unterworfen ist. Es gehört dazu als Oberhaupt, wenn es als gesetzgebend keinem Willen eines andern unterworfen ist.[…].

Kant's shrinks from respecting the personal and natural in construing his intelligible world (mundus intelligibilis). He breaks with the definition of person given by Boethius (the individual substance of rational nature), which had been was widely adopted before (and applicable to society, as the composite of persons cannot change the nature of components). The personal (natural) relations exist (according to Thomas) *between* persons, because produced by acting; by being a cause with respect to the proper effect. The relation must originally regard but two objects; whereas an infinite space *amongst* individuals is prescribed in Kant as an a priori condition of every possible action.

> Ich verstehe aber unter einem Reiche *die systematische Verbindung verschiedener vernünftiger Wesen durch gemeinschaftliche Gesetze*. Weil nun Gesetze die Zwecke ihrer allgemeinen Gültigkeit nach bestimmen, so wird, wenn *man von dem persönlichen Unterschiede vernünftiger Wesen, imgleichen allem Inhalte ihrer Privatzwecke abstrahiert, ein Ganzes aller Zwecke* (sowohl der vernünftigen Wesen als Zwecke an sich, als auch der eigenen Zwecke, die ein jedes sich selbst setzen mag) *in systematischer Verknüpfung, d. i. ein Reich der Zwecke*, gedacht werden können, welches nach obigen Prinzipien möglich ist.[…] Nun ist auf solche Weise eine Welt vernünftiger Wesen (mundus intelligibilis) als ein Reich der Zwecke möglich und zwar durch die eigene Gesetzgebung aller Personen als Glieder. […][72]

> By a kingdom I understand a systematic union of various rational beings through common laws. Now since laws determine ends in terms of their universal validity, if *we abstract from the personal differences of rational beings as well as from all the content of their private ends* we shall be able to think of *a whole of all ends in systematic connection* (a whole both of rational beings as ends in themselves and of the ends of his own that each may set himself), that is, a kingdom of ends, which is possible in accordance with the above principles. For, all rational beings stand under the law that each of them is to treat himself and all others never merely as means but always at the same time as ends in themselves. But from this there arises *a systematic union of rational beings through common objective laws*, that is, a kingdom,

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Nun folgt hieraus unstreitig: dass jedes vernünftige Wesen als Zweck an sich selbst sich in Ansehung aller Gesetze, denen es nur immer unterworfen sein mag, zugleich als allgemein gesetzgebend müsse ansehen können, weil eben diese Schicklichkeit seiner Maximen zur allgemeinen Gesetzgebung es als Zweck an sich selbst auszeichnet, imgleichen dass dieses seine Würde (Prärogativ) vor allen bloßen Naturwesen es mit sich bringe, seine Maximen jederzeit aus dem Gesichtspunkte seiner selbst, zugleich aber auch jedes andern vernünftigen als gesetzgebenden Wesens (die darum auch Personen heißen) nehmen zu müssen. Nun ist auf solche Weise eine Welt vernünftiger Wesen (mundus intelligibilis) als ein Reich der Zwecke möglich und zwar durch die eigene Gesetzgebung aller Personen als Glieder. Demnach muss ein jedes vernünftige Wesen so handeln, als ob es durch seine Maximen jederzeit ein gesetzgebendes Glied im allgemeinen Reiche der Zwecke wäre. Das formale Prinzip dieser Maximen ist: handle so, als ob deine Maxime zugleich zum allgemeinen Gesetze (aller vernünftigen Wesen) dienen sollte. Ein Reich der Zwecke ist also nur möglich nach der Analogie mit einem Reiche der Natur […].

[72] Denn vernünftige Wesen stehen alle unter dem Gesetz, dass jedes derselben sich selbst und alle andere niemals bloß als Mittel, sondern jederzeit zugleich als Zweck an sich selbst behandeln solle. Hierdurch aber entspringt eine systematische Verbindung vernünftiger Wesen durch gemeinschaftliche Objektive Gesetze, d. i. ein Reich, welches, weil diese Gesetze eben die Beziehung dieser Wesen auf einander als Zwecke und Mittel zur Absicht haben, ein Reich der Zwecke (freilich nur ein Ideal) heißen kann.(loc. cit.).

> which can be called a kingdom of ends (admittedly only an ideal) because what these laws have as their purpose is just the relation of these beings to one another as ends and means.[73]

The categorical imperative is an axis of the connection in question. The imperative must remain undefined (unquestionable). As commonly known, Kant demands (in forming this imperative) the rejection of every if-sentence, possibly preceding his normative one. The imperative in ethics had been assumed the form: "if you want to be happy, you should act honestly": it was conditioned so. The conditional rational justification, was presented in Aristotle, but was deemed reprehensible in Kant's ethics.

Ethics is not separated from science in Aristotle in the way it appeared to Kant. The Aristotelian imperative is a judgment built according to *general* principles of science. In them, the causal correlations of objects are expressed by the middle terms of syllogisms and the judgments of ethics are syllogisms too. Kant's mundus intelligibilis is bereft of any such like correlations. A mere sequence of objects remains similar to that of the elements of a set. Husserl too, when constructing his strenge Wissenschaft (phenomenology was supposed to be that: a "stringent science") departs from the paradigm of the exact science (exacte Wissenschaft).

Aristotle states that mathematical objects are the effect of the formal abstraction. They do not exist outside human mind in the form they do in mathematical books. They, at best, exist according to how natural objects are spatially related to each other, which is to say: they exist in "manifold" (reich; rich) aspects. Now consequential regarding values in quantitative terms is bound to lead to relativizing them, as the quantitative relations must be infinitely multipliable.

Nowadays, the openness defines society this way. The measurable values have been privileged. Still, measuring the naturally unmeasurable cannot produce anything else than relativism. The *genuine* values are organically connected with each other, and their *causal character* must be respected. In a given state of human affairs, a right judgment regards the necessary connection of objects, so that what precedes and follows – the facts – do not appear before our eyes in a linear sequence only (they do appear so if represented in artificial information carriers only). The organic sequence is necessary (and prerequisite) for attaining the Ultimate End of human life.

The connection in question is normally expressed by conjunctions such as: If; Because; Then. They do not denote anything existing in nature independently of what they connect, but they, nevertheless, do connect real states of affairs. In the language of Scholasticism, they were called "dictiones syncategorematicae".[74] The exemplary connection of statements (effected by them) might be called demonstration, which is considerably more than an intuition.

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[73] Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, translated and edited by Mary Gregor, Cambridge University Press 1997.
Section II Transition from popular moral philosophy to metaphysics of morals. 4:433.
Access 2025-12-27
https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/blog.nus.edu.sg/dist/c/1868/files/2012/12/Kant-Groundwork-ng0pby.pdf

[74] Summa Theologiae I, q. 31 a. 4 c.

If lacking such like connections, sentences are juxtaposed by means of parataxis only. Analogically, we might speak of a parataxis conjunction of the predicates-values in Lotze and Scheler.

Parataxis sentences (asyndeta), e.g.: "I came; I saw nothing" are commonly used in rhetoric. They played an important role in the Proto-Indo-European language, but the language of a civilized society must not make do with them. Rhetoric appeals to emotions, whereas the effective acting must be originally unemotional, as concertation on what is being done demands indifference to what incidentally affects the acting.

The sentences adduced above can be guessed to mean (and thus rewritten as) e.g.: "Although I came, I saw nothing", or (possibly): "When I came, I saw nothing. The sentences then seem to be as obvious as banal. Still, a paradoxical sense is possible also, e.g. "Because I came, I saw nothing" (1), or: "If I came, I saw nothing" (2). The sentences are likely to be discarded as non-aesthetical and thus non understandable, for the sense of what is (felt to be) befitting replaces often understanding. Still, they might really express a relation between (1) my coming to a place and withdrawing of the object to be seen. Birds, if tried to be observed, retreat really from the scope of view of the possible observer. Thermo-visual cameras (or even the ordinary ones if carefully disguised) do not disturb the environment to be observed, but placing them discretely in this place is a special problem after all.

Similarly, the sentence: "If I came, I saw nothing" (2), is meaningful if implying the following: "If I really came to that place we have been speaking of and I was supposed to come to, I might declare that I saw nothing indeed". The sense of them both is neither obvious nor banal. Still, more often than not, it is assumed that the "ordinary" life should be fashioned after the ordinary collocations of the language spoken therein, and the language shapes the form of the social ties. The banality might be a token of a "modern" tongue indeed, but real difficulties we face in our life are never banal.

Conjunctions such as: If; Because; Then, and the similar ones if shifted amongst the asyndeta sentences disrupt the linear sequence of events. In the latter, quantitative relations might be seized only. Husserl's philosophical tongue is mathematical at bottom, as "every eidos has its mathematical extent".[75] The identity of an object is "defined" by its position. Now placing an object in the storage media devices might determine its meaning (in some respect), but the object does not become real then.

The same is the case with Heidegger's Dasein. It is, etymologically, being-there, and the Latin existentia had originally the same meaning: the identity of an object was determined by the place it occupied. In the spirit of Existentialism, some "new dimensions" of the human life happen be sought after, and the existence implied to be dimensional in the way bodies are.

Some 50 years has passed since the death of Heidegger who predicted that "the metaphysics of future" would use the tongue of mathematics. The perspective of its appearing does not seem to loom yet. It seems that metaphysics must remain what it has been since Aristotle after all.

The subject matter of metaphysics *Aristotle* speaks of is the (most) necessary. The somewhat enigmatic notion of essence (τὸ τι ἦν εἶναι) is to be understood in the terms of the necessary past (the past tense of 'einai-to be' appears therein). It is only the practical intellect

[75] Ideas I, §. 13 (27).

which turns to the future (rationally), but the anti-theoretical mind of modernity turns to it blindfolded. In Aristotle, a theoretical foundation of the "turning to the future" is provided by metaphysics. The "metaphysics of the future" (if it be called so) would be useful if dependent on metaphysics normally so called. In other words, the philosophy of producing (and acting before producing) is of the great importance if based on the metaphysics in the traditional sense of the word, but cannot be meant to replace it. Aristotle in his Physics (highly appreciated by Heidegger), gives scarce remarks only about that "philosophy of producing" (of the localization of objects).

The algorithm of localization is at bottom the same as that of producing. At the beginning of the second book of his Physics, Aristotle says that two principles exist in the world:

> Of things that exist, some exist by nature, some from other causes. 'By nature' the animals and their parts exist, and the plants and the simple bodies (earth, fire, air, water) for we say that these and the like exist 'by nature'.
>
> All the things mentioned present a feature in which they differ from things which are not constituted by nature. Each of them has within itself a principle of motion and of stationariness (in respect of place, or of growth and decrease, or by way of alteration). On the other hand, a bed and a coat and anything else of that sort, qua receiving these designations i.e. in so far as they are products of art – have no innate impulse to change. …
> None of [artificial products] has in itself the source of its own production. But while in some cases (for instance houses and the other products of manual labour) that principle is in something else external to the thing, in others those which may cause a change in themselves in virtue of a concomitant attribute-it lies in the things themselves (but not in virtue of what they are).[76]

Aristotle's stance is "naturalist". Husserl's (and the majority of the modern philosophers) assumes the opposite "anti-naturalist" stance, because rejecting nature's existence prior to the existence of artificial objects, which nowadays make for the richdom (Reichtum) of people. Natural things (Natursachen) are of secondary importance for a man "civilized" after the Hegelian fashion. Natural things cannot be created, as nobody ever managed to create even e.g. a mosquito. The fact, however, does not seem bother much the "civilized" man. There are, according to Husserl, the other (more precious) objects (values) open to "objectification" ("valuation").

> But in the act of valuation we are turned towards values … The intentional object rather, that which is valued, enjoyed, beloved, hoped as such … first becomes an apprehended object through a distinctively *"objectifying" turn of thought* . … Thanks to this objectification we find facing us in the natural setting, and therefore *as members of the natural world*, not natural

[76] Physics By Aristotle Translated by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye.
Access 2025-12-27
https://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/physics.2.ii.html

> things (Natursachen) merely, but values and practical objects of every kind, cities, streets with streetlighting arrangements, dwellings, furniture, works of art, books, tools, and so forth.[77]

Natursachen are given there some precarious mode of existence only. In Aristotle, the natural science tackles natural substances independent of what/whether we think of them. Human willing is natural and precedes execution of the moral act. Producing artificial objects might be follow the execution of the act, but does not need so (there are riches available without it). Making (producing) is perhaps the most apparent ("imposing") sign of willing (acting), but natural faculties precede, in the human mind, the valuable and measurable.

The philosophy of nature is concerned with what is born (nascitur), or, generally, comes to being. Ethics is concerned with what is begotten in our mind before realized in nature. Mathematics (for all the evidence for the contrary) is concerned with the nature of objects abstracted from those natural ones. The mathematical beings do not exists in nature, but what they stem from does exist as borders amongst natural bodies regraded in a certain *simplification*. Theology too is concerned with a nature, viz. the divine nature, at least if the theology of the Sacred Scripture is meant, which speaks of a twofold beginning of the Divine Word; "according to the two natures that he receives through generation … [the] two births":

> … Christ has proceeded from the Father eternally and from his mother temporally, and each procession has the notion of a birth. For according to the eternal procession the Son is of the substance of the Father, and he goes forth from him unto a distinct person, and yet he is joined to the Father on account of their substance's undividedness, since the Word is with God. Whence it is clear that the three things that earlier were said to belong to the notion of "birth" are preserved here, in their own way, and on account of this he is said to "arise," to be "brought forth," and to be "born." But his temporal procession, by which he proceeds from his mother, has the notion of "birth" as does that of anyone else who is born from his mother. This is why, just as his processions are two … so too his births are two.[78]

Metaphysics is situated between Scientia naturalis and Scientia divina. It is non understandable if not using the four causes proposed in Physics (Metaph., I. c. 3, 983a 24-34); it happens to be despaired to learn if not directed by the supreme science; the one containing the entire truth infallibly, and corrective of manifold philosophical errors (Contra Gent., I. c. 4). The principles of the Scientia divina have been revealed so as to render those enlightened so able to partake of the divine nature; to reach it (es zu reichen).

Aristotle makes some important remarks concerning producing *in general*. It is, contrary to what Plato says in Timaeus, not similar to the divine creating, and dissimilar to any begetting also. Still, the world seen with the eyes of an ancient Greek might appear (to the eyes of the "civilized" man) completely dissimilar to that of the 21th century. Looking behind the window I see objects quite different from those forming the natural environment of the past generations (their richdom seems to be so imposing). The people of the past regarded:

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[77] Edmund Husserl, Ideas General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. With a new foreword by Dermot Moran Translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson, § 37.
Access 2025-12-27 https://dokumen.pub/ideas-general-introduction-to-pure-phenomenology-online-ausgnbsped-9780203120330-0203120337-9780415519038-0415519039.html

[78] Super Sent., lib. 3 d. 8 q. 1 a. 4 qc. 1 c. (Ad primum)

trees; animals, storms, etc., whereas nowadays we see (in cities): cars, buildings, roads, etc.; but trees, etc. on the screen of the artificial carriers of information mainly. Moreover, people happen to be regarded in their background in terms of extension (Reichweite) also. It might be "multi-dimensional", but dimensional (weitreichend) first.

Aristotle must have been aware of what *appears* to be the opposition of the "two worlds", but most probably, could not imagine the extent the opposition has assumed in modernity. Nor (more importantly) could he imagine the artificial to try to engulf the natural; subjugate it in the manner the Hegelian "civilized" man tried to. He proves that there is but one world, to the effect that no future and modern one (e.g. that of the 21th century) might be different to the ancient one. It is the world of nature accompanied by *the shadow of the artificial*.

There is but one reality and one metaphysics analyzing it. Most probably, it has been disrespected nowadays, because rejecting the idolatrous worship of the "modern artificial world". Still, the unreal *deserves* the disrespect, because non-analyzable for a rational being (respectful of order). Science is a triumph of the human rationality, but idolatrous admiration for everything stamped (freely) with the mark of modernity is irrational indeed.

Producing might be a token of human rationality if subjected to science, but the latter cannot be subordinate to the former. If bereft of the natural footing which should precede it, acting becomes chaotic.

The metaphysics of the future might be of use in understanding the "artificial world" if formed according to the paradigm of the *traditional* metaphysics (and the philosophy of nature). It might be called "a general theory of producing" and the existential philosophy of Heidegger might be useful there also. The philosophy of existence in the place (secundum existentiam) is a natural part of the philosophy of existence (of being as such). (Existentia is seized more abstractedly in the latter).

Particular sciences concerning particular modes of producing exist, but no one of them regards the universal mode of producing. Nor even economy is such a science, because it fails to define *the nature* of the artificial. Normally, the artificial is "defined" by a sheer contrast to the natural, and the "modern" by contrast to the "obsolete" and "outdated".

Moreover, some scientists, pursuing particular sciences, do not, often, make do with the particular, but try to transcend it, which is laudable, but results, if the endeavor is bereft of a method legitimizing the transcending, in extrapolating unduly the method of a particular science unto the entirety of the possibly producible or even unto the entirety of the world. Roger Penrose says that mathematical beings exist in an ideal (Platonic) world. The aesthetical and moral values, on the other hand, exist *beside* them.[79] *The contention has not been proved.*

The notion of value, existing in economy first, was extrapolated thus by Herman Lotze unto the sphere of ethics. The natural order was reversed, because producing (ars) follows (possibly) willing (deciding), but never precedes it. Economics uses the tongue of mathematics. The philosophy of the human nature was tried to be modelled after that pattern also.

[79] R. Penrose, The Road to Reality, 1.1. 5

Mathematics concerns quantity. The method of mathematics (of the quantifiable), if applied to the unquantifiable, produces the non-understandable. Quantity is a category of being (it is not being itself). Being as such is not measurable and not to be described in terms of "dimension". The temptation to extrapolate the method is strong, probably because the measurable is imaginable (is easy to grasp), which is not the case with what the stringent discipline of science demands. The mathematical objects are hardly imaginable, and much effort is needed to train the imagination to grasp them, whereas the discipline might be deemed disposable in "humanities", which, although not exact themselves, are admirative of the splendid success of the exact and claiming the right to partaking in the success, without, however, following their rigor.

The "mathematical world" created by Plato and Pythagoreans was a challenge to those who followed. Aristotle does not reject in bulk this type of idealization, but proves it to be an idealization nonetheless. Especially however, values must not be supposed to exist in a world of the post-Cartesian ideas (they proved to be astonishingly "rich"). The ideas Plato speaks of are real, whereas the "objective being" (natura tertia) was created between the immaterial and the material in the Middle Ages Arab philosophy. The classical Platonism has come to us via this intermediary.

Plato himself was seriously concerned with the problem of definitions (he followed Socrates there). The definitions of virtues were needed in the polemics with the sophists of his age. Protagoras claims that "man is the measure" (of good and evil; of truth and falsehood). Plato replies (in his Laws; IV, 716C) that God is the measure "much more than, as some say, man is". He must be the best measure, and the best measure knowable to Plato was that mathematics. His definitions were formed, consequently, according to how the mathematical objects were believed to exist. A natural number of man would exist too, and both his body and his psyche was tried to be "counted" this way by those who followed suit. The atom number of elements is "defined" by the number of protons in their nuclei, and more complex structures were believed to be numerable accordingly.

Plato's intentions seem to be clear as the relativism of sophists must have posed a threat to civilization. The problem is, however, whether a "radical option" (whatsoever) is as radical a means to oppose *effectively* the wrong stance. Radicalism, according to Aristotle, is needed in acting, but useless in thinking, because effective acting follows matured understanding i.e. the one accomplished without excitement. Plato's indignation was justified, but not effective for that reason.

Vana sine viribus ira est ("Anger without strength is empty"). Emotions (and indignation in particular), if expressed outwardly, testify to inner inquietude born possibly from the sentiment of evil felt to be both besetting and far-reaching (weitreichend). It cannot liberate from evil, although witnesses to the personal susceptibility (to the personal character not being debased yet). Impunity is hardly bearable indeed. The problem is how to make it powerless without, however, making the other accomplice in one's own anxiety.

The problem of mathematicism is as old as philosophy itself. [80] It appeared distinctly in Plato.[81] The problem is of pivotal importance in defining. Definition (contrary to what

[80] Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 3 l. 13 n. 13. [aliqui philosophi …] non distinguebant inter unum quod est principium numeri, et unum quod convertitur cum ente.

Plato claimed) cannot consist in a "division" of a continuum. Definition, according to Aristotle, is a shortening of the syllogistic reasoning and differs from it formally only. If they both "are not identical"[82] absolutely, it is only because the principles of one science (the definition of its proper subject matter) are proved in a superior one (to be the properties of its "superior" subject matter). Particular words (used in the common life casually) become scientific terms in syllogisms; connected so strictly that (in relation to the principles) they prove unyielding to any "creative interpretation".

Analogically, particular events of life are not that much "phenomena of existence" (and witnessed only) as rather a chain of causes and effects. In syllogisms, the syncategorematic dictions: If; Because; Now; and the like are indispensable. Phenomenology can easily dispose of them.

The notion of the Western Values is being commonly used and abused, becoming dangerously capacious. Thick volumes have been written about that life is e.g. "despair"; "being towards death", "transcending oneself", etc., etc.. Questioning those values, authorized by the great and acknowledged names of literature and philosophy might smack of obscurantism and philistinism nowadays. Do they, however, really belong to the "spiritual heritage of Europe"?

Plato had no scruples when expelling "the poets" from his ideal state. The contemporary European has had them only too many, because he/she draws from the antiquity not immediately, but via the Arab medieval philosophy.

The Cartesian Cogito (emblematic for the European "rationalism") is, in fact, Avicenna's "floating man argument" clad in the modern gown. According to Descartes, thinking is: simply and unconditionally, which is to say: evil can issue from the will only (Meditatio IV, 57-62).

The claim that evil can issue from the will *might be* true, because the will can render any human faculty (the intellect included) evil, but the fact was obviously ignored by Descartes. According to what Al Quran says, thoughts cannot be evil unless words and deeds follow.[83] The "European humanism" has been built on that "fundament". Deeds happen to be evil, but judgments ("words") in general, are always suspected of being hurtful (in the same

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[81] Sentencia De anima, lib. 1 l. 4 n. 7. Item ponebat Plato numeros esse causam rerum: et hoc faciebat, quia nescivit distinguere inter unum quod convertitur cum ente, et unum quod est principium numeri, prout est species quantitatis. Ex quo sequebatur, quod cum universale separatum poneret causam rerum, et numeros esse substantiam rerum, quod huiusmodi universalia essent ex numeris.

[82] Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, transl. S. Bouchier, 1901, Book II. Chap. III.: The distinction between Definition and Demonstration.
Access 2026-01-17 https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/bouchier-posterior-analytics

[83] Verily, Allah has pardoned my nation for what occurs within themselves, as long as they do not speak of it or act upon it.
Source: Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī 6664, Grade: Muttafaqun Alayhi
Al-Tahawi and the scholars of language said that what is intended are thoughts without choice, as Allah Almighty said: We know what his soul whispers to him (50:16). Allah knows best.
Source: Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim bi-Sharḥ al-Nawawī 127
Access 2025-04-09: https://www.abuaminaelias.com/held-accountable-thoughts/

way), just because of what they are: judgments. "Thoughts", to the contrary, seem to be their opposite, as long as expressed spontaneously and thus free from the suspicion of judging anybody. Apparently, a cry of e.g. a bird is expressive of its inner state of mind, and the "human" (or rather post-human) thoughts are demanded to be similar. Nobody can be punished for expressing his/her emotions freely, for it would be "unhuman". A psychotherapist begins his/her session with the standard: "there are no bad answers": feel free to express them indiscriminately. Analogically, a politician-psychotherapist invites to express (vent out) any sentiments without *rational* restrictions (Scheler disapproves of repressing them, too). Sentiments are considerably less (in that paradigm) than judgments. Those who express sentiments cannot (allegedly) be accused of hate speech, whereas those who express judgments (*any* judgments) "must" be always accused thereof. The "hate speech" of judgments is hated, but the hate of this hate is approvable for some queer reasons. The "spontaneous" abhors unemotional and intellectual with its quantifiers such as: "if", "so" "for, "so" . There are emotions only beneath the "freely expressed", and the freedom of expression is pushed even to its inarticulacy.

The hate might be either a sentiment or a habit of the will. The difference is visible not only in classical philosophy, but in the English grammar also; "to hate" (and the like) collocates both with infinitives (1) and the -ing forms (2) all depending on whether expressive of (1) a voluntary habit or a (2) sentiment. The latter is natural for man (and for more perfect animals also), but the former might not be so: all depending on whether directed towards good or evil. This is the only reasonable criterion to discriminate between them. The discrimination is unavoidable, because we might, in a particular instance, act spontaneously (expressing anything), but in a long run, the expressing becomes habitual and *a decision to act* "spontaneously" *follows and precedes* a subsequent particular act.

Judgments are discriminative by their very nature (should be so), because the lack of toleration for errors is prerequisite of any human activity and indispensable for life. The refusal, on the other hand, to pass any judgment (to label it "hatful" out of its nature) is in accordance with openness for accepting all which *seems to be* new (even if containing exploded errors) and rejecting everything which hampers the notorious "freedom of expression." The "openness" might beget chaos detrimental to any form of life. The chaos itself, in turn, is easily susceptible of hate.

The judgment is right if conditional, but the opposite principle seems to define Kant's Reich der Zwecke.

It was implied that every judgment must be hurtful. Now some judgments are begotten of mercy. "Judge me, O Lord, according to my justice, and according to my innocence upon me" (Psalm 7:9). The Psalmist

> …describes the manner of judgment in the form of a prayer, since by praying he shows what will happen in the judgment, saying, ***judge me***. And first, he describes the repayment of good people; second, the punishment of evil ones: sinners shall be brought to naught.
>
> In judgment, two things are repaid, since good things will be given to the good and evil to the evil. Therefore, he who is good and free from evil will have an abundance of good things and a removal of evil things. *He who shall hear me . . . shall enjoy abundance, without fear of evils* (Prov 1:33). And so in regard to this first aspect, he says, ***judge me, O Lord, according to my justice***, which you have given to me, according to which I am just; and it is justice that

you should repay good things to me. *Blessed are those who hunger and thirst after justice: for they shall have their fill* (Matt 5:6).

In regard to the second aspect, he says, ***according to my innocence***, and it is justice that they should suffer no evil. *The innocent shall be saved, and he shall be saved by the cleanness of his hands* (Job 22:30).

And note that he asks for this judgment to be in accordance with justice. *Above, in the penitential psalm, he speaks that it should be in accordance with mercy, not remembering his own merit; but now, since, already justified, he has done some good things for which reward is owed, he asks to be judged according to justice*. His saying ***upon me*** expresses that the justice and innocence of man are not from man, but from God (Dominican Fathers).[84]

The toleration for evil is contemporarily combined with questioning the right for life of the innocent: the unborn, albeit science (human physiology) leaves no doubts as to the real beginning of the human life. The "toleration" for one's commodities of life is in fact proclamation of the death sentence for the innocent.

The humanity of the outstanding personalities is easily affirmable (for his/her richdom) and the mass media culture seems to feed upon the affirmation. The humanity of the innocent and, at the same time, bereft of political rights is extremely difficult to affirm, because they are not permitted to "express" anything at all. The unborn happen to be deprived of all rights in a civic society (Reich der Zwecke), as they are "outnumbered" (and not given the unique status of a "minority" for that matter also). The "union of various rational beings" is not "systematic" in that case at all, as their very presence in the phenomenal world does not strike the eyes with such clarity as is does in the case of those privileged ones.

Mathematicism harmonizes perfectly with Emotivism, which is visible in Blaise Pascal and the modern followers of Kant. The human Demiurge-mathematician experiments on the social tissue manipulating, at the same time, with those subject to that "experiment": people. The emotions are, accordingly, either evoked (and *ex*-pressed) or *re*-pressed: all depending on how needed for that demiurgic acting. The problem will be addressed in the following Section.

The problem of the definition of humanity (in qualitative terms) is essential and consists, in some respect, in telling between what is supposed to be and what is out of necessity. The seemingly abstract statements of metaphysics could be interpreted as the

[84] S. Thomas, Super Psalmo 7 n. 4.

Modus judicii ponitur n forma orationis, quia orando ostendit quid fiet in judicio, dicens, *judica me*. Et primo ponit bonorum retributionem. Secundo malorum punitionem, consumetur. In judicio duo retribuuntur: quia bonis bona, et malis mala. Qui ergo bonus est, et qui caret malis, habebit abundantiam bonorum, et sublationem malorum: Prov. 1: *qui me audierit, abundantia perfruetur, timore malorum sublato* et cetera. Et ideo quantum ad primum dicit, *judica me secundum justitiam meam*, scilicet quam dedisti mihi, secundum quod sum justus: et haec justitia est, ut mihi retribuantur bona: Matth. 5: *beati qui esuriunt et sitiunt justitiam, quoniam* et cetera. Quantum ad secundum dicit: *secundum innocentiam meam*: et haec justitia est ut nihil mali patiatur: Job 22: *salvabitur innocens: salvabitur autem in munditia manuum suarum*. Et nota, quod petit hoc judicium secundum justitiam. Supra dicit in poenitentiali Psalmo secundum misericordiam, nullum meritum commemorans: nunc autem quia jam justificatus fecerat aliqua bona, quibus debebatur praemium, petit judicari secundum justitiam. Quod ait, *super me*, designat quia justitia hominis et innocentia non sunt ab homine, sed a Deo.

simple: “it is good to exist”; “life is good in all its genuine form”. To the contrary, destroying the life; either physically or through the hate speech directed against the spiritual plenitude of life is always bad (is the privation of being). Tending to being is a necessary feature of the entire nature. The artificial, on the other hand, produced by men only pretends to be real. It might be rich and imposing. It might be intrinsically connected with the Reich der Zwecke, but is not “das Gottes Reich” for that reason.

There is, in Polish, an important difference between the freedom of speech and the freedom of the word (mentioned above). Words which are born naturally build the spiritual realm of life, whereas those pretending to be genuine (“expressions”) spawn mental agility only, and are all the more incidental and possibly nocuous, the more freely expressing barely-articulable emotions (destructive, in fact, of life). The agility, however, happens to be deemed a token of richdom.

Freedom of the word cannot be directed against anybody, whereas the hysterically expressed emotions are bound to harm people indiscriminately. Human words are originally (in the human hearts) cherished as the most precious and basic for the integral human development. They are infinitely more precious than anything which is countable. The species (in the human mind) are, according to Thomas, expressive of the inner (naturally begotten) word. The artificial expressions happen to be rich, because imposing, albeit sometimes without a good reason.

The problem of the extent (Reichweite) of “dimensions” and richness (Reichtum) of the human existence might be illustrated as follows. Definition of man proposed by Thomas reads: animal rationale (logon echōn in Aristotle). Now, should the aforementioned definition be rewritten in mathematical terms, the following equation will appear:

Man = animal + rationality.

Regrouping the elements of an equation is permitted in mathematics, because the science is purely formal. But the same regrouping in natural science is inadmissible and the effects are absurd. The “rational” is (must be as a specific difference) beyond the genus (animal), whereas numbers are included in each other. The qualitative difference cannot be reduced to the quantitative one, albeit the attempts to do that were often alluring.

The equation:

Man – rational = animal

seems to have some sense, but has, at best, a metaphorical one only, viz.: “a man bereft of rationality acts like a beast”. The sentiment is emotional (and understandable to some extent also), but far from being precise. If stating one’s bestiality, one expresses his/her mood, but (contrary to what Heidegger says about his Stimmung) it cannot found rationality. No one is definitely deprived of rationality and, consequently, of human dignity either.

Despite the excessive admiration for mathematics (which might have led him to Materialism after all), Plato assumed the coexistence of two worlds: the ideal one (with the mathematical at its bottom) and the material: possibly changeable (but with the mathematical at its border). In Phaedrus, he says decidedly that every human soul is immortal (245C), although the principles he adopted might have induced him to the contrary.

Avicenna does not seem to agree with that "soul is an immortal number". The term "every", if applied to human soul, does not have a definite meaning: we do not know (according to him) what would make for its personal immortality after the soul departs from the material body individualizing it. Averroes advances a step further. Man is an animal, but rationality "added" to his/her animality constitutes (if man approaches the Cosmic Intelligence) a certain entity called by the Latin Averroists (of the 13th century) intellecus adeptus, and by the modern ones: human consciousness. The addition makes for hominization. The transcending of the natural animality is accomplished by the addition (value added, as Marx and French Physiocrats have it). Man is thus "defined" by wealth (Reichtum) of artificial goods mainly. The "added value" (Mehrwert) is representative of the level of the consciousness of the Kantian mundus intelligibilis.

The mathematicism espoused by Plato is different to that of the (Arab) transcendentalists. Plato says that being is number, whereas Avicenna says that it is "superadded" to being. Above being, the aforementioned consciousness appears in human history. It is not individual, like e.g. stones of trees must be, but exists in some mysterious way of its own (nulla re indiget ad existendum: Husserl, Ideas I, §49; 92).

The shape and level of consciousness might be different so that values, which correspond to them (in that paradigm), might be ranked accordingly. The very ranking might be called, in turn, producing the added value.

The nature of the Cosmic Intelligence Avicenna speaks about was originally determined (if cosmology he adopted were able to do the job). But in Kant, Hegel, Comte and many others its nature remains undetermined. Both social progress and its outcome are hardly palpable entities. The consciousness is not a place, but at best, a direction; an eschatological ideal (Reich der Zwecke) humanity advances towards. People progress in producing added values i.e. material goods so, but they produce the ideas meant to regulate the progress also. They all form the wealth of a state (its richdom; Reichtum).

Normally, we are apprehensive of consuming healthy food, but are less (or not at all) concerned with the soundness of ideas proposed to the "free market of thinking". Perhaps, they all are supposed to improve indiscriminately human condition (which happens be believed even despite blatant evidence to the contrary). The values have this character in the civic society (they are constitutive thereof).

The real ones stem, to the contrary, from God via some authorized intermediaries appointed by God himself. They stem from God in a definite (natural) order.[85] If we were to

[85] Super Sent., lib. 4 d. 46 q. 2 a. 1 qc. 3 co. Ad tertiam quaestionem dicendum, quod omne opus divinum ex potentia, sapientia et bonitate procedit; sed tamen opus aliquod appropriatur potentiae, sapientiae vel bonitati, secundum quod in eo mirabilius apparet id quod pertinet ad aliquod praedictorum attributorum. Potentia autem importat absolutam rationem principii aliquid producentis; sed sapientiae est ordinare; unde ad sapientiam pertinet modus producendi rem, quo aliquid ordinate in esse producitur; sed bonitas, quae habet rationem finis, respicit motivum ad producendum: et ideo in opere creationis, in quo admirabile redditur hoc praecipue quod res in esse productae sunt, manifestatur maxime divina potentia; sed in opere gubernationis, quo res ordinatae disponuntur, redditur ipse ordo rerum admirabilis, et ideo sapientiae attribuitur; sed opus recreationis admirabile redditur ex ipso motivo, quia *non ex operibus justitiae quae fecimus, sed propter suam bonitatem salvos nos fecit*; unde attribuitur praecipue bonitati. Et quia ex hoc aliquid dicitur misericorditer esse factum quod non ex debito datur, sed ex bonitate largientis; ideo opus misericordiae, inquantum hujusmodi, bonitati appropriatur.

take away the order from the created cosmos, we would deprive it of what is the best in it.[86] But the "values" emanating from the Comic Giver of Form (resp. an Intelligence), or emerging from the bestial human past via comic evolution cannot have any definite order (save the order be called their juxtaposition). There is no order in the Cartesian world, because to investigate it "would smack if insolence" (Meditation IV, 55).

The produced by humans (despite pretending to be "intellectual") might be a toxin nonetheless. Films; "music"; advertisements and the like sold under the label of sound goods do not, apparently, belong to the genuine "spiritual heritage of Europe" for that reason at least they are less "European" than commonly assumed. They became "European" some (ca seven) centuries ago.

In a concrete situation, a *physical* source of valuing should be demonstrated, which is considerably more than "witnessed". Ultimately, the Supreme Source of the values is to be found in *the nature* of God; the Creator. Still, the unique status of the supreme was annexed first by a Cosmic Intelligence; next by the human consciousness with its Reach der Zwecke. The civilization, thus, was separated from the only real source of its vital activity.

In a concrete situation, it is me (not the humanity) which is possibly affected by some privation or at least by some life uncertainty (our being in potentiality is indissolubly connected therewith). I am created and, at the same time, *being* created in every moment (and situation) I chance to be,[87] which entails that the direction of acting in concerto for this (my) physical being must coincide with the direction of nature (its order) discovered in theoretical science. A human being might be affected by his/her temporality and locality also, but never defined (or improved) by them. The question: "Why should I act in a prescribed manner", may be always replied by the following: "It is the actual way departing from my potential being towards the plenitude of being; It is the way of what is by participation towards what is per se".

The world produced by humans, or by their productive imagination (its richdom) might be an obstacle to the plenitude of life, and is so very often. Some values (even those

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[86] Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 69 n. 17 Adhuc. Subtrahere ordinem rebus creatis est eis subtrahere id quod optimum habent: nam singula in seipsis sunt bona, simul autem omnia sunt optima, propter ordinem universi; semper enim totum est melius partibus et finis ipsarum. Si autem rebus subtrahantur actiones, subtrahitur ordo rerum ad invicem: rerum enim quae sunt diversae secundum suas naturas, non est colligatio in ordinis unitatem nisi per hoc quod quaedam agunt et quaedam patiuntur. Inconveniens igitur est dicere quod res non habeant proprias actiones.

[87] Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 37 q. 1 a. 1 c. […] dicit Gregorius, quod omnia in nihilum deciderent, nisi ea manus omnipotentis contineret. Unde oportet quod operatio ipsius, qua dat esse, non sit intercisa, sed continua; unde dicitur Joan. 5, 17: pater meus usque modo operatur, et ego operor.

Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 1 q. 1 a. 5 ad s.c. 2. Quaelibet autem res praeter Deum habet esse ab alio. Ergo oportet quod secundum naturam suam esset non ens, nisi a Deo esse haberet; sicut etiam dicit Gregorius quod omnia in nihilum deciderent, nisi ea manus omnipotentis contineret: et ita non esse quod ex se habet naturaliter, est prius quam esse quod ab alio habet, etsi non duratione; et per hunc modum conceduntur a philosophis res a Deo creatae et factae.

De potentia, q. 5 a. 1 c. […] quod divina operatione cessante, omnes res eodem momento in nihilum deciderent […]

acknowledged) prove to be in fact anti-values if related to the ultimate End of the human life. "Relating" in this case, is tantamount to giving real definitions.

It goes without saying that we chose amongst values, but it is not obvious, at first glance, why we do so. Election (eligere) Thomas speaks of is the conclusion of the syllogism of action. The principle of the syllogism is, in turn, states the possibility of partaking in the inner life (nature) of God. The principle is distinctly given in metaphysics, or at least dimly perceived (by laymen) as the Universal Providence of the world (Contra Gent., III, c. 38). Practically, however, we resort to some readymade definitions of virtue or of faith (the principles) in the form of the Compendium of Creeds, Definitions and Declarations of the Catholic Church. They are relatively simple schemes of conduct, although adopting them to a particular situation might pose a certain difficulty after all.

The "dogmatism" of the definitions was attacked by the Kantian "reform". The question: "why", as to the value of a deed is forbidden by the very form of the categorical imperative. Zwecke (objectives) should be immanent to human existence and, consequently, independent of any cause (especially the Supreme One). Aristotle says: "the universal is precious because it shows the cause"; whereas Kant seems to say: "the universal is precious because it is universal and separated from the individual and the natural". Kant's Zweck is literally translatable into Greek as telos, but the meanings differ. Kant's Zweck precludes (instead of opening) the way to the Transcendence.

Aristotle, Augustine and Thomas all agree that the ultimate reason for undertaking any action is desire for happiness. Happiness is, however, not to be understood childish as satisfaction, but as the plenitude of life. All which leads to the Plenitude might be called a value. The values, however, do not exist in the way e.g. points coexist in a line, but are hierarchically ordered. The order, if discovered, is the same as the definition.

6. The eternal truths before the eyes of the Demiurge

People normally believe in that there is "Something" excellent beyond the visible world, and to be acknowledged as such, but the conviction happens to be undermined in the artificial human world; the character of its object "sublimated" in the moment imagination replaces the intellect. The invisible must be called God in religion and the Supreme Being in the classical intellectual philosophy, but not in the "modern" one.

"Sublimation" means inclusivity, but ascribing a property of God the Creator to any of his creatures is an "impropriety": an act of idolatry. There are many "miracles" in the post-Cartesian society, but they are all produced by humans. "Miracles of science" are paramount amongst them.

People living in extremely harsh life conditions are not likely to commit such impropriety, as they think about God so little that their thoughts are not likely to blunder into the cul-de-sacs of the modern humanism. On the other hand, in a world with a safe abode of life ("created" by man), a place for such like "creative thinking" can appear really. The human mind is, in a civilized society, free to thing about the (really or supposedly) important. It can discover the Supreme Truth, but it can distort it also. In the world created by man, the unique term of creation devaluates and the conviction that "there is something beyond" also.

Since Plato, philosophers have been preoccupied with the problem of the eternal truths (the most important ones). Still, if eternity is the exclusive property of God's entity, the very plural (the truths) seemed to be not befitting God. Augustine, to be sure, uses the plural, but Thomas (interpreting him) says that the eternal truths are identical with the one and indivisible nature of God. Augustine both followed and corrected Platonists,[88] and the correction, in this case, consisted in that Logos (containing the eternal truths) is an effective (and not only formal) principle of human cognition. There are manifold truths in the human world, but One Word of God only containing them eminently. The exemplary ideas (of e.g. justice and mercy) must be identical with God's essence, whereas the "eternal" Plato speaks of: numbers, quantities, etc., apparently cannot be identified therewith.

Plato thought that the eternal is, first of all, the mathematical. He credited mathematics with such esteem that tried to apply its method in philosophy also. In Metaphysics (bk. II, Ch. 3) the approach is described as "psychologically" justified (something we know thoroughly, we appreciate, as a rule, very much), although otherwise deemed vituperable. "Species are *quasi* numbers" (according to Aristotelians) which is to say: "they *are not* numbers *properly* speaking, but figuratively only". Plato, however, understood it literally. There is, allegedly, a number of being and its species definable thereby. The elements in the Mendeleev Table are ordered according to the number of protons in their nuclei, and the number of molecules can (supposedly) "define" every being (the living one included). Still, Plato speaks of ten ideal numbers only, and he, most probably, would have rejected the "interpretation" of his doctrine in the spirit of scientism. Be that as it may, he speaks of *natural* numbers only, whereas the Neo-Platonist (of old and of new) speak about the *infinite* series of real numbers. In them, any new value number might readily appear.

Defining is of pivotal importance for grasping the unchangeable and the most important beyond the actual scope of human life. But the method of defining Plato adopted, for all its boldness, is of no use there.[89] Mathematics might use this method properly, but determining the extension of a thing is by no means tantamount to defining its essence properly. Especially, man cannot be defined by the place and time he occupies in the allegedly expanding universe.

Defining, however, was not sought by Plato for its own sake. In his Politeia (Republic), he declares that the cognizance of ideas is but a stepping stone on the way to the cognizance of the Good Itself, which is above essence (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας); (above the

[88] Summa Theologiae I, q. 84 a. 5 c. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in II de Doctr. Christ., *philosophi qui vocantur, si qua forte vera et fidei nostrae accommoda dixerunt, ab eis tanquam ab iniustis possessoribus in usum nostrum vindicanda sunt. Habent enim doctrinae gentilium quaedam simulata et superstitiosa figmenta, quae unusquisque nostrum de societate gentilium exiens, debet evitare*. Et ideo Augustinus, qui doctrinis Platonicorum imbutus fuerat, si qua invenit fidei accommoda in eorum dictis, assumpsit; quae vero invenit fidei nostrae adversa, in melius commutavit. Posuit autem […] formas rerum per se subsistere a materia separatas, quas ideas vocabat, per quarum participationem dicebat intellectum nostrum omnia cognoscere […] Augustinus[…] posuit loco harum idearum quas Plato ponebat, rationes omnium creaturarum in mente divina existere, secundum quas omnia formantur, et secundum quas etiam anima humana omnia cognoscit.

[89] Aristotle, Post. Analytics, II, c. 5; First Analytics I, c. 31.

definable).[90] Contrary to what some modern interpreters say, Aristotle does not attack the Idea of the Supreme Good, but rather fills it up with its natural content (calls The Good consequently God). Perhaps his interpretation is not very much to the taste of modern interpreters, but the multitude (and variety) of interpretations (which contradict each other) testifies to that they might have distorted the old Platonism also. There were, amongst the interpreters, declared atheists too.

According to Plato, God is separated (χωριστός) from the entire world. The very term choridzein was adopted by Aristotle, but given a more precise meaning (the same was the case with the ancient arché and telos). Normally, we separate (χωρίζομεν) materials, or at least something imaginable (in mathematics). In metaphysics however, it is about abandoning the imaginable. Arché and telos signified originally "beginning" and "end", but the further we depart from the palpable and the more "abstract" the idea we use might seem, the more precise it is. God is "separated" without *being* separated (and without any operation on the idea expressive of His being), analogically as He is perfect with being perfected: "perfectum" stems from "perficere": to complete, accomplish; per- (thoroughly) and facere (to make).

God is (according to Aristotle) transcendent. He is a transcendent *substance* though, which is to say: his entity *is not above* substance after all (as Plato's term ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας implied). In other words and contrary to what Neo-Platonists openly say, God has a nature and His properties are contained in it. We name them departing from the definable perfections of the created things, albeit the very essence of God is itself undefinable.

He conclusions philosophy and theology arrive at are firm and certain, and correspond to the eternal truths of God. They are contained in the Handbook of Creeds and Definitions (Enchiridion symbolorum, definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum) of the Catholic Church.

The both sciences must be bold enough to come to nontrivial conclusions, but at the same time, modest enough and obedient to the judgments passed according to these infallible principles. The very essence of the so called negative theology (practiced by Thomas) consists

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[90] 508 B 9 Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ ὁ ἥλιος ὄψις μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, αἴτιος δ' ὢν αὐτῆς ὁρᾶται ὑπ' αὐτῆς ταύτης;

Οὕτως, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Τοῦτον τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φάναι με λέγειν τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔκγονον, ὃν τἀγαθὸν ἐγέννησεν ἀνάλογον ἑαυτῷ, ὅτιπερ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τόπῳ πρός τε νοῦν καὶ τὰ νοούμενα, τοῦτο τοῦτον ἐν τῷ ὁρατῷ πρός τε ὄψιν καὶ τὰ ὁρώμενα.

508 E 1 Τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχον τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γιγνώσκοντι τὴν δύναμιν ἀποδιδὸν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν φάθι εἶναι· αἰτίαν δ' ἐπιστήμης οὖσαν καὶ ἀληθείας,

509 B 6 Καὶ τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις τοίνυν μὴ μόνον τὸ γιγνώσκεσθαι φάναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπ' ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔτι **ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας** πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος.

Καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων μάλα γελοίως, Ἄπολλον, ἔφη, δαιμονίας ὑπερβολῆς.

in telling between the Creator and the created; between what is proper to God only, but appropriated analogically to creatures.

The way to God must be the way which *leads only* to God. Nothing which is a means only can become the end. Humanity (Kant speaks of) is apparently a means; not an end. None of the properties of God: His almightiness; omniscience; creativity; eternity can be ascribed to man (to humanity), which must be underscored, because the very essence of modernity (in theology too) seems to consist in "humanizing" the divine (in blurring the distinctions). For instance, man cannot do good out of nothing (the exclusive prerogative of God). He can preserve and multiply the created only. Ascribing the creativity to man, in that case, is an act of idolatry.

In Plato's Timaeus, Demiurge "creates" observing the eternal truths. Still, it is us-humans who normally observe objects set before our eyes or imagination (and reproduce the observed). The historians of philosophy justly say that the eternal, in Timaeus, is not identical with the essence of the "creating" Demiurge (human thoughts must not be identical with human nature, because they *change therein*). For all his ingenuity, Plato's mind fell prey to Anthropomorphism. It is man the artisan only who acts so: contemplating a paradigm and molding a matter thereafter. God creates out of nothing and has no exemplar in doing so besides his own intellect.

According to Thomas, the comparison used by Plato is generally acceptable, but to be corrected nonetheless. We cannot ascribe to God the properties of an ordinary artisan; analogy must be use and the imperfect of the creature removed from the notion of the Creator.

The modern philosophy is a specific (rationalistic) interpretation of that Platonic idea of creativity. The Demiurge of modernity is (contrary to the original Platonism) man the sophist creative of truth and good as well as disrespectful of the transcendent. The first principle (in Plato's Republic) is a firm point or reference and its *original* creativity is *opposed* decidedly to sophistry. The way Plato, however, opposed the sophistry allowed assuming it a more refined form. The "eternal mathematical truths" cannot be unconditionally immanent to God's essence, but might be immanent to the human ideal world. The images sophists produce before human eyes are obviously immanent to their artificial world, and mathematics gave the hand to producing them.

In Kant, the idea of producing is "modernized" in this vein. The transcendental unity of apperception is the principle (the point or reference) instead of God. Man "creates" the "human reality" observing what he has supposed to be eternal. Since Galileo, the eternal has been identified with the mathematical. Man was allegedly given a key of wisdom so as to rule over nature demiurgically.

According to Hegel, man (his consciousness), at the end of his history, will be the absolute master of nature. The idea was furthered by Marx and applied in the Communist States. In consequence, come unique treasures of nature were irretrievably lost and destroyed. Nature used to be "subjugated" and the above-mentioned principatus despoticus adopted to the detriment of both man and nature. Still, a more serious problem has newly arisen with respect to the *human* nature. Manifold attempts are being made "to improve" it notwithstanding apparent harm done to the innocent victims of those "experiments".

The essence of the Totalitarian Communism (the Demiurge of the modernity) and the Totalitarianism as such (in the Nazi Germany also) consists in the promise (addressed to the

common man) to obtain (or at least to partake of) absolute power over nature, combined with the claim that he/she is unable to command his/her own body and to be pardoned for not trying to. Human bodily nature has been separated thus from the rest of the natural world (aiming at natural perfection, but never at pleasure as such). Traditionally (in Aristotle) man was deemed to have a *politic* power over his/her sensuality and body, which is tantamount to that he/she should try to labor over this/her moral improvement. In Marxism, the improvement was deemed unnecessary, and the avant-garde of the Communist rulers were far from moral perfection (the same was the case in the Nazi Germany), and the vast masses invited to partake in both despotic power over "crude" nature and the witch-hunt against "enemies" (combined with the moral permissivism). Instead of undertaking a laborious way of personal improvement, a despotic power over the weak and handicapped was given to the avant-garde and rationed by them to the masses intoxicated with the contagious ideology.

Neo-Marxism has developed that idea of "creativity", but "improved" it also. The minorities (their human bodily nature) are not to be defended from oppression only, but *created* and the oppression *provoked* so as to render the existence of the defending avant-garde necessary. No *politic* power over the *personal* existence was needed, because the modern "virtues" of Neo-Marxism consisted in yielding to the basest impulses to be found in one's character. Still, if they *are not actually* found, the "handicapped-to-be" are to be helped and "educated" to find them nonetheless. They could be invented or "created".

According to Aristotle, man has as much right to rule over the others as he/she has first gained over his/her sensual nature. Seneca says: summum imperium sibi imperare. It is extremely difficult to command his/her own life, but it is the only acceptable way to command the others: to try and to contribute to the common weal in politics. Some are not willing to take on the labor.

Emotional motivations might, to be sure, vary considerably in the actual advocates of "progress" (be hardly guessable too), but the intention philosophy speaks of is that of the natural; not about, those "motivations". It is about *the intention of the actions*; not about the intention of *those acting*. One can be excusable of malice, but complicit in evil nonetheless. The most sublime emotions cannot absolve from responsibility for the culpable ignorance. The normal course of natural acting must be anticipated.

In the natural order, the politic power over the material and the sensual (in a man and those naturally nigh to him/her) is legitimized by one's rationality. In the "modern order" a despotic power of the avant-garde over the "matter" of humanity modelled at whim is, in fact, uncheckable. By the force of the politic power, the intentions of these who work for a society (ruling it) and those willing to partake (by obedience and execution) harmonize. To the contrary, for all savages (of old and now), work is a misery and power (is believed to be) matched with oppression. For the civilized men, both labor and power is part of true happiness (a foretaste of it). Happiness consists (according to Aristotle) in (the intellectual) activity.

Aristotle says that laws are meant to make people morally better, which sounds helplessly anachronist, as the oppressive idea of state devised by Hobbes, Kant and Hegel dominates. People should be compelled rather to act honestly, because nothing good is to be expected of their nature. The best, allegedly, way to control a political power is to restrict institutionally its extent.

Mathematics was called in modernity a key of wisdom. Philosophy was tried to be fashioned after the exemplar. Although Aristotle says that three "philosophies" exist and mathematical one amongst them,[91] he never confuses their methods. Applying one and universal method in all sciences is, according to Thomas, a serious error,[92] characteristic of ideology, not of science. It is impossible to describe human existence in terms of quantity. Nay, it is even impossible to write a book on mathematics without using a conceptual language (some theorists of science agree). The formal abstraction carried out by a mathematician is in fact always preceded by what Thomas calls abstractio totius (abstraction of the essential content of a thing), which leads to a definition. Commanding nature is impossible without first determining what the nature is. Blurring the distinctions is not characteristic of science, but of ideology.

Using the mathematical method in metaphysics is impossible. Kant proved that metaphysics is impossible after adopting (what he deemed to be) mathematical method, which amounts to the same Thomas says. The proper method of metaphysics is, according to Thomas, separation (with the perspective of the cognizance of the separate substance in the end), not "visualization" Kant proposed. The supreme science is architectonic, which might be taken literally, as it fosters the development of others (raises the edifice of science). The Kantian Critique, to the contrary, is destructive of science, although Kant himself says (in his Prolegomena) that it should be destructive of the supreme one (metaphysics) only. Metaphysics governs the subordinate sciences with a politic power (i.e. one respecting the sovereignty of the subject), whereas the dominion of the Kantian Critique is despotic.

Descartes had the problem with defining human nature, and nothing else was to be expected after adopting the idea of extension to be universal. Should the definition be: animal rationale, both "animal" and "rational" will have to be definable as so forth ad infinitum. Descartes entitled his main work "Mediations on the First Philosophy", but it was considerably less than the first philosophy (πρώτη φιλοσοφία) of Aristotle. In the latter, definitions are peremptory, because the first principles have been used and no regressus ad infinitum looms. Each science has its specifically different "degree of entity", which, however, might be called "a number of being" metaphorically only. The species have some perfections,[93] but not new "dimensions of existence" for that reason. Species (the forms of

[91] Metaph., VI, c. 1, 1026a 18-19.

[92] Super De Trinitate, pars 3 q. 6 a. 2 c. 4. Et ideo in divinis neque ad imaginationem neque ad sensum debemus deduci, in mathematicis autem ad imaginationem et non ad sensum, in naturalibus autem etiam ad sensum. Et propter hoc peccant qui uniformiter in his tribus speculativae partibus procedere nituntur.

[93] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 52 a. 1 c. Ut igitur huius rei veritas manifestetur, considerandum est quod illud secundum quod sortitur aliquid speciem, oportet esse fixum et stans, et quasi indivisibile, quaecumque enim ad illud attingunt, sub specie continentur; quaecumque autem recedunt ab illo, vel in plus vel in minus, pertinent ad aliam speciem, vel perfectiorem vel imperfectiorem. Unde philosophus dicit, in VIII Metaphys. quod species rerum sunt sicut numeri, in quibus additio vel diminutio variat speciem. Si igitur aliqua forma, vel quaecumque res, secundum seipsam vel secundum aliquid sui, sortiatur rationem speciei; necesse est quod, secundum se considerata, habeat determinatam rationem, quae neque in plus excedere, neque in minus deficere possit.

In De generatione, lib. 1 l. 8 n. 5. Omnes enim formae substantiales differunt secundum magis et minus perfectum: unde in VIII Metaphys. dicitur quod species rerum sunt sicut numeri, quorum species variantur

being) must be discrete, as the first principle (the non-contradiction principle) is definitive of the diversity of being (hoc ens non est illud; this being is different from that one). The species existing in nature partake thus (as Aristotle has it) of eternity, but those in the human intellect too.

The "grievous error" (as Thomas puts it) of extrapolating the method of mathematics became a capital virtue of modernity. The Cartesian mathesis universalis is a uniform method to be adopted in all sciences. Amongst them, philosophy might be "the first", albeit in Kant "the first" is not ascribed to being (and to philosophy in the traditional sense), but to the cognizance (and to his Critique). Subsequent stages of the "reform" and "progress" are marked by the emancipation of the domains deemed before proper of philosophy. The specialization might be a token of progress indeed, but without – so to say – a counter-specialization (a "synthesis") parallel to it and gathering the previously dispersed, it must be detrimental to any science.

At the turn of the 20th century, the problem of the "openness" and "reform" was not so striking as it has seemed 100 years later: in the epoch labeled the end of philosophy by those who claimed to be philosophers themselves. By the end of the 19th century, Edmund Husserl began his philosophical pathway of life from mathematics. His first philosophical work was written in the spirit of Psychologism (the mathematical truths were deemed empirical). Still, the philosophy he was about to become famous of began in the moment he assumed the a priori character of the mathematical truths. The question: what was first: man or mathematics was answered by him and J. St. Mill differently: the mathematical truths have not been evolving along the evolution of Homo sapiens. Nevertheless, they might, in the years of the phenomenological development, "evolve" (in a sense) along with the progress of the phenomenology of human subjectivity.

Husserl originally objects to the advocates of scientism that they "disqualified genuine truths" which might have been obtained from the intuition similar to that supposedly applied in mathematics. They were, in the years to come, called values. They were, thus, juxtaposed before the eyes of man the experimenter (partaking of the human subjectivity) in the way ordinary measurable values were. That was the stance of the "first phenomenology". Scheler, Ingarden, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Reinach and the majority of phenomenologists make do with the eidetic reduction; the "intuition" of values, but Husserl himself advanced a step further.

Plato assumed that the first principle is above everything and the eternity must belong to it (to God) eminently.[94] He does not speak of the supreme value, because he does not speak of *any* values in the way phenomenologists do. Husserl would react nervously to comparing his philosophy with the "naivety" of the ancient thinker. The comparison is unjust, no doubt. Values Plato himself speaks of are real and eternal (immovable), contrary to those modern (Husserlian) ones. Moreover, the "supreme" (the superlative), in term of ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας *might* even preclude the possibility of comparison.

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secundum additionem et subtractionem. Potest etiam dubitari de hoc quod dicit, quod cuius differentiae magis significant hoc aliquid, magis est substantia: cum tamen dicatur in praedicamentis quod substantia non suscipit magis et minus.

[94] Super De causis, l. 4 39.

Neo-Platonist, however, imagined the principle to be at the top of the universe (which was an interpretation of Plato's Republic indeed). A more important, nonetheless, (as Krąpiec has it) shift of meaning of the ideal and eternal occurred in Descartes. The ideas ceased to be real. Those who followed suit assumed that without existing in the human mind, ideas do not (possibly) exist at all. No one, however, has been so consequential in drawing the ultimate conclusions form the fact of their "subjectivity" as Husserl, perhaps because the subjectivity was *originally* in him deprived of its vulgar meaning and the "truths" it faced were "eternal" in a sense. "Phenomenology is, so to speak, a secret nostalgia of all modern philosophy"[95] (of Descartes, Locke, Hume and Kant). The so called phenomenological reduction was demanded so as to legitimize the eidetic one, for Kant, who was relatively the closest to the ideal, "misinterpreted the realm of Phenomenology",[96] after all.

Undoubtedly, the mathematical truths can and must be grasped comprehensively. None of them is understood really if not comprehended (known fully; not partially). The all-or-nothing rule observes there. In the common day life, however, the principle does not work, because we *get to know* something departing from some vague notion of a thing to be known in the end, and improve our understanding successively. Ethics is, in this respect, dissimilar to mathematics also, as Aristotle observes.[97] In the first Chapter of his Physics, Aristotle says that the "most general" and, at the same time, undetermined pre-knowledge precedes the prefect one: expressed in definitions. The principle (this beginning) is not formal, but effective of the perfect guise of knowledge. The knowledge is perfected in the similar way a new being is generated in nature by its cause.

Husserl seems to imply that his perfect phenomenology was preceded by the imperfect one. The way towards the fullness of comprehension departs, according to modernity, from the indefinite: it emerges from a mythical abyss of unconsciousness. Husserl followed in fact Schelling there, whom he otherwise despised. In Aristotle, *the principle is the form* abstracted from the sensual (species intelligibilis of scholastics). It is called also by Thomas intentio intelligiblis ("an intention to be known"). The "intentio intellecta" ("an intention already known"), on the other hand, is *the same* intention of the transcendent nature already captured by the human intellect. We can "comprehend" things by grasping the intention of nature (and of its Creator ultimately also). Some attempts have been made to reconciled Thomas' notion on intentionality with the modern one (the terminology seemed, apparently, encouraging), but they must have been miscarried as the principles are different. Intentionality is a modus of *nature*; not of "consciousness".

The mathematical truths, for the very reason they are comprehended, seemed to Husserl *immanent* to the human "consciousness". Husserl's phenomenological reduction is both consequential and extreme consequence drawn from the Cartesian reform. Philosophical Immanentism appears: the conviction that all truths must be immanent to the human mind (called consciousness), whereas the existence of what lies beyond is, at best, of no account.

The mathematical truths might *appear to be* eternal, but mathematics itself does not need to be eternal for that reason. Without a palpable matter the extension of the matter

[95] Ideas I, § 62.

[96] Ibid.

[97] Nicom. Ethics, I, c. 6.

cannot exist at all. Physicists say that if the Fine-Structure Constant (α), had been different to that presently known (~1/137.036), the world would have appeared before our eyes "quite differently". There is no reason to assume that the Husserl's "life world" would not be affected by the change.

Moreover, there is no reason to doubt that a matter could exist totally dissimilar to that known by us nowadays. The mathematical truths, in this imaginable world, would have been unchangeable, but the reason and substrate of their unchangeableness would be different. They could have been perpetual (and *conditionally* unchangeable), but never coeternal to God. It is indubitable only that in every possible world the plurality of substrates would make for the series of *natural numbers*. The principles of Euclid geometry seem to be unchangeable, because applicable to the material world we see. But the non-contradiction principle would *apply to all possible worlds*.

The idea of the first phenomenology claims that the mathematical truths are immovable, which might be true, but the contention than they are coeternal to God is untenable. Still, the contention that they are coeternal to the first principle identifiable with the transcendental Ego is proper to the second phenomenology.

In his Ideas I, Husserl elaborates on boosting the "intuition" of the eternal truths. Two notions: "setzen" and "stiften" are descriptive of the mode they are grasped by man. The latter is more idealistic, but they both are interpretative of the ancient myth of Demiurge. Plato's Demiurge calls to existence, and it might be supposed that the ideal comes to existence in the mind of a modern idealist too. His mind would be, then, obviously "creative" of the actual shape they assume. But this creativity (its unhampered progress) demands excluding the traditional "naive" idea of creativity (proper to Platonists of old). The phenomenological reduction consists in – so to say – calling the Principle into nonexistence.

Traditional metaphysics is concerned with "everything which exists in any way whatsoever" (Summa, I, 44, 2, c): beyond the human mind. Now Husserl demands, for the sake of the consequent idealism, bracketing the existence of everything. Plato aimed at the cognizance of God; the self-subsisting Good was the supreme goal of philosophical inquiry. Husserl demands the opposite, in a sense. He demands suspending the conviction as to the existence of everything, God's existence included; or perhaps first of all the existence of the transcendent God the Creator. Possibly, some modern "idea of God" will be granted a (modest) place in that consciousness only.

> The Transcendency, God, Excluded.
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> After the natural world is abandoned, we encounter yet another transcendency which is not given, like the pure Ego, immediately in union with reduced consciousness but becomes cognized in a highly mediated fashion, a transcendency standing, as it were, in polar contrast to the transcendency pertaining to the world. We mean the transcendency pertaining to God.
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> *… the transition to pure consciousness by the method of transcendental reduction leads necessarily to the question about the ground for the now-emerging factualness of the corresponding constitutive consciousness. Not the fact as such, but the fact as source of endlessly increasing value-possibilities and value-actualities forces* the question into one about the "ground" — *which naturally does not have the sense of a physical-causal reason.* We pass over whatever else, from the point of view of religious consciousness, is able, as a

rationally grounding motive, to lead to the same principle. What concerns us here, after merely indicating different groups of such rational grounds for believing in the existence *of an extra-worldly "divine" being is that this being would obviously transcend not merely the world but "absolute" consciousness. It would therefore be an " absolute" in the sense totally different from that in which consciousness is an absolute, just as it would be something transcendent in a sense totally different from that in which the world is something transcendent. Naturally we extend the phenomenological reduction to include this "absolute" and " transcendent" being. It shall remain excluded from the new field of research which is to be provided, since this sh all be a field of pure consciousness.*[98]

After the phenomenological reduction has been accomplished, the existence of eternity independent of human temporality wanes. In the "tame reality" created by phenomenology, there is no place for the transcendent God. The human Ego must replace it. The place might be allotted to the Supreme Value, viz. *the idea* of God, but that place exists *in* the human world really; it is immanent to it (is not beyond it). God, according to Thomas, is creative of all possible places and thus exists outside them all. Even if a place were to be called "Supreme", it would be nonetheless (as any superlative must be), relative to the other ones, and, first of all, to the human reality possibly creative of all "places".

God was *tried to be* deprived of the real power He exercises over the physical world, and replaced by the transcendental Ego. The latter is (in Husserl) the only indubitable reality[99]. Still, despite all who do not acknowledge the fact, God *does possess* the power, and no "human creativity" can impair it.

Eternity was ascribed to "mathematical essences" first, but to the Supreme Nature secondarily only. In consequence, the sense of the "supreme" and "supremacy" (previously free of spatial connotations) changed also as well as the notion of rational being cognitive of the non-visible. Although we are no able to draw any positive knowledge from the cognizance of the First Principle directly, the most appalling errors would issue if the possibility of getting to know the Supreme *Being* were precluded.

The supreme in dimension is by no means identical (even in the common day life) with the best. Apparently, the temperature of – say – 90 degrees Celsius is by no means better than that of 20 degrees. In fact, the higher is then destructive of the human life. In it (as Aristotle says) the proper measure is not necessarily the supreme one. It is proper to man to have two hands, two legs, but one heart and on liver only (and so on) *so as to serve to one general intention of life*. Should the dimensions of his existence extend "further" it could not be perfect.[100]

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[98] Epoché: Ideen I, §58.

[99] The phenomenological Reductions < 109> §57. The Question of the Exclusion of the Pure Ego [Ich].

[100] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 52 a. 1 c. Ut igitur huius rei veritas manifestetur, considerandum est quod illud secundum quod sortitur aliquid speciem, oportet esse fixum et stans, et quasi indivisibile, quaecumque enim ad illud attingunt, sub specie continentur; quaecumque autem recedunt ab illo, vel in plus vel in minus, pertinent ad aliam speciem, vel perfectiorem vel imperfectiorem. Unde philosophus dicit, in VIII Metaphys. quod
species rerum sunt sicut numeri, in quibus additio vel diminutio variat speciem. Si igitur aliqua forma, vel quaecumque res, secundum seipsam vel secundum aliquid sui, sortiatur rationem speciei; necesse est quod,

Conversely, God could be not "more perfect", if any "idea of God" included anthropomorphism. God could be not better because accomplishing impossible actions (some non-discriminative of good and evil; of truth and falsehood). Something proper to man (e.g. emotions) could not exist in God at all. The anthropomorphization of the eternal must lead to absurdities. (The separate problem is that the border between the possible and the impossible is *subjectively* difficult to grasp fully for us humans). Thomas says:

> … to ascribe to creatures things that are proper to God, seems to amount to the same as affirming something unfitting of Him, since whatever is proper to God is God Himself: and to ascribe to a creature, that which is proper to God, is to assert that God is the same as a creature. [101]

> Now man cannot consider these [future] effects in themselves except when they are present, as when he sees Socrates running or walking: the consideration of such things in themselves before they occur is proper to God, Who alone in His eternity sees the future as though it were present … Hence it is written (Isa 41:23): *Show the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods.* Therefore if anyone presume to foreknow or foretell such like future things by any means whatever, except by divine revelation, he manifestly usurps what belongs to God. [102]

The whole virtue of man consists in the wholehearted subsection to God. The natural consequence is that the lower in man is subjected to the superior in him. The temporal is subjected to the eternal. The natural consequence of the mutiny against the transcendent God is the inner inquietude and the brutal dominion of the basest impulses possibly to be found in the "human" world and interiorized therefrom.

7. Theory of evolution

If man had been a product of the evolution, everything produced by him (and written too) should have undergone the same evolution. This applies, then, to Darwin and his book On the Origin of Species also. Darwinism might be well materialism, but apart from its content, a

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secundum se considerata, habeat determinatam rationem, quae neque in plus excedere, neque in minus deficere possit.

[101] Quod autem ea quae sunt Dei propria creaturis attribuantur, ad hoc pertinere videtur quod aliquid ei attribuatur quod ei non conveniat. Quidquid enim est Deo proprium est ipse Deus, attribuere ergo id quod Dei proprium est alicui creaturae est ipsum Deum dicere idem creaturae. (Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 13 a. 1 ad 3.)

[102] Homines autem in seipsis huiusmodi effectus considerare possunt solum dum sunt praesentes, sicut cum homo videt Socratem currere vel ambulare. Sed *considerare huiusmodi in seipsis antequam fiant, est Dei proprium*, qui solus in sua aeternitate videt ea quae futura sunt quasi praesentia, ut in primo habitum est, unde dicitur Isaiae XLI, *annuntiate quae futura sunt in futurum, et sciemus quoniam dii estis vos*. Si quis ergo huiusmodi futura praenoscere aut praenuntiare quocumque modo praesumpserit, nisi Deo revelante, manifeste usurpat sibi quod Dei est. (Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 95 a. 1 c.)

question might be raised, how the evolution became – so to say – aware of itself speaking through Darwin's mouth in 1859.

The answer for the question might seem superfluous from the point of view of science treated pragmatically only. "No matter how odd, theories are acceptable as far as they improve our wellbeing". The problem is, however, that some *eventually* fail to improve human well-being. The science itself is a problem; its progress is not necessary; if it appeared at a certain level of (the alleged) evolution, it could cease to exist also. An answer was given in 1794, when Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre was published. It was furthered in 1800, when Schelling brought out his System of the Transcendental Idealism. Sixty years before the theory of evolution appeared (in the form of the book), a theoretical framework for its existence was raised.

Schelling was extremely popular after Hegel's death (1831) and his System of the Transcendental Idealism was an alternative version of the Objective Idealism (attractive for those estranged by Hegel's style of thinking). Although it preceded in time Hegel's Phenomenology (1807), it endured after its collapse. Not only does it anticipate the idea of evolution, but expresses it pointblank.

The fact would have been non-understandable if the Theory had been wholly empirical, because the System was (dully) deemed totally unempirical. But evolutionism could have never appeared *in history* without the System. Moreover, the popularity of "naturalism" in Europe nowadays, after the bankruptcy of Diamat, would be (without the System) non-understandable too. In Neo-Marxism, Freudism and Evolutionism melt together actually, because they have been both anticipated in the System. A new, naturalist and globalist version of transcendentalism replaced the older one.

Schelling answered the question of (the genesis of) self-consciousness in relatively plain words, and provided the principles of "deduction" of every possible form of science from these principles. Justice is to be done to the System, although the Objective Idealism was deemed an embarrassing bequest of the modern philosophy.

Schelling's principles are theoretical and practical at the same time. The absolute freedom manifests itself in the two aspects, and it might be supposed to be a hidden force of the evolution. Still, the absolute principle is in fact one and unique only: the absolute identification of the Ego with itself. Secondarily only, does it undergo objectification in: (1) the scientific concepts; (2) moral notions (possibly deducible therefrom). Thus, we can deduce the manifold from the unique; and in particular: the Theory (of Darwin) from the System (of Schelling). It might seem that we can deduce any "theory" whatsoever from the principles capacious enough for any "groundbreaking" ideas. But on the other hand, it does not seem possible to reconcile the System with any guise of unbiased experience.

We experience the harmony of the world we see, but we do not see in it "competition" and Thomas Hobbes's "war of all against all". Such a "strife for survival" is characteristic for the human *degenerated* society only. Nor do we see that trials (challenges and strife) in nature outnumber the accommodation. E.g. a bird builds its nest always the same way, without attempting "new possibilities". Its instinct performs uniform actions only, but if the actions fail to succeed, they will be not improved, but the bird's species will perish as a whole, without any attempt to adapt to the environment. The environment *might be only damaged by humans*. Humans only do "change" the environment so, whereas animals simply

cannot brook the change. It might be supposed only (not proved) that the status quo we see is an outcome of the strife for survival, a "compromise" amongst competing beings. But in fact, the strife *for being* we see is an organic part of the harmony. The world we see is the closed ecosystem in which every species has its proper place. The place is *given*; not fought out.

The human society should be built on the similar natural principles, but richer too, as far as human nature is more perfect: *rational*. However, a deplorable fact has been observed since the beginnings of the philosophical reflection (in Bias, Heraclitus, Aristotle, Augustine) that the prevalent majority of humans act irrationally i.e. contrary to their rational nature. In many societies, envy, rivalry and elimination of those deemed (for some reasons) inferior prevails over solidarity.

Capitalism is, in this respect, more humanitarian than progressive ideologies. In nature, a weak individual perishes, and, if ill, desires its death, because the prolonged agony (and sickness) is unbearable (prolonging it is cruel). In the capitalist society, the weak perish too, although the reason for assessing some as misfits seems to be fragile. In fact, all reasons apart from those *purely intellectual* must be frail. It is natural that an individual acting against his/her *rational nature* and (more importantly) against what completes his/her nature from the part of The Nature superior to it, must perish, because cut off the Source of its vital energy. The Non-Created Nature is supernatural for man, but is a determinate nature nonetheless and completive of its natural desire. However, in the Communist society, whole groups are eliminated and the reasons for the elimination are insane. Moreover, in the *Modern* Socialist states, handicapped groups are being created ("educated" or "given choice" to be handicapped), and the weakness promoted and pampered, which is morbid (cruel) indeed as it leads to spiritual degradation. Some groups are being isolated and social envy provoked against them. The Sword of Damocles hangs over their heads and the "generous defendants of minorities" claim to be indispensable for not falling it on their necks. The agony is being prolonged; the evolution equals degeneration.

No matter how "progressive", an ideologist, he/she claims that the whole value of acting is immanent to acting. Pure acting only (reines Thun) is genuine. Originally, some relatively modest theories of acting were formulated by Hobbes and Smith. The reprise comes in 1800, when the whole nature appeared to many to act anthropomorphically (if competing and hostility were to "define" the actual state of human affairs).

Still, besides the individuals and groups isolated and exterminated (or defended from extermination in such a way that the extermination is imminent nonetheless), some privileged figures (Schelling, Marx, Darwin, Bergson, Freud) appeared, in whom the evolution comes to self-awareness. They observe the progress from some coign of vantage, but not indifferently.

If everything underwent evolution, any event, the publication of On the Origin of Species would undergo it also. At least, the material shape of the book must be subject to this fluctuation of being. But *the principle* of the origin of the self-consciousness must be exempted (must not be subject to the fluctuation). If the Theory is to be true after – say – 100 years, it cannot evolve itself. The paradox is explained by Schelling. The System is the raison d'être of the Theory.

> So long as the self is apprehended in its original evolution of the absolute synthesis, there is only one series of acts, that is of the original and necessary acts of the self; …

> Philosophy as such is therefore nothing else but the free imitation, the free recapitulation of the original series of acts into which the one act of self-consciousness evolves.[103]

There *seems* to exist a mechanic necessity in nature, but the privileged point of reference is granted to self-consciousness (freedom). It is conscious, first of all, of its own self, but secondarily of what emanates (evolves) from it and appears to be different thereto. "The whole series of my presentation consists in nothing else but in the evolution of that one synthesis". Self-consciousness appears in the philosophy (in the Wissenschaftslehre), but never in science without the help of the "philosophy".

The Ego is super-temporal. "The self as self is absolutely eternal, that is, outside time altogether".[104] "For it is trough self-consciousness that all limitation originates, and thus all time as well, this original act cannot itself occur in time … the secondary act necessarily occurs … in time".

The contention that the Ego is eternal – set against the obvious fact that each of us-humans comes to existence and dies too – might seem absurd, or at least contrary to the common sense. Descartes' Meditations are yet founded upon the latter. The Ego in them is, apparently, Descartes himself; a substance; not a process or an epiphenomenon of matter, because Descartes declares that he is keen on proving the hypostatic existence of the soul. Now, if the Ego of this or that man were a substance, it could not undergo evolution (moral sentiments could not fluctuate also). Still, the problem appears in the moment *another* person repeats after Descartes: Cogito ergo sum. The statement is only meaningful if *actually spoken in the first singular*, but the fact that *any* person might (and should) repeat it in *any* circumstances makes it that the statement becomes depersonalized. Marxists were so dearly attached to Cartesianism. In the Post-Marxist society, the empirical Ego (and its values) undergoes potentially infinite modifications. Originally, the Ego aspired to be absolute. Subsequently, the empirical Ego becomes absolutely changeable.

Self-consciousness is the absolute act, through which everything is constituted for the Ego. The activity must be "absolutely free", but at the same time, absolutely necessary. Schelling thought (for some odd reasons) that it must be the case with God, so that the attribute had to apply to the deified Ego also. There is, according to him, nothing in God which cannot issue from the necessity.[105] That "philosophical absolute" bears some resemblance to the Neo-Platonist Unity, although the naive cosmological context had been dropped and the sophisticated idea of cosmological evolution replaced it.

> 1. *Das Selbstbewußtsein ist der absolute Akt, durch welchen für das Ich alles gesetzt ist.*
> […] Diejenige Handlung, … muß *absolut* frei sein. *Absolute Freiheit aber ist identisch mit absoluter Notwendigkeit.*[106]

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[103] System of the Transcendental Idealism, trans. By Peter Heath, University Press Columbia 2001, p. 49.

[104] Ibid., p. 48

[105] System of the Transcendental Idealism, p. 47.

[106] Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, System des transzendentalen Idealismus, Dritter Hauptabschnitt. System der theoretischen Philosophie nach Grundsätzen des transzendentalen Idealismus. II. Deduktion der Mittelglieder der absoluten Synthesis.

Descartes addressed his Meditations to the professors of Sorbonne, so that he painstakingly drew a sharp dividing line between the Infinite God's Ego (if it be called so), and the finite Ego of Descartes himself. After Descartes, however, for the reasons mentioned above, the attributes of the Infinite had been believed to appear in the physical world in the guise of outstanding personages – so to say – incorporating it. The process must have appaered necessary. According to Kołakowski, it was Avicenna who introduced Necessitarianism in Europe. It seemed, however, always at odds with what traditional theology said about God's freedom of creation.

In his Summa, Thomas asks the question whether God acts out of necessity. It might be easily guessed that a genuine theologian must answer with No, but it is really interesting, how Thomas *proves* that He must not act so. Necessitarianism might have the advantage of founding necessary character of scientific statement. Einstein was always convinced that they must be necessary, and Thomas thought them necessary too. Still, some modern interpreters of Thomas' thought shrink from admitting that God is a necessary being for it would entail (as it seemed) that He acts out of necessity also.

Free actions are, according to Thomas, contingent. John Duns Scotus imputed to Thomas the claim that the effect being contingent was due to that God's acting stumbles upon obstacles (the secondary causes). In fact however, Thomas says that God wills both necessity and contingency in creatures. In other words: He does not need to reckon with possible obstacles to His actions. Neither, for that matter, does He need so with the human free will. (It cannot be an "obstacle"). There is no "inert background" His will stumbles upon, nor a "dispersion" of His energy on secondary objects.

Two separate events might be well contingent in relation to each other. (Einstein speaks of their different cones of future in this context). Thomas gives an example. Two servants can be sent into the same place ignorant of each other, but ordered to this place by their Master. Facts might be contingent, but the effective correlation of facts cannot be so. The proof of the correlation of the facts is the same as the proof of the existence of God (the Master) who governs and orders. Even if two servants are free, the correlation of the actions is under control of the Master. God is a necessary being, but He is, first of all intelligent of the necessary and the contingent.

God must be a necessary being. At least, the fact must be acknowledged that His existence might be necessarily proved. The whole validity of the proof of the existence of God consists in that a necessary connection between premises and the conclusion ("God Exists") might be demonstrated.

God is creative of both necessity and contingency in nature, but he cannot create chaos or turpitude (allow the world to evolve): not because of the lack of power, but because of the lack of the human wicked features (human actions happen to be both chaotic and abhorrent;

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http://www.zeno.org/Philosophie/M/Schelling,+Friedrich+Wilhelm+Joseph/System+des+transzendenten+Idealismus

conflicting and hostile). The harmony of the world is integrated from both the contingent and the necessary; from them being actually created now, in the past and in the future. God does not "witness" the spectacle of the history of the universe only. His providence controls actually every event, no matter how tiny or vile.

God is a necessary being with no detriment to his freedom of intellectual nature. There are, in the Arab mediaeval philosophy, two (hardly reconcilable) "ideas of God". The Asharites believed in the existence of the absolute despot, whereas Neo-Platonists put the stress on the necessity of His actions. The modern "European" philosophy has been oscillating between the two extremes since Descartes.

In Schelling, there is the creative Ego on the one side and the necessity on the other. "Dogmatism" equals "mechanisms". As a resort to break the sequence of the supposedly necessary objects, self-consciousness appears: an autonomous and independent entity. "The self is a self-enclosed world, a monad, which cannot issue forth from itself, nor can anything enter either, from without".[107] Everything emanates (or evolves) therefrom. The evolution is a line stretching out into infinity. "To be infinite becoming its boundaries must be abolished". "The boundary is abolished for every specific point, yet it is not abolished absolutely, but merely thrust out into infinity"[108]. The idea of extension dominates.

If "the boundaries are abolished", how is it that boundaries separating different human words (e.g. in the present text) are not so accordingly? There is no doubt that the intuition of the pure Ego must remain after all, but it is unclear, how to express the intuition in words. The evolution seems to aim at self-consciousness and the particular advocates of the ideas, too, partake, to different degree, of it, although the mode of participation remains unclear. The absolute act is the absolute freedom, but in humans, science must be aware of the restrictions imposed on it by logics at least. We face in the System "more" than science: an ideology.

Schelling might have been right if the ultimate source of the knowledge must have been self-consciousness. Should it be so, we will be unable to assess the value of the System without sharing unreservedly its point of view. But even if we granted his right to all-encompassing insight into the mystery of being, we would have to (for the sake of the purity of his System) provide a critical edition of the book. Some criteria *extrinsic* to the System must have been adopted after all.

Before each of us is conscious of one's self he/she is first conscious of the physical objects beyond his/her mind, and other persons too.[109] This is the original meaning of the

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[107] System of the Transcendental Idealism, p. 37.
Zweiter Hauptabschnitt.
Allgemeine Deduktion des transzendentalen Idealismus
d) Aber das Ich kann sein Produzieren nicht begrenzen, ohne sich etwas entgegenzusetzen.

[108] System of the Transcendental Idealism, p. 38, 39.
Zweiter Hauptabschnitt.
Allgemeine Deduktion des transzendentalen Idealismus
d) Aber das Ich kann sein Produzieren nicht begrenzen, ohne sich etwas entgegenzusetzen. ee).

[109] De veritate, q. 1 a. 5 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum, quod non potest intelligi simpliciter veritatem non esse; potest tamen intelligi nullam veritatem creatam esse, sicut et potest intelligi nullam creaturam esse. Intellectus enim potest intelligere se non esse et se non intelligere, quamvis numquam intelligat sine hoc quod sit vel intelligat; non enim oportet quod quidquid intellectus intelligendo habet, intelligendo intelligat, quia non semper

Socrates' syneidesis (conscientia). We get to know things which are not identical which ourselves and the reflection on one's self might (but does not need to follow). Still, the entire human science is based upon that necessary relations exist amongst objects which might be themselves contingent. The ultimate conclusion of metaphysics reads that necessarily correlated objects of the world are, in their entirety, contingent nonetheless, and have the Cause beyond them all. The Cause does not need to reckon with any necessity in producing a separate object. Now the world as such is separate at least from non-being. God is neither a mechanism immanent to the necessary chain of causes, nor a witness of what unfolds before His eyes out of necessity.

God is not a side of the "transcendental" equation $1 \equiv 1$.[110] He is rather a cause of every "equation"; of each particular or specific correlation of objects. He is the cause of the validity of every proportion existing in the world. There is, in it, acting and yielding to the acting. There is, on the one side of an equation, a given state of affairs, and the adequate judgment on the other in the human mind. Supply does not, however, always equal demand in the human world. Nor do the trials meet always appropriate acceptation. Human "demands" are sometimes bizarre really (especially if prompted artificially); and humans happen, on the other hand, to be willing to accept the otherwise unacceptable (an ideology instead of the checkable truth). Human creativity, moreover, taken if its modest (soundest) sense, as well as some persevering trials to improve human well-being fall, more often than not, on the wall of misunderstanding. The majority have been rejecting the most generous proposal of the improvement of human well-being from some two thousand years.

Chapter II. ENLIGHTENMENT

1. The general enlightenment. *al-fayḍ al-ilāhī.* Aufklärung

A particular emotional disposition (e.g. comfort-loving nature) might motivate one's personal relativism. Such a relativist regards his/her own opinion (the comfort or else his/her resentment or envy, etc.) as the gauge of truth and good (falsity and evil). But the emotional disposition will be relatively labile until a justification of the stance is provided and supposed to be rational. Choosing incidental goods (emotional agility) begets restlessness, because it is contrary to the human *rational* nature. Apart from emotions, there is in man another principle too, able to provide a theoretical justification of right choices, or pseudo-theoretical

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reflectitur super se ipsum; et ideo non est inconveniens, si veritatem creatam, sine qua non potest intelligere, intelligat non esse.

[110] Schelling, System, p. 34

justification of the private disposition. The objective judgment of the quality of the moral disposition begets the scientific certitude. The pseudo-rational justification, to the contrary, gives the provisional calmness of mind only.

Moral relativism is, in particular circumstances, powerless, until some "theoretical" foundations of relativism have been laid. A supposedly universal "theory" helps the individuals to shift off the responsibility for the private choices. Ultimately, however, the fundamental relativism succeeds in replacing all its individual forms.

Opinions found in philosophical books (or in those pretending to be philosophical) happen to be interiorized and regarded as one's own. They are products of mind and *happen to be* put on the free market of thinking (alienated in the way Hegel probably rightly observed). They become super-individual this way. The ultimate source of relativism is, then, meta-individual. It is a sophism accepted without proper reflection, but deemed to be rational because adorned with sophisticated words. The opinions accepted thus (often in youth) are about to be "checked" in the private life, but the cost of the checking proves eventually very high.

The maxim homo mensura (man is the gauge of truth and good) is deemed emblematic for the entire relativism, but it was originally (in Protagoras) based on some "theoretical" assumptions. The adage was repeated by Nietzsche, but some modifications added, because the "theoretical" in question had been deepened before Nietzsche.

Most probably, Protagoras would have been unable to express the opinion, if the sophistic movement of the 5th century BC had not been preceded by dynamic development of theoretical thinking, which, on its part, apparently did not aspire to social engineering characteristic for sophists. The "theoretical" in question consists in overlooking the distinction between the unity of being and the unity of number. An important shift of the meaning of the principle of human knowledge had occurred. Both unities are principles, but the latter is not applicable save to quantities only.

Most probably, Protagoras failed to ponder over the alleged universality of the mathematical method, but availed himself of the fruits of the assumption nonetheless. It was Pythagoreans (before sophists) who put mathematics in the center of their philosophy.

Practical reason works – according to Thomas – as an extension of the theoretical one.[111] But on the other hand, the deficiencies in "theories" result in distorting practical truths. Nowadays, the relativism espoused by Protagoras seems naïve. The modern one is incomparably more sophisticated, because "theories" which underpin it are "deeper" also. They began, however, to be deepened to the Middle Ages already. A source of the mathematical principle was pointed out by Avicenna. It was a *transcendental depersonalized light*.

Mathematics happens to be regarded as an a priori science, because its objects are not visible in nature. On the other hand, the local movement of visible bodies is expected to be described exactly by dint of mathematical concepts. The mathematical unity was deemed *the* principle (although Aristotle thought it to be *a* principle only). A just measure of the

[111] Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 4 a. 2 ad 3. […] intellectus speculativus extensione fit practicus, ut dicitur in III de anima.

movement was expected to be found this way, and the "free movement" of the human body was to be described this way also. It might be, however, doubted, whether the measure is just indeed, as "just" is linked to justice much more then to exactness. The value of knowledge in general is, according to Thomas, gauged by a more general principle. The unity of being (its integrity) is considerably more than its quantity.

Unity and multiplicity are, according to Aristotle, opposed in the way the measure and the measured are (Metaphysics, X c. 6, 1056b 32-33). The "plurality" of the sensed had seemed to some (before him) to be measured by the unity to be found in "pure" (mathematical) thinking. Aristotle corrects the stance. The principle of the cognizance of mathematical objects was correctly provided by Pythagoreans, but the principle of the cognizance of *natural* objects is different. The principle is the effect of abstraction from the sense data called abstractio totius (the abstraction of the substantial form), by which the conceptual knowledge of the definable is given. It is essential to distinguish it from abstractio formalis proper to mathematics, which gives the accidental (quantitative) form only. Science is relative only in the sense the real (definable) objects are a gauge of human knowledge (the latter is related to them).

"Protagoras says 'man is the measure of all things', as if he had said 'the man who knows' or 'the man who perceives' … because they have respectively knowledge and perception, which we say are the measures of objects". (Πρωταγόρας δ' ἄνθρωπόν φησι πάντων εἶναι μέτρον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὸν ἐπιστήμονα εἰπὼν ἢ τὸν αἰσθανόμενον; Metaphysics, X c. 1, 1053a 35-1053b1; D. Ross). Contrary to what might be expected, Aristotle does not assess – *here, in Metaphysics* – those who followed Protagoras as serious enemies; "Such thinkers are saying nothing, then, while they appear to be saying something remarkable" (οὐθὲν δὴ λέγοντες περιττὸν φαίνονταί τι λέγειν; 1053b 3), but points out to the restricted validity of the maxim Homo mensura only. Homo mathematicus, a one-dimensional being measures material objects indeed, which are not exactly: circles, lines, trigons, etc., but approach the "ideal" exemplar only (existing in his mind).

> Evidently, then, unity in the strictest sense, if we define it according to the meaning of the word, is measure, and most properly of quantity, and secondly of quality. And some things will be one if they are indivisible in quantity, and others if they are indivisible in quality; and so that which is one is indivisible, either absolutely or qua one.
>
> ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὸ ἑνὶ εἶναι μάλιστά ἐστι κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα ἀφορίζοντι μέτρον τι, καὶ κυριώτατα τοῦ ποσοῦ, εἶτα τοῦ ποιοῦ, φανερόν· ἔσται δὲ τοιοῦτον τὸ μὲν ἂν ᾖ ἀδιαίρετον κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, τὸ δὲ ἂν κατὰ τὸ ποιόν· διόπερ ἀδιαίρετον τὸ ἓν ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ᾗ ἕν. (Metaphysics, X c. 1, 1053b4-8; D. Ross)

Plato, to the contrary, attacked sophists as openly as uncompromisingly. In his Laws, he says that "God is the measure much more than, as some say, man is". The theory of ideas was built so as to defend the civilization against the destructive force of sophistry.

Opposition, for all its possible vehemence, is nonetheless definable itself. In the 10th book of his Metaphysics, Aristotle enumerates four species of the genus "opposite" (ἀντικείμενον). Knowledge is opposed (ἀντίκειται) to its object indeed (it is relative thereto), but is contrary accidentally only to the opinions deemed false. Opinions (sometimes vehemently opposed to each other) are contrary to each other (contraria; ἐνάντια): the genus

is the same, but the species are different. The contraries have a common denominator (genus, γένος), which is not the case with the knowledge and the known. Thus, assuming the guise of "a vehement opponent" is bought with accepting some presuppositions shared in common with the opponents. In this place, we have in mind the assumption – uncritically and tacitly accepted – that the mathematical unity is the same as the unity of being. Plato – for all his honest intentions – amended rather than destroyed the stance he attacked. A new difficulty arose. If God is the measure (like e.g. a thermometer or an inch-ruler might be), He is not transcendent, because the ordinary measure is homogenous to the measured. The thermometer gets warmer when immerged in a fluid to be measured, and the inch-ruler must be put physically on the objects to be gauged with it. A new way for relativism was paved, even if the latter was believed to be peremptorily defeated.

The Arab medieval philosophers were advocates of *one* ancient philosophy. Plato and Aristotle were (deemed) both its masters; the differences of their doctrines had been overlooked. The historians of philosophy usually speak about "the Arab Aristotelianism" (of the Middle Ages), but Avicenna understood Aristotle in a quaint way. The transcendence of God is (believed to be) guaranteed by relegating Him into the deep abyss of the cosmos. In Avicenna, various threads of the ancient thought interlace. God is not the measure immediately, but an entity which emanates from Him is that. *The emanation is the same as enlightenment*.

The principle of metaphysics is (according to Aristotle) admiration (the same is the case with the other sciences to some degree too). It is circumspection in (uttering) opinions combined solely with the desire to know (for its own sake).[112] The Aristotelian epoché (if it be called so) consists in abnegation of every egotic orientation, for the sake of the personally disinterested pursue of the cognizance of causes. Science, according to Aristotle, consists in being in relation to the necessary objective states of affairs. The relation is included in the genus of the opposite-ἀντικείμενον (being its species), but counter-divided to another species thereof: the contrary (contrarium; ἐνάντιον). Science is, by its nature, a relative to the necessary facts, but cannot be relative *principally* to anything else. What is spoken *now* is often contrary to what *has been* spoken, but science is relative to what *exists in nature*. Avicenna's main interest was not for what exists in nature. In it, contrary dispositions follow upon each other and the changeableness makes for the possibility of evil appearing therein. Above it, however, no evil is possible, as the over-lunar objects are not subject to change. For man, existing in the material world, the ultimate perfection is to be sought in the over-lunar world. A certain sensual disposition of mind was needed to *accept the transcendental light* therefrom. *Contrasting opposite opinions might prepare the ground for enlightenment.*

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[112] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 41 a. 4 ad 5. Ad quintum dicendum quod admirans refugit in praesenti dare iudicium de eo quod miratur, timens defectum, sed in futurum inquirit. Stupens autem timet et in praesenti iudicare, et in futuro inquirere.

Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 3 a. 8 c. Et illud desiderium est admirationis, et causat inquisitionem, ut dicitur in principio Metaphys. Puta si aliquis cognoscens eclipsim solis, considerat quod ex aliqua causa procedit, de qua, quia nescit quid sit, admiratur, et admirando inquirit. Nec ista inquisitio quiescit quousque perveniat ad cognoscendum essentiam causae.

According to Thomas, the contraries existing in nature are not contrary in the human mind.[113] They are abstracted although not literally "sublated" (augehoben) in the way Hegel thought them to be. The process of the sublation (if it should be called so) does no unfold in time. The sublation (if identified with abstraction) is a momentary (a-temporal) motion of the intellect.[114] Hegel believed in – so to say – ultimate abstraction performed at the end of the human history. The end, apparently, has not come yet, and is not likely to come ever either. Thus, it remains an uninterrupted process of Aufhebung unfolding in time and bereft of any *natural* frame of reference. In Avicenna (originally) the frame of reference was identified with *the transcendental source of enlightenment*.

The human mind is more than just an animal mind, but the difference does not consist in the complexity of contrary sensual dispositions (which would account for aptness for enlightenment). According to Thomas, human mind is above all bodies because cognizant of all bodies. The testimony to the fact is borne by that human body is the most perfect one possibly existing in nature. Some human senses are less acute than the animal ones, but the most necessary one: the sense of touch is most perfect in humans. Human body is endowed with the best temperance (optima complexio) so that the imperfection of e.g. the sense of smell or seeing is counterbalanced by the possibility of the judgment upon the sensed workable due to the best temperance of the material instrument (the brain) the intellect uses via inner sensual powers (memory, imagination, etc.). The optima complexio is furthest from the contraries existing in nature. The material organ of the sensual power subservient to the

[113] Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 82 n. 3. Item. Quod est in sua natura perfectum absque contrarietate, est universalioris virtutis quam illud quod in sua natura non perficitur nisi cum contrarietate: contrarietas enim est ex differentiis determinantibus et contrahentibus genus; unde in acceptione intellectus, quia est universalis, species contrariorum non sunt contrariae, cum sint simul. Corpora autem caelestia sunt in suis naturis absque omni contrarietate perfecta: non enim sunt levia neque gravia, neque calida neque frigida.

[114] Contra Gentiles, lib. 2 cap. 50 n. 7. Formae contrariorum, secundum esse quod habent in materia, sunt contrariae: unde et se invicem expellunt. Secundum autem quod sunt in intellectu, non sunt contrariae: sed unum contrariorum est ratio intelligibilis alterius, quia unum per aliud cognoscitur. Non igitur habent esse materiale in intellectu.

Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 11 l. 1 n. 3. Et si dicatur quod est una, videtur hoc esse in contrarium, quia plura, de quibus consideratur in una scientia, sunt contraria, eo quod unum contrariorum est ratio ad cognoscendum alterum, propter hoc videntur sub una arte cadere. Sed principia rerum, cum sint plura, non sunt contraria, alioquin non possent convenire in uno principiato.

Compendium theologiae, lib. 1 cap. 84 c. Corruptio absque contrarietate esse non potest, nihil enim corrumpitur nisi a suo contrario: unde corpora caelestia, in quibus non est contrarietas, sunt incorruptibilia. Sed contrarietas longe est a natura intellectus, in tantum quod ea quae secundum se sunt contraria, in intellectu contraria non sunt: est enim contrariorum ratio intelligibilis una, quia per unum intelligitur aliud. Impossibile est igitur quod intellectus sit corruptibilis.

Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 82 n. 3. Item. Quod est in sua natura perfectum absque contrarietate, est universalioris virtutis quam illud quod in sua natura non perficitur nisi cum contrarietate: contrarietas enim est ex differentiis determinantibus et contrahentibus genus; unde in acceptione intellectus, quia est universalis, species contrariorum non sunt contrariae, cum sint simul. Corpora autem caelestia sunt in suis naturis absque omni contrarietate perfecta: non enim sunt levia neque gravia, neque calida neque frigida.

immaterial intellect is, then, best complexioned too. The harmony of the contraries is reduced to unity in the human *personal* mind: not "for the time being" but for every time.

> Therefore, since the body to which the rational soul is united must be best disposed for a sensitive nature, it must have the most competent organ of touch. And so, it is said in On the Soul 2 that among all animals we have this sense to a greater degree, and also that one man is more adept than another in intellectual operations as a result of this sense. For we see that those who have tender flesh, that is, those who are of good touch, are well-endowed mentally.
>
> … since the body to which the rational soul is united must be best disposed for the sense of touch, it must be brought in the fullest measure to an intermediate state by the harmonious combination of its constituent elements and their qualities.
>
> In this way it is evident that the total operation of an inferior nature reaches its highest peak in man as a most perfect being. For we see that the operation of nature ascends progressively from the simple elements, by blending them, until it reaches the most perfect mode of combination, which is the human body. Consequently, this disposition of the human body, to which the rational soul is united, must exist in order that the body may possess the most tempered combination.[115]

The unity of number was confused with the integrity of being (identified with its *substance*) in antiquity. However, the unity was regarded (by Avicenna) as an *accident* of being. It was deemed a priori datum of mind in modernity, which *chances* to understand nature by dint of this unity indeed. The modern paradigm of science (the Galileo Paradigm) was believed to be built of this principle, but *any* paradigm (the Avicennian included) can function in the frames of Posterior Analytics only. Avicenna believed to comment Aristotle, but interpreted him in a strange manner instead.

Particular sciences are related, but their subject matters and methods must not be confused. In Aristotle, all sciences are hierarchically and *naturally* ordered, albeit subordinate to the supreme one. In Avicenna and Descartes, the supreme is the source of enlightenment.

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[115] Q. d. de anima, a. 8 c. Cum igitur corpus cui anima rationalis unitur debeat esse optime dispositum ad naturam sensitivam, necessarium est ut habeat convenientissimum organum sensus tactus. Propter quod dicitur in II de anima quod hunc sensum habemus certiorem inter omnia animalia; et quod propter bonitatem huius sensus etiam unus homo alio est habilior ad intellectuales operationes. Molles enim carne (qui sunt boni tactus) aptos mente videmus. Cum autem organum cuiuslibet sensus non debeat habere in actu contraria, quorum sensus est perceptivus, sed esse in potentia ad illa, ut possit ea recipere, quia recipiens debet esse denudatum a recepto; aliter necesse est hoc esse in organo tactus, et in organis aliorum sensuum. Organum enim visus, scilicet pupilla, caret omnino albo et nigro, et universaliter omni genere coloris; et similiter est in auditu et in olfactu. Hoc autem in tactu accidere non potest. Nam tactus est cognoscitivus eorum ex quibus necesse est componi corpus animalis, scilicet caloris et frigoris, humidi et sicci; unde impossibile est quod organum tactus omnino sit denudatum a genere sui sensibilis, sed oportet quod sit reductum ad medium, sic enim est in potentia ad contraria. Corpus ergo cui anima rationalis unitur, cum debeat esse convenientissimum ad sensum tactus, oportet quod sit maxime reductum ad medium per aequalitatem complexionis. In quo apparet quod tota operatio inferioris naturae terminatur ad homines sicut ad perfectissimum. Videmus enim operationem naturae procedere gradatim a simplicibus elementis commiscendo ea, quousque perveniatur ad perfectissimum commixtionis modum, qui est in corpore humano. Hanc igitur oportet esse dispositionem corporis cui anima rationalis unitur, ut scilicet sit temperatissimae complexionis (Dominican Fathers).

The "supernatural" and artificial light was shed upon what was supposed to be made visible thereby.

Confusing the methods proper to diverse sciences seemed to be innovative and interdisciplinarity attractive for some time, but proved eventually deadly to science. The uniform mathematical method cannot be adopted to them all. The mathematical principle might be expected to be hidden in the depths of the cosmos or in the eschatological future of humanity, but the expectations are not likely to be fulfilled. Sciences were believed (in that paradigm) to gather data (like computers do), but unable to gather certain conclusions (like rational beings must). A machine cannot digest the data. It can process them only – if programmed before. The human mind is more than just a computer.

In Schelling, the "ideal equation" $1 \equiv 1$ is given a "philosophical" meaning, because its truth is sustained by the transcendental Ego. In it, the total objectivity is equaled with the total subjectivity. It is a stepping stone towards the total subjectivization of values Nietzsche proclaimed. The transcendental enlightenment was its first principle. It evolved from it.

In the preceding Chapter, the problem of extrapolating the validity of the mathematical method was addressed. In the present Chapter, the problem of extending the validity of the experimental method beyond the scope it can only work in is addressed. The extension was made possible when *Avicenna's idea of general enlightenment took its roots in Europe*.

Experience was equaled with experimenting. Phenomenologists use the word of experience in the sense alien to both classical philosophy and exact science. They claim to intuit the intelligible light before it happens to be shaped into variegated forms; before knowing particular objects the light is shed upon. The transcendental light was molded into various forms, but the forms claimed to be knowable only after knowing the original light. Be that as it may, a phenomenologist *will never judge* the sensed.

In modernity, the transition from experimenting on inanimate objects towards experimenting on humans (social engineering) occurred. In physics, the creativity of thinking is sometimes appreciated more that some ready-made (confirmed) conclusions. (Einstein valued more imagination than reasoning). Really, some groundbreaking discoveries were made sometimes by accident. Even searching for the impossible (e.g. the alchemical synthesis of gold) resulted in some valuable (albeit unexpected) inventions. A bold way of thinking leads often to an effect both splendid and unpredictable. The effect might be more or less valuable than what has been expected, but often has a value, even if defining the value in advance seemed originally unworkable. The experimenter is – to some existent – entitled to be a relativist of a sort. Still, as soon as he leaves his laboratory (a safe abode of free thinking tightly separated from the natural world) – *he forfeits the right to creativity immediately*.

The creed of the moral relativism in modernity might be summarized thus: man commands with his experimenting mind not only the objects of the experimenting in a narrow (precise) sense of the word (which, according to Kant, should obey the mind), but all objects, the human emotionality included.

The eccentricity of a scientist may be regarded as a virtue of sorts, and the scientist as an inoffensive crank. The eccentricity, however, of those experimenting with their ideas on humanity is anything but innocent. If the ideas are checked experimentally, they might both promote and destroy life. The toxicity of a principle grows proportionally to how amply (diffusedly) the principle of relativity is being applied. The German idealism is in this respect

"more creative" than anyone before. The naive Russian revolutionists had believed, in the 19th century, in freedom and justice (the Christian values after all yearend for by those deeply humiliated by the system of the state oppression), before they read Marx diligently enough to come to conviction that these values were vain words. The need for "radical" ideas grew proportionally to the sense of despair, hatred and envy born from unbearable life conditions in the "Prison of Nations" at the turn of the 20th century.

According to Aristotle, the human intellect performs abstraction from phantasms and the abstracting might be called (in this context) the *particular enlightenment*. The effect of abstracting is the middle term (μέσον) of a syllogism, be it theoretical or a practical one (in a syllogism of action). In Avicenna, abstracting is replaced with the *general* enlightenment, because the intellect is not human in the sense of being individualized along with different bodies, but is a cosmic enlightening intelligence common to all people. Humans partake unequally of the enlightenment. We face there not only mathematicism, but the archetype of the modern idea of *general enlightenment* (al-fayḍ al-ilāhī; Enlightenment; Aufklärung).

According to Aristotle, the human intellect is – as it were – a light, but certainly is not a cosmic source of the cognoscibility of objects. The human intellect enlightens phantasms in a *personal act* of abstracting and the habitual knowledge is the effect of abstracting (Phys. I, c. 1; Metaph. II). The middle terms of syllogisms are obtained by dint of abstracting, but never by dint of the general enlightenment. These primitive data of the intellect are pretty meager,[116] but they are a principle of the subsequent cognizance nonetheless. We measure how adequate our cognizance is by comparing it to the necessary objective states of affairs, but never by comparing its forms to the source of enlightenment.

Scotus adopted Avicenna's idea of general enlightenment at the turn of the 14th century. He, according to Gilson, does not draw a sharp dividing line between the human intellect and the divine one, unless the distinction between the finite and the infinite be called so. Scotus fails to take into account the specifics of the human cognition.

Humans – for the reason mentioned above (and to be addressed subsequently too) – can get to know objects first partially only (it is natural to them not to grasp it comprehensively at the outset of cognition), whereas the purely intellectual beings (angels) grasp it with one act comprehensively. All the more so it must be the case with God. Cognizance (equaled to the general enlightenment) consists – in Scotus' eyes – in ascending towards the Principle of both being and cognoscibility. Some might expect to "dwell in the *divine* truth" this was. In Thomas, cognition must consist in grasping a natural (for us humans) principle *of thinking* (the abstracted one) for the sake of the cognizance of the Principle *of being*. Those two must be neatly distinguished, but are hopelessly confused in the idea of the general enlightenment. There is, in it, a common principle of them both.

Some extreme (extremely consequent) theistic advocates of the idea of the general enlightenment claimed to "see everything in God", which is called ontologism.[117] The essence

[116] In Physic., lib. 1 l. 1 n. 7. Simpliciter autem notiora sunt, quae secundum se sunt notiora. Sunt autem secundum se notiora, quae plus habent de entitate: quia unumquodque cognoscibile est inquantum est ens. Magis autem entia sunt, quae sunt magis in actu: unde ista maxime sunt cognoscibilia naturae.

[117] Super De Trinitate, pars 1 q. 1 a. 3 c. 1 Responsio. Dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod primum, quod a mente humana cognoscitur etiam in hac vita, est ipse Deus qui est veritas prima, et per hoc omnia alia

of the general enlightenment appears therein clearly (albeit its atheist versions are equally justified). The general enlightenment does not consist in (contrary to what Kant claimed) "independence of thinking", but in thinking being independent of the cognizance the necessary objective states of affairs. The genuine independence of thinking must consist in the uncompromising pursuit of the objectively valid truth.

The essential in the idea of the general enlightenment can be summarized as follows: "the first cognizable is cognoscibility as such"; "before seeing the enlightened we partake of the enlightenment first".[118] It is not ontologism properly speaking, but – so to say – a secular version thereof.

Unless we affirm (as a necessary conclusion of reason) the existence of God, departing from an immovable principle *which is not God,* the philosophy we practice has little or no value at all. But on the other hand, my being-there worthy of a rational being must lead to the conclusion as to the existence of God beyond this world. The genuine philosophy can even gather from conclusions formulated by atheists the contrary of what they claimed: the existence of God included. (The existence of atheists might be a deplorable fact, but is a fact potentially analyzable nonetheless). Unfortunately, the necessary facts, Aristotle speaks of were denounced as impossible by the 14th century nominalists already.

For an empiricist, it does not suffice to repeat after Kant that all our knowledge begins with experience (is *occasioned* thereby), because but it is *necessitated* by it rather than occasioned, and no transcendental depersonalized light can improve it. Kant added that it does not terminate in the cognizance of the experienced (the necessary objective states of affairs), but in the cognizance of the "supernatural" source of light.

A person I am talking to now (the one reading the present words) is endowed with the unity of his/her being (his/her being is integral so); the unity is not superadded, but results from the principles of his/her nature (which are created by God). The *abstract* knowledge can be "impartially" shared by *concrete* beings, and the sharing does not result in breaching

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cognoscuntur. Sed hoc apparet esse falsum, quia cognoscere Deum per essentiam est hominis beatitudo, unde sequeretur omnem hominem beatum esse. Et praeterea, cum in divina essentia omnia quae dicuntur de ipsa sint unum, nullus erraret circa ea, quae de Deo dicuntur, quod experimento patet esse falsum. Et iterum ea, quae sunt primo in cognitione intellectus, oportet esse certissima, unde intellectus certus est se ea intelligere, quod patet in proposito non esse. Repugnat etiam haec positio auctoritati Scripturae quae dicit Exodi 3: *non videbit me homo et vivet.*

[118] Super De Trinitate, pars 1 q. 1 a. 3 c. 2 Unde alii dixerunt quod essentia divina non est primo cognitum a nobis in via, sed influentia lucis ipsius, et secundum hoc Deus est primum quod a nobis cognoscitur. Sed hoc etiam stare non potest, quia prima lux divinitus influxa in mente est lux naturalis per quam constituitur vis intellectiva. Haec autem lux non est primo cognita a mente neque cognitione qua sciatur de ea quid est, cum multa inquisitione indigeat ad cognoscendum quid est intellectus; neque cognitione qua cognoscitur an est, quia intellectum nos habere non percipimus, nisi in quantum percipimus nos intelligere, ut patet per philosophum in IX Ethicorum. Nullus autem intelligit se intelligere, nisi in quantum intelligit aliquod intelligibile. Ex quo patet quod cognitio alicuius intelligibilis praecedit cognitionem qua aliquis cognoscit se intelligere et per consequens cognitionem qua aliquis cognoscit se habere intellectum, et sic influentia lucis intelligibilis naturalis non potest esse primum cognitum a nobis, et multo minus quaelibet alia influentia lucis.

anyone's mental integrity. It is apparently not the case with the aforementioned artificial and "supernatural" source of light.

A person *seen only* on the e.g. screen of the computer is not real, as the time in which the seeing and the seen act is not identical (what is seen might be even artificially created), whereas the abstracted must be identical, being a-temporal.

The speech presented by dint of an artificial device can be easily interrupted because simply shut off. But an undoubtedly real person (if interviewed) might be prevented from completing a sentence by a rude interviewer only (he/she can do the same as the spectator who switches off the speech). The mass media culture works (is molded) this way. The disintegrated speech might express an emotional attitude, but never a precise and ripe conclusion. The habit of knowledge is (in Aristotle) more perfect than sensual alteration, albeit they both are qualities of man. Still, according to Avicenna, no habits can exist in the human mind. The undoubtedly real persons happen to be treated as artificial objects. Scattered pieces of information are being amassed, but never analyzed.

Any vivid dialogue (the one arranged in the mass media is not vivid after all) suffices for falsifying the alleged a priori character of unity (to prove its not being superadded to the sense data). Every sentence begins with a capital latter and ends (if not interrupted by a rude interlocutor) with a full stop. Normally, we do not interrupt the others if respecting their dignity. There are, consequently, as many proofs of the a posteriori character of unity as many meaningful sentences we utter. In a written book (even in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason) such proofs can be found also. A subject in a sentence partakes of the (act expressed by) the verb, which is to say: it is in potentiality to the actuality of the verb (expressed by it). The other parts of the sentence can enrich its content, but *never disintegrate* it. The true freedom of speech consists in the right to the integrity of speaking; *the right to its not being disintegrated*. Apparently, it cannot consist in volubility of speaking.

The "market value" of the sentence spoken aloud might be bereft of any objective value, but "expressed and witnessed" by some personally interested in persuading the others. Apparently, the *real* value of the whole cannot result from its elements being amassed, but on the other hand, it cannot consist in their unity being imposed on it from without *artificially*. (It is possible to cut off a piece of a sentence so that a new unity created by the cutting off appears). The unity of a sentence corresponds to the integrity of the structures and substructures to be found in nature. There is potency and act to be found in them, and their nature consists in them being coupled, for autonomous elements can make up but an aggregate, but never a unity. The sentences spoken out should correspond to the unity.

> 7. … we proceed in understanding from potency to act. Our knowledge begins from sensible things, which are material and intelligible in potency. … 9. the universal is a sort of intelligible whole, because it comprehends many as parts—namely, its inferiors. … *the integral whole* and the universal agree in that each is confused and indistinct. For just as he who apprehends a genus does not apprehend the species distinctly, but in potency only, so also he who apprehends a house does not yet distinguish its parts. Hence *it is that a whole is first*

known to us as confused. This applies to both of these wholes. (In Phys. I., lect; 1; Dominican Fathers).[119]

The sense data Kant speaks of exist side by side in the way e.g. letters on a sheet of paper or sounds reverberating in the air when uttered. Poorly articulated as they happen to be, they are at least theoretically analyzable by computers, although the analysis in question *stops at the elements and never reaches the causes*. Neither speaking nor writing as such can consist in synthetizing *the elements*, because the speaking and the writing (if human) are expressive of understanding the causes. A machine can do something which *phenomenally* resembles a human act, but can never replace it. The actual exchange of thoughts (to be distinguished from exchanging mechanically standard and banal formulas) demands the existence of something between the partners of a dialogue; something so "dry and abstract" that able to penetrate into another's mind without breaching its integrity and without being distorted by the mere fact of being interiorized also. We can easily see breaching someone's emotional integrity in a dialogue which is disrespectful of the human dignity, but attempts at breaching the spiritual integrity are less perceptible, even if more destructive in fact. The "freedom of expression" does not need to be the human *personal* freedom.

The notorious Kant's 100 thalers have value only if they have parity in gold, whereas such parity can be found in anybody's mind only if endorsing this value. The ideal king of the era of enlightenment (Frederic II) created a "transcendental tender", which in the "Dark Age" could have been called forgery, but newspeak allows avoiding drastic expressions. It does not really matter, whether those enlightened are hypocritically convinced that the "tender" (goods) they offer have parity in their minds, because witnessed against the otherwise obvious facts, or cynically admit their felony (Frederic II was frank enough in this respect). First of all, a judgment is false (and the deed which follows perverse) if contrary to nature. Secondarily, a man can be false if relishing in falsity (justifying the evil).[120] The words spoken aloud must have "parity" in the words of heart.

The life falsehood exists (as was mentioned above) in the very moment one makes his/her own Ego a gauge of falsity and veracity. But it does not really matter (for relativism to be what it is), whether the Ego is private or inflated to the dimensions of a: tribe, society,

[119] Super De Trinitate, pars 1 q. 1 a. 3 c. 4 Et inter haec illa sunt priora, quae primo intellectui abstrahenti occurrunt. Haec autem sunt quae plura comprehendunt vel per modum totius universalis vel per modum totius integralis, et ideo magis universalia sunt primo nota intellectui et composita componentibus, ut diffinitum partibus diffinitionis. Et secundum quod quaedam imitatio intellectus est in sensu, qui etiam quodammodo abstracta a materia recipit, etiam apud sensum singularia magis communia sunt primo nota, ut hoc corpus quam hoc animal. Unde patet quod Deus et aliae substantiae separatae nullo modo possunt esse prima intellecta, sed intelliguntur ex aliis, ut dicitur Rom. 1: *invisibilia* et cetera.

[120] Summa Theologiae I, q. 17 a. 1 c. Et sic dicitur res esse falsa, quae nata est facere de se opinionem falsam. Et quia innatum est nobis per ea quae exterius apparent de rebus iudicare, eo quod nostra cognitio a sensu ortum habet, qui primo et per se est exteriorum accidentium; ideo ea quae in exterioribus accidentibus habent similitudinem aliarum rerum, dicuntur esse falsa secundum illas res; sicut fel est falsum mel, et stannum est falsum argentum. Et secundum hoc dicit Augustinus, in libro Soliloq. quod *eas res falsas nominamus, quae v erisimilia apprehendimus*.

nationality, race, *or even humanity*. The only difference consists in that the transcendental egotism is more toxic, because potentially endorsing many private (wicked) sentiments.

Five elements combine (in an order) to form the modern justification of a private relativism:

1) The assumption of the a priori character of *some* truths;
2) The assumption that the latter are only worth taking into account and mathematics is privileged so;
3) Pointing out to the source of the privileged truths;
4) The idolatrous worship of the source;
5) Demiurgic experimenting on humans.

According to Aristotle, mathematics is not an a priori science, because its objects are abstracted (formally) from material things.[121] The abstracting runs so smoothly in those competent in this science that its effects might bear a resemblance to an autonomous being. Although the resemblance proves, at a closer examination, a phantom, the sentiment might lead (by the five aforementioned stages) to relativism. That generalization happens to be assessed as a token of science. Scientism appears first, but the ideology of relativism in the end.

It goes without saying that the mathematical unity is a principle of *a* science, but it is by no means certain that the principle is, for all its exactness, the principle of *every science*. Still, the "bold" assumption that it is so really, provokes equally bold experiments on the entire nature, the human nature included. For this experimenting however, the specifics of human nature must be ignored: its rationality. Emotions and imagination can be relatively easily tampered with, but the human will and the intellect can be moved by God only. The unique chance to thwart the "experiments" appears in turning to God the Creator; to commit oneself to Him unreservedly (esclavage d'amour).

The principle of the a priori unity assumes in Wittgenstein and Husserl the formula: simplex sigillum veri.[122] The cognition of "multi-dimensional" objects, in that paradigm, must consist in a series of "approximations", without the certitude Aristotle demands of science (Posterior Analitycs I, c. 2). The very foundations of the European science are based on Aristotle's theory of science, whereas the nominalists and neo-positivist paradigm of science is bound to wreak its destruction.

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[121] Super De Trinitate, pars 3 q. 5 a. 3 c. 4. Et ita sunt duae abstractiones intellectus. Una quae respondet unioni formae et materiae vel accidentis et subiecti, et haec est abstractio formae a materia sensibili. Alia quae respondet unioni totius et partis, et huic respondet abstractio universalis a particulari, quae est abstractio totius, in quo consideratur absolute natura aliqua secundum suam rationem essentialem, ab omnibus partibus, quae non sunt partes speciei, sed sunt partes accidentales.

[122] Super De Trinitate, pars 1 q. 1 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, in omni cognitione, in qua ea quae sunt priora et simpliciora primo cognoscuntur, id, quod est primum et simplicissimum, primo cognoscitur. Sed in cognitione humana ea, quae prius occurrunt, sunt priora et simpliciora, ut videtur, quia ens est illud quod primo cadit in cognitione humana, ut Avicenna dicit; esse autem est primum inter creata. Ergo cognitioni humanae primo occurrit Deus, qui est simpliciter primum et simplicissimum.

The late Husserl's idea of the Lebenswelt seems to testify to that the optimism of his early works (as to their scientific certainty) was an illusion. The principle of our cognizance must not be simple in the way e.g. a point is.[123] Understanding being first is a simple principle indeed, but the first intellectually grasped is this because undivided, as the very privative prefix in its formula (principium *in*complexum) suggests. Moreover, a – so to say – counter-principle is to be accepted (principium complexum) along with it: the non-contradiction principle. The primitive sense data are analyzed to the point an integral structure appears, which is basic for a possible definition of the thing in question.

God occupies in Avicenna's philosophy a great place really. But Avicenna says that it is impossible to prove His existence, and we have to make do with some "manifest signs" of His existence instead. On the other hand, the place God occupies in his system is as specific as the Supreme Unity must in any Neo-Platonist system. The system allows interpreting it in both theist and atheist terms. The Supreme might be well called an Absolute, albeit it will be deprived of personal features (and all the more the possibility will be precluded that Three Divine Persons exist). Moreover, a "radical" Neoplatonism allows depriving the Unity of its ontological features also. ("The unity is not a being, but more than being"). An idea appears in the place of the Supreme Reality (ideas do not, in modernity, exist in the way ordinary things do) and man approaches the idea without any hope to cleave to it in the end (to embrace it). Paradoxically that dynamic approximation makes it that man approaching the ideal becomes unawares a measure of the dynamics.

According to many, the overall problematics of philosophy can be summarized in contrasting unity and multiplicity. The idea might appear "abstract", but the modern idea of the pluralist society is anything but abstract. Pragmatic as it might appear, it demands accepting a theoretical justification: a principle of the transcendental unity.

In Metaphysics X. 6 Aristotle addresses the problem in what way unity and multiplicity are opposed. The question of whence philosophy departs (for being the genuine philosophy) might be viewed from this coign of vantage and the nature of the *specific* unity it is based upon also. Thomas says that the unity of being (its integrity) is grasped intellectually *before* the unity of number is.

It might seem that the "fundamentalism" (enmity of openness) is opposed to both the Protagorean homo mensura and the modern idea of plurality. To the contrary, a "humane" world "to better live in" is being created in opposition to that "crude" one. In fact, however, the "humane" world proves eventually to be wholly unhuman, because the artificial and "supernatural" in a rationalist manner must be inimical to the natural in man. It is as it must have been: the destruction of the natural unity of man is tantamount to his own destruction. The "humane" idea might seem alluring, but if grasped in its extreme consequences, it proves destructive for the very individualism it had endorsed.

No one particular person can be a measure for the simple reason his/her actions stumble upon some "objects" (persons) possibly not willing to submit to, and to share in,

[123] In Physic., lib. 1 l. 1 n. 7. Non ergo dicit notiora naturae, quasi natura cognoscat ea; sed quia sunt notiora secundum se et secundum propriam naturam. Dicit autem *notiora et certiora*, quia in scientiis non quaeritur qualiscumque cognitio, sed cognitionis certitudo. Ad intellectum autem secundae propositionis, sciendum est quod *confusa* hic dicuntur quae continent in se aliqua in potentia et indistincte.

his/her own sentiments unreservedly. Consequently (so as to the egotism be "inclusive" enough), some individuals must be proved to be "fake individuals", according to the notorious: "there no freedom for the enemies of freedom", which chimes in with what nominalists generally always spoke about "individuals". The "corrected" human individuality, consequently, assumes the form of a: tribal, social, national, or racial Ego. Its form must be, efficacious enough to shout down the opponents, and prevent them from protesting also. In Kant and Comte, the global humanity is the extreme guise of that idea. Globalist humanity is a deity which demands idolatrous worship, reserved previously to God only. In reality (in those who advanced the ideal) the human assumes manifold forms, but they all share in common hostility to the human *rational and biological* nature ("the enemy"), and promote the existential and institutionally acknowledged one (anerkannt as Hegel put it). The forms are demanded to be inclusive enough to admit the possibility to obtain the originally projected Eternal Peace (Kant) or the Global State (Staat der Staaten: Schelling), but, for the time being, destructive of all the opponents of the ideal. On the way to the ideal, more and more drastic conflicts of humanity are being faced. *The artificial source of light, no matter how much extended, must always constrain the human nature.*

Avicenna's thought admits plurality of interpretations. The fact that Aquinas quotes him many times testifies to that an interpretation is possible different to those accepted in modernity. Thomas addresses some special threads of Avicenna's thought, but omits his cosmology of light. In the years after Thomas's death, however, Europe espoused but two (opposed to each other) interpretations. There was nominalism on the one hand, and the philosophy of subject on the other. Ockham, Locke, Hume and the French sensualists claimed that only individuals exists, but bereft of any *specific* individuality, whereas the philosophy of subject (in Brentano, Husserl, Heidegger) tried to guarantee the specifics of human existence, but always at the expense of ignoring the human biological and rational nature. Richard Feynman says that only elementary bodies exist (in the reality of his), whereas human are (generally) but complexes of atoms. In the philosophy of subject humans are – so to say – the *complexes of ideas*. At best, the "complexes" might be provisionally "defined" by them existing is some places. The philosophy of subject arises from the direct opposition to scientism, but shares with it a common presupposition. The spiritual identity of man was believed to be created neither out of "atoms" (scientism) nor sensations (Condillac), but from some interiorized ideas. The ideas make us, allegedly, what we really are: apart from our biological and rational nature.

Distorting the truth about the human nature results from distorting the truth about the cognizance of the physical world we live in. The first object of the human intellect is the quiddity of a material thing. The cognizance of this cognizance (the reflection) comes later on. Thirdly, there comes the cognizance of the principle of the cognizance, and, ultimately, the cognizance of the subject the principle resides in.

Those regarding mathematics as the absolute key of wisdom avoid the answer to the question about the substrate the mathematical truths reside in (according to Avicenna, they reside in the superlunary intelligence). The philosophy of subject is apparently in verbal opposition to e.g. the operationism typical of scientism, but shares in common the conviction that (apart from what sustains the measuring principle) the principle regards extension

nonetheless. Husserl says, that "every eidos has its mathematical existent". The extent, no matter where allocated, is endowed with an autonomous being.

Science – as was said above – is a relative. A substitute of science begets relativism, because ideas (no matter how understood) lack the real reference (relation) to the necessary objective states of affairs. Moreover, the very idea that the latter can exist, had been discarded at the very outset of the modern reform. The existential nature exists (apparently) apart from the nature normally so called. The crude nature, in turn, must obey the despotic rules of the Verstand (reason) (in transcendentalism).

No animal can be a relativist, and if it had conceived a preposterous idea of "improving" its own species, it would immediately die. It can be really the case with animals only if in conflict with the human "Darwinian" *artificial* world. Animals are apparently unable to understand it; they feel at home in the crude nature, but die in the world polluted with the human toxins of greed, envy and "modern" ideas. Animals in nature can be brutal, and might even seem cruel, but are never perverse, which is in the case with the "Darwinian" world created by man. Similarly, a man acting according to his/her rational nature would never become a relativist. Relativism might appear in the moment reason yields to phantasy; the ancient theoria submits to the modern neo-positivist theories, in which experimenting on people is not only admissible, but is deemed a token of cultural refinement.

A certain amount of molecules of one's bodies was believed to define its identity, albeit the real identity can only be sustained by a substratum the amount resides in. A certain amount of sensations (ideas) petrified in one's mind makes for a possible (predictable to some extent) way of one's life in the future. However, no one of them defines this identity peremptorily. Each one of them might, obviously, sink into oblivion (if the brain the memory uses has been damaged). The truth of the old: Media vita in morte sumus (we succumb to death in every moment of our life) verifies here. Every moment in our life death touches upon some part of our existence, and the life consists in resisting the process. However, the process is *natural* (in some respect at least). It is natural for "modern ideas" to die out, even if their precarious existence is being sustained by desperate endeavors of the creators of the "humane world".

Neither elementary matter nor ideas are constitutive of human identity. The human immaterial souls sustain them all (for some time at least), but never identify with them. At best, it can be said that some of them might harmonize with (the properties indissoluble from) the human nature (the intellect and the will).

Humans, if consuming food, do not become what they eat (as Feuerbach thought). Neither the ideas produced in some minds do create those who consume them. Neither, if trying to change one's convictions, do I attack him/her. Thoughts are not a weapon (only ideologies; the Ersatz; can be that). If the change proposed is unemotional, it is not likely to breach anyone's emotional integrity. All "creative ideas" can do so. We humans can enlighten the others *to some extent* (when teaching) in a sense: to strengthen the power of understanding, although our ability to do so is considerably weaker than that of angels, and all the more: of God.[124]

[124] Summa Theologiae I, q. 111 a. 1 c. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum divinae providentiae ordo habeat ut actionibus superiorum inferiora subdantur, ut supra dictum est; sicut inferiores Angeli illuminantur per

Neither anyone, if trying to correct one's own opinions attempts a kind of spiritual suicide. *We are not what we think. Descartes was wrong*. The ideas are only sustained by the immaterial substratum: the human soul (proportioned to human biological body, as was said above, and the whole is sustainable of all other accidents). Some *perverse* ideas can really do harm. They slip into to the human mind and fuse together with what we have thought out previously so that the mixture proves to be toxic. We happen to be blindfolded by what was supposed to enlighten us.

A physician cooperates with nature, and the teacher addresses, analogically, the first principles connatural to a disciple's mind. The human (and angelic) illumination (teaching) can never infringe the personal integrity, but must always respect it (The progressive ideological education is furthest from genuine teaching). It is the exclusive prerogative of God to enlighten man from within:[125] in such a way that the will and the intellect are by no means compelled, but strengthened only. The created nature naturally obeys the Creator.[126]

We do not construct the object of the experiment, but we do construct sentences expressive of what we conceive in mind previously: of what precedes (on the part of our nature) the spoken out aloud. We clothe the natural with a definite form of verbal expression. Constructing concerns but the outer (phenomenal) side of words (it concerns signs only, but thoughts are more than signs. The word of the intellect is "spoken without sound and without image" (sine voce et imagine vocis prolatum).[127]

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superiores, ita homines qui sunt Angelis inferiores, per eos illuminantur. Sed modus utriusque illuminationis quodammodo est similis, et quodammodo diversus. Dictum est enim supra quod illuminatio, quae est manifestatio divinae veritatis, secundum duo attenditur, scilicet secundum quod intellectus inferior confortatur per actionem intellectus superioris; et secundum quod proponuntur intellectui inferiori species intelligibiles quae sunt in superiori, ut capi possint ab inferiori. Et hoc quidem in Angelis fit, secundum quod superior Angelus veritatem universalem conceptam dividit secundum capacitatem inferioris Angeli, ut supra dictum est. Sed intellectus humanus non potest ipsam intelligibilem veritatem nudam capere, quia connaturale est ei ut intelligat per conversionem ad phantasmata, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo intelligibilem veritatem proponunt Angeli hominibus sub similitudinibus sensibilium; secundum illud quod dicit Dionysius, I cap. Cael. Hier., quod *impossibile est aliter nobis lucere divinum radium, nisi varietate sacrorum velaminum circumvelatum*. Ex alia vero parte, intellectus humanus, tanquam inferior, fortificatur per actionem intellectus angelici. Et secundum haec duo attenditur illuminatio qua homo illuminatur ab Angelo.

[125] Contra Gentiles, lib. 2 cap. 98 n. 18 Item. Intelligibile est intra intellectum quantum ad id quod intelligitur. Nulla autem substantia illabitur menti nisi solus Deus, qui est in omnibus per essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam. Impossibile igitur videtur quod substantia separata per essentiam suam intelligatur ab alia, et non per similitudinem eius in ipsa.

[126] De veritate, q. 22 a. 8 c. Responsio. Dicendum, quod Deus potest mutare voluntatem de necessitate, non tamen potest eam cogere. […] Potest autem Deus voluntatem immutare ex hoc quod ipse in voluntate operatur sicut et in natura; unde, sicut omnis actio naturalis est a Deo, ita omnis actio voluntatis in quantum est actio, non solum est a voluntate ut immediato agente, sed etiam a Deo ut primo agente, qui vehementius imprimit.

[127] De veritate, q. 4 a. 1 c. Responsio. Dicendum, quod nomina imponuntur a nobis secundum quod cognitionem de rebus accipimus. Et quia ea quae sunt posteriora in natura, sunt ut plurimum prius nota nobis, inde est quod frequenter secundum nominis impositionem, aliquod nomen prius in aliquo duorum invenitur in quorum altero per nomen significata res prius existit; sicut patet de nominibus quae dicuntur de Deo et creaturis, ut ens, bonum, et huiusmodi, quae prius fuerunt creaturis imposita, et ex his ad divinam praedicationem translata, quamvis esse et bonum per prius inveniatur in Deo. Et ideo, quia verbum exterius, cum sit sensibile, est magis notum nobis

Cognition does not consist in "synthetizing", although we do gather letters when reading (legere in Latin), or sounds if speaking (λέγειν in Greek). They are meant to represent what has been previously conceived without signs. The word of human heart (of the intellect) proceeds from the intellect pregnant with the similitude of the real ting abstracted from phantasms.

Abstraction is an enlightenment of a sort (our private one). It reveals the truth hidden beneath the phenomena and represents immaterial relations existing amongst material objects also. The latter form natural complexes and the task of science consists in retracing them. The full system of the natural world relations makes up a closed entity, and some (Varro) identified it with God. The opinion is wrong, because no system is a substance. Even a grass blade has more entity in itself that the entire system of the world relations. The relations cannot subsist without what sustains them, and the same applies to the intellectual light we have been speaking of too. Be that as it may, Varro advanced in the right direction after all. He only failed to add that a Substance beyond the system of relations must be effective thereof. The contrary is the case with those who separate the relations from what can only sustain them and create some artificial worlds (the artificial source of light is believed to sustain them all). The light of Neo-Platonism must be artificial because it is not a wave, but a bundle of rays, and rays do not exist in nature.

Practically, producing artificial worlds must add up to diminishing the dimensions of the entire world to some "particular" worlds first. It seemed to many that the globalized world will not diminished this way, but all the *human* world; *a* world; must be so nonetheless. The human in question is always sustained by a particular phenomenal form (imagined in the mind). The cogitant Ego is bound to diminish the world. It was hoped that particular worlds

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quam interius secundum nominis impositionem, per prius vocale verbum dicitur verbum quam verbum interius, quamvis verbum interius naturaliter sit prius, utpote exterioris causa et efficiens et finalis. Finalis quidem, quia verbum vocale ad hoc a nobis exprimitur, ut interius verbum manifestetur: unde oportet quod verbum interius sit illud quod significatur per exterius verbum. Verbum autem quod exterius profertur, significat id quod intellectum est, non ipsum intelligere, neque hoc intellectum qui est habitus vel potentia, nisi quatenus et haec intellecta sunt: unde verbum interius est ipsum interius intellectum. Efficiens autem, quia verbum prolatum exterius, cum sit significativum ad placitum, eius principium est voluntas, sicut et ceterorum artificiatorum; et ideo, sicut aliorum artificiatorum praeexistit in mente artificis imago quaedam exterioris artificii, ita in mente proferentis verbum exterius, praeexistit quoddam exemplar exterioris verbi. Et ideo, sicut in artifice tria consideramus, scilicet finem artificii, et exemplar ipsius, et ipsum artificium iam productum, ita et in loquente triplex verbum invenitur: scilicet id quod per intellectum concipitur, ad quod significandum verbum exterius profertur: et hoc est verbum cordis sine voce prolatum; item exemplar exterioris verbi, et hoc dicitur verbum interius quod habet imaginem vocis; et verbum exterius expressum, quod dicitur verbum vocis. Et sicut in artifice praecedit intentio finis, et deinde sequitur excogitatio formae artificiati, et ultimo artificiatum in esse producitur; ita verbum cordis in loquente est prius verbo quod habet imaginem vocis, et postremum est verbum vocis. Verbum igitur vocis, quia corporaliter expletur, de Deo non potest dici nisi metaphorice: prout scilicet ipsae, creaturae, a Deo productae verbum eius dicuntur, aut motus ipsarum, inquantum designant intellectum divinum, sicut effectus causam. Unde, eadem ratione, nec verbum quod habet imaginem vocis, poterit dici de Deo proprie, sed metaphorice tantum; ut sic dicantur verbum Dei ideae rerum faciendarum. Sed verbum cordis, quod nihil est aliud quam id quod actu consideratur per intellectum, proprie de Deo dicitur, quia est omnino remotum a materialitate et corporeitate et omni defectu; et huiusmodi proprie dicuntur de Deo, sicut scientia et scitum, intelligere et intellectum.

(particular societies and states) can be integrated (someday) into a superstructure. But the notorious Eternal Peace appeared to be waylaid by some particular substructures. The substructures ("ecosystems") are actually integrated into the all-encompassing structure only by God the creator. Any artificial integration of elements bereft of their natural properties proves eventually to be destructive of all natural substructures.

According to Aristotle, no order can exist without who orders. The natural order is to be preserved. A kingdom cannot exist without a king, and the army without a commander. God is all this if compared to the nature created by Him. He is the absolute measure, but the world is not governed by Him despotically, as it was the case with the enlightened kings of the 18th century. He respects the sovereignty of the subject. *He never acts against nature*, albeit he sometimes acts *beside* the ordinary course of nature.

Anything a man can do, can be done better by God himself. A cathedral could have been raised without the help of people working on it, and any book written in a perfect form without men too (without mistakes and drawbacks which seem to accompany them all). But He left to us but one unique book written by Him himself (the Bible). Writing all the other books was left to the secondary causes (particular men are this). A closer principle and measure is, then, *this* or *that* man; not any man, however, but, as Aristotle says, the virtuous one ("the instrument of God's peace"). God conceded to e.g. Augustine or Thomas his own causality this way.

"Man is the measure" conditionally only, for the condition to be met is not anyone's emotional satisfaction, nor the sentiment of sharing the satisfaction with others. The opinions and sentiments are to be "bracketed" for the sake of the cognizance of the objective states of matter and the common weal resulting therefrom.

Things are what they are independently of what we think of them. "Being a measure" equals to being related to the substructures of the natural world. Knowledge is a relative[128] and its whole value (its being possibly a measure) consists in judging adequately the complexes of the secondary causes.[129]

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[128] In Physic., lib. 7 l. 6 n. 5. Circa primum inducit talem rationem. Sciens maxime dicitur ad aliquid, scilicet ad scibile, cuius assimilatio in sciente, scientia est.

[129] Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 5 l. 17 n. 28. Sciendum est autem, quod quamvis scientia secundum nomen videatur referri ad scientem et ad scibile, dicitur enim scientia scientis, et scientia scibilis, et intellectus ad intelligentem et intelligibile; tamen intellectus secundum quod ad aliquid dicitur, non ad hoc cuius est sicut subiecti dicitur: sequeretur enim quod idem relativum bis diceretur. Constat enim quoniam intellectus dicitur ad intelligibile, sicut ad obiectum.

Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 5 l. 17 n. 30. Deinde cum dicit illa vero ponit tres modos, quibus aliqua dicuntur ad aliquid non secundum se, sed secundum aliud. Quorum primus est, quando aliqua dicuntur ad aliquid propter hoc quod sua genera sunt ad aliquid, sicut medicina dicitur ad aliquid, quia scientia est ad aliquid. Dicitur enim, quod medicina est scientia sani et aegri. Et isto modo refertur scientia per hoc quod est accidens.

Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 10 l. 8 n. 14. Alia vero sunt ad aliquid non ex aequo; sed unum eorum dicitur ad aliquid, non quod ipsum referatur, sed quia aliquid refertur ad ipsum, sicut in scientia et scibili contingit. Scibile enim dicitur relative, non quia ipsum refertur ad scientiam, sed quia scientia refertur ad ipsum.

The experience consists thus, in analyzing much more than in "synthetizing". The latter might prove, sooner or later, creative of truth; i.e. distorting it. Science is measured by the necessary objective states of affairs. Without being measured so, it becomes unheeded a substitute of what is must have been: an ideology.

Science is always born from abstraction, which might be called the special enlightenment (Aristotle; Augustine), but never from general enlightenment (Avicenna, Scotus, Kant). There is, according to Thomas, a very special enlightenment though as to the truths which transcend the natural course of events.[130]

Sciences are divided into theoretical and practical ones, but not separated from each other in the way Kant thought them to be. The praxis stems from theory, but on the other hand, the theoretical science is practical as far as being actually taught (teaching is a praxis). Some truths might be discovered privately as long as the general emotional disposition does not hamper it. Various sciences depend, to various degrees, on the moral quality of those who practice them. A scientist must be at least hard-working and disciplined, because sloppiness paralyzes the effectiveness of the work to be done at all. But apart from those border conditions to be observed in any science, a scientist might be what he/she pleases to be. For instance, Schrodinger's groundbreaking discovery was done in a morally doubtful situation. A "peaceful coexistence" of the subject and the object (of a science) is required to some extent at least, but if they (the subject and the object) are not naturally familiar to some extent (with each other) they can coexist at a safe distance only (the object is not interiorized as it needs to be in who is personally engaged in science).

More than just the border conditions are to be observed in ethics. One's life falsehood is almost immediately reflected in the objects he/she considers. Gilson applies this even to metaphysics. The value of one's philosophy would be directly proportional to the inner quality of the philosopher. The claim does not seem to be quite true. The theoretical and the practical intellects are intertwined in ethics (strictly) and in other sciences (partially) too, but, generally speaking the theoretical precedes the practical, and, in the *purely* theoretical science, the former precedes the latter – so to say – distinctly. Thus, however, the Aristotelian theory (θεωρία) proves to be a unique principle potentially liberating from any practical impasse.

The intertwining of them both is visible clearly in teaching. The words (if not spoken aloud) harmonize, roughly speaking, with one's inner emotional disposition, because it is practically infeasible to be critical of one's own activity in the moment of performing the activity: to both proceed in working and check it in every moment a possible error is being anticipated. Still, the words spoken aloud should harmonize also with the emotional disposition of those to whom they are spoken (addressed): to some reasonable extent at least.

Savoir vivre demands not to interrupt those speaking and not to hurt them unnecessarily too, and teaching is only possible in the atmosphere of respect. Perhaps, we are

[130] Super De Trinitate, pars 1 q. 1 a. 1 c. 3. Sic ergo sunt quaedam intelligibiles veritates, ad quas se extendit efficacia intellectus agentis, sicut principia quae naturaliter homo cognoscit et ea quae ab his deducuntur; et ad haec cognoscenda non requiritur nova lux intelligibilis, sed sufficit lumen naturaliter inditum. Quaedam vero sunt ad quae praedicta principia non se extendunt, sicut sunt ea quae sunt fidei, facultatem rationis excedentia, et futura contingentia et alia huiusmodi; et haec cognoscere mens humana non potest, nisi divinitus novo lumine illustretur superaddito lumini naturali.

not obliged morally to reckon with one's oversensitivity or petulance, but, generally, (as Thomas says) a teacher must rather help than harm (hurt) those taught by him.[131] Speaking and teaching is (apart from its object) performed here and now, and has, thus, a moral value. It is addressed to those the speaker feels solidarity with in discovering truth. The naked truth might hurt for this reason at least that it has been spoken out without due circumspection. It does not suffice to say the truth; it is advisable also to say it so that it might be possibly accepted without conflict.

Two things are extremely difficult to match: the uncompromising love of truth for its own sake, and the forbearance for those who err, but not cleave obstinately to the exploded errors. It is really difficult to reconcile the unconditional desire for truth and the respect (without relativity) for those searching it awkwardly only. To temper the wind to the shorn lamb.

Thomas Aquinas matches them both masterfully. He hardly ever (as Chenu observes) rejects an adversary's opinion in bulk; he points out rather that the otherwise erroneous opinion is valid relatively only, and only its proper context was ignored by the opponent.

Science should be "ruthless" in respecting the necessary objective states of affairs, but "indulgent" in teaching (in the special enlightenment) those who have some seeds of truth in their minds, but are unable to make them grow up. The knowledge and the known are opposite (ἀντικείμενα), but are in the fourth species of the genus opposite: the knowledge is relative (τὸ προς τι) to the known. Science is *constructively* opposed to the necessary states of affairs, but *accidentally* only opposed squarely to opinions which might have been uttered before. Contrasting opinions (in the way Mill though advisable in his On Liberty) improves in no way the real knowledge, although Avicenna seems to think that it prepares for the General Illumination.

The known is not the Gegenstand (the object) put before the subject, as contraries well might be. Thus, we do not have (as Fichte suggests) to choose between the objectivism and subjectivism. They are contrary indeed, but the contraries can exist in the human mind if abstracted from the phantasms. We do not have to choose between "fundamentalism" (which, allegedly, debases humans) and idealism (which, apparently, leads to relativism). Contrasting opinions is not a means (condition) to acquire enlightenment.

A teacher and the disciple are related in the philosophical sense (pointed out by Aristotle), but are literally so in the family where parents teach and raise, whereas the children obey. Being in relation is in vogue nowadays, but it seems advisable to define it. Contrary to what has been commonly assumed, *relations* (according to Thomas) *are not principles, but effects of acting*. The relation in question is born from the teacher's acting and the disciple's being acted upon (accepting the acting). People feel comfortable (safe) in the presence of persons who proved to be amiable masters.

The relation of teaching and learning is not, however, the most important one. It is, in family, preceded by the act of procreation (fertility). Fatherhood and the sonship are real

[131] Super De Trinitate, pars 1 q. 2 a. 4 c. 1. […] verba docentis ita debent esse moderata ut proficiant, non noceant audienti. Quaedam autem sunt quae audita nemini nocent, sicut ea quae omnes scire tenentur; et talia non sunt occultanda, sed manifeste omnibus proponenda.

effects of human acting (of fertility). The upbringing follows the generation, but they both, can be, nevertheless, seized in one generic notion.

In is not a sheer mode de parler when we speak of the intellectual fertility (proliferousness), because we follow Socrates' teaching on maieutics there. Before a word is spoken aloud it remains deep in the human heart and awaits being delivered therefrom.

According to the Revelation, in God, speaking and begetting are the same "process" (processus), for they terminate in the same Begotten Word of God (Logos); the Second Person of Trinity. Man is made on the image of the divine fertility. The mystery suggests the ultimate destiny of man. Still, even Cicero the pagan says that we should treat our masters as spiritual fathers. Conversely, the fullness of fatherhood in the human family appears in teaching and upbringing: imparting the values (Gogacz).

The very essence of being a teacher and the complementary sense of being a pupil consists in (the persons) being related. Thomas calls them relativa secundum esse (their very being consists in being related, which is proper to the tenth category of being, whereas being in the subject is common to all nine categories of accidents).[132] Normally, however, we ascribe teaching to a person who teaches, whereas being taught to another one and we call them: relativa secundum dici, then. Children are first conscious of being related (their being relations secundum esse), before being conscious of being subject to what generates relations. Be that as it may, the original relations are not at all similar to e.g. spokes based on the hub of the wheel or the meshes of the fisherman's nest. This image applies to spatial (secondary) relations only; to being in the place (Dasein), which is, however, not definitive of the human

[132] Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 30 q. 1 a. 2 c. Si primo modo, hoc contingit dupliciter: aut enim propria praedicatione praedicatur aliquid de Deo ex tempore, quod designat habitudinem principii ad principiatum; aut aliquid quod designat ipsum principiatum a Deo, sicut quando est praedicatio per causam, ut cum dicitur, Deus est spes nostra. Si primo modo, hoc contingit dupliciter: aliquando enim nomen imponitur ad significandum ipsam habitudinem; sicut hoc nomen dominus, et hujusmodi, quae sunt relativa secundum esse, et alia dicta de Deo, sunt quidem relativa, quia etiam significant ex primo suo intellectu habitudinem quae secundum rationem est in Deo; sed ex consequenti faciunt intellectum essentiae, secundum quod talis habitudo fundatur in aliquo essentiali. Aliquando autem nomen imponitur ad significandum illud supra quod fundatur habitudo, sicut hoc nomen scientia, qualitatem, quam consequitur respectus quidam ad scibile. Unde ista talia non sunt relativa secundum esse; sed solum secundum dici. Unde ista principaliter dant intelligere rem alterius praedicamenti, et ex consequenti important relationem.

Summa Theologiae I, q. 13 a. 7 ad 1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod relativa quaedam sunt imposita ad significandum ipsas habitudines relativas, ut dominus, servus, pater et filius, et huiusmodi, et haec dicuntur relativa secundum esse. Quaedam vero sunt imposita ad significandas res quas consequuntur quaedam habitudines, sicut movens et motum, caput et capitatum, et alia huiusmodi, quae dicuntur relativa secundum dici.

De potentia, q. 7 a. 10 ad 11. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod distinctio ista relativorum secundum esse et secundum dici, nihil facit ad hoc quod sit relatio realis. Quaedam enim sunt relativa secundum esse quae non sunt realia, sicut dextrum et sinistrum in columna; et quaedam sunt relativa secundum dici, quae tamen important relationes reales, sicut patet de scientia et sensu. Dicuntur enim relativa secundum esse, quando nomina sunt imposita ad significandas ipsas relationes; relativa vero secundum dici, quando nomina sunt imposita ad significandas qualitates vel aliquid huiusmodi principaliter, ad quae tamen consequuntur relationes. Nec quantum ad hoc differt, utrum sint relationes reales vel rationis tantum.

existence as such. If the human existence had been defined so, the whole activity of men would have consisted in occupying the placed alien to the primitive abode, which might be connected with expulsion (evicting) the others. The quantitative relations are real, no doubt, but can never be the original ones. Competing for being in the place causes violence in various (emotional, economic, physical) forms. People happen to be exposed to e.g. emotionally aggressive "music" or advertisements; forced to accept them. Nobody, however, unless totally debased, can relish in been degraded so. If debased and deprived of the most precious in the Totalitarian States, people can abnegate it indeed, but the value of one's humanity is not gauged by how importunely he/she is able to impose one's views on the others or else to succumb to them.

We become good or wise thanks to wise and good masters, but being good and wise is not the same as being-good-at; e.g. physics. People can be tried to be "trained" in e.g. physics (and in any particular science), but the training is a substitute of real teaching. People can be indoctrinated mechanically (if not resisting firmly enough), but can never be made to love: physics, literature, philosophy … etc. They all are not accidents "superadded" to the human mind in the way Avicenna thought them to be.

There is, between what is accidental (or incidental) to a person (in the ordinary sense of the word) and the person the accidents happen to, a link: a property (proprium), which accounts for some accidents being connatural to us, whereas the others: unnatural. The intellect is the "proper accident"; a propriety which mediates between a person and what accrues to it. (Similarly masculinity and femininity are so for humans). They are innate; concreated with us by God. We come from the hands of the Creator as good, and the principles connatural for us cannot be but good also. But what is accepted beyond this connatural order can be both good and evil (evil consists in – so to say – slipping out of God's hands). The accepting is accidental, and the accepted might harmonize with the human rational nature or jar with it. The contrary to nature is defined as sin.[133]

There is no ethics in Avicenna, because there no vital substratum of virtues. Thomas relates Avicenna's stance as follows:

> … there is the same sort of difference of opinion on three issues: on the bringing of forms into existence, on the acquiring of virtues, and on the acquiring of scientific knowledge. For some have said that all sensible forms come from an external agent, a separated substance or form, which they call the giver of forms or agent intelligence, and that all that lower natural agents do is prepare the matter to receive the form. Similarly, Avicenna says that *our activity is not the cause of a good habit, but only keeps out its opposite and prepares us for the habit so that it may come from the substance* which perfects; the souls of men. This is the agent intelligence or some similar substance. They also hold that knowledge is caused in us only by an agent free of matter. For this reason Avicenna holds, that the intelligible forms flow into our mind from the agent intelligence.

[133] Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 65 a. 1 arg. 1. Damascenus enim dicit, in II libro, quod peccatum committitur per hoc quod receditur ab eo quod est secundum naturam in id quod est contra naturam.

Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 82 a. 3 arg. 1. Videtur quod peccatum originale non sit concupiscentia. Omne enim peccatum est contra naturam, ut dicit Damascenus, in II libro. Sed concupiscentia est secundum naturam, est enim proprius actus virtutis concupiscibilis, quae est potentia naturalis.

> … the … opinion excludes proximate causes, attributing solely to first causes all effects which happen in lower natures. In this it derogates from the order of the universe, which is made up of the order and connection of causes, since the first cause, by the pre-eminence of its goodness, gives other beings not only their existence, but also their existence as causes (Fathers of the English Dominican Province).[134]

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[134] De veritate, q. 11 a. 1 c. Responsio. Dicendum, quod in tribus eadem opinionum diversitas invenitur: scilicet in eductione formarum in esse, in acquisitione virtutum, et in acquisitione scientiarum. Quidam enim dixerunt, formas omnes sensibiles esse ab agente extrinseco, quod est substantia vel forma separata, quam appellant datorem formarum vel intelligentiam agentem; et quod omnia inferiora agentia naturalia non sunt nisi sicut praeparantia materiam ad formae susceptionem. Similiter etiam Avicenna dicit in sua Metaphys., quod habitus honesti causa non est actio nostra; sed actio prohibet eius contrarium, et adaptat ad illum, ut accidat hic habitus a substantia perficiente animas hominum, quae est intelligentia agens, vel substantia ei consimilis. Similiter etiam ponunt, quod scientia in nobis non efficitur nisi ab agente separato; unde Avicenna ponit in VI de naturalibus, quod formae intelligibiles effluunt in mentem nostram ab intelligentia agente. Quidam vero e contrario opinati sunt; scilicet quod omnia ista rebus essent indita, nec ab exteriori causam haberent, sed solummodo quod per exteriorem actionem manifestantur. Posuerunt enim quidam, quod omnes formae naturales essent actu in materia latentes, et quod agens naturale nihil aliud facit quam extrahere eas de occulto in manifestum. Similiter etiam aliqui posuerunt, quod omnes virtutum habitus nobis sunt inditi a natura; sed per exercitium operum removentur impedimenta, quibus praedicti habitus quasi occultabantur; sicut per limationem aufertur rubigo, ut claritas ferri manifestetur. Similiter etiam aliqui dixerunt quod animae est omnium scientia concreata; et per huiusmodi doctrinam et huiusmodi scientiae exteriora adminicula nihil fit aliud nisi quod anima deducitur in recordationem vel considerationem eorum quae prius scivit; unde dicunt, quod addiscere nihil est aliud quam reminisci. Utraque autem istarum opinionum est absque ratione. Prima enim opinio excludit causas propinquas, dum effectus omnes in inferioribus provenientes, solis causis primis attribuit; in quo derogatur ordini universi, qui ordine et connexione causarum contexitur: dum prima causa ex eminentia bonitatis suae rebus aliis confert non solum quod sint, sed et quod causae sint. Secunda etiam opinio in idem quasi inconveniens redit: cum enim removens prohibens non sit nisi movens per accidens, ut dicitur VIII Physic.; si inferiora agentia nihil aliud faciunt quam producere de occulto in manifestum, removendo impedimenta, quibus formae et habitus virtutum et scientiarum occultabantur: sequetur quod omnia inferiora agentia non agant nisi per accidens. Et ideo, secundum doctrinam Aristotelis, via media inter has duas tenenda est in omnibus praedictis. Formae enim naturales praeexistunt quidem in materia, non in actu, ut alii dicebant, sed in potentia solum, de qua in actum reducuntur per agens extrinsecum proximum, non solum per agens primum, ut alia opinio ponebat. Similiter etiam secundum ipsius sententiam in VI Ethicorum, virtutum habitus ante earum consummationem praeexistunt in nobis in quibusdam naturalibus inclinationibus, quae sunt quaedam virtutum inchoationes, sed postea per exercitium operum adducuntur in debitam consummationem. Similiter etiam dicendum est de scientiae acquisitione; quod praeexistunt in nobis quaedam scientiarum semina, scilicet primae conceptiones intellectus, quae statim lumine intellectus agentis cognoscuntur per species a sensibilibus abstractas, sive sint complexa, sicut dignitates, sive incomplexa, sicut ratio entis, et unius, et huiusmodi, quae statim intellectus apprehendit. In istis autem principiis universalibus omnia sequentia includuntur, sicut in quibusdam rationibus seminalibus. Quando ergo ex istis universalibus cognitionibus mens educitur ut actu cognoscat particularia, quae prius in universali et quasi in potentia cognoscebantur, tunc aliquis dicitur scientiam acquirere. Sciendum tamen est, quod in rebus naturalibus aliquid praeexistit in potentia dupliciter. Uno modo in potentia activa completa; quando, scilicet, principium intrinsecum sufficienter potest perducere in actum perfectum, sicut patet in sanatione: ex virtute enim naturali quae est in aegro, aeger ad sanitatem perducitur. Alio modo in potentia passiva; quando, scilicet, principium intrinsecum non sufficit ad educendum in actum, sicut patet quando ex aere fit ignis; hoc enim non poterat fieri per aliquam virtutem in aere existentem. Quando igitur praeexistit aliquid in potentia activa completa, tunc agens extrinsecum non agit nisi adiuvando agens intrinsecum, et ministrando ei ea quibus possit in actum exire; sicut medicus in sanatione est minister naturae, quae principaliter operatur, confortando naturam, et apponendo medicinas, quibus velut instrumentis natura utitur ad sanationem. Quando vero aliquid praeexistit in potentia

Grammatically, the problem might seem to be that of but few letters (added or subtracted) in the philosophical terminus we describe virtues with. Aristotle says that virtues (and vices) are habits (ἕξεις) and the English term stems from the Latin "habitus" (they both are derived from ἔχειν and habere; "to have" respectively). There is, according to Avicenna, no such habit (the had) in the human mind. In the Latin translations of his Metaphysics, another term: habilitas appears instead: a kind of readiness or promptness to accept the enlightenment, without, however, the ability to grasp it firmly.

According to Avicenna, there is no firm substratum of science and virtue called by the scholastics the habit. In the intellect called by Arabs "material" neither science nor virtue can reside. Instead, a promptness to accept what stems from the Giver of Forms appears.

Both in learning and upbringing we turn eventually to God, but to the intermediaries only in the natural order. Now, in the general enlightenment there is no ordered but a linear sequence of the forms radiated from the supreme principle. Angels, according to Thomas, and (teachers to some extent too) can enlighten men because being persons and subject to the order constituted by God. But the promptness Avicenna speaks of is a general disposition to accept any science *without any order*. Consequently, a specialist in e.g. physics will feel free to utter authoritatively opinions on theology or philosophy. He/she will be an "expert" in the way Avicenna thought the enlightened must be.

Theory and praxis are connected in Thomas, but never confused as they must be in the idea of the general enlightenment. In Aristotle, the ultimate conclusion metaphysics arrives at

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passiva tantum, tunc agens extrinsecum est quod educit principaliter de potentia in actum; sicut ignis facit de aere, qui est potentia ignis, actu ignem. Scientia ergo praeexistit in addiscente in potentia non pure passiva, sed activa; alias homo non posset per seipsum acquirere scientiam. Sicut ergo aliquis dupliciter sanatur: uno modo per operationem naturae tantum, alio modo a natura cum adminiculo medicinae; ita etiam est duplex modus acquirendi scientiam: unus, quando naturalis ratio per seipsam devenit in cognitionem ignotorum; et hic modus dicitur inventio; alius, quando naturali rationi aliquis exterius adminiculatur, et hic modus dicitur disciplina. In his autem quae fiunt a natura et arte, eodem modo ars operatur, et per eadem media, quibus et natura. Sicut enim natura in eo qui ex frigida causa laborat, calefaciendo induceret sanitatem, ita et medicus; unde et ars dicitur imitari naturam. Et similiter etiam contingit in scientiae acquisitione, quod eodem modo docens alium ad scientiam ignotorum deducit sicuti aliquis inveniendo deducit seipsum in cognitionem ignoti. Processus autem rationis pervenientis ad cognitionem ignoti inveniendo est ut principia communia per se nota applicet ad determinatas materias, et inde procedat in aliquas particulares conclusiones, et ex his in alias; unde et secundum hoc unus alium dicitur docere quod istum decursum rationis, quem in se facit ratione naturali, alteri exponit per signa et sic ratio naturalis discipuli, per huiusmodi sibi proposita, sicut per quaedam instrumenta, pervenit in cognitionem ignotorum. Sicut igitur medicus dicitur causare sanitatem in infirmo natura operante, ita etiam homo dicitur causare scientiam in alio operatione rationis naturalis illius: et hoc est docere; unde unus homo alium docere dicitur, et eius esse magister. Et secundum hoc dicit philosophus, I posteriorum, quod demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire. Si autem aliquis alicui proponat ea quae in principiis per se notis non includuntur, vel includi non manifestantur, non faciet in eo scientiam, sed forte opinionem, vel fidem; quamvis hoc etiam aliquo modo ex principiis innatis causetur. Ex ipsis enim principiis per se notis considerat, quod ea quae ex eis necessario consequuntur, sunt certitudinaliter tenenda; quae vero eis sunt contraria, totaliter respuenda; aliis autem assensum praebere potest, vel non praebere. Huiusmodi autem rationis lumen, quo principia huiusmodi nobis sunt nota, est nobis a Deo inditum, quasi quaedam similitudo increatae veritatis in nobis resultans. Unde, cum omnis doctrina humana efficaciam habere non possit nisi ex virtute illius luminis; constat quod solus Deus est qui interius et principaliter docet, sicut natura interius et principaliter sanat; nihilominus homo et sanare et docere proprie dicitur modo praedicto.

("God exists"), is, at the same time, a possible principle of ethics ("there is for humans the fullness of being in God"). The conclusion of the syllogism ethics constructs is, in turn, the imperative of acting in concreto. There is general and the particular in philosophy, but never a dialectics in the sense Hegel thought it to be. Principles are, out of their nature, general. The conclusions in ethics are particular. In teaching, a particular act of speaking follows upon the theoretical investigations.

There is reasoning (inquisition) needed for arriving at the conclusions in ethics and the middle terms analogous to those in theoretical sciences. The middle terms in metaphysics allows solving important aporias (even if they chance to be seen unnecessary/unpractical "splitting hairs"), and the analogous termini in ethics allow liberating from serious existential impasses people happen to be entangled in, and they cannot be called unpractical only because being extremely serious. On the other hand, rejecting "abstractionism" (the role of the middle term in reasoning) equals accepting unreservedly authority of "the enlightened". According to Thomas, the argument from authority is the weakest one unless Gods' authority is concerned.

There is, however, a difference between the theoretical and practical syllogisms. The conclusions of the former are necessary, whereas the conclusions of the latter are probable only. To be, however, precise: they are probable only *before acting*, whereas after acting (if the act is *reflected* upon) they are judged objectively like any other facts might be.

According to Gilson, the rationalist idea of salvation is characteristic of Avicenna's philosophy (which might be said of many "modern" ideas, Marxism included). The Bible revelation was "rationalized" by the philosophers for whom "theology" seemed to be but a substitute of strict reasoning (Averroists were generally inspired by the way Islam had to function in a society). The Christian Revelation appeared to ancient philosophers as a novelty (Acts. 17. 16-34). Some rejected it with contempt, but some accepted it willingly out of *rational* motives. The *rationalist* motives could only prompt the rejection.

Avicenna attaches a quaint (rationalist) meaning to the words "prophet" or "mystic". According to Thomas, the prophet is so called because (etymologically) "seeing things from distance", [135] and the prescience of the future is *in exceptional cases* only supernaturally given

[135] De veritate, q. 12 a. 1 c. Responsio. Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Glossa in principio Psalterii, prophetia visio dicitur, et propheta videns, ut patet I Reg. IX, 9, ut supra dictum est. Non tamen quaelibet visio prophetia dici potest, sed visio eorum quae sunt procul a communi cognitione; ut sic dicatur esse propheta non solum procul fans, id est annuntians, sed etiam procul videns, a phanos, quod est apparitio. Cum autem omne quod manifestatur, sub lumine quodam manifestetur, ut etiam haberi potest ab apostolo, Ephes. V, 13, oportet ut ea quae manifestantur homini supra cognitionem communem, quodam altiori lumine manifestentur, quod lumen propheticum dicitur, ex cuius receptione aliquis propheta constituitur. Sciendum est autem, quod aliquid recipitur in aliquo dupliciter: uno modo ut forma in subiecto consistens; alio modo per modum passionis; sicut pallor in eo qui naturaliter vel ex aliquo forti accidente hunc colorem habet, est ut quaedam qualitas; in eo vero qui subito ex aliquo timore pallescit, est ut quaedam passio. Similiter etiam et lumen corporale est quidem in stellis ut stellarum qualitas, utpote quaedam forma in eis permanens; in aere vero est ut quaedam passio, quia lumen non retinet, sed recipit tantum per appositionem corporis lucidi. In intellectu igitur humano lumen quoddam est quasi qualitas vel forma permanens, scilicet lumen essentiale intellectus agentis, ex quo anima nostra intellectualis dicitur. Sic autem lumen propheticum in propheta esse non potest.

Quicumque enim aliqua cognoscit intellectuali lumine, quod est ei effectum quasi connaturale ut forma in eo consistens, oportet quod de eis fixam cognitionem habeat. Quod esse non potest, nisi ea inspiciat in principio in

to men. Avicenna however, seems to espouse a kind of gnosis there. To his mind, the same a scientist elaborates upon is seized directly by a "prophet" or "mystic" by dint of some spiritual kinship (*ittiṣāl*) with the object to be known in the Giver of Forms inaccessible to the ordinary men.[136] In the "era" of enlightenment, gnosis is popular too; because no rational

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quo possunt cognosci: quamdiu enim non fit resolutio cognitorum in sua principia, cognitio non firmatur in uno, sed apprehendit ea quae cognoscit secundum probabilitatem quamdam utpote ab aliis dicta: unde necesse habet de singulis acceptionem ab aliis habere. Sicut si aliquis nesciret geometriae conclusiones ex principiis deducere, habitum geometriae non haberet; sed quaecumque de conclusionibus geometriae sciret, apprehenderet quasi credens docenti, et sic indigeret ut de singulis instrueretur: non enim posset ex quibusdam in alia pervenire firmiter, non facta resolutione in prima principia. Principium autem in quo possunt cognosci futura contingentia, et alia quae cognitionem naturalem excedunt, de quibus est prophetia, est ipse Deus. Unde cum prophetae Dei essentiam non videant, non possunt ea quae prophetice vident, cognoscere aliquo lumine quod sit quasi quaedam forma habitualis eis inhaerens: sed oportet quod de singulis sigillatim instruantur. Unde oportet quod lumen propheticum non sit habitus, sed magis sit in anima prophetae per modum cuiusdam passionis ut lumen solis in aere. Unde, sicut lumen non remanet in aere nisi apud irradiationem solis, ita nec lumen praedictum remanet in mente prophetae nisi quando actualiter divinitus inspiratur. Et inde est quod sancti de prophetia loquentes, de ea per modum passionis loquuntur, dicentes eam esse inspirationem vel tactum quemdam, quo spiritus sanctus dicitur tangere cor prophetae: et aliis huiusmodi verbis, de prophetia loquuntur. Et sic patet quod quantum ad lumen propheticum, prophetia non potest esse habitus. Sed sciendum, quod sicut est in rebus corporalibus, quod aliquid post passionem, etiam passione abeunte, efficitur habilius ad patiendum, sicut aqua calefacta prius, facilius postmodum post infrigidationem calefiet, et homo post frequentes tristitias facilius ad tristitiam provocatur; ita etiam quando mens aliqua divina inspiratione tangitur, etiam illa inspiratione abeunte remanet habilior ad iterato recipiendum, sicut post devotam orationem remanet mens devotior; unde propter hoc, ut Augustinus dicit in Lib. de orando Deum: ne mens quae curis et negotiis tepescere coeperat, omnino refrigescat, et penitus extinguatur, nisi crebrius inflammetur, certis horis ad negotium orandi mentem revocamus. Unde et mens prophetae postquam fuerit semel vel pluries divinitus inspirata, etiam actuali inspiratione cessante remanet habilior ut iterum inspiretur. Et haec habilitas potest habitus prophetiae dici; sicut etiam Avicenna dicit, VI de naturalibus, quod habitus scientiarum in nobis nihil aliud sunt quam habilitates quaedam animae nostrae ad hoc quod recipiat illustrationem intelligentiae agentis, et species intelligibiles ab ea in se effluentes. Sed tamen non proprie potest dici habitus, sed magis habilitas vel dispositio quaedam, a qua aliquis nominatur propheta, etiam quando actu non inspiratur. Tamen ne fiat vis in vocabulo habitus, sustinentes
utramque partem, utrisque rationibus respondeamus.

[136] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Archive
Ibn Sina [Avicenna]
First published Thu Sep 15, 2016
4. The Metaphysics of the Rational Soul; Practical Philosophy
Access 2026-02-03
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2025/entries/ibn-sina/
The wording itself of this acquisition of knowledge by the human intellect—"contact with the active intellect," or receiving the "divine effluence"—has misled students of Avicenna into thinking that this "flow" of knowledge from the divine to the human intellect is automatic and due to God's grace, or it is ineffable and mystical. But this is groundless; the "flow" has nothing mystical about it; it just means that the intelligibles are permanently available to human intellects who seek a middle term or other intelligibles at the end of a thinking process by means of abstraction and syllogisms. Avicenna is quite explicit about the need for the human intellect to be prepared and to demand to hit upon a middle term, or actively to seek an intelligible, in order to receive it. He says specifically, "The active principle [i.e. the active intellect] lets flow upon the [human rational] soul form after form *in accordance with the demand by the soul*; and when the soul turns away from it [the active intellect], then the effluence is broken off" (GS 5, De anima, 245–246; transl. Gutas 2014a, 377; cf. Hasse 2013, 118).

algorithm of cognizance is always required. The *rationalist* arguments do not need to be rational, but inclusive of the irrational also. There must be particular algorithms to be observed in particular sciences, but the idea of the general enlightenment precludes this plurality and renders the totality of science a structure similar to ideology.

The enlightened were, in Kant, demanded to think independently, but the independence is, in that case, tantamount to loneliness in acquiring the knowledge. The "authority" teaches nothing (because refuses to listen), but demands to reject everything, especially if the destruction of the authority of the Church is concerned and detailed reasoning despised for its being "scholastic".

Thomas says that human authority is of little value in science (locus ex auctoriate est infirmissimus) albeit adds: nisi fundatur super auctoritate divina (unless the authority of God is concerned).[137] The teacher of truth (if authorized by God) is rather an instrument of the Holy Spirit than an autonomous entity. The sensitivity, in turn, to accept His promptings is called a Gift.[138]

The whole truth (the natural and the supernatural alike) stems eventually from the Holy Spirit (omne verum a quocumque dicatur a Spiritu Sancto est)[139], but God never

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The same applies to other forms of communication from the supernal world. In the case of the prophet, he acquires all the intelligibles comprising knowledge, complete with middle terms as already mentioned, because the intellective capacity of his rational soul to hit upon the middle terms and acquire the intelligibles is extraordinarily high; this capacity is coupled with an equally highly developed internal sense of imagination that can translate this intellective knowledge into language and images (in the form of a revealed book) that the vast majority of humans can easily understand. … All issues relating to the cognitive side of religion he added to the traditional contents of metaphysics

[137] Summa Theologiae I, q. 1 a. 8 ad 2. Ad secundum dicendum quod argumentari ex auctoritate est maxime proprium huius doctrinae, eo quod principia huius doctrinae per revelationem habentur, et sic oportet quod credatur auctoritati eorum quibus revelatio facta est. Nec hoc derogat dignitati huius doctrinae, nam licet locus ab auctoritate quae fundatur super ratione humana, sit infirmissimus; locus tamen ab auctoritate quae fundatur super revelatione divina, est efficacissimus.

[138] Summa Theologiae I-IIae q. 68 a. 4 c. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, dona sunt quidam habitus perficientes hominem ad hoc quod prompte sequatur instinctum spiritus sancti, sicut virtutes morales perficiunt vires appetitivas ad obediendum rationi. Sicut autem vires appetitivae natae sunt moveri per imperium rationis, ita omnes vires humanae natae sunt moveri per instinctum Dei, sicut a quadam superiori potentia. Et ideo in omnibus viribus hominis quae possunt esse principia humanorum actuum, sicut sunt virtutes, ita etiam sunt dona, scilicet in ratione, et in vi appetitiva. Ratio autem est speculativa et practica, et in utraque consideratur apprehensio veritatis, quae pertinet ad inventionem; et iudicium de veritate. Ad apprehensionem igitur veritatis, perficitur speculativa ratio per intellectum; practica vero per consilium. Ad recte autem iudicandum, speculativa quidem per sapientiam, practica vero per scientiam perficitur. Appetitiva autem virtus, in his quidem quae sunt ad alterum, perficitur per pietatem. In his autem quae sunt ad seipsum, perficitur per fortitudinem contra terrorem periculorum, contra concupiscentiam vero inordinatam delectabilium, per timorem, secundum illud Proverb. XV, per timorem domini declinat omnis a malo; et in Psalmo CXVIII, confige timore tuo carnes meas, a iudiciis enim tuis timui. Et sic patet quod haec dona extendunt se ad omnia ad quae se extendunt virtutes tam intellectuales quam morales.

[139] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 109 a. 1 ad 1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod *omne verum, a quocumque dicatur, est a spiritu sancto* sicut ab infundente naturale lumen, et movente ad intelligendum et loquendum veritatem. Non autem sicut ab inhabitante per gratiam gratum facientem, vel sicut a largiente aliquod habituale donum

destroys the order established previously. This authority can constrain liberty only in the case it acts contrary to what is connatural to man and created in him by God.

Teaching, in the traditional sense of the word, is profitable in the theoretical science, but indispensable in the practical one, because facilitating conclusions: the imperatives for acting. The plurality of opinions must, therein, add *constructively*, which allows seeing the object of the possible action from an objective (or at least inter-subjective) point of view. It seems indispensable as material circumstances of acting happen to multiply in an unpredictable way. Conversely, adding *clashing* opinions ("On Liberty" demands adding them without order) must result in paralyzing the will to act. Argument (in English) might be understood as litigation, but shall be understood as reasoning nonetheless.

Two extremes are to be avoided in searching for the principles of science and morals (De Veriate, 1, 1; quoted above). It is not true that "all science is in us" (Plato), before we come to existence (although the science might be called innate in the sense its principles are concreated with us). Neither is it true that all human science comes from the abyss of cosmos (Avicenna) and we shall to expect only be generously enlightened. Media via est procedendum. Natura semina nobis scientiae dedit, scientiam non dedit (Seneca). If Avicenna had been right, science would equal indoctrination. If Plato had been right, teaching would be superfluous. Plato seems to imply this in His Meno and The Epistle 7. On the other hand, Avicenna's "prophet" or "mystic" would never address the principles connatural to man, because he/she simply ignores them. The "consciousness" of the enlightened would be molded liberally and without reckoning with their biological and rational nature.

The form of health in body and virtue in mind reside naturally (like the natural principles of thinking do), but those improving the health and habits are but stewards of nature, according to the ancient: medicus curat, natura sanat.

Tradition, the object of attacks of the advocates of the enlightenment, is a vivid continuation of the intellects of those who lived, live and will live in the future: in sometimes totally different milieus of life. The common in question spans over centuries (and countries) and is sustained by the vivid presence of the Creating Principle.

The idea of enlightenment is a continuation of the ancient emanationism (as the philosophy of light) and a correction, because a novelty appears in it: the idea to explain the structure of cosmos in temporal terms. If forms (species) come from "somewhere" in time, the question about the origin of species must pop up sooner or later.

There are "existential" consequences of the temporality also. The second law of Thermodynamics (acknowledged by science) says that entropy must grow in the world and the same "cosmic inertia" (probably) must befall humans (if cut off the *transcendent* source of energy physics, nonetheless, refuses to speak of). But the "futurist" Weltanschauung reverses

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naturae superadditum, sed hoc solum est in quibusdam veris cognoscendis et loquendis; et maxime in illis quae pertinent ad fidem, de quibus apostolus loquebatur.

Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 19 q. 5 a. 2 ad 5. Ad ultimum dicendum, quod quamvis malum non sit bonum, nec sit a Deo, nihilominus intelligere malum bonum est, et a Deo est; et ideo veritas quae consistit in commensuratione intellectus ad privationem existentem extra animam, bona est, et a Deo; et ideo dicit Ambrosius, *quod omne verum, a quocumque dicatur, a spiritu sancto est*.

the law. There is, for some mysterious reasons, an improvement in mechanic sequence of events, where one can expect but destruction.

The worse and the better, in the Weltanschauung, are predicated against some privileged frame of reference, although the special theory of relativity falsified the claim that such a frame could exist *in* the world. No Weltanschauung needs no take the theory (the science) into account. Consequently, the moral improvement (if it be called so) would consist in approaching "the ideal" Light only.

The principle founding Avicenna's philosophy reads: ex uno nihil nisi unum: there can be but a unity that follows immediately upon a unity (flows from it). The objects are juxtaposed in a linear sequence. Time, on the axis of coordinates grows only, so that the future can be good only.

Human intellect does not need the general enlightenment. It needs what is given to it by its Creator, but first of all, it needs the Creator himself. We ascend to Him intellectually only if the acts of the intellect are mediated by the acts of the will.

God is the end of the entire world (Metaph. XII, c. 7, 1072a 19-1072b14; Psalm 101. 26-29[140]), albeit different objects in it, partake differently (more or less perfectly) in the perfection of the End. Nature, if analyzed by man (Metaph., I, c. 3, 984b 8-11), shows the way to the Source. Man, the nature analyzing it, is however, capable of partaking in its perfection in an eminent way.

2. Enlightenment and the globalization of thinking. The yoke of thousands backs

2.1. The idea of enlightenment

In the 18th century, the enlightenment became a "new" social idea after Avicenna's philosophical ideas had been accepted (even if their author was ignored). A unique source of cognition appeared separated from the physical (factual) world. Facts and values were believed to stem therefrom and to exist in parallel. This way, however, "facts" and "values" ceased to be what they had been before (the meaning of them both changed). David Hume says that the realm of the moral obligations is absolutely different to the realm of the crude reality and not deducible therefrom. Thus, the "Greek naturalism" was jettisoned for the sake

[140] Augustinus, In eumdem Psalmum 101, Enarratio, Sermo 2

12. [vv. 26-28.] *In principio terram tu fundasti, Domine*. Novi aeternitatem tuam, qua praecedis omnia quae fecisti. *Principio terram tu fundasti, Domine; et opera manuum tuarum sunt coeli. Ipsi peribunt; tu autem permanes: et omnes sicut vestimentum veterascent, et sicut opertorium mutabis eos, et mutabuntur; tu vero idem ipse es.* Tu quis es? *Idem ipse es*. Tu qui dixisti: *Ego sum qui sum, idem ipse es*. Et quamvis etiam ipsa non essent nisi ex te, et per te, et in te, tamen non quod ipse es: Tu enim idem ipse es. Et anni tui non deficient. Illi anni tui non deficient, illi anni tui qui erunt in generatione generationum, non deficient. Haec ergo sciens, exiguitatem dierum meorum quaererem a te, nisi scirem omnes dies saeculi ab initio usque in finem exiguos esse in comparatione aeternitatis tuae.

of a "modern rationalist piety". Its priests (Hume and the others) were either factual or declared atheists.

Greeks (in general) thought really that laws exist in nature and things might be said to be "obliged" (in a sense) to act in a definite manner. Although laws are normally known to exist in the "human world", they exist, nonetheless, in what sustains them either in the human or inanimate nature first. The Heraclitean Logos permeates the whole nature. Humans are, indeed, distinguished by the being aware of the presence of the Logos in nature, and privileged in comparison to other natural beings executive of the laws only, but they never "dictate" the laws in the way Kant fancied.[141]

In the decades after Kant's death (1804), may became convinced that the human "I ought to", and everything which constitutes the essence of his social being, consists in transcending the state of crude nature. The civilization, thus, became "supernatural" in the rationalist manner and encompassing totally the realm of moral obligations. In his famous essay, Kant poses the question: "What is enlightenment", but he fails to determine *what it really is.* The exact philosophical notion of the general enlightenment (al-fayḍ al-ilāhī) was replaced a somewhat vague idea of *what enlightenment should be.* Aufklärung was defined persuasively.

> Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one's understanding without guidance from another. This immaturity is self-imposed when *its cause lies not in lack of understanding*, but in lack of resolve and courage to use it without guidance from another. Sapere Aude! "Have courage to use your own understanding!"--that is the motto of enlightenment.
>
> … it is difficult for any individual man to work himself out of the immaturity that has all but become his nature. … But *that the public should enlighten itself is more likely*; indeed, if it is only allowed freedom, *enlightenment is almost inevitable*. … *Nothing is required for this enlightenment, however, except freedom*; and the freedom in question is the least harmful of all, namely, *the freedom to use reason publicly in all matters*. … (Only one ruler in the world says, "Argue as much as you want and about what you want, but obey!") … *The public use of one's reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among mankind; the private use of reason may, however, often be very narrowly restricted, without otherwise hindering the progress of enlightenment*. … Now in many affairs conducted in the interests of a community, a *certain mechanism is required by means of which some of its members must conduct themselves in an entirely passive manner so that through an artificial unanimity* the government may guide them toward public ends… [thus] an appointed teacher's use of his reason for the sake of his congregation is merely private, …. By contrast, the cleric--as a scholar who speaks through his writings to the public as such, i.e., the world--*enjoys in this public use of reason an unrestricted freedom* to use his own rational capacities and to speak his own mind. … But would a society of pastors, perhaps a church assembly or venerable presbytery … not be justified in *binding itself by oath to a certain unalterable symbol* in order to secure a constant guardianship over each of its members and through them over the people, and this for all time: I say that *this is wholly impossible.* Such a contract, *whose intention is to preclude forever all further enlightenment of the human race, is*

[141] Modernity broke with the "Greek naturalism", but accepted, in its place, a modern one, which had been based on Kant's theoretical thinking and elaborated upon by his successor: Schelling.

> *absolutely null and void* … One age cannot bind itself, and thus conspire, to place a succeeding one in a condition whereby it would be impossible for the later age to expand its knowledge (particularly where it is so very important), to rid itself of errors, and generally *to increase its enlightenment*. That would *be a crime against human nature, whose essential destiny lies precisely in such progress*; subsequent generations are thus completely justified in dismissing such agreements as unauthorized and criminal. … A man may put off enlightenment with regard to what he ought to know, though only for a short time and for his own person; but to renounce it for himself, or, even more, for subsequent generations, is *to violate and trample* ***man's divine rights*** *underfoot*. …If it is now asked, "Do we presently live in an enlightened age?" the answer is, "No, but *we do live in an age of enlightenment." ... this age is the age of enlightenment, the century of Frederick*. A prince who does not find it beneath him to say that he takes it to be his duty to prescribe nothing, but rather to allow men complete freedom in religious matters—who thereby renounces the arrogant title of tolerance—is himself enlightened and *deserves to be praised by a grateful present and by posterity* as the first, at least where the government is concerned, *to release the human race from immaturity and to leave everyone free to use his own reason in all matters of conscience*. Under his rule, venerable pastors, in their role as scholars and without prejudice to their official duties, may freely and openly set out for the world's scrutiny their judgments and views, even where these occasionally differ from the accepted symbol. … *[we] have before us a shining example, with respect to which no monarch surpasses the one whom we honor. But only a ruler who is himself enlightened and has no dread of shadows, yet who likewise has a well-disciplined, numerous army to guarantee public peace, can say what no republic may dare, namely: "Argue as much as you want and about what you want, but obey!"* (Immanuel Kant, Konigsberg in Prussia, 30 September 1784).[142]

Kant – as we see – enumerates in fact the elements of the enlightenment mentioned in the preceding Section:

1) The primacy of the general enlightenment;
2) The vocation and progress of humanity in attaining the enlightenment;
3) The attacks on the Magisterium of the Church;
4) The idea of the existential nature of man;
5) "the liberty" within the frames of an authoritarian state;
6) The primacy of the positive (statutory) law;
7) The divine worship of humanity.

The theoretical footing of Kant's' philosophical stance is agnosticism, which consists in rejecting the natural law ("Greek naturalism"), and prepares the place for the modern naturalism elaborated departing from Kant's "anti-naturalist" principles some years afterwards. Its "commandments" are strict and disrespectful of the *natural law*. The

[142] An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?[1] Immanuel Kant (1784) Translated by Ted Humphrey Hackett Publishing, 1992

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unconscious ("spirit") should be cherished (admired), but never expected to be known rationally.

According to Thomas, the cognizance of nature consists in knowing *specific* natural properties of things,[143] which is pivotal for liberating humans from what hampers their *personal* development. The artificial and the institutional world might entangle and ensnare (if "enlightened"), but the nest of naturalist ideas does the same more discreetly and effectively. There are, in the natural world, diverse objects, but no uniform and shapeless Ding an sich hopelessly yearned for (by naturalists) after being evicted from the human world. There are, in Kant, disciples and teachers, but there is "above them" a "supernatural" (anti-natural) structure too: a uniform and repressive of the personal progress. The "supernatural" of naturalists is protective of the natural (in the Kantian) sense at all expense.

The whole structure of the Critique of the Pure Reason is underpinned by the so called transcendental unity of apperception – common to all men. It is, in Kant, the unique and uniform source of cognizance. The cognizance of this or that man might well begin with senses, but ends only in the globalized thinking.

Sophisticated as the idea might seem, it was nonetheless substantiated in a concrete being: the Prussian State, and the ideal Prince of the era of enlightenment: Frederic II. The traditional sense of values such as e.g. freedom and justice changes, because they are defined in a special way. It is as it must have been: once the natural fundaments of the human existence were rejected, the institutional imposing of the rules of conduct would be the only possible outcome.

The modern ideas happen to be in vogue, although upon closer examination, the often prove to be but a sheer repetition of the past (usually unknown to non-philosophers). The idea of the general enlightenment has been in vogue since the 18th century, but it had been eroding (before Kant) the tissue of the European identity from centuries. The rationalist idea of salvation stems from Avicenna (who died in 1037). The philosophical original (in its Latin medieval translation, which is here sufficient for accounting for the influence it exerted upon the Latin world) presents itself as follows:

> Discere non sit nisi inquirere perfectam aptitudinem coniungendi se intelligentiae agenti, quousque fiat ex ea intellectus qui est simplex, a quo emanent formae ordinatae in anima mediante cogitatione. Aptitudo autem quae praecedit discere est imperfecta ; postquam vero discitur est integra [...] solet anima coniugi intelligentiae et emanat ab ea virtus intellectus simplicis, quem sequitur emanatio ordinandi. (p. 5, c. 6, R 247).
>
> Learning is nothing else but the acquisition of the perfect ability to communicate with the agent intelligence up to the moment, an intellect is born from this communication which is simple, and from which some ordered forms emanate: via cogitation. The ability which precedes learning is imperfect …. The soul is used to communicating with the agent intelligence from which the power of the simple intellect emanates …

[143] Expositio Posteriorum Analyticorum, lib. 1 l. 41 n. 9. In qualibet enim scientia sunt quaedam principia subiecti, de quibus est prima consideratio; sicut in scientia naturali de materia et forma, et in grammatica de literis. Est etiam in qualibet scientia aliquid ultimum, ad quod terminatur consideratio scientiae, ut scilicet passiones subiecti manifestentur. Sed utrumque horum, scilicet et primae partes et passiones, possunt alicui attribui et per se et non per se.

> Cum autem anima liberabitur a corpore et ab accidentibus corporis, tunc poterit coniungi intelligentiae agenti, et tunc inveniet in ea pulchritudinem intelligibilem et delectationem perennem [...] (p. 5, c. 6, R 248)
>
> When the soul is liberated from the body, and from its accidents, it will be able to communicate with the agent intelligence and will find the intelligible beauty and eternal bliss.
>
> [...] gradus altior omnibus gradibus aptitudinis [...] [est] dispositio intellectus materialis [qui] debet vocari intellectus santcus qui est illius generis cuius est intellectus in habitu, sed hic est supremus in quo non omnes homnes conveniunt (p. 5, c. 6, R 248).[144]
>
> A stepping stone to all grades of communication is a disposition of the material intellect, which can be [then] called saint, and, although of the same sort as the habitual intellect, is its senior. Not all human communicate therein.

Verbecke summarizes Avicenna's stance as follows:

> For the real actualization of the human intellect, a cause is necessary. The cause is the intelligence in act. It is endowed with the principles of the abstracted intelligible forms. It is the sun of our souls.[145] The agent intelligence "gives" the intelligible forms to our souls.[146]
>
> The agent intelligence enlightens the sensible images, which are intelligible in potency, in the way light enlightens colorful objects and renders them visible. The agent intelligence makes it that, in the sensible images, a trace appears distinct from the images themselves. The trace is impressed in the rational soul and serves as a „preparation" for the emanation of its [proper] intelligible [form]. In the same way, the middle terms of syllogisms prepare the conclusions and conduce to them.[147]
>
> In Avicenna' eyes, the human intellect does not discover the intelligible in the sensible images [….] it is always "receptive" only, whereas the intelligible forms are created by Separate Substances. It cannot advance further than to prepare itself for the emanation.[148] The "acquired intellect" (intellectus adeptus) is, first of all, an ability to communicate with the agent

[144] Avicenna Latinus, Liber de anima, ed. S van Riet, Introduction par G. Verbeke, Louvain 1968, t. II, ss. 148-151.

[145] Il faut nécessairment une cause afin de réaliser l'actualisation [d' humain intellect]; cette cause est l'intelligence en acte, qui possède en elle les principes des formes intelligibiles abstraites […] et est le soleil de nos âmes [65*].

[146] L'intellect agent « donne » les formes intelligibiles à notre âme [...] [65*].

[147] L'intellect agent éclaire les images sensibiles qui sont intelligibiles en puissance, comme la lumiere eclaire les objets colores et les rend visibiles. L'intellect agent fera apparaitre dans les images sensibiles une « trace » distincte des images elles-memes; celle-ci s'imprime dans l'ame rationelle et y joue le role de « preparation » a l'emanation de l'intelligibile correspondanat, a la maniere des moyens termes qui preparent et amenent la conclusion [67*].

[148] Aux yeux d'Avicenne, l'intellect humain ne découvre pas l'intelligibile dans les images sensibiles [...] Intellect humain reste toujours « réceptiv »: alors que les substances séparées créent les formes intelligibiles, l'intellect humain ne peut aller plus loin que de se préparer à leur émanation [67*].

> intelligence every moment it expects from it intelligible forms. That possessed of the acquired intellect is able to turn his spiritual gaze on the ineligibles when he desires to.[149]
>
> The whole human cognition stems from the one and unique source: the agent intelligence, which is not the totality of the intelligible forms, but possesses actually in the simple way the same human possess in the manifold manner. In the human cognition, the intelligible forms follow upon each other. That is why them being distinguished and ordered in that totality is of pivotal importance. The cognizance is perfect only as far it is ordered.[150]

Two spheres: of the matter and intelligible being exist in parallel, as they stem from the same (transcendental) source. Avicenna calls it the Giver of Forms. Before they become substantiated in human minds or in matter, they exist in a neutral state called Natura Tertia.

Aristotle amended Plato's dualism of forms and matter, accounting for the possible transition of the forms from matter into human minds and called it abstraction. Avicenna and those who followed rejected the "abstractionism" so that the two spheres became separated again in the natural world, but united only in the super-lunar (transcendental) one. Many a modern philosopher harbors the vehement idiosyncrasy towards "abstractionism". Aristotle says that the human intellect abstracts, i.e. enlightens the phantasms, whereas Avicenna (who follows Alexander of Aphrodisias there) replaces the abstraction with the general enlightenment. They both tried to account for that we do have unchangeable knowledge of changeable things, but Aristotle *accounts for the fact*, whereas Avicenna tries to guarantee what he deemed desirable. But if some people regarded the facts undesirable after all (some relish in speculating on moral values in the way many speculate on marked value of shares), they, most probably, were about to use Avicenna's argument *reversing it*: so as to "prove" that the existence of God and what emanates from Him is but a evasion of those who cannot face the facts (cannot brave the harshness of life), and resort to the ideal. Thus "realism" would be in opposition to a kind of escapism.

Values are mostly deemed to be more than just human thoughts and thus might be identified with Avicenna's Natura Tertia (superlunary thoughts). They should have (in phenomenology) a special *kind of being* and supreme to *ordinary* thoughts, which are mostly "timid and uncertain" indeed. But perhaps values (in science and morals) should be given a special *kind of cognition* only, which is human really, albeit supreme to the *ordinary* one. Defining things is laborious indeed, but humans can afford it even if the majority of them (cherishing "timid thoughts") deem it unfeasible.

Nevertheless, some (viz. nominalists) not willing to theorize in the way the old metaphysicians did nor to resort to philosophy of subject, would rather identify them with what merely exists in the human mind. Moreover, should the mind be called (and *deemed* to

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[149] L'intellect acquis (intellectus adeptus) [...] est tout abord la capacité de se unir a l'intellect agent chaque fois qu'on le veut et d'en recevoir les formes intelligibiles : celui qui possède l'intellect acquis [...] est en état de porter le regard de son esprit sur les intelligibiles en question comme il le voudra [69*].

[150] Tout le savoir humain découle d'une source unique, l'intellect agent, qui ne est pas un ensemble de formes intelligibiles, mais qui réalise de façon simple ce qui dans l'homme est marqué de multiplicité ; dans la conaisssance humaine les formes intelligibiles sont saisies les unes après les autres ; c'est pourqui la distinction de chacune d'elles et leur ordonance dans l'ensemble sont de toute première importance. Ce savoir n'est donc parfait que dans la mesure où il est ordonné [72*].

be) "material" in the way it was by Arabs (devoid of its individual spiritual character), thoughts themselves would be, subsequently, reduced to the epiphenomena of matter.

However, no matter whether a materialist or an idealist, everyone sometimes faces the facts which are as undesirable as unbearable (idealists are less likely to dispose of their reality). From the depth of the human heart, honest (morally justified) mutiny arises against what occurs to us against what we expect (and regard decent), but "powerless" in fact like all unwitnessed values must be after rejecting the existence of the just and powerful Judge (the Creator) of the world and the human deeds therein. Before Kant, it had been commonly accepted that nothing occurs in the world contrary to the Divine Will, which is true, no doubt, but the statement should be detailed (completed), because the power of *the secondary* causes, *can try to oppose* the Divine Will really. The opposition must be frustrated in the end, but the problem is that *we are not actually at the end now*. Our mutiny against the perverse activity of the secondary causes might be itself included in the universal order of the Divine Providence *if it is rational*. We will (we "desire") decidedly the opposite then, although we might fancy a more "serene" reality (dream of it). In the very act of the Divine Predestination, "God is helped by us; inasmuch as we execute His orders, according to 1 Cor. 3:9: *We are God's co-adjutors*. Nor is this on account of any defect in the power of God, but because He employs intermediary causes, in order that the beauty of order may be preserved in the universe; and also that He may communicate to creatures the dignity of causality".[151]

Our will justly opposes the contrary of our honest desires. In the depths of our *rational* mind (not to be confused with the irrational subconsciousness), we would like, sometimes, testify to the contrary of what naked facts suggest. In this sense, Husserl, Scotus, Avicenna, Thomas and Aristotle say the same. The problem is how to "rationalize" the mutiny.

On the other hand, some extraordinary things happen (used to happen in the past often). Miracles which occurred some 2000 years ago testify to the Divine provenance of the Christian Revelation. A twofold attitude is possible towards the (previously) inexplicable. Some would say: I believe in what is contrary to what reason testifies (because the "reason" with its "witness" seems to me somehow suspicious), whereas the others (rationalists) would say: I disbelieve it even against the obvious testimony of senses. The extraordinary events (and all facts for that matter too) can be analyzed diligently and without prejudice and purely rational conclusions met in the end. The rational, however, is no to be confused with the rationalist. "Naked facts" are what they are, but the problem is that we happen to despair to get to know them and to analyze subsequently. A rationalist testifies "scientific ideas" (what he/she believes them to be) even against the testimony of senses. An intellectualist (e.g.

[151] Summa Theologiae I, q. 23 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod aliquis dicitur adiuvari per alium, dupliciter. Uno modo, inquantum ab eo accipit virtutem, et sic adiuvari infirmi est, unde Deo non competit. Et sic intelligitur illud, quis adiuvit spiritum domini? Alio modo dicitur quis adiuvari per aliquem, per quem exequitur suam operationem, sicut dominus per ministrum. Et hoc modo Deus adiuvatur per nos, inquantum exequimur suam ordinationem, secundum illud I ad Cor. III, *Dei enim adiutores sumus*. Neque hoc est propter defectum divinae virtutis, sed quia utitur causis mediis, ut ordinis pulchritudo servetur in rebus, et ut etiam creaturis dignitatem causalitatis communicet. (Dominican Fathers).

Aristotle) has the only resort to what is presented to senses and reflected upon (has no transcendental prosthesis of thinking).

Metaphysics proves that the Divine Providence governs the entire material world. The most vile and abominable facts are preknown and controlled. They might appear abominable or undesirable for us (which is only natural), but they are, nonetheless analyzable, and the analysis proves them being ordered so the *ultimate* effect will prove better than anyone possibly anticipated by man. The naked facts are sometimes *felt* abhorrent (not *feeling* them being abhorrent would testify to the moral debasement), but *the order of the facts is the best possibly existing in the world*. The whole task of the genuine philosophy consists in retracing the source of the order (in bracketing the feeling without suppressing it). Some philosophers cope with the task better than others. It is, then, not indifferent what philosophy we chose to account for the non-toxicity of the vile facts. We can only brave them if equipped with the perfect tool. Phenomenology is a resort (refuge), but not effective enough to resolve the problem definitely; to *defy it*. Aristotle's philosophy will serve incomparably better. But there was a philosopher also who did not ever shrink from analyzing no matter how perplexed ideas and facts. His Summa bears the testimony to the tact.

In the text quoted at the beginning of this Section, Kant advocates for the bravery of thinking: in *the public* sphere. The profane of the common life was to be put up with. It might, however, be doubted, whether real bravery consists in ignoring facts or rather in defying them *in concreto*. The conviction that "Things cannot be helped occurring" might well suit the mentality of the Eastern people, but the Western Latin Civilization is characteristic for its power to resist; to defy them (to spiritualize the profane to the point it becomes sacred). It is not difficult *to appear* daring in the public debate (paradigmatic for the Kantian freedom of expression), if not endangered by court responsibility, but it is extremely difficult to consume the modern hypocritical ideas without all-encompassing feeling of the inevitable debasement of the public life. The majority of those partaking in the public life (in democracies) must put up with facts, but must not put up with their specific value.

There is no other way to prove the courage of wisdom (sapere audere) that to follow Thomas who shows *now* the constructive way to defy peremptorily what used to be deemed impossible.

2. 2. Dualism of facts and values the globalization of thinking

The dualism of facts and values is normally, like any dualism must be, a frail structure. It can always be asked whence Hume knows that the two spheres are opposed really and only the two exist (must exist). E.g. were we to accept the validity of the theory of evolution, and, at the same time, assume that it is a theory in the Neo-positivist sense of the word only, we would be obliged to (as it seems) to accept that it is (or at least: might be) as evanescent (and falsifiable) as any facts in the changeable world must be. Is it then, a factual epiphenomenon of human material being, or rather something more than ordinary facts? People de facto assume that it must more than just a fact, as no facts can be interpretative of themselves, but fail to prove its privileged position.

Some attempts were made after Hume to answer the question, which was possible, because Avicenna's doctrine allows multiplicity of interpretations, although that nominalist is perhaps the least refined one.

Avicenna explains the problem of the dualism in cosmological terms. Latin medieval translation of his Al Shifa hugely influenced the Western thought, but the impact this thought exerted upon the modernity was proportional to how much ignored its *original* source. In 1852, Renan wrote that the Europeans know almost nothing about Arabs, but he had in mind Averroes, notorious for his monopsychism and the idea of "the secular state" and thus relatively well recognizable after all, whereas the greatest (Avicenna) was about to be known only after ca half a century. Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny, Amélie-Marie Goichon[152] and, first of all, Gilson improved greatly the knowledge we have about the Arab philosophy now, but it must be noted that Gilson himself used the 16th century edition of "Avicenna's Metaphysics" only, whereas the critical edition of Avicenna's Liber de scientia divina (quoted above) appeared but in 1980s.

The process of the unification of thinking was well under way, when the source of the unification remained unknown even to philosophers. Versöhnung (reconciliation) plays a pivotal role in Hegel's system. It was, however, a quaint reconciliation, as it prescinds from the order of justice; the justification and satisfaction.[153] The modern idea of unification stems, apparently, from Kant, Comte and Hegel, although it assumed a certain guise in Avicenna already.

It might be supposed that Hume's claim: "obligations are not deducible from facts" is not unconditionally valid, as Putnam and pragmatics rejected it really. Two lines might *appear* to be parallel, whereas convergent in one ("transcendental" or material) point nonetheless. The metaphysics of light appeared in Roger Grosseteste in the 12th century already, but this (and any similar one) magnificent jeu de esprit can be interpreted in the terms of the geometrical optics only. Sun's rays exist in graphs and children's drawings, but they do not exist in nature. The Avicennian cosmic source of light emits beams indeed, and, although it was deemed mostly to be *super*-lunar i.e. devoid of the *ordinary* matter, for the mere fact it exists in cosmos, the source in general might be supposed to be material nonetheless.

Monism is a more tenable philosophical stance. An idealist (following Fichte) would accept the primacy of thinking (along with the idealist interpretation of light in terms of geometrical optics), whereas a materialist would rather treat thinking as an epiphenomenon of matter. The "fundamental option" seems inevitable unless (perchance) God were to replace the Giver of Forms, which was the case indeed in the 13th century (in William of Auvergne). But in that case, philosophy resorts to religion and *uses it* in fact, which seems to be the contrary of what the Fathers have demanded of philosophy since Clemens of Alexandria.

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[152] A. M. Goichon, The Philosophy of Avicenna and its influence on medieval Europe, trad. angl. par M.S. Khan, Delhi 1969.

[153] Vaticanum II. Schema constitutionis dogmaticae De deposito fidei pure custodiendo Caput X De Satisfactione Christi 56. [Christus, Dei Verbum, in assumpta carne patiendo et moriendo, pro peccatis hominum Deo vere et proprie satisfecit].

It is really difficult to understand, how Hume was able to match his agnosticism with putting the phrase: "human nature" in the title of his main philosophical work. How did he manage to get to know *this* nature in the philosophy which precluded the possibility to get to know *any* nature at all? A monist claims an intuition of the Urstoff of the universe (a "nature" of sorts), and thus is more self-consistent, albeit the cognition (intuition) bears resemblance to gnosis.

According to Thomas, human nature is cognoscible really, and the source activity of the human mind is too, as it is concreated with this nature[154] (the fact can be proved). Thinking is a "specific being" indeed, but must not appear to be a "mysterious being" rationalists thought it to be. The artificial (and sometimes admirable) in thinking (presented e.g. in philosophical books) might be imposing indeed, but its natural basis is unchangeable. It is independent of the social acknowledgment, for the dignity of man (a person) is inalienable.

According to some "modern realists" (Thomas cannot be listed amongst them anyhow) human thoughts are but anticipations of what might be useful in the future (Alva Noë, Peirce, Antonio Damasio). The bizarre consequence of the stance is that mathematical beings cease to be, then, unchangeable.

Fichte puts the problem on the razor's edge, but in Schelling the conflict is somehow mollified by a "metaphysics" of sorts. There are (allegedly) several degrees (or even monotonous displacement of values) of the so-called "consciousness" with the unconscious/subconscious at the bottom and the unified consciousness at the top. A new

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[154] Contra Gentiles, lib. 2 cap. 78 n. 4. Quia in omni natura in qua invenitur potentia et actus, est aliquid quasi materia, quod est in potentia ad ea quae sunt illius generis, et aliquid quasi agens, quod reducit potentiam in actum, sicut in artificialibus est ars et materia. Sed anima intellectiva est quaedam natura in qua invenitur potentia et actus: cum quandoque sit actu intelligens et quandoque in potentia. Est igitur in natura animae intellectivae aliquid quasi materia, quod est in potentia ad omnia intelligibilia, quod dicitur intellectus possibilis: et aliquid quasi causa efficiens, quod facit omnia in actu, et dicitur intellectus agens.

Summa Theologiae I, q. 41 a. 2 ad 3. Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam voluntas, inquantum est natura quaedam, aliquid naturaliter vult; sicut voluntas hominis naturaliter tendit ad beatitudinem. Et similiter Deus naturaliter vult et amat seipsum.

De veritate, q. 21 a. 6 ad 9. Ad non um dicendum, quod quidam dicunt, modum, speciem et ordinem, secundum quod constituunt bonum naturae, et secundum quod diminuuntur per peccatum, prout pertinent ad bonum moris, esse eadem secundum rem, sed differre secundum rationem; sicut patet in voluntate, quod ipsa una et eadem potest considerari in quantum est natura quaedam: et sic est in ea modus, species et ordo, constituentia bonum naturae; vel in quantum est voluntas, prout habet ordinem ad gratiam: et sic attribuitur ei modus, species et ordo, quae possunt diminui per peccatum, quae constituunt bonum moris. Vel potest melius dici, quod cum bonum consequatur esse, et bonum per speciem, modum et ordinem constituatur: sicut est aliud esse substantiale et accidentale, ita constat esse aliam formam substantialem et accidentalem; et utraque proprium modum habet, et proprium ordinem.

De veritate, q. 23 a. 4 c. Sciendum est igitur, quod cuiuslibet voluntatis est duplex volitum: unum quidem principale, et aliud quasi secundarium. Principale quidem volitum est in quod voluntas fertur secundum suam naturam; eo quod ipsa voluntas natura quaedam est, et naturalem ordinem ad aliquid habet; hoc autem est quod naturaliter voluntas vult: sicut humana voluntas naturaliter appetit beatitudinem, et respectu huius voliti voluntas necessitatem habet, cum in ipsum tendat per modum naturae; non enim potest homo velle non esse beatus, aut esse miser. Secundaria vero volita sunt quae ad hoc principale volitum ordinantur sicut in finem.

possibility of reconciliation appears. A variety might exist in the phenomenal world, but there is (allegedly), on the one side, sub-consciousness which defines "authenticity" of humans, and the transcendental idea of totality, on the other. In that paradigm, "human nature" is but an amorphous stuff to be modelled according to what the enlightened think advisable. Someday, all people "will be brethren", which, however, requires: (1) first of all, depriving them of their specific and rational nature (as well as their personal dignity), and then (2) institutional unification of them all in the globalist state (Staat der Staaten).

The dreams about building such a "supernatural" rationalist structure might seem either grotesque or appalling all depending on how efficient the structure is able to enforce its idolatrous worship. Be that as it may, the structure must prove to be at least economically inefficient, for it is possible to decoy gullible humans into the state of sub-consciousness, but it is impossible to enchant the *material* world, which is impervious to the commanding force of symbols.[155] The economy (its values) proved to be astonishingly indifferent to the generous ideas of the "humanist world" to be raised in the eschatological future of man. Some claimed that the welfare state has been built on the principles of the rationalist doctrine, but the wealth (those values) can be gathered only after rejecting them.

Nowadays, the sublation of the dualism in question requires replacing science with ideology, which is, however, tantamount to undermining the fundaments of the former. Perhaps, humans might feel "alienated" in the world of naked facts, but the problem is whether the alienation is sublated by ascending towards the Creator of the factual world (God), or by escaping from it into the sphere of pure consciousness.

Contrary to what Kant declares, the consequent enlightenment ideology must *repress* rather than enhance the maximalist thinking. Inability to act and to work effectively must follow and the economic incapacity will demonstrate the sterility of the paradigm first. If e.g. the equation 2 + 2 = 4; is not necessary, but is an anticipation only, the material world is more mysterious to us-humans than it is for dumb animals.

According to Hegel, the history of civilization had been incessant mutiny against nature until its end appeared in his Phenomenology of Spirit. Perhaps, it is just to rebel against injustice, but the rebellion must be worthy of the rational being nonetheless. "To be", in the eminent sense of the word, means for humans "to exist as individuals of the rational nature". The human nature is distinguished by its rationality, but it is a created nature nonetheless.

It is impossible to raise the edifice on rotten fundaments, and those which seemed to be based on it, will collapse the sooner, the more unflinchingly the fundament was deemed to be based on "humanist principles". The edifice of the civilization must be based on the Rock.[156]

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[155] Summa Theologiae I, q. 1a5 a. 5 ad 3. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XXI de Civ. Dei, daemones alliciuntur per varia genera lapidum, herbarum, lignorum, animalium, carminum, rituum, non ut animalia cibis, sed ut spiritus signis; inquantum scilicet haec eis exhibentur in signum divini honoris, cuius ipsi sunt cupidi.

[156] Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 4 a. 7 ad 4. Ad quartum dicendum quod ad rationem fundamenti non solum requiritur quod sit primum, sed etiam quod sit aliis partibus aedificii connexum, non enim esset fundamentum nisi ei aliae partes aedificii cohaererent. Connexio autem spiritualis aedificii

Humans happen to be deceived that "their-human values" can exist apart from (or even in opposition to) those natural and revealed ones: the Decalogue and everything which can be rationally deduced from the Revealed Texts.[157], but the nature (their nature too) cannot be deceived.

The illusion that "a better human world" can be raised has overshadowed the otherwise obvious fact that the "humane" becomes, in that case "unhuman" and absurd. Nature is not obliged to conform to no matter how "noble" ideas devised by the illuminati. The excessive (and unscientific for that matter too) reaction to the Kantian repressive morality was born in the era or "modern" naturalism. This testifies to that natural order of things (imposed by God) is being desired after all, even if the desire is blind.

The reconciliation has an ambivalent character. After Napoleonic Wars, and after the ancien régime had been restored (and called "sacred"), the Prussian Governor of the province of Wielkopolska (the cradle of the Polish State), offered a reconciliation of sorts to its inhabitants. The German idealism was substantiated by the Prussian Etatism. "We are willing to forget that you are not Prussians yet, provided you show a sincere readiness to become Prussians in the near future". There no room for natural law, nor for human dignity there. "Our age, the age of enlightenment, is the age of the Frederic II", who did no reckon with the Decalogue in politics.

God is a just judge, whereas the humanity is almost always an unjust judge (perhaps that is why Augustine called it massa perditionis). Good (in Neo-Platonism) is (more or less consequently) identified with unification (Gleichschaltung) and disrespecting the natural order of the universe.

The desire to "humanize" the "idea of God" leads to demiurgic activities in the sphere of values: the scientific, moral and economic alike. Sartre thought that humanism (the idea of the unity of humanity) is incompatible with theism (the belief in the existence of the transcendent God), and he might have not been wrong there. The belief has eroded on several stages:

1) First, in the spirit of Neo-Platonism, the creative act of God was relegated into the abyss of the cosmos;
2) The idea of God unheeded replaced the real God;
3) The advocates of the enlightenment (e.g. Hume) noticed that such an idea is useless in the world of theirs;
4) Hegel and Comte deified the humanity and demanded the idolatrous worship thereof.

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est per caritatem, secundum illud Coloss. III, *super omnia caritatem habete, quae est vinculum perfectionis*. Et ideo fides sine caritate fundamentum esse non potest, nec tamen oportet quod caritas sit prior fide.

[157] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 100 a. 3 s.c. Sed contra est quod, Matth. V, super illud, beati estis cum maledixerint etc. dicit Glossa quod Moyses, decem praecepta proponens, postea per partes explicat. Ergo omnia praecepta legis sunt quaedam partes praeceptorum Decalogi.

The idolatry is a dominant of the contemporary culture and becomes pivotal element of the "spirituality" of the "modern" (united) Europe. The fact was lost sight of that the fundaments of our civilization were raised on:

1) The Greek philosophy;
2) The Roman law;
3) The Christian Revelation (which uses them both).

Our civilization can only rot on the fundaments of transcendentalism. The putrefaction leads to the demise of the vital forces, perhaps most clearly visible in the sphere of economic values.

The true spiritual heritage of Europe was built on the fundaments of intellectualism to be neatly distinguished from "rationalism". The identity of Europe is founded on the belief in the existence of the transcendent God. Human beliefs must be accepted critically only. On each page of his Summa, Thomas encouraged us to ask "awkward" questions. Avicenna was an authority for him too, but Thomas did not hesitate criticizing him when it seemed necessary.

The unity as such cannot be identified with deity. Aristotle proves that the unity of order of each particular substructure (each ecosystem) and the unity of the total structure (a meta-ecosystem) is only possible due to the relation to the Transcendent Cause: creative of the order (as Thomas adds). Without the creator of the order, the world would have been chaos; and without acknowledging its presence in the human world, the "human world" is bound to become chaos really.

2. 3. If the goal of humanity is still lacking …

Friedrich Nietzsche addresses Kant's idea of the unity of humanity as follows:

> A thousand goals have there been hitherto, for a thousand peoples have there been. Only the fetter for the thousand necks is still lacking; there is lacking the one goal. As yet humanity hath not a goal.
>
> But pray tell me, my brethren, if the goal of humanity be still lacking, is there not also still lacking—humanity itself?—

Contrary to what might have appeared, Nietzsche continues rather than breaks with the tradition of Enlightenment. According to Hume, the lack of the unification goal is deplorable. National and religious animosities had been tearing apart Europe for many centuries. They had been, allegedly, caused by particular circumstances of place and time. No natural basis of acceptable diversity was admitted to exist. The diversity had to be removed. Nietzsche writes:

> Creating ones were first of all peoples, and only in late times individuals; verily, the individual himself is still the latest creation.
>
> Peoples once hung over them tables of the good. Love which would rule and love which would obey, created for themselves such tables (solche Tafeln).

The term of „table" (Tafel) used in this context was popularized by Scheler, who quotes Nietzsche many times. Nietzsche, however, explains what the term "table of values" must originally mean:

> A table of excellencies hangeth over every people. […] "To honour father and mother, and from the root of the soul to do their will"—this table of surmounting hung another people over them, and became powerful and permanent thereby.[158]

The forth Commandment is meant; definitive, as it were, of the nation in question.

According to Thomas, *any* Commandment is part of the Perfect Ten (the Decalogue). The Ten must be perfect. The Commandments are addressed to all the peoples.

> … the *ten strings of the psaltery signify the law of God, which consists of ten precepts and should be played by hand (that is, with good works),* and from above, since the precepts should be fulfilled because of hope of things eternal—otherwise it would be played from below. And so the psalm is David's since it was composed by him and treats of his kingdom as a figure of Christ's.[159][160]

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[158] Tausend Ziele gab es bisher, denn tausend Völker gab es. Nur die Fessel der tausend Nacken fehlt noch, es fehlt das Eine Ziel. Noch hat die Menschheit kein Ziel. Aber sagt mir doch, meine Brüder: wenn der Menschheit das Ziel noch fehlt, fehlt da nicht auch—sie selber noch?— Schaffende waren erst Völker und spät erst Einzelne; wahrlich, der Einzelne selber ist noch die jüngste Schöpfung. Völker hängten sich einst eine Tafel des Guten über sich. Liebe, die herrschen will, und Liebe, die gehorchen will, erschufen sich zusammen solche Tafeln. Eine Tafel der Güter hängt über jedem Volke. „Vater und Mutter ehren und bis in die Wurzel der Seele hinein ihnen zu Willen sein" : diese Tafel der Überwindung hängte ein andres Volk über sich auf und wurde mächtig und ewig damit.

Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra; XV. The Thousand and One Goals; Translated By Thomas Common. The Project Gutenberg EBook of Thus Spake Zarathustra, by Friedrich Nietzsche. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1998/1998-h/1998-h.htm

[159] Super Psalmo 2, n. 1. Psalmus proprie dicitur a Psalterio, quod est quoddam instrumentum decachordum, quod manu tangitur: unde dicitur a psallere, quod est manu tangere, et habet tactum a superiori: unde Psalmus proprie dicitur canticum, quod David cantabat, vel cantari faciebat ad Psalterium. Mystice autem per decachordum Psalterium signatur lex Dei, quae in decem praeceptis consistit, et oportet quod tangatur manu, idest bona operatione, et a superiori, quia praecepta sunt implenda propter spem aeternorum, alias tangeretur ex inferiori. Est ergo Psalmus David, quia ab eo compositus, et de regno ejus in figura regni Christi agit.

[160] Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 87 a. 1 c. Sed determinatio certae partis exhibendae ministris divini cultus non est de iure naturali, sed est introducta institutione divina secundum conditionem illius populi cui lex dabatur; qui cum in duodecim tribus esset divisus, duodecima tribus, scilicet levitica, quae tota erat divinis ministeriis mancipata, possessiones non habebat, unde convenienter institutum est ut reliquae undecim tribus decimam partem suorum proventuum Levitis darent, ut honorabilius viverent, et quia etiam aliqui per negligentiam erant transgressores futuri unde quantum ad determinationem decimae partis, erat iudiciale, sicut et alia multa specialiter in illo populo instituta erant ad aequalitatem inter homines ad invicem conservandam secundum populi illius conditionem, quae iudicialia praecepta dicuntur; licet ex consequenti aliquid significarent in futurum, sicut et omnia eorum facta, secundum illud I ad Cor. X, omnia in figuram contingebant illis; in quo conveniebant cum caeremonialibus praeceptis, quae principaliter instituta erant ad significandum aliquid futurum. Unde et praeceptum de decimis persolvendis hic significat aliquid in futurum, qui enim decimam dat, quae est perfectionis signum (eo quod denarius est quodammodo numerus perfectus, quasi primus limes numerorum, ultra quem numerum non procedunt, sed reiterantur ab uno), novem sibi partibus reservatis,

Nietzsche does not seem to think so. “The table of excellences”, which “hangeth over every people” is, relative to the particular. Nietzsche confuses good (morals) with the diversity of customs, which are different in different peoples really. “One goal”, on the other hand, could appear after sublating (taking away) the differences. The notorious sublation is pivotal for the Kantian project de facto, and the Hegelian one explicitly.

According to Thomas, differences are inherent in the nature *diversified by one creative* act of God. The diversity had been planned before the world was created. In the history of the Earth, some 99% of species ceased to exist before Homo sapiens could appear on its surface: perfect not for being able to expand or eliminate anybody *sharing the same biological and rational nature*, but because able to recognize the Transcendent Source of his existence. The sequence was not accidental. Creating new species in the place of those deceased was *planned.*

Human cognition concerns the order of nature and the natural laws consequently too. The Perfect System of values (The Decalogue), and the perfect system of nature appeared only because *One Transcendent Goal had existed before*.

Decalogue helps to ordain every particular way to God. But beside it, the natural reason is capable of the cognizance of the purport of the Decalogue to some extent also. The non-contradiction principle helps us to ordain the world of facts, which is to say: to discover the knowledge about it. Dividing, discrimination and diversity are all instilled in the tissue of science. Science cannot bear the character of unification, Kant thought it should. The Eternal Pea and the Reconciliation at all expense – without abnegating the evil done – is a fake peace, as Augustine says.[161] Moreover, if the peace is not founded upon telling truth from falsity; good from evil; the objects existing beyond the human mind; it leads straightforward to totalitarianism.

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protestatur quasi in quodam signo ad se pertinere imperfectionem, perfectionem vero, quae erat futura per Christum, esse expectandam a Deo. Nec tamen propter hoc est caeremoniale praeceptum, sed iudiciale, ut dictum est.

[161] Augustinus Hipponensis - De Civitate Dei - Liber 19. Pax est in tranquillitate ordinis.

13. 1. Pax itaque corporis est ordinata temperatura partium, pax animae irrationalis ordinata requies appetitionum, pax animae rationalis ordinata cognitionis actionisque consensio, pax corporis et animae ordinata vita et salus animantis, pax hominis mortalis et Dei ordinata in fide sub aeterna lege oboedientia, pax hominum ordinata concordia, pax domus ordinata imperandi atque oboediendi concordia cohabitantium, pax civitatis ordinata imperandi atque oboediendi concordia civium, pax caelestis civitatis ordinatissima et concordissima societas fruendi Deo et invicem in Deo, pax omnium rerum tranquillitas ordinis. Ordo est parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio. Proinde miseri, quia, in quantum miseri sunt, utique in pace non sunt, tranquillitate quidem ordinis carent, ubi perturbatio nulla est; verumtamen quia merito iusteque sunt miseri, in ea quoque ipsa miseria sua praeter ordinem esse non possunt; non quidem coniuncti beatis, sed ab eis tamen ordinis lege seiuncti. Qui cum sine perturbatione sunt, rebus, in quibus sunt, quantacumque congruentia coaptantur; ac per hoc inest eis ordinis nonnulla tranquillitas, inest ergo nonnulla pax. Verum ideo miseri sunt, quia, etsi in aliqua securitate non dolent, non tamen ibi sunt, ubi securi esse ac dolere non debeant; miseriores autem, si pax eis cum ipsa lege non est, qua naturalis ordo administratur. Cum autem dolent, ex qua parte dolent, pacis perturbatio facta est; in illa vero adhuc pax est, in qua nec dolor urit nec compago ipsa dissolvitur. Sicut ergo est quaedam vita sine dolore, dolor autem sine aliqua vita esse non potest: sic est quaedam pax sine ullo bello, bellum vero esse sine aliqua pace non potest; non secundum id, quod bellum est, sed secundum id, quod ab eis vel in eis geritur, quae aliquae naturae sunt; quod nullo modo essent, si non qualicumque pace subsisterent.

Aristotle says that there are two principles in the world: the (human) will and nature. There is, however, no dualism there, and Thomas explains that the human will is a nature too.[162] Hence, any normative sentence can be reduced to the descriptive one without (paradoxically) ceasing to be what it must be: ordaining the human rational nature. "Thou shalt not kill" can be translated into the philosophical tongue as: "killing is contrary to your rational nature"; "it is a non being crippling your being"; "it is possibly destructive of your own being in the end". The nature is knowable, and ethics is subordinate to metaphysics (and thus never opposed to the philosophy of nature). Thus however (if a hierarchy exists amongst sciences), the objects of ethics form the genuine hierarchy of values also.

3. The tropism of the human existence. Values and participation

y might be, and, at the same time, rejecting any objective criterion of what values *must not* be, has been nowadays almost commonly accepted. The *consequent* acceptance of this latitude must lead to undermining all fundaments of the social structure, along with the trust invested in any principles, the principle of toleration (latitude) included. No matter how elaborate, the edifice must be based on natural fundaments. The basis, in abstract philosophical terms, is to be called substantia; hypostasis: the substrate of a definite nature. Axiology (the theory of the forms of values) must be naturalistic in the Greek sense of the word, as any other axiology must allow the possibility of "multiplying the values" and thus relativizing them.

People called in Psalm 76. μονότροποι,[163] agree readily as to one system of values, because, as Augustine says, the Greek τρόποι might be translated into Latin as modi (modes) or mores (morals) (Qui enim graece τρόποι dicuntur, et modi, et mores latine interpretari possunt). Μονότροποι are the people who feel and think the same way. God makes it that those of one habit (equal as to their life-tropism) inhabit one home (Ps 67. 7) and are – as Augustine says – the place God himself inhabits. Albeit God is in every place, the place of those unanimous is special and might be called sacred.[164]

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[162] Summa Theologiae I, q. 41 a. 2 ad 3. Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam voluntas, inquantum est natura quaedam, aliquid naturaliter vult; sicut voluntas hominis naturaliter tendit ad beatitudinem. Et similiter Deus naturaliter vult et amat seipsum.

[163] Salmi 67

1 Εἰς τὸ τέλος· τῷ Δαυιδ ψαλμὸς ᾠδῆς.
4 καὶ οἱ δίκαιοι εὐφρανθήτωσαν, ἀγαλλιάσθωσαν ἐνώπιον τοῦ θεοῦ, τερφθήτωσαν ἐν εὐφροσύνῃ.
5 ᾄσατε τῷ θεῷ, ψάλατε τῷ ὀνόματι αὐτοῦ· ὁδοποιῆσατε τῷ ἐπιβεβηκότι ἐπὶ δυσμῶν, κύριος ὄνομα αὐτῷ, καὶ ἀγαλλιᾶσθε ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ. ταραχθήσονται ἀπὸ προσώπου αὐτοῦ,
6 τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν ὀρφανῶν καὶ κριτοῦ τῶν χηρῶν· ὁ θεὸς ἐν τόπῳ ἁγίῳ αὐτοῦ.
7 ὁ θεὸς κατοικίζει μονοτρόπους ἐν οἴκῳ ἐξάγων πεπεδημένους ἐν ἀνδρείᾳ, ὁμοίως τοὺς παραπικραίνοντας τοὺς κατοικοῦντας ἐν τάφοις.

[164] Augustinus, In Psalmum 67 Enarratio. Locus sanctus Domini est mundum cor.

7. [v 7.] Nam de his orphanis et viduis, id est spei saecularis societate destitutis, Dominus sibi templum fabricat: de quo consequenter dicit: *Dominus, in loco sancto suo.* Quis enim sit locus eius aperuit, cum ait: *Deus qui inhabitare facit unius modi in domo*: unanimes, unum sentientes: iste est locus sanctus Domini. Cum enim

The *real* object of the ultimate perfection accessible to man is the same, albeit the objects actually desired (intended) might be different because of the lack of the due reflection and knowledge. Thus, our attitude to It changes. We happen to inhabit various places, but there is but one homeland we come to existence in, and one (unique) we are about to obtain as the plenitude of existence.

The relation to the end and fostering the same intention might be *imagined* as "turning in a direction". Intentionality is, in phenomenology, a mode of seizing values, and the "turning-to-something" was understood literally. Husserl speaks of the "corporeal presence" of objects. In a uniform magnetic field, ferromagnetic particles align themselves into regular, thread-like structures. The same might be *imagined* about the human desires. Still, the material elements lack memory, because hysteresis of the ferromagnetic is its inertia, whereas the human memory should participate in/of the intellect, because the *active* ability to recall objects to memory seems to safeguard the sameness of the forms of life of the community.

Mos (mores in plural) is the Latin word for the Greek ēthos (written with the long ē). That is why the same long ē appears in the Greek ethica (ἠθικά; ethics). Morality (moral nature, character) is deducible from. In is to be called: "manners and habit of man; his way of speaking and acting, or expressing himself …." To the contrary, ĕthos written with the short ĕ, is broadly: "custom, usage, manner, habit or even *disposition and temper inherited from one's sires*" (Liddel Scott; s.v.)[165]. Dispositions might change according to place and time, because

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dixisset: *Dominus in loco sancto suo*: tamquam requireremus in quo loco, cum ille ubique sit totus, et nullus eum contineat corporalium spatiorum locus, illico subiecit; ne quaeramus eum absque nobis; sed potius *unius modi* habitantes *in domo,* mereamur ut habitare etiam ipse dignetur in nobis. Iste est locus sanctus Domini, quod plerique homines quaerunt, ut habeant ubi orantes exaudiantur. Sint ipsi ergo quod quaerunt; et quae dicunt in cordibus suis, id est in talibus cubilibus suis, compungantur, habitantes *unius modi in domo,* ut a Domino magnae domus inhabitentur, et apud seipsos exaudiantur. Est enim domus magna, in qua non solum aurea vasa sunt et argentea, sed et lignea et fictilia; et alia quidem sunt in honorem, alia in contumeliam: si qui autem mundaverint semetipsos a vasis contumeliae, erunt *unius modi in domo,* et locus sanctus Domini. Nam sicut in magna hominis domo, non in qualicumque loco eius requiescit dominus eius, sed in aliquo utique secretiore et honoratiore loco: sic Deus non in omnibus qui in domo eius sunt habitat (non enim habitat in vasis contumeliae); sed locus sanctus eius sunt quos *habitare facit unius modi,* vel *unius moris in domo.* Qui enim τρόποι graece dicuntur, et modi, et mores latine interpretari possunt. Nec habet graecus: *Qui inhabitare facit;* sed tantum, *habitare facit. Dominus* ergo *in loco sancto suo.* Quis est locus iste? Ipse Deus eum sibi facit. Deus enim *habitare facit unius moris in domo*: hic est locus sanctus eius.

[165] Super Sent., lib. 3 d. 23 q. 1 a. 4 qc. 2 c. 5 Unde et dicuntur mores animalium ea quae proveniunt in ipsis ex passionibus appetitivae partis, sicut quod solicitantur circa filios, et quod repugnant, et hujusmodi: sicut patet in 9 de animalibus quamvis in eis dicantur mores magis secundum similitudinem quam secundum proprietatem: quia non agunt quasi dominium suorum actuum habentia, sed magis a natura aguntur, ut dicit Damascenus. Et sic etiam apud Graecos hoc nomen ethos dupliciter sumitur: et secundum quod importat diuturnitatem quamdam, dicitur febris Ethica: secundum autem quod importat morem secundo modo acceptum, dicitur scientia Ethica, quam nos moralem dicimus. Sic ergo loquendo de more actus, ita se habet ad hoc quod sit moralis, sicut se habet ad voluntatem et appetitum.

Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 58 a. 1 c. Et hae quidem duae significationes in nullo distinguuntur, apud Latinos, quantum ad vocem. In Graeco autem distinguuntur, nam ethos, quod apud nos morem significat, quandoque habet primam longam, et scribitur per eta, Graecam litteram; quandoque habet primam correptam, et scribitur per epsilon. Dicitur autem virtus moralis a more, secundum quod mos significat quandam inclinationem naturalem, vel quasi naturalem, ad aliquid agendum.

they are accidental forms of good actions. Still, they cannot be changed chaotically and without preserving those traditional ones: the change for better implies that the starting point is good to some extent at least. The attempt to implement some medieval customs (ĕthe) now, might seem bizarre, but some philosophers (Scheler, Berdyaev) did no doubt in the value of the ethos (ēthos) of the middle ages.

The universality is founded upon the unity of desires, but does not exclude the multiplicity of the starting points nonetheless. Before we come to the state of consummation, we become (come to existence) as e.g. Poles, Americans, Arabs … etc.

The modern globalization tends to imposing by force one privileged (for some quaint reasons) system of values, which are called (abusively) the Western Values. The same Western Values patronized shameful colonization and exploitation of some countries in the 19th century. They *pretended* to be the genuine heritage of Europe so as to cover up common greed, hubris and arrogance: fostered by the institutions of enlightenment. *The genuine heritage of Europe was her calling*: *to pass over the universal values of Christendom.* Many *genuine* Europeans fulfilled the calling in the spirit of sacrifice, repentance, humility and charity. For the majority however, these values ("monkish virtues", as Hume has it) seemed hopelessly outdated. Nothing, however, changed (for better) really in the moment hypocritical evaluation of "Eurocentrism" appeared. The ideas of the enlightenment have been *radicalized in it; not changed*.

The actual form of the so called Western Values is accidental only; it has appeared in the effect of Europe's losing its ancient identity. The fundament of those Values is the Kantian agnosticism. Once the biological substrate of the human nature had been rejected, the humanity of one's actions was witnessed only, whereas the biological nature of man might be mercilessly trampled upon. It might be doubted whether ethos should be, in that case, written with long or short vowel. The vowel in ἠθικά; ethics; is called long out of nature (naturā longa) in Greek and Latin.

Formalism equaled with Gleichschaltung aims at abolishing subjectivism contrary to it, because it tries to abolish the subjectiveness of *natural subjects* (substrates of humanity), remaining tolerant of the other forms of subjectivism. The cognizance of things beyond phenomena is connatural to man (a substrate of rational humanity), albeit the cognizance of the phenomena might be closer to the "animal consciousness" indeed. Man (the rational being) searches for the cognizance of the substances, but deprived of the *philosophy* of substance (Aristotle's metaphysics is this) turns to the vulgar subjectivism of what is called naturalism abusively only.

The boundaries of the allegedly superior values are those of the countries civilized according to the principles of the philosophy of enlightenment. The boundaries tend to expand in place, but it is impossible to expand these boundaries in time also. The boundaries seem to fence off the barbarian outskirts of the "civilized world" as well as the modern progressive "Now" from the barbaric past of the "Dark Ages", but it is impossible to fence off

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Thomas differentiates but changes letters: Aristotle's' „Ethics" is, obviously, written with the long ē. Sententia Ethic., lib. 2 l. 1 n. 3. Et inde est quod nomen virtutis moralis sumitur a consuetudine, parum inde declinans. Nam in Graeco ethos per E breve scriptum significat morem sive moralem virtutem, ythos autem scripta per Y Graecum quod est quasi E longum significat consuetudinem. Sicut etiam apud nos nomen moris quandoque significat consuetudinem, quandoque autem id quod pertinet ad vitium vel virtutem.

the future in the same way. Some "undemocratic" countries might be tried to be compelled to accept the "standards of democracy" (whatever the meaning of the word), but their inhabitants, disrespectful of the grandiose "superiority of the Western Values", cannot be compelled to accept them *willingly*, because it implies contradiction. The principle of non-contradiction plays, practically, no role in Kantianism, and thus does not seem to bother much the inhabitants of the Kantian world, but beyond its actual boundaries, the natural world exists impervious to the generosity of the modern ideas.

The Greek philosophy, the Roman law and, first of all, Christianity, which *uses them both*, is really superior to the natural state of humanity. The alleged barbarians could have accepted them all with gratitude only. But *they could not accept forged values*, a caricature of these original ones.

People who are about to live on Earth in – say – fifty years cannot be made to desire the same progressive values which are acknowledged commonly now for the simple reason those values are going to appear as hopelessly outdated after the fifty years, as those past appear passé to the progressivists now.

Man's will cannot be compelled so even if the Kantian ethics is the ethics of compulsion. Man's intellect is actually forced to accept necessary conclusions, but no one can be compelled to use his/her own intellect (in fact many dread the very perspective). The *law-giving* "practical reason" is meant to replace, in Kant, the free will. The conclusions the intellect arrives at suggest the objects of the possible choice (a value) to the human will, but never compel it to choose them. One can be made to fall if pushed (physically), and to feel sometimes against his/her inner mental disposition, because unable defend himself effectively enough from the importunate advertisements or the so called "music". Irrationalism and Emotivism is founded upon the possibility to taper with emotions and is part of the contemporary commercialization of human culture. Trading goods or even political ideas as must-haves might seem successful *for a short spell of time*, but not for the long run. It is impossible to create a "new brave world" with the people in it conventionally smiling and conventionally thoughtless. People are *out of their nature* more than "consumers" of ideas and material goods.

Globalization of the modern times, aims at vindicating its universality (and objective value), but is a form of subjectivism nonetheless, and it is as it must have been: it is impossible to live in the world deprived of any form of subjectiveness. The problem consists in that the traditional personalism: the philosophy of the rational substrates (subjects) of humanity was replaced by the transcendental subjectiveness equaled to subjectivism. The modern subjectivism was founded upon rejecting the traditional philosophy of substance. The universal values were jettisoned without rational premises, because a rationalist is bound to reject everything which seems to contradict his/her principles accepted a priori. Kant was ignorant of the past philosophy, because all rationalists despise the heritage of the past. The inferiority of its value had been taken for granted.

The idea of unification might well resemble some ideas Plato espoused, but is rather an heir to the Neo-Platonist medieval Arab philosophy. Averroists, in the Arab world, despised the naïve religious beliefs of the masses, but could not liberate themselves from the influence of that "religion" nonetheless. The boundaries of the modern ideas of enlightenment

overlap, roughly speaking, with the scope of the actual influence of this "religion" in the West.

Values, in that paradigm, occupy one privileged place, which is the superlunary Intelligence in Avicenna; the transcendental ideal in Kant, substantiated in the Prussian State, or even in the other more "modern" one.

Scheler accepts the idea of the "revelation" if "independent of its specific meaning and significance in positive religions"; he applauds the "revelation" of the enlightened "reason" even if rejecting the "achievements" of the Epoch:

> … the concept of "revelation" … indicates that objective truths and values which presuppose a highly developed gift of cognition and feeling can be communicated to another group that has no organ for their original apprehension. This group must "believe" what others "see." …"revelation" is a fundamental concept of … every genuine human civilization. It … is the decisive criterion—and not the question whether an affirmation corresponds to a "universal capacity."[166]

According to the *Latin* Averroists, the ordinary Christian must believe in what "philosophers" are supposed to know. Modernists, the Averroists of our time, despise the Scripture too if it seems to contradict their "knowledge".[167] There is, allegedly, one and unique source of science and good alike, and those enlightened are the necessary intermediary between the source and the unenlightened masses. (Scheler does not endorse the ideas of the enlightenment in bulk, but follows the principles nonetheless).

The natural dispositions are of no account for rationalists. Revelation is identified with enlightenment and the Averroists draw ultimate conclusions from the fact. The Giver of Forms exists in a privileged place. From a privileged "center of humanity", legislative acts emanate so as to enlighten those in dark. All forms (of good and truth alike) stem from the Centre, and the nature is expected to accept them willingly, because *devoid of any forms*. The rude are to be "trained" so as accept them.

According to Augustine, "seminal reasons" ("germinal principles") exist in the entire nature. The nature is "pregnant" with them. According to Thomas, the actual forms of human actions are similar to the inchoative forms existing in human nature before.[168] Humans cannot

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[166] Max Scheler, Ressentiment. Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen, Translated by Louis A. Coser from the text of 1915. V. Ressentiment and other value shifts in modern morality. 2. The subjectivization of values. Access 2026-02-17
chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://mercaba.org/SANLUIS/Filosofia/autores/Contempor%C3%A1nea/Scheller/Ressentiment.pdf

[167] Pascendi dominici gregis, Summi Pontificis Pius PP. X, De modernistarum doctrinis.

[168] Super Sent., lib. 3 d. 33 q. 1 a. 2 qc. 2 c. Ad secundam quaestionem dicendum est, quod quidam philosophi, quos sequitur Avicenna, posuerunt omnes formas esse a datore, et quod agens naturale non facit nisi dispositionem ad formas illas; et similiter etiam dicit Avicenna, quod scientia et virtus sunt a dator, et per studium et exercitium disponitur anima ad recipiendum influxum dictorum habituum. Haec autem positio t ollit naturalem virtutem, quae inest cuilibet principio naturali ad faciendum sibi simile, secundum quod materia in quam agit, est receptiva suae similitudinis.

be "made to act", because they cannot be "made" at all in the way rationalists (social engineers) thought is possible.

Logos (the Second Person of Trinity) is the ultimate end of the Christian's life. The humanity of Christ (according to the First Epistle to Timotheus (3.5), *is a means* to this end. According to Augustine, Logos (Christ) enlightens our minds in the supernatural order. According to Aristotle, the active intellect enlightens phantasms in the act of abstraction. In either case, however, the enlightenment is a personal act; the act sustained by the hypostasis of the rational nature.

Thomas says that *besides* virtues – not instead of them – we have the Gifts of the Spirit, which are more than virtues, because enabling us to elicit the acts of the most important virtues (those which have God for their object). They make us docible to the promptings of the Holy Ghost (in ordine ad finem ultimum supernaturalem, ad quem ratio movet secundum quod est aliqualiter et imperfecte formata per virtutes theologicas, non sufficit ipsa motio rationis, nisi desuper adsit instinctus et motio Spiritus Sancti).[169]

In Avicenna and those who followed suit, the enlightenment is a-personal activity of the transcendental cosmic Intelligence. There is no *natural* difference between the natural and the supernatural there, as the latter is defined as sheer privation of the former. The collectivism and monopsychism of Averroists is a radicalization of the stance. The supernatural in Marx is called the superstructure.

The distinction of two forms of knowledge (and two kinds of wisdom and of two sources of cognition) is pivotal for Thomas, but dropped by rationalists. They blurred the distinction so that a hybrid appeared which is neither philosophy nor religion.

Transcending the state of crude nature must be, for a man civilized after modern fashion, tantamount to destroying this nature, which is clearly visible in the classic Marxism and in Neo-Marxism. They both harbor spontaneous idiosyncrasy towards what might have existed apart from their "principles", in *the specifically diversified* and created nature. There are, really, rational premises to accept the divine Revelation, but the rationalist premises demand to accept its substitute only: the enlightenment.

People happen to "chose new homelands" and are expected to accept morals (ēthē) observed therein so as to actively participate. Still, the problem of the aforementioned "vowel length" of the first letter appears. Either the values of the country are accepted as potentially universal, because founded upon rational natural principles, or vindicate some privileged position by being institutionally sanctioned only.

In the 19th century a shift of the meaning of universality occurred. The West had been legatee to the tradition before, but then, tried to discount this position for some petty material goals. The Western universality was; is; and is going to be; a *duty to propagate the universal tradition to all man-kind*, but became unheeded a privileged place and *usurped the right* to superiority. Practically, the globalist humanism is only the cover up for common greed and the lust for life. "All men will be brethren", but the form of the brotherhood was institutionally prescribed by the center of the humanity.

"Society" is a collective noun, but "societas" in Latin stems from (the concrete) "socius" (comrade) and "sociare" (to communicate with). The "brotherhood" must be (if ever)

[169] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 88 a. 2; aa. 1; 3.

understood accordingly. It is not a thing (an object) first, but a free act of persons willing to communicate and participate. Tropism of the human existence consists in cherishing the same hopes and desires, and the sameness is only possible in reference to the same Transcendent Cause, which fulfills the desires. The laws of the (created) nature and the Law of the (creating) Nature must be observed; the beginning and the End must mark the natural outlines of the way. The desires, however, happened to be, in history, tried to be institutionally unified. The natural in man was blatantly disrespected and coerced in the Marxist states.

Society, however, might have another meaning also. Two thousand years ago Logos assumed the human nature in the act of "solidarity" with the human kind. Christ's humanity was accepted, but not changed by its being accepted; it was (is) integral. The actual integrity of the humanity is, then, to be searched in this Source:

> Now, the same comparison stands between the whole of the present life and the earthly state as between the whole of eternity and the society of the blessed who, as we showed above, possess their last end eternally. Therefore, he that sins against his last end, and against charity, which is the bond of the society of the blessed and of those who are tending to beatitude, ought to be punished eternally, although his sins may have occupied but a short time.[170]

> For in order that man may do well, whether in the works of the active life, or in those of the contemplative life, he needs the fellowship of friends.
> But if we speak of perfect happiness which will be in our heavenly Fatherland, the fellowship of friends is not essential to happiness; since man has the entire fullness of his perfection in God. But the fellowship of friends conduces to the well-being of happiness.[171]

> [In] 1 Cor. 1:9. … it is written: *God is faithful, by Whom you are called unto the fellowship of His Son.* Now this fellowship of man with God, which consists in a certain familiar colloquy with Him, is begun here, in this life, by grace, but will be perfected in the future life, by glory; each of which things we hold by faith and hope. Wherefore just as friendship with a person would be impossible, if one disbelieved in, or despaired of, the possibility of their fellowship or familiar colloquy; so too, friendship with God, which is charity, is impossible without faith, so as to believe in this fellowship and colloquy with God, and to hope to attain to this fellowship.[172]

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[170] Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 144 n. 4. Eadem autem est comparatio totius vitae praesentis ad rempublicam terrenam, et totius aeternitatis ad societatem beatorum, qui, ut supra ostensum est, ultimo fine aeternaliter potiuntur. Qui ergo contra ultimum finem peccat, et contra caritatem, per quam est societas beatorum et tendentium in beatitudinem, in aeternum debet puniri, quamvis aliqua brevi temporis mora peccaverit.

[171] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 4 a. 8 c. Indiget enim homo ad bene operandum auxilio amicorum, tam in operibus vitae activae, quam in operibus vitae contemplativae. Sed si loquamur de perfecta beatitudine quae erit in patria, non requiritur societas amicorum de necessitate ad beatitudinem, quia homo habet totam plenitudinem suae perfectionis in Deo. Sed ad bene esse beatitudinis facit societas amicorum.

[172] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 65 a. 5 c. Et I ad Cor. I dicitur, fidelis Deus, per quem vocati estis in societatem filii eius. Haec autem societas hominis ad Deum, quae est quaedam familiaris conversatio cum ipso, inchoatur quidem hic in praesenti per gratiam, perficietur autem in futuro per gloriam, quorum utrumque fide et spe tenetur. Unde sicut aliquis non posset cum aliquo amicitiam habere, si discrederet vel desperaret se posse habere

Mental endowment of man enabling him/her to participate in the life of Logos must be (if real) a gift, which transcends the capacity of the human nature infinitely. It must be *supernatural in relation* to the human nature. But the claim that God in himself is supernatural is bereft of sense, albeit those who followed Avicenna seem to advance the sentiment.[173] Man's transcending his/her nature is precisely directed by God. It cannot be carried out either blindfolded or with horse blinds on.

Values in those whom followed Avicenna seem to be similar to lines protracted to infinity, but deprived of any definite beginning. Principles, in the Greek philosophy, *must* be definite. There are, in us, natural principles of acting called virtues (virtus; ἀρετή). Ethics must be material, but – so to say – "more material" than Scheler thought. It is the problem how the substrate of actions is to be understood. In Thomas, the substrate is ultimately the hypostasis of the human nature, and the virtues (the abilities to act) stick in it. Acting consists in transcending a privation connected *accidentally* with this nature, but existing in a definite nature nonetheless. The meanders (ĕthe) of the human life are to be straightened not according to any transcendental ideal: "the basis for the comprehensive determination of a thing" (Kant, Critique, A 571-580), but by the Transcendent Cause respecting the order of Its acting, which is to say: according to the natural law.

The moral relativism affects first of all those uprooted (déraciné) from their natural abodes. Trees happen to be uprooted literally when deprived of the possibility to take roots, but the term applies to humans also. They happen to be displaced from their native or habitual surroundings.[174] Human existence is not necessarily connected with any material place, but can be *conditionally* so: as being rooted in the "innate" dispositions suggests the way from a closer homeland to the perfect one. We (all of us) are specifically humans out of necessity, but we (each of us) are hypostases of the human nature because our humanity is individualized by the place we come to existence (materia signata).

Still, uprooted (déraciné) means eventually "removed or destroyed utterly".[175] Perhaps, we might live in any place, but deprived of *any* place is tantamount to destruction. Relativism is a form of destruction. Not only (mainly) the destruction of the civilization is meant. The destruction of the way to the Transcendence counts infinitely more.

A line can be drawn and the nature of the starting point it originates from not reflected upon. It is, however, impossible to "draw a life line" without determining the starting point

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aliquam societatem vel familiarem conversationem cum ipso; ita aliquis non potest habere amicitiam ad Deum, quae est caritas, nisi fidem habeat, per quam credat huiusmodi societatem et conversationem hominis cum Deo, et speret se ad hanc societatem pertinere.

[173] De ente et essentia, cap. 4. Invenitur enim triplex modus habendi essentiam in substantiis. Aliquid enim est, sicut Deus, cuius essentia est ipsummet suum esse; et ideo inveniuntur aliqui philosophi dicentes quod
Deus non habet quiditatem vel essentiam, quia essentia sua non est aliud quam esse eius. Et ex hoc sequitur quod ipse non sit in genere, quia omne quod est in genere oportet quod habeat quiditatem praeter esse suum, cum quiditas vel natura generis aut speciei non distinguatur secundum rationem naturae in illis, quorum est genus vel species, sed esse est diversum in diversis

[174] Collins dictionary online.

[175] Ibid.

first; the nature virtue. It is, then, impossible to understand what values should be without understanding first whence good originates from.

> Although virtue makes the person who has it good and renders his work good, nevertheless, the accounts of goodness and virtue are not the same. For virtue is said according as it is the principle of action, and stands in the role of an efficient cause; but good rather regards the account of the end. But since the effect must be proportionate to the end, and from this the one acting acquires goodness, as does his act, this is why virtue, which bears this proportion, since it is the disposition of the perfect to the best, as it says in the Physics 7, is said to make the agent and the act good. [176]

The virtue is what it is and does not allow being "more" or "less", for the change would have destroyed its specific nature. It is defined as the "disposition of the good towards the best" (dispositio boni ad optimum.[177]). Still, the disposition can be more or less rooted in the human nature, and the moral progress consists in "taking roots" in the rational nature.

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[176] Super Sent., lib. 4 d. 46 q. 1 a. 1 qc. 2 ad 1. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quamvis virtus faciat bonum habentem, et opus reddat bonum; non tamen est eadem ratio bonitatis et virtutis; quia virtus dicitur secundum quod est principium actionis, et tenet se ex parte causae efficientis; sed bonum magis respicit rationem finis. Sed quia effectus debet esse fini proportionatus, et ex hoc efficiens bonitatem sortitur, et actus ejus; ideo virtus, quae hanc proportionem importat cum sit dispositio perfecti ad optimum, ut dicitur in 7 Phys. dicitur facere bonum agentem et actum.

[177] Super Sent., lib. 3 d. 24 q. 1 a. 3 qc. 2 c. Et propter hoc illa quae sunt optima, non laudantur, sed honorantur. Et quia virtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum, ut dicitur in 7 Physic. ideo proprie actus virtutis laudabilis est. Nostra autem naturalis cognitio se habet ad divinam sicut ad superiorem; et ideo cum ratio nostra divinae consentit, actus laudabilis est, sicut cum irascibilis subditur rationi; et ideo credere veritati primae in his quae non videntur, laudabile est, et opus meritorium, et opus virtutis.

Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 49 a. 2 c. Non autem consideratur in his aliquid pertinens ad rationem boni vel mali, quia motus et passiones non habent rationem finis, bonum autem et malum dicitur per respectum ad finem. Sed modus et determinatio subiecti in ordine ad naturam rei, pertinet ad primam speciem qualitatis, quae est habitus et dispositio, dicit enim philosophus, in VII Physic. loquens de habitibus animae et corporis, quod sunt dispositiones quaedam perfecti ad optimum; dico autem perfecti, quod est dispositum secundum naturam. Et qui a ipsa forma et natura rei est finis et cuius causa fit aliquid, ut dicitur in II Physic. ideo in prima specie consideratur et bonum et malum; et etiam facile et difficile mobile, secundum quod aliqua natura est finis generationis et motus.

Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 71 a. 1 c. In essentia quidem virtutis aliquid considerari potest directe; et aliquid ex consequenti. Directe quidem virtus importat dispositionem quandam alicuius convenienter se habentis secundum modum suae naturae, unde philosophus dicit, in VII Physic. quod virtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum; dico autem perfecti, quod est dispositum secundum naturam. Ex consequenti autem sequitur quod virtus sit bonitas quaedam, in hoc enim consistit uniuscuiusque rei bonitas, quod convenienter se habeat secundum modum suae naturae.

Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 23 a. 7 c. Bonum autem secundarium et quasi particulare hominis potest esse duplex, unum quidem quod est vere bonum, utpote ordinabile, quantum est in se, ad principale bonum, quod est ultimus finis; aliud autem est bonum apparens et non verum, quia abducit a finali bono. Sic igitur patet quod virtus vera simpliciter est illa quae ordinat ad principale bonum hominis, sicut etiam philosophus, in VII Physic. dicit quod virtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum. Et sic nulla vera virtus potest esse sine caritate.

De virtutibus, q. 1 a. 1 c. Quia vero operatio est finis operantis, cum omnis res, secundum philosophum

Nature, however, is not a monolith. There is – for humans – the proper and specific nature. The natural disasters (elementary natural actions) are not connatural to men obviously enough. Rationalism, on the other hand, can be called a "super-natural disaster".[178]

Every "non-crippled being" tries to participate in resemblance of the first Being by producing its like (De anima, II 4). But the participation is more than it was originally in Plato; it is not about extension, but about being rooted in. It is impossible (Aristotle says) to gauge being with the yardstick of extension, because beings are specifically (qualitatively) different (πολλαχοῦ λέγεται τὸ ὄν). It is, then, impossible "to be more" (or less for that matter too), but it is possible to live more intensely.

Existence (life) has a manifold meaning too. For man, "to live" is the same as "to be" (vivere est viventibus esse).[179] "To live" means for humans to partake of *their proper* acts of existence, which does not allow "more" or "less" indeed, but it does mean also to partake in

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in I caeli et mundi, sit propter suam operationem, sicut propter finem proximum; unumquodque est bonum, secundum quod habet completum ordinem ad suum finem. Inde est quod virtus bonum facit habentem, et opus eius reddit bonum, ut dicitur in II Ethic. et per hunc etiam modum patet quod est dispositio perfecti ad optimum, ut dicitur in VII Metaph. Et haec omnia conveniunt virtuti cuiuscumque rei.

[178] Super Sent., lib. 3 d. 23 q. 1 a. 3 qc. 1 c. Sed quia non potest aliquid alteri violentiam inferre nisi per potentiam perfectam, secundum quam agat et non patiatur; inde tractum est nomen virtutis ad significandum omnem potentiam perfectam, sive qua potest aliquid in seipso subsistere, sive qua potest operari: et sic dicitur in 1 Cael. et Mund. quod virtus est ultimum potentiae: quia perfectio potentiae mensuratur ex ultimo et maximo quod quis potest. Et quia malum in actu contingit ex defectu potentiae agentis, ideo ad perfectionem potentiae exigitur quod bene operetur in suo genere: et propter hoc in 2 Ethic. dicitur, quod virtus est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus ejus bonum reddit; et in 6 Physicor. dicitur quod virtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum, eorum scilicet ad quae potentia se extendit. Et quia de virtutibus humanis loquimur; ideo virtus humana erit quae perficiet humanam potentiam ad actum bonum et optimum.

But something cannot impose violence on something else unless it has a perfect power, so that it acts and is not acted upon; and for this reason, the name *virtus* has been expanded into meaning every perfect power by which something can either subsist in itself, or by which it can work. Accordingly, it says in On the Heavens 1, that a *virtus* is the furthest extent of a power: because the perfection of a power is measured by the last and greatest that it can do. Now, badness in an act happens from a defect in the power that is acting, and therefore, the perfection of a power requires that it work well in its genus. And this is why it says in the Ethics 2 that virtus or virtue is what makes the one who has it good and renders his work good, and in the Physics 6 it says that virtue is the disposition of some complete thing to its best, in those things that a power extends to. And since we are speaking of human virtues, human virtue will be what perfects or completes a human power for a good act and for its best. However, since a human being is human by having reason and understanding, the human powers are the ones that are rational in some way, either by their essence, like the ones in the intellective part, or by participation, like the ones that are in the sensitive part obeying reason. Now, as was said before, these powers cannot be determined to good acts by the nature of the power, and in fact, they cannot be perfectly determined except by a habit. Therefore, human virtues, which is what we are speaking about, are not powers but habits (Fathers of the English Dominican Province).

[179] Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 38 q. 1 a. 2 ad 3. Ad tertium dicendum, quod vita dicitur dupliciter. Uno enim modo vita idem est quod esse viventis; ut in 2 de anima dicitur, quod vivere viventibus est esse; et hoc modo vita hominis relinquitur ex conjunctione animae ad corpus, et vita aeterna ex aeterna conjunctione utriusque: et hoc modo vita aeterna non est finis rectarum voluntatum. Alio modo dicitur vita operatio rei viventis: et hoc modo vita aeterna dicitur operatio perfecta, qua homines beati in aeternum Deum videbunt, secundum quod dicitur Joan. 17, 9: *haec est vita aeterna ut cognoscant te solum Deum verum, et quem misisti Jesum Christum.*

the proper principles of acting, which, however, are not so proper that not communicable with others. They are not individualized in the way a personal act of existence must be, but are specific nonetheless.

Every being, according to Thomas, participates, first of all, in/of its own act of being, but in/of accidental forms subsequently, too. God – to the contrary – does not participate in being. He *is* being. The truth is hardly expressible in English, in which "being" is a participle. God Is without restriction and without "tending to being" (which must be the case in every created being), which is expressed by the technical term Ipsum Esse Subsistens, in which Esse is an infinitive. This sublime truth – Haec sublimis veritas – was revealed to Moses on the Mount Sinai.[180], but is, to some extent at least, knowable for the pure human reason. God IS (absolutely) so that He *is*, consequently: good, wise, true or rather He is: Goodness, Wisdom and Truth in the absolute sense of the word. These perfections are identified with his being and nature.

People happen to participate in these perfections via principles which are (made) connatural in them (they cannot participate in/of them immediately). Metaphysics proves that God is the Self-Subsisting being. Ethics says, on the other hand, that human principles of participation in/of the Fullness; the human virtues; are to be called values in relation to their End.

All perfections exist in God as exemplar ideas: the ideal forms of the human life. The inequality in partaking thereof stems from them being unequally rooted in the human life.

No one comes to existence with inborn aptitudes to moral actions, albeit some somatic and emotional dispositions are inherited indeed. The dispositions suggest only the way to be embarked on, but not determine its course. They are rather a material to be worked on. They cannot be easily disposed of, but must be carefully examined nonetheless.

The end of this personal moral labor – according to Aristotle – is happiness, but we do no advance to it unassisted. Friends are of great avail to attain the end. Social and national bonds, by the mere fact of being enduring enough, suggest the possible direction (τρόπος). People then turn (τρέπουσι) to the same (μόνῳ) good, and thus become μονότροποι. The rational nature is a fundament to be preserved unreservedly, but what accrues to it must be examined as to its ability and firmness in leading to the Ultimate End of human life.

Beside those advancing the same end (μονότροποι) we meet aliens to our culture too. The Greek culture was, however, exceptional in this respect. It is astonishing for its ability to assimilate the inventions of the other cultures without losing its own identity. Greeks imprinted on them their individual mark. The alphabet we use it the best example thereof. Sill, natural boundaries must have impeded this enculturation. The ancient Greek could never become universal, unless it became the "Greek of the New Covenant".

In Homer's Odyssey, Odysseus is called *πολύ*τροπος (well-traveled; street-smart), because "turning amongst many cultures".[181] The Odyssey is the poem of return and of a

[180] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 22 n. 10. Hanc autem sublimem veritatem Moyses a domino est edoctus, qui cum quaereret a domino, Exod. 3 dicens: si dixerint ad me filii Israel, quod nomen eius? Quid dicam eis?

[181] Liddel-Scott: πολυ-τροπία, ἡ, I. *versatility, craft,* II. *multifariousness, variety*.

failure at the same time. Odysseus returns to his homeland, but loses all his comrades (Odys., I, 1-13). It is the icon of the Western Civilization. The homeland we came to existence in was marked by the sign of our belonging to Christianity. Still, "we expect a better homeland" (Hebrews 11:16), because we see now but in part (1 Corinthians 13:12) and are being apprehensive of the failure.

God reveals Himself so as to make us able to come (to return) to the Other Side. People advancing to It, albeit previously even alien, by the mere fact of turning in the same direction, will be called μονότροποι. This revelation is *His* enlightenment.

The rationalist enlightenment usurps the divine authority, and is, at the same time, disrespectful of the human natural endowment (it cannot create it). God never changes the algorithm of His actions and respects what he has done before (created). The mildness and strength of this Natural Principle is in sharp contrast to the arrogance and debility of the rationalist enlightenment with its allegedly superior values.

The real values are measured by the firmness of their participation in/of being. We are what we are, but we are not what we do or think: the actions we undertake enrich *accidentally* only our nature and substitute – on the part of the objects they aim at – what *lacks in subjects* that carry them out. We cannot find the perfection immanent to our nature save in its Transcendent Cause. The most important actions have It for their end.

Albeit the forms of the participation might be manifold, the substratum of the participation is one and the same and founded in the unity of a substance: a hypostasis of rational nature. This nature is individualized by the place we come to existence, by the place we are born in; by the "matter" called by Scholastics materia signata. This accounts for the multiplicity of persons endowed with individual intellects (Avicenna failed to account for the multiplicity). The intellect of this or that man is "signated" by the unique place he/she comes to existence (his/her homeland).

The relation of the created being to its Creator is, thus, defined both as to the beginning and the end; by coming to existence and by the attaining the plenitude of existence. Tropism of the human existence consists in turning towards God, and the turning might be shared with the others. Thus, we are in the relation to God, albeit, strictly speaking, the Spirit we are rooted in is the Self-Subsisting Relation Itself: the Third Person of Trinity.

πολύ-τροπος, ον, (τρέπω) *much-turned, i.e. much-travelled, much-wandering*, epith. of Odysseus, Od.1.1, 10.330.II. *turning many ways: metaph., shifty, versatile, wily*, of Hermes, and in this sense Plato took the word as applied to Odysseus, Hp.Mi.364e (Sup.), al.; τὸ π. τῆς γνώμης their *versatility* of mind, Th.3.83; *fickle*, ὅμιλος ; of diseases, *changeful, complicated*,. III. *various, manifold*, Adv. πολυτρό-πως *in many manners*.

Chapter III. PRODUCING

1. Reality of products and the wealth of people

Producing is a significant (or even a predominant) part of human activity. We live nowadays mostly in cities amongst objects composed artificially; produced in them. Still, the difference between, especially, living beings and artificial ones is easily perceptible. Living things are apparently not composed by humans. However, some believe that elementary bodies can be composed after all, as producing e.g. gold synthetically is theoretically possible. Still, we produce using "matter", which has both natural and elementary structure. The most commanding technologic achievements came after discovering the *undoubtedly elementary* structure of matter. Producing consists in composting (and decomposing to some extent too). Albeit some believe that the so called "evolution" produces in the way humans do, *natural begetting follows a principle immanent to a specific nature.* Natural things come to existence by the principles immanent to their nature, whereas, the forms introduced to products stem from without. The human intellect is able to trigger the production, and the produced is dissimilar to his intellect, but similar to the form abstracted from the elementary matter.

Natural elements are no doubt real. But artificial products are not real in the strict sense of the word. An artificial product is a composition of elements, and the form imposed by composing is – according to Thomas – accidental.[182] We might mistakenly imagine that we

[182] Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 36 q. 2 a. 1 c. Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut formae artificiales habent duplex esse, unum in actu secundum quod sunt in materia, aliud in potentia secundum quod sunt in mente artificis, non quidem in potentia passiva, sed activa; ita etiam formae materiales habent duplex esse, ut dicit Commentator in 11 Metaph. unum in actu secundum quod in rebus sunt; et aliud in potentia activa secundum quod sunt in motoribus orbium, ut ipse ponit, et praecipue in primo motore, loco cujus nos in Deo dicimus. Unde apud omnes philosophos communiter dicitur quod omnia sunt in mente Dei, sicut artificiata in mente artificis; et ideo formas rerum in Deo existentes ideas dicimus, quae sunt sicut formae operativae.

Super Sent., lib. 4 d. 1 q. 1 a. 1 qc. 5 ad 1. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicut formae artificiales sunt accidentales, tamen in artificialibus tota substantia est materia, et propter hoc praedicatur, ut dicatur, phiala est aurum […]

Summa Theologiae III, q. 66 a. 4 c. […] Ars autem deficit ab operatione naturae, quia natura dat formam substantialem, quod ars facere non potest, sed omnes formae artificiales sunt accidentales; […]

De potentia, q. 3 a. 8 arg. 5. […] formae artificiales non habent causam in subiecto, sed sunt totaliter ab extrinseco […]

Quaestio de anima, a. 10 ad 16. Ad decimumsextum dicendum quod forma domus, sicut et, aliae formae artificiales est forma accidentalis: unde non dat esse et speciem toti et cuilibet parti; neque totum est unum simpliciter, sed unum aggregatione […]

De principiis naturae, cap. 1. Sicut quando ex cupro fit idolum, cuprum quod est potentia ad formam idoli, est materia; hoc autem quod est infiguratum sive indispositum, dicitur privatio; figura autem a qua dicitur idolum, est forma, non autem substantialis quia cuprum ante adventum formae seu figurae habet esse in actu, et eius esse

are able to form e.g. a stone (when carving it) or water (pouring it into a container which provides it a form), but the most complex forms of nature (e.g. plants or animals) cannot be deemed to be "superadded" to natural stuff in the human way. Nature is not to be deemed to act anthropomorphically: generating cannot be reduced to building. Building in humans requires the knowledge of *purely* elementary forms: the nuclear fissure of atoms is possible, but the fissure of elementary particles is not. The undoubtedly elementary is indivisible in se. The undoubtedly real cannot be composed too.

The accidental forms (according to Aristotle) accrue to a substratum without changing its nature (its identity). The contrary is the case with the substantial forms. The prime mater (not a "stuff", but pure potentiality) is given actuality by the substantial form, which is considerably more than its *outer shape*. The identity of *the things composed naturally* is natural too.

Arguing with the first philosophers of nature, Aristotle objects that the forms of theirs are in fact accidental only and superadded to the Urstoff (called then arché). In effect, their Urstoff only exits in the stronger sense of the word,[183] whereas the principle of existence of e.g. this or that animal is purely incidental. Forms (in such a philosophy) are not different as to their nobility. Splitting e.g. a stone would be no different to e.g. splitting a dog's pate.

The problem, however, seems to be even more serious if the human existence is concerned. Rational soul is its *natural* principle. Some artificial, however, ideas seemed to "enrich" it (if added) so much that constituting its identity. Human existence must be personal (without being artificially "personalized") so as to be the existence of this or that man. It must be more than just a modification of the Urstoff if the dignity (and the integrity) of this or that man is concerned apart from its alleged market value (resulting from producing).

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non dependet ab illa figura; sed est forma accidentalis. Omnes enim formae artificiales sunt accidentales. Ars enim non operatur nisi supra id quod iam constitutum est in esse perfecto a natura.

De operationibus occultis naturae. […] formae artificiales sunt accidentia quae non consequuntur speciem: […] forma artificialium nihil aliud sit quam ordo, compositio et figura […]

Sentencia De anima, lib. 2 l. 2 n. 1. […] formae artificiales accidentia sunt, quae sunt magis nota, quoad nos, quam formae substantiales, utpote sensui propinquiora: ideo convenienter rationem animae, quae est forma substantialis, per comparationem ad formas accidentales manifestat. […]

Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 7 l. 2 n. 8. […] Figura enim et aliae formae artificiales non sunt substantiae, sed accidentia quaedam. […] hoc modo se habet figura ad aes in artificialibus, sicut forma substantialis ad materiam in naturalibus […]

[183] Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 12 l. 3 n. 6. Unde primi naturales solam materiam posuerunt esse substantiam. Et hoc ideo quia viderunt quod in artificialibus quae fiunt per contactum, et non per naturalem unionem, sola materia et subiectum videtur esse substantia: nam formae artificiales sunt accidentia. Item natura rei videtur esse substantia et hoc aliquid; natura autem rei est in quam terminatur naturalis generatio, idest forma, quae est quasi habitus quidam.

In Physic., lib. 1 l. 12 n. 11. Unde manifestum est quod omne quod fit, fit ex subiecto. Sed advertendum est quod artificialia connumeravit inter ea quae fiunt simpliciter (quamvis formae artificiales sint accidentia), quia artificialia quodammodo sunt in genere substantiae per suam materiam: vel propter opinionem antiquorum, qui similiter aestimabant naturalia ut artificialia, ut in secundo dicetur.

The advocates of scientism claim that only (what they call) "matter" is real, whereas an actual shape it assumes is of secondary importance. The practical consequences of the stance are not confronted with the same willingness. The attempts at composing and decomposing human existence might savor of hubris, even if sometimes they are deemed a mark of modernity. It is relatively easy to carry them out on exterior objects (humans might be treated as "alien" then). But if the composing and decomposing is about to affect the status of the "experimenter" the situation changes radically. No one personally would like to be tampered with or manipulated, unless completely debased and agreeing in his/her existence being shaped so.

There is always, in a society composed of "consumers", demand for kitsch and rubbish, because the "ideal consumers" do not reason, but act "spontaneously" only. There are ideas produced to the free market of thinking also, but if the freedom is not founded in reason.[184] The interactions are blind, and the demand for rubbish ideas prevailed in e.g. the 1930s Nazi Germany. The co called scientific socialism, in turn, treated humans as stuff to be modeled, because acting according to ideas called "scientific" for some quaint reasons. Marx came to be known for the famous: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it". He would like to change the world instead of merely understanding it. In fact, he failed completely to understand it.

It goes without saying that we are able to compose and decompose artificial (accidental) forms, but the claim that we are able, by the same token, "create" anything, i.e. impart it a substantial form is bizarre. Humans are able to produce e.g. a cosmic racket, but no one has ever succeeded in producing e.g. a mosquito, and will never be able for that matter too.

The composing and decomposing consists in the localization of the stuff ("matter"); i.e. placing next to each other some elements. It were e.g. a piece of stone, a fiber and a bone some 30 000 years ago, and the effects of the composing and decomposing were not really commanding. But the same algorithm of composing and decomposing is preserved nowadays in "wonders of technics", which *might seem* imposing, but are in fact more composed only. Humans force the elements to occupy some places with more or less success and adroitness.

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[184] Summa Theologiae I-IIae q. 17 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod radix libertatis est voluntas sicut subiectum, sed sicut causa, est ratio. Ex hoc enim voluntas libere potest ad diversa ferri, quia ratio potest habere diversas conceptiones boni. Et ideo philosophi definiunt liberum arbitrium quod est liberum de ratione iudicium, quasi ratio sit causa libertatis.

De veritate, q. 24 a. 2 c. … cum ad operationem nostram tria concurrant, scilicet cognitio, appetitus, et ipsa operatio, tota ratio libertatis ex modo cognitionis dependet. Appetitus enim cognitionem sequitur, cum appetitus non sit nisi boni, quod sibi per vim cognitivam proponitur. … si iudicium cognitivae non sit in potestate alicuius, sed sit aliunde determinatum, nec appetitus erit in potestate eius, et per consequens nec motus vel operatio absolute. Iudicium autem est in potestate iudicantis secundum quod potest de suo iudicio iudicare: de eo enim quod est in nostra potestate, possumus iudicare. Iudicare autem de iudicio suo est solius rationis, quae super actum suum reflectitur, et cognoscit habitudines rerum de quibus iudicat, et per quas iudicat: unde totius libertatis radix est in ratione constituta. Unde secundum quod aliquid se habet ad rationem, sic se habet ad liberum arbitrium. Ratio autem plene et perfecte invenitur solum in homine: unde in eo solum liberum arbitrium plenarie invenitur.

Still, as long as the complexity of the process grows, its effects might be more and more commanding, adored or even worshiped.

The German idealists (Fichte was the first of those more radical ones) and those who followed suit would rather speak of shaping the Urstoff than of discovering *specific* natural forms independent of shaping. Man stumbles (allegedly) upon resistance (Anstoss) in facing reality. For Heidegger, the Widerstand is a reality of a sort.[185] Man operates with his hands and the matter seems to resist indeed. But the idealists seem to assume that the resistance is pivotal for, rather than an irksome circumstance of, producing: the necessity to reckon with difficulty in implementing some preconceived ideas. According to Thomas, some "ideas" are *begotten* in the human soul without any labor. The labor might precede or follow this natural activity, which is incomparably more than sheer producing.

There is an equivocation hidden in the word "to touch".[186] One physical (and possibly inanimate body) can touch the other and meet resistance to its movement. Although the human sensual touching is connected with it, it is not identical. Energy is transferred by inanimate bodies touching each other, but no such transfer is essential for human sensual perception. Our senses are not measuring apparats, as they do not absorb energy when observing objects. Only the sense organs do, but the sensation is the more perfect, the less it is the case. All the less is the human intellect an apparatus, for it places all apparatuses in their proper places (which would have been impossible if it had been but one of many apparatuses). We are disinterested spectators of the cosmic spectacle before we (possibly) became its actors: existentially engaged in the performance. My body, obviously, touches a body I sense to be e.g. hot or cold, but sensing does not consist (as Aristotle says) in becoming affected physically (being hot or cold). The "consciousness" is not that of "corporeal self-presentation of an individual object".[187] It does not, generally, follow upon any activity (the epoché methodologically demanded in phenomenology included), but precedes them all. Cognition consists in seeing objects "from distance". The animal cognition demands a distance needed for finding an animal's place of existence *in* the world. The human (intellectual) cognition demands the distance needed for finding the Source of his existence *beyond* the world.

The principle of being (arché) was identified by the first Greek philosophers with "matter" (hyle). Etymologically, ὕλη means timber (wood). Aristotle uses the term, but draws a distinction between the *prime* matter, which can only be actualized by the substantial form, and the *secondary* matter which can exist (like decaying wood) apart from the substantial form of e.g. a living tree. It might be used by fungi if decayed enough, or by humans, *but the other way round*: because *preventing* the wood from decaying and giving it form of e.g. furniture.

The materialists of old and new fall prey to illusion that a universal stuff (the Urstoff) exists primarily and is modeled both by humans and what they call the cosmic evolution alike. The materialists of new are different to the old ones in that they regard nature anthropomorphically as German idealists taught them to.

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[185]Being and Time, § 43

[186]Being and Time, §12.

[187] E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, §. 39.

The prime matter is not real without its proper form, although elements (possessing some elementary forms) might be called secondary matter *in relation to those who use them*. However, the elementary as such does not need not to be elementary *matter*. Time is both real, because (indirectly) measurable, and immaterial. Photons are elementary, but bereft of mass. The electromagnetic field is real, but not material for that reason. Moreover, its being not material accounts for the possibility of (the otherwise undoubtedly) material objects exerting force upon each other. Descartes and those who followed suit believed in the so called "massiveness" definitive of (perceptible) bodies. In fact, bodies are only perceptible because of the electric field bereft of any "massiveness". (The electromagnetic field is a broader, unified concept than the electric field). The same electric field accounts for the possibility to coerce elements to "exists next to each other": like they must in objects produced by man.

The electric field is not stuff, but might be a binder of the material stuff. Composing and decomposing of the stuff would be impossible if the matter had been bereft of electric charge: apparently not identifiable with the Cartesian res extensa. This feature of the elementary is essential for both sensing and producing. The resistance, on the other hand, Marxists stumble upon when trying to **"**move the block of the world from its foundation" is bogus. The resistance stems from electric interactions of bodies and of human hands touching them too. Electrons (and all bodies for that matter too) do not cease to be what they really are if repelling each other. All the less, my senses do suffer physically if affected by bodies.

The algorithm of localization of objects depends on their being at hand (zuhanden as Heidegger has it). Still, man cannot be defined by his being-there too (Dasein). He must have been defined so indeed if the entire activity of man had consisted in producing: material objects or new ideas alike (which does not need to be the case). The ideas which appear in the human mind are produced in it (imagined) before they are invested with a physical shape.[188] There were some reasons in Kant's identifying "pure" thinking with "producing" (produzieren). The most sophisticated words might be produced this way, albeit those primitive cannot be so. The words of heart are *begotten*. "Pure" thinking is not *natural* thinking.

Descartes did not, in fact, tell between man and what he thinks (he differentiated only between res cogitans and modi cogitationis). Cartesians, in turn, identified cognition with producing. According to Kant, man produces (produziert) ideas in the similar way humans produce material goods. In effect, the same lot might befall humans and the ideas they "produce". "It is possible for me to cease to exist in the very moment I cease to think", Descartes says. It seemed possible for humans to cease to exist in the very moment they cease to produce. Still, for the time being, the "thinking reed" (likely to cease to exist after all) is endowed with a demiurgic power, because as long as it produces new ideas, new forms of humanity might be believed to appear in the physical world. Social engineering becomes a

[188] Summa Theologiae III, q. 78 a. 2 c. […] Forma autem artificialis est similitudo ultimi effectus in quem fertur intentio artificis, sicut forma artis in mente aedificatoris est forma domus aedificatae principaliter, aedificationis autem per consequens.

possibly essentially intertwined with the "frailty of human existence". According to Husserl, "Only the Spirit is immortal", and the human mental productivity was meant.

According to Thomas, some human "thoughts" (words) are immortal indeed as long as conceived and begotten in the human heart (the intellect and will), before assuming (possibly) a phenomenal shape. Begetting is different to producing.

Allegedly, it is only humans who are both conscious and apprehensive of their approaching death (the decomposition of their bodies). Still, upon a closer examination, it becomes clear that it is only products in general which inevitably tend to non-existence (like the decaying wood mentioned above). I do not like my favorite furniture to decay so, but I might be apprehensive of the possibility nonetheless. Some happen to be dearly attached to material objects, although it might seem infantile. Similarly, some people happen to be dearly attached to the ideas they have produced, and they are so perhaps because acknowledged (by the others to be imposing). They might even seem exposed to death in every moment the ideas are endangered.

The problem is detailed. Aristotle says that e.g. poets love their poems in pretty much the same way parents do love their children. The comparison explains the case. Some words are (according to Thomas) rather conceived in the human mind naturally and begotten in it too, but secondarily only invested with a particular shape proper to a language (e.g. the poet speaks in). But there are others words in the human mind too, *possibly* shaped after, and close to, the begotten archetype.

We *rather* do not doubt whether the actual shape of Thomas' Summa is the best possible, and the words in it could not be better arranged so as express the archetype contemplated by its author before the assuming the definite ("Latin") shape. Still, there is nothing inconvenient in assuming that Thomas himself could have expressed his thoughts better than he actually did. There are several autographs of his In Boethium De Trinitate really, and first (tentative) redactions of his Summa Contra Gentle too. Summa Theologiae approaches the words of heart *probably only* the best way human words have ever chanced to do.

We rather *do not* doubt that some *modern* ideas *should* have been expressed better than they actually were. Some philosophical ideas seem to be rather produced with the hope of improving by chance (by way of trial and error) some new possibilities of thinking, and their novelty equaled their "freedom of expression". The philosophical ideas in general, might share the characteristics common to all human products and proportionally so as the happen to be but loosely connected with the intelligible truth contemplated and begotten in heart before being spoken aloud or written down.

The ideas gathered in the human imagination are incessantly sinking into oblivion (like decaying matter must). They decay along with the physical ageing of our brain and are bound to die unless they become values to be bequeathed along with our genotype; incorruptible, because defined. The "pure" ideas, to the contrary, must perish and those dearly attached to them experience the perdition of their own existence (identified with thinking) at the same time. Humans are more or less aware of the fact, but sometimes unwilling to put up with it.

The words spoken in the human heart are indissoluble. The ideas modeled in imagination (in such "stuff") so as to represent them, are dissoluble, because accidental forms

of thinking only. They can cease to exist or appear in the human mind without, however, impairing or improving its identity. They are accidents (accidentia) not parts (modi) of the human souls. They grew older as we do either, but something remains *beneath* them. Human words spoken aloud and the words written down too tend to non-existence, like any products must tend "downwards". But the human heart (as Augustine has it) naturally gravitates to its Creator. The material world we come to existence in is exceptional (because chosen by our Creator), by in the perspective of consummation (to be found ultimately in the Creator), proves eventually alien after all. Disengaged from the care of "building a better place to live in" we turn freely to the "epicenter" of our vital activity.

The material stuff is – according to Mieczysław Gogacz – coerced to carry out the function prescribed to it by man. Aristotle distinguishes between motus naturalis and motus violentus; and analogically: quies naturalis and quies violentus. The growing of e.g. a tree is natural and the place it grows in is natural also, because the first (albeit not immediate) principle of growth is its substantial form. The tree moves specifically because its motion is perfected by the species of this tree. But the movement of the "same tree" felled by a lumberjack is unnatural because contrary to its *particular* nature. At best, it can be natural like the material elements it consists of are (a man ignorant of the properties/properties of the material could only destroy it). The same forced movement is subsequently: transport, planning, sanding, gluing, etc. (of the wood). A table which is an effect of these actions rests eventually in a place e.g. in my home. The rest is forced upon it too (from the point of view of this *particular* nature), but desirable from the point of view of who uses the wooden table. The forced rest is always accompanied by the process of biodegradation: decaying of wood, corroding of metals etc. The majority of those processes are undesirable from the human point of view, but natural (motus naturalis) nonetheless. The natural movement is counterbalanced by the artificial initiated by man.

We are incessantly trying to impart to the stuff ("matter") a possibly enduring shape ("form"), but we must be, nonetheless, aware that the endeavor is eventually doomed to failure: contrary to what Hegel and Marx dreamt of. Hegelians, who tried to "subjugate the matter" dreamt of becoming its creators. All reality apart from the human one would cease to exist "at the end of the human history". The nature bereft of the artificial forms was given only the precarious existence of the "other-being of the idea" in Hegel. The stance had been already anticipated by Kant (his agnosticism). Contrary, however, to what Kant thought, nature is not a monolith existing (in a way), but deprived of the forms of being. It is strong and diversified. Human producing and everything which happens to be called the marvels of technics must, some day, cease to exist. Man can sustain their existence for some time only.

The power of human producing is finite, because linear. Producing begins with the idea of a product and ends with exhausting the possibilities of its realization. The contrary is the case with nature. Its processes are cyclic. A tree dies and the process of its biodegradation is natural from the point of view of its environment. The decaying matter is the matter of new life. Still, between the death of the tree initiated by man and its natural decay; in a short interval between felling the tree and its having decayed; some artificial products made by man of it can exist.

If I had had to regard the destruction of my plans and ideas as the destruction of my life, the awareness of the frailty of the products would be tantamount to the consciousness of

my existing towards death. If man had been "producing animal" (to be defined as homo faber), he would have to die along with them. The composing of stuff (and composing it to some extent too) is artificial, but the total decomposition leads to the destruction of the entire "human world". Indeed, it leads to the natural rest.

I do not die along with what I have made, unless, perchance, the death be taken metaphorically. Being to death must be the condition of homo faber, but homo sapiens does not need to be that after all.

The naked statement that the identity of artificial products consist in composing (and decomposing so as correct the former) does not seem to determine its nature sufficiently nonetheless. The problem has been already announced. Artificial products are not real in the sense of existing on their own, but ignoring their reality in bulk would be totally unpractical. In the common day life, we must reckon with what we deem to be the properties/proprieties of artificial products, albeit only insofar as we know the elementary matter they are built of.

The artificial form is not identical with the substantial form, but the artificial forms are forms indeed, since all accidents are some forms. Substance is being par excellence and thus cannot be created by man. It can only be created by God. But in Plato's Timaeus, God is likened to an artifex, and the likeness (for all its ingenuity) proved anthropomorphic. Demiurge produces (like humans) out of preexisting matter. Plato's "matter" was not what it should have been, Aristotle objects. It is not Chora (place). We face the accidental form of "where" in Plato's myth. The likeness unveils the true nature of the "matter" homo faber operates on. Being-in-a-place is, generally, definitive of human products.

Thomas corrects the stance. God produces the totality of being, the matter included, whereas man-the-creator (the artifex) models the stuff which is by no means created by him.[189] Neither are natural forms connatural to us (as it must be the case with God' ideas), because we get to know them one after the other. The real existence of this or that being has two closer principles: its form and matter, but the matter is united by the form, and they both are made real due to the first principle created immediately by God: the act of existence. The created existence is the proper effect of the Self-Subsisting Existence.[190]

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[189] Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 17 q. 3 a. 2 expos. Deo autem natura est quod facit. Ipse enim per naturam suam omnipotens est: ipse etiam naturarum institutor et conditor est: sicut enim ex operatione hominis formae artificiales proveniunt, ita etiam ab intellectu Dei formae naturales profluxere; unde id quod ab eo fit, naturae rationem habet. Si autem ibi aliter futura sunt, potius futura sunt sicut ibi sunt ubi praescit ille qui non potest falli.

Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 18 q. 1 a. 2 c. Respondeo dicendum, quod emanatio creaturarum a Deo est sicut exitus artificiatorum ab artifice; unde sicut ab arte artificis effluunt formae artificiales in materia, ita etiam ab ideis in mente divina existentibus fluunt omnes formae et virtutes naturales. Sed quia, ut Dionysius dicit, ea quae sunt causatorum abundanter praeinsunt causis, formae receptae in materia non adaequant virtutem vel artem increatam a qua procedunt; unde apud artificem remanet ex arte sua virtus aliquid aliter operandi circa ipsa artificiata, quibus virtus artis alligata non est: et similiter in virtute divina est ut aliquid rebus creatis addat vel mutet vel abstrahat.

[190] Super De Trinitate, pars 3 q. 5 a. 3 c. 1. […] ipsum esse rei, quod quidem resultat ex congregatione principiorum rei in compositis vel ipsam simplicem naturam rei concomitatur, ut in substantiis simplicibus. […]

Artificial products are not real, whereas the beings produced by God must be real, and the natural relations (the laws of nature) concreated with them too.

Human producing must respect the laws of nature, albeit it happens to breach them more often than not. Apparently, producing of iron is morally indifferent, but producing e.g. pork does not seem to many to be so. The substantial form of an animal is more perfect than the elementary one and thus demands some rights to respect.

The substantial form is – as it were – a measure of being. The artificial one – to the contrary – is the measure of the forced movement (motus violentus). It is then, the measure of (1) working (producing) in relation (2) to the place (definitive) of the product. In this aspect only, products are real, i.e. endowed with a weak formality of their own. The form of an artificial product is to be placed in the Aristotelian category of "where", which chimes in with what Plato says about "place" (χώρα) – the place and the container of forms introduced into matter by Demiurge.

Elements or matter resources, if transported from their natural place, exist in the place determined by the algorithm of their localization. The wealth of a society consists not only in the variety of the modes of the localization (the complexity of forms), but in **readability** of the relations amongst them also. After work, people often search for the immediate contact with nature (the nature untouched by human hand), which testifies – inter alia – to that making out the relation of what has been wrought to its natural source is essential for the work to be carried out rationally.

Agility – to the contrary – is only illusion of activity. Its effect can be luckily obtained, but the activity is a hazard nonetheless and its effect – incidental.

An illiterate cannot use an instrument which demands reading its manual carefully. The contemporary, civilizational illiteracy consists – generally – in the inability of reading the relation of the artificial to the natural. The wealth of nations consists not only in the complexity of artificial products, but in the possibility to use them effectively too, which entails the transparency of their structure. Inability to read such "manuals" must lead to pauperization. In fact, the inability (callousness) results from whatever makes humans insensible. Films, advertisements, "music" and "entertainment" do this really.

Turning away *from* the objects of hackneyed activity *for some time* makes it possible to turn *back* to the same activity, which becomes then (if treated from distance) less hackneyed and thus more effectively performed economically too. But turning *upside down* the order of the wrought is altogether destructive for work. The so called entertainment is just this more often than not.

The need for palliatives is growing proportionally to how intensively a person is being forced to hackneyed work. The entertainment seems almost the same as distraction, but the latter equals to (sensual) disintegration. The idea was invented in antiquity, not in the sense of being "promoted", but rather in the sense of being imagined. Sinis, an antihero of the Greek mythology captured travelers, tied them to two pine trees that he had bent down to the ground, and then let the trees go, tearing his victims apart. Sinis was an inventor of the idea of distraction.

Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 4 l. 2 n. 11. […] Esse enim rei quamvis sit aliud ab eius essentia, non tamen est intelligendum quod sit aliquod superadditum ad modum accidentis, sed quasi constituitur per principia essentiae.

Pure nonsense is widely adopted in comedy films. Many a man engaged in show business in 1950s betrayed sympathy to a special form of pure nonsense: socialism. Its ideas might seem grotesque, and that is why, paradoxically, they were in high demand. In capitalistic society, in the very moment the capital becomes depersonalized (man forced to work, but denied the right to have it his/her own way), the demand for socialism (and all absurdities for that matter too), becomes urgent.

Socialism produces the contrary of what it promises, which is only natural for the convention of pure nonsense. The idea of the unification of life was invented in antiquity too, with its another antihero: Procrustes. He stretched people's bodies or cut off their legs, so as to force them to fit the size of an iron bed.

The Scripture says that wealth comes to people along with wisdom – as if in passing.[191] The wealth is not the most important work of the intellect, albeit it cannot be anything else than the work of the intellect. The intellect searches for causes, and although material causes effective in producing are causes indeed, they are but no means the most important ones. The final cause is the most important. In the question: "What for" the purpose is implied: definitive of acting human, but of the Source of strength of human acting. The Supreme Cause (The Creator of the universe) is, at the same time, the principle of human acting and its fulfillment (happiness). The speculative intellect discovers the Supreme Cause; the practical one shows it as the reward for honest life, whereas the intellect engaged in producing searches for the accessory goods of life.

On the way to the Supreme Cause, we could leave some objects which might seem imposing, but are in fact rather "by-products" of the general tendency ("work") of life. The "marvels of technics" can arouse admiration only if the primitive admiration which initiates the quest for the Supreme is stifled. The artificial products are goods secondarily only, because they are *instruments* of life, whereas the *fullness* of life consists in seeing God the Creator. If the goods of civilization are not treated as they deserve to (instrumentally: not worshiped), the man, who might be attached to any of them, will be treated instrumentally.

Composing and discomposing (to some degree too) is definitive of the products visible in the material world. But the work of hands is preceded by the work of reason, which composes and discomposes *statements* (when syllogizing) or parts of a sentence (when combining nouns with verbs).[192]

The practical syllogism ends with the imperative of acting in concerto, which is essential for work and consuming goods too. The imperative is *conditioned* by its premises. The conditioned imperative (its being the conclusion) is forbidden in Kant's Critique of

[191] Sap. 7. 11. Venerunt autem mihi omnia bona pariter cum illa, et innumerabilis honestas per manus illius; 12 et laetatus sum in omnibus, quoniam antecedebat me ista sapientia, et ignorabam quoniam horum omnium mater est.

[192] Summa Theologiae I, q. 89 a. 5 c.

De veritate, q. 14 a. 1 c. Una [operatio intellectus] qua format simplices rerum quidditates; ut quid est homo, vel quid est animal: in qua quidem operatione non invenitur verum per se et falsum, sicut nec in vocibus incomplexis. Alia operatio intellectus est secundum quam componit et dividit, affirmando vel negando: et in hac iam invenitur verum et falsum, sicut et in voce complexa, quae est eius signum. […]

Practical Reason. The *categorical* imperative was meant to replace it: a command without giving the reason of command. The idea was vulgarized nowadays. Various Must-haves (imperatives of advertisement without rational justification) replace the work of the intellect. Every imperative not preceded by reasoning must be blind, and the people following it must act blindfolded.

The theoretical syllogism ends with the conclusion which is most important for human life: God exists beyond the physical world. But He exists beyond (and perhaps: contrary to) *the artificial* world too, which renders the conclusion all the more important, because humans happen to create systems of oppression beside houses, roads, factories, etc.

The conclusion of the theoretical syllogism is "abstract" as it reads: God is the End of the entire world. But if combined with the definition of man (a rational being) it has an "existential" purport: Man can adhere to God with the simple act of the intellect and will (which is incomparably more than reasoning).[193] The spiritual acts cannot be "visualized", but can be retraced e.g. in the sentences written in a book as long as they are ordained carefully and keen on obtaining truth accessible to anyone. The printed letters are artificial, but they are, at the same time, at the border of the spiritual, as they represent the words spoken in heart and bereft of any phenomenal shape.

People chance to get rich because making out a new possibility of composing and discomposing the material stuff previously overlooked. Trading is the elementary form of composing and discomposing. It consists in reallocating objects to more "artificial" places. A trader gives people objects which can be effectively and honestly used. But the possibility opens too of objects being *abused*.

A pen (a communicator) has become a means of the freedom of speech since Pericles (παῤῥησία means speaking openly from: πᾶν ἐρέω). The pen in the hand of a writer or a scientist is useful, because the words written with it are rational. The same pen, however, in the hand of an illiterate is useless, and in the hand of a criminal or a slanderer is nocuous (its valor abused). Words happen to weaponized practically because of the invention of manifold forms of communication accessible both to "saints and villains".

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[193] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 114 a. 10 co. Bonum autem hominis est duplex, unum simpliciter, et aliud secundum quid. Simpliciter quidem bonum hominis est ultimus finis eius, secundum illud Psalmi LXXII, *mihi autem adhaerere Deo bonum est*, et per consequens omnia illa quae ordinantur ut ducentia ad hunc finem. Et talia simpliciter cadunt sub merito.

Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 17 a. 6 co. Fides ergo facit hominem Deo inhaerere inquantum est nobis principium cognoscendi veritatem, credimus enim ea vera esse quae nobis a Deo dicuntur. Spes autem facit Deo adhaerere prout est nobis principium perfectae bonitatis, inquantum scilicet per spem divino auxilio innitimur ad beatitudinem obtinendam.

Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 23 a. 7 co. Sicut ergo duplex est finis, unus ultimus et alius proximus, ita etiam est duplex bonum, unum quidem ultimum, et aliud proximum et particulare. Ultimum quidem et principale bonum hominis est Dei fruitio, secundum illud Psalm. *mihi adhaerere Deo bonum est*, et ad hoc ordinatur homo per caritatem. Bonum autem secundarium et quasi particulare hominis potest esse duplex, unum quidem quod est vere bonum, utpote ordinabile, quantum est in se, ad principale bonum, quod est ultimus finis; aliud autem est bonum apparens et non verum, quia abducit a finali bono.

The co called "progressive thinkers" obtained the possibility to disseminate their preposterous ideas, which led to the pauperization and extermination of the millions of innocent people (their only "guilt" consisted in not being able to refute those ideas). Corncockle in the wheat in out-of-place, and the progressive ideas disseminated in simple minds are similarly destructive of life. The dissemination can by no means be called freedom of expression.

Protagoras was expelled from ancient Athens for the public declaration of agnosticism,[194] and his woks works publicly burnt. The Athens is a cradle of civilization, but it would have not been so if "tolerant" in the way commonly accepted nowadays. A country which is indifferent to good and evil; to truth and falsehood; must be a *grave* of civilization. Greeks were famous for both their commercial agility and the intellectual openness. They both can be naturally combined, but trading fake goods or insults is by no means liberty.

The first effect of trading and producing is the so called added value. What does it consist in?

The fundamental value is (as was shown above) the logical value of a statement (its truth or falsity). Wealth in general consists in the veracity of human affairs (men are called "false" if pretending to be what they are not). The intellect affirms the veracity of a judgment and ordains the relations of the signs-elements designing "the map of the human affairs" so. But the "productive imagination" devised by Kant (an oxymoron, as imagination, and any sensual power for that matter too cannot be active) is an Ersatz and productive of a Weltanschauung only. If led by the imagination, we might *chance* to obtain the desirable objects by a lucky coincidence of circumstances (Kant has in mind a – so to say – "transcendental" coincidence), but the effects are then, generally, incidental. Similarly, the word *casual* stems from the Latin casus/cadere: one can e.g. fall ill (in morbum cadere) apparently against his will. True, some breaking discoveries, were (believed to be) made in passing, but they were realized to be discoveries really (not fancies) after reflecting only upon the "casual play of imagination". Without the intellectual reflection the way into the future would be the way into the unknown (uncertainty).

The exemplary ideas reside in the Divine Intellect and ordain the nature. Sometimes they do so in an extraordinary way, which is, then, called supernatural because of *the manner of acting upon the natural*, but God never acts *contrary to* nature. The values are objects of the human intellect which *discovers the ordained*, and constitutes the place of a *particular* (i.e. artificial) object on the map of the human world. The constitution (stiften) without the respect for the Supreme Cause could (seem to) be productive of the human world (Lebseswelt),[195] but is bereft of any natural foundations.

Before we begin to produce (things or ideas) we have (should have) an honest end in our mind (intention). It is something-for-me, but more than just useful. It is, generally,

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[194] M. Tulli Ciceronis De natura deorum ad M. Brutum Liber primus

[63] Abderites quidem Protagoras […] sophistes temporibus illis vel maximus, cum in principio libri sic posuisset „De divis neque, ut sint neque ut non sint, habeo dicere", Atheniensium iussu urbe atque agro est exterminatus librique eius in contione combusti […]

[195] E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie (§. 37)

something-for-everybody; it is good as such, because universal and created by God for all. The reversal of the relation between the good and the useful is destructive for human affairs. The moral values cannot exist in a background of effective producing, because they would be exposed to instrumentalisation then. Moral values are of importance, because leading to the Plenitude of Being. Material values are of importance, as long as used for this purpose. The genuine hierarchy of values must respect this order. Mere "sets of values" must be disrespectful the order. The hierarchy is shattered if stained by utilitarian approach. "Human creativity" happens to claim the right it can never duly possess. For the sake of true (not utilitarian) happiness, the utilitarian values must be allotted their due place. Producing is (in some respect) about extending (the accessibility of goods). Happiness is not at all about extending ("the greatest amount of good to the greatest number of people"). Some (apparent) goods must be *rejected* for the sake of the genuine good.

The subjectivity, no matter whether vulgar or transcendental (collective) is destructive of human life. The extension does not make for its goodness. The Hegelian collective consciousness is an extreme guise of the subjectivism (disguised the best possible way). The real wealth is built on the personal reflection (discretion) only, but squandered only by sheer accumulation (collectivization precludes discretion, obviously enough). Even if raised onto the plinth of the "supreme" value, the human means cannot cease to be what they must be: the means *to the end*, even if believed to be the end themselves. The cognizance of the relation of the end to what leads to the end is typical for rational creature, but its disregard is typical for a debauched reason.

The free market can work smoothly only if the wealth (artificial objects) is "composed and discomposed" by the personal reason and the capital personalized for the sake of "the greatest amount of economic freedom to the greatest number of *reasoning* people". The state redistribution of goods is its opposite, but the scheme is anticipated already in the moment the artificial accumulation of the capital takes place: ineffective for a sound economy. The idea of the state redistribution of goods happens to be attractive in the very moment the wealth is merely amassed and objects (made out to be) "composed and discomposed" without rational order. Socialism (such a product present of the free market of thinking) offers a remedy for the irrational accumulation of capital, but the treatment proves to be worse that the illness.

The private property must be personalized, because it is the individuals of the rational nature only that can meet rational decisions. The concentration of the capital is counterproductive. The low-cost weapons compete successfully with the high-budget military investments.

The asymmetric relation of the means to the end has been tried to be reversed. Heidegger speaks of new existential possibilities (Vorhandenheit) appearing in the background of what is wrought by hand ("is at hand": zuhanden). The scheme of thinking was outlined by Fichte already. The relation of the so called subject (das Ich) to the so called object (der Gegenstand) was believed to be consequent upon the (irrational) thun (doing). Moreover, the stance was anticipated even by Descartes who says that man is made unto the image of God according to his "will" ("liberty"),[196] although "the will" was going to assume in those who followed the guise of an irrational drive. In Augustine, the will is what it must be

[196] Descartes, Meditations, IV. 57.

(and the inverted comas are not needed), because the Trinity is mirrored in the human mind which encompasses: the reminiscence, *the intellect* and the will. The will comes as the last, but in God the Archetype the three are co-essential (Three Persons share in the same Nature). Augustine claims it to be the case in man too, which is true as long as they are all rooted in the same human nature. Be that as it may, the will is by no means the most important; because counter-divided with the intellect it thus occupies its proper place.

The Christian Revelation speaks of the Trinity of Persons. The "rationalist" revelation (Enlightenment) speaks of a "creative liberty" (a depersonalized "will"). Now, the act of the "will" which is not preceded by the act of the intellect (intellect; logos) is blind (emotional) and its acts must turn eventually against man. What Pico della Mirandola called transcending himself (following the irrational drive) is first of all transgressing the boundaries of nature and honesty.

According to Marx, man is expected to accomplish auto-creation, but the word "man" loses in him any definite meaning and the fact is plainly visible in the era of "trans-humanism". Not only can nuclear weapons endanger physical existence of man. All attempts aimed at improving the existential possibilities of man must begin with the destruction of the previously existing nature.

When experimenting, we introduce, in the physical matter, the idea of a product previously thought out in the mind. The scientific experimenting is in fact paradigmatic for any subsequent producing. A breaking discovery might have been done in a shabby laboratory, but it is going to be the reiterated in "hygienic" conditions on the massive scale. The massiveness, however, is (as was mentioned above) a special problem. An experimenter might be regarded as an unrealistic visionary, whereas the producer must be his contrary: soberly thinking person. Their functions (albeit seemingly opposite) harmonize in a well ordained society like innovative thinking and common sense must in each person after all. An object might be seen "from distance", but ascertained to be real when touched.

Still, science does not begin with experimenting, but with theorizing. The theory in question is, however, far cry from what neo-positivist thought it to be. (They succeeded in convincing, nonetheless, a great deal of genuine scientists for their ideas). Before we invent anything by the way of trial and error, we have in mind what things must be out of necessity (certitidaliter). Otherwise, the discovery would have been the result of a lucky coincidence.

There is, thus, a relation between the theory and producing (ars). But there is, practically (from the perspective of who thinks and produces alike), human ethos in-between them two. The theory is a "product" of the speculative intellect, but it is normally expressed by dint of artificial signs: and thus substantiated in artificial products called books, Websites and the like. They all appear in *human* time and thus are part of the human life-line, which begins with the vague notion of good to be done, whereas ends with the clear consciousness of the Supreme Good having been obtained. All material products appear on the way towards the Ultimate (people happen to be waylaid by them). The end is shown by the intellect, but obtained actually by means of moral virtues.

Somatic and emotional dispositions inherited from the ancestors mark the beginning of the aforementioned way *in some respect*, and customs of the place we live (come to existence) also. They are all the more valuable the more spiritualized (reflected upon). The effectiveness of producing shares in the value. But values are, first of all, the effect of the rational in man.

The technical inventions of the 21th century appeared after breaking discoveries which had been made at the turn of the 20th century. The structure of the elementary (matter) was discovered theoretically first and without any prospect of material gain in mind (the prospect would, probably, render the splendid intellectual adventure just a petty business). Definite conclusions of the discoveries were made, and the definite can be always materially discounted.

Kant's "creative imagination" is furthest from theorizing. It is "synthetizing" rather than reflecting. An "analytics of mind" has been provided in his Critique, but the analytics were a priori conditions of any possible knowledge believed to be knowable in advance. Normally, the act of reflection follows upon the "invented" or the invention follows natural principles, neither of which was taken into account by Kant.

It is natural for every man to reflect after cherishing the hope of having furthered specific cognition (after loosening a little bit the reins of his imagination) or to further the cognition because inspired by an yet indistinct notion of being conceived in the intellect. It is practically infeasible to ascertain as to the personal possibilities before attempting to realize them in concerto. Any step towards the future must be accompanied by reflection lest the general line of "reasoning" be irretrievably lost. People do not know that they are able (or unable) to do anything before they try to.

Still, a special (general) reflection is needed before any particular one. The *moral* reflection accompanied the civilization from its very beginnings. The Greek imperative Γνῶθι σεαυτόν: "Know thyself"; was a natural part of the Greek intellectualism. The material interests did not overshadow the interest in the Supreme Cause of the material. The majority of Greeks were practical merchants, but Greeks came to be known in history for their philosophy. The excessive interest in the material goods must result in failing to obtain them firmly in the end. "The shortest road to wealth is the contempt of wealth." (Brevissima ad divitias per contemptum divitiarum via est. Seneca, Epistulae morales 62,3).

Both theoretical and moral reflection normally accompanies the ordinary activities and prevents human existence from being tethered to the earth. It averts the mind from means and directs it to the end.

The Kantian analytics a priori was meant to precede producing in general instead of controlling its actual shape. No rational proof of the reasonableness of the progress into that future was provided.

The a priori conditions are (if ever) instilled in the structure of nature. They are not the a priori conditions of morals and science in the same way though, because knowing them existing in nature is by no means identical with assuming the proper (morally acceptable) stance to the knowledge. People cannot be "educated" to be "good". The ideology of Enlightenment cannot replace science.

2. The wealth of nature and the natural value

Smith and Marx alike assume that the economic value lies totally on the part of the object produced, and is directly proportional to the amount of labor put into its object. The way the economic values have been understood impacts, in turn, the understanding of values as such.

> We begin by citing a rule of preference which has come to determine the morality of the modern world: Moral value pertains only to those qualities, actions, etc., which the individual has acquired by his own strength and labor. According to this view, there are no specific original "dispositions" of moral value—on the contrary, these are opposed to the morally valuable qualities as mere "natural gifts," for example by Kant. …Neither antiquity nor Christianity knew this valuation, which severs moral value and the meaning of life from all inner connections with the universe, with biological origin, history, and even God …The ultimate reason for this new valuation is a different attitude in apprehending values.…All value is now attached to "work," which is supposed to raise the moral level. *The value of the initial and final level plays no role.* The emphasis no longer lies on the evident objective qualities of value, but on the subjective process of "work." The result is the following axiom: "There is moral value only in that which everyone —even the least gifted—can do." …*the same shift takes place in extramoral domains of value, in legal and economic life*. The theories of property and value of the English political and economic theoreticians, first John Locke and then Adam Smith and David Ricardo, merely formulate and conceptualize an existent tendency of modern valuation. They hold that the right of ownership as well is derived from labor on the objects, not from occupation or other origins. It is clear that this new standard must lead to a most radical critique of the existing systems of ownership …The theory of labor value is analogous. There are original value distinctions between the materials in the goods, which vary with the nature of the country. *The formal values of the goods are independent of "labor," they are due to the inventiveness of resourceful persons who set models for labor. Another value lies in the combination of the results of labor which is brought about by the activity of the coordinator and supervisor.* Yet all these values are now *disregarded* from the outset, or they are to be *converted into the currency of "labor"*—in order to found the senseless tenet that each has a right to a quantity of values equal to that which he has produced by his "labor" (the so-called "right to the whole product of labor").[197]

The notion of the object (the labor is put into) is based on some philosophical assumptions mentioned in the preceding Section. The manner economic values have been understood must determine the understanding of values in general, because they were accepted to be comparable by the philosophy of enlightenment. Things included in one genus are comparable and the intellectual light is such a genus. Scheler criticizes some threads of the philosophy of enlightenment, although his "table of values" is not that much hierarchy (of ends) as rather a realm of invention. Material values are evidently produced, but if comparable (at the same time) to all the others, all values might be supposed to be producible. Nietzsche draws this conclusion. Scheler *does not* reject his views unreservedly.

There must be some reason in using the term of value in the broader sense, but there no reason to grasp all values univocally. The economic and moral values are called so

[197] Max Scheler, Ressentiment. Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen, Translated by Louis A. Coser from the text of 1915. V. Ressentiment and other value shifts in modern morality. 1. The value of things self-earned or selfacquired.

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analogically only. One object (e.g. urine or food) is called healthy with respect to the other (an animal) to which the healthiness is ascribed by definition. The means are never gauged with the same yardstick as ends are. When defining the economic values, their *unilateral* relation to the moral values should be underscored.

Hegel (and Marx) tried to describe theoretically a social phenomenon of the then culture: the slavish subjection to the capital; to elucidate the fact (provide a general account of the fact present in it for some hundred years already). Some justification of this state of affairs was bound to appear sooner or later, because human reason demands *any* justification, even the most bizarre provided by Hegel and Marx. Hegel says what might have been said by anybody, although does it in his own way. There are (allegedly) no moral values existing apart from human (transcendental) subjectivity. Nature is only despicable, and the natural law of no account (no "value" as Scheler puts it). The human "freedom" consists in transcending the state of crude nature. The history of humanity is the history of the working thrall. The absolute liberation was about to come at the end of the human history. In the 19th century slavery was abolished indeed, but in the 20th century some modern forms of slavery (e.g. man trafficking) appeared instead. The "end of the history" is not likely to come in the foreseeable future.

Nature, according to Hegel, is "the other being" of the logical idea. Man projects the idea of freedom and realizes it in the history. Nature is totally dependent on the Sprit, and the German spelling (of capital letters in nouns) does not allow differentiating between the Spirit of God and the spirit of man. They are in fact identified.

Hegel reverses the traditional Greek paradigm. In the Greek philosophy, the ultimate end of man consists in knowing the order of the universe (the nature independent of human thinking), whereas his moral task can be summarized as living according to nature. *Rational* nature is meant.

Even if the human nature happens to be stained by vice (a privation), it is only natural to try to set it free from the privation.[198] The omission of the attempt to liberate it from *concrete* privations equals pusillanimity, because the *universal* idea of freedom is as vague as "abstract". The resentment Scheler speaks of is the grudge nourished towards the good of nature,[199] after despairing to obtain what can heal it. Christian thinkers, inspired by the Christian mercy (directly opposite to envy) postulate the fight for the Most Precious that can possibly perfect the nature (heal it and set it free). Liberating from what marred it opens the

[198] Aristot. Metaph. I, c. 2, 982b 25 nn.

ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος, φαμέν, ἐλεύθερος ὁ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου ὤν, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὴν ὡς μόνην οὖσαν ἐλευθέραν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν: μόνη γὰρ αὕτη αὐτῆς ἕνεκέν ἐστιν. διὸ καὶ δικαίως ἂν οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη νομίζοιτο αὐτῆς ἡ κτῆσις: πολλαχῇ γὰρ ἡ φύσις δούλη τῶν [30] ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν, ὥστε κατὰ Σιμωνίδην "θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτ᾽ ἔχοι γέρας," ἄνδρα δ᾽ οὐκ ἄξιον μὴ οὐ ζητεῖν τὴν καθ᾽ αὑτὸν ἐπιστήμην.

[199]Ibidem, εἰ δὴ λέγουσί τι οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ πέφυκε φθονεῖν τὸ θεῖον, [983α] [1] ἐπὶ τούτου συμβῆναι μάλιστα εἰκὸς καὶ δυστυχεῖς [2] εἶναι πάντας τοὺς περιττούς. ἀλλ᾽ οὔτε τὸ θεῖον φθονερὸν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἀοιδοί, οὔτε τῆς τοιαύτης ἄλλην χρὴ νομίζειν τιμιωτέραν.

possibility to partake in/of the Divine Nature.[200] According to Augustine and Damascene, sin might be defined as "what is contrary to nature".[201] The principle of the liberation and the future participation in/of the Divine is to be called grace. It is immanent to human nature (possessed firmly by it). It perfects nature effectively, but it never abolishes it.[202]

The niche of liberty in which the Post-Hegelian humanity was supposed to exist is, in fact, but the indetermination of its future. A real change (in the history) must be that of something definite both as to its principle and its consummation (the nature can be defined thus also).The change in the human nature is accidental and its value ambiguous: it can be for worse or for better. Unless the Ultimate is shown to be its end, it is likely to be the change for worse. The human actions do not constitute the human nature. Action is an accident (accidens; συμβεβηκός) and the accidents cannot exist without what sustains them (substance). On mine changing the abode or habits, I do not become "someone else" save metaphorically only. The same which applies to individuals of humanity applies to humanity as such (homniem esse vel hunc hominem esse). Since one's coming to existence and his/her death the same individual substance sustains various accidents which by no means define their nature. Analogically, humanity remains the same specifically, notwithstanding its history.

Hegelianism is not only a (possibly disputable) justification of social affairs appearing in the era of Enlightenment, but also a theoretical continuation of the reform which occurred some two hundred years before. Descartes understood by nature either God himself or the

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[200] Super Sent., lib. 3 d. 28 q. 1 a. 3 c. Una quae competit eis secundum naturam suam; et sic homines et Angeli non communicant in eadem vita; sed homines ad invicem, et Angeli ad invicem, quia convenit eis circa easdem operationes occupari. Alia vita utriusque est per gratiam, secundum quam fiunt participes divinae vitae; et in hac vita communicant et ad invicem, et cum Deo. Et ideo secundum hanc vitam potest esse amicitia eorum ad invicem, et haec amicitia est caritas.

Super Io., cap. 14 l. 6. Filius autem, cum sit ipsa sapientia genita, est ipsa veritas; supra XIV, 6: *ego sum via, veritas et vita.* Et ideo effectus missionis huiusmodi est ut faciat homines participes divinae sapientiae, et cognitores veritatis. Filius ergo tradit nobis doctrinam, cum sit verbum; sed spiritus sanctus doctrinae eius nos capaces facit.

[201] Summa Theologiae I-IIae q. 71 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in III de Lib. Arb., *omne vitium, eo ipso quod vitium est, contra naturam est*.

Summa Theologiae II-IIae, q. 65 a. 1 arg. 1.; I-IIae, q. 82 a. 3 arg. 1.

Summa Theologiae I-IIae q. 71 a. 2 c. […] Sed considerandum est quod natura uniuscuiusque rei potissime est forma secundum quam res speciem sortitur. Homo autem in specie constituitur per animam rationalem. Et ideo id quod est contra ordinem rationis, proprie est contra naturam hominis inquantum est homo; quod autem est secundum rationem, est secundum naturam hominis inquantum est homo. *Bonum autem hominis est secundum rationem esse, et malum hominis est praeter rationem esse*, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Unde virtus humana, quae hominem facit bonum, et opus ipsius bonum reddit, intantum est secundum naturam hominis, inquantum convenit rationi, vitium autem intantum est contra naturam hominis, inquantum est contra ordinem rationis.

Super Sent., lib. 3 d. 16 q. 1 a. 1 ad 2. Ad secundum dicendum, quod peccatum non inest homini ex aliquo principiorum naturalium, immo est contra naturam rationis.

[202] Super Sent., lib. 4 d. 49 q. 2 a. 3 ad 8. Ad octavum dicendum, quod gloria perficit naturam, et non destruit.

order of things created by him,[203] which is rather reasonable. But the problem is that he, at the same time, says that the very attempt to investigate the teleological order of nature smacks of hubris (IV 55). Nor is the existence of "other thinking things" so obvious to serve as a principle of philosophy. In consequence, he is compelled to focus on *his own* individual *subjective* nature (which he *believes* to be) given him by God. The nature of God is "inscrutable" too, and thus despaired to be understood. The subjective nature (or, if you like, a subjective spirit) remains only. Descartes and Hume (in his Treatise of Human Nature) focus on it only.

Spinoza takes over the distinction mentioned in Mediations (VI 80), and, following the Latin medieval Averroists, distinguishes between natura naturans and natura naturata. The distinction is parenthetically mentioned by Thomas.[204] Natura naturans might be granted to be called God, whereas everything issuing from it might be called natura naturata. But is it by no means indubitable that (as Spinoza claims) there is but one nature endowed with infinite of attributes of which only two are knowable to man: the extension (proper to "matter") and the cognition (proper to spirit). They both are parts of human nature really. Descartes had separated them artificially, which prompted the "cosmological" speculations by Spinoza. Human rational soul animates human body, but it is not creative of the latter nonetheless. Humans "create" products, but their creation (should the term be granted) is different to the Divine one (as was mentioned in the preceding Section). The "matter" of the world produced by humans is dissimilar to the matter *animated directly* by the human soul (human body).

Since its very beginnings, the Greek philosophy had been concerned with nature which exists apart from our mind. Even if we were to call it natura naturata in general, science always concentrates on a specific nature (a specific aspect of being). It is impossible to get to know anything without telling it from what it is not and must not be either. The natures of e.g. a plant and an animal must be distinguished. We do not treat inanimate bodies in the way we treat animals (e.g. crops we use for nourishment). The existence of specifically various natures does not result from amassing a certain amount of "matter". Even if we were to call God natura naturans, we must call Him an *intelligent* Nature nonetheless (natura *intelligibiliter* naturans) i.e., acting on purpose and telling between what it to be done from what must not be so. Various forms of specific natures issue from this Nature, but they cannot "emanate" therefrom. The (premediated) order of the created universe attracts our human attention first.[205] Otherwise we would have been no more interested in the cognition of the

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[203] Med. VI. 80.

[204] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 85 a. 6 c. Et secundum hanc, omnis corruptio et defectus est contra naturam,

ut dicitur in II de caelo, quia huiusmodi virtus intendit esse et conservationem eius cuius est. Natura vero universalis est virtus activa in aliquo universali principio naturae, puta in aliquo caelestium corporum; vel alicuius superioris substantiae, secundum quod etiam Deus a quibusdam dicitur natura naturans. Quae quidem virtus intendit bonum et conservationem universi, ad quod exigitur alternatio generationis et corruptionis in rebus.

[205] Contra Gentiles, lib. 2 cap. 41 n. 2. Et sic illud ordinans est prima causa et una distinctionis rerum. Si vero diversi agentes non sint ad invicem ordinati, concursus eorum ad diversitatem rerum producendam erit per accidens. Distinctio igitur rerum erit casualis.

world than e.g. plants are. Human nature is specific indeed, because characterized by what is commonly called "curiosity". The curiosity might be a vice (if equaled with distraction) or a virtue (if equaled with studiousness). But animals do not exhibit it in either sense.

Human nature is specific too, because cognizant of its own nature, albeit it primarily focuses on the *outer* nature, and the reflection on the principle of cognition comes but later on (In Descartes and Kant it precedes it). Natura, if you like, naturata might be produced by God, but man is cognizant of its differences nevertheless. It is essential to tell between the producing and the produced, but also distinguish the *modes* of producing. No one "chunk" of natura naturata is productive of another, albeit it might be productive of its becoming it time (if generating) or its assuming a new accidental form "in the history" (if it be produced artificially). Divine producing is identical with the Divine Nature, whereas the human producing (this accident) cannot be so. Consequently, we must distinguish:

1) The natural resources, which, after being transformed accidentally are given a certain value;
2) The human nature, as the principle of actions to be undertaken. The human nature in its *integrity* is endowed with a principle of reproducing its like in the *same species*, but given an ability also to produce the artificial means to sustain the naturally begotten. Artificial products serve, first of all, the progeny produced naturally. The family is a natural center for producing material goods (its closer natural end). The reproduction of biological life and traditional values in the family precedes production normally so called;
3) The Nature of the Ultimate End of the natural world and the human nature in particular. It "defines" the scope of the actions possibly undertaken by man.[206]

Contra Gentiles, lib. 2 cap. 42 n. 2. Haec igitur positio toti rerum diversitati non unam causam assignat, sed singulas causas determinatis effectibus: totam autem diversitatem rerum ex concursu omnium causarum procedere ponit. Ea autem a casu esse dicimus quae ex concursu diversarum causarum proveniunt et non ex aliqua una causa determinata.

Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 97 n. 3. Et hoc evidenter apparet naturas rerum speculanti. Inveniet enim, si quis diligenter consideret, gradatim rerum diversitatem compleri: nam supra inanimata corpora inveniet plantas; et super has irrationalia animalia; et super has intellectuales substantias; et in singulis horum inveniet diversitatem secundum quod quaedam sunt aliis perfectiora, in tantum quod ea quae sunt suprema inferioris generis, videntur propinqua superiori generi, et e converso, sicut animalia immobilia sunt similia plantis; unde et Dionysius dicit, VII cap. de Div. Nom. quod *divina sapientia coniungit fines primorum principiis secundorum*. Unde patet quod rerum diversitas exigit quod non sint omnia aequalia, sed sit ordo in rebus et gradus.

Contra Gentiles, lib. 4 cap. 1 n. 5. Oportet igitur processum emanationis a Deo uniri quidem in ipso principio, multiplicari autem secundum res infimas, ad quas terminatur. Et ita, secundum diversitatem rerum, apparet viarum diversitas, quasi ab uno principio inchoatarum, et terminatarum ad diversa.

[206] Summa Theologiae I, q. 45 a. 2 c. Respondeo dicendum quod non solum non est impossibile a Deo aliquid creari, sed necesse est ponere a Deo omnia creata esse, ut ex praemissis habetur. Quicumque enim facit aliquid ex aliquo, illud ex quo facit praesupponitur actioni eius, et non producitur per ipsam actionem, sicut artifex operatur ex rebus naturalibus, ut ex ligno et aere, quae per artis actionem non causantur, sed causantur per actionem naturae. Sed et ipsa natura causat res naturales quantum ad formam, sed praesupponit materiam.

Some say that, in the 19th century, people began to call values what was previously called good. The statement is correct to some extent only. Good is in fact a "meta-value". It is a property of being. It is immanent to nature in the sense (1), (2), (3) mentioned above.

Consequently, the values of products and the wealth of nations too do not result from just *any* labor whatsoever, but rather from *rational* labor; the one harmonizing with the human nature created by God and respecting the order of nature created by God. (The attempts to both "subjugate" the nature and improve it are equally irrational). The labor is undertaken with the intention of obtaining the Transcendent Creative Nature (God) for someone personally as well as for those nigh by the bonds of natural proximity, which make the relatives a natural "entity" of a sort: the family. Man cannot be an end unto him/herself.

The existence of the crude nature (1) has been cast into doubt since Hegel. Neo-Marxists corrected the stance, because addressing Hegel's great adversary. Schelling provided an alternative within the stance of the Objective Idealism. In Hegel, nature is of no account, and in fact despicable. In Schelling, the nature is "divine" potentially (the spirit lurks hidden in it). In both cases, however, defining the relation amongst the aforementioned (1), (2), (3) natures is infeasible. The real wealth can only result from defining (in a broader sense of the word). The weal accumulated by a lucky coincidence (irrationally) can be only squandered.

The value of a thing in the *narrowest* sense of the word can be identified with its utility, but the utility is not what the advocates of utilitarianism thought it to be. It must be placed in the category of USUS, as the realization of the intention (a moral act). Still, both realizing the intended and willing the end (intending it) must be right, and it is impossible to ascertain as to the righteousness of an action without understanding it first. Man is, first of all, the reasoning animal, but the producing animal (possibly) consequently only. The reason gives a stimulus to intend the real (not only an apparent) good and to realize it in the material world: to produce goods, which are so called because representing the formerly premeditated (moral) good (the good as such; "in singular").

Man should think first of all about God, and about himself (and of his relatives) in the second place. But the "material goods" are only subservient to these substantial goods. The family is the good immanent to the human nature, but sometimes placed in a place unbefitting its value. Producing *exterior* goods is naturally preceded by producing its like (things we produce in factories are not similar to us, but to ideas which appear in our minds, whereas the progeny is naturally similar, and not to be improved by any ideas).

Economic values might potentially serve wicked purposes or preposterous ideologies. There is a relation between the real and intended good (as intentions do not make things real), but, on the other hand, the value of a thing with substantiates the intended in the visible world is relative to them both, even if the relation be blurred. Lest it be so, a reflection is needed and the intention in question harbored with the perspective of obtaining the Supreme God and participating of its life/nature.

Good is the property of being created by God. However, according to Augustine, the archetypes of creation are to be called good in the eminent sense of the word, because they are identical with the essence of the Supreme Nature. God creates according to a rational plan conceived in His Logos. There is, contrary to what Descartes says, an intention legible to man

in the act of creation. Things are created in a definite order so as to show us-humans the perfection of the Divine act of creation (its mode).[207]

Natural resources (1) and the human nature (2) are created thus, so that the latter stand in a definite relation to the former. The essence of the relation is, however, not essentially definable in spatial terms. The essence of what is "between" us-humans and the crude nature is to be understood in the perspective of obtaining the Ultimate end (*this* Nature) (3).

What exists between things related to each other depends wholly upon the subjects the relation is sustained by. The relation can be called wealth, but cannot be deemed (as Hegel and Marx suggest) "supernatural", only because transcending the crude nature. It are only some (few) material signs "authorized" by God Himself which can claim the right to be called so. They are extraordinary means to obtain the *naturally* desired by man. Things "created" by man are by no means supernatural because "opposed" to nature.

All natural resources exist in their natural places. The notion of the natural place plays the pivotal role in Aristotle's philosophy of nature, as was mentioned in the preceding Section. Alas, the notion had appeared "obsolete" in the moment some believed that "the book on nature is written in the tongue of mathematics", because there were no privileged places in the three dimensional space. The latter had been in fact supposed to exist in a special manner, until the supposition was falsified by Michelson, Morley and Einstein. Moreover, according to the Pauli Exclusion Principle, no two electrons can have (in a single atom) the same set of four quantum numbers. They seem to have their natural places anyhow. The nature might appear legible (to some extent) if viewed from the perspective mathematics offers, but it is far cry from admitting that reality is a text of sorts (Heidegger).

The Aristotelian stance chimes in with what we get to know about nature by means of common sense observation. Some plants and animals exists well in their natural environments, [208] but if tried to be introduced in some "new" placed run the risk of shattering

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[207] Super Sent., lib. 3 d. 1 q. 1 a. 3 ad 3. Ad tertium dicendum, quod in productione minimae creaturae manifestatur infinita potentia, sapientia et bonitas Dei: quia quaelibet creatura ducit in cognitionem alicujus primi et summi, quod est infinitum in omni perfectione. Nec oportet ut potentia infinita per effectum infinitum manifestetur nec bonitas infinita per communicationem infinitam; sed sufficit ad ostendendum bonitatem infinitam hoc quod unicuique juxta suam capacitatem largitur.

De veritate, q. 23 a. 1 ad 3. Nec est inconveniens, in Deo significari aliquid per modum causae; sic enim divinitas significatur in Deo ut habens se ad Deum per modum causae formalis. Res vero creatae, quas Deus vult, non se habent ad divinam voluntatem ut fines, sed ut ordinata ad finem: propter hoc enim Deus creaturas vult esse, ut in eis sua bonitas manifestetur, et ut sua bonitas, quae per essentiam multiplicari non potest, saltem similitudinis participatione in plures effundatur.

[208] Vergilius, Georgica I.
[50] At prius ignotum ferro quam scindimus aequor,
ventos et varium caeli praediscere morem
cura sit ac patrios cultusque habitusque locorum
et quid quaeque ferat regio et quid quaeque recuset.
Hic segetes, illic veniunt felicius uvae,
[55] arborei fetus alibi, atque iniussa virescunt
gramina. …
[60] Continuo has leges aeternaque foedera certis
inposuit natura locis, …

the equilibrium of the ecosystem. Nature if exploited without discretion can endanger the very act of exploiting.

People happen to produce and "dislocate" natural resources. They happen to introduce exotic ("artificial") plants or animals into the milieus previously (and possibly eventually too) alien to them. The costs of the introduction and production might outweigh the expected profit, should the truth of the relation of natures (1), (2), (3) be ignored.

People can image to live in a safe abode of their artificial world, but cannot live authentically if ignorant on purpose of the relation in question. The authentic life can never be cozy life. Some might be clever at discounting materially (for a short run) some possibilities resulting from distorting the truth of natures (1), (2), but the civilization is the work of unpractical theorists rather than clever "players".

Three relatively stable isotopes of oxygen exist in nature: ^{16}O, ^{17}O i ^{18}O. They all can come into the structure of the water which surrounds the Erath crust. The isotopes ^{16}O and ^{18}O are necessary for circulation of polar waters. The existence of some more complex ("richer") isotopes of oxygen its theoretically possible, but their "life time" is measured in seconds, and those "richest" ones have but a "statistic" existence, due to the practical inability to measure it precisely (it is neither real nor rational mode of existence, perhaps similar to Avicenna's natura tertia). The most commanding discoveries of the 20th century came after discovering the elementary structure of the world. Words and theorems cannot mirror the reality, but the mode we get to know it can correspond to its complexity. It might be assumed that all human products (such like material values) are in fact "unstable isotopes" of human reason existing only at the border of what is undoubtedly real and what exists but in the imagination.

Instability seems to determine human producing, and, at the same time, makes for the difference to the Divine Producing (of the entire world). The produced by humans is tried to be (dis-)placed more or less effectively so to coexist in a desirable place, but the coexistence is unstable after all. Deeds of God are, to the contrary, perfect.

The same algorithm of the artificial coexistence of "matter" has been used since the most primitive tolls of the Paleolithic Age. The coexistence of the "matters" is nowadays incomparably more complex than thousands years before, but the state of nature has not changed and the relations possible to exist therein also. The coexistence should be as stable and legible for the observing eye as only possible, but, along with its becoming more and more complex, the both features of products are being endangered. The wealth of people consists in preserving the endangered.

No animal (apart from humans) can ever try to coerce "matters" to coexist in a prescribed place after severing them from the other one (some animals can build, but no animal can isolate the "elements" so that they might become "matter" for producing). No animal, moreover, can undertake auto-destructive actions, the opposite whereof is clearly visible in humans, perhaps because they are able to put the end to the existence of matter in its proper place ("ex-terminate" it so). The last great discovery of science (nuclear fissure) can be its last literally speaking because used in the weapons of mass destruction. The destruction is the Janus Face of the human producing. A gun bullet has no natural place in the human heart, nor the Mustard Gas in the human lungs. Weapons happen to be produced with exquisite

intentions to "make the world a better place to, live in" *for those who produce* weapons, *at the expense* of those dislocated from this "better place". The process of weaponizing the produced might end with the global destruction, because the advocates and the "enemies" (victims) of progress could prove eventually undistinguishable. One's existence can (be believed to) expand whilst disrespecting the natural place of the others. The extension must be frustrated in the end (because unnatural), but the destruction of human life is real no doubt.

The economic (material) value of goods depends on: (i) their complexity; (ii) the transparence of their structure; (iii) and the accuracy of the localization of the natural resources. The creativity of the human mind follows, in this case, the purely theoretical reflection upon the nature existing beyond the human mind (1) and its dependence upon its Transcendent cause (3).[209] It is impossible to produce without knowing the nature of the "elementary matter", but it is impossible also to go get to know any *particular* cause without knowing the *general* direction of the human life (2) (or at least not writing it off) and without answering to the naive: "what is it all for?", and finding the answer in the Uncreated Nature (3).

Whilst existing in the Hegelian niche of freedom man can forget for some time indeed about the principles of his existence because enchanted by the spell of the Objective Spirit (the one substantiating his productive activity). The "spirit" in fact separates man from his transcendent destiny (3). Bereft of the contact with crude nature, and most importantly, of the contact with the Creator of the nature of man degrades morally, mentally, spiritually or even physically.

The word of relation is so commonly used nowadays that it might seem to be abused. It is essential for human relations that they can only exist *between* humans endowed with individual being. The whole world is a system of relations.[210] But the local relations (the best imaginable) are by no means the most important ones.[211] Dasein is by no means the original

[209] De veritate, q. 12 a. 3 ad 13. Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod res aliqua dupliciter potest cognosci: scilicet an est, et quid est. Quia vero proprietates creaturarum, ex quibus cognitionem accipimus, maxime distant a proprietatibus divinis, inde est quod de Deo cognoscere non possumus quid est; sed ex hoc ipso quod creaturae dependent a Deo, ex creaturis inspectis cognoscere possumus, Deum esse. Sed quia praesentia a futuris non dependent, proprietates autem habent similes, idcirco ex rebus praesentibus non possumus scire an aliqua futura sint.

Super De Trinitate, pars 2 q. 4 a. 4 ad 4. Ad quartum dicendum quod omnes effectus causarum secundarum magis dependent a Deo quam etiam ab ipsis causis secundis, et ideo etiam remotis causis secundis ipse miraculose potest producere effectus quos voluerit.

Summa Theologiae I, q. 9 a. 2 c. Omnes enim creaturae, antequam essent, non erant possibiles esse per aliquam potentiam creatam, cum nullum creatum sit aeternum, sed per solam potentiam divinam, inquantum Deus poterat eas in esse producere. Sicut autem ex voluntate Dei dependet quod res in esse producit, ita ex voluntate eius dependet quod res in esse conservat, non enim aliter eas in esse conservat, quam semper eis esse dando; unde si suam actionem eis subtraheret, omnia in nihilum redigerentur, ut patet per Augustinum, IV super Gen. ad Litt.
Sicut igitur in potentia creatoris fuit ut res essent, antequam essent in seipsis, ita in potentia creatoris est, postquam sunt in seipsis, ut non sint.

[210] Summa Theologiae I, q. 13 a. 7 c.

[211] Ibidem., [quod] patet de omnibus relationibus quae consequuntur quantitatem, ut magnum et parvum, duplum et dimidium, et huiusmodi, nam quantitas est in utroque extremorum.

relation. According to Mieczysław Gogacz, the most prominent feature of Neo-Platonism is the primacy of relations over the individualized natures (Nowadays, it is a fundamental concept of Post-humanist Theory, and critical social theory advocated by Gilles Deleuze and others). The relations were imagined as "lines" and the point they intersect was to be called this or that being. Marxism proves to be Neo-Platonism too. Social relations are believed to exist *amongst* objects, although the natural relations can only exist *between* them (there are but two extremes of one relation).

The flawed concept of relations impacts on how actions (such relations) of man are understood. Beyond the immediate reach of my actions and with the hope for them to be acknowledged by the others, some things might appear to exist, albeit the mode of their existence is barely cognoscible. They were imagined to exist "somewhere", but alienated from their authors. Producing seemed to be defined by alienation.

In the Middle Ages, the problem of the so called just price was analyzed. The same problem seems nowadays hopelessly outdated, but it always might be asked why it is so.

Justice in modernity has been so tightly connected with the "social realm": the space individuals are supposed to exist in; that existing (allegedly) before and apart of individuals: *amongst* them. But justice can be understood to exist originally *between just two* persons. An odd notion of the social justice appeared. A particular moral act (of justice) was but an instantiation of that general reality.

There is, to be sure, "distributive justice" in Thomas, which concerns good given *individuals unequally* so that they may use them aright (giving them equally would be unjust),[212] but never opposite to commutative justice (to render anyone their due).

Justice (contrary to what Kant and those who followed assumed) *can* be ascribed to nature. If I say; "it is just so" I have in mind the correlation of the objective (natural) states of

[212] Summa Theologiae I, q. 21 a. 1 c. Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est species iustitiae. Una, quae consistit in mutua datione et acceptione, ut puta quae consistit in emptione et venditione, et aliis huiusmodi communicationibus vel commutationibus. Et haec dicitur a philosopho, in V Ethic., iustitia commutativa, vel directiva commutationum sive communicationum. Et haec non competit Deo, quia, ut dicit apostolus, Rom. XI, *quis prior dedit illi, et retribuetur ei?* Alia, quae consistit in distribuendo, et dicitur distributiva iustitia, secundum quam aliquis gubernator vel dispensator dat unicuique secundum suam dignitatem. Sicut igitur ordo congruus familiae, vel cuiuscumque multitudinis gubernatae, demonstrat huiusmodi iustitiam in gubernante; ita ordo universi, qui apparet tam in rebus naturalibus quam in rebus voluntariis, demonstrat Dei iustitiam. Unde dicit Dionysius, VIII cap. de Div. Nom., *oportet videre in hoc veram Dei esse iustitiam, quod omnibus tribuit propria, secundum uniuscuiusque existentium dignitatem; et uniuscuiusque naturam in proprio salvat ordine et virtute.*

Summa Theologiae IIª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 c. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, iustitia particularis ordinatur ad aliquam privatam personam, quae comparatur ad communitatem sicut pars ad totum. Potest autem ad aliquam partem duplex ordo attendi. Unus quidem partis ad partem, cui similis est ordo unius privatae personae ad aliam. Et hunc ordinem dirigit commutativa iustitia, quae consistit in his quae mutuo fiunt inter duas personas ad invicem. Alius ordo attenditur totius ad partes, et huic ordini assimilatur ordo eius quod est commune ad singulas personas. Quem quidem ordinem dirigit iustitia distributiva, quae est distributiva communium secundum proportionalitatem. Et ideo duae sunt iustitiae species, scilicet commutativa et distributiva.

matter, which *may* apply to human affairs, but does not need to. Moreover, the natural justice is prior to the human one. The primitive (original) justice is a relation of nature.

The wisdom directing actions stamps them with the mark of justice, whereas cleverness makes for them to be "successful" only. Artificial products can be shrewdly advertised (especially if of dubitable quality). The more "artificial" they are the more urgent sometimes the need for "testifying" their quality subjectively. The (healthy) food products do not need to be advertised this way. The healthiest food is the dark bread, and it is unimaginable that can be advertised. (Neither can fasting be advertised for the matter too, albeit it improves greatly human health). Some believed that the food production must be subsidized, which might be true, but the problem is why it must be so *now*, viz. what social relations have made it to be so in modernity. All human affairs, as Henryk Sienkiewicz wrote, can be stained by falsity and false pretenses with the exception of the earth. The earth is truest, because its Creator can be relatively clearly seen beyond it. No one can live without bread, although the man civilized in the Hegelian manner can deem artificial goods to be more deserving of the name of the genuine goods.

The value of artificial products can be easily marred. Cleverness can replace wisdom. The veracity (value) of the earth cannot be so. The rural production of the individual farmers fell, after October 24 1929, in some countries by almost 90%. Some had to settle the bill for bold experiments in economy. The capital if cut off from nature (depersonalized) proves the instrument of destruction. Socialism is the most extreme guise of that destruction, but capitalism prepares the place it might easily occupy in the future.

The nature might seem to be indifferent to the human plight or even seem cruel (if regarded in a childish way), but can never be perverse and "competitive" as Darwinists fancied. They regarded nature anthropomorphically, albeit the form of humanity they had in mind was that of the social affairs of the 18th century (competition dominated in them).

Nature is just, because the order of nature corresponds to the creative intention fostered by God. The statutory law might be just or unjust, all depending on whether reckoning with the natural law, and not precluding the possibility to consult the Divine Law embedded in exemplary ideas (of what things should be) of the Divine Logos.

Nature resources (food first of all) should be equally accessible to everybody, but not all men are equally endowed with the faculty to use them effectively. The economics must reckon with the fact and the economic liberty is needed to use them so. Some people might be indolent, weak or not intelligent enough and unable to act vigorously. The access to natural reassures (1) must correspond to the degree they can be wisely used. In must be realistically taken into account that some (e.g. socialists) can only squander them. The strong and the wise are to be given a greater reward for their work. Their incomes might even seem to be enormous in comparison with the average. Still, the incomes are but a means to realize the ultimate destiny of all man. *Man are equal with respect to their ultimate destiny, but naturally unequal to each other, because not equally anxious to obtain the Ultimate*. The just price should reflect the nature of the "equation" with natural desire for perfection on its one side and the natural fulfillment on the other.

Breaching the right to the access to natural resources is evil, because potentially impairing the ability to achieve the Ultimate End (3) (the same is to be said about "democratizing" the right to *artificial* resources). But the evil itself consists in breaching the

right to adhere to this End. We cannot, to be sure, adhere to it firmly enough in this life,[213] but are given, nonetheless, a foretaste of the consummation in convenient circumstances. Without it no man can be really free, because not able to enjoy the hope to obtain the Ultimate End. In antiquity, the rest in it was named otium-σχολή,[214], but not all man were, apparently given the personal freedom. This state of affairs changed in the Middle Ages. Schole was called the Holy Day.

"Justice" restricted to the realm of supply and demand impaired hugely the supreme right to the rest in the Supreme Good. During the 19th century Industrial Revolution in Europe the workers were forced to work 12 or 16 hours a day; 6 or 7 days a week. They were thus deprived of the right to the rest in God. Marxism *continued* and *improved* the work of destruction, because it deprived workers of the rest in God de iure. Social justice prevailed over the justice normally so called.

In the 20th century, limits were introduced to the work day, but some more refined methods were invented so as to deprive man of the most precious. The general tendency in the materialized world was to discount materially the natural human energy issuing from man's tending to God. People have been tried to be deprived of the contact with the Source and participation in His inner life.[215]

Many times, people would recklessly destroy what seemed "unnecessary" or "useless". Nature suffered, but human rational nature especially so. Human acting and human existence were deemed "unidimensional", because restricted to producing. The fact had been ignored that *before producing* anything in the outer world, man *conceives* an idea of the product-to-be in the *innermost* of his mind, and *after producing* it he invests all the income in the *inner natural* sanctuary of his life: his family. *The primitive human reality is that of begetting the words in heart and progeny in the family*.

Scientific socialists dreamt of subjugating the nature and succeeded to some extent at least, because many unique animal habitats have been irretrievably destroyed and many multicultural regions (e.g. in the eastern territories of the Second Polish Commonwealth) deprived of their authentic diversity. The contemporary multiculturalism is only a caricature of the original authentic diversity. The biological nature was/is of no account for ideologists. An "existential nature" (defined institutionally) was/is to replace it.

The contemporary Neo-Marxist society is "open" to redefining all traditional values. The redefinition is a legislative act. Those deprived of the life are exterminated "in clinics" or "given" the right to "dignified death."

Sartre's l'Humanité differs from the Cicero's humanitas like barbarism from civilization must. No one can be the end unto himself. Kant's Humanität (die Menschheit ist

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[213] Summa Theologiae I-IIae q. 109 a. 6 c. Dionysius, in libro de Div. Nom., dicit quod Deus convertit omnia ad seipsum. Sed homines iustos convertit ad seipsum sicut ad specialem finem, quem intendunt, et cui cupiunt adhaerere sicut bono proprio; secundum illud Psalmi LXXII, *mihi adhaerere Deo bonum est*.

[214] Aristot. Politica. 7.1334a 10, nn.

[215] 2 Pt 1. 4. δι' ὧν τὰ τίμια καὶ μέγιστα ἡμῖν ἐπαγγέλματα δεδώρηται, ἵνα διὰ τούτων γένησθε θείας κοινωνοὶ φύσεως, ἀποφυγόντες τῆς ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ φθορᾶς.

ein Zweck, niemals bloß ein Mittel) cannot be the ultimate end, and all the less its more "modern" continuations can. The end must be *transcendent actually* and not transcendental in the eschatological future of humanity.

L'Humanité was supposed to be the supreme value, but definable ideologically and institutionally only. The progress of humanity was taken for granted. Human affairs could only meliorate in the future.

There is no "better future" in nature and no progress also. The Second Law of Thermodynamics speaks of the world entropy growing out of necessity: about *the energetic death* of the universe. The Law is "empirical", but *universally valid* if completed: the world must die (and humanity too) if cut off its Transcendent Cause (3).

The so called Objective Idealism was an uncanny response to the human desire for the divine, but Hegelianism was "more" than just odd (William James). Schelling's system is perhaps less "refined", but more understandable for the same reason. No wonder it inspired Freudianism and Neo-Marxism better than Hegelianism did inspire Marxism. Both systems are monistic, but in Schelling the divine lurks hidden in the nature. The nature is "divine", and differentiating between natures (1), (2), (3) proves impossible.

Schelling admitted the possibility of auto-deification, but, since the "divine" loses its original meaning, it equals de facto the possibility of auto-destruction. Nowadays, in the era inspired by his philosophy, we face, due to the creative interpretation of Neo-Marxism, the growth of the social entropy and the demise of natural power of man. Monism is the system of growing entropy.

The determination of the special position of man in nature seems to be indispensable. Descartes tried to omit the difficulty, creating a special mode of being called realitas obiectiva (Med. III, 41). It was bereft of reality in the common sense of the word, but on the other hand, was something more than the mode of human thinking (a being of reason). Phenomenologists believe in that values must be just that: Objective Reality.

In the centuries to come, it proved impossible to both "deduce" the idea of God from the realitas obiectiva (in the way Descartes tried to), and to determine the status of man in relation to nature (after taking the existence of realitas obiectiva for granted). Still, it is all the more unbecoming to try to deduce the idea of God from human subjectivity *directly* (without the intermediary of realitas obiectiva): from pure thinking (in Locke) or from the mere desire for happiness. In the human mind, vices exist along with virtues, and only the latter can be reasonably ascribed to God (in the ideal form). Without telling the ones from the others, the divine would be imagined anthropomorphically, and all objections Xenophanes raised against this type of "humanism" in antiquity would become actual again. It is, generally, impossible to determine the perfections of God without settling the relation of natures (1), (2), (3) in the aforementioned sense, but also without giving the reason why God (the Supreme) "decided" to create and recreate the humanity. According to Aristotle, privations (vices are this) have a special (defective) being whereas the real being stems from God only.[216] On the way towards Him, some definable objects: values and anti-values might be met.

[216] Contra Gentiles, lib. 2 cap. 21 n. 10. Oportet igitur quod ab eo quod est per se causa essendi: nam effectus proportionaliter reducuntur in causas. Hoc autem est primum ens solum, quod est causa entis inquantum

People happen to be immoral, but the immorality of social affairs can lead some (not callous enough) to despair. The desire for the Absolute might be frustrated (or "sublimated" for the matter too) so that no reality behind the idea of God remains. The experience of the Totalitarianisms of the 20th century occasioned some to fall into atheism. Modern "naturalism" is one of its forms. Nature as such cannot be immoral, but it is not tantamount to that it is "moral" (as ecologists de facto claim). The good of the universe consists in its order viz. differences existing amongst *specific* natures. Equality, to the contrary, is the other name of destruction.

When analyzing the structure of the nature, man is able to come to the conclusion as to the existence of the Creator of the nature. But there is another ("parallel") process too and tending in the opposite direction. Human organism "analyzes" nutrients in order that they might sustain its life. The opposite process of ageing, illness and the demise of vital forces impairs it. Analogically, along with the process of analyzing nature and differentiating its threefold sense (1), (2), (3), a counter process of "unification"; "inclusiveness" and "equality" takes place: destructive of all more perfect forms of human rational life. The ideas are produced bound to boost the growth of the social entropy. They are "artificial" more (and more destructive too) than anything else produced by man.

Man is part of the created universe directly as to his/her nature, but as to what completes his/her nature accidentally and indirectly only. Things often happen to us which we are afterwards ashamed of (or should be so). Making out the existence of the Uncreated Nature beyond the veil of the created nature happens to be difficult for this reason also that some accidental "modes of our existence" accrue to our nature without proper order. Both the achievements of humanity so splendid that arousing idolatrous worship and the debasement (the child of the social progress) hamper this cognition.

For determining the nature of accidents, the nature as such should be known first: in the threefold sense (1), (2), (3) mentioned above. There are, to be sure, no accidents in God, but there is, as was said above, His creative intention which animates the created world.[217]

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huiusmodi: alia vero sunt causa essendi per accidens, et huius esse per se. Cum igitur producere ens non ex ente praeexistente sit creare, oportet quod solius Dei sit creare.

Contra Gentiles, lib. 2 cap. 22 n. 3. Virtus autem divina est per se causa essendi, et esse est eius proprius effectus, ut ex dictis patet. Ergo ad omnia illa se extendit quae rationi entis non repugnant: si enim in quendam tantum effectum virtus eius posset, non esset per se causa entis inquantum huiusmodi, sed huius entis. Rationi autem entis repugnat oppositum entis, quod est non ens.

Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 75 n. 13. Amplius.

De potentia, q. 3 a. 16 ad 4. […] Oportet autem illud quod est causa entis in quantum est ens, esse causam omnium differentiarum entis, et per consequens totius multitudinis entium.

De malo, q. 16 a. 7 ad 15. […] voluntas divina est universaliter causa entis, et universaliter omnium quae consequuntur modum necessitatis et contingentiae. Ipsa autem est supra ordinem necessarii et contingentis, sicut est supra totum esse creatum.

[217] Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 25 n. 9. […] ipsaque prima philosophia tota ordinatur ad Dei cognitionem sicut ad ultimum finem, unde et scientia divina nominatur. Est ergo cognitio divina finis ultimus omnis humanae cognitionis et operationis.

Proportionally to how precisely the relation is settled, we are able to find our own place in the world. Using the conclusions of metaphysics allows, in this case, determining the relation of man to his Ultimate end in ethics (the end can be called good as such). Goods *in plural* are produced for the benefit of humans if subservient to good per se ("in singular").

Human activity begins with analyzing the objective (natural) state of matter existing independently of the human mind. The conclusion as to the existence of the Supreme Nature might follow. Still, the nature might be also used (as resources), albeit only after analyzed to a degree at least. The dependence upon the Ultimate might be *provisionally* not taken into account, but never denied in the end. From the same natural point of departure, human activity advances in (as it might seem) opposite directions. It might be inspired by the disinterested pursue of truth as such, or (the opposite) interest in the particular form of nature which animates producing. The truth about nature might be discounted materially.

Chronologically, as Aristotle has it, producing preceded the theorizing.[218]. But the primacy of time is not the primacy of nature. Man is (by definition) rather the "contemplating" (or "metaphysical" as Gilson has it) animal than the "producing" one. The first man (according to the Revelation); the man existing in the state of the original justice; knew natural things better than we do now.[219] The barbaric savagery followed the expulsion from Eden. Man then "knew the truth" in the world potentially endangering his existence. After having found himself in this harsh position (in the world alien to him), and before taming the nature to some reasonable extent, man had first to understand it anyhow.

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[218] Aristot. Met. 1.981b 17-25

πλειόνων δ᾽ εὑρισκομένων τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν μὲν πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα τῶν δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν οὐσῶν, ἀεὶ σοφωτέρους τοὺς τοιούτους ἐκείνων ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς [20] χρῆσιν εἶναι τὰς ἐπιστήμας αὐτῶν. ὅθεν ἤδη πάντων τῶν τοιούτων κατεσκευασμένων αἱ μὴ πρὸς ἡδονὴν μηδὲ πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εὑρέθησαν, καὶ πρῶτον ἐν τούτοις τοῖς τόποις οὗ πρῶτον ἐσχόλασαν: διὸ περὶ Αἴγυπτον αἱ μαθηματικαὶ πρῶτον τέχναι συνέστησαν, ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἀφείθη σχολάζειν [25] τὸ τῶν ἱερέων ἔθνος.

[219] De veritate, q. 18 a. 4 c. […] Cognitio autem naturalis humana ad illa se potest extendere quaecumque ductu naturalis rationis cognoscere possumus. Cuius quidem naturalis cognitionis est accipere principium et terminum. Principium autem eius est in quadam confusa cognitione omnium: prout scilicet homini naturaliter inest cognitio universalium principiorum, in quibus, sicut in quibusdam seminibus, virtute praeexistunt omnia scibilia quae ratione naturali cognosci possunt. Sed huius cognitionis terminus est quando ea quae virtute in ipsis principiis insunt, explicantur in actum: sicut cum ex semine animalis, in quo virtute praeexistunt omnia membra animalis, producitur animal habens distincta et perfecta omnia membra, dicitur esse terminus generationis animalis. Adam autem in principio suae conditionis non solum oportuit ut haberet naturalem cognitionem quantum ad sui principium, sed etiam quantum ad terminum; eo quod ipse condebatur ut pater totius humani generis. A patre autem filii accipere debent non solum esse per generationem, sed et disciplinam per instructionem. Et quia non competit alicui esse principium secundum quod est in potentia, sed secundum quod est in actu: ratio cuius, actus naturaliter est prior potentia, et naturae operatio semper a perfectis incipit; inde est quod oportuit primum hominem mox in ipsa sui conditione constitui in termino perfectionis et quantum ad corpus, ut esset conveniens principium generationis totius humani generis, et quantum ad cognitionem, ut esset sufficiens instructionis principium. Sicut igitur nihil in corpore eius erat non explicitum in actum quod pertineret ad perfectionem corporis ipsius; ita quidquid seminaliter sive virtualiter erat in primis principiis rationis, totum erat explicitum secundum perfectam cognitionem eorum omnium ad quae virtus primorum principiorum se extendere poterat. Unde dicendum est, quod quidquid unquam homo aliquis de cognitione rerum naturali ingenio assequi potuit, hoc totum Adam naturali cognitione habitualiter scivit.

Producing ("taming" the world of the exile) was always preceded by finding a coign of vantage for possible cognition; by creating a "laboratory" of cognition. The laboratory of a scientist is rarely a safe abode of life. The desire to know the truth *as such* must be always matched with the risk of knowing it at *the expense* of one's life. The value of civilization is defined by risks undertaken for designing possible products-to-be, rather than safety in using them. The laboratory, however, might be inflated to so enormous dimensions that believed (as in Hegel) to be a reality on its own, and its nature be misunderstood. Some feel safe in big cities, whereas lost in the wilderness, which is not as rational as it might seem, as the city pollution endangers life not less than tropical diseases. The artificial is hoped to "better"; the human existence, albeit it might as well put to it a considerable risk.

The "hope" seems to be the mode of consuming goods, whereas taking reasonable and premediated risks is the mode of existence of those keen on understanding nature. Consuming material goods (choosing them from shop shelves) or choosing representatives meant to represent the *material interests* seems to be the (modest) mode of rationality commonly accessible to anybody. Still, it is but a substitute of *genuine* thinking. The *sum* of particular interests can never create a new *quality*: the universal knowledge.

Aristotle states that people took to theory after securing their elementary needs. If seized superficially, the statement would imply that human rationality developed after human material culture. Hegel seems to understand it this way (he quotes Aristotle anyhow). Still, man is defined (by Aristotle) rather by cherishing logos (interior words of the intellect), not sentiments (as Libelt and Heidegger thought). Man's admiration for existence of the nature comes before producing material goods even if not evident clearly first.[220]

We live (in fact) between two "homes". In the paradise lost the first and theoretical cognition of things was perfect. In the paradise about to come things will be seen clearer too. Anyhow, the paradise is not to be found on the earth contaminated by human vices. It might seem that the desire for "a better world to live in" is a simple consequence of the awareness of losing the original one. But every "better" (and good) is that of nature. The desire must be preceded by knowing nature: its place and properties.

A dim awareness of the home-to-be, accompanies all attempts to build new home on the earth. The intention to achieve this must follow its cognition. Devising the means to obtain the end (producing things) is aimed at sustaining man's existence. Still, as it cannot be sustained peremptorily, another mode of existence is to be expected from beyond this world.

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[220] Aristot. Met. 1.981b 13-17

τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον εἰκὸς τὸν ὁποιανοῦν εὑρόντα τέχνην παρὰ τὰς κοινὰς αἰσθήσεις θαυμάζεσθαι [15] ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων μὴ μόνον διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναί τι τῶν εὑρεθέντων ἀλλ᾽ ὡς σοφὸν καὶ διαφέροντα τῶν ἄλλων.

Aristot. Met. 1.983a 12-21

ἄρχονται μὲν γάρ, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, ἀπὸ τοῦ θαυμάζειν πάντες εἰ οὕτως ἔχει, καθάπερ περὶ τῶν θαυμάτων ταὐτόμ ατα τοῖς μήπω τεθεωρηκόσι [15] τὴν αἰτίαν ἢ περὶ τὰς τοῦ ἡλίου τροπὰς ἢ τὴν τῆς διαμέτρου ἀσυμμετρίαν (θαυμαστὸν γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ πᾶσι τοῖς μήπω τεθεωρηκόσι τὴν αἰτίαν εἴ τι τῷ ἐλαχίστῳ μὴ μετρεῖται: δεῖ δὲ εἰς τοὐναντίον καὶ τὸ ἄμεινον κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἀποτελευτῆσαι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τούτοις ὅταν μάθωσιν: οὐθὲν γὰρ [20] ἂν οὕτως θαυμάσειεν ἀνὴρ γεωμετρικὸς ὡς εἰ γένοιτο ἡ διάμετρος μετρητή.

Cicero says that the civilized man needs but two things: library and garden. We need them both actually so as to obtain the Ultimate End (3). The library of the ancients was considerably small. It could have been, as was said above, called a "laboratory" to further the cognition of the natural world, had not the "free men" of antiquity despised manual work. Be that as it may, "library" or "laboratory" alike serves as a means to improve the cultivation of the garden. The problem consisted in that (before monastic medieval reform) some refused to do this with their own hands.

The garden must be cultivated but never destroyed. In antiquity, "libraries" and "gardens" coexisted peacefully. Nowadays, "laboratories" inflated artificially to the dimensions of state-own enterprises engender the existence of man on the earth.

The fact that we are able and *willing* to act at all (the labor does not require coercion) is the simple consequence of that we see the Ultimate End at least from distance. The distant end might be, to be sure, lost from sight for some time, but if despaired to be seen at all, the end ceases what it must have been: the *actual* source of vital energy.

The pathway of life leading to the end is man's itinerary. On it, e.g. gravel, sand or mud happen to be trodden on, and thus the ground which sustains our body's weight might be called way also (a road). Ascending to the Sublime, we must, because composed of material body, sustain the weight of it on the material ground. We must, then, regard the earth in a special manner.

> I asked the earth, and it answered me, "I am not He"; and whatsoever are in it confessed the same. I asked the sea and the deeps, and the living creeping things, and they answered, "We are not thy God, seek above us." I asked the moving air; and the whole air with his inhabitants answered, "Anaximenes was deceived, I am not God." I asked the heavens, sun, moon, stars, "Nor (say they) are we the God whom thou seekest." And I replied unto all the things which encompass the door of my flesh: "Ye have told me of my God, that ye are not He; tell me something of Him." And they cried out with a loud voice, "He made us." My questioning them, was my thoughts on them: and their form of beauty gave the answer.[221]

Pure regard or disinterested occupation with what constitutes our natural environment (a token of human rationality) begets admiration, and the desire for fulfillment. Being tethered to the earth, to the contrary, in the way Nietzsche though advisable, debases man. Nietzsche was right in a sense when observing that some "breaking" (to his mind) discoveries "traded a blow to the human pride" in modernity. The lack of "pride" (equaled to pusillanimity and submissiveness) is a special modern "virtue" indeed.

The Eden was a unique garden, and the nature as such (1) might be viewed theoretically so: as the work of God. But the earth can become an exile also (muscipulla

[221] The Confessions of Saint Augustine, By Saint Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, translated by E. B. Pusey (Edward Bouverie). Book X. 6.
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pedum insipientium),[222]and the artificial world (especially the progressive one) a gaol (in the Platonic Myth of the Cavern sophist were progressive thinkers of that time).

> Is not this corporeal figure apparent to all whose senses are perfect? why then speaks it not the same to all? Animals small and great see it, but they cannot ask it: because no reason is set over their senses to judge on what they report. But men can ask, so that the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; but by love of them, they are made subject unto them: and subjects cannot judge. [223]

The conclusion of the proof of the existence of God is, at the same time, the principle of the syllogism of practical life. It serves, moreover, to build the complex of means leading to the end. The means must be material, but their end must not be so.

Theoretically, both syllogisms are easily distinguishable. Practically, however, they are barely distinguishable, because a certain affectual attitude accompanies no matter how "abstract" considerations. Each act of the intellect is motivated by the will except for the most primitive one regarding the first naturally known principles. The good of the intellect is a special good in a sense. [224][225]

The first act of the intellect is independent of the will, and thus the primacy of the intellect shows up. There is, however, but one science in which the fact becomes clearly

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[222] Summa Theologiae I, q. 65 a. 1 ad 3. Sed quod avertant a Deo, hoc est ex culpa eorum qui insipienter eis utuntur. Unde dicitur Sap. XIV, quod *creaturae factae sunt in muscipulam pedibus insipientium*. Et hoc ipsum quod sic a Deo abducunt, attestatur quod sunt a Deo.

Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 79 a. 1 ad 2. Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum dicitur, *creaturae Dei factae sunt in odium et in tentationem animae hominum*, haec praepositio in non ponitur causaliter, sed consecutive, non enim Deus fecit creaturas ad malum hominum, sed hoc consecutum est propter insipientiam hominum. Unde subditur, et in muscipulam pedibus insipientium, qui scilicet per suam insipientiam utuntur creaturis ad aliud quam ad quod factae sunt.

Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 9 a. 4 c. Respondeo dicendum quod ad scientiam proprie pertinet rectum iudicium creaturarum. Creaturae autem sunt ex quibus homo occasionaliter a Deo avertitur, secundum illud Sap. XIV, *creaturae factae sunt in odium, et in muscipulam pedibus insipientium*, qui scilicet rectum iudicium de his non habent, dum aestimant in eis esse perfectum bonum; unde in eis finem constituendo, peccant et verum bonum perdunt.

[223] The Confessions of Saint Augustine, By Saint Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, translated by E. B. Pusey (Edward Bouverie). Book X. 6.
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[224] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 59 n. 5. … *verum est bonum intellectus*: ut patet per philosophum, in VI Ethicorum.

[225] Summa Theologiae I, q. 82 a. 4 ad 1. Unde intellectus intelligit voluntatem, et actum eius, et obiectum ipsius, sicut et alia specialia intellecta, ut lapidem aut lignum, quae continentur sub communi ratione entis et veri. Si vero consideretur voluntas secundum communem rationem sui obiecti, quod est bonum, intellectus autem secundum quod est quaedam res et potentia specialis; sic sub communi ratione boni continetur, velut quoddam speciale, et intellectus ipse, et ipsum intelligere, et obiectum eius, quod est verum, quorum quodlibet est quoddam speciale bonum. Et secundum hoc voluntas est altior intellectu, et potest ipsum movere.

visible. In all particular sciences, the acts of the will and the intellect are so tightly intertwined that scarcely distinguishable. Metaphysics is exceptional in this respect, because, as Thomas says, its conclusions are nearest to its principles.[226] Thus, the theory as such proves to be superior to the act of the will after all.[227] The relation (if blurred) mars the cognizance of the nature of the human mind. Contemplation (the act of theory), to the contrary, is, as Aristotle says, is a reward for ordaining the practical in man.

The crude nature serves as a starting point for the demonstration in question and initiates the way of the intellect towards God, but blind alleys are likely to be blundered into also, because the means can be unheeded treated as ends and the Ultimate End despaired to be obtained. The artificial world created by man can be this.

The wealth of nations is a phenomenon of the human life appearing on the way towards God. Between man and God, there are many "unstable isotopes" of human thinking, and both material goods and ideas produced by human mind are unstable indeed.

3. Human existence in the material world

In question 8. of the First Part of his Summa Thomas addresses the problem of the existence of God in things. The existence must be exceptional because of the unique mode God has produced things into being. Human producing is a defective resemblance thereof.

> God is in all things; not, indeed, as part of their essence, nor as an accident, but as an agent is present to that upon which it works. For an agent must be joined to that wherein it acts immediately and touch it by its power; hence it is proved in Phys. vii that the thing moved and the mover must be joined together. Now *since God is very being by His own essence, created being must be His proper effect*; as to ignite is the proper effect of fire. Now *God causes this effect in things not only when they first begin to be, but as long as they are preserved in being*; as light is caused in the air by the sun as long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore as long as a thing has being, God must be present to it, according to its mode of being.
>
> But *being is innermost in each thing* and most fundamentally inherent in all things since it is formal in respect of everything found in a thing, as was shown above (Q. 7, A. 1). Hence it must be that *God is in all things, and innermostly*. (a. 1) (Dominican Fathers).

However, the mode of His existence in the world is known to us only by the analogy to the human existence in the world.

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[226] Super De Trinitate, pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 ad 21. […] eius ratiocinatio est intellectuali considerationi propinquissima et conclusiones eius principiis).

[227] Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 26 n. 22. Et in hoc ipso intellectus voluntatem praecedit: nunquam enim voluntas desideraret intelligere nisi prius intellectus ipsum intelligere apprehenderet ut bonum. Et iterum, voluntas movet intellectum ad operandum in actu per modum quo agens movere dicitur; intellectus autem voluntatem per modum quo finis movet, nam bonum intellectum est finis voluntatis; agens autem est posterior in movendo quam finis, nam agens non movet nisi propter finem. Unde apparet intellectum simpliciter esse altiorem voluntate: voluntatem vero intellectu per accidens et secundum quid.

> But how He is in other things created by Him, may be considered from human affairs. A king, for example, is said to be in the whole kingdom *by his power* [1], although he is not everywhere present. Again a thing is said to be *by its presence* [2] in other things which are subject to its inspection; as things in a house are said to be present to anyone, who nevertheless may not be in substance in every part of the house. Lastly, a thing is said to be *by way of substance or essence* [3] in that place in which its substance may be (a. 3).

Thomas was, first of all, a theologian, but the tolls he uses in explaining theological problems are philosophical. In order to explain the theological problem of God's existence in the world, philosophical considerations on the (threefold) mode of existing of things in the world had to be carried out first. Their conclusions, in turn, might be applied to the special presence of man in the world "produced" by him.

God is present in things in a threefold manner: per potentiam; per praesentiam; per essentiam. The first mode is relatively well imaginable, like any physical power might be. The second is less so, as the "presence" is more abstract or even equivocal. The last one however, is barely understandable. The innermost existence of the First Cause in its effects seems to defy our power of grasping the relation of causes to the effects; the former exist normally *before and outside* the latter.

The Power of God extends to everything and thus corresponds to a King's power which traditionally existed in the mediaeval monarchies. But the ordained regal power is to be distinguished from the absolute power of the monarchs of the era of enlightenment (the absolutist one). God is not an Eastern or an enlightened despot. His power is both strong and gentle. God is present (est per praesentiam) in the world personally and thus things are subject to his *benevolent* inspection better than to any human one. Eventually, however, an even more "abstract" mode of existence justifies the two former. God is "powerful" and "present" because being in things *inwardly*.

God exists in all things per essentiam (as they are subject to His power), because giving them incessantly their own existence. Subtracting the influence of the Supreme Cause would result in the immediate annihilation of things.[228]

The existence of God per praesentiam is different from the human one too. Things are represented to us humans when known and thus we might suppose to exist in a distant place just because seeing things there.

> When it is said that the soul sees anywhere, this can be taken in two senses. In one sense the adverb anywhere determines the act of seeing on the part of the object; and in this sense it is true that while it sees the heavens, it sees in the heavens; and in the same way it feels in the heavens; but it does not follow that it lives or exists in the heavens, because to live and to exist do not import an act passing to an exterior object. In another sense it can be understood

[228] De potentia, q. 5 a. 1 ad 4. Deus autem per se est causa essendi: et ideo non est simile. Unde Augustinus dicit: *non enim sicut structuram cum fabricaverit quis abscedit …*

Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 65 n. 9. Quae virtus ab eis quae creata sunt regendis si aliquando cessaret, simul et eorum cessaret species, omnisque natura concideret. Neque enim sicut structuram aedium cum fabricaverit quis, abscedit atque, illo cessante atque abscedente, stat opus eius, ita mundus vel in ictu oculi stare poterit, si ei regim en Deus subtraxerit.

> according as the adverb determines the act of the seer, as proceeding from the seer; and thus it is true that where the soul feels and sees, there it is, and there it lives according to this mode of speaking; and thus it does not follow that it is everywhere (a. 4 ad 6).

God's knowledge is, contrary to the human one, the effective pre-knowledge, which determines the future of the world. In consequence, God's existence in all things created by Him is more effective also than the human existence (mostly ignorant of the future) can be. God is present in creatures (the human free will included), because He fills up all places (Summa, Ia q. 8 a. 2 ad 3),[229] without, however, breaching the effectiveness proper to the secondary causes existing in them. The human will is a secondary cause indeed, and thus coadjutress of God's actions. To derogate from her perfection would be the same as to derogate from the dignity of the Divine creative act.[230]

The assertion that God is the King of the universe demands the explanation of the nature of His "undemocratic" power. Man is created in the image and likeness of God, but the image does not adequate its archetype (is defective). He partakes defectively in all aforementioned attributes of God. The same must be the case with *any* human power.

It is the exclusive prerogative of God to be in all things per essentiam. Man is present so in a narrow section of the universe only. This part is to be called human body. Human soul gives existence to the part of the universe called man's body.[231] The soul is its formal principle, albeit God is, nonetheless, the first effective cause of every bodily existence.

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[229] Summa Theologiae I, q. 8 a. 2 ad 3. In substantiis autem incorporeis non est totalitas, nec per se nec per accidens, nisi secundum perfectam rationem essentiae. Et ideo, sicut anima est tota in qualibet parte corporis, ita Deus totus est in omnibus et singulis.

[230] Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 69 n. 17. Adhuc. Subtrahere ordinem rebus creatis est eis subtrahere id quod optimum habent: nam singula in seipsis sunt bona, simul autem omnia sunt optima, propter ordinem universi; semper enim totum est melius partibus et finis ipsarum. Si autem rebus subtrahantur actiones, subtrahitur ordo rerum ad invicem: rerum enim quae sunt diversae secundum suas naturas, non est colligatio in ordinis unitatem nisi per hoc quod quaedam agunt et quaedam patiuntur.

[231] De veritate, q. 28 a. 7 c. Dicendum, quod in quolibet genere causae, causa naturaliter est prior causato. Contingit autem secundum diversa genera causarum idem respectu eiusdem esse causam et causatum; sicut purgatio est causa sanitatis in genere causae efficientis, sanitas vero est causa purgationis secundum genus causae finalis; similiter materia causa est formae aliquo modo in quantum sustinet formam, et forma est aliquo modo causa materiae in quantum dat materiae esse actu. Et ideo nihil prohibet aliquid altero esse prius et posterius secundum diversum genus causae.

Q. d. de anima, a. 9 co. Sic igitur anima, secundum quod est forma dans esse, non habet aliquid aliud medium inter se et materiam primam. Sed quia eadem forma quae dat esse materiae est etiam operationis principium, eo quod unumquodque agit secundum quod est actu; necesse est quod anima, sicut et quaelibet alia forma, sit etiam operationis principium. Sed considerandum est quod secundum gradum formarum in perfectione essendi est etiam gradus earum in virtute operandi, cum operatio sit existentis in actu.

De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 3 co. Perfectioris autem agentis est inducere perfectiorem formam. Unde perfectior forma facit per unum omnia quae inferiores faciunt per diversa, et adhuc amplius: puta, si forma corporis inanimati dat materiae esse et esse corpus, forma plantae dabit ei et hoc et insuper vivere; anima vero sensitiva et hoc, insuper et sensibile esse; anima vero rationalis et hoc, et insuper rationale esse. Sic enim inveniuntur differre formae rerum naturalium secundum perfectum et magis perfectum, ut patet intuenti.

The soul is present in the entire body and in all its parts.[232] Hence, the human organism might be called a microcosm (Democritus, Aristotle). The original (bodily and organic) presence of man in the world is the principle of his/her existing in it in the secondary manner, because the human soul does not animate save this or that individual body only, whereas it is able move others comparable in mass with her own body.

Man can be thus present in "his own world", which is not to be called microcosm, nonetheless, as it is artificial, not natural structure. This presence is twofold. The past generations are "present" (1) in the artificial goods created by them and outstanding their earthly bodily existence. Artificial goods are material, but the mode of existence of the past generations in *our* present time (in *their* future) is not purely material. Man produces "goods", but they are inherited in a certain immaterial order. The order is to be called their value, especially legible in definable words. "In libraries, the immortal souls of the dead speak".[233] Material objects are bequeathed to posterity, and signs (written down in books) are material too, even if representative of their immaterial content. But the biological existence (2) of the heirs precedes them being heirs to the inherited tradition. The heirs (the progeny) are naturally produced in a family, which is the best ambience for accepting the bequest. This mode of acceptance might be called the value in the eminent sense of the word. Parents are present in their progeny naturally (bodily) first, but spiritually too as long as passing on the traditional values.

God is present in the world according to His providence. Providentia humana, on the other hand, Cicero speaks of, is a faint reflection of this absolute one. The scope of the activity of the human providence is tiny. Humans happen to be bothered about their personal or family existence, but not certain of the endeavors after all. In the family, man exists beyond the *immediate* scope of his individual existence; the existence is reproduced naturally, and thus his/her bodily presence in the world is prolonged also to some extent at least. To the contrary, the material products exist in an anonymous and imperfect way only.

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[232] Contra Gentiles, lib. 2 cap. 72 n. 4. Totum autem vel pars secundum perfectionem essentiae invenitur in formis per se. De hac igitur totalitate loquendo, quae per se formis competit, in qualibet forma apparet quod est tota in toto et tota in qualibet parte eius: nam albedo, sicut secundum totam rationem albedinis est in toto corpore, ita et in qualibet parte eius. Secus autem est de totalitate quae per accidens attribuitur formis: sic enim non possumus dicere quod tota albedo sit in qualibet parte.

Contra Gentiles, lib. 4 cap. 67 n. 3. Unde et corpus naturale sic est in toto loco totum quod non est totum in qualibet parte loci, sed partes corporis partibus loci aptantur: eo quod est in loco mediantibus dimensionibus. Si autem aliquid substantiale sit in aliquo toto totum, etiam totum est in qualibet parte eius: sicut tota natura et species aquae in qualibet parte aquae est, et tota anima est in qualibet corporis parte.

Summa Theologiae I, q. 76 a. 8 c. Actus autem est in eo cuius est actus. Unde oportet animam esse in toto corpore, et in qualibet eius parte. Et quod tota sit in qualibet parte eius, hinc considerari potest, quia, cum totum sit quod dividitur in partes, secundum triplicem divisionem est triplex totalitas.

Summa Theologiae I, q. 76 a. 8 c. Unde oportet animam esse in toto corpore, et in qualibet eius parte. Et quod tota sit in qualibet parte eius, hinc considerari potest, quia, cum totum sit quod dividitur in partes, secundum triplicem divisionem est triplex totalitas. Est enim quoddam totum quod dividitur in partes quantitativas, sicut tota linea vel totum corpus.

[233] In bibliothecis loquuntur defunctorum immortales animae; Pliny the Elder.

The sphere of existence extends proportionally to how perfectly the matter to operate on has been known. We can relatively well represent to ourselves the objects we read about in books, but applying the bookish knowledge to the material world proves to be difficult. Adequate representation is considerably more than sheer mirroring ("the reality"). The most valuable in the material world: its immaterial order cannot be mirrored this way. Plato (in his Pheado) tried to retrace "what is better" in nature rather than what merely exists in it "side by side". "What is better" in it suggests to the intellect and the human will the possible manner of actions reaching *beyond* the world: from the created order to the Creator of the order.

The representations of things which are precious for us (this or that way) are normally followed by the desire to possess them as firmly as only possible, although the desire is likely to be frustrated. The theoretical knowledge about the order of the world (not followed by any desire), to the contrary, can be possessed quite firmly, and opens the possibility (fulfilled by the Revelation) to possess the everlasting presence of the Author of the order existing beyond it.

> God is said to be in a thing in two ways; in one way after the manner of an efficient cause; and thus He is in all things created by Him; in another way he is in things as the object of operation is in the operator; and this is proper to the operations of the soul, according as the thing known is in the one who knows; and the thing desired in the one desiring. In this second way God is especially in the rational creature which knows and loves Him actually or habitually.[234]

On the way towards the End, material things might be (tried to be) possessed more or less firmly. The relation to what might be possessed was traditionally called its use (Usus).[235] Things exist before being used (they cannot be used effectively unless known to exist so). The Use, in an absolute sense of the word, is a general attitude to what is at our disposal (e.g. imagination can be used this way if not moved by incidental stimuli, and the intellect if disciplined). The use, in the narrow sense of the word, is restricted to implementing the ideas invented in mind into the material world.

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[234] Summa Theologiae I q. 8 a. 3 c. Respondeo dicendum quod Deus dicitur esse in re aliqua dupliciter. Uno modo, per modum causae agentis, et sic est in omnibus rebus creatis ab ipso. Alio modo, sicut obiectum operationis est in operante, quod proprium est in operationibus animae, secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente, et desideratum in desiderante. Hoc igitur secundo modo, Deus specialiter est in rationali creatura, quae cognoscit et diligit illum actu vel habitu. Et quia hoc habet rationalis creatura per gratiam, ut infra patebit, dicitur esse hoc modo in sanctis per gratiam. In rebus vero aliis ab ipso creatis quomodo sit, considerandum est ex his quae in rebus humanis esse dicuntur.

[235] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 16 a. 3 c. Sed considerandum est quod ultimus finis dicitur dupliciter, uno modo, simpliciter; et alio modo, quoad aliquem. Cum enim finis, ut supra dictum est, dicatur quandoque quidem res, quandoque autem adeptio rei vel possessio eius, sicut avaro finis est vel pecunia vel possessio pecuniae; manifestum est quod, simpliciter loquendo, ultimus finis est ipsa res, non enim possessio pecuniae est bona, nisi propter bonum pecuniae. Sed quoad hunc, adeptio pecuniae est finis ultimus, non enim quaereret pecuniam avarus, nisi ut haberet eam. Ergo, simpliciter loquendo et proprie, pecunia homo aliquis fruitur, quia in ea ultimum finem constituit, sed inquantum refert eam ad possessionem, dicitur uti ea.

The dream to "command nature" with the absolute (despotic) power seems to be definitive of the post-Hegelian society, whereas the possibility to command it orderly is founded upon the faculty to use things wisely. This actual ability to use them at all depends on how adequately things have been previously known theoretically. Still, the ability to use them aright depends on how they are known by the practical intellect (dependent upon the righteous will). Anyway, the order of implementing the indented (and the known) depends upon the command we have over our individual bodies. The body naturally depends on the rational soul (its nigh principle). Intentions conceived in it animate our life. Their scope extends first of all into our personal future. Secondarily, it extends into exterior bodies to be found in our future and commanded proportionally to how well we command our personal future. The artificial things are "animated" (in a metaphorical sense) to the extent the human *individual* body is animated (literally) first.

The attempts to "subjugate nature" (Hegel; Marx) might seem grotesque first, but might prove gruesome in the moment the human body (part of the nature anyhow) becomes the object of the attempts. Humans are part of the material world as to their bodies, and the attempts to subjugate *the entire* nature might result in attempts to enthrall those endowed with *a particular* material nature. In the 19th century slavery was abolished, but in the years to come, it gave way to the modern slavery (man trafficking). In the post-Hegelian society, the ideologists attempt to direct the others' bodily existence, because persuaded to be unable to command their own bodily existence. It seems only natural (or at least easier) to focus on an exterior objects of activity instead of the laborious reflecting on one's own principles of acting. The code of human existence has been believed to be written down "somewhere" (possibly in genes). In the past, it used to be believed to be written down in stars, and those morally and intellectually weak excusable for not being able to change their alleged "destiny". Predestinationism is the name for yielding to emotions, which are difficult to command indeed, but possible to command nonetheless (by the politic power of the personal intellect). "The wise man will master the stars" ("Sapiens dominabitur astris", Thomas says) even if permanently persuaded (by "educators") as to the futility of his efforts.

When existing in the state of the integral nature, man did not experience the mutiny of his/her own body. It resulted from weakening the power of existence in this body. The plenitude of existence entails the power of the will commanding the body as well as the intellectual awareness of this bodily existence. Its weakening results eventually in the necessity to cease to exist in the body at all (death), but first in approaching it (by illness or ageing) as well as in a dim awareness thereof (called anxiety).

The existence of the man in "his/her" outer material world depends on the immaterial existence in *his/her* own one (microcosm) called his/her body. Man is able to extend his presence in the world to the extent he/she is effectively present in his/her own body first. Being present in it formally is natural, but being present so as to command it actually is a moral problem.

Science, originally, makes things present to our mind (praesentat eas) [236], because it represents the state of energy of the outer objects. Commanding nature might follow, but not in the way, "progressive thinkers" thought it possible. Science without morals produces but thugs. Commanding one's "extended" somatic presence in the outer world is impossible without commanding one's physical personal existence first. This, however, is only possible through the act of the will and the intellect. Laws of nature must be known first, but respected next too. In the first place, the natural law governing human existence is to be preserved. The right to life is the most important one, albeit most heinously trampled upon in the era of the modern slavery.

Contrary to what the (modern and ancient) Manicheans claim, God is the absolute master of the (material) world, and of the human (immaterial) will also[237]. Human producing can in no way impair this power, and human activities in general cannot either. Man partakes of (God's) absolute perfections deficiently only. He is not a Demiurge of his existence.

No one (unless insane) believes to be a Demiurge of his/her personal (individual) existence, as no one is able to command his/her future fully, obviously enough, but the belief in the "supreme value" of "humanity" (its allegedly inviolable existence) is common. The dreams about the absolute dominion over the material world seem astonishingly alluring, albeit science (physics) says that the end might come quite "incidentally" by a mere collision with an asteroid. According to Hegel, the state is the divine being on the earth. The human power was deified.

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[236] De veritate, q. 14 a. 9 c. Quaecumque autem sciuntur, proprie accepta scientia, cognoscuntur per resolutionem in prima principia, quae per se praesto sunt intellectui; et sic omnis scientia in visione rei praesentis perficitur.

[237] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 6 a. 4 ad 1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus, qui est potentior quam voluntas humana, potest voluntatem humanam movere; secundum illud Prov. XXI, *cor regis in manu Dei est, et quocumque voluerit, vertet illud*. Sed si hoc esset per violentiam, iam non esset cum actu voluntatis nec ipsa voluntas moveretur, sed aliquid contra voluntatem.

Summa Theologiae III, q. 86 a. 1 co. Primo quidem, quia per hoc tolleretur libertas arbitrii. Secundo, quia derogaretur virtuti gratiae, per quam moveri potest cor cuiuscumque peccatoris ad poenitendum, secundum illud Proverb. XXI *cor regis in manu Dei, et quocumque voluerit vertet illud*. Quod autem secundo modo non possit per veram poenitentiam aliquod peccatum remitti, est etiam erroneum.

Super Iob, cap. 12. Ostenso igitur quod in Deo sit fortitudo, sapientia et consilium, ultimo ostendit quod in eo sit intelligentia, quam diximus pertinere ad cognitionem occultorum, quae maxime videntur esse ea quae in corde latent: haec autem Deum cognoscere ostendit per hoc quod in cordibus hominum operatur, et sic occulta cordium quasi suos effectus cognoscit. Dicit ergo *qui immutat cor principum populi terrae*, quantum scilicet ad voluntatem, unde et Prov. XXI 1 dicitur *cor regis in manu domini, quocumque voluerit inclinabit illud*; et licet omnium hominum voluntates Deus inclinet, tamen specialis mentio fit de regibus et principibus quia eorum voluntates maius pondus habent, utpote quorum voluntatem multi sequuntur. Quantum vero ad intellectum subiungit *et decipit eos*, quod quidem dicitur non quod in falsitatem eos inducat, sed quia lumen suum eis subtrahit ne veritatem cognoscant, et eorum rationem obnubilat ne ad mala quae proponunt consequenda vias idoneas invenire possint, unde sequitur *ut frustra incedant per invium*, idest ut procedant per vias non convenientes quibus ad finem suum pervenire non possint.

Human knowledge, contrary to the divine one – must have a restricted value only.[238] The absolute knowledge entails the absolute power. Human science is restricted as to its mode and subject (Anal. Post., I, Ch. 7). Ideologies only can claim the right to unrestricted "wisdom". The ideology of enlightenment was/is in fact a project of the absolute knowledge. The genuine knowledge is about special objects and its conclusions are (according to Aristotle) necessary. The contrary must be the case with the allegedly absolute human knowledge: its conclusions are unverifiable, but always demanding absolute submission. Theories of the enlightened happen to be both bold and arbitrary.

Thomas Carlyle characterized the Partitions of Poland as an act of historical justice, arguing that Poland's internal anarchy justified her destruction. He described the Partitions as a necessary and righteous act of stronger states (Prussia, Russia and Austria). Their strength reflected (allegedly) their "divine" power.

"Punishment will follow crime sooner or later," admitted (perhaps not quite willingly) the Russian Tsar Alexander. "History" (God's presence in the world) conceded the point of the latter; not of the former. 123 years after the Partitions *all three partitioning Empires ceased to exist definitely*. The Polish Commonwealth was reborn.

Existing "here and now" in the material world, man is potentially able to extend his presence in the world. After representing in his mind the state of affairs independent of it and after composing and disposing ideas formed according to the representations, man is able to compose and decompose the elements of the material world. Man is exceptional in this respect, because other animals (dumb animals bereft of reason) are not endowed with the power to "transcend" rationally the natural boundaries of their existence. They are able to "synthetize" material objects only as far as building according to what their instinct suggests. Not only can man relocate his own body (like other animals can); he relocates the material objects too: composing and discomposing them. It is possible only due to the ability to represent the similitudes the material objects and their immaterial order in the mind.

Still, composing and discomposing is but a means, because existing in any place at all is less than to exist (to be) in the full sense of the word. The material world as such is not our home. Being in the presence of God is this.[239] Secondarily, the place we come to existence (the place chosen by God; by His providence) can be called our home also.

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[238] Super Io., cap. 12 l. 5. Nam desidiosi et carnales non perceperunt vocem ipsam nisi quantum ad sonum; et ideo dicebant *tonitruum factum esse*. Sed non usquequaque decipiebantur: vox enim domini tonitruum erat, tum quia mirabilem significationem habebat, tum quia maxima continebat; Iob XXVI, 14: *cum vix parvam scintillam sermonum eius audierimus, quis poterit tonitruum magnitudinis illius intueri?* Ps. LXXVI, 19: *vox tonitrui tui in rota.*

[239] Summa Theologiae I, q. 8 a. 3 c. Respondeo dicendum quod Deus dicitur esse in re aliqua dupliciter. Uno modo, per modum causae agentis, et sic est in omnibus rebus creatis ab ipso. Alio modo, sicut obiectum operationis est in operante, quod proprium est in operationibus animae, secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente, et desideratum in desiderante. Hoc igitur secundo modo, Deus specialiter est in rationali creatura, quae cognoscit et diligit illum actu vel habitu. Et quia hoc habet rationalis creatura per gratiam, ut infra patebit, dicitur esse hoc modo in sanctis per gratiam. In rebus vero aliis ab ipso creatis quomodo sit, considerandum est ex his quae in rebus humanis esse dicuntur.

Had the cognition through representation been superfluous because of the allegedly superior value of the intuitive cognition, persons could be not obliged to be bothered about the rational dominion over their material existence. Animals (most probably) intuit "their world" this way, but their world is always a special natural environment. The human world claims to be more than that. The idea of the dominion of the "humanity" over *entire* nature seems to enliven it. However, the personal responsibility for its fabric happens be shifted onto collective consciousness.

According to Augustine, the rational soul takes care of the material body, but its excessive bothering about body's artificial needs degrades it.[240] This slavish subjection is unnatural. The spiritual gives way to the corporeal instead of spiritualizing it. Had the humanity had the power to replace each of us in taking personal decisions, the demand to command our bodies (to spiritualizing their existence) would be unreasonable.

However, human family is a unique natural environment in a sense. Both bodily and personal existence appears therein. The former is confirmed by its indissolubility; the latter by the right to upbringing the progeny; the right to spiritualizing the material. Its existence has prominent value in a civilized society, but its rights are breached and the right to spiritualizing the corporeal denied in degrading ones.

The humanity happens to be deified and the individuals denied both the right and the power to command their own corporeal existence. Humans happen to be persuaded that they are unable to act rationally, but should (for the sake of "health" or "happiness") yield to the spontaneity of emotions.

Along with the proliferation of the ideology of "spontaneity" men happen to be deprived of the right to their bodily existence. The right to life of the unborn and the handicapped is denied along with propagation the unbridled spontaneity of "emotions" (which

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[240] Augustinus Hipponensis - De Trinitate - Liber decimus

5. 7. [Anima] per egestatem ac difficultatem fit nimis intenta in actiones suas et inquietas delectationes quas per eas colligit; atque ita cupiditate acquirendi notitias ex his quae foris sunt, quorum cognitum genus amat et sentit amitti posse, nisi impensa cura teneantur, perdit securitatem, tantoque se ipsam minus cogitat, quanto magis secura est quod se non possit amittere. Ita cum aliud sit non se nosse, aliud non se cogitare (neque enim multarum doctrinarum peritum, ignorare grammaticam dicimus, cum eam non cogitat quia de medicinae arte tunc cogitat); cum ergo aliud sit non se nosse, aliud non se cogitare, tanta vis est amoris, ut ea quae cum amore diu cogitaverit, eisque curae glutino inhaeserit, attrahat se cum etiam cum ad se cogitandam quodam modo redit. Et quia illa corpora sunt, quae foris per sensus carnis adamavit, eorumque diuturna quadam familiaritate implicata est, nec se cum potest introrsus tamquam in regionem incorporeae naturae ipsa corpora inferre, imagines eorum convolvit et rapit factas in semetipsa de semetipsa. Dat enim eis formandis quiddam substantiae suae; servat autem aliquid quo libere de specie talium imaginum iudicet, et hoc est magis mens, id est rationalis intellegentia,, quae servatur ut iudicet. Nam illas animae partes quae corporum similitudinibus informantur, etiam cum bestiis nos communes habere sentimus.

6. 8. Errat autem mens, cum se istis imaginibus tanto amore coniungit, ut etiam se esse aliquid huiusmodi existimet. Ita enim conformatur eis quodam modo, non id exsistendo, sed putando; non quo se imaginem putet, sed omnino illud ipsum cuius imaginem se cum habet. Viget quippe in ea iudicium discernendi corpus quod foris relinquit, ab imagine quam de illo se cum gerit; nisi cum ita exprimuntur eaedem imagines tamquam foris sentiantur, non intus cogitentur, sicut dormientibus, aut furentibus, aut in aliqua extasi accidere solet.

are as much spontaneous as commercialized). The corporeal presence of man in the world is – in the eyes of neo-Marxists – consequent upon social relations. Those "relations" transcend the personal existence in such a way that they *transgress* the natural rights and the natural law.

4. Is good and value the same?

A univocal (unambiguous and generic) definition of e.g. animal seems to be easily available, but the definition of good proves extremely difficult. Aristotle distinguishes: bonum honestum, bonum utile and bonum delectabile. Only the first is good as such, whereas the others are so in respect to what is good per se. The useful is related to the honest as a means are to their ends. Delight, in turn, is good only as far as accompanying the possession of what is good in the first sense of the word. Good is predicated analogically only about e.g. good man; good music or good car. It cannot be compared in terms of "more and "less" nor comprehended in one generic notion (a "table of values").

The theory of values espoused by Rudolf Hermann Lotze, Max Scheler and Roman Ingarden is based on John Duns Scotus' speculations on what he called the metaphysics of the univocity of being. Scotus attacked the theory of analogy in the form known to him under the name of Henry of Ghent. He feared that Henry's theory of analogy would undermine the validity of the proof of the existence of God (the logical error called quaternio terminorum would do so indeed). Nevertheless, in his Theoremata he states, later on, that the proof of the existence of God is impossible. Esse diminutum (the subject matter of his metaphysics, called later on by Descartes objective reality) proved eventually incapable of sustaining the reasoning leading to the existence of God. On the contrary, it proved to be a vehicle of modern philosophical ideas, either theoretical in Brentano, Husserl and Heidegger or practical in Adam Smith. The philosophical notion of esse diminutum or objective reality seems to be sophisticated indeed. It was about to be called value next (by Rudolf Hermann Lotze), but was originally substantiated in the (quite plain) notion of *economic* values.

Some objected (in Thomas' times) "that goodness is not rightly divided into the virtuous, the useful and the pleasant", but unless the virtuous be con-divided to the latter two, the useful and the pleasant seem barely comparable themselves. The third part of the comparison (tertium comparationis) is the human nature. "This division properly concerns human goodness", albeit it does not concern it only. Because, "if we consider the nature of goodness from a higher and more universal point of view, we shall find that this division properly concerns goodness as such".

> For everything is good so far as it is desirable, and is a term of the movement of the appetite; the term of whose movement can be seen from a consideration of the movement of a natural body. Now the movement of a natural body is terminated by the end absolutely; and relatively by the means through which it comes to the end, where the movement ceases; so a thing is called a term of movement, so far as it terminates any part of that movement. Now the ultimate term of movement can be taken in two ways, either as the thing itself towards which it tends, e.g., a place or form; or a state of rest in that thing.

> Thus, in the movement of the appetite, the thing desired that terminates the movement of the appetite relatively, as a means by which something tends towards another, is called the useful; but that sought after as the last thing absolutely terminating the movement of the appetite, as a thing towards which for its own sake the appetite tends, is called the virtuous; for the virtuous is that which is desired for its own sake; but that which terminates the movement of the appetite in the form of rest in the thing desired, is called the pleasant.[241]

Virtue normally concerns humans, but (in a broader sense) a natural property of any (even the inanimate) thing (its perfection) might be called a virtue also. The pleasant, in turn, is so if harmonizing with (good or bad) habits ("perfections" and "imperfections") existing in one's nature. The habits, on the other hand, are formed by the right or perverse judgment of reason (the latter account for "imperfections"). The useful, lastly, is so, because the means to the end are (wisely of rashly) devised by the reason. The notion of the virtuous formed in accordance with right reason precedes them both. *They are not directly comparable*. No "existential" (or economic) equation *exists on its own* between the pleasant ("demand") and the useful ("supply") on its sides. Every equation can be formed by the personal intellect only. The human rationality is not an effect of the free interplay of demand and supply, but precedes them both. In other words, the "=" sign between the both sides of the ("existential") equation is never purely formal, because actually modified in every vital act of moral assessment. Material goods can be assessed this way as well as products of art and science. Moreover, even the demand for debauched ideas can exist in debauched minds, and the demand for socialist ideas is stated by von Hayek as both undebatable as deplorable.

Producing might be totally subsumed under the category of Usus – the implementation of the primitive intention conceived in the intellect. We can easily see products (the effects) which exist materially, but with some difficulty only do we reflect on the immaterial principle thereof.

When accepting the offer of work under contract, people agree (at least implicitly) with the employer as to the righteousness of the end previously intended. The economic effectiveness depends to a considerable extent also on to how carefully the means leading to

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[241] Summa Theologiae I, q. 5 a. 6 arg. 1 Videtur quod non convenienter dividatur bonum per honestum, utile et delectabile.

Summa Theologiae I, q. 5 a. 6 c. Respondeo dicendum quod haec divisio proprie videtur esse boni humani. Si tamen altius et communius rationem boni consideremus, invenitur haec divisio proprie competere bono, secundum quod bonum est. Nam bonum est aliquid, inquantum est appetibile, et terminus motus appetitus. Cuius quidem motus terminatio considerari potest ex consideratione motus corporis naturalis. Terminatur autem motus corporis naturalis, simpliciter quidem ad ultimum; secundum quid autem etiam ad medium, per quod itur ad ultimum quod terminat motum, et dicitur aliquis terminus motus, inquantum aliquam partem motus terminat. Id autem quod est ultimus terminus motus, potest accipi dupliciter, vel ipsa res in quam tenditur, utpote locus vel forma; vel quies in re illa. Sic ergo in motu appetitus, id quod est appetibile terminans motum appetitus secundum quid, ut medium per quod tenditur in aliud, vocatur utile. Id autem quod appetitur ut ultimum, terminans totaliter motum appetitus, sicut quaedam res in quam per se appetitus tendit, vocatur honestum, quia honestum dicitur quod per se desideratur. Id autem quod terminat motum appetitus ut quies in re desiderata, est delectatio.

the end are devised and implemented, but – first of all – on how capacious/just/right the notion of the end is. The consideration (inquisitio) of the means might be carried out privately, but happens to be hugely improved if shared with others: personally interested in the effective implementation of the previously intended. People discuss so (when working) on the possible improvement of the means.

But on the other hand, some ends are bad as such, and cannot be justified by their economic effectiveness or by any discussion. Producing e.g. gun toys is morally bad, because endangering the life of children, as well as the so called film production which is often immoral. Not only does it impair man's ability to live honestly, but ability to *work* effectively also, because occasioning frustration, anxiety or morbid emotionality.

The right judgment of reason concerns good as such: the end. The means to the end are to be called. Goods produced by man artificially are useful (should be so).

What is produced is so by the rational being only. Men do not partake of rationality proportionally to how effectively they produce. The rationality is the *principle*, whereas the produced is only a *token* of the rationality.

People happen to be called worthy or worthless too, by analogy to economics (which might seem acceptable), but to be called worth e.g. 2 million $ also (which is disputable). The moral value *precedes* the values of the produced and cannot be supposed to *reflect* it.

According to Aristotle, a man is defined (if ever) by the end he/she intends; "Each person is such as the end appears to him." (talis unusquisque est qualis finis videtur ei) rather than by the means which lead to it. Finis is here the general intention of one's life. It testifies to the inner moral quality of one's character. People do no become good because acting by the way of trial and error, but because reflecting on the principle of what might possibly become good.

Man *wills* both the end and the means to it, albeit not necessarily *wants* them both (the language used commonly now reflects the utilitarian principles, which marred the necessary distinctions). The good intended must be properly judged by the intellect, and the judgment might be totally disinterested. Man might be wanting (might want) something because deprived of it by force (in want of it). But man *cannot will anything if compelled*, because it implies contradiction.[242] Deus potest mutare voluntatem de necessitate, non tamen potest eam cogere.[243] [244]

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[242] Summa Theologiae I, q. 91 a. 1 c. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum Deus perfectus sit, operibus suis perfectionem dedit secundum eorum modum; secundum illud Deut. XXXII, *Dei perfecta sunt opera*. Ipse autem simpliciter perfectus est, ex hoc quod omnia in se praehabet, non per modum compositionis, sed simpliciter et unite, ut Dionysius dicit, eo modo quo diversi effectus praeexistunt in causa, secundum unam eius essentiam.

De potentia, q. 5 a. 1 ad 1Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod creaturae Dei sunt perfectae in sua natura et in suo ordine […]

Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 23 q. 2 a. 2 c. […] natura a perfectis exordium sumit, ut Boetius dicit, et *Dei perfecta sunt opera*, ut Deut. 32, 4, dicitur. Ideo Adam, tamquam principium totius humani generis, omnem perfectionem quae naturae humanae competit, in suo primordio accepit, sicut secundum corpus, ita et secundum animam, ut esset potens ad propagandum alios corporaliter, et instruendum intellectum.

[243] De veritate, q. 22 a. 8 c. Responsio. Dicendum, quod Deus potest mutare voluntatem de necessitate, non tamen potest eam cogere. Quantumcumque enim voluntas immutetur in aliquid, non dicitur cogi in illud. Cuius

Something strange has occurred in Europe after 1517. It has been believed that "In every good work the just man sins" (Denzinger, 771; 31); that "Free will after sin is a matter of title only; and as long as one does what is in him, one sins mortally" (Denzinger, 776; 36). "That after the sin of Adam man's free will was lost and destroyed, or that it is a thing in name only, indeed a title without a reality, a fiction" (Denzinger, 815 Can. 5).[245] "That the more earnestly anyone strives to dispose himself for grace, so much the more grievously does he sin" (Denzinger, 817 Can. 7). "That the commandments of God are even for a man who is justified and confirmed in grace impossible to observe" (Denzinger, 828 Can. 18). "That in every good work the just one sins … and therefore deserves eternal punishments" (Denzinger, 835 Can. 25).

In consequence, the *moral work* on one's personal character was abandoned and the ordinary work on material objects remained the only possibility. The moral work of the medieval ascetics improved *hugely* the actual state of the material culture, but manual work

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ratio est, quia ipsum velle aliquid est inclinari in illud; coactio autem vel violentia est contraria inclinationi illius rei quae cogitur. Cum igitur Deus voluntatem immutat, facit ut praecedenti inclinationi succedat alia inclinatio, ita quod prima aufertur, et secunda manet. Unde illud ad quod inducit voluntatem, non est contrarium inclinationi iam existenti, sed inclinationi quae prius inerat: unde non est violentia nec coactio. Sicut lapidi ratione suae gravitatis inest inclinatio ad locum deorsum; hac autem inclinatione manente, si sursum proiiciatur, erit violentia. Si autem Deus auferat a lapide inclinationem gravitatis, et det ei inclinationem levitatis, tunc ferri sursum non erit ei violentum; et ita immutatio motus potest esse sine violentia. Et per hunc modum intelligendum est quod Deus voluntatem immutat sine hoc quod voluntatem cogat. Potest autem Deus voluntatem immutare ex hoc quod ipse in voluntate operatur sicut et in natura; unde, sicut omnis actio naturalis est a Deo, ita omnis actio voluntatis in quantum est actio, non solum est a voluntate ut immediato agente, sed etiam a Deo ut primo agente, qui vehementius imprimit. Unde, sicut voluntas potest immutare actum suum in aliud, ut ex dictis patet, ita etiam et multo amplius, Deus. Immutat autem voluntatem dupliciter. Uno modo movendo tantum; quando scilicet voluntatem movet ad aliquid volendum, sine hoc quod aliquam formam imprimat voluntati; sicut sine appositione alicuius habitus, quandoque facit ut homo velit hoc quod prius non volebat. Alio vero modo imprimendo aliquam formam in ipsam voluntatem. Sicuti enim ex ipsa natura, quam Deus voluntati dedit, inclinatur voluntas in aliquid volendum, ut ex dictis patet; ita ex aliquo superaddito, sicut est gratia vel virtus, inclinatur ulterius ad volendum aliquid anima, ad quod prius non erat determinata naturali inclinatione. Sed haec quidem inclinatio superaddita, quandoque est perfecta, quandoque imperfecta. Quando quidem est perfecta ita facit necessariam inclinationem in id ad quod determinat; sicut per naturam de necessitate inclinatur voluntas in appetendum finem, sicut contingit in beatis, in quibus caritas perfecta inclinat sufficienter in bonum, non solum quantum ad finem ultimum, sed etiam quantum ad ea quae sunt ad finem. Aliquando vero forma superaddita non est usquequaque perfecta, sicut est in viatoribus; et tunc ex forma superaddita voluntas inclinatur quidem, sed non de necessitate.

[244] De veritate, q. 22 a. 9 c. Hoc enim supra ostensum est, quod aliquod bonum de necessitate movet voluntatem per modum obiecti, quamvis voluntas non cogatur. Alio vero modo potest intelligi voluntas immutari ab aliquo per modum causae efficientis: et sic dicimus, quod non solum nulla creatura potest cogere voluntatem agendo in ipsam, quia hoc nec Deus poterat; sed nec etiam potest directe agere in voluntatem ut eam immutet necessario, vel qualitercumque inclinet, quod Deus potest; sed indirecte potest aliqualiter inclinare voluntatem aliqua creatura, non tamen necessario immutare. Cuius ratio est, quia, cum actus voluntatis sit quasi medius inter potentiam et obiectum, immutatio actus voluntatis potest considerari vel ex parte ipsius voluntatis, vel ex parte obiecti.

[245] Paul III 1534-1549 Council of Trent, Canons On Justification.

can improve to some modest extent man's moral value only. Troeltsch and Weber deduce the ethos of the modern capitalism from the absolute credit given to the executive work.

The Stricture unequivocally demands of us the personal perfection (man's sanctity) in the words: "Follow peace with all men, and holiness: without which no man shall see God" (Pacem sequimini cum omnibus, et sanctimoniam, sine qua nemo videbit Deum; Heb 12,14); "I am the Lord your God: be holy because I am holy" (Ego enim sum Dominus Deus vester : sancti estote, quia ego sanctus sum; Lev 11,44); "Speak to all the congregation of the children of Israel, and thou shalt say to them: Be ye holy, because I the Lord your God am holy" (Loquere ad omnem coetum filiorum Israel, et dices ad eos : Sancti estote, quia ego sanctus sum, Dominus Deus vester; (Lev19,2; 1 Pet 1,16).[246]

The moral perfection was despaired to be obtained and the perfection of the produced remained only worth taking care of. Apparently, a minimum of personal virtue (honesty and studiosity) is necessary for effective producing, and the ethos in question demands the minimum only. Everything worthwhile was subject to producing, because the total subjection of the human will to God (his sanctity) had been deemed infeasible. God would have been "powerless with respect to the human will" (as stained irretrievably with sin), which derogates to His perfection and to the sound reason, as two causes (wills) can only conflict if equal,

[246] Super Rom., cap. 12 l. 1 corpus nostrum Dei servitio mancipatur. Lev. XX, 7: sanctificamini et estote sancti, quia ego sanctus dominus Deus vester. Proprie autem sanctitas dicitur per respectum ad Deum, inquantum scilicet homo servat ea quae sunt iusta, quoad Deum.

Summa Theologiae I q. 19 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, I Thess. IV, haec est voluntas Dei, sanctificatio vestra.

Summa Theologiae I, q. 19 a. 2 c. […] hoc praecipue pertinet ad voluntatem divinam, a qua, per quandam similitudinem, derivatur omnis perfectio. Unde, si res naturales, inquantum perfectae sunt, suum bonum aliis communicant, multo magis pertinet ad voluntatem divinam, ut bonum suum aliis per similitudinem communicet, secundum quod possibile est. Sic igitur vult et se esse, et alia. Sed se ut finem, alia vero ut ad finem, inquantum condecet divinam bonitatem etiam alia ipsam participare.

Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 121 n. 1 Sicut autem per corporalia et sensibilia mens hominis elevari potest in Deum, si quis eis in reverentiam Dei debito modo utatur, ita etiam eorum indebitus usus mentem a Deo vel totaliter abstrahit, dum in inferioribus rebus constituitur voluntatis finis; vel mentis intentionem a Deo retardat, dum ultra quam necesse sit, ad huiusmodi res afficimur. Est autem divina lex ad hoc principaliter data ut homo adhaereat Deo. Pertinet igitur ad legem divinam ordinare hominem circa corporalium et sensibilium affectionem et usum.; n. 2 Adhuc. Sicut mens hominis ordinatur sub Deo, ita corpus sub anima ordinatur, et inferiores vires sub ratione. Pertinet autem ad divinam providentiam, cuius quaedam ratio homini a Deo proposita divina lex est, ut singula suum ordinem teneant. Est igitur sic homo ordinandus lege divina ut inferiores vires rationi subdantur; et corpus animae; et exteriores res ad necessitatem homini deserviant.; n. 3Amplius. Quaelibet lex recte proposita inducit ad virtutem. Virtus autem in hoc consistit, quod tam interiores affectiones, quam corporalium rerum usus, ratione regulentur. Est igitur hoc lege divina statuendum.; n. 4 Praeterea. Ad unumquemque legislatorem pertinet ea lege statuere sine quibus lex observari non potest. Cum autem lex rationi proponatur, homo legem non sequeretur nisi alia omnia quae pertinent ad hominem, rationi subderentur. Pertinet igitur ad legem divinam praecipere ut omnia quae sunt hominis, rationi subdantur.; n. 5 Hinc est quod dicitur Rom. 12-1: *rationabile obsequium vestrum*; et I Thess. 4-3: *haec est voluntas Dei, sanctificatio vestra*.; n. 6 Per haec autem excluditur quorundam error dicentium illa solum esse peccata, quibus proximus aut offenditur aut scandalizatur.

which is not the case in humans and God. The Scripture, obviously, *does demand* sanctity of man.

> Having, therefore, been thus justified and having been made the "friends of God" and "his domestics" [John 15:15; Eph. 2:19], "advancing from virtue to virtue" [Ps. 83:8], "they are renewed" (as the Apostle says) "from day to day" [II Cor. 4: 16], that is, by mortifying the members of their flesh [Col. 3:5], and by "presenting them as instruments of justice" [Rom. 6:13, 19], unto sanctification through the observance of the commandments of God and of the Church; in this justice received through the grace of Christ "faith cooperating with good works" [Jas. 2:22], they increase and are further justified [can. 24 and 32], as it is written: "He that is just, let him be justified still" [Apoc. 22:11], and again: "Be not afraid to be justified even to death" [Eccles. 18:22], and again: "You see, that by works a man is justified and not by faith only" [Jas. 2:24]. And this increase of justice Holy Church begs for, when she prays: "Give unto us, o Lord, an increase of faith, hope and charity" [13th Sun. after Pent.].[247]

The creative and re-creative God's action seemed to stumble upon allegedly unsurmountable barrier called by Kant the radical evil rooted in the human nature. This sentiment of despair might assume a milder form though and incline to believing in that the will should be totally passive with respect to God's actions (Madame De Guyon), which, however, entails contradiction (the will is active and its nature cannot be changed). Especially, it is active with respect to emotions (the "sense" of God's proximity included).

The values born out of the sense of despair (fashioned after the "modern" manner) ceased to be what values/goods had previously always been: ends which exists beyond the scope of the useful. Above (in the Section 2), Scheler's assessment of the stance was adduced.

The unidimensional man of modernity realizes material values, but those comparable to them secondarily only. The "higher" values were in fact believed to be comparable in the way the values of the shares on the stock exchange are.

Man's dignity defined traditionally by his rationality is nowadays (this or that way) humiliated, and the modern "humility" is far cry from its ancient ancestor. Man is expected (or even importunately demanded) to accept submissively the produced (which must-be-had), but deemed *unable to will* anything freely. Instead, manifold human wants are being invented. Humans might want (passively), but never allowed to will (actively).

The general sentiment of "sinfulness" or the modern lack of "hubris" (e.g. the abnegation of the loathsome "white-supremacy"), replaces the specified rational reflection on the nature of special privations to overcome, which was traditionally called ascetics. The ethos of capitalism was a flawed idea, but the actual power of capitalism had been (until, say, some 50 years ago) sustained by the moral stamina of people it ruthlessly exploited. Nowadays, the system seems to have exhausted its possibilities.

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[247] Paul III 1534-1549 Council of Trent 1545-1563 Ecumenical XIX (Contra Novatores 16 cent.) SESSION VI (Jan. 13, 1547) Decree on Justification, Chap. 10. (Concerning the Increase of Justification Received)

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Free market is the only reasonable form of producing, but the modern *globalized* capitalism is organically unable to safeguard the free economy, because of its flawed assessment of the worth the capital, and its unnatural amassment. The assessment might be only reasonably done by small private independent firms. The "economic mechanisms" were believed to generate the power of producing, but mechanisms could not coerce anybody. Human wants can be artificially generated, but the human will (the desire for good as such) cannot so. Man cannot be compelled to will anything, nor even persuaded to will anything he/she is personally disinterested in. Humans can never become "mechanisms" in the way e.g. La Mettrie or Condillac thought them to be. The "theorists" are not granted, to be sure, unconditional trust (the theories, in general, are taken with a pinch of salt), but a make believe game is being performed nonetheless and the "theories" (even if not certain) are believed to be at least stimulating.

Free *market* can only be established by free *persons*. The capital must be personalized (Chesterton; de Belloc). Free agents should be intellectually and morally strong. Everything which impairs the *integral development* of man should be eliminated. Some objects impair moral development obviously enough, but are deemed (for some queer reasons) to improve the economic development (which is nonsensical no doubt).

Natural order has been reversed to the detriment of nature (which has been acknowledged by ecologists), but especially to the detriment of the human rational and free nature (which is being stubbornly ignored). Man is first rational and free being, but the producing animal possibly consequently only. The senile demise of the flawed *materialist* system must follow.

The end of man is not "to make the world a better place to live in", but to make him/herself better or even: seeking for the personal perfection in the perspective of adhering to the Source of the perfection. The perfection of the intellect and the will differs *qualitatively* from the perfection of what can be possibly produced. This perfection, however, proves, in the end, to be found in the Self-Subsisting Good and Being. Human will must not be subject to any "modest" and. It must be *totally subject* to its Creator.

5. The initial value

Notwithstanding whether understood to be moral or material; to be good as such "in singular", or to be goods "in plural"; no matter whether done or made; good always seemed difficult to define. In the majority of European languages the difference exists between: do-make; czynić-robić; agere-facere; ἄγειν-πράττειν; tun-machen. The first concerns the action which perfects the person who performs is, whereas the latter perfects the matter (material) which exists beyond the mind of who produces it.[248] The material good produced in the latter sense

[248] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 74 a. 1 c. Respondeo dicendum quod peccatum quidam actus est, sicut supra dictum est. Actuum autem quidam transeunt in exteriorem materiam, ut urere et secare, et huiusmodi actus habent pro materia et subiecto id in quod transit actio; sicut philosophus dicit, in III Physic. quod motus est actus mobilis a movente. Quidam vero actus sunt non transeuntes in exteriorem materiam, sed manentes in agente, sicut appetere et cognoscere, et tales actus sunt omnes actus morales, sive sint actus virtutum, sive peccatorum.

is commonly called added value. But it is not clear, at first glance, whether an "analogous" value exists in the intellect and the will, *before* it attempts to make anything. The original activity seems to consist in "doing" apart from, and before, "making".

We can assume that the beginning of the existence of Homo sapiens on the Earth was marked by the ability to make goods, as no other animals, apparently, can produce in the way humans can. Still, the very *origin* of the *ability* is no less interesting than the original phenomenal shape it took on. If Homo sapiens had been (by definition) the multiplying animal, a certain basic value would have to exist first, because zero multiplied no matter how many times equals always zero.

Hegel seems to imply that Homo sapiens came to existence (or even performed an act of autocreation) in the moment he became homo producens. Indeed, no other species besides the human one can produce/make something which is *similar to the idea* conceived in its mind, but *totally dissimilar* to its own natural species. The products of industry are "dissimilar" to men really, whereas the naturally produced (progeny) is similar as to its species. Deeds (the done) are similar to men too. The problem is, however, that the *ability* to make (to produce the artificial) was believed to come to existence along with the necessity to produce (to make) anything at all.

Hegel was an (unconscious) heir to the mediaeval Arab philosophy. He repeats (in his own words; unaware of the fact) one of the most important statements of the mediaeval Liber de causis reads: omnis sciens essentiam suam, est rediens ad essentiam suam reditione completa (a being which is such as to know its own essence returns to it by a complete return). The sentence was, generally, about to be widely "commented" in the centuries to come.

The two "motions" (of "exit" and "return") were about to assume (in the 19th century) the form of Entäusserung and Erinnerung. The "exit" is the work, whereas the rerun is its understanding and the eschatological future of "humanity".

According to Thomas, they concern at best, the acts of the intellect and the will, on the one hand, and the possible reflection on them, on the other.

> the most perfect beings, such as, for example, intellectual substances, return to their essence with a complete return: knowing something external to themselves, in a certain sense they go outside of themselves; but by knowing that they know, they are already beginning to return to themselves, because the act of cognition mediates between the knower and the thing known. That return is completed inasmuch as they know their own essences. Hence, it is said in On the Causes: a being which is such as to know its own essence returns to it by a complete return (Dominican Fathers).[249]

[249] De veritate, q. 1 a. 9 c. Sed veritas est in sensu sicut consequens actum eius; dum scilicet iudicium sensus est de re, secundum quod est; sed tamen non est in sensu sicut cognita a sensu: etsi enim sensus vere iudicat de rebus, non tamen cognoscit veritatem, qua vere iudicat: quamvis enim sensus cognoscat se sentire, non tamen cognoscit naturam suam, et per consequens nec naturam sui actus, nec proportionem eius ad res, et ita nec veritatem eius. Cuius ratio est, quia illa quae sunt perfectissima in entibus, ut substantiae intellectuales, redeunt ad essentiam suam reditione completa: in hoc enim quod cognoscunt aliquid extra se positum, quodammodo extra se procedunt; secundum vero quod cognoscunt se cognoscere, iam ad se redire incipiunt, quia actus cognitionis est medius inter cognoscentem et cognitum. Sed reditus iste completur secundum quod cognoscunt essentias proprias: unde dicitur in Lib. de causis, quod omnis sciens essentiam suam, est rediens ad essentiam

In other words, the spiritual in a *definite form* (actum) precedes the "alienated" (the produced in the material world) (factum).

The difference between doing (the act the intellect and the will) and making (the action of human hands, which make e.g. stools; or imagination, which makes e.g. preparations therefor) appears to be clear. In Marx, the distinction was *completely blurred*. The Entäusserung and Erinnerung, in consequence, equaled auto-creation, because the intellect and the will were believed to be produced by the mere fact of producing material goods.

We can "make somebody to work"; viz. to give an order, and the act of who is made to do something follows, but we cannot "make anybody in order him to work"; we cannot create save new possibilities; things (and humans especially) cannot be created. The act of making originates from the maker: is "alienated" to the point of its nature being sometimes ignored. But there is *only one act* in e.g. contemplating the beauty of nature. The latter is, according to Aristotle, much more human than the act of producing.

According to Hegelians, the spiritual in man exists originally in the form of a vague idea of freedom only, but becomes substantiated in the consequence of (compulsive) labor. Without it morals could have never existed. Culture seemed to define man so as an existential species (because his coming to existence this way was deemed essential), whereas the definition of man's relation to nature remained unclear (it must have been so as the relation was believed to be "sublated"; aufgehoben). In the Schellingian naturalism it *should* remain undefined, albeit it was originally (in Hegel) "defined" by the privation (of the natural state) only.

Zero multiplied no matter how many times equals zero only so that there must have been "an original" value to multiply after all. Hegel, accounting for the existence of the value resorts to the myth of Lordship and Bondage (Herrschaft und Knechtschaft). A unique situation in the history proved to be the very beginning of the *human* history. A vanquished and humiliated serf projected a vague idea of freedom and the manual work he was forced to perform accounted for the possibility of the added value to occur. The morals appeared but against the backdrop of producing.

Hegelians[250] attach value to this work only. They prescind from the natural in man as well as from his/her natural relations; his/her biology, nation, but first of all, from him/her being created by God.

The *real* final value consists in adhering to God the Creator. The initial value marks the beginning of the way towards this plenitude. In modernity, they both were disposed of and a "way" without a beginning and the end has remained only. "The initial and final level plays no role [and] the same shift takes place in extramoral domains of value, in legal and economic life." "All these values are now disregarded from the outset, or they are to be converted into the currency of «labor»".[251]

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suam reditione completa.

[250] This type of reasoning was ascribed by Scheler to Enlightenment (which was quoted at the beginning of Section 2)

[251] Max Scheler, Ressentiment. Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen, Translated by Louis A. Coser from the text of 1915. V. Ressentiment and other value shifts in modern morality. 1. The value of things self-earned or selfacquired.

The place of man in the universe was tried to be described in those terms, but the description was by no means an exact definition (privations cannot be definitive of anything at all). Man exists *in* nature and his existence cannot be grasped in terms of transcending the nature, because this transcending is a privation indeed. There is a natural endowment in man, which accounts for the possibility to act at all, and to produce for that matter too. There is, moreover, a supernatural presence of the Supreme Nature in the human history initiated by this Nature. The objects produced by man are by no means supernatural; sometimes they can be called non-natural only (destructive of nature).

According to Aristotle, nature is the immanent principle of motion.[252] We can speak of the totality of nature,[253] but this totality is relatively weak, because the unity of order (cosmos is this) is the weakest unity (unitas ordinis sit minima unitatum).[254] Various beings in it are specifically different, and the specifics of man consist in him/her being rational and free *before*, and independently of, commencing any act of producing and making.

There are in us seeds of intellectual virtues provided naturally as well as the inborn desire for good as such called synderesis,[255] which is considerably more than the desire for something good-for-us only. The nature of man consists in this; its principles are natural; because innate and make for the possibility to act at all (to do good) and to make all goods subservient to what is done honestly.

The original exists this way, and can by "multiplied", albeit bereft of numerical value, having the "virtual" one only. Be that as it may, *this* value cannot be produced out of nothing, because it is the unique prerogative of God to produce ex nihilo: to create.[256]

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[252] In Physic., lib. 2 l. 1 n. 5. Deinde cum dicit: est igitur natura etc. concludit ex praemissis definitionem naturae hoc modo. Naturalia differunt a non naturalibus inquantum habent naturam; sed non differunt a non naturalibus nisi inquantum habent principium motus in seipsis; ergo natura nihil aliud est quam *principium motus et quietis in eo in quo est primo et per se et non secundum accidens*. Ponitur autem in definitione naturae principium, quasi genus, et non aliquid absolutum, quia nomen naturae importat habitudinem principii.

[253] Quodlibet VI, q. 11 c. […] totum universum est unum unitate ordinis, ut patet per philosophum, XII Metaph. Haec autem unitas ordinis attenditur secundum quod quodam ordine reguntur corporalia per spiritualia, et inferiora corpora per superiora, ut Augustinus dicit in III de Trinit.

[254] Contra Gentiles, lib. 2 cap. 58 n. 5. Nec ad unitatem hominis ordo formarum sufficiet. Quia esse unum secundum ordinem non est esse unum simpliciter: cum unitas ordinis sit minima unitatum.

[255] De veritate, q. 14 a. 2 c. Nihil autem potest ordinari in aliquem finem nisi praeexistat in ipso quaedam proportio ad finem, ex qua proveniat in ipso desiderium finis; et hoc est secundum quod aliqua finis inchoatio fit in ipso, quia nihil appetit bonum nisi in quantum habet aliquam illius boni similitudinem. Et inde est quod in ipsa natura humana est quaedam inchoatio ipsius boni quod est naturae proportionatum: praeexistunt enim naturaliter in ipso principia demonstrationum per se nota, quae sunt semina quaedam contemplationis sapientiae; et principia iuris naturalis quae sunt semina virtutum moralium. Unde oportet etiam quod ad hoc quod homo ordinetur in bonum vitae aeternae, quod quaedam inchoatio ipsius fiat in eo cui repromittitur.

[256] Contra Gentiles, lib. 2 cap. 21 tit. Quod solius Dei est creare.

Man possesses the produced, but is always, practically, apprehensive of the possibility to lose the achieved. The *social* relations are needed to safeguard the certainty of the possession, but the "*socialist*" (the destructive of the possessed) in man tends to the opposite: the expropriation. There must exist something in the human nature (or the human nature recreated supernaturally by God) firm enough to resist the attempts (the derogation) and to make the possession of goods as stable as only possible. No mechanisms can do the job.

The identity of the artificial products is defined by their (spatial) relations, but safeguarded by qualitatively different relations only. There are not only spatial relations amongst humans. The most important ones come to existence (*between* them), because of them *doing good*, and *before* producing and *making goods* (which exist amongst them really).

The done (actum) exists originally in mind independently of the outer world: the principles of the inner words are possessed so, because abstracted from the sensible. The problem, however, consists in that words themselves cannot be sometimes possessed as firmly as we wish them to be. The inner good cannot be extorted from us by anybody, but can be lost, because of our weakness, carelessness or negligence. All virtues are this: the most precious (and creative of the material goods for that matter too), but at the same time, the frailest because borne in "frail vessels".

The virtues are not (as Kant and Stoics) assumed the end as such. They are but means to obtain the plentitude to be found in God. They have value in respect to this end. On the way to the Ultimate we stumble upon obstacle we would like to dodge or to eliminate. We should be really apprehensive about our being possibly failures because of our own incapability to contain it. There is however, according to St Luis, the unique Form of Virtues, Who originally was the form of God's (the Logos) body coming on the Earth. Our ultimate destiny consists in cleaving inseparably to the Divine Logos. The way to the Logos, in turn, is safeguarded by the Form of Humanity in which He appeared on the Earth.

6. The initial and final value

Human life spans between grasping the principle of acting and adhering to the Principle of every actuality possibly existing in the Universe. On the way towards the Ultimate, the human intellect passes judgments on the mode of our being and acting between the principle and the End. It is reasonable to cleave (adhaerere) decidedly onto the Principle of our being only (solo Deo fruendum as Augustine has it), but treating with a distance everything which is but a means to the End.[257]

Contra Gentiles, lib. 2 cap. 22 n. 2. Si enim solius Dei creare est, ab ipso immediate producta esse oportet quaecumque a sua causa produci non possunt nisi per modum creationis. Huiusmodi autem sunt omnes substantiae separatae, quae non sunt compositae ex materia et forma, quas esse nunc supponatur; et similiter omnis materia corporalis.

Summa Theologiae I, q. 47 a. 1 c. Sed hoc non potest stare propter duo. Primo quidem, quia supra ostensum est quod creare solius Dei est. Unde ea quae non possunt causari nisi per creationem, a solo Deo producuntur, et haec sunt omnia quae non subiacent generationi et corruptioni.

[257] Super Sent., lib. 3 d. 9 q. 1 a. 2 qc. 5 c. Ad quintam quaestionem dicendum, quod Deus est principium et finis omnium; et inquantum est principium, adoramus eum latria: inquantum vero finis ultimus, fruimur eo. In

Light travelers along the *approximately* straight line, after departing from its source and tending to a thing illuminated by it. But the *ideally* straight line is a mathematical idea only. The same applies to all numerical values. They do not exist in nature apart from the substances which sustain their existence. Mathematics is a discipline par excellence, and that it why it cannot be free in the full sense of the word. Rigorous discipline is hardly reconcilable with freedom. There no room for freedom in the world of signs "written in the tongue of mathematics".

Free market is an effect of free actions (the relation cannot be reversed). An action, in turn, is to be called inwardly free if carefully premeditated (intellectus est radix voluntatis)[258] and outwardly too if it does not stumble upon exterior obstacles. Human action extends between intending the end and implementing it in the material world (the means are so realized on the way to the Ultimate and intended along with the End[259]). The implementing is normally called work. The work, however, happens to be depersonalized and its value, consequently, appears to be problematic if the beginning and the end are ignored: if the means are not a transparent proxy leading to the End.

The average man is able to asses rationally spending, say, 100,000 $. An exceptionally gifted entrepreneur is able to spend effectively perhaps even 100,000,000 $. But no creature reasoning in the way human do can reasonably spend 100,000,000,000 $. The accumulation of the capital is the direct way to wasting it (The means are accumulated to the extent they obliterate every reasonable end). The capital, if accumulated "artificially", proves unable to be

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redeundo autem ad ipsum juvamur per alias creaturas rationales, scilicet Angelos et homines; et ideo, quamvis solo Deo fruendum sit, tamen possumus frui homine in Deo, sicut dicit apostolus, et Augustinus. Sed in exeundo ab ipso sicut a principio creante, non juvamur per aliquam creaturam, quia immediate creavit nos; et ideo honor latriae est sibi soli exhibendus, non alicui in ipso, quantumcumque sit in participatione suae bonitatis, nisi honoretur uno honore cum eo, sicut caro Christi, et imagines.

[258] Summa Theologiae I-IIae q. 17 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod radix libertatis est voluntas sicut subiectum, sed sicut causa, est ratio. Ex hoc enim voluntas libere potest ad diversa ferri, quia ratio potest habere diversas conceptiones boni. Et ideo philosophi definiunt liberum arbitrium quod est liberum de ratione iudicium, quasi ratio sit causa libertatis.

De veritate, q. 24 a. 2 c. […] cum ad operationem nostram tria concurrant, scilicet cognitio, appetitus, et ipsa operatio, tota ratio libertatis ex modo cognitionis dependet. Appetitus enim cognitionem sequitur, cum appetitus non sit nisi boni, quod sibi per vim cognitivam proponitur. […] Iudicare autem de iudicio suo est solius rationis, quae super actum suum reflectitur, et cognoscit habitudines rerum de quibus iudicat, et per quas iudicat: unde totius libertatis radix est in ratione constituta. Unde secundum quod aliquid se habet ad rationem, sic se habet ad liberum arbitrium. Ratio autem plene et perfecte invenitur solum in homine: unde in eo solum liberum arbitrium plenarie invenitur.

[259] De veritate, q. 23 a. 1 ad 3Ad tertium dicendum, quod voluntas est alicuius dupliciter: uno modo principaliter, et alio modo secundario. Principaliter quidem voluntas est finis, qui est ratio volendi omnia alia; secundario autem est eorum quae sunt ad finem, quae propter finem volumus. Voluntas autem non habet habitudinem ad volitum quod est secundarium, sicut ad causam; sed tantummodo ad volitum principale, quod est finis.

Summa Theologiae I, q. 58 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod duae operationes possunt simul esse unius potentiae, quarum una ad aliam refertur; ut patet cum voluntas simul vult et finem et ea quae sunt ad finem, et intellectus simul intelligit principia et conclusiones per principia, quando iam scientiam acquisivit.

used in producing artificial goods (it becomes and end unto itself). No instrument has the nature of what it is used for. It occasions undertaking irrational and economically ineffective decisions.

A *checkable* piece of information gives rational premises for undertaking *rational* decisions. But the contemporary main stream media provide an Ersatz: some opinions which are "existentially witnessed" only by some easily recognizable personalities. A real person can inspire trust, but some personalities inspire uneasiness instead, as they stimulate emotions desirable from their subjective point of view. Actions, obviously, might follow those stimuli. The scheme of "acting" unfolds, then, in terms of action and reaction. Social reactions (repercussions) are supposed to follow wrong social activities, but in fact social reactions are expected to follow any public activities. The reactions cannot be free, because mechanical, unless a persuasive definition of liberty be used. The real definition describes what a thing really is (independently of what it is thought to be); the persuasive definition tells what it is expected to be.

People are mostly led by emotions rather than by reason, and that is why they are, on average, employees rather than employers. The latter are rather creative of the materialist economies which tend to be as exact as mathematics is, and the capitalist economics aspires to be non-empathic, because there is no room for "empathy" in mathematics, obviously enough. Individuals, mostly, act as unpredictably as emotionally, and the only possible way to "create" "ideal" (non-empathic) economic subjects (only useful in sound economies) seemed to consist in fragmenting their personality into desirably simple elements, which might be easily *counted*. The problem of the materialist capitalism, however, consists in that the simple elements might be as well tampered with by the advocates of the materialist anti-capitalism. There are, in fact, no "simple elements" a man is supposed (by *any* materialists) to be built of, but attempts at severing them (at all expense and contrary to sound reason) can be best discounted by the *most consequent* materialists, which paves the notorious "road to serfdom" really.

If an alleged "complex" refuses to act as precisely as demanded to, the in-complex, most probably would do the job. A redefinition of the individual seems indispensable for any materialist Weltanschauung. The nominalist philosophy gives the hand. If "only individuals exists", they cannot be *individuals-of* a specific nature, but must be individuals-as-such and bereft of any *specific* nature. Atoms can be "unspecified" thus as well as atomic perceptions (Locke) or atomic facts (Wittgenstein). They are to be called individuals rather than individuals of any (and especially rational) nature. In the "exactly ideal world" the "structures" consisting of "atoms" readily act and are acted upon.

Even a purely animal (or aesthetical) perception (not to mention that of an animal of the rational nature) can spoil the desirable spontaneity of (re-)actions, so that people are to be "educated" so as to act mechanically without any form of reflection.

The stimuli which occasion these activities are expected to be manifold ("competing") and casual, but never supposed to be *harmful because casual*. They are forbidden to be called wicked, even if the intentions of those who produce and use them (the actions as well as the responses of those who consume them) must be sometimes called so. Moreover, man, under the yoke of the hackneyed labor, desires more stimuli; the more so the more the labor is hackneyed. The majority of them were regarded before, say, 100 years as simply immoral.

Nowadays, the very judgment on their value is deemed "immoral" in the society defined by the "openness" to any stimuli.

The modern individualism is widely appraised, but the individuals have ceased to be what they used to be in the classic philosophy (persons). They have been deprived of their biological nature and especially demanded to abnegate the rational in their nature. "Reason is (allegedly) a whore of the devil" (Erzhure und Teufelsbraut). "Reason is the devil's prostitute and can do nothing else but slander and dishonor what God does and says" (Luther).[260]

Economic relations cannot cause human freedom. Especially however, materialist economics aims at suppressing it. "Free will is a matter of title only", according to both M. Luther and J. S. Mill (the latter advocated for the liberty persuasively defined). In classic terms, freedom is defined as tending to the genuine good (the one known to be so). In modernity, it is defined ideologically or institutionally only.

The participation in/of various forms of social existence can be a value, but "market mechanisms" are not based on the active and free participation. "To partake" means" "to have a part" (of a greater whole) *etymologically only*. In this sense, the par-taken might always be taken away.

Mechanisms are necessary to a degree only. Criminals must be "automatically" eliminated so as not to harm the innocent, but no one is able to automatically stimulate them to do good as such. The punishment occasions only right actions (does not necessitate them). Living by the necessary is a minimum; beside it, men can, nonetheless, lodge extravagant claims for socials benefits as well as idiosyncrasy for work, which was, according to Herbert Marcuse, the genuine virtue of the modernity (machines were expected in the future to work instead of humans only because humans had been supposed to be machines before).

People happen to be deceived into believing that any value must be measured (this or that way). But even an indubitably measurable value can be *actually immeasurable* if not readily knowable. The actual value of a measurement is legible only if the numbers displayed on the screen of the measuring apparatus do not fluctuate. The fluctuation of the e.g. temperature reading impairs the value of the reading. The value might be really high in economy, but if not legible clearly, it proves to be bogus. The same concerns the fluctuation of the values on the stock market.

Some supposedly innovative ideas might be in fact fake values as long as they do not respect the traditional distinctions. Good which cannot be actively participated in/of is nothing.

The "reality" of materialist economics is no more real than mathematical abstracts are. The natural relations (the measurable one included) are but accidents of substances (individuals of the rational nature).

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[260] Martin Luther, Disputatio de homine, in WA 39, 175 (theses 5 and 9). The translation by Josiah Roberts Reason Diabolical, Reason Divine: Melanchthon on Philosophy, Humanism and Scripture Access 2026-10-29 https://davenantinstitute.org/reason-diabolical-reason-divine-melanchthon-philosophy-humanism-scripture/#_ftn7

A mathematician can be decoyed into believing into the reality of the objects he/she is vividly interested in, and the belief might improve his/her *personal* achievements, but cannot be shared with the majority of the society, who have the full right to be ignorant of the grandiose existence of that "reality". In economics, an analogous illusion might be harbored as to the autonomous existence of "economic life/reality" independent of rational substances (humans) which can only sustain its existence.

The equilibrium between demand and supply happens to be easily measured, but this does not amount to that it can be thus easily *created*. No mechanism can work on its own – without persons knowing the nature of principles and the End and striving for the means so as to obtain the End.

People are free if seeing The Other Side from afar and tend to it studiously. On doing so, they leave behind some by-products of this genuine work of life (the only one deserving the name fully). The objects (e.g. the marvels of technology) happen to be admired, but they are in fact rather left-overs of the genuine feast.

7. Valuing and working

The innovative, creative labor seems to contribute much more to the wealth of nations than the executive one. It is more valuable to create new jobs than to consume the thus created – taking up the jobs.

The innovative work is valuable because it consists in more than just in implementing orders. The work conceived as decision unfolds in between grasping the intended end and grasping a material object physically, with hands, in the immediate contact with nature; between the purely immaterial and the necessarily material.

In his Summa, Thomas tackles the problem of decisions. The essential in it, the inquiry, is determined both as to its principle and the end.

> The inquiry of counsel is actually finite on both sides, on that of its principle and on that of its term. For a twofold principle is available in the inquiry of counsel. One is proper to it, and belongs to the very genus of things pertaining to operation: this is the end which is not the matter of counsel, but is taken for granted as its principle… The other principle is taken from another genus, so to speak; thus in demonstrative sciences one science postulates certain things from another, without inquiring into them. Now these principles which are taken for granted in the inquiry of counsel are any facts received through the senses—for instance, that this is bread or iron: and also any general statements known either through speculative or through practical science; for instance, that adultery is forbidden by God, or that man cannot live without suitable nourishment. Of such things counsel makes no inquiry. But the term of inquiry is that which we are able to do at once. For just as the end is considered in the light of a principle, so the means are considered in the light of a conclusion. Wherefore that which presents itself as to be done first, holds the position of an ultimate conclusion whereat the inquiry comes to an end. Nothing however prevents counsel from being infinite potentially,

> for as much as an infinite number of things may present themselves to be inquired into by means of counsel (Fathers of the English Dominican Province).[261]

Neither principles nor ends are subject to rational discourse, but both make it possible to occur. It consists in composing and decomposing premises containing "new ideas", upon which composing and decomposing of material objects might follow. There is a "completely new idea" on one hand, and the physically accessible matter of its realization on the other. People happen to be dreamers or even visionaries, because cherishing grandiose ideas, but unable to substantiate them, and find a point of departure of the work possibly commenceable in nature. But on the other hand, men in a closer contact with nature (or what they deem to be natural) might be engrossed by it and incapable to master it too.

Matching the two is as important as rarely obtainable. The majority of people put up with existing in-between the two principles without reflecting on them. The reality which engrosses human existence this way so much that the existence happens to be called (by existentialists) "unauthentic;" is in fact "human reality": a scheme of acting. Contrary to what might appear , it is not that much the naked nature, as it might be confronted and braved only by those reflecting on the value of the principles, but the "natural" (viz. ordinary) way of acting. The executive labor is the same as the routine one. Still, there are, on the opposite pole, people who live in the sphere of dreams and unable to act at all. Sing it requires (contrary to what existentialists claim) seing the naked nature beyond the phenomena which are immediately given.

The end intended is a value in the analogous sense of the word. The same is the case with the basic value of the matter to labor on. Valuing (this type of work) unfolds between the two. The innovative work thus proves to be identical with the inquiry (consilium).

> In every inquiry one must begin from some principle. And if this principle precedes both in knowledge and in being, the process is not analytic, but synthetic: because to proceed from cause to effect is to proceed synthetically, since causes are more simple than effects. But if that which precedes in knowledge is later in the order of being, the process is one of analysis, as when our judgment deals with effects, which by analysis we trace to their simple causes. Now the principle in the inquiry of counsel is the end, which precedes indeed in intention, but comes afterwards into execution. Hence the inquiry of counsel must needs be one of analysis,

[261] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 14 a. 6, c. Respondeo dicendum quod inquisitio consilii est finita in actu ex duplici parte, scilicet ex parte principii, et ex parte termini. Accipitur enim in inquisitione consilii duplex principium. Unum proprium, ex ipso genere operabilium, et hoc est finis, de quo non est consilium, sed supponitur in consilio ut principium, ut dictum est. Aliud quasi ex alio genere assumptum sicut et in scientiis demonstrativis una scientia supponit aliqua ab alia, de quibus non inquirit. Huiusmodi autem principia quae in inquisitione consilii supponuntur, sunt quaecumque sunt per sensum accepta, utpote quod hoc sit panis vel ferrum; et quaecumque sunt per aliquam scientiam speculativam vel practicam in universali cognita, sicut quod moechari est a Deo prohibitum, et quod homo non potest vivere nisi nutriatur nutrimento convenienti. Et de istis non inquirit consiliator. Terminus autem inquisitionis est id quod statim est in potestate nostra ut faciamus. Sicut enim finis habet rationem principii, ita id quod agitur propter finem, habet rationem conclusionis. Unde id quod primo agendum occurrit, habet rationem ultimae conclusionis, ad quam inquisitio terminatur. Nihil autem prohibet consilium potentia infinitum esse, secundum quod in infinitum possunt aliqua occurrere consilio inquirenda. (Dominican Fathers).

beginning that is to say, from that which is intended in the future, and continuing until it arrives at that which is to be done at once (Fathers of the English Dominican Province).[262]

8. The consumption and metabolism of information

In the world in which the commercialized emotionality dominates over the sober and cool judgment of the intellect, the problem of the information overload/noise and the metabolism of information appears. In the "sensual world/realty", people happen to be lost, not only because of the multiplicity of information. The problem of the complexity of the interpretation is more serious than the problem of the complexity of the information itself.

The history of Homo sapiens is measured by approximately 40,000 years. It began with departing from God and his Logos. Manifold human words (logoi) were about to obfuscate the way of a possible return. The words, by their nature, were originally meant to represent things adequately and thus show potentially the way towards the Lost Principle. But a dissonance in the human mind made it that things were represented inadequately and thus seemed to be disobedient to the rational principle in man. They became a danger, or at least a challenge. Hence, the history of Homo sapiens became, by its beginnings, the history of the barbaric savagery; of being helpless and lost in the hostile nature.

The world might have well appeared inimical, but was never perverse. Rules were severe, but just. Moreover, the number of objects constituting the "biotope" of a savage tribe was scanty. Proportionally to how man succeeded in dominating over nature, the objects meant to be used for that purpose grew in number. The life of the contemporary inhabitants of a big city is, apparently, different to the primitive life of a tribe village, because the artificial objects are nowadays incomparably more complex and manifold than, say, before 30,000 years. They are, however, not only artificial, but first of all, artificially and sophistically composed. According to Heidegger, the artificial world is a line protruding into infinity; into the indeterminate and uncertain. The artificially produced objects happen to be used differently to what they originally were meant to. A new possibility to use (and to abuse) them appears.

The mode they are used can be expressed by numbers, words, diagrams, images, which can be, generally, called the access code to the artificial products. The access codes might perish along with e.g. epidemic disaster, but houses, bridges, roads, etc. will remain nonetheless. Not only are the modern objects more complex; the mode of use them becomes more and more complicated also. In consequence, the objects with their access code obliterated or blurred lose their original value, or become alien for the people, who experience *in themselves* the inability to use them.

Even a quite complex artificial structure can be relatively easily managed if (1) a legible scheme of how to use it is easily available and (2) the reading of the scheme is not

[262] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 14, a. 5, c. Respondeo dicendum quod in omni inquisitione oportet incipere ab aliquo principio. […] Principium autem in inquisitione consilii est finis, qui quidem est prior in intentione, posterior tamen in esse. Et secundum hoc, oportet quod inquisitio consilii sit resolutiva, incipiendo scilicet ab eo quod in futuro intenditur, quousque perveniatur ad id quod statim agendum est.

interrupted. The dominant feature of the postmodernist world seems, however, to be the very interrupting of the reading and generating the information overload/noise, which impairs the ability to concentrate and to work. It is not culture which makes man unhappy (as Freud, Rousseau, Adorno and Horkheimer assumed), but the presence of the information overload/noise which paralyses the effectiveness of the use of the achievements of the civilization/culture. The concentration is disturbed by thoughtless talk, "music", advertisements and the like.

The access code in question is roughly speaking the same as the form of the artificial objects Aristotle speaks of. It is defined by him as the purpose they might serve for. The final cause (the end) is, philosophically speaking, the most important one and thus most difficult to grasp adequately. The artificial products appear to be readily definable rather by the material amassed (its sum) so as to make up the structure.

The final cause is the cause par excellence in Plato, but came to be known as the last one; at the end of the first (most brilliant) period of the history of philosophy. The first philosophers of nature (Thales, Anaximenes) put up with material causes and accounted for the becoming of things showing the elements they were, allegedly, composed of. They called it by various names, but the rule had remained the same until Parmenides noticed that "something did not work" smoothly enough in the scheme. "Being" seemed to him more important than "matter". Plato and Aristotle improved the newly invented notion of being (the additive structure of the produced is not a being), but the temptation of seizing the "stuff" of the universe, or even its being in terms of addition remained strong (e.g. in Leibniz). The cognoscibility of the artificial object would have been consequent upon enumerating exhaustively their components. However, sheer amassment of elements improves by no means legibility of a particular/specific structure, even if it might satisfy the desire for simplifying the *totality* in some "plain" terms.

"Manuals" (descriptions of the effective use of products) are not usually written by the same people who produce the objects. (The complex might be analyzed individually, but is mostly a social function). They might be written well of poorly; plainly or (as in translations) in a quite incomprehensible tonague. Still, the manual, if meant to be perfect, equals the definition of the product provided in terms of its purpose (final cause). It might be naively assumed that the wealth of a society consists in sheer amassment of products and is, thus, directly proportional to their complexity. In fact, unless the complexity is defined, it is non legible (and of no use); and unless it is protected by (statutory and customary) law, it might be rather an incentive for the greedy to lay hold of the products by force or fraud. The protection is more than using sheer physical force. A precious house, and especially our home, happens to endangered in many sophisticated ways, amongst which the brutal violence is perhaps the least dangerous. Blurring the distinctions proper to (and needed for) the definitions of special/particular products (of hands and mind) is incomparably more dangerous. The precious is defined by the algorithm of its effective protection also.

The values-definitions of goods produced in the past (by our ancestors) are necessary for preserving the value of goods produced now, similarly as the value of a house depends on the stability of the ground it is built on. The common weal is accessible (potentially) to everybody now, but our "present-Now" is defined only in terms of passing from the past into the future. The present time, as commonly known, is hardly definable. Were we to imagine it

anyhow, it would be a bridge between the past and the future. We cannot live otherwise than crossing the bridge. The Now, if definable at all, would have been a relation of the necessary past to the free future (the definition does not seem to be strict enough though).

The definition of time comes into the definition of vital movement (and for any movement too). Every motion unfolds in time, and the human time is perhaps as complex as the human vital motion. The law of the preservation/conservation of energy is in force in nature, but an analogous law must be observed in the human affairs also. The energy of the value of products must be preserved for the sake of possible entering into predictable future (the future must be more than mere uncertainty). The laws of the real social development are *naturally conservative*. The laws observed in social affairs should be conservative first of all too.

The value of shares is notified on the stock market, but not mechanically, because the temperature of emotions is notified along with the value of economic entities. Expectations and hopes are notified too and thus artificial fluctuations follow. The apprehension and hope can (at least to some extent) obliterate the adequacy of the value reading. Stock market is an instrument of reading, but not a perfect one. It is only the real definition of a product which is perfect. It includes the formal cause of a product, but material too as far as subordinate to it. The emotions are material indeed in respect to the rational in man.

The definition of the artificial is, however, *practically* never as formal as e.g. the definition of an animal or the triangle must be. Besides its purely intellectual purport it might include, moreover, the volitional attitude of those willing actively to preserve the value in question and conserve it. Originally, the values (step-stones on the way to the Ultimate) are objectively valid means leading to this end; the step-stones trodden on by those who *advance* (move) to the end. The efficient cause is, then, included in the definitions too: the volitional attitude of those ready to preserve it. However, the emotional attitude is effective enough. The will is not to be identified with higher emotions, because it is qualitatively different to them (they are all passive; the will is active). Emotions are blind if not informed by the intellect, and the only intermediary to inform them is the will. In animals, emotions are informed by their instinct only and the range of the animal existence must be, thus, restricted proportionally to the range of the instinct information. It can never reach the Ultimate.

Selling fake products instead of the genuine ones is forgery. But creating new jobs without proper health protection is no less fraudulent. The tax income from such a fraud enterprise is outweighed by the costs of treatment of cripples produced along with those allegedly economical products. Nobody can be denied the right to ruin his own health for the sake of a quick profit (which might seem necessary for him), but must be bluntly informed about the risk and not decoyed into believing that his ruined health will be repaired by the nationalized health service.

The means to obtain the end used to be called something-for-me. It is unique in man to use things apart from relishing in them. Animals can feel pleasure, but cannot devise freely means to obtain pleasurable objects.

> If … we compare use and enjoyment in respect of their objects, enjoyment is better than use; because that which is appetible absolutely is better than that which is appetible only as directed to something else. But if we compare them in respect of the apprehensive power that

> precedes them, greater excellence is required on the part of use: because to direct one thing to another is an act of reason; whereas to apprehend something absolutely is within the competency even of sense.[263]

All creatures tend in some way to their source (the Creator), but man might deliberately so, and might be certain that some actions are bound to lead the End. He is not doomed to desire the End ineffectively (dream of it). His actions are thus, in a sense egoistic, or, at least, must never be as "altruistic" as Comte supposed. Acting out of *pure* egoism, however, is not tantamount to acting quite egoistically, because "pure" might mean "honest". The pure seems to be innermost in man. According to Aristotle, the supreme in man is his/her intellect, so much so that man can be even called the intellect tout court (Ethics, X, Ch. 7). The intellect is personal, but its object is universal (those who followed Hegel claimed the opposite). It regards *by its nature* the common weal. Thus, the most personal actions must be aimed, by the nature of their principle, at the common weal sharable by anybody.

The intellectual principle in man is, however, individualized along with the place he/she comes to existence. The objective is universal, but the mode of realizing it varies along with the variety of places the intellectual principle begins to work. People happen to share thus *the same mode of approaching* a purely philosophical problem, and the solution of the problem is no doubt universal. There are "particular" obstacles the intellect must cope with to be shared solidary with those who meet them. There is but one universal language of metaphysics, but manifold particular tongues to be learnt so as to solve particular problems on the way to the Universal Principle. The way manifold human words should be reduced to the Unique Divine Word is willed ("desired") like means must be along with their ends. Those who will the end in the same way, or "desired" it, and entangled in the same difficulties, are to be called a community, because are used to naming the good the same way (Cf. Ch. Enlightenment, Section 3). If related thus to the other persons individuals form natural communities. Family is the first one of them. The nation too, is a kind of a spiritual solidarity.

Still, the principles *I* use to solve a particular problem are *not-mine* by definition, because universally valid, like e.g. physical laws must be. A thing might assume a definite form and be valued too only because first understood as completely alien. Things are produced so and deduced from the state of crude nature which is completely "disinterested" in human problems. Moreover, its lacking of "empathy" provides a unique way to solve all problems. Things are valuable as far as the objective state of matters is assessed theoretically

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[263] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 16 a. 2 c. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, uti est applicare aliquod principium actionis ad actionem, sicut consentire est applicare motum appetitivum ad aliquid appetendum, ut dictum est. Applicare autem aliquid ad alterum non est nisi eius quod habet arbitrium super illud, quod non est nisi eius qui scit referre aliquid in alterum, quod ad rationem pertinet. Et ideo solum animal rationale et consentit, et utitur.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod frui importat absolutum motum appetitus in appetibile, sed uti importat motum appetitus ad aliquid in ordine ad alterum. Si ergo comparentur uti et frui quantum ad obiecta, sic frui est nobilius quam uti, quia id quod est absolute appetibile, est melius quam id quod est appetibile solum in ordine ad aliud. Sed si comparentur quantum ad vim apprehensivam praecedentem, maior nobilitas requiritur ex parte usus, quia ordinare aliquid in alterum est rationis; absolute autem aliquid apprehendere potest etiam sensus.

first in terms of their binary logic value: a statement must be true or false; must have this logical value first. The possible access code to the products must observe this border condition. A thing, before being produced out of the state of crude nature, must be first known to be producible at all.

The natural properties of things are known first before they can be composed and discomposed in a befitting way. E.g. specific heat of a substance must be known first as well the other natural properties of the materials to be used. Analogically, special properties/proprieties might be indissolubly attached to the natural components of a society.

The binary value of a scientific statement guarantees the value of the object about to be produced according to the requirements of the science. The "truth" of these produced objects (them-not-being-fake) appears in the moment they prove to be working in the way they were expected to.

The mathematical objects are – so to say – pellucid by their very nature. The opposite is the case with the "objects" that come to know them: humans. Their nature seems to be most complex and thus most difficult to assess adequately.

Some ethical systems (Spinoza; Kant) were aimed at simplifying the structure. The endeavors are "psychologically" understandable for that reason at least that the emotional in man (the matter to cope with in ethics anyhow) is considerably complex. The emotional in animals is simpler, but even it is hardly reducible to elementary reactions. The emotional in man is *particularly* complex, because *it partakes of right or perverse reason*. Men can be led by the universal moral rules, but by the particular (possibly debauched) reason also.

Simplified principles can exist in the cabinets of doctrinaires only. It is possible to think out any form of humanity whatever, but the forms devised in the seclusion of cabinets are but loosely connected with the natural subjects they were expected (or ever demanded) to represent. These forms are called by Aristotle "dialectical": tentative rather than peremptory forms of the intellect.

The objects creative of products are to be known (as to their natural properties/proprieties) no less exactly than the objects produced by them. The truth of the human nature is perhaps the least readable, but its value must be known nonetheless. Normally, when working, people are in contact not only with material objects, but with each other (immaterial objects; persons) too. The natural properties of them both are to be known so as to produce effectively. Usually, if forming a team to work so, people get to know their advantages and drawbacks (or at least shortcomings) so as to use the elements of the team the best possible way. But the knowledge of the *properties/proprieties following the human nature as such* must precede that of the *particular* properties.

Man is defined as rational animal. His properties/proprieties: justice; faith; energy and the like are defined next. Pragmatically, people happen to be assessed (e.g. by their supervisors) as hardworking, sluggish; clever or dull; which might suffice provisionally to use their labor effectively to a greater or lesser *extent*. But the problem of the use in the most general (philosophical) sense of the word is more important. Unless we apply our abilities to work as *intensely* as only possible, we cannot fully succeed in it.

The philosophical category of Usus is more capacious than Kant thought it to be. We use normally, inanimate objects and treat them instrumentally so. Kant thought that humans must not be used this way, which is perhaps true, but he failed to grasp that we can use i.e.

apply our intellect and the will to doing or making, or vice versa, to abandon ourselves to idleness if personally disinterested in making or doing. It cannot be taken for granted that the intellect and the will must be applied to objects in the way e.g. fire if applied to the combustible is bound to burn it. The way humans approach objects is more intricate, which is not to say: non understandable.

> The use of a thing implies the application of that thing to an operation: hence the operation to which we apply a thing is called its use … Now we apply to an operation not only the interior principles of action, viz., the powers of the soul or the members of the body; as the intellect, to understand; and the eye, to see; but also external things, as a stick, to strike.[264]

It is only natural to try to deal with the complex analytically for the sake of understanding it as plainly as possible. But the analysis must not be carried out at the expense of failing to take into account the essential of a subject. It must not be reductionist. Simplifying a problem is by no means tantamount to solving it. Each science tries to understand the manifold by as few principles as only possible. "The common intention of all philosophers was to reduce multitude to unity and variety to uniformity *as much as possible*". The analyzing of the complex does not equal to idealizing it. Already "the ancient philosophers attempted to reduce [the nature of] bodies to some fewer and more simple principles, that is, to elements, one or many, and to elementary qualities. "But their position is untenable".[265] Ideas, no matter how splendid, cannot replace science. The constructive analysis might be called (after Kępiński) the metabolism of information. The opposite ideologization is to be called overload/noise information.

The metabolism of nutrients consists in the fractionation of e.g. carbohydrates into simple elements (glucose is this). Analogically, the complex forms of the phenomenally given humanity should be analyzed until its proper and admissibly simple elements are found. The elements of the definition (definientia of humanity) are meant.

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[264] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 16 a. 1 c. Respondeo dicendum quod usus rei alicuius importat applicationem rei illius ad aliquam operationem, unde et operatio ad quam applicamus rem aliquam, dicitur usus eius; sicut equitare est usus equi, et percutere est usus baculi. Ad operationem autem applicamus et principia interiora agendi, scilicet ipsas potentias animae vel membra corporis, ut intellectum ad intelligendum, et oculum ad videndum; et etiam res exteriores, sicut baculum ad percutiendum. Sed manifestum est quod res exteriores non applicamus ad aliquam operationem nisi per principia intrinseca, quae sunt potentiae animae, aut habitus potentiarum, aut organa, quae sunt corporis membra. Ostensum est autem supra quod voluntas est quae movet potentias animae ad suos actus; et hoc est applicare eas ad operationem. Unde manifestum est quod uti primo et principaliter est voluntatis, tanquam primi moventis; rationis autem tanquam dirigentis; sed aliarum potentiarum tanquam exequentium, quae comparantur ad voluntatem, a qua applicantur ad agendum, sicut instrumenta ad principale agens. Actio autem proprie non attribuitur instrumento, sed principali agenti, sicut aedificatio aedificatori, non autem instrumentis. Unde manifestum est quod uti proprie est actus voluntatis.

[265] De veritate, q. 5 a. 9 c. … quod communis intentio omnium fuit reducere multitudinem in unitatem, et varietatem in uniformitatem, secundum quod possibile esset. Et ideo antiqui, considerantes diversitatem actionum in istis inferioribus, tentaverunt ea reducere in aliqua principia pauciora et simpliciora, scilicet in elementa, multa aut unum, et in qualitates elementares. Sed ista positio non est rationabilis.

Some products are labeled as junk food. Sucrose (their main ingredient) is relatively easy to assimilate, but it is not for that reason healthy. Dark bread is so, whereas sweets are "good" for childish people only. Analogically, some information might seem attractive and thus easily absorbable, being toxic nonetheless. Some news is precisely this: shocking, scandalizing, annoying. People become addicted to them in the way they can be addicted to sugar. The phenomena of the infantile emotionality seem to dominate in the mass media.

A picante dish teases but a sick palate. The exciting (picante) news teases the debauched imagination. The sound information is that analyzable into simple elements, and people must not be replaced in performing the analysis. It is accomplished by the only totally active principle of the human mind: the intellect. Emotions are totally passive. The so called "higher emotions" are so only to the extent they partake actually of the intellect.

The world we live and work in consists of some really strange (δεινά as Sophocles has it) objects. They are so because immaterial. They are considerably more complex than usually admitted to. There are (besides properties of matter) proprieties and improprieties in personal characters, and the analogous proprieties and improprieties exist in the national characters or even in the form of humanity it actually assumes.

Some personal improprieties might be annoying or irritating e.g. attempts to shift the responsibility on the others. They are to be known without both prejudice and connivance for that reason at least lest we fall prey to manipulation. The phenomena of human existence must never be taken in the way they present themselves directly to our mind.

Natural objects (as to their core) are not immediately given to our mind. They are rather represented in it. The representation is according to Aristotle, pleasurable and is proper to humans only, because no other animal can admire e.g. the beauty of a landscape, and pleasure in all animals but humans is indissolubly matched with desire. The *human* esthetical pleasures are not followed by any desire. A true amateur of art is rarely an art collector. The admired (piece of art) does not need be possessed. The admiration prompts rather an analysis than desire (the only "desire" felt in this case is the desire to get to know causes). It is the beginning of philosophy and of other sciences to some extent also.

Still, Aristotle says that representation as such is pleasurable to all. People happen to relish in the representations without any hope to obtain desirable objects (to have them at hand), but enjoy in artificial needs stimulated by them nonetheless; too lazy to analyze the given, but curious enough to see something more of the sort.

Phenomenology discards the very possibility of representation. The phenomena are (allegedly) presented to our mind "bodily", which is to say: not to be subject to abstraction. Some indeed are accustomed to artificial objects so much that prone to set all other (possibly natural) objects in their backdrop only.

Phenomenology does not admit the possibility to analyze the phenomena (the allegedly immediately given), but does demand the right to multiply the phenomena; the existential possibilities; ad infinitum. This, however, might lead to the relativization of the value of the previously given. The analysis of the phenomena gives *sound* pleasure. The multiplying of the supposedly immediately given provides some artificial pleasure only. Highly processed food is unhealthy, and the representation forgotten to be what it really is: the re-presentation, is so also.

Junk food might be pleasing and some news highly processed too. Ideologies are extremely highly processed news. Still, the pleasure, however vehement in them, is morbid.

The consumption of the artificially processed food is harmful. Analogically, the consumption of the information processed artificially begets mental prostration. Technics give nowadays many ways to process information this way.

The representation is *really* pleasurable if resulting from the activity of the abstracting intellect. The overrepresentation begets uneasiness only.

The mode of the consumption of the thus overrepresented varies with the character of a consumer. Indigestible food might be relatively less toxic for a consumer used to it; it can be tolerated so. It is, however, not the case with a European consuming the Orient "cuisine", or, vice versa, with an Asiatic who would fancy to taste the so called Western Values (not to be confused with the traditional values of the Latin Western Civilization).

The Latin Western Civilization used to be superior not because of its nature (culture is artificial after all), but because of the active participation in/of the Supreme Principle *commonly accessible to all civilizations*, even if chronologically appearing in the West first. The moral duty rested on the beneficiaries to pass over the Revelation to the "barbarians". Many heroes of faith faced the demand. Some, however, tried to discount materially their doubtful superiority, by e.g. slave or opium trade. The pride ascribed to itself the value of the generously donated by God[266].

In the globalized world, the goods of culture are commonly accessible, but not easily digestible for that reason. The European mind can digest the toxins it has been accustomed to since the era of Enlightenment longer and its death might be postponed. "Assisted dying" is the name. But the same toxins given to a non-European mind will work as vehemently as brutally. The "savages" do not relish in celebrating serenely their approaching death in the way Europeans are accustomed to. Vehement crimes follow upon the vehement scenes presented in mass media claiming the right for "free expression", because made for entertainment only, and not to be (allegedly) taken as incentives to crime. Those lacking the ability to take the make-believe stories with a grain of salt are hypocritically pitied.

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[266] Summa Theologiae I, q. 63 a. 3 c. Sed in hoc appetiit esse similis Deo, quia appetiit ut finem ultimum beatitudinis id ad quod virtute suae naturae poterat pervenire, avertens suum appetitum a beatitudine supernaturali, quae est ex gratia Dei. Vel si appetiit ut ultimum finem illam Dei similitudinem quae datur ex gratia, voluit hoc habere per virtutem suae naturae, non ex divino auxilio secundum Dei dispositionem.
Et hoc consonat dictis Anselmi, qui dicit quod appetiit illud ad quod pervenisset si stetisset.

De malo, q. 16 a. 3 c. Angeli autem omnes sic conditi sunt, ut quidquid pertinet ad naturalem perfectionem eorum, statim a principio suae creationis habuerint: tamen erant in potentia ad supernaturalia bona, quae per Dei gratiam consequi poterant. Unde relinquitur quod peccatum Diaboli non fuerit in aliquo quod pertinet ad ordinem naturalem, sed secundum aliquid supernaturale. Fuit ergo primum peccatum Diaboli in hoc quod ad consequendum supernaturalem beatitudinem, quae in plena Dei visione consistit, non se erexit in Deum, tanquam finalem perfectionem ex eius gratia desiderans cum Angelis sanctis, sed eam consequi voluit per virtutem suae naturae; non tamen sine Deo in naturam operante, sed sine Deo gratiam conferente. Unde Augustinus in Lib. de libero arbitrio, peccatum Diaboli in hoc ponit quod est sua potestate delectatus; et in IV su per Gen. ad Litt. dicit quod si ad se natura angelica converteretur, saepe Angelus amplius delectaretur quam eo c uius participatione beata est, et intumescens superbia caderet.

The material goods are the least valuable in the Western World. The "immigrants" are given but the scraps of the feast. Social benefits are only an Ersatz in comparison to the spiritual goods.

In the first centuries of the Christian era, savages invaded the Roman Empire, but after Christianized they became Romans, because the universal value of the Christian Revelation made the assimilation possible. Nothing of the sort is offered nowadays to the incomers. The savages of the modern era might be dimly aware of the essence of the Western Civilization hidden under the pretenses of "benefits". They are immediately given indeed, but are neither sound nor really valuable for that matter.

What is valuable as such is relatively easily analyzable into its elements. The European identity is defined by the Christian Revelation, the Roman Law and the Greek Philosophy. Without them, it is non understandable.

The Latin Civilization has been, no doubt, the supreme exiting *until now* in the world, but the co called Western Values are in fact a pale replica of the original Latin ones.

The attitude to the representation of the human body was specific for the Greek world. The representation of the nude female body is pleasurable not because provoking sensual lust, but (just the opposite), because lulling the lust possibly existing before in the mind. The opposite is the case with the contemporary culture of exposing nudity of the human body (the female body first of all). Lusts grow more and more proportionally to how artificially the human nakedness is present. Humans (women first of all) are thus humiliated, but this type of humiliation is widely advertised as a virtue of modernity.

The representation of the nude (female) body was in Greeks founded on its exact proportions (even purely mathematical canons of the proportion were provided). A well-proportioned human body is good-looking indeed. But denudating a female body without humiliating it is possible in the legitimate marriage only and is tantamount to discovering its fertility. The desire for the somatic contact with a human body is counterbalanced by the admiration for the mystery of life newly appearing through this body. The life can be reproduced naturally, but can never be produced artificially.[267]

9. What is work?

In the physical sense, work is defined by the scalar dot product of the force vector ($\vec{F}$) and the displacement vector ($\Delta\vec{x}$): $W=\vec{F}\cdot\Delta\vec{x}$. It represents the amount of energy transferred from to the point *A* the point to the point *B*.

The common sense meaning of the work is different. If it has been wrongly assessed that an object is to be transferred from the point *A* the point do to the point *B*, it will have to be transferred in the opposite direction next. In the physical sense, work equals zero then:

[267] Summa Theologiae I, q. 92 a. 1 c. Respondeo dicendum quod necessarium fuit feminam fieri, sicut Scriptura dicit, in adiutorium viri, non quidem in adiutorium alicuius alterius operis, ut quidam dixerunt, cum ad quodlibet aliud opus convenientius iuvari possit vir per alium virum quam per mulierem; sed in adiutorium generationis. Quod manifestius videri potest, si in viventibus modus generationis consideretur.

$W=\vec{F} \cdot \Delta\vec{x}$ – $W=\vec{F} \cdot \Delta\vec{x}$, as the vector $\Delta\vec{x}$ changes its direction. But the work in the common sense of the word equals the double amount of energy required to transfer the object from *A* to *B* and in the opposite direction.

The objects composed artificially are, as has been mentioned above, not real in the strict sense of the word. It is materials only which are real, and they can be described, with a good approximation, in terms of the Newtonian Mechanics. Work is an algorithm of the localization of material objects, and the artificial products are sums of the materials. Thus, however, the real value of the work proves to be directly proportional to how precisely the elements (materials) have been localized (it depends on direction of the displacement). The real value of the work is not proportional to the weariness of those who transfer the objects, or to the effort of the human imagination using its material organ: the brain. The effort of both hands and the imagination can be wrongly placed (directed) and its effectiveness can stumble on accidental obstacles which diminish the objective value of the work.

The first tools of the Paleolithic Age were, obviously, incomparably simpler additive structures than the contemporary ones, but the same principle of construing them all has been applied since the artificial began to be produced. They are contemporarily more complex, but remain structured i.e. potentially analyzable into simple elements nonetheless. The value of a product is directly proportional to the precision of the displacement $\Delta\vec{x}$.

Marx believed in that only the physical work is valuable. He might have been right at least as long as his personal work on his Capital (a work deemed to be intellectual indeed) is worthless or even worse (has a minus value), because destructive of the value of the previously achieved. The force vector ($\vec{F}$) of his personal effort (his imagination was focused in some direction anyhow) was wrongly directed so that it proved to be destructive of the values exiting before.

The value of a product does not stem from the physical (organic) effort, but from the precision of directing the possible displacement of objects. They can be "wrongly directed", or the manner of directing them might prove chaotic and thus destructive of the value of work. Socialism is the perfect system of the disorganization of work.

The standard payment for the work should, too, vary and to be proportional to how precisely a worker is able to perform his activity. Obviously, precise mechanics must be rewarded better than the ordinary locksmithery. The more precise, in general, demands more concentration (the tools are more vulnerable, and the brain/mind of the worker also). Distraction, on the other hand, in the work results in what might be called dispersion of energy. Transferring an object from the point *A* the point do to the point *B* is, apparently, impeded by friction. Manifold instruments of dispersion exist in the contemporary world which can impair the effectives of the work the way friction slows down the local movement.

The demand for precision grows proportionally to the complexity of the artificial. The elimination of causal/incidental stimuli, analogous to the physical fraction, is essential.

The same work might be done more or less economically i.e. the input of organic effort might vary (is not directly proportional to the effects). The physical effort should be minimized so as to obtain a possible optimum. But the same, mutatis mutandis, observes in the intellectual work. Obviously, brain, the material organ of the sensual powers (memory, imagination) is subject to manifold (and possibly destructive) stimuli. Some excellent

scientists (e.g. Edison of Tesla) managed to work extremely effectively because sparing unnecessary effort and organizing their work precisely. The work can be, obviously, paralyzed if disorganized.

The principle, however, of the organization of the material must be immaterial itself (nothing can be a cause of itself). The principle of the manual work and the principle of the intellectual work too performed by hands e.g. in writing is the *immaterial intellect*.

The work (no matter how understood) must begin with the activity of the theoretical intellect. A possible direction of the effort must be given, before commencing any. The intellect animates directly the human body (anima intellectiva est forma corporis)[268], but it "animates" so to speak figuratively the exterior material bodies indirectly too. Work consists thus in changing originally the position of one's body towards the material objects.

Producing is active in the full sense of the word, whereas, imagining, sensing and memorizing is, strictly speaking, passive (all emotions are passive too). There is but one totally active principle in the human psyche: the intellect, and there is only one totally active principle in the human body too; the vegetative power which sustains self-preservation or the preservation of the species. The generative power in man animates (literary speaking) a new life to come in family, but the intellect animates the new life with the moral values imparted to the progeny also. There must be something or someone (an objective) we work for; we work "egoistically" for ourselves of for what we deem part of ourselves.

A pen or a screwdriver is grasped physically by hand after an idea of how it might be used has been grasped *mentally*. The mode of grasping things in the latter sense is expressed in the material signs representing their immaterial purport.

Many books have been written in the West since the first one: the Iliad was composed masterfully some 3,000 years ago. They have been composed well or poorly; the harmony of the poetic versification is clearly perceptible, contrary to those which followed in the ordinary life. Some books were composed so as to provide honest rest (otium; schole) after work done before; some, however, were composed so as to facilitate the work to be done and to direct a possible mode of producing. Philosophical books are this, but the most important book: The Scripture (not written by man only) is eminent in the both senses.

The theoretical books happen to improve the efficiency of economic activity of man or to impair it. The impact, however, of purely theoretical thinking upon the practical in man varies along with how precisely the "theoretical" happens to be "translated" into the practical. Normally (directly), those who create new jobs do improve producing. Their work should be

[268] Summa Theologiae I, q. 76 a. 1 c. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere quod intellectus, qui est intellectualis operationis principium, sit humani corporis forma. Illud enim quo primo aliquid operatur, est forma eius cui operatio attribuitur, sicut quo primo sanatur corpus, est sanitas, et quo primo scit anima, est scientia; unde sanitas est forma corporis, et scientia animae. Et huius ratio est, quia nihil agit nisi secundum quod est actu, unde quo aliquid est actu, eo agit. Manifestum est autem quod primum quo corpus vivit, est anima. Et cum vita manifestetur secundum diversas operationes in diversis gradibus viventium, id quo primo operamur unumquodque horum operum vitae, est anima, anima enim est primum quo nutrimur, et sentimus, et movemur secundum locum; et similiter quo primo intelligimus. Hoc ergo principium quo primo intelligimus, sive dicatur intellectus sive anima intellectiva, est forma corporis.

rewarded according to how precisely they improve the effectives of the ordinary executive work.

The remuneration of this creative work might vastly outstrip the ordinary wages: proportionally to how effectively it stimulates the latter, which is both just and reasonable. It is, however, not indifferent, how these excessive incomes are used next. The money is only valuable if *circulating freely* in a society. The *moral* obligation how to use it rests on those who gained it, *in the perspective of the Transcendent End*. The *institutional* obligations to use it *in the perspective of the end totally immanent to humanity* are simply *immoral*. The money is but a means to improve the common weal.

Money is a measure of the value of the work, but the opinions on the nature of money can be really strange. Some believe that "money begets money", which is absurd, because it is only living beings which can beget: ideas (words) are begotten in the minds of those who design new modes of acting and children are naturally begotten as those who *might first benefit* of the acting. Greed is not creative. The boundless "optimism" before October 24, 1929 was followed by the incontrollable hysteria. Emotions are exactly this: to be governed but destructive if emancipated. Nature is a homeostat. The bill for extravagancy is to be settled sooner or later.

It is only the word of heart which is begotten naturally in the human mind and the progeny which is so in family: able to accept the best way the created wealth. The produced so by man imitates the Divine Word and can lead to It also.

10. The shape of humanity

It does not seem difficult to assess the material value of an ordinary product. The artistic value of an art product is considerably more difficult to assess. E.g. Van Gogh (acknowledged nowadays) lived and died in poverty. All the more difficult is it to assess the value of a philosophical idea. It should correspond to the quiddity of the material thing, but the quiddity (essence) lies so deeply hidden under its phenomena that it may be believed impossible to be disclosed (abstracted from the phenomena).

The modern philosophical ideas do not even pretend to represent the reality hidden beyond the representations. They put up with producing "innovative concepts" with the hope to come luckily upon truth by way of trial and error. Thus, a kind of reciprocity between the "inner" and the "outer" side of the human existence was tacitly assumed to exist. Some objects were expected to be known first with some pragmatic objective in mind only and transformed into their "outer" shape next (which can meet the expectations). A dialectics seemed to appear between the "reality" approached pragmatically and the "reality" changed, in the way Marx thought it possible.

The paradigm is Neo-Platonic at its core, because it implies the possibility to mirror the reality in mind, and the ideas, in turn, being reflected in the reality. A dialectics of parallel mirrors; of the reflected and the reflecting; had had a long history before. Neo-Platonism (the philosophy of light), however, was notorious for ignoring the true nature of light, which does not consist of "rays". Reflecting, according to what we know now from physics, is furthest from this philosophical idea. Thomas (anticipating modern discoveries) says that light in

nature undergoes dispersion, and hence the "mirroring" of images ad infinitum proves infeasible.[269] The same must apply to producing.

Heidegger was probably right in observing that producing might advance *potentially* ad infinitum (it cannot actually so). But he failed to notice that the principle of producing must be *qualitatively* different to the produced. Otherwise the very principle would have been producible which savors of nonsense. Producing is not a mechanical reaction to a stimulus from without. Light must undergo dispersion in the inanimate nature and the produced is, apparently, not animated save metaphorically only. In the *animal* senses, the potential of energy is grasped so that the senses prove to be more than just measuring apparatuses and animals more than just machines. They are able to initiate *vital* motion, which is considerably more than seer "reacting". All the more the "shape of a thing" (species intelligibilis), when seized by the *immaterial human intellect*, is grasped firmly and able to initiate *special vital* motion. The energy of the principle (the species intelligibilis) is not dispersed; its form is not blurred. It can be distorted only by the free play of imagination. Producing (which is possible for animals to the restricted extent only) is proper to humans as such. It follows the immaterial representation of a thing.

People happen to produce what is (assessed to be) valuable, and conversely, happen to be assessed as valuable or worthless, perhaps because of the ability (or inability) to produce in general. Still, there is no "mirroring" of the value of the produced resulting from the (mechanical) activity of those producing. There is a *causal relation* between: (1) the reality to be known and the reality known already;[270] and (2) an idea of a thing to be made and the thing actually made. Man must differ qualitatively from the things which make up his closer environment, even if it might be not evident, at first glance, what the difference consists in.

A thing produced *seems* to mirror the image conceived in the imagination of a product-to-be, but it cannot mirror *the innermost* (intellectual) principle of producing. However, there appeared some quaint products which might *seem*, by their very nature, to mirror the human reality after all. The ordinary objects reflect the "inner man" in a metaphorical sense of the word only, but some modern inventions appeared which claim to mirror directly the shape of humanity.

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[269] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 5 a. 6, ad 2. Ad secundum dicendum quod, quando aliqua forma actu existit in aliquo secundum esse perfectum et naturale, potest esse principium actionis in alterum; sicut calidum per calorem calefacit. Sed si forma existit in aliquo imperfecte, et non secundum esse naturale, non potest esse principium communicationis sui ad alterum, sicut intentio coloris quae est in pupilla, non potest facere album; neque etiam omnia quae sunt illuminata aut calefacta, possunt alia calefacere et illuminare; sic enim illuminatio at calefactio essent usque ad infinitum. Lumen autem gloriae, per quod Deus videtur, in Deo quidem est perfecte secundum esse naturale, in qualibet autem creatura est imperfecte, et secundum esse similitudinarium vel participatum. Unde nulla creatura beata potest communicare suam beatitudinem alteri.

[270] De veritate, q. 1 a. 10 ad s. c. 3 Ad tertium dicendum, quod duplex est perfectio; scilicet prima, et secunda: prima perfectio est forma uniuscuiusque, per quam habet esse; unde ab ea nulla res destituitur dum manet; secunda perfectio est operatio, quae est finis rei, vel id per quod ad finem devenitur et hac perfectione interdum res destituitur. Ex prima autem perfectione resultat ratio veri in rebus; ex hoc enim quod res formam habet, artem divini intellectus imitatur, et sui notitiam in anima gignit. Sed ex perfectione secunda consequitur in ipsa ratio bonitatis, quae consurgit ex fine; et ideo malum simpliciter invenitur in rebus, non autem falsum.

In 1877, Edison invented phonograph and the possibility appeared to listen to the voice of the living and the dead alike. E.g. Winston Churchill's voice can be heard thus and the *person* imagined being present if heard. The difference between a person and her/her representation seem to be obvious, but the difference between this "mechanical" (because recorded mechanically) *voice* and the real one is not easily perceptible. Professional musicians hear the difference between the voice heard live (but once) and the same voice recorded (and to be listened potentially ad infinitum). Similarly, a professional opera singer will never use a microphone at the performance (his/her voice would be mechanically distorted this way).

In 1839, daguerreotype (a prototype of the modern photography) was invented and the possibility to record the outer shape of the human body appeared. If looking at a photograph, I might recall the memory of an absent person, and I am aware of the difference to the present one, because the photograph can represent both the living and those who passed away.

But in 1888, the first motion picture appeared and ever since (up to our days) the ways have been improving to blur the difference between the reality tout court and the so called "virtual" reality of the movies. The adult realize mostly the difference, but the children accustomed to it to the point of being addicted to the device react with aggression to the very attempt to be deprived of their "own reality". The modern philosophy, because of its phenomenalism, improves in no way the faculty of discerning between appearances and *the reality existing apart and before being observed*.

Aristotle did not know the modern term of value, but provided a comprehensive system of categories ("ideas") which enable us to find in it what is nowadays called the value. Aristotle could have not imagined the actual shape of "virtual reality", but anticipated the problem in terms of the philosophy of representation in general. The aforementioned shape of humanity can be found therein also.

There are four species of the genus (category) of τὸ ποιόν (Quality). The form (forma) is the last of them, and at the same time, a "border-notion" between the category of Quality and Quantity. Quality "qualifies" man as the rational being. What is, on the other hand, multipliable (quantities), like any products of art and industry might be, is but loosely connected with his essence (quiddity). (There is a proper quantity of man too, but this, again, approaches the aforementioned well-proportioned shape of humanity). Aristotle did not anticipate the modern inventions, but did form a system of general notions which can adequately describe any of them.

Products consist of elements. For instance, lines drawn a sheet of paper consist of points of ink, and some pixels form the image of this text (you read just now), but no virtual reality exists made out of pixels of its image. All products are potentially analyzable up to their simple elements, but the products of art and science are analyzable up to what defines adequately and *abstractedly* their value. The ability to synthetize follows the ability to reflect on the potentially analyzable.

The beauty of the human body is called its "formosity" (formositas) in Latin. The proportion of the body is pleasing when seen,[271] whereas its disproportion jars upon our sense

[271] Summa Theologiae I, q. 5 a. 4 ad 1Ad primum ergo dicendum quod pulchrum et bonum in subiecto quidem sunt idem, quia super eandem rem fundantur, scilicet super formam, et propter hoc, bonum laudatur ut pulchrum. Sed ratione differunt. Nam bonum proprie respicit appetitum, est enim bonum quod omnia appetunt. Et ideo

of what is befitting. Still, people in modernity happen to be "helped" in the perception as if they had been bereft of the personal faculty of seizing the proportion (and to sense, for that matter too, the laughable disproportion of objects).

Human body was masterfully represented in the Greek art. The canons of the beauty were rigorous and even mathematically expressed. Marble (the sculptures were carved out of) was difficult to work on and that is why perhaps only the most studious managed to master it. The opposite is the case with what is called the modern art. The materials are easily accessible, because technics make them so. The accessibility of the materials (e.g. "special effects" in films) made them almost so perfect that able to operate on their own, but for the same reason extremely difficult to command from purely artistic point of view which requires sparsity of the means of expression. Kitsch, on the other hand, is the name of the outwardly splendid. The modern cinema is considerably more likely to be labeled so than the silent movies in which the material was what it must have been: a challenge. A matter which can operate on its own "artificially" is not the material art must cope studiously with. "The master first shows himself in restriction, and only law can give us freedom" (In der Beschränkung zeigt sich erst der Meister, Und das Gesetz nur kann uns Freiheit geben; Goethe).

In the Greek mythology, Pygmalion (a sculptor) fell in love with Galatea (the sculpture which he had carved himself). According to Aristotle, it is natural for any artist to love what he produces. Still, there a difference between the love of creating[272], which is as natural as any intense spiritual activity of man must be, and the love of what has been already created. No genuine artist loves what *he used to* create, because the love for the irretrievably lost in the past is a testimony of the approaching death (inability to work *now*).

The so called contemporary man does not love art in the way Greeks used to (actively). He rather loves the produced which is expected to mirror the inner of man (satisfy its needs). The values of the so called Objective Spirit are included (according to Hegel) in what has been produced by man. However, they become "synthetized with" (and animated for) the Subjective Spirit (man; his needs) and the Absolute Spirit of art, philosophy and *religion* appears.

Gods "pitied" Pygmalion and animated Galatea, but the pity of gods (in plural) is furthers from the mercy of God (in singular). The animation of the inanimate leads (out of its very nature) to the deification of the produced and to idolatry ("pluralism") consequently too. Marx dreamt of "changing the reality" this way.

The animation of the human images is part of the contemporary "virtual" reality, which seems to lead life on its own. From the purely technical point of view, the images consist of pixels/elements and are analyzable in the way all products (no matter how complex)

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habet rationem finis, nam appetitus est quasi quidam motus ad rem. Pulchrum autem respicit vim cognoscitivam, pulchra enim dicuntur quae visa placent. Unde pulchrum in debita proportione consistit, quia sensus delectatur in rebus debite proportionatis, sicut in sibi similibus; nam et sensus ratio quaedam est, et omnis virtus cognoscitiva. Et quia cognitio fit per assimilationem, similitudo autem respicit formam, pulchrum proprie pertinet ad rationem causae formalis.

[272] Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 26 a. 12, c. Naturale autem est cuilibet quod diligat opus suum, sicut videmus quod poetae diligunt poemata sua. Et hoc ideo quia unumquodque diligit suum esse et suum vivere, quod maxime manifestatur in suo agere.

might be. But they might be synthetized spontaneously too and thus forgotten what they really are: products (not to be worshipped). We do not get to know real people when analyzing the matter of their images, but an analysis of their *nature* is needed after all. The shape of humanity can be analyzed (if ever) in qualitative terms only (the quantity of the human material existence is of little importance after all). The "elements" of human nature are to be called its *proper* qualities much more than any shape can be. The last (the fourth) species of Quality is insufficient for understanding man adequately.

Man – according to Aristotle – is not, and never can be, similar to any machine. The adequate presentation of the human reality in terms of its quantity (which Husserl seems to demand) is infeasible. Nor can man become *a machine to feel pleasure* in the way Neo-Marxists thought it advisable. The feeling of pleasure is vital act and cannot be mechanically prompted.

In the category of Quale, the (outer) form is the last and the least important one. Three first species thereof characterize (in an order) better every specific quality; the human one included. In the third species of the category of Quale, the so called "sensual qualities" characterize man as a "sensing animal".[273] Sensations, however, in man are something more than in (dumb) animals, because we can speak of e.g. esthetic taste per analogy to the sense of teste normally (animally) so called. Some images might seem "piquant" whereas the others unsavory (distasteful) only.

Animals are adequately definable by the sensual qualities and that is why they cannot be called "machines" (as Descartes thought them to be). They are qualitatively different to the inanimate objects. But man, (contrary to what Libelt, Heidegger and the advocates of emotivism thought) cannot be defined so even if the so called "higher emotions" were to replace the ordinary ones. People are more or less than animals, depending on how the animal in them partakes of right or perverse reason (in the latter case they might be "great" really, but not good for that reason). The name of the "brute" seems to be extremely offensive, but this name would be a compliment if applied to the creators of the Totalitarian Systems (e.g. the "Great Germany") of the 20th century.

There might be something specifically attractive in man (or repelling for that matter too). Pheromones (or the like) can work mechanically only. Food presented to a hunger animal cannot but prompt sensual desire to devour it. The promptings of instinctive actions

[273] Summa Theologiae I, q. 78 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod magnitudo et figura et huiusmodi, quae dicuntur communia sensibilia, sunt media inter sensibilia per accidens et sensibilia propria, quae sunt obiecta sensuum. Nam sensibilia propria primo et per se immutant sensum; cum sint qualitates alterantes. Sensibilia vero communia omnia reducuntur ad quantitatem. Et de magnitudine quidem et numero, patet quod sunt species quantitatis. Figura autem est qualitas circa quantitatem; cum consistat ratio figurae in terminatione magnitudinis. Motus autem et quies sentiuntur, secundum quod subiectum uno modo vel pluribus modis se habet secundum magnitudinem subiecti vel localis distantiae, quantum ad motum augmenti et motum localem; vel etiam secundum sensibiles qualitates, ut in motu alterationis, et sic sentire motum et quietem est quodammodo sentire unum et multa. Quantitas autem est proximum subiectum qualitatis alterativae, ut superficies coloris. Et ideo sensibilia communia non movent sensum primo et per se, sed ratione sensibilis qualitatis; ut superficies ratione coloris. Nec tamen sunt sensibilia per accidens, quia huiusmodi sensibilia aliquam diversitatem faciunt in immutatione sensus. Alio enim modo immutatur sensus a magna superficie, et a parva, quia etiam ipsa albedo dicitur magna vel parva, et ideo dividitur secundum proprium subiectum.

cannot be resisted in animals, and that is why (probably) they appeared to Descartes similar to machines; but they can be resisted in humans even if the resistance might prove deadly to them. There is something specific in the representation of e.g. the female body and really different to its "attractiveness" in the ordinary sense of the word. Greeks called it charis (gratia in Latin).

Gratia (χάρις) is reciprocal in a sense (and its very meaning is equivocal). It is either a reason (cause) a person is loved and something inhering so firmly in him/her that able to attract the attention; or it is our personal attitude towards a person distinguished thus from the others. The same is the case with the English "grace". It is either "favor", "goodness", "kindness", or "a beauty which pleases"; "an embellishment". Martin Luther seemed to misunderstand this double sense of the word (gratia is a technical term in theology). We are favored by God (He is gracious for us), but for some real reason only (*inherent in us firmly*) as no intellectual being can act without reason and blindfolded (the Sun might be supposed to emanate light, but God does not emanate good this way). Still, there is a difference between the human love (caused by grace) and the divine one: creative of grace.[274] God loves us so *actively* that we might *be really* good, and the direct effect of His active goodness is the *habitual* sanctifying grace (habits are moral qualities par excellence), which rests *immovably* in the soul of the justified (it is not an evanescent sensual quality to be pitied). This "habitual embellishment" is the reason why God does not abhors us.[275] No one can love turpitude, but an exceptional love of God consists in removing *definitely* the turpitude and replacing it with the spiritual grace.

The human perceptible qualities beget more than sheer covetousness. Under the phenomenal shape of the human body and under its sensible qualities too, a specific quality appears at the border of the sensual and the spiritual. The animal appetite tends to be saturated, but can be so only if physically joined to its object. To the contrary, the human perception of the otherwise fleeting sensual perception comes to permanent rest Greeks called ataraxia. In some special circumstances, the sensual desire is lulled by peace found in the object. The object was thus metonymically called rest itself by Franz Schubert in one of his most brilliant works (Du bist die Ruh). In the Adagietto of his V Symphony, Mahler recalls the memory of his beloved Alma so: in the perhaps most soothing melody ever written. Habits

[274] Super Io., cap. 5 l. 3 Hic tradit doctrinam de potestate vivificativa. […] attendendum est, quod dupliciter aliquid diligitur. Cum enim bonum solum sit amabile, aliquod bonum potest se dupliciter ad amorem habere, scilicet vel ut causa amoris, vel ut ab amore causatum. In nobis autem bonum causat amorem; nam causa amoris nostri ad aliquem est bonitas eius. Non enim ideo bonus est, quia nos eum diligimus; sed ideo diligimus eum, quia bonus est: unde in nobis amor causatur a bono. Sed in Deo aliter est, quia ipse amor Dei est causa bonitatis in rebus dilectis: quia enim Deus diligit nos, ideo boni sumus, nam amare nihil est aliud quam velle bonum alicui. Cum ergo voluntas Dei sit causa rerum, quia omnia quaecumque voluit, dominus, fecit, ut dicit Ps. CXIII, 3, manifestum est quod amor Dei, causa est bonitatis in rebus. Unde Dionysius dicit, VI cap. de divinis nominibus, quod divinus amor non permisit eum sine germine esse.

[275] Summa Theologiae IIIa q. 49 a. 4 ad 1Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus diligit omnes homines quantum ad naturam, quam ipse fecit. Odit tamen eos quantum ad culpam, quam contra eum homines committunt, secundum illud Eccli. XII, *altissimus odio habet peccatores.*

(placed in the first species of the category of Quality) rest immovably in those who possess them.

Good is a quality which exists in humans, but the opposite malice can exist in them too. There is, then, something which sustains them both, which is to be called potency (potentia), and to be placed in the second species of the category of Quality. Potentia intellectiva defines man peremptorily, and the shape of humanity in abstracto consists therein. Analogically, a sanctifying habit called grace is created in man by God himself,[276] but sustained by the so called character (a potency) first.[277] It is possible to have the latter, but be bereft of the former.

The images in general, and the images of the female body in particular, are highly commercialized in the modernity. Thus, however, people happen to be degraded below the level of animals. A deadly blow (as Nietzsche has it) was traded to the "human pride". People are really humiliated this way. There is a natural ability in man to denude the essence of the immediately given from its phenomena so as to grasp the essence (quiddity). The intellect abstracts so, because it is an active principle. But emotions in man are by no means active (cannot abstract and liberate).

The nudity of the female body might be revealed without humiliating it in the legitimate marriage, because in it, its natural fertility is revealed at the same time. Generative potency (potentia generativa) is active in man too. All living creatures imitate the fertility of the Eternal Archetype begetting their progeny.[278]

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[276] De veritate, q. 27 pr. 1 Et primo quaeritur utrum gratia sit aliquid creatum positive in anima.

[277] Summa Theologiae IIIa q. 63 a. 2 c .Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, sacramenta novae legis characterem imprimunt inquantum per ea deputamur ad cultum Dei secundum ritum Christianae religionis. Unde Dionysius, in II cap. Eccles. Hier., cum dixisset quod Deus quodam signo tradit sui participationem accedenti, subiungit, perficiens eum divinum et communicatorem divinorum. Divinus autem cultus consistit vel in recipiendo aliqua divina, vel in tradendo aliis. Ad utrumque autem horum requiritur quaedam potentia, nam ad tradendum aliquid aliis, requiritur potentia activa; ad recipiendum autem requiritur potentia passiva. Et ideo character importat quandam potentiam spiritualem ordinatam ad ea quae sunt divini cultus. Sciendum tamen quod haec spiritualis potentia est instrumentalis, sicut supra dictum est de virtute quae est in sacramentis. Habere enim sacramenti characterem competit ministris Dei, minister autem habet se per modum instrumenti, ut philosophus dicit, in I Polit. Et ideo, sicut virtus quae est in sacramentis, non est in genere per se, sed per reductionem, eo quod est quiddam fluens et incompletum; ita etiam character non proprie est in genere vel specie, sed reducitur ad secundam speciem qualitatis.

[278]Contra Gentiles, lib. 4 cap. 2 n. 5. Quia vero nomina patris et filii generationem aliquam consequuntur, ipsum etiam divinae generationis nomen Scriptura non tacuit. Nam in Psalmo, ut dictum est, legitur: ego hodie

genui te. Et Proverb. 8, dicitur: nondum erant abyssi et ego iam concepta eram: ante omnes colles ego parturiebar; vel secundum aliam litteram: ante omnes colles generavit me dominus.

Contra Gentiles, lib. 4 cap. 7 n. 2. Cum enim Scriptura divina et Christum Dei filium, et Angelos Dei filios nominet, alia tamen et alia ratione: unde apostolus, Hebr. 1-5, dicit: cui dixit aliquando Angelorum, filius meus es tu, ego hodie genui te? Quod ad Christum asserit esse dictum.

Accidents contribute hugely to the cognizance of substances,[279] but the first species of the Category of Quality does it best. The power to abstract (intellectually), and beget (physically) are most prominent features of man. The moral/habitual quality, on the other hand, qualifies rather a person in the eyes of those able to appreciate him/her. Emotions are, to the contrary, a poor means to assess the inner quality of man. All the less, the outer shape of humanity is able to do this: even if artificially animated.

11. Consumerism

Consumerism seems to define the modern society, but the definition seems to be inadequate. People are rich truly only because *able to consume the fruits of their labor in peace*, whereas the modern society is organically unable to create this niche of fruition. "Consummate" means etymologically "perfect", but the perfection of persons is of no account for consuming in the ordinary sense of the word.

The full consumption (of a good) stems from the human appetite resting immovably in the object purchased and his/her intellect being aware of possessing this thing firmly. The human appetite can rest so only if rational (the act of the will).

Human emotions, contrary to those purely animals ones, are unable to rest in the objects desired immovably: they fluctuate not because they are what they are: emotions, but because the emotions in animals bereft of reason rest firmly in the objects instinctively desired, whereas the emotions in humans are not the "supreme instance" of acting. They are instruments of a higher appetite so that the human instinct works incomparably worse the animal one.

The problem is, thus, where the "epicenter" of a human desire is located, for there is not a universal instinct directive of human actions, as in purely animal species. The "epicenter" should be located in persons, but is often located *beyond* them, which occasions uneasiness and the inability to consume goods without impediment. The objects happen to be

[279]Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 56 n. 5. Igitur quicquid intellectus de aliqua re cognoscit, cognoscit per cognitionem substantiae illius rei: unde in qualibet demonstratione per quam innotescunt nobis propria accidentia, principium accipimus quod quid est, ut dicitur in I posteriorum. Si autem substantiam alicuius rei intellectus cognoscat per accidentia, sicut dicitur in I de anima, quod accidentia magnam partem conferunt ad cognoscendum quod quid est; hoc est per accidens, inquantum cognitio intellectus oritur a sensu, et sic per sensibilium accidentium cognitionem oportet ad substantiae intellectum pervenire; propter quod hoc non habet locum in mathematicis, sed in naturalibus tantum. Quicquid igitur est in re quod non potest cognosci per cognitionem substantiae eius, oportet esse intellectui ignotum.

De veritate, q. 1 a. 10 c. […] res enim notitiam sui facit in anima per ea quae de ipsa exterius apparent, quia cognitio nostra a sensu initium sumit, cui per se obiectum sunt sensibiles qualitates; unde et in I de anima dicitur, quod accidentia magnam partem conferunt ad cognoscendum quod quid est: et ideo quando in aliqua re apparent sensibiles qualitates demonstrantes naturam quae eis non subest, dicitur res illa esse falsa; unde Philos. dicit VI Metaph. quod illa dicuntur falsa quae nata sunt videri aut qualia non sunt, aut quae non sunt; sicut dicitur aurum falsum, in quo exterius apparet color auri, et alia huiusmodi accidentia, cum tamen interius natura auri non subsit.

formally purchased, but never possessed peremptorily, because, "their center of gravity" lies outside the individual mind of a consumer.

The acquisitive society is unable to guarantee the firmness of consuming, because consumption is meant to be an economic driver: the primary engine for GDP. Pleasures are deemed to be means to that end, which is contrary indeed to the very nature of the animal pleasure.

All natural goods happen to be commercialized in the acquisitive society, but they are not possessed by the same token. The more precious a natural object, the more exposed to commercialization.

The most heinously commercialized object is the female body. Marriage might be defined as *the firm indissoluble, exclusive and fertile possession on another's person body*. The female body is commercialized in modern films and the alleged pleasure in consuming its image is supposed to stem from its being coupled with lust (concupiscence). According to Thomas, man in the state of the primitive innocence (in the paradise) would have experienced more intense corporeal pleasures of coitus, because it would be unmarred by the unordered concupiscence: unstained by it. The two are easily confoundable: the concupiscence is characteristic for its restlessness, whereas pleasures (even the sensual ones) are a rest by definition.

If "advertised" and commercialized, the female body (its image) might rouse a morbid restlessness, and the satisfaction of fulfilling the concupiscence might be *believed* to follow, but is extremely unlikely to, as the body cannot be possessed firmly enough. The real happiness (marital bliss) consists in lulling the concupiscence in the fertile act of full possession of another person's body. It is achieved by the personal gift of a person closest by the bond of proximity. Moreover, it is more than just an animal pleasure, because, in the family, the spiritual begetting (the upbringing) naturally completes the natural one. Another's person body is not possessed (and enjoyed) fully unless the fruits of the marital intercourse are possessed too, which is to say: their future is mastered to some extent also and the traditional values imbued.

The entertainment industry attacks the integrity of the (self-)possession of the human body, and the "consumers" are persuaded that concupiscence is the more intense the more it is bereft of firmness and fertility. The possession of the human body is not full unless all natural fruits of it are possessed also. The certainty (certitudo prolis) of the lot of the progeny begets natural rest.

Human body is, no doubt, a unique object existing amongst many artificial ones, and that is why it happens to be so vehemently desired (it cannot be a "fake" product anyhow). It is desired, because *believed* not to be likely a "stimulus of economic growth". However, it happens to be the "stimulus" anyhow and instrumentalized this way.

Artificial goods are – as it were – a line reaching to the infinity of the human existential possibilities. The natural goods, to the contrary, form a closed line of the circle of personal biological life. An end it is naturally a new beginning. The rest gives power to action.

The demand for the "goods" of secondary importance them might be always roused, by never quenched. Restlessness must follow, and the ability to *consume the good in one's own private manner impaired*.

The "machine for feeling pleasure" can never exists, but is always demanded to exist in the artificial world "created" by man. Humans are deprived of natural rest and the social/personal costs of the bereavement overstep possible (economic) profits. If bereft of the natural rest, man is unable to work effectively, distracted and mentally disintegrated.

The ability to feel pleasure is not constant. Young people are able to feel incomparably stronger than the old ones, and those uncontaminated by the commercialization ("immigrants") stronger than those having been exposed to the contamination. The ability to feel pleasure resides in persons; not outside them. Not, however, all pleasures are comparable. The rest of the will is incomparably more valuable than emotional satisfaction.

The human will can eventually rest immovably in God only. On the way to the Consummation some goods foretell the ultimate Good, but some lead astray from it also. The permanent peace is to be found in God only. Some particular goods can anticipate the Ultimate though.

According to Aristotle, no person can live even one day without feeling pleasure. If bereft of *natural* pleasures, people turn to artificial ones and are likely to commit most absurd actions: to flee, as it were, blindfolded from their suffering. The real problem is then, what kind of pleasure we chose.

Life, in general, consists in acting and the pleasure which follows is all the more intense the more the acting is not being interrupted. Acting is aimed first at good as such (or at what is believed to be so), but at the rest in the good secondarily only. No one acts reasonably so as to rest, because acting for the sake of not acting implies contradiction. Striving *directly* to emotional fulfillment is unnatural. Man obtains then the opposite of what he expected: uneasiness. Man can (following Rousseau) try to become a beast, but must experience uneasiness in realizing the project, because it is infeasible for a rational animal to become a dumb animal. An animal can be fulfilled in the state of nature and that is why it cannot be unhappy, even if it cannot be happy if fulfilled. Man *must* be unhappy if striving for the unreasonable.

Human will (his/her heart) can rest eventually in God only. Genuine goods foretell the consummation in the Ultimate, whereas the fake ones anticipate death and are approached with anxiety.

Chapter IV. INTUITIONISM

1. Intuition and Resentment

Values – according to Scheler – are grasped within the image of the world (Welbild). The "world picture" is known originally, but distorted potentially by various types of resentment. Without the resentment, this specific reality would be never twisted out of its plain geometric outlines. Scheler's values are "intuited" in the same manner as mathematical objects are, even if the principle of the intuition is no longer reason, but emotions.

> [Morality] rests on an eternal hierarchy of values, and its rules of preference are fully as objective and clearly "evident" as mathematical truths. There does exist an ordre du coeur and a logique du coeur (in Pascal's words) which the moral genius gradually uncovers in history, and it is eternal—only its apprehension and acquisition is "historical." Ressentiment helps to subvert this eternal order in man's consciousness, to falsify its recognition, and to deflect its actualization.[280]

Scheler opposes Nietzsche's relativism, but agrees that the "falsification of the value tablets" occurred in history. Nietzsche's Umwertung is usually deemed his manifesto of the relativism, but it might be deemed the mutiny against the "falsification" in general too. Accordingly, it might be translated as "re-valuation" or "trans-valuation", all depending on whether the existence of the table of values uncontaminated by the resentment is implied, or the existence of any values defied.[281] "Nietzsche is wrong in thinking that genuine morality springs from ressentiment", although he speaks correctly

> of a "falsification of the value tablets" by ressentiment. On the other hand again, he is a skeptic and relativist in ethics. Yet "false" tablets presuppose others that are "true," or else

[280] Max Scheler, Ressentiment, transl. by Louis A. Coser from the text of 1915. p. 23

Access 2026-10-29 chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://mercaba.org/SANLUIS/Filosofia/autores/Contempor%C3%A1nea/Scheller/Ressentiment.pdf access 2026-04-22

Nicht die echte Sittlichkeit — wie Nietzsche meint — beruht auf Ressentiment. Diese beruht auf einer ewigen Rangordnung der Werte und dieser entsprechenden evidenten Vorzugsgesetzen, die so objektiv und so streng »einsichtig« ist, wie die Wahrheiten der Mathematik. Es gibt eine »ordre du ceur« und eine »logique du coeur« — wie Pascal sagt — welche der sittliche Genius stückweise in der Geschichte aufdeckt und die nicht selbst, sondern deren Erfassen und Gewinnen nur historisch ist. Das Ressentiment aber ist eine der Quellen des Umsturzes jener ewigen Ordnung im menschlichen Bewußtsein.

[281] Der Fortschritt dieser inneren Bewegung führt zunächst nur zu einer charakteristischen Verfälschung des sachlichen Weltbildes. Seine Welt erhält eine ganz bestimmte Struktur des Reliefs der Lebhaftigkeitswerte.Viel tiefer greift seine Wirkung, wo es nicht zur Fälschung des Weltbildes und zum Hasse bestimmter Menschen führt, sondern zu einer Perversion des Wertfühlens und darauf fußend erst zu dem Faktum, das Nietzsche die »Fälschung der Werttafeln« nennt.

there would be nothing but a "struggle of value systems" none of which would be "true" or "false."[282]

Revaluation might be called the hierarchization of values. The right understanding of parts demands (as in the notorious hermeneutic circle) cognition of the totality and vice versa. It must have been so, as no transcendent gauge of values was admitted to exist: creative of them all and organizing them all from without. The world of values seemed to be an autonomous reality.

According to Gilson, some philosophical ideas, over centuries, happened to be regarded as obvious without a sufficient reason; to the detriment of the cognizance of the genuine principle of the real world. His L'être et l'essence is dedicated to the problem of the cognizance of this principle. He addresses Thomas Aquinas when stating that the primary known is being (ens ut primo cognitum).

Maritain and many others seem to agree, but speak of the *intuition of being*, which, however, is not to be found in Thomas' texts. Gilson speaks of the so called existential judgments being (ens) is grasped, and some Thomas' texts seemed to substantiate the validity of the notion even if the term of the existential judgment was never explicitly used. Anyway, it is by no means obvious, that the judgments should signify the same in Thomas as in Brentano and Husserl (by whom the term of the existential judgment was actually used). It seems that they should differ after all; as they are supposed to justify realism in Thomas, whereas the traces of realism are scarcely visible in Husserl (his fundamental judgment called epoché justifies the opposite of the philosophical realism). Gilson says that the theory of existential judgments is the same in Scotus and Thomas, but the two masters of Scholasticism originated two completely different approaches to philosophy. Intuitionism itself is (according to Sebastian Day) originally to be found in Scotus, and that is why his thought appeared so up-to-day nowadays.

Be that as it may, both intuitionism and the theory of existential judgments presuppose the so called identity principle. The intuition of being (or whatever else in its stead) is accomplished in the act of grasping the alleged identity principle. As soon, however, as the act of the intuition (or existential judgments) is passed, human thoughts depart into the sphere of "pure thinking" and it might only be hoped that they do not so peremptorily. No one – as it seemed *to nominalists* – can deny the existence and identity alike of his own act of cognition, but the existence of *the real subject matter* of cognition might be doubted indeed after departing from the original "direct contact" with this "reality". Idealism seems to be more compatible with the original Scotism (who was not called a "Kant of the Middle Ages" for nothing). There is *but one principle* in Scotism, and everything which stems from the principle must be (this or that way) regarded as a *privation* of the principle (the "direct contact").

According to Thomas, there are *two* principles. The in-complex notion of being is a counterpart of the complex non-contradiction principle, which accounts for the existence of the dynamism of thinking. Idealists do not speak willingly about philosophical errors.

[282] Ibid. Dies sagt im Grunde Nietzsche selbst, wenn er von einer »Fälschung der Werttafeln« durch das Ressentiment redet. Gleichwohl ist er auf der anderen Seite Relativist und Skeptiker in der Ethik. Und doch setzen gefälschte Werttafeln »wahre« voraus […]

"Consequence" is the name. In the ordinary life, we distinguish between being and non-being in the way Aristotle did in his Metaphysics, but the distinction does not is seem to be of much use in modernity. The interaction between the both principles accounts for the possible errors, whereas there are no errors admissible in a system of the pure self-consistent idealism. They do not bother much if contradicting the otherwise obvious facts.

The "problem of realism" does not exist in Thomas, as the two principles allow building real definitions and syllogisms in which real causes are grasped as the middle terms of them. The cognition is, apparently, as real as all relations must be: it is relative to the necessary state of affairs existing beyond the human mind. In the Scotian tradition, a parallelism of being and thinking must appear instead.

Kant accepts the primacy of the identity principle in its pure idealistic guise. Thus however, he feels obliged to comprise the totality of cognition under what he called Anschauung. Nothing, to his mind, can be known, unless presented (vorgestellt) in the Anschauung, which is normally translated as "intuition". Kant was interested in exact sciences, and the intuition originating their judgments (synthetic a priori) was only possible due to the original intuition of the so called pure concepts. There were but twelve of them. Those who (as Husserl) were interested in "humanities" did not attach much importance to the exact twelve. Neither, had Husserl's' "strict science" (phenomenology) to be restricted to the realm of exact sciences, albeit phenomenology (and "humanities") originated therefrom. Instead of the Kantian transcendental deduction of pure concepts, Husserl adopts the so called eidetic reduction. In it, considerably many and various "pure concepts" (the moral ones included) might be grasped. He prefers, moreover, to speak of Intuition or Einsicht instead of Anschauung.

> …the field of phenomenology is the analysis of the Apriori which can be legitimized in immediate intuition, the fixing of the immediately given essences and concatenations of essences … in the transcendentally pure consciousness.[283]

> Die Phänomenologie […] ihr Feld ist die Analyse des in *unmittelbarer Intuition aufweisbaren Apriori, die Fixierung unmittelbar einsichtiger Wesen* und Wesenszusammenhänge und ihre deskriptive Erkenntnis in dem systematischen Verbande aller Schichten im transzendental reinen Bewußtsein. (§ 134. Apophantifche Formenlehre).[284]

Every eidos (as it must behoove what is modeled after the fashion of the exact science) "has its mathematical extent", even if it be called a value. These objects, consequently, are grasped intuitively as the mathematical objects were supposed to be. But they can be called "ideal qualities" also as if their quality appeared beside the sphere of the numerable.

"Der systematische Verband aller Schichten im transzendental reinen Bewußtsein" is obviously characteristic for idealism. In Husserl, the idealism is consequential, because based on the so called phenomenological reduction: bracketing the real existence of everything

[283] Edmund Husserl Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy First Book. General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, translated by F. Kersten.

[284] Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie, Halle 1913

except pure consciousness (the self-identity of cognition). Still, the majority of phenomenologists remained (so to speak) "realists" and put up with the eidetic reduction. The essence of things was expected to be grasped by essence intuitions (*Wesensanschauungen*; *Wesenseinsichten*).

Scheler agrees with Adolf Reinach and the majority of phenomenologists and accepts the *unconditioned* intuition of essences. The intuitions, however, to his mind, are never complete, and thus the original table of values happens to be distorted in the terms of the aforementioned privation. This grasping of the object of essential insights is never complete and only partial insights into reality are possible. Modernity, for Scheler, suffers from a fundamental mistrust of the world, the doubt that the world *given in experience* is not the world itself, but rather some construct produced by the human mind. The aforementioned plain geometric outlines of the world picture might be believed to be more than such a product indeed.

The sources of the modern intuitionism are to be sought in the Middle Ages, viz., in Ockham and Scotus. The impact of the via moderna (of the Middle Ages) was so huge that even some Thomas' modern interpreters advocate intuitionism. The common enemy is, in that case, Aristotle's abstractionism. Aristotle is blamed for ignoring the primacy of existence (the principle of being), and his thought happens to be contrasted with the "existential metaphysics" allegedly built by Thomas. The latter, however, can be more justly applied (as Honnefelder has proved) to Scotus rather than to Thomas. The statement that Aristotle was ignorant of the true nature of being is typical of Scotus.

The famous treaty by Thomas De ente et essentia (quoted sometimes to substantiate the primitive intuition of existence) begins with the phrase: "parvus error in principio magnus est in fine" (a small error in the beginning is a big one in the end). Aristotle, according to some, took a false step at the very beginning. The culpable ignorance of the true nature of being rendered him (allegedly) ignorant of the true nature of the subject matter of metaphysics (ens inquantum est ens).

The words, however, "parvus …" are a quotation from Aristotle himself (On the Heavens and the Earth; De Caelo et Mundo), and the supposition that the founder of the "realistic metaphysics" inspired its destroyer (Kant with his idealism) sounds bizarre. It is rather Platonism which allows opposite interpretations (idealism ad realism alike). The key notion is eidos (εἶδος) there, which originally meant "visible form" or "shape" (possibly seen). In Aristotle however, it is more than a "pure form" (not to say: a "pure concept"), because it is, to his mind, *but one of four causes*. Each one of them can be grasped in what might be called "intuition" (anchinoia; eustochia), but the intuition (if the name be granted) of any one of them apart from the others must be incomplete. In this sense, Aristotle says the same as Scheler does.

According to Thomas, Aristotle adopted the right method and thus a breakthrough in the ancient philosophy occurred (In Metaph., 344). The problem of Aristotle is not that of the beginning (the starting point) of metaphysics, but that of its consummation. Aristotle, as Thomas has it, failed to advance the ultimate step towards the comprehensive cognition of being (Summa, I q. 44, a. 2).

Eidos is the same as *the form of a physical body* and thus only one of four causes. Each one of them can be "intuited" so as to provide the middle term of the demonstrative

syllogism. Thus grasping eidos alone (apart of the three other causes) must distort reasoning indeed. It might have seemed that "the image of reality" built on the basis of dropping the material in things must be distorted, but seizing eidos as "visible form" or "shape" (in its "bodily presence" as Husserl has it) is distortion itself and no Materiale Wertethik seems workable in phenomenology after all.

A syllogism built on eidos seized formally is called "dialectical" one by Aristotle. Idealistic systems are "dialectical" indeed, as the most idealist one (Hegelianism) proves. The comprehensive, to the contrary, grasping of all causes allows representing a thing adequately. The cognizance of the definition of a thing is dependent upon the comprehensive cognition of its causes. The cognition of its essence is comprehensive then too. The *real* essence is never a pure eidos; specific natures originate from the concurrence of all four causes.

The attitude of Thomas to Aristotle's stance is detailed. Mostly, he follows Aristotle unreservedly, but occasionally he corrects his stance, which is to say: advances the step further which Aristotle failed to make himself. Anyhow, he advances in the direction shown by Aristotle.

The cognition of eidos alone is not an adequate cognition of a thing. Ethics (and each science for that matter too) built of a purely formal principles should be justly blamed for "formalism". The understanding of what is, in a broader sense, "material" seems to be indispensable in any science (albeit in ethics the need seem to be more pressing). The problem is, thus, how to understand what the "material" is.

The subject *matter* of ethics is qualified by "circumstances" which Kant notoriously unwilling to analyze.

> … whatever conditions are outside the substance of an act, and yet in some way touch the human act, are called circumstances. Now what is outside a thing's substance, while it belongs to that thing, is called its accident.[285]

The circumstances are called material in ethics indeed, although they comprise: motives, objectives etc. There are 10 of them in ethics, but the species of a moral act (eidos) along with what qualifies it from the part of circumstances can be *generally* subsumed under the head of four causes.

> For in acts we must take note of who did it, by what aids or instruments he did it, what he did, where he did it, why he did it, how and when he did it. But Aristotle in Ethic. iii, 1 adds yet another, to wit, about what, which Tully includes in the circumstance what.
>
> The reason of this enumeration may be set down as follows. For a circumstance is described as something outside the substance of the act, and yet in a way touching it. Now this happens in three ways: first, inasmuch as it touches the act itself; second, inasmuch as it touches the cause of the act; third, inasmuch as it touches the effect. It touches the act itself, either by way of measure, as time and place; or by qualifying the act as the mode of acting. It touches the effect

[285] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 7 a. 1 c. Dicitur autem in localibus aliquid circumstare, quod est quidem extrinsecum a re, tamen attingit ipsam, vel appropinquat ei secundum locum. Et ideo quaecumque conditiones sunt extra substantiam actus, et tamen attingunt aliquo modo actum humanum, circumstantiae dicuntur. Quod autem est extra substantiam rei ad rem ipsam pertinens, accidens eius dicitur. Unde circumstantiae actuum humanorum accidentia eorum dicenda sunt.

> when we consider what is done. *It touches the cause of the act, as to the final cause, by the circumstance why; as to the material cause, or object, in the circumstance about what; as to the principal efficient cause, in the circumstance who; and as to the instrumental efficient cause, in the circumstance by what aids.*[286]

The *real* hierarchy of values will be distorted should any of them be ignored, and the real is never "geometrical".

The problem of ethics is, however, but the instantiation of the general problem of science. In it, the form must be that of a *matter* "*moved*" towards a certain *end*. The gathering of all four causes results in the comprehensive cognition of a thing. But can it result in something more nonetheless of which Aristotle was ignorant anyhow?

According to Thomas, it can (and should). It is Esse (the act of existence) which results from the congregation of four causes. To be precise: the congregation allows grasping the act of existence, because the existence itself (esse) is the proper effect of the Cause: the Esse Subsistent (God). It is incidental for a thing to exist indeed if the relation of the Cause to the created being is taken into account, because God might have not created any things. But the relation of a created thing to its Cause (God) is necessary as long as the thing exists, and is the basis of the necessary demonstration of the existence of God. Things are known to be contingent *in the end* (them being contingent is a corollary of the proof of the existence of God), and the intuition of being or the existential judgment of the contingent cannot be supposed to establish the starting point of the proof. Neither, for that matter, can the intuition (or whatever else in its stead) set up any system of "absolute philosophy" (concerned with an intellectually refined "absolute" or "totality" instead of God). Probably, Nietzsche was simply

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[286] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 7 a. 3 c. Considerandum est enim in actibus quis fecit, quibus auxiliis vel instrumentis fecerit, quid fecerit, ubi fecerit, cur fecerit, quomodo fecerit, et quando fecerit. Sed Aristoteles, in III Ethic., addit aliam, scilicet circa quid, quae a Tullio comprehenditur sub quid.

Et ratio huius annumerationis sic accipi potest. Nam circumstantia dicitur quod, extra substantiam actus existens, aliquo modo attingit ipsum. Contingit autem hoc fieri tripliciter, uno modo, inquantum attingit ipsum actum; alio modo, inquantum attingit causam actus; tertio modo, inquantum attingit effectum. Ipsum autem actum attingit, vel per modum mensurae, sicut tempus et locus; vel per modum qualitatis actus, sicut modus agendi. Ex parte autem effectus, ut cum consideratur quid aliquis fecerit. Ex parte vero causae actus, quantum ad causam finalem, accipitur propter quid; ex parte autem causae materialis, sive obiecti, accipitur circa quid; ex parte vero causae agentis principalis, accipitur quis egerit; ex parte vero causae agentis instrumentalis, accipitur quibus auxiliis.

Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 7 a. 4 c. Respondeo dicendum quod actus proprie dicuntur humani, sicut supra dictum est, prout sunt voluntarii. Voluntatis autem motivum et obiectum est finis. Et ideo principalissima est omnium circumstantiarum illa quae attingit actum ex parte finis, scilicet cuius gratia, secundaria vero, quae attingit ipsam substantiam actus, idest quid fecit. Aliae vero circumstantiae sunt magis vel minus principales, secundum quod magis vel minus ad has appropinquant.

I answer that, As stated above (Q1, A1), acts are properly called human, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Now, the motive and object of the will is the end. Therefore that circumstance is the most important of all which touches the act on the part of the end, viz., the circumstance why: and the second in importance, is that which touches the very substance of the act, viz., the circumstance what he did. As to the other circumstances, they are more or less important, according as they more or less approach to these (Fathers of the English Dominican Province).

most consequential in discrediting the core purport of the alleged intuition of a particular being. This being must be subject to any change.

Things are contingent in Avicenna, because their act of existence is an "accident" only. However,

> … even though a thing's existence is other than its essence, it should not be understood to be something added to its essence after the manner of an accident, but something established, as it were, by the principles of the essence. Hence the term "being," which is applied to a thing by reason of its very existence, designates the same thing as the term applied to it by reason of its essence.[287]

The first (abstracting) operation of the intellect "concerns the nature itself of a thing, in virtue of which the object known holds a certain rank among beings …", but

> the second operation has to do with a thing's being (esse), which results from the union of the principles of a thing in composite substances, or, as in the case of simple substances, accompanies the thing's simple nature.[288]

Now, the "second operation" *is never the original one* (intuition; existential judgment). The "second operation" is a judgment indeed though, as it is the judgment of separation: *reasoning* proper to the method of metaphysics. We do not "intuit" any "specific reality" so as to found the reasoning.

The reasoning might fall short of demands though. Aristotle did know that God is the ultimate cause of the universe, but was not certain about whether He is, at the same time, its

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[287] Sententia Metaphysicae, IV, c. 2, nr 558. Sed in primo quidem non videtur dixisse recte. Esse enim rei quamvis sit aliud ab eius essentia, non tamen est intelligendum quod sit aliquod superadditum ad modum accidentis, sed quasi constituitur per principia essentiae. Et ideo hoc nomen ens quod imponitur ab ipso esse, significat idem cum nomine quod imponitur ab ipsa essentia.

Super De Trinitate, pars 3 q. 5 a. 3 co. 1 Responsio. Dicendum quod ad evidentiam huius quaestionis oportet videre, qualiter intellectus secundum suam operationem abstrahere possit. Sciendum est igitur quod secundum philosophum in III de anima duplex est operatio intellectus. Una, quae dicitur intelligentia indivisibilium, qua cognoscit de unoquoque, quid est. Alia vero, qua componit et dividit, scilicet enuntiationem affirmativam vel negativam formando. Et hae quidem duae operationes duobus, quae sunt in rebus, respondent. Prima quidem operatio respicit ipsam naturam rei, secundum quam res intellecta aliquem gradum in entibus obtinet, sive sit res completa, ut totum aliquod, sive res incompleta, ut pars vel accidens. Secunda vero operatio respicit ipsum esse rei, quod quidem resultat ex congregatione principiorum rei in compositis vel ipsam simplicem naturam rei concomitatur, ut in substantiis simplicibus.

[288] Super De Trinitate, pars 3 q. 5 a. 3 c. 1 Responsio. Dicendum quod ad evidentiam huius quaestionis oportet videre, qualiter intellectus secundum suam operationem abstrahere possit. Sciendum est igitur quod secundum philosophum in III de anima duplex est operatio intellectus. Una, quae dicitur intelligentia indivisibilium, qua cognoscit de unoquoque, quid est. Alia vero, qua componit et dividit, scilicet enuntiationem affirmativam vel negativam formando. Et hae quidem duae operationes duobus, quae sunt in rebus, respondent. Prima quidem operatio respicit ipsam naturam rei, secundum quam res intellecta aliquem gradum in entibus obtinet, sive sit res completa, ut totum aliquod, sive res incompleta, ut pars vel accidens. Secunda vero operatio respicit ipsum esse rei, quod quidem resultat ex congregatione principiorum rei in compositis vel ipsam simplicem naturam rei concomitatur, ut in substantiis simplicibus.

Creator.[289] Mostly, he is (nowadays) assumed to fail to endorse the creationist stance, albeit Thomas does not agree with the modern interpretation unreservedly. The ambiguity, at any rate, issues from uncertainty what really "results from the union of the principles of a thing in composite substances".

No "resentment" is needed to fail to grasp the "reality" adequately. The lack of the *consequence in harmonizing the two principles* suffices, or vice versa, the obstinacy in pursuing but one "primitive opening intuition of reality." The resentment (culpable anyhow), is but a separate ("psychological") problem. The lack of the consequence in advancing the otherwise sound principles results in not comprehending the reality. But on the other hand, the obstinacy (not being open minded enough to say: audiatur et altera pars; let the other side be heard as well) in advancing exploded errors (a "unique principle") does lead to "distorting the reality" to the point of creating "*the image* of reality" which ceases to represent anything, but becomes a "reality" on its own, which nulla re indiget ad existendum (as Hussserl has it), within the frames of pure idealism.

The "world" created so is called consciousness. Resentment, being a privation (mentioned above), must appear *beneath* the threshold of consciousness.

> What is called "falsification of the value tablets," "reinterpretation," or "transvaluation" should not be mistaken for conscious lying. Indeed, it goes beyond the sphere of judging. It is not that the positive value is felt as such and that it is merely declared to be "bad." Beyond all conscious lying and falsifying, there is a deeper "organic mendacity." *Here the falsification is not formed in consciousness, but at the same stage of the mental process as the impressions and value feelings themselves: on the road of experience into consciousness.* There is "organic mendacity" whenever a man's mind admits only those impressions which serve his "interest" or his instinctive attitude. … the most honest and upright convictions may prevail in the periphery of consciousness.[290]

The notion of consciousness was created by the immediate followers of Descartes, but the notion of sub/non-consciousness was created neither by Scheler nor by Freud. It appears in The System of the Transcendental Idealism by Schelling in 1800. It does not appear in Hegel (in must not so), because Hegelianism is perhaps the most consequent idealism ever. It must appear in every system in which the consciousness is rather a problem than a ("historical")

[289] Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 6 l. 1 n. 21 Necesse vero est communes causas esse sempiternas. Primas enim causas entium generativorum oportet esse ingenitas, ne generatio in infinitum procedat; et maxime has, quae sunt omnino immobiles et immateriales. Hae namque causae immateriales et immobiles sunt causae sensibilibus manifestis nobis, quia sunt maxime entia, et per consequens causae aliorum, ut in secundo libro ostensum est. Et per hoc patet, quod scientia quae huiusmodi entia pertractat, prima est inter omnes, et considerat communes causas omnium entium. Unde sunt causae entium secundum quod sunt entia, quae inquiruntur in prima philosophia, ut in primo proposuit. Ex hoc autem apparet manifeste falsitas opinionis illorum, qui posuerunt Aristotelem sensisse, quod Deus non sit causa substantiae caeli, sed solum motus eius.

[290] Max Scheler, Ressentiment, transl. by Louis A. Coser from the text of 1915. p. 26-27.

Access 2026-10-29 chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://mercaba.org/SANLUIS/Filosofia/autores/Contempor%C3%A1nea/Scheller/Ressentiment.pdf access

fact. Freud considers in his Lectures which privative prefixes could suit best to describe (what Scheler called) "the road of experience into consciousness", but a privative prefix is needed anyhow to describe the falsification formed beneath the level of consciousness.

Thomas admits that certain affectual dispositions can distort the validity of the actually performed reasoning. He does not use the modern term of repression, but his system is comprehensive enough to find its proper place therein. Thomas follows Aristotle in stating that every man has a certain "gravitational center" of life: dominating and justifying all activities which are in fact but means to this end. The end might render him/her open-minded or vice versa deaf to the otherwise sound arguments. The end "justifies" the means in relation to that end only. It does not justify the man. Man might be not sincere even with him/herself enough to admit that a certain deed or thought was but a consequence a this dominant life magnet. People happen to be blinded by what has attracted them, and is not being reflected upon. Still, they may reflect, i.e. confront the "inner" and "outer" reality also. The end immanent to the personal human life should correspond to the transcendent one creative of the inner life, and eventually to the Transcendent Cause of the entire universe. If the reflection were lacking (or labeled as the "torture of consciousness") people would be unwilling to admit openly the nature of relation in question, and the unwillingness might be called repression indeed.

The traditional confession or reflection was a personal act. A "confession" "modernized" according to the requirements of philosophy of the "transcendental" subjectivity is to be carried out on a psychoanalyst's couch. Hegel's "unhappy consciousness" (unglückliches Bewusstsein) appeared as the natural consequence of what Kant called the *absolute* necessity of moral law. Constraint is the name. A sub-consciousness might exist in an intellectually disintegrated personality only i.e., in the personality in which the relation of the means to end is blurred to the point the means obfuscate the end: the conditional necessity of what-*must*-be-done *for the sake of* …" gives way to the *absolute* necessity of what-*has*-to-be-done *unconditionally*. We are conscious (in the "old-fashioned" sense of the word) of the former relation first of all. In the "unhappy consciousness" of Hegelianism, the "image of reality" has not been integrated into a complete form, but desperately hankered after, nevertheless. The impossible was hankered after though, as the complete system of relations can be provided by the classical science only. In modernity, the consciousness of what "has to be done" unconditionally dominates over *culpable* lack of consciousness of the end. The relation of what is actually done or thought to the end is not clear enough.

The relation of the means to the end marks the life line of a person. It is more than just a *linear* hierarchy of values, as all "motives" and "objectives" are taken into account in designing it (they might not be aligned, literally speaking, indeed).

The values are identified by phenomenologists as pure essences, but they are – as it were – individualized by personal act of witnessing them in the act of intuition. Now, for integrating the life-line, those "particularized essences" are of no account. The human life is aimed at the fullness of being (God), which is defined as the universal ground of being

(universalis ratio essendi).[291] God is the cause of every being (being qua being). The integration of the personal life line results from congregation of all (four) "physical" causes of acting (which might be called circumstances also) and thus in discovering the possible Source of values in the actual life and the everlasting one in the life to come.

The objects encountered on the way towards the ultimate should be understood (to be defined as the means to the End), albeit they happen to be actually loved or hated; desired or despaired to obtain; besides. Emotions as such are neither good nor bad (more perfect animals share them with us in common and are not called good or bad morally for that reason). Emotions are moral as far as partaking of reason, which might be indeed right or flawed; might be "particular" or "general". The role of resentment appears here. Arguably however, it is not only this emotion which can distort the right reasoning. Departing from the order of right reason in any way whatsoever results in disintegrating the life line; the line of right reasoning.

The universal reason settles the relation of the end immanent for the particular human existence to the transcendent (resp. Transcendent) end of life. But the particular reason is wicked if emancipated from the influence of the universal one and advancing incidental objectives. Emotions are good if used effectively to the reasonable end. They become "toxic" if emancipated from their natural dependence.

Emotions as such are never "negative", unless understood according to their etymology in Greek and Latin. This way, some might be nocuous (pathologic) indeed. Passions (πάθη; passiones) deserve the name for "being passive" i.e. suffering the mostly unwelcome change. According to Stoics, they are ailments of the soul. In reality, they are so if emancipated from the order of reason only.

Envy (resentment) might be defined as "sadness at the prosperity of another" (tristitia de prosperitate aliena).[292] Some goods happen to be begrudged indeed and Scheler takes pains to list them exhaustively. But there might be, nonetheless, some morally right reason to be annoyed by the prosperity of the wicked: should the prosperity be used against the others. Not even the sorrow about one's (undeserved perchance) prosperity might be called a "deadly ailment" of the human soul.

There is but one emotion which deserves fully the name of the unwelcome change and one specific consequence of it which deserves the name of the life illness. Sorrow is a passion par excellence. But the emotion is not culpable for that reason, nonetheless, even if caused by someone's prosperity. Sorrow about someone's undeserved or harmful prosperity might be debasing if not reflected upon. *Without the reflection* it might become toxic really.

Scheler distinguishes fear (Furcht) from anxiety (Angst). Thomas *defines* them both. Fear is directed to evil which might, nonetheless, be either fled from or attacked if assessed as hateful. Thus, it can inspire daring. But a man overcome by Angst is unable to do anything at

[291] Contra Gentiles, lib. 2 cap. 21 n. 3 Item. Ex hoc ostensum est quod Deus creat res, quia nihil potest esse praeter ipsum ab eo non causatum. Hoc autem nulli alii convenire potest: cum nihil aliud sit universalis causa essendi. Soli igitur Deo competit creatio, sicut propria eius actio.

[292] De veritate, q. 26 a. 4 c. … secundum materiales differentias boni vel mali … differunt misericordia et invidia, quae sunt species tristitiae: nam invidia est tristitia de prosperitate aliena, in quantum aestimatur malum proprium; misericordia vero est tristitia de adversitate aliena, in quantum aestimatur ut proprium malum.

all. No possibility to flee or to attack appears. Sorrow is most harmful, but a special effect thereof: the anxiety, if not waning, *might be morbid*.

Resentment does not seem to be the most toxic of all emotions, if the one harboring this emotion is concerned. But it is toxic really if successfully discharged on a suitable (susceptible) object. The disinterested envy engenders in those affected by it the feeling of prostration. Scheler puts up with the "subjective" aspect of intoxication, but fails to account for the existence of the systematic or the organized envy: *the ideology of equality*. The most susceptible (vulnerable) are affected and hypocritically pitied at the same time.

The life line should be rational and planned, and it might be called a hierarchy or table of values (names do not matter much), provided all stages on the way towards the Ultimate are precisely defined. Intuitions do not suffice. We plan our life telling between truth and falsity; between good and bad; between being and nonbeing; between what is good-for-me only and what-is-good-for-everybody. On the pathway of life, some traces might have been left behind. The material sings are this. Saints and heroes have left more "sings" than ordinary people. The way they paved leads to the definite, whereas "the way of the wicked shall perish"[293]. But there is unique way to God He pave for us all Himself coming to us: The Immaculate One.[294]

The providential plan of God as to the human destiny in the natural order (and the supernatural one called predestination) implies absolute pre-knowledge of God. To the contrary, the human pre-knowledge (Cicero speaks of) is never absolute.[295] The advocates of ontologism believe in that an insight into the Divine Ideas is possible and we get to know the temporal things whilst intuiting the exemplary eternal ideas thereof. Calvinists believed something of the sort as to the supernatural calling of man. Still, this Divine "Table of Values" (if it be called so) is impossible to grasp for the finite human intellect. The Scripture tells about the frailty of human anticipations. "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain (Wis 9:14).[296]

We do not have any insight into the totality as such nor into any part contained in it. Neo-Platonists believed in that God is a mirror of the universe and the world can be seen

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[293] Super Io., cap. 3 l. 3 …Perire namque dicitur aliquid quod impeditur ne perveniat ad finem ad quem ordinatur. Homo autem ordinatur ad finem, qui est vita aeterna; et quamdiu peccat, avertit se ab ipso fine. Et licet dum vivit omnino non pereat, ita quod non possit restaurari, tamen quando moritur in peccato, tunc perit omnino; Ps. I, 6: *iter impiorum peribit*.

[294] A treatise. The True Devotion to the Blessed Virgin, by Louis-Marie, Grignon de Montfort. translated from the original French by Frederick William Faber, London, 1863. Pt V, Ch. V, 3.

[295] Summa Theologiae I, q. 22 a. 2 ad 3. Ad tertium dicendum quod homo non est institutor naturae, sed utitur in operibus artis et virtutis, ad suum usum, rebus naturalibus. Unde providentia humana non se extendit ad necessaria, quae ex natura proveniunt. Ad quae tamen se extendit providentia Dei, qui est auctor naturae.

[296] Summa Theologiae I, q. 113 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per liberum arbitrium potest homo aliqualiter malum vitare, sed non sufficienter, quia infirmatur circa affectum boni, propter multiplices animae passiones. Similiter etiam universalis cognitio naturalis legis, quae homini naturaliter adest, aliqualiter dirigit hominem ad bonum, sed non sufficienter, quia in applicando universalia principia iuris ad particularia opera, contingit hominem multipliciter deficere. Unde dicitur Sap. IX, *cogitationes mortalium timidae, et incertae providentiae nostrae.* Et ideo necessaria fuit homini custodia Angelorum.

reflected in the mirror. Scotus corrected the stance in that only the mirror of eternity was not to be *directly* identifiable with God's essence.

Scheler enumerates various types of the resentment. They all can distort the right pathway of reason towards the Ultimate: at least indirectly. But the ideology of envy impairs *directly* the very *ability* of acting. The race or class hatred can do this. There is, however, an exceptional form of resentment attacking reason *directly* (the rectitude of the reasoning and the way of the intellect towards God). It is directed against the science called by Aristotle "divine": metaphysics.

The history of philosophy and culture bears manifest testimonies to the presence of this envy. The practical knowledge *happens* to be obfuscated by inordinate emotions leading astray from the pathway of right reason, if despite a true first principle (an axiom), false conclusions are met, because issuing from an "emotional" minor premise of the debauched syllogism. But the theoretical knowledge about God happens to be attacked too. *The cognizance of the first principle can be directly the object of resentment.*

"… these men blaspheme whatever things they know not: and what things soever they naturally know, like dumb beasts, in these they are corrupted". (Hi autem quaecumque quidem ignorant, blasphemant : quaecumque autem naturaliter, tamquam muta animalia, norunt, in his corrumpuntur). Albert the Great adopts these words of St. Juda (Iudae 10-12) to the enemies of philosophy (Opera, Borgnet, t. XIV. p. 910). "They intoxicate the body of the learned and forbid to enjoy sweetness of the common striving for truth" (VIII, p. 803-4). The contemplation of the divine is (according to Aristotle and Thomas) the best remedy for sorrow (and for anxiety perhaps too) and the unique source of freedom too. Alas, the most precious happens to be mostly envied also.

Attacking philosophy must be (paradoxically) philosophical itself, so that its method must bear a certain resemble to the principles the genuine philosophy. Contradicting someone's principles directly is an Ersatz of using the non-contradiction principle. According to Aristotle, if discussing without envy we decide for one of the contrary statements,[297] but the contrary are not contradictory. Science is about ordering the contrary opinions on the matter which undeniably exists (is agreed upon by both parts of a dialogue).[298]

Contradicting for its own the sake is barren.

Many fallacious arguments have been advanced against the possibility of the philosophical cognizance of God.[299] Various forms of agnosticism too aimed at falsifying the

[297] Metaph., IV, c. 4, 1006a19-22.

[298] Summa Theologiae I, q. 75 a. 6 c. … In anima autem intellectiva non potest esse aliqua contrarietas. Recipit enim secundum modum sui esse, ea vero quae in ipsa recipiuntur, sunt absque contrarietate; quia etiam rationes contrariorum in intellectu non sunt contrariae, sed est una scientia contrariorum.

[299] Theses a Ludovico Eugenio Bautain iussu sui episcopi subscriptae, 8 sept. 1840 (et 18 nov. 1835); (sous Grégoire XVI); Theses de fide et ratione oppositae fideismo. **2751** *1622* 1. Le raisonnement peut prouver avec certitude l'existence de Dieu et l'infinité de ses perfections - La foi, don du ciel, suppose (est postérieure à) la revélation; elle ne peut donc pas convenablement être alléguée vis-a-vis
d'un athée en preuve de l'existence de Dieu (cf. DS 2812).

fundamental truth about the natural cognoscibility of God's existence. Aristotle himself noticed the presence of the philosophical minimalism in his times.[300]

If science had been about searching only (as Lessing claims), the end of the research could have never been obtained, and the searching itself would be bereft of sense. Reasonable life does not consist in following any objectives whatsoever (in doing anything lest be indolent). It is about finding *the real source* of mental energy *now*; as real as the food we consume every morning. The energy can only stem from the Transcendent Cause.

The envy of "sceptics" might not be directly toxic for those intoxicating, but must be so for those eventually intoxicated (those who succumb to the feeling). If no way out of the maze of the life is shown anxiety and despair must follow.

The totality of being (if God be called so) is to be intuited in the afterlife only. But a representative sings of the totality might be "intuited" (in the improper sense of the word) on the way to the consummation. Thus, we contemplate the conclusions of a science without checking *personally* the validity of the principles. The conclusions, however, can be contemplated so only if certain (proved to be so by the unshakable authority).

The certitude is the token of the genuine science.[301] The conclusions of science are (in Aristotle) never provisional, but always peremptory. The same holds true as to theology. Albeit the text of the Scripture allows many interpretations, it does not allow *infinitely many* ones (and all the less: any interpretations whatever). The Scripture provides premises, and the theology is about definite conclusions. Theologians, to be sure, might err, but the errors have

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[300] Metaph., I, c. 2, 982b 24-983a10

δῆλον οὖν ὡς δι'
οὐδεμίαν αὐτὴν ζητοῦμεν χρείαν ἑτέραν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος, φαμέν, ἐλεύθερος ὁ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου ὤν, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὴν ὡς μόνην οὖσαν ἐλευθέραν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν· μόνη γὰρ αὕτη αὐτῆς ἕνεκέν ἐστιν. διὸ καὶ δικαίως ἂν οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη νομίζοιτο αὐτῆς ἡ κτῆσις· πολλαχῇ γὰρ ἡ φύσις δούλη τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν, ὥστε κατὰ Σιμωνίδην "θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτ' ἔχοι γέρας", ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἄξιον μὴ οὐ ζητεῖν τὴν καθ' αὑτὸν ἐπιστήμην. εἰ δὴ λέγουσί τι οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ πέφυκε φθονεῖν τὸ θεῖον, ἐπὶ τούτου συμβῆναι μάλιστα εἰκὸς καὶ δυστυχεῖς εἶναι πάντας τοὺς περιττούς. ἀλλ' οὔτε τὸ θεῖον φθονερὸν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἀοιδοί, οὔτε τῆς τοιαύτης ἄλλην χρὴ νομίζειν τιμιωτέραν. ἡ γὰρ θειοτάτη καὶ τιμιωτάτη· τοιαύτη δὲ διχῶς ἂν εἴη μόνη· ἥν τε γὰρ μάλιστ' ἂν ὁ θεὸς ἔχοι, θεία τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐστί, κἂν εἴ τις τῶν θείων εἴη. μόνη δ' αὕτη τούτων ἀμφοτέρων τετύχηκεν· ὅ τε γὰρ θεὸς δοκεῖ τῶν αἰτίων πᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀρχή τις, καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην ἢ μόνος ἢ μάλιστ' ἂν ἔχοι ὁ θεός.

[301] Anal. Post., I. c. 2. 71b 9-16.

᾽Επίστασθαι δὲ οἰόμεθ' ἕκαστον ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸν σοφιστικὸν τρόπον τὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὅταν τήν τ' αἰτίαν οἰώμεθα γινώσκειν δι' ἣν τὸ πρᾶγμά ἐστιν, ὅτι ἐκείνου αἰτία ἐστί, καὶ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι τοῦτ' ἄλλως ἔχειν. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι τοιοῦτόν τι τὸ ἐπίστασθαί ἐστι· καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι καὶ οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι οἱ μὲν οἴονται αὐτοὶ οὕτως ἔχειν, οἱ δ' ἐπιστάμενοι καὶ ἔχουσιν, ὥστε οὗ ἁπλῶς ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον ἄλλως ἔχειν.

been always corrected by the Magisterium of the Church. Denzinger's Encheridion is at our disposal in which peremptory conclusions are gathered. Each stage on the way to God might be contemplated or intuited so, because the firmness of the stages is proved.

2. The intuition of mine-ness. Some remarks concerning Kant's Ich denke

Good is defined by Aristotle as what all things desire. Human desire (the will) might be a special instantiation of the general tending of things to their own perfection obtainable by the relation to the Transcendent Good, but it is special only because rational. The end immanent to any nature (the human one included) is what it must be because of the relation to the Transcendent End. Nothing (and no living creature in particular) can sustain its own existence without reaching to what exists beyond it (is transcendent at least in a weak sense of the word). Thus, if I have something in mind, and the object thought of *seems* to be the good of my intellect, I will only ascertain myself as to whether it is *actually good* by confronting it with the objective and transcendent yardstick of its goodness. Accordingly, values (goods) are what they really must be, only if ultimately set against the universal source of goodness.

Human thoughts happen to be vague and disconnected, but they are really valuable if integrated in the way a meaningful sentence must be. Sentences, however, differ in this respect also. The perfect one can be reshaped into the form of the real definition. Thus, it proves to be a stage on the way towards the Transcendent End.

Practical definitions of virtues direct human acting. Theoretical definitions provide, in turn, "unpractical" premises of speculative thinking (they become practicable if the theory becomes more than just a theory: the premises of the first philosophy directive of others). The dogmatic definitions of the Catholic Church direct the human spiritual life directly to God. These values are absolutely unchangeable. The constant flux of time bounces against them.[302]

Thoughts are immanent to human thinking: otherwise they could not have been called human. Still, we do not define notions, but we *use notions* so as to define transcendent things. Normally, we aim at the cognizance of real persons, because the cognizance of what they are merely *imagined to be* proves insufficient. My thoughts turn to a person I care for, and thus accompany the person (albeit possibly absent).

The modern philosophy has eliminated the notion of transcendence (choristón) elaborated by Plato and Aristotle (the founders of classical philosophy). Things, allegedly,

[302] Vaticanum II, Lumen gentium, 25. Haec autem infallibilitas, qua Divinus Redemptor Ecclesiam suam in definienda doctrina de fide vel moribus instructam esse voluit, tantum patet quantum divinae Revelationis patet depositum, sancte custodiendum et fideliter exponendum. Qua quidem infallibilitate Romanus Pontifex, Collegii Episcoporum Caput, vi muneris sui gaudet, quando, ut supremus omnium christifidelium pastor et doctor, qui fratres suos in fide confirmat (cf. Lc 22,32), doctrinam de fide vel moribus definitivo actu proclamat. Quare definitiones eius ex sese, et non ex consensu Ecclesiae, irreformabiles merito dicuntur, quippe quae sub assistentia Spiritus Sancti, ipsi in beato Petro promissa, prolatae sint, ideoque nulla indigeant aliorum approbatione, nec ullam ad aliud iudicium appellationem patiantur. Tunc enim Romanus Pontifex non ut persona privata sententiam profert, sed ut universalis Ecclesiae magister supremus, in quo charisma infallibilitatis ipsius Ecclesiae singulariter inest, doctrinam fidei catholicae exponit vel tuetur.

exist originally for-me only, and the phenomenologists speak of the "egological orientation" of thinking. It was Descartes already who made his Cogito the starting point of philosophy. According to Fichte, the object of pure thinking is thinking itself. According to Hegel, the subject matter of philosophy is philosophy itself.

The modern philosophy is not, however, a solipsism. The primitive opening intuition of a system meant to be breaking happens to communicated. The ideas sprawl and engulf some minds yet untouched by them and potentially only endorsing that primitive intuition: the ideas are – in other words: *transcendental*. For instance, Hegel's thoughts happened to be shared by those who identified themselves as "Hegelians".

Nevertheless, the original intuition might be (supposed to be) distorted, contaminated and misinterpreted by "profanes". The "noble ideas" happed to be "desecrated" by those unable to thing loftily enough. Hegel was not (allegedly) to be blamed for Marx; Marx could not be responsible for Lenin, etc. The egological transcendental orientation could degrade into a vulgar subjectivism, because the common sense meaning attached to the "transcendental" is: "subjective".

The Cartesian Cogito assumes in Kant the form of the famous Ich denke: "The «I think» must be able to accompany all my representations." ("Das: Ich denke, muß alle meine Vorstellungen begleiten können").[303]

It goes without saying that every sentence I actually utter must be accompanied by what makes the sentence both mine (authorized) and meaningful (self-consistent). In this sense, groans, shirks, roars and the like are not mine, because they lack the *indented* meaning. They might express something, but are not part of communicable tongue nonetheless. I do not really care for what I cannot be responsible (in this sense it is not mine). The problem is what really accounts for *this mineness*. Kant thought that it is the fundamental Ich denke which accompanies all meaningful sentences.

> The "I think" must accompany all my representations … That representation which can be given previously to all thought is called intuition. All the diversity or manifold content of intuition, has, therefore, a necessary relation to the "I think," in the subject in which this diversity is found. …The unity of this apperception I call the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, … this universal identity of the apperception of the manifold given in intuition contains a synthesis … the empirical consciousness which accompanies different representations is in itself fragmentary and disunited, and without relation to the identity of the subject. … only because I can connect a variety of given representations in one consciousness, is it possible that I can represent to myself the identity of consciousness in these … "These representations given in intuition belong all of them to me," is accordingly just the same as, "I unite them in one self-consciousness, or can at least so unite them" … I can comprehend the variety of my representations in one consciousness … Synthetical unity of the manifold in intuitions, as given à priori, is therefore the foundation of the identity of apperception itself, … This principle is the highest in all human cognition.[304]

[303] Kritik der reinen Vernunft; KrV A 354, in der 1. Auflage.

[304] The Critique of Pure Reason, by Immanuel Kant, translated by J. M. D. Meiklejohn https://www.gutenberg.org/files/4280/4280-h/4280-h.htm

Suffering is, no doubt, immanent to or existence, although hardly communicable (Munk in his famous Scream tried, apparently in vain, to convey its meaning, but a sentiment was conveyed only). Feelings cannot be clad with words; cannot assume any definite form and are themselves scarcely understandable without what formally organizes them. It is reason which makes them communicable. Shrieks might be expressive of pain in animals, but they are so

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First division. Transcendental logic. Transcendental analytic. Book I. Analytic of Conceptions. Chapter II. Of the Deduction of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding. Section II Transcendental Deduction of the pure Conceptions of the Understanding. Of the Originally Synthetical Unity of Apperception § 12.

Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Zweite hin und wieder verbesserte Auflage (1787).
The Project Gutenberg eBook of Kritik der reinen Vernunft.Der transzendentalen Analytik Zweites Hauptstück. Von der Deduktion der reinen Verstandesbegriffe

Erster Abschnitt

§ 16 Von der ursprünglich-synthetischen Einheit der Apperzeption

Das: Ich denke, muß alle meine Vorstellungen begleiten können; denn sonst würde etwas in mir vorgestellt werden, was garnicht gedacht werden könnte, welches ebensoviel heißt, als die Vorstellung würde entweder unmöglich, oder wenigstens für mich nichts sein. Diejenige Vorstellung, die vor allem Denken gegeben sein kann, heißt Anschauung. Also hat alles Mannigfaltige der Anschauung eine notwendige Beziehung auf das: Ich denke, in demselben Subjekt, darin dieses Mannigfaltige angetroffen wird. Diese Vorstellung aber ist ein Aktus der Spontaneität, d.i. sie kann nicht als zur Sinnlichkeit gehörig angesehen werden. Ich nenne sie die reine Apperzeption, um sie von der empirischen zu unterscheiden, oder auch die ursprüngliche Apperzeption, weil sie dasjenige Selbstbewußtsein ist, was, indem es die Vorstellung Ich denke hervorbringt, die alle anderen muß begleiten können, und in allem Bewußtsein ein und dasselbe ist, von keiner weiter begleitet werden kann. Ich nenne auch die Einheit derselben die transzendentale Einheit des Selbstbewußtseins, um die Möglichkeit der Erkenntnis a priori aus ihr zu bezeichnen. Denn die mannigfaltigen Vorstellungen, die in einer gewissen Anschauung gegeben werden, würden nicht insgesamt meine Vorstellungen sein, wenn sie nicht insgesamt zu einem Selbstbewußtsein gehörten, d.i. als meine Vorstellungen (ob ich mich ihrer gleich nicht als solcher bewußt bin) müssen sie doch der Bedingung notwendig gemäß sein, unter der sie allein in einem allgemeinen Selbstbewußtsein zusammenstehen können, weil sie sonst nicht durchgängig mir angehören würden. Aus dieser ursprünglichen Verbindung läßt sich vieles folgern.

Nämlich diese durchgängige Identität der Apperzeption eines in der Anschauung gegebenen Mannigfaltigen, enthält eine Synthesis der Vorstellungen, und ist nur durch das Bewußtsein dieser Synthesis möglich. Denn das empirische Bewußtsein, welches verschiedene Vorstellungen begleitet, ist an sich zerstreut und ohne Beziehung auf die Identität des Subjekts. Diese Beziehung geschieht also dadurch noch nicht, daß ich jede Vorstellung mit Bewußtsein begleite, sondern daß ich eine zu der anderen hinzusetze und mir der Synthesis derselben bewußt bin. Also nur dadurch, daß ich ein Mannigfaltiges gegebener Vorstellungen in einem Bewußtsein verbinden kann, ist es möglich, daß ich mir die Identität des Bewußtseins in diesen Vorstellungen selbst vorstelle, d.i. die analytische Einheit der Apperzeption ist nur unter der Voraussetzung irgendeiner synthetischen möglich. Der Gedanke: diese in der Anschauung gegebenen Vorstellungen gehören mir insgesamt zu, heißt demnach soviel, als ich vereinige sie in einem Selbstbewußtsein, oder kann sie wenigstens darin vereinigen, und ob er gleich selbst noch nicht das Bewußtsein der Synthesis der Vorstellungen ist, so setzt er doch die Möglichkeit der letzteren voraus, d.i. nur dadurch, daß ich das Mannigfaltige derselben in einem Bewußtsein begreifen kann, nenne ich dieselben insgesamt meine Vorstellungen; denn sonst würde ich ein so vielfarbiges verschiedenes Selbst haben, als ich Vorstellungen habe, deren ich mir bewußt bin. Synthetische Einheit des Mannigfaltigen der Anschauungen, als a priori gegeben, ist also der Grund der Identität der Apperzeption selbst, die a priori allem meinem bestimmten Denken vorhergeht. Verbindung liegt aber nicht in den Gegenständen, und kann von ihnen nicht etwa durch Wahrnehmung entlehnt und in den Verstand dadurch allererst aufgenommen werden, sondern ist allein eine Verrichtung des Verstandes, der selbst nichts weiter ist, als das Vermögen, a priori zu verbinden, und das Mannigfaltige gegebener Vorstellungen unter Einheit der Apperzeption zu bringen, welcher Grundsatz der oberste im ganzen menschlichen Erkenntnis ist.

only because the animal instinct makes them meaningful.[305] The sensed is something for me, no doubt, but it is "nothing" (viz. meaningful) to the others.

Children get to know a language because reflecting upon the previously inarticulate sounds. Learning, in this case, is more than sheer repetition, for e.g. starlings cannot learn even if they can perfectly repeat. The same sound, in turn, becomes articulate only if confronted with a person who attaches some importance to the uttered. The material medium (the air) conveys the immaterial meaning because the acoustic wave is measured *extremely* precisely so that it renders the sounds meaningful words. The form of the energy of the material sound is best possibly commensurate and thus at the border of the immaterial. Human voice is the best possibly existing voice in *this* material world, and that is why sounds become signs and convey the immaterial purport.

The "childish" words are expressive not so much of "existential needs" but rather of the "curiosity" of the outer world a child takes care of. Thus the child starts to treat his/her own existence from a certain distance and strives for the cognizance of the previously alien world. For animals, the cognitive distance towards their natural environment would have posed a deadly danger. Contrary to animals, humans are able to *attack this danger squarely* and thus broaden their nature environment potentially *ad infinitum*. The children become interested in what has been previously alien to them. The scope of the personal interest might vary in individuals, but is at least potentially infinite. A certain "curiosity" of the unknown is proper to humans, but would have been destructive for any other animals (the purely animal forms of life). Perhaps, the anthropoids which had appeared on the Erath before Homo sapiens must have perished because confronted with a potentially open environment. The immaterial intellect (which they were bereft of) can only master the infinite.

In Kant, it is his Ich denke, which accounts for being human ("meaningful"). Still, the primacy of practical reason in Kant (its preponderance over the theoretical one) made, in those who followed suit, the primitive intuition able to get to know what Kant himself thought impossible to be known: Ding as sich (a "reality"). Reality as such is – to Kant's mind – non cognoscible. In those who followed suit, it was "cognoscible" in some quaint manner (intuitively), and the intuition of the Urstoff of the world took on strange forms really. It seems that any idealist can deduce from the depths of his mind anything he pleases provided it is going to be contained in the form of "consciousness", and a certain minimum of reasonableness is guaranteed. The intuitions of the subconscious (of what precedes the conscious), however, might be really odd. "Symbolic reality" is different indeed to that describable in the language of *signs*.

Be that as it may, the primitive intuition (in this or that form) is potentially sharable by all who succumb to the "innovative intuition" of the founder so that they share eventually the same intersubjective Ego.

In the real world (to be neatly distinguished from the ideal or "realized" in the aforementioned manner) the inner and the outer side of human existence might be, at the same time, confronted and harmonized. The end immanent to our existence is only realizable (is not a fancy) due to the Transcendent Cause; the Creator of our existence. The contrary is the case with the "idea" of God created by modern philosophers.

[305] Metaph., IV, c. 4, 1008b 11-12.; In Metaph., IV, lect. 9, nr 653.

Both Descartes and Aristotle speak of the first philosophy, but they attach a different meaning to the term. Descartes reflects upon his own consciousness, whereas Aristotle aims at the cognition of the universe and reflects upon adroitness of each step of the intellect towards the end of this cognizance. The world is a kingdom, and God is his King.[306] The "kingdom" Kant speaks of (the kingdom of values; Reich der Zwecke) is an autonomous being; it has no Master. In Husserl, consciousness is a self-sufficient being.

Something, no doubt, must accompany my thinking for the mere fact that it can be interrupted physically and a reintegrating principle seems to be necessary so as to restore the broken thread of thinking. We happen to be physically in different places, but hope to retain the same memory of what transcends them all. For the sake of the integrity of the life, we should (1) harbor the same intention of thinking in any place, and (2) the intention should be acceptable by the person it is addressed to. Otherwise no dialogue would be possible. Still (and following Plato), we can speak of an inner dialogue too possible due to resuming privately the same motive of thinking which have been memorized before. Thoughts can be written down on a sheet of paper lest they fall into oblivion. I hope to quicken them in some totally new circumstances, which are considerably more than "points of my personal" existence to be integrated in the way a line drawn on paper might be. The different places and times are more than just "points" (which are easily imaginable, but not readily manageable in the life for that reason). What is *intellectually* intended encompasses several places which would have been otherwise unknown and unpredictable. I will (I desire) to command the physical variety by my primitive intention which should "accompany my thoughts". But the intention is never to be identified with the Kantian Ich denke, or any irrational intuition of his followers.

The Kantian Ich denke originates manifold forms of intuitionism and subjectivism, phenomenology included. The egological orientation excludes in fact the possibility to get to know something *completely new* and not included in the consciousness, because nothing "alien" may intrude its realm. In the same vein, Moritz Schlick says that, when getting to know something, we but recognize the allegedly new in the already pre-known categories. The claim, however, that a person I actually speak to, is part of my consciousness sounds rather bizarre.

Normally, we accept persons to exist independently of whether or what we think of them. The intention which quickens the real dialogue is aimed at something which is neither "mine" nor "yours", but is above any "mine-ness" (or yours-ness) at all. I intend to say something which can be equally intended by a totally alien person. Furthering the cognition is only possible in these terms. Apparently, words I utter permeate the material medium, because the acoustic wave is propagated in the air indeed. The waves, in general, have some objectively measurable properties quite independent of the egological orientation. The only difference to the ordinary sounds (and animal voices too) consists in that the human ones (as was mentioned above) are the utmost harmony of the material and thus are at the border of the immaterial.

Children (and ordinary people mostly too) get to know everything new this way. But the advocates of the philosophy of subject cannot account for the cognizance of anything new

[306] Metaph., IV, c. 7; 10.

at all. In fact, they only claim the validity of their own concepts, which "extend" and "devour" the empirical Egos found on their way (ideas are "transcendental" in this manner). No consciousness is able to account for the real source of its existence, but claims the right to new "believers" only. However, it is visible that this consciousness is unable to improve its own existence in the real world too, because no great phenomenological books have been written after Heidegger's death in 1976.

Dialogue is necessary for teaching, although it is not necessary for indoctrination or "training". The idea of the genuine dialogue implies multiplicity of intellects interacting constructively with each other. The "modern" idea of consciousness, on the other hand, is an heir to the mediaeval Averroist monopsychism. Its essential claim reads: "the same knowledge exists in both a master and the disciple". The knowledge cannot be passed on. It can be imagined to expand only. Consciousness must be collective.

In Plato's Philebus and in Augustine's Soliloquies, we read that the genuine truth is "neither mine nor yours", but is above anyone's personal (subjective) point of view. Thus, by its very (classical) definition, it must not be "private". The actually spoken out must be accompanied by the intention to communicate the spoken, but the nature of the intention consists in subordinating the "private" to the generally acceptable.

It is impossible to talk reasonably to anybody without benevolence, albeit it is possible to shout and spit venom at who appears abominable for the mere fact of hurting one's self-love. Words happen to be weaponized this way. Emotions might be expressed so, and those emotionally attacked perceive them to be "negative" (and they are so in a sense).

Love, according to Dionysius and Thomas, is "ecstatic" in the sense of not being "egological". The object I care for and get to know engulfs my attention to the point I can become oblivious of my own existence for the sake of a deeper cognition of what really matters for me.[307] The valuable (carum in Latin) is what I care for and the genuine love (the not self-centered one) might be thus called caritas. Still, the word of love happens to be nowadays used and abused in many ways, because the objective (transcendent) criterion of what is valuable as such (in se) has been abandoned. The authentic love is rather a stewardship than cupidity. Something which is desired for-me only is in fact rather used than appreciated.[308]

Thoughts supposed to be "great" are normally accompanied by what accounts for their self-consistence (as Kant) or at least their persuasiveness and attractiveness. Some might be not anxious enough to express their thoughts diligently enough if their thoughts are en vogue (attractive) rather than analyzed. The gradient of the gravitational field of dying stars is so

[307] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 28 a. 3 s.c; c. Primam [secundum vim apprehensivam] quidem extasim facit amor dispositive, inquantum scilicet facit meditari de amato, ut dictum est, intensa autem meditatio unius abstrahit ab aliis. Sed secundam [secundum quidem vim apprehensivam] extasim facit amor directe, simpliciter quidem amor amicitiae; amor autem concupiscentiae non simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Nam in amore concupiscentiae, quodammodo fertur amans extra seipsum, inquantum scilicet, non contentus gaudere de bono quod habet, quaerit frui aliquo extra se. Sed quia illud extrinsecum bonum quaerit sibi habere, non exit simpliciter extra se, sed talis affectio in fine infra ipsum concluditur. Sed in amore amicitiae, affectus alicuius simpliciter exit extra se, quia vult amico bonum, et operatur, quasi gerens curam et providentiam ipsius, propter ipsum amicum.

[308] Ibid.

huge that they disrupt (disintegrate) physically the objects which happen to be near them (attracting them so mush). Disintegration (as it seems) might always follow intense attractiveness.[309]

The fundamental intuition is – according to Descartes – that of the (theoretically personal) Cogito. In Kant, the depersonalized Ich denke appears in its stead with its special kind of cognition called Anschauung. Anschauung is normally translated as intuition, albeit the primitive one has a special character. The empirical Anschauung of the exact sciences demanded (to Kant's mind) the primitive Anschauung of his Ich denke (self-consciousness). Kant does not prove its existence, but must presuppose. In those who followed Kant, the originally (in Kant) unknowable reality was going to be intuited and the prior agnosticism was abrogated in many strange ways. Fichte speaks of the intuition of the Deed (Thun), whereas the others (Schopenhauer, Bergson, Freud) were about to check some alternative options.

It seems that a dominant affect quickens anybody's thoughts as long as something really difficult to know (or to obtain) is faced. Some great ideas *seemed* to be born from the need to cope with great difficulties. But the power to create (to foster an innovative idea) must incomparably bigger than the power (ability) to consume the thus created. The supposedly great ideas happen to be accepted all the more passively the more distant their source. Ultimately, the primitive egological orientation degrades into sheer ("profane") sentimentality. Emotivism replaces the rational ethics and empathy replaces love defined in the classical terms. Husserl says (in his Untersuchungen and Ideen) that consciousness *might* be animal. In fact, however, the consciousness *must eventually* become animal in the minds of his inheritors (and the opposite of the eidetic reduction takes place in their minds). Moreover, in the minds of "consumers", the consciousness becomes *specifically* animal: soft and emotional.

Words spoken out in the spirit of the Greek parrhesia (freedom of speech) are accompanied by the disinterested love of truth (the intention shared with a person we care for) as well as wholly "egoistic" desire to get to know the truth at all costs, the open hostility of those opposing the truth included. Truth is aimed at directly, but falsehood rejected indirectly also.[310] The life falsehood might exist in a person I really care for, and this (evil) it must be as fiercely hated as the person is loved. The fact must be bluntly stated, although circumspection and benevolence bids to treat the falsehood as abstractedly (depersonalized) as only possible. Falsity is a wound in the human rational nature and the wound must be healed. A doctor cannot love tuberculosis and a tuberculosis patient at the same time. The wounds and illnesses (as well as false opinions) are to be "hated" for the sake of a person they affect.

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[309] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 28, a. 5 obj. 2. […] amor est resolutivus. Est ergo corruptivus et laesivus.; a. 5 ad 2. Ad secundum. Quaedam vero unio est effectus amoris. Et haec est unio realis, quam amans quaerit de re amata. Et haec quidem unio est secundum convenientiam amoris, ut enim philosophus refert, II Politic., Aristophanes dixit quod *amantes desiderarent ex ambobus fieri unum, sed quia ex hoc accideret aut ambos aut alterum corrumpi*, quaerunt unionem quae convenit et decet; ut scilicet simul conversentur, et simul colloquantur, et in aliis huiusmodi coniungantur.

[310] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 1 n. 6. Eiusdem autem est unum contrariorum prosequi et aliud refutare sicut medicina, quae sanitatem operatur, aegritudinem excludit. Unde sicut sapientis est veritatem praecipue de primo principio meditari et aliis disserere, ita eius est falsitatem contrariam impugnare.

The fact seems to be quite obvious as to the biological side of the human existence. However, consciousness has been believed to be exempted from the common laws of nature (it was believed to be supernatural). The obvious fact has been ignored that people chance to change opinions even radically, and the change does not amount to a "mental suicide". Neither should anybody be suspected of an "attempted murder" if trying to correct someone else's errors. The consciousness is not an inviolable sanctuary. Tolerating exploded errors is, practically, tantamount to indifference. It has been believed that no "theories" can be harmful, but their practical implementations only, as it was the case with Marxism. From the juridical point of view, nobody indeed can be taken to court for mere thinking out crime (Marx himself lived and "worked" undisturbed in London for several years). The murderous ideologies, however, must be judged and assessed according to what they really are.

It is not Ich Denke which accompanies my thoughts (my way of the intellectual development), but the will (desire) to get to know truth at any expense. It is not so much about *a* truth (somebody might be emotionally hurt by) as rather about truth (in general). The cost of the disinterested pursuit might be self-denial. The primitive desire for knowledge Aristotle speaks of, at the beginning of his Metaphysics, accompanies all my thoughts like the memory of a person I care for or the country I was born in. It renders the otherwise ordinary actions exceptional: in the view of the principle which enlivens them.

Apart, however, from the homeland we came to existence in and persons we met there, there is "a better homeland" (Hbr 11. 13) too. The Revelation made us look ahead beyond the horizon of the actual life. This unknown homeland is, however, not indefinite. God is the Principle every human life depends on, and the indubitable fact can be possibly known by the natural reason. The role of metaphysics consists in determining the nature of dependence. It is in fact so radical that all human desires and thoughts are actually quickened by the vivid presence of the Principle. To the contrary: all desires and thoughts in which God is absent are unhuman (they jar with the human rational nature). God creates us in every moment of our *positive* existence; He creates all human actions also, which, however, do not cease to be human for this reason (nor the humans do cease to be responsible for them).[311]

We normally feed on real nutrients, and nobody is able to live by e.g. smell of flowers (notwithstanding how nice). There is, to be sure, a difference between what enlivens the spiritual and corporeal existence, but it is not the difference between the "ideal" and the "real", because God is real in the full sense of the word (as Pyrro of Elis says). The problem consists in how we get to know the source.

The sound (undebauched) palate discerns between healthy and harmful (no matter how "exquisite") food instinctively, but no "moral instinct" exists in the human mind able to tell,

[311] Summa Theologiae I q. 83 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod liberum arbitrium est causa sui motus, quia homo per liberum arbitrium seipsum movet ad agendum. Non tamen hoc est de necessitate libertatis, quod sit prima causa sui id quod liberum est, sicut nec ad hoc quod aliquid sit causa alterius, requiritur quod sit prima causa eius. Deus igitur est prima causa movens et naturales causas et voluntarias. Et sicut naturalibus causis, movendo eas, non aufert quin actus earum sint naturales; ita movendo causas voluntarias, non aufert quin actiones earum sint voluntariae, sed potius hoc in eis facit, operatur enim in unoquoque secundum eius proprietatem.

in an instant, between good and evil. The actual presence of the source of the spiritual life must be discovered step by step; by way of reasoning.

The primitive impulse towards good as such (called synderesis) proves insufficient in the end. The impulse is (according to Thomas) natural, but the human will (and the intellect also) is a specific nature nonetheless. The impulse towards good must be natural as long the first ("inborn") movement thereof is concerned. There are naturally known principles in both the intellect and the will (concreated with them both), but the principles are what they must be in relation to their proper conclusions only, and the relation cannot be settled otherwise than by the way of reasoning. The drama of the human existence consists in that the principles might be set aside (ignored) and what was supposed to be reasoning might be stimulated by emotions. The way of the debauched reasoning must end, in this case, in a cull de sac.

Emotions are potentially good as long as partaking of rational nature or at least in harmony with its natural destiny. It is hope which stimulates us to obtain the arduous and accompanies our thoughts, but the hope is directed to the not immediately given (not intuited in any way) only. Hope can be found in animals too, which pursue both absent and desired objects fostering the hope to obtain them not only in imagination, but "to grasp it by hand". The human hope must be at least animal (so perfect as to not put up with the immediately given), but should be, in addition, directed to the objects worthy of the rational creature: graspable more firmly than any material objects can. It is thus necessary to discern (discriminate) amongst the objects and the modes of hope.

There is, according to Thomas, a difference between *bene* sperare and *bonum* sperare, and *bonum* sperare and sperare *Summum* bonum. Bene sperantes (those full of hope) are e.g. those drunk or unexperienced.[312] Moreover, as there are different goods (bona) hoped for

[312] Sententia Ethic., lib. 3 l. 17 n. 8. Deinde cum dicit: consimiles autem etc. comparat hanc fortitudinem verae fortitudini. Et dicit quod isti qui sic sunt bene sperantes, sunt consimiles vere fortibus, quia ambo sunt audaces, idest pericula audacter aggredientes, non autem secundum quod audax dicitur aliquis vitiose. Sed differunt, quia fortes audacter aggrediuntur propter praedicta, scilicet ex electione, et propter bonum; sed isti qui sunt bonae spei, aggrediuntur audacter propter hoc quod aestimant se esse meliores in pugna, et nihil se passuros contrarium ab aliis.; Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 40 a. 6 s.c.

Summa Theologiae I-II q. 40 a. 5 c. […] spei obiectum est bonum futurum arduum possibile adipisci. Potest ergo aliquid esse causa spei, vel quia facit homini aliquid esse possibile, vel quia facit eum existimare aliquid esse possibile. Primo modo est causa spei omne illud quod auget potestatem hominis, sicut divitiae, fortitudo, et, inter cetera, etiam experientia, nam per experientiam homo acquirit facultatem aliquid de facili faciendi, et ex hoc sequitur spes. Unde Vegetius dicit, in libro de re militari, nemo facere metuit quod se bene didicisse confidit. Alio modo est causa spei omne illud quod facit alicui existimationem quod aliquid sit sibi possibile. Et hoc modo et doctrina, et persuasio quaelibet potest esse causa spei. Et sic etiam experientia est causa spei, inquantum scilicet per experientiam fit homini existimatio quod aliquid sit sibi possibile, quod impossibile ante experientiam reputabat. Sed per hunc modum experientia potest etiam esse causa defectus spei. Quia sicut per experientiam fit homini existimatio quod aliquid sibi sit possibile, quod reputabat impossibile; ita e converso per experientiam fit homini existimatio quod aliquid non sit sibi possibile, quod possibile existimabat. Sic ergo experientia est causa spei duobus modis, causa autem defectus spei, uno modo. Et propter hoc, magis dicere possumus eam esse causam spei.

Summa Theologiae I-II q. 40 a. 6 c. Respondeo dicendum quod iuventus est causa spei propter tria, ut philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric. Et haec tria possunt accipi secundum tres conditiones boni quod est obiectum spei, quod est futurum, et arduum, et possibile, ut dictum est. Iuvenes enim multum habent de futuro, et parum

(sperata) they must be compared too and the hope eventually directed to the Sovereign Good (It must be regarded as the most precious). Hope is cherished not for the sake of fulling the emptiness of life with any objective whatsoever. The *unique* object of hope is to be discerned from ordinary ones. For the sake of obtaining the best, all other must be discriminated. The Western Civilization is built on *the principle of discrimination*, whereas its senile demise is marked by the dominion of *the principle of indifference*. We do not however, discriminate objects, because they are felt to be abhorrent, but because they are *understood* to be unequally suitable for the intended end. We rationally (coolly) tell between truth and falsehood; between good and evil, according to the "inborn" principles we possess, even if the susceptibility of those potentially affected must be taken calmly into account also.

The hope is specific so much that even its opposite: despair (directly, as it seems contrary to hope) *might be good* provided it concerns a *particular* good which is incompatible with the maximalist range of life. We *despair constructively* for the sake of a greater hope to realize. Despair might naturally beget daring, and the daring is sometimes indispensable for attacking evil which stands in the way of the ambitious life. Despair might be – according to Thomas – especially dangerous for enemies as it spawns a "desperate courage" in those who despair of their rescue (have nothing left to lose). A special act of despair" might be good as far as prompting efforts to overcome special difficulties. Strength is born sometimes from the despair of obtaining *an apparent* good of the intellect.

The despair only which totally dominates in the human life destroys it. We "tolerate" those things only which we *totally* despair to obtain. We do not tell then between the wrong and the wronged because we despair to liberate them (they appear totally indifferent).

The hope might be a virtue, provided it be preceded by faith (the knowledge) and they both be carefully distinguished. The faith in God might be described as "seeing from distance"[313], and nobody can desire (hope for) the unseen (unknown). Hope cannot be blind,

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de praeterito. Et ideo, quia memoria est praeteriti, spes autem futuri; parum habent de memoria, sed multum vivunt in spe. Iuvenes etiam, propter caliditatem naturae, habent multos spiritus, et ita in eis cor ampliatur. Ex amplitudine autem cordis est quod aliquis ad ardua tendat. Et ideo iuvenes sunt animosi et bonae spei. Similiter etiam illi qui non sunt passi repulsam, nec experti impedimenta in suis conatibus, de facili reputant aliquid sibi possibile. Unde et iuvenes, propter inexperientiam impedimentorum et defectuum, de facili reputant aliquid sibi possibile. Et ideo sunt bonae spei. Duo etiam istorum sunt in ebriis, scilicet caliditas et multiplicatio spirituum, propter vinum; et iterum inconsideratio periculorum vel defectuum. Et propter eandem rationem etiam omnes stulti, et deliberatione non utentes, omnia tentant, et sunt bonae spei.

Summa Theologiae I-II q. 40 a. 6 ad 1Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in iuvenibus et in ebriis licet non sit firmitas secundum rei veritatem, est tamen in eis secundum eorum aestimationem, reputant enim se firmiter assecuturos illud quod sperant.

Summa Theologiae I-II q. 40 a. 6 ad 2 Et similiter dicendum ad secundum, quod iuvenes et ebrii habent quidem infirmitatem secundum rei veritatem, sed secundum eorum existimationem, habent potestatem; quia suos defectus non cognoscunt.

[313] De veritate, q. 14 a. 2 ad 15. Intellectui autem praesto esse dicuntur quae eius capacitatem non excedunt. Sed quantum ad certitudinem assensus, fides est cognitio ratione cuius potest dici etiam scientia et visio, secundum illud I Cor. XIII, 12: *videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate*. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit in Lib. de videndo Deum: *si scire non incongruenter dicimur etiam illud quod certissimum credimus, hinc factu m est ut etiam credita recte, etsi non adsint sensibus nostris, videre mente dicamur*.

but must be directed by faith; it aims at something *extremely difficult and arduous; non-mine; non-human.*[314]

The first emotion is love: the sense of harmony. It is so fundamental that Augustine calls all the others but "specific kinds of love", as they are naturally born therefrom.[315] Still, the most precious is more than just an emotion in humans and must be most diligently protected. Faith must precede love in *the intellect* and hope must so in *the will*.

The judgments on faith are gathered in the Doctrinal Definitions of the Catholic Church. Without them faith would be incessantly endangered. Faith cannot be identified with hope. The faith could be illusion if not confirmed by the aforementioned definitions.

The definitions are in fact conclusions of the demonstrative syllogisms of rational theology. The conclusions are gathered in every science, but a unique science (theology) provides potentially unique definitions too.

The name of "theologics" stems from Aristotle. It is, according to him, either the knowledge we have about God or the knowledge God has about Himself.[316] Aristotle did not take into account the possibility that the latter knowledge could be imparted to humans (it was indeed about to be revealed to them four centuries after his death). To his mind, the philosophical "theologics" (metaphysics) is accessible to man only. Metaphysics is a science par excellence (maxime scientia);[317] so much so that *hardly* accessible and even appearing to

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Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 47 n. 7; cap. 51 n. 5; lib. 4 cap. 1 n. 11; De veritate, q. 12 a. 6 c.

[314] Metaph., I, c. 2, 982b 25-26; 982b 28-33.

[315]Summa Theologiae I-II q. 27 a. 4 c. Respondeo dicendum quod nulla alia passio animae est quae non praesupponat aliquem amorem. Cuius ratio est quia omnis alia passio animae vel importat motum ad aliquid, vel quietem in aliquo. Omnis autem motus in aliquid, vel quies in aliquo, ex aliqua connaturalitate vel coaptatione procedit, quae pertinet ad rationem amoris. Unde impossibile est quod aliqua alia passio animae sit causa universaliter omnis amoris. Contingit tamen aliquam aliam passionem esse causam amoris alicuius, sicut etiam unum bonum est causa alterius.

Summa Theologiae I-II q. 26 a. 2 c. […] ipsum appetibile dat appetitui, primo quidem, quandam coaptationem ad ipsum, quae est complacentia appetibilis; ex qua sequitur motus ad appetibile. Nam appetitivus motus circulo agitur, ut dicitur in III de anima, appetibile enim movet appetitum, faciens se quodammodo in eius intentione; et appetitus tendit in appetibile realiter consequendum, ut sit ibi finis motus, ubi fuit principium. Prima ergo immutatio appetitus ab appetibili vocatur amor, qui nihil est aliud quam complacentia appetibilis; et ex hac complacentia sequitur motus in appetibile, qui est desiderium; et ultimo quies, quae est gaudium.

[316] Metaph., I, c. 2, 983a 5-10.

[317] Expositio Posteriorum, lib. 1 l. 17 n. 5 Secundo, cum dicit: et namque scivit etc., ostendit praeeminentiam huiusmodi scientiae, quae considerat principia communia, scilicet primae philosophiae, ad alias. Semper enim oportet illud, per quod aliquid probatur, esse magis scitum vel notum. Qui enim scit aliquid ex superioribus causis, oportet quod sit magis intelligens illas causas, quia scivit ex prioribus simpliciter, cum non sciat ex causatis causas: quando enim aliquis scit ex causatis causas, tunc non intelligit ex prioribus et ex magis notis simpliciter, sed ex magis notis et prioribus quoad nos. Cum autem principia inferioris scientiae probantur ex principiis superioris, non proceditur ex causatis in causas, sed e converso. Unde oportet quod talis processus sit ex prioribus et ex magis notis simpliciter. Oportet ergo magis esse scitum quod est superioris scientiae, ex quo probatur id quod est inferioris, et maxime esse scitum id, quo omnia alia probantur, et ipsum non probatur ex alio priori. Et per consequens scientia superior erit magis scientia, quam inferior; et scientia suprema, scilicet philosophia prima, erit maxime scientia.

lie beyond the reach of man ("unhuman"). It always might be asked what actually accompanies "theologics" lest it become "human" instead being (as originally) divine. Metaphysics must be "unhuman" so as to serve the undoubtedly superhuman (be a handmaid of theology).

Theological conclusions are actually met by theologians (humans anyhow). The theologians can err, but their work can be valid too if assisted by the vivid presence of the Holy Spirit (Who, however, must be infallibly known to be present so). Theology is supreme wisdom, as it has God for its subject matter, who is the Sovereign Truth.[318] The supernatural gift of wisdom should accompany all human deeds actually directed to God, the theological work included. But there is no subjective gauge of certitude that the presence is real and not bogus. God is the object of the infused theological virtue of faith, but He is also the subject matter of the supreme science which determines the way of the human intellect to Him.

Natural "theologics" Aristotle speaks of is not the theology in the sense of the word accepted nowadays, but both metaphysics and theology are sciences in the paradigm of Posterior Analytics. From its very starting point, the "philosophical" wisdom must be assisted (accompanied) by a principle leading to the fullness of wisdom. The principle must moderate the pathway of philosophy from its beginnings. Human intellects happen to trudge into blind alleys, and the effort to get out of them proves greater than that to avoid them. A certain science-generating approach should guarantee succeeding in both advancing to the end and liberating from possible errors.

According to Heidegger (who developed Hegel's thought there), it is Angsts which stimulates philosophical discovery. In Hegel, The Christian Revelation was tried to be rationalized so. Hegel quotes Scripture saying "the beginning of wisdom is the fear of Lord",[319] but interprets these words in a peculiar way. According to Scripture, "Lord" is to be

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[318] Super Sent., lib. 3 d. 23 q. 2 a. 2 qc. 3 c. Sed quia voluntas hoc modo non determinat intellectum ut faciat inspici quae creduntur, sicut inspiciuntur principia per se nota, vel quae in ipsa resolvuntur; sed hoc modo ut intellectus firmiter adhaereat; ideo certitudo quae est in scientia et intellectu, est ex ipsa evidentia eorum quae certa esse dicuntur; certitudo autem fidei est ex firma adhaesione ad id quod creditur. In his ergo quae per fidem credimus, ratio voluntatem inclinans, ut dictum est, est ipsa veritas prima, sive Deus, cui creditur, quae habet majorem firmitatem quam lumen intellectus humani, in quo conspiciuntur principia, vel ratio humana, secundum quam conclusiones in principia resolvuntur; et ideo fides habet majorem certitudinem quantum ad firmitatem adhaesionis, quam sit certitudo scientiae vel intellectus: quamvis in scientia et intellectu sit major evidentia eorum quibus assentitur.

[319] Super Sent., lib. 3 d. 34 q. 2 a. 1 qc. 2 c. Ad secundam quaestionem dicendum, quod timor hic distinguitur secundum ordinem timentis ad Deum, cui per unum timorem magis appropinquat vel distat, quam per alium. Cum enim timor in fuga mali consistat; malum autem est poenae et culpae; erit timor quidam qui consistit in fuga mali culpae tantum, per quam homo a Deo separatur, scilicet timor castus vel filialis; alius autem qui consistit in fuga mali poenae. Poena autem est duplex. Una pro cujus vitatione peccatum quandoque committitur, sicut sunt temporales poenae; et hanc poenam refugit timor mundanus vel humanus. Alia est pro cujus vitatione nunquam fit peccatum, sed magis vitatur, sicut poena quae erit post hanc vitam; et hanc poenam fugit timor servilis. Alius autem timor est qui fugit utrumque malum, poenae scilicet et culpae, scilicet initialis, qui habet oculum ad utrumque; et ideo est medius inter servilem et castum.

Super Sent., lib. 3 d. 34 q. 2 a. 1 qc. 3 c. Ad tertiam quaestionem dicendum, quod timor mundanus et humanus, cum sint inordinati, non possunt esse donum spiritus sancti; sed sunt vel passiones vel electiones similes passionibus, aut etiam habitus, secundum quod habitus nomine operationis vel passionis nominantur. Similiter

called the fullness of being. The Hebrew JHWH means this,[320] and is seems only natural that every being "gravitates" to where it originated from (to the fullness of being). The fullness proves to be the actual source of human life in all its forms, and we must be anxious not to lose it. Timor separationis (the fear of being separated from the Source) enlivens our journey to the Ultimate. But according to rationalists, there is not the Ultimate beyond the human life and consciousness is a closed entity. No transcendent Good is needed to quicken it. In consequence, to a rationalist mind, it is rather "humanity" which should be feared and worshiped. There is, allegedly, no reason to be afraid of the just Judge of the human deeds. It is "social" justice which matters; not the divine one.

The "human" eschatology might seem preposterous if reflected upon or appear gruesome if viewed in its historical consequences. Apart from the ennobling fear of God (timor Domini), a debasing fear of humans (timor humanus) appears in history. People happen to abnegate sound principles when facing persecution, infamy, death (are threatened so *by humans*).

Heidegger was perhaps right in observing that what he called Stimmung (mood) accompanies human thinking, but it is but no means obvious that it does so *always*, and all the

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etiam timor servilis non pertingit ad perfectionem doni, sicut nec fides informis ad perfectam rationem virtutis. In omni enim virtute hoc est commune, secundum philosophum, quod virtuosus operatur boni gratia, vel propter turpis vitationem. Timor autem servilis operatur bonum non propter fugam turpis, sed propter fugam tristis; unde deficit a perfectione virtutis, et multo amplius a perfectione doni, quod est virtute perfectius. Timor autem castus, et initialis secundum quod participat timorem castum, habet rationem doni: cujus ratio est, quod altiori mensura suos actus modificat quam fit mensura humana. Mensura enim humanorum operum est rationis bonum; unde virtuosus abstinet a malis, fugiens et timens inconveniens rationis, quod est turpe; et iste timor est annexus cuilibet virtuti. Sed timor qui est donum, facit abstinere a malis propter fugam inconvenientis, quod est in separatione a Deo; et ideo ipsum Deum habet pro mensura suae operationis. Et quia modus a mensura causatur, ideo operatur supra humanum modum, et propter hoc est donum.

Super Sent., lib. 3 d. 34 q. 2 a. 2 qc. 1 c. Respondeo dicendum ad primam quaestionem, quod secundum philosophum in 1 Metaph., liber est qui sui causa est; servus autem per contrarium intelligendus est qui alterius causa est, et non sui. Sumus autem causa eorum quae ad nos pertinent per voluntatem: unde illud dicitur aliquis facere libere quod spontanea voluntate facit; illud autem serviliter ad quod faciendum sibi voluntas deest: facit autem illud coactus ab alio violentia vel metu; et ideo cum tristitia, quia omne coactum est contra voluntatem et triste, ut dicitur in 5 Metaph.: et secundum hoc dicitur aliquis ex libertate spiritus aliquid facere, quia beneplacito suae voluntatis delectabiliter facit; timore autem servili, quod facit coactus metu poenae, et per consequens cum tristitia: mallet enim non facere, nisi poena timeretur. Patet igitur quod servilitas ex illa parte consequitur timorem qua ad aliquid faciendum vel dimittendum inclinat. Haec autem inclinatio non intrat essentiam timoris, sed est effectus ejus; essentiam vero suam habet ex comparatione ad proprium objectum, quod est poena aeterna, quam fides indicat. Unde servilitas est accidens timoris, et non intrat essentiam ejus: et ideo essentia ejus bona est, quia refugere poenas aeternas non est nisi bonum. Unde servilis timor secundum essentiam suam est a spiritu sancto non tamen donum spiritus sancti, nisi communiter loquendo, ut dicimus, omne quod a spiritu sancto datur, donum ejus esse. Sic autem non loquimur de donis. Sed illa servilitatis conditio quae includit privationem voluntatis justitiae, non est a spiritu sancto.

[320] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 22 n. 10 Hanc autem sublimem veritatem Moyses a domino est edoctus, qui cum quaereret a domino, Exod. 3 dicens: *si dixerint ad me filii Israel, quod nomen eius? Quid dicam eis?* Dominus respondit: *ego sum qui sum. Sic dices filiis Israel: qui est misit me ad vos*, ostendens suum proprium nomen esse qui est. Quodlibet autem nomen est institutum ad significandum naturam seu essentiam alicuius rei. Unde relinquitur quod ipsum divinum esse est sua essentia vel natura.

less that it *must so*. What I actually say, chances to be motivated by anger, resentment, or the desire to pay back with interest for my hurt self-love. It happens to be so, but it should have never happened nonetheless. Anyway, not all emotions are equally "creative" for thinking. Perhaps fear might be privileged in a sense, but its nature must be specified after all. Thomas actually did it.

Human "life-motivations" happen to be as manifold as odd. The problem is, then, how and whether the manifold can be integrated into one form of the Civilization. Its fabric must be based on firm foundations, and it seems to be impossible to be based on incidental/casual emotions. The disinterested pursuit of truth marks the beginning of the Greek philosophy and, consequently, of the European science also. All actively participating should harbor the same intention of getting to know the objective truth, even if it is not obvious, at first glance, whence it stems.

According to Plato and Aristotle, a special kind of fear called admiration marks the beginning of philosophy (and the entire science too). It is furthest from debasing and paralyzing anxiety. A moderate fear can stimulate work, because it occasions hatred (for evil) and daring consequently too. It prompts attacking the obstacles, which are unavoidable on the way of life: all the more so the more ambitious its objectives.[321] The hope for obtaining the supreme knowledge follows upon the necessary circumspection in uttering (rash) statements and assessing the actual state of the knowledge.

Anxiety, to the contrary, is so toxic that not even to be called an emotion, but rather a special effect thereof.[322] Similarly, the physical pain is not to be called sorrow, albeit they both in Latin are called Dolor. There are painkillers available in pharmacies, but rational (i.e. natural) means to avoid sorrow too (sorrow might really occasion or intensify physical pain). The anxiety cannot be directly avoided (it cannot be repressed), but some rational means

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[321] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 44 a. 4 c. Ex parte igitur instrumentorum corporalium, timor, quantum est de se, semper natus est impedire exteriorem operationem, propter defectum caloris qui ex timore accidit in exterioribus membris. Sed ex parte animae, si sit timor moderatus, non multum rationem perturbans; confert ad bene operandum, inquantum causat quandam sollicitudinem, et facit hominem attentius consiliari et operari. Si vero timor tantum increscat quod rationem perturbet, impedit operationem etiam ex parte animae.

Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 126 a. 2 c. Omnis autem virtus moralis ponit modum rationis in materia circa quam est. Unde ad fortitudinem pertinet timor moderatus secundum rationem, ut scilicet homo timeat quod oportet, et quando oportet, et similiter de aliis. Hic autem modus rationis corrumpi potest, sicut per excessum, ita et per defectum.

[322] Summa Theologiae I-II q. 35 a. 8 c. […] extraneum circa effectum tristitiae, potest accipi quantum ad alterum tantum, quia scilicet tollitur fuga, et sic est anxietas quae sic aggravat animum, ut non appareat aliquod refugium, unde alio nomine dicitur angustia.

Summa Theologiae I-II q. 37 a. 2 c. […] tristitia contingit ex aliquo malo praesenti. Quod quidem, ex hoc ipso quod repugnat motui voluntatis, aggravat animum, inquantum impedit ipsum ne fruatur eo quod vult. Et si quidem non sit tanta vis mali contristantis ut auferat spem evadendi, licet animus aggravetur quantum ad hoc, quod in praesenti non potitur eo quod vult; remanet tamen motus ad repellendum nocivum contristans. Si vero superexcrescat vis mali intantum ut spem evasionis excludat, tunc simpliciter impeditur etiam interior motus animi angustiati, ut neque hac neque illac divertere valeat. Et quandoque etiam impeditur exterior motus corporis, ita quod remaneat homo stupidus in seipso.

might prevent it occurring nonetheless, and help sustaining its toxicity if present. But stimulants are largely available too. Envy (resentment) is generally responsible for anxiety to appear and "emotional softening" is its special objective. Evil is always present in the human life, and the fact must be faced squarely. Evil is to be attacked; not to be fled from blindfolded. Evil can never be eliminated by "humanization" of social affairs. The problem is how to attack it (as to succumb to it is the essence of anxiety) constructively, i.e. without hurting the others and oneself also. In the pursuit of the most valuable, we must *persevere despite all hardships.*

Timor (fear) is one of eleven emotions enumerated by Thomas. There are, in turn, seven subspecies thereof: segnities, erubescentia, verecundia, admiratio, stupor, agonia.[323] The most important, here, is admiration, because it naturally begets hope for the cognizance of the ultimate truth as well as plausible aggression against what thwarts it.

The admiration has accompanied philosophy since its very beginning, and was in fact the stimulus of the growth of the Civilization. There is, originally, something not mine I try to understand at the beginning of my intellectual journey to the ultimate. The interest for it was lost by Descartes and those who followed suit.

Admiration is about not taking phenomena in their naked directness. The directly given cannot be a real source of the human life (cannot, especially, quicken the intellectual life). Contrary to animals, humans are scarcely given anything in a ready-made form which could sustain their life. The must *analyze so as to live*. It is *the cause* of the immediately given that matters. They *must not synthetize lest they die.* Material things and emotional motivations are manifold indeed, but Kant's synthetizing activity of Ego must be destructive for life. Gleichschaltung and the ideology of equality must lead to spiritual debasement.

There is a spell of time (and local distance) between I put a capital letter on a sheet of paper and the full stop at the end of a meaningful sentence. There is too, a physical distance between *A* speaking to (and teaching) *B*, and a spell of time between uttering and hearing particular sounds. The fact is easily perceptible in our listening to a recorded speech. It is less perceptible in the vivid dialogue, but, at the same time, more troublesome, because the sentence might be interrupted or listen to negligently. The outward disregard of the listener can occasion disintegration of the thread of thinking (those unable to advance *rational* arguments put up with such "practical" arguments). Anyhow, the spell of time and space

[323] Summa Theologiae I-II q. 41 a. 4 c. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, timor est de futuro malo quod excedit potestatem timentis, ut scilicet ei resisti non possit. Sicut autem bonum hominis, ita et malum, potest considerari vel in operatione ipsius, vel in exterioribus rebus. In operatione autem ipsius hominis, potest duplex malum timeri. Primo quidem, labor gravans naturam. Et sic causatur segnities, cum scilicet aliquis refugit operari, propter timorem excedentis laboris. Secundo, turpitudo laedens opinionem. Et sic, si turpitudo timeatur in actu committendo, est erubescentia, si autem sit de turpi iam facto, est verecundia. Malum autem quod in exterioribus rebus consistit, triplici ratione potest excedere hominis facultatem ad resistendum. Primo quidem, ratione suae magnitudinis, cum scilicet aliquis considerat aliquod magnum malum, cuius exitum considerare non sufficit. Et sic est admiratio. Secundo, ratione dissuetudinis, quia scilicet aliquod malum inconsuetum nostrae considerationi offertur, et sic est magnum nostra reputatione. Et hoc modo est stupor, qui causatur ex insolita imaginatione. Tertio modo, ratione improvisionis, quia scilicet provideri non potest, sicut futura infortunia timentur. Et talis timor dicitur agonia.

exists no doubt between the teacher and the taught. According to Averroes, Kant and Hegel it cannot exist at all. The same "knowledge" must exist in the teacher and the disciple. It is called consciousness.

Individual intellects (if persons should be called so) exist in the physical world only because individualized by what Thomas called materia signata: a physical part of the universe. There is no room, however, for the personal, and *biological* at the same time, existence in the uniformed "universe" of consciousness. At best, the persons would be called the *acknowledged* individuals.

Acknowledgement (Anerkennung), in Hegel, is necessary for the "authentically conscious existence". This notion plays the pivotal role in the Hegelian system. An individual Ego is reflected in manifold mirrors (other individuals are this), and the reflection makes for them to become persons instead of mere individuals. The fact is being pertinaciously ignored that the human acknowledgement is fallible and provoking even crimes as in the Totalitarian systems (Tyrants were "loved" by masses in a strange manner indeed). Individuals can be hostage to racial, national, social and other prejudices, which are no less toxic only because cherished by mutually acknowledged individuals. Perhaps they *more toxic* for this very reason.

Hegelianism is not a historical curiosity. Allegedly:

> This truth is central for our faith that God accepts us with all our virtues and vices …. God loves us along with our failures and downfalls, and the same attitude is to be applied to our neighbors. That is why I cannot judge any persons.[324]

[324] Anerkennung als Lebensmotor, Von Astrid Mayerle | 13.11.2010

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Der Begriff Anerkennung spielt eine Rolle in der Philosophie eigentlich seit Johann Gottlieb Fichte, einem Philosophen des deutschen Idealismus, der am Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts in seiner Grundlegung der Rechtsphilosophie geschrieben hat, dass man ohne wechselseitige Anerkennung überhaupt kein richtiger Mensch sein kann, seiner selbst nicht richtig bewusst werden kann und die wechselseitige Anerkennung eine Selbstbeschränkung voraussetzt: Man muss den Anderen gelten lassen, um vom anderen wiederum anerkannt, bestätigt zu werden. Also die grundlegende Form ist der Gewaltverzicht und die Zustimmung zu den gleichen Rechten eines jeden. Das ist die Basis der Anerkennung, die für Fichte das Rechtsverhältnis begründet und ohne das kann man kein selbstbewusster Mensch sein."

Es geht also um einen wechselseitigen Austausch, ein kommunikatives Verhältnis. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel hat zum Kern seiner Philosophie der Anerkennung das Sich-spiegeln-im-Anderen gemacht, wörtlich, man „schaut sich in jedem als sich selbst an". Der Andere als Spiegel. Hegel hat sich in dem Zusammenhang auch mit dem Begriff der Nächstenliebe beschäftigt. Das christliche Modell der Nächstenliebe beinhaltet eine Variation der Vorstellung vom Sich-spiegeln-im-Anderen, denn der Mensch spiegelt sich genau genommen zweifach. Die bayerische Regionalbischöfin Susanne Breit-Kessler:

„Das Zentrum unseres Glaubens ist, dass Gott uns annimmt, wie wir sind, mit unseren guten und Schattenseiten, dass seine Liebe nichts ist, was man sich verdienen könnte oder sollte, sondern sie wird einem zugesagt und zugesprochen. Wenn diese Liebe mir zugesagt wird, wenn ich daran glaube, dass Gott mich liebt – mit all meinen Fehlern, mit allem, was ich kann, mit allem, worin ich gescheitert bin, dann gilt das natürlich meinem Nächsten auch. Und dann kann ich doch nicht hergehen und sagen, ich setze mich über Gott und urteile den

"Our faith" contradicts Scripture and the doctrinal definition of the Synod of Orange (529), but contradicts also the common reason, because it seems preposterous to accept the downfall of the Civilization in the Nazi Germany after 1933, and in the Soviet Russia after 1917. The mass murderers *must be judged*. We must discriminate between the culprits and their victims, even if the culprits had been commonly acknowledged and given thus a carte blanche to commit their felonies. *The gauge of the value of humanity is not immanent to humanity*. God does not need humans to be merciful, but we need the Supreme Judge lest we be simply unjust.

The desire to be acknowledged by God is fully rational and recommended by the First Epistle to Corinthians. The desire to be acknowledged by humans *might be* just under some special circumstances, but never unconditionally so.

Fuga seaculi (flight from the world) is spawn by the consciousness of our existing in the world stained by human vices. This consciousness is never absolute; it is specified by our attitude to the world. The source of liberation (of the real life) is to be sought beyond the human world. The human world can be, at least potentially, always alien to us in the perspective of obtaining the fullness of life it cannot give to us.[325]

The science-generating admiration is always accompanied by at least dim foreboding of the Ultimate Peace.[326] This way all people see God from distance.[327] Human reconciliation

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andern ab, mobbe ihn, gehe unfair mit ihm um. Also das ist eine ganz logische Konsequenz aus dieser Überzeugung, dass Gott uns Menschen liebt und uns mit seiner Liebe entgegenkommt."

[325] Summa Theologiae I, q. 65 a. 1 ad 3. Sed quod avertant a Deo, hoc est ex culpa eorum qui insipienter eis utuntur. Unde dicitur Sap. XIV, *quod creaturae factae sunt in muscipulam pedibus insipientium*. Et hoc ipsum quod sic a Deo abducunt, attestatur quod sunt a Deo.

Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 9 a. 4 c. Respondeo dicendum quod ad scientiam proprie pertinet rectum iudicium creaturarum. Creaturae autem sunt ex quibus homo occasionaliter a Deo avertitur, secundum illud Sap. XIV, *creaturae factae sunt in odium, et in muscipulam pedibus insipientium*, qui scilicet rectum iudicium de his non habent, dum aestimant in eis esse perfectum bonum; unde in eis finem constituendo, peccant et verum bonum perdunt. Et hoc damnum homini innotescit per rectum iudicium de creaturis, quod habetur per donum scientiae.

Super Iob, cap. 15. […] sapientibus enim solis terra data esse dicitur quia bonorum terrenorum ipsi sunt domini, utentes eis ad suum bonum, insipientes autem utuntur eis ad suum damnum, secundum illud Sap. XIV 11 *creaturae factae sunt in muscipulam pedibus insipientium*. Et iterum ad eorundem dignitatem ostendendam subdit et *non transibit alienus per eos*, quia videlicet hi qui sunt a sapientia alieni consortio sapientum annumerari non possunt; vel quia sapientes ab extraneis non suppeditantur: per illos enim alienus transire dicitur qui ab aliquo alieno vincuntur et subiciuntur.

[326] Contra Gentiles, III, 38.

[327] Super Io., cap. 1 l. 5. Et possumus hunc defectum cognitionis divinae referre vel ad naturam hominis, vel ad culpam. Ad naturam quidem, quia licet omnia haec praedicta auxilia data sint homini, ut ducatur in cognitionem Dei, tamen ratio humana in se deficiens est ab hac cognitione; Iob XXXVI, v. 25: *unusquisque intuetur eum procul*; et iterum ibi: *ecce Deus magnus vincens scientiam nostram*. Sed si aliqui eum cognoverunt, hoc fuit non inquantum fuerunt in mundo, sed inquantum fuerunt supra mundum, et tales quibus dignus non erat mundus, quia *mundus eum non cognovit*.

is considerably less valuable than God's peace. People can be "unanimous" if forced to (mobbed or blackmailed), but the inner inquietude testifies against the appearances.[328]

Affectively charged motivations accompany our mental life indeed, but it is by no means certain that they should not be reflected upon. The reflection seems to be *necessary* to discern between what animates our life really and what but decoys us into believing in the existence of "a better human world".

The fear of Lord is the beginning of the supernatural wisdom. The fear of what can potentially separate us from God is the beginning of the pathway of the intellect towards natural wisdom. It accompanies all our steps on the journey.

3. The canvas and the thread of life. The intuition of part and totality

The knowledge about the world might be always suspected to be but a particular insight into its material side. Thus, it does not, apparently, fulfil the desire for the fullness of knowledge. According to Thomas, human happiness is just this: the full insight into the Fullness of Being, but science is laborious rather than *directly* satisfying the desire. No one of the objects of the material world is able to fulfil the desire for the plenitude to be found only beyond this world. Each of them is good (as far as being), but even if the good satisfied our desire in a particular moment, the very evanescence of the sentiment would make it that the apprehension of the possible loss would render the good the apparent one. The more the present now is saturated with a particular good, the more painful the anticipation of its imminent loss.

Thus, apart from facts supposed to be but an incidental configuration of objects (Sachverhalt Wittgenstein speaks about) of the material world, an intuition of the all-encompassing reality happens to be sought. In it, the objects would appear to be something more than constitutive of the incidental facts. Facts happen to be unwelcome and denied for all the evidence to the contrary, and thus set against the background of the ideal (so as to seem less unwelcome). The background might prompt distorting them. The valuable seized that way become part of a Weltanschauung: a canvas of life to weave particular threads of events thereon.

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[328] Summa Theologiae II-II q. 29 a. 1 c. Respondeo dicendum quod pax includit concordiam et aliquid addit. Unde ubicumque est pax, ibi est concordia, non tamen ubicumque est concordia, est pax, si nomen pacis proprie sumatur. Concordia enim, proprie sumpta, est ad alterum, inquantum scilicet diversorum cordium voluntates simul in unum consensum conveniunt. Contingit etiam unius hominis cor tendere in diversa, et hoc dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, secundum diversas potentias appetitivas, sicut appetitus sensitivus plerumque tendit in contrarium rationalis appetitus, secundum illud ad Gal. V, *caro concupiscit adversus spiritum.* Alio modo, inquantum una et eadem vis appetitiva in diversa appetibilia tendit quae simul assequi non potest. Unde necesse est esse repugnantiam motuum appetitus. Unio autem horum motuum est quidem de ratione pacis, non enim homo habet pacatum cor quandiu, etsi habeat aliquid quod vult, tamen adhuc restat ei aliquid volendum quod simul habere non potest. Haec autem unio non est de ratione concordiae. Unde concordia importat unionem appetituum diversorum appetentium, pax autem, supra hanc unionem, importat etiam appetituum unius appetentis unionem.

According to Plato, the facts we face in the ordinary life are particular instantiations of the totality behind them; of objects which participate in/of Being. The objects appear-to-be, but they "exist" only; their being is precarious, but nevertheless real. The Platonic stance seemed untenable to Aristotle, but corrigible after all. The *destructive* reaction to the medieval Platonism of e.g. William of Champeaux in the 12th century gave rise to the modern nominalism.

The modern scientism originated in the moment William Ockham (in the 14th century) claimed that only individuals exist, and so radially individual that bereft of any common nature to be predicated about them. The nature of the individuals remained something of a mystery, as natures as such were supposed to not exist or at least to be non-cognoscible. The individuals in Aristotle are called first substances because sustaining both accidents and the special being of their proper natures (the latter are to be called the second substances for this reason). Science, according to Aristotle consists in assessing proper accidents (properties) of these substances, which might be called values also. An individual is a substance (it must be *something* anyhow) as far as it participates of the nature sharable with other ("similar") individuals. The individuals, however, are not similar because *appearing* so to us-humans, but because *acting* on each other. For instance, the human body can be affected by a purely mechanical impulse, but the more mechanical it is, the more likely it is about to harm it. It can only be *perfected* (affected not as just *a* body but as *the human* body) by those akin ontologically: the individuals of the same species or at least of the same genus. The first perfection thereof is biological life, and its species is defined by its individuals being able to produce fertile progeny. The truth becomes to be ignored in the moment all consequences of the radical nominalism appear. Individuals are, allegedly, able *to produce anything just because being radically individual*, and the indifference was about to be called inclusiveness. Facts are "isolated" to the point no *natural* interactions of beings in the world are expectable; they are intuited as such. Values (in that paradigm) exist but in the sphere of private motivations, but never in the core of nature.

Scientism provoked the reaction of the philosophy of subject at the turn of the 20th century, but the reaction was in fact a continuation of some motives immanent to the system of nominalism. The individuals can be called "monads" (Leibniz), and a special "thinking monad" given a privileged position. Husserl himself considered Hume (the notorious nominalist) to be one of the founders of phenomenology. Even if material individuals were to be ignored, the individual Ego could take their place. Still, it is as undefinable as the individuals of nominalists must be. It is intuited as individual. No biological human nature exists, but the existential one instead.

Accidents (in Aristotle) are rather individualized than individuals as such, because their whole being depends on the substances which sustain them. Substance is, etymologically, something which "stands under" accidents and its proper existence. S*ome* accidents are evanescent ("radically factual") with respect to the objects which might be nigh spatially but ontologically "remote". But some of them are so close to their natures that are to be called proper accidents. For instance, the sex of an animal must be so. Femininity and masculinity in humans must constitute their biological value.

Nominalism was notorious for ignoring the existence of *any* accidents, which is contrary to the common sense no doubt. The motive of relations (which are accidents

anyhow) is en vogue nowadays, but the *nature* of relations (them being just accidents) is permanently ignored. The simplest way to *imagine* what relations might be is to "intuit" threads of existence woven onto the canvas of being. The picture might satisfy the esthetical taste, but cannot fully satisfy the human desire for the real good. Life does not need to be "beautiful" so as to be valuable and accomplished.

The last category of accidents is, in Aristotle, the category of relative. "Relatives" are ("in English") apparently real. Science is a relative too, because its whole value consists in its bearing upon a transcendent thing; a relative, however, which can appear in a rational being only (animals get to know things, but their knowledge is never certain). There are relations amongst objects, no doubt, but originally pair relations *between* what perfects and what is perfected in the natural way. The individuals are thus connected via proper accidents, if the connection is to be perfective of substances. Incidental interactions can be only destructive.

Wittgenstein accepts (in the spirit of nominalism) the so called logical atomism, which adds up to denying the existence of proper accidents. Perfection is the name of freedom, but in Wittgenstein the "freedom" is tantamount to the future facts being indefinite (Tractatus, 5. 1362). The world was dissected into isolated (atomic) facts. But, as no one is able to live in such a "scattered reality", the philosophy of the individual *Ego* supplements the drawbacks of the philosophy of individual *facts*. The individual *Ego* founds an autonomous "reality"; a safe abode for its ("unique") individuality. The fact (of the "birth of the "reality") becomes evident in the very moment one of the "individuals" decides to put down (in a book) a self-coherent system of statements (stamped with the mark of his/her individuality). Apparently, no one can write a book composed of "isolated facts", because the sentences in it are expressive of their mutual connections. No matter how staunch an advocate of nominalism, he/she must become the advocate of the philosophy of subject in the moment he/she realizes the fact. The unity of the "thinking monad" as well as its self-intuition (present in Nicolas of Autrécourt already) must be privileged.

Books, thus, were expected to contain something more than "naked facts": they contained (allegedly) some "values". The facts scientism speaks of are similar to the mythical Proteus: incomprehensible and alien. But there must be something which I really care for when e.g. writing a book (even if the writing be factual). The "modern" values were expected to exist beyond the facts.

Scheler deems the values to be interwoven into the fabric of the all-encompassing Weltanschauung in the way a sentence of a well composed book must form its integral part. The Weltanschauung is the intuition of totality. It might have successfully replaced the Aristotelian science, if the science had been no more than just a book it is actually contained in. Weltanschauung is, however, a *sum*, not a structure. It is but a substitute of science.

The classical science is certain, whereas the modern one is, by the form nominalists allotted it, provisional only. Obviously, it cannot satisfy the intellect craving for certitude. That is why the substitute of the certitude phenomenology provided seemed so attractive.

The particular science has a good reason to decline the answer to general questions. The questions, however, happen to (be tried) be asked (which is an indubitable fact), and thus expected to be answered or at least listened to. The blank space was filled by the philosophy of subject with its intuition of totality. The indubitable fact had been ignored that the same questions had been answered better some centuries earlier. The first philosophy (metaphysics)

was the supreme science. It directed the other sciences, but could not encompass them all and become a Weltanschauung or ideology. It proved to be less "attractive".

The totality of the mutually interacting transcendent things was called by ancients the universe (τὸ πᾶν). It is the subject matter of Physics (the philosophy of nature). There is, however, above it, the supreme science (first philosophy) called metaphysics. It considers the relation of the totality to its Transcendent Cause (the one not related to the universe).

The system of relations the Aristotelian Physics speaks of is more than a world picture (Weltbild). The objects it tackles exist naturally and are naturally related too. They are more than what is merely depicted on the canvas of the Weltanschauung. The fabric of the universe is, thus, rather a pathway to the Transcendence, which is only discoverable by the reasoning intellect. No intuition can grasp it.

The picture (which might be called form; eidos; in a sense) is the lasts (and the least important) species of the category of quality. Relations which follow natural actions must qualify the human existence (perfect it), but the picture cannot satisfy save their aesthetical taste. The picture/figure might be called a canvas, and the particular relations might be imagined to be interwoven in its fabric (intuited so). Normally, relations are *imagined* to be just this: a net of threads possibly integrated into a totality. But the real relations (non-intuitively known) qualify the human existence; perfect it. No matter how ambitious its objective, the Aristotelian Physics was never intended to provide any insight into the totality. The insight, as it seems, would engulf completely our attention. The personal existence might be called metaphorically an Ariadne's thread, and the thread is expected to lead *beyond* the maze of the universe.

The totality, if related to what exists beyond it, is the subject matter of the supreme science. Now, the human intellect and the will can only find complete rest in what "is beyond". On the other hand, if the Transcendent Reality were despaired to be obtained, the desire would rest (for some time) on any incidental/casual object whatever.

The desire *naturally* rests in what is discovered by the intellect. The desire for the fullness to be found *beyond the actual* scope of life can be frustrated. It must be eventually so if its object is imagined (intuited) only.

Aristotle distinguishes between the natural and unnatural rest. If having despaired to obtain the indubitable value, the human will inclines to a "private" totality. The rest in it is proper to idolatry. The human will should rest in God only or in what is indubitably related to Him. That is why Augustin says: solo Deo fruendum. But the artificially roused desire happens to be attached to incidental objects. Eidolon is a diminutive of eidos (the real object). The attachment gives rise to idolatry if eidolon is worshiped instead of God (latreuein means to worship in Greek).

The rest the marital bliss consists in is the effect of the fertile relation of the espoused. The rest called happiness is, analogically, caused by the act of spiritual fertility of moral actions. The rest in a *depicted* reality degrades the animal or spiritual fertility alike and occasions incidental actions. There is natural desire for e.g. water and the unnatural one for e.g. for sugared drink, and the rest in respective objects too called hydration and dehydration. The unnatural jars with the sense of propriety, but people can get use to no matter how

irksome accidents[329] provided they are exposed to them uninterruptedly (they seem unavoidable then). The very interruption, on the other hand, would prove them avoidable and possibly undesirable or even loathsome.

The effects of idolatry are listed in Rom. 1-19 ss. The corporeal transgression against biological nature is the penalty for the spiritual transgression against God (idolatry is this). It might be so, because effects are more perceptible (painful) than causes. This way, generally, one transgression might be a punishment for the other.[330] What more hurts is the punishment for what is more serious. It is so, however, indirectly only, because turning against God (the source of every good) in the act of the worship of the creature (instead of Creator) (finding rest therein) is in fact refusing to accept the help of God. So as to cope with the shameful we should first abnegate the wicked (they are both heinous, but in a different sense).

> Since it is essential to punishment that it be against the will, a sin whereby another sin is punished needs to be more manifest, in order that it may make the man more hateful to himself and to others; but it need not be a more grievous sin: and in this way the sin against nature is less grievous than the sin of idolatry. But since it is more manifest, it is assigned as a fitting punishment of the sin of idolatry, in order that, as by idolatry man abuses the order of the divine honor, so by the sin against nature he may suffer confusion from the abuse of his own nature.[331]
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> We may speak of sin in two ways: first, in its essence, as such; second, as to that which is accidental thereto. Sin as such can nowise be the punishment of another. Because sin considered in its essence is something proceeding from the will, for it is from this that it derives the character of guilt. Whereas punishment is essentially something against the will … Consequently it is evident that sin regarded in its essence can nowise be the punishment of sin.
>
> On the other hand, sin can be the punishment of sin accidentally … when one sin is the cause of another, by removing an impediment thereto. For passions, temptations of the devil, and the like are causes of sin, but are impeded by the help of Divine grace which is withdrawn on account of sin. Wherefore since the withdrawal of grace is a punishment, and is from God,

[329] Summa Theologiae I-IIae q. 34 a. 2 c …that which is not good in itself, may be good in respect of some individual … because it is suitable to him by reason of a disposition in which he is now, which disposition, however, is not natural …

[330] Summa Theologiae I-IIae q. 87 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc etiam quod aliqui puniuntur a Deo, dum permittit eos in aliqua peccata profluere, ad bonum virtutis ordinatur. Quandoque quidem etiam ipsorum qui peccant, cum scilicet post peccatum humiliores et cautiores resurgunt. Semper autem est ad emendationem aliorum, qui videntes aliquos ruere de peccato in peccatum, magis reformidant peccare. In aliis autem duobus modis, manifestum est quod poena ordinatur ad emendationem quia hoc ipsum quod homo laborem et detrimentum patitur in peccando, natum est retrahere homines a peccato.

[331] Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 94 a. 3 ad 3. Ad tertium dicendum quod quia de ratione poenae est quod sit contra voluntatem, peccatum per quod aliud punitur oportet esse magis manifestum, ut ex hoc homo sibi ipsi et aliis detestabilis reddatur, non autem oportet quod sit gravius. Et secundum hoc, peccatum contra naturam minus est quam peccatum idololatriae, sed quia est manifestius, ponitur quasi conveniens poena peccati idololatriae, ut scilicet, sicut homo per idololatriam pervertit ordinem divini honoris, ita per peccatum contra naturam propriae naturae confusibilem perversitatem patiatur.

> …the result is that the sin which ensues from this is also a punishment accidentally. It is in this sense that the Apostle speaks (Rom 1:24) when he says: *Wherefore God gave them up to the desires of their heart*, i.e., to their passions; because, to wit, when men are deprived of the help of Divine grace, they are overcome by their passions. In this way sin is always said to be the punishment of a preceding sin (Fathers of the English Dominican Province). [332]

Science happens to be actually worshiped in the modern world, be it the exact science, which is expected to liberate "humanity" from no matter how serious predicaments, be it the philosophy of subject which creates a "glass bubble" to live in and to separate from any transcendent ("irksome") reality ("facts".

Albeit the relations of the material objects are themselves immaterial (otherwise those spatial could not have been considered in mathematics), they are scarcely imaginable as an autonomous being in the *classical* philosophy. Science can only be worshiped if degraded to the form of Weltanschauung or ideology, in which imagination counts for reason.

Relations can only exist amongst substances. The human relation between a son and the father cannot be self-subsistent, obviously enough. The relation results from the natural act of procreation (biological fertility) and is completed (in family) by the act of spiritual fertility called education (imparting values is this). Not even in God, can the Self-Subsistent Relations (Persons) be severed from God's nature.

The relations happened, however, to be absolutized in Marxism (imagined what they cannot be in reality; a canvas to spin on). This way man was called the supreme value, albeit bereft of a natural substratum to sustain it (his "supremacy" is being rationed institutionally). Moreover, humanity happens to be a project of a (potentially murderous) ideology. The human idols demand a human sacrifice. On the altar of the social progress, biological existence of the unborn, the terminally ill, or simply "unhappy" is laid.

The existence of the perfect Man has the absolute value since it was effected by the Logos of God assuming the human nature, having before existed in the Divine one. The

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[332] Summa Theologiae I-IIae q. 87 a. 2 c. Respondeo dicendum quod de peccato dupliciter loqui possumus, per se, et per accidens. Per se quidem nullo modo peccatum potest esse poena peccati. Peccatum enim per se consideratur secundum quod egreditur a voluntate, sic enim habet rationem culpae. De ratione autem poenae est quod sit contra voluntatem, ut in primo habitum est. Unde manifestum est quod nullo modo, per se loquendo, peccatum potest esse poena peccati. Per accidens autem peccatum potest esse poena peccati, tripliciter. Primo quidem, ex parte causae quae est remotio prohibentis. Sunt enim causae inclinantes ad peccatum passiones, tentatio Diaboli, et alia huiusmodi; quae quidem causae impediuntur per auxilium divinae gratiae, quae subtrahitur per peccatum. Unde cum ipsa subtractio gratiae sit quaedam poena, et a Deo, ut supra dictum est; sequitur quod per accidens etiam peccatum quod ex hoc sequitur, poena dicatur. Et hoc modo loquitur apostolus, Rom. I, dicens, *propter quod tradidit eos Deus in desideria cordis eorum*, quae sunt animae passiones, quia scilicet deserti homines ab auxilio divinae gratiae, vincuntur a passionibus. Et hoc modo semper peccatum dicitur esse poena praecedentis peccati. Alio modo ex parte substantiae actus, quae afflictionem inducit, sive sit actus interior, ut patet in ira et invidia; sive actus exterior, ut patet cum aliqui gravi labore opprimuntur et damno, ut expleant actum peccati, secundum illud Sap. V, *lassati sumus in via iniquitatis*. Tertio modo, ex parte effectus, ut scilicet aliquod peccatum dicatur poena respectu effectus consequentis. Et his duobus ultimis modis, unum peccatum non solum est poena praecedentis peccati, sed etiam sui.

Divine Persons are to be called Relations,[333] but cannot be imagined to exist apart from the Divine Nature (in an idealized form). There is one Divine Nature; there are two processions (acts productive of Persons), and Three Divine Persons. The processions of the Divine intellect and the will are the exemplar of the analogous activity in man.

The supreme value, for man, consists in participating in/of the Divine nature (2 P 1. 4) and the inner life of Trinity. The Trinity is transcendent (existing beyond the universe and "more real" than it).

The effects of the creative actions of God are called reality in the ordinary sense of the word. But there is, apart from creation, a recreation of man too. The effects of the Trinitary actions of God are scarcely perceptible in the human history, but not less real for that reason. The way God acts so cannot be comprehended by the human intellect,[334] but the existence of God beyond the world must be comprehended. The fact that He exist is conditionally necessary: it is necessary to say that He exists if anything else might be said to exist. The fact can be known with certitude the first philosophy provides. God must be known to exist beyond the universe before He can be tried to be understood to act in the universe according to His Trinitary nature. The Three Self-Subsisting Relatives share the same Divine nature. They are not "idealized archetypes" of the existence of human relativeness, but the real Source of human existence. God must not be the supreme value, because He cannot be a value at all, as the *real cause* of every genuine value.

On the *finite* search for the *Infinite* Subject, science does need not to be abandoned, but rather appreciated to the point of granting its maximalist character. Metaphysics is a science par excellence and theology too, provided they are both built on the principles given in Posterior Analytics. Without them both, human relativeness (humans being in relations) would degrade to the form of vulgar relativism: the assumption that nature and its nature properties (values) do not exists save in imagination only.

The way to relativism was paved in the moment Kant separated the practical and theoretical reason to the effect of relations being rather "sensed" (intuited in a special way) than understood. In fact, anything whatsoever can be sensed so, and "private sets of values" might appear.

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[333] Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 23 q. 1 a. 3 c. Et ideo dico, quod persona in divinis significat relationem per modum substantiae. Ipsa enim relatio, quae est distinguens, est distinctum, quia paternitas est pater. Et quia persona significat quid distinctum existens in natura aliqua, ideo constat quod significat relationem, inquantum ipsa relatio est ad ipsum relatum, et inquantum ipsum relatum est subsistens in tali natura.

[334] Vaticanum I, Dei Filius, c. 4, (Denzinger, 1796). And, indeed, reason illustrated by faith, when it zealously, piously, and soberly seeks, attains with the help of God some understanding of the mysteries, and that a most profitable one …; nevertheless, it is never capable of perceiving those mysteries in the way it does the truths which constitute its own proper object. For, divine mysteries by their nature exceed the created intellect so much that, even when handed down by revelation and accepted by faith, they nevertheless remain covered by the veil of faith itself, and wrapped in a certain mist, as it were, as long as in this mortal life, "we are absent from the Lord: for we walk by faith and not by sight" [II Cor. 5:6 f.]. (Denzinger, The Sources of Catholic Dogma, Translated by Roy J. Deferrari from the Thirtieth Edition of Henry Denzinger's Enchiridion Symbolorum).

Ethics, in Thomas and Aristotle, is not an "autonomous" science. It is subordinate (subalterna) to the supreme science. The threads of life must be woven into a compact fabric. The certitude of the supreme science is indispensable. Metaphysics shows all the treads to lead to the Transcendent Cause.

It is an indubitable fact that humans seek for happiness (even if they call it by other names, ashamed, as it were, of the naivety of the old), but it is a *deplorable* fact that they happen often to fail to ask for its Source. A "beautiful life" depicted on the canvas of an ideology was expected to suffice. But images do not have causes; they have authors only. The real things, to the contrary, even if imagined, must have some causes.

The conclusions of the supreme science (metaphysics and theology are this respectively to their proper subjects) are, at the same time, the principles of constructing the "syllogism of life" which is considerably more than a picture of life. The canvas of life can be pictured in imagination, and mass media might be expected to provide a picture a personal existence to find one's proper place therein. The picture, however, is representative of free play of imagination rather than an effect of intellectual work. The imagination is creative of manifold modern types of representation. The representation is (as Aristotle says) pleasurable as such. The problem is, however, what the representation corresponds to.

The system of relations classical philosophy speaks of cannot be admired to the point of being worshiped, but the philosophy which claims the possibility to intuit the totality is bound to do so.

After Kant, the knowledge about facts (intuited in the ordinary way) has been separated from the knowledge of values (intuited in "special" way). Moore speaks about "naturalistic error" of those who would try to reconcile the thus separated. The separation does not exist in the classical philosophy, because nature as such aims at good and the humans do so also if following their *rational* nature. According to Plato, nature aims always at what is better and its processes are never incidental/casual. Rejecting the teleology of nature is to be called misology. Plato anticipated the possibility of the hatred towards reason, which might appear in consequence of the autonomy of morals.

> I heard some one reading … that mind was the disposer and cause of all, and I was delighted at this notion, which appeared quite admirable, and I said to myself: If mind is the disposer, mind will dispose all for the best, and put each particular in the best place; and I argued that if any one desired to find out the cause of the generation or destruction or existence of anything, he must find out what state of being or doing or suffering was best for that thing, and therefore a man had only to consider the best for himself and others, and then he would also know the worse, since the same science comprehended both. And I rejoiced to think that I had found … a teacher of the causes of existence … and then he would teach me the nature of the best and show that this was best … What expectations I had formed, and how grievously was I disappointed! As I proceeded, I found my philosopher altogether forsaking mind or any other principle of order, but having recourse to air, and ether, and water, and other eccentricities. I might compare him to a person who began by maintaining generally that mind is the cause of the actions of Socrates, but who, when he endeavoured to explain the causes of my several actions in detail, went on to show that I sit here because my body is made up of bones and muscles; and the bones, as he would say, are hard and have joints which divide them, and the muscles are elastic, and they cover the bones, which have also a covering or environment of flesh and skin which contains them; and as the bones are lifted at their joints by the

> contraction or relaxation of the muscles, I am able to bend my limbs, and this is why I am sitting here in a curved posture—that is what he would say, and he would have a similar explanation of my talking to you, which he would attribute to sound, and air, and hearing, and he would assign ten thousand other causes of the same sort, forgetting to mention the true cause, which is, that the Athenians have thought fit to condemn me, and accordingly I have thought it better and more right to remain here and undergo my sentence (Phaedo; c. XLVI; XLVII).[335]

The simplest form of the canvas of life seemed to many the three dimensional space mathematics speaks of. All events must be weaved thereon. The "body is made up of bones and muscles"; they "have joints which divide them, and the muscles are elastic, and they cover the bones", etc., because mathematics allows to explain them so. Mathematics satisfies *some* intellects to *some extent*, but in the moment it fails to satisfy them *fully*, some new "dimensions of life" are sought. Thus, some "special" forms of intuition promise to fulfil the desire. Irrationalism must follow. Practically, however, irrationalism equals relativism.

Kant believed in that mathematics uses a special kind of intuition. The prominent philosophers of modernity advocate the *absolute* primacy of intuition.

> "To philosophize is to place oneself with the object by the exercise of intuition" (H. Bergson, Einfűhrung in die Metaphysik, Jena 1901, p. 26). [336]

> a properly philosophical intuition … serves to open up an endless field of work together with a science that, without any symbolizing or mathematical methods, without an apparatus of inferences and proofs, nevertheless obtains a wealth of knowledge quite rigorous and decisive for all further philosophy" (E. Husserl, Philosphie als stregne Wissenschaft", Logos I, (1910/11, p. 341).[337]

> Die Phänomenologie […] ihr Feld ist die Analyse des in unmittelbarer Intuition aufweisbaren Apriori, die Fixierung unmittelbar einfichtiger Wesen und Wesenszufammenhänge und ihre deskriptive Erkenntnis in dem systematischen Verbande aller Schichten im transzendental reinen Bewußtfein.[338]

The "endless field of work" (Husserl speaks of) must be taken in its naked wording: the endless lacks any definite bearing on what can sustain it. The infinite (if taken "abstractedly" enough in metaphysics) can satisfy the human intellect (God is infinite in the eminent sense of the word). However, the *infinity of the ways* towards the consummation precludes, practically, the possibility of consummation. Husserl himself uses the term of Umwertung notorious for Nietzsche.

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[335] Phaedo By Plato, Translated by Benjamin Jowett. The Project Gutenberg EBook of Phaedo, by Plato. Access 2026-05-12 https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1658/1658-h/1658-h.htm

[336] Moritz Schlick, General Theory of Knowledge, transl. by A. E. Blumberg, Wien-Ney York 1974, p. 82.

[337] Ibidem.

[338] Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie, Halle 1913; § 134. Apophantifche Formenlehre.

The infinity of the object of the human hope and the infinity of the subject matter of the supreme science satisfies the human intellect, because it provides it the natural rest. The infinity of the "threads" of the life renders it restless (bereft of the natural rest) and its actions incidental/casual.

The proof of the existence of God known from Thomas' Summas is more than just a proof. It is a way. Philosophy puts up with a naked fact: there is a Cause beyond the universe, but a corollary is added: the cause is to be identified with what all people call God[339] (the Cause of happiness). It is called so by all who live according to how humans should live: reasoning and deciding. Degradation of the intellectual in man must results in the total disintegration of life, because the intellect is the principle of integrating emotions *directly*, and of the bodily existence indirectly (the latter depends wholly on the order imposed thereby). The human nature is a homeostat: the impairment of its most important part results in shattering the equilibrium of the whole structure. A toothache can hamper the ordinary work. The misology must hamper the whole activity, because the intellect naturally dominates.

The supreme science (scientia subalternans) subordinates everything to the cognizance of God;[340] statements and decisions alike. It "defines" everything this way: in the relation to the ultimate destiny of man: the happiness in God.

The supreme, however, is not defined in the relation to its inferiors. Neither is the self-subsistent so in relation to the contingent (the non-self-subsistent). Leibniz's proof of the existence of God ex contingentia mundi contains petitio principii. The natural relations (contrary to the mathematical one) are asymmetric. The relations of effects to their proper causes are asymmetric indeed. Some relations can be, to be sure, imagined and thus interwoven onto the canvas of life, but the natural ones cannot be so. The relation of an effect to the cause marks the beginning of the way of the intellect towards the ultimate.

Scheler attacks Kant for his formalism, but the negation of falsity does not always make for veracity, unless the presupposition of the basic error is rejected. Kant presupposes the necessity of intuition, albeit restricts it to the intuition of exact sciences. Scheler *extends* the role of intuition instead of restricting its scope to the syllogism-founding anchinoia Aristotle speaks of. Scheler extols the value of the Middle Ages, but does not seem to grasp in what its real value consists. It was the intellectualism built on the narrowly restricted form of "intuition".

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[339] Summa Theologiae I, q. 2 a. 3 c. Hic autem non est procedere in infinitum, quia sic non esset aliquod primum movens; et per consequens nec aliquod aliud movens, quia moventia secunda non movent nisi per hoc quod sunt mota a primo movente, sicut baculus non movet nisi per hoc quod est motus a manu. Ergo necesse est devenire ad aliquod primum movens, quod a nullo movetur, et hoc omnes intelligunt Deum. Secunda via est ex ratione causae efficientis.

[340] Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 25 n. 9. Ordinantur igitur artes practicae ad speculativas, et similiter omnis humana operatio ad speculationem intellectus, sicut ad finem. In omnibus autem scientiis et artibus ordinatis ad illam videtur pertinere ultimus finis quae est praeceptiva et architectonica aliarum: sicut ars gubernatoria, ad quam pertinet finis navis, qui est usus ipsius, est architectonica et praeceptiva respectu navisfactivae. Hoc autem modo se habet philosophia prima ad alias scientias speculativas, nam ab ipsa omnes aliae dependent, utpote ab ipsa accipientes sua principia, et directionem contra negantes principia: ipsaque prima philosophia tota ordinatur ad Dei cognitionem sicut ad ultimum finem, unde et scientia divina nominatur.

Facts (facta) are so called because they are effects of what acts (factor) for the sake of a definite end.[341] The reasonableness of the motives of the human actions does not always strike our eyes,[342] but grasping the motives can help understanding (and possibly preventing) the actions (in the future). The actions of men might be difficult to comprehend, because lacking indubitably rational motives. The contrary is the case with God's actions. The effects (factura) of the Creator (factoris caeli et terrae) are indubitably purposeful.[343] "Divine facts, especially miracles and prophecies which, because they clearly show forth the omnipotence and infinite knowledge of God, are most certain signs of a divine revelation, and are suited to the intelligence of all" (Vaticanum I, Dei Filius, c. 3, Denzinger, 1790).[344]

People, however, might turn away from facts either because they seem personally inconvenient or *should so* because distorted (seized in a reductionist way). Anything, as it might seem, can be "depicted" on the canvas of the universe the modern Weltanschauung offers. Some facts might be abhorrent really until seen sub specie aeternitatis. The modern Weltanschauung provides its Ersatz (the coign of vantage of tradition is not willingly accepted). The reality might appear to be even "brutal", although the brutality is in fact the lack of rationality (a Mr. Hyde might be always hidden in who rejects reason). It might appear so if bereft of its Principle.

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[341] Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 3 n. 2. Inde enim manifestum est omne agens agere propter finem, quia quodlibet agens tendit ad aliquod determinatum. Id autem ad quod agens determinate tendit, oportet esse conveniens ei: non enim tenderet in ipsum nisi propter aliquam convenientiam ad ipsum.

[342] Summa Theologiae I-IIae q. 1 a. 1 c. Respondeo dicendum quod actionum quae ab homine aguntur, illae solae proprie dicuntur humanae, quae sunt propriae hominis inquantum est homo. Differt autem homo ab aliis irrationalibus creaturis in hoc, quod est suorum actuum dominus. Unde illae solae actiones vocantur proprie humanae, quarum homo est dominus. Est autem homo dominus suorum actuum per rationem et voluntatem, unde et liberum arbitrium esse dicitur facultas voluntatis et rationis. Illae ergo actiones proprie humanae dicuntur, quae ex voluntate deliberata procedunt. Si quae autem aliae actiones homini conveniant, possunt dici quidem hominis actiones; sed non proprie humanae, cum non sint hominis inquantum est homo. Manifestum est autem quod omnes actiones quae procedunt ab aliqua potentia, causantur ab ea secundum rationem sui obiecti. Obiectum autem voluntatis est finis et bonum. Unde oportet quod omnes actiones humanae propter finem sint.

[343] Contra Gentiles, lib. 2 cap. 23 n. 6. Adhuc. Deum agere propter finem ex hoc manifestum esse potest quod universum non est a casu, sed ad aliquod bonum ordinatur: ut per philosophum patet, in XI metaphysicae.
Primum autem agens propter finem oportet esse agens per intellectum et voluntatem: ea enim quae intellectu carent, agunt propter finem sicut in finem ab alio directa.

Summa Theologiae I, q. 44 a. 4 c. Respondeo dicendum quod omne agens agit propter finem, alioquin ex actione agentis non magis sequeretur hoc quam illud, nisi a casu. Est autem idem finis agentis et patientis, inquantum huiusmodi, sed aliter et aliter, unum enim et idem est quod agens intendit imprimere, et quod patiens intendit recipere. Sunt autem quaedam quae simul agunt et patiuntur, quae sunt agentia imperfecta, et his convenit quod etiam in agendo intendant aliquid acquirere. Sed primo agenti, qui est agens tantum, non convenit agere propter acquisitionem alicuius finis; sed intendit solum communicare suam perfectionem, quae est eius bonitas. Et unaquaeque creatura intendit consequi suam perfectionem, quae est similitudo perfectionis et bonitatis divinae. Sic ergo divina bonitas est finis rerum omnium.

[344] Denzinger The Sources of Catholic Dogma Translated by Roy J. Deferrari from the Thirtieth Edition of Henry Denzinger's Enchiridion Symbolorum.

The ancient philosophers coped with the similar problem of the status of the universe, although they did not have to cope with artificial ideas interwoven into its fabric. Naturalism bid Stoics to accept the existence of finality in the core of nature so that the human destiny seemed to be granted *some* place therein. Happiness seemed to be possible to obtain so even if not so high as in Aristotle. They failed to accept (prove) the existence of the transcendent Cause of the universe, but found a modest place therein for humans after all. The stance was, at bottom, rational, albeit minimalist nonetheless.

The situation changed dramatically in the moment Hegel claimed consciousness to be a supernatural being. Naturalism might be questioned because one-sided. The Hegelian anti-naturism precludes the possibility to search anything beyond nature, because the place-beyond has been annexed by human consciousness.

Thomas proves that all facts must be under absolute control of the Creator of the universe so that no reason appears to be afraid on any of them provided they are *naked* facts. The facts depend on God's will, but a certain order of dependence makes it that, apart from the mere will of God, natural causes are to be sought in particular sciences and free (natural) actions undertaken. The particular objects are mutually ordained and thus can be known to be so even if the Ultimate Cause of the totality is yet unknown. This concerns the common providence, which governs all the universe,[345] as well as a special providence called predestination: ordaining man to the supernatural end. Obviously, the predestination does not preclude the necessity of the natural order of causes even if the necessity is conditioned by God Himself.[346] Actions are necessary so as to obtain the ultimate end; otherwise the end could have never been known to be ultimate really. Passive submission apparently does no suffice, because the passiveness makes the passive unable to understand the nature of the subject they willingly submit to. Humans can submit themselves thus to *the idea* of God which they entertain in their minds, but ignore God himself. Deeds are needed so as to obtain the end, because they are pre-known by God to be accomplished and thus are meritorious. If God is *really* omnipotent, He can create both this man and his free and meritorious deeds, without, however, depriving him of the authorship of the deeds. Admittedly, *the idea of God*

[345] Summa Theologiae I, q. 103 a. 5 ad 2. Hoc autem modo non gubernantur a Deo creaturae irrationales, quae tantum aguntur, et non agunt. Cum ergo apostolus dicit quod Deo non est cura de bobus, non totaliter subtrahit boves a cura gubernationis divinae; sed solum quantum ad modum qui proprie competit rationali creaturae.

[346] Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 40 q. 1 a. 2 c. Addit autem ad minus tria: unum ex parte ipsorum praedestinatorum: quia cum providentia Dei sit respectu omnium, et specialiter quodammodo sit respectu habentium voluntatem, praedestinatio includit in se providentiam secundum illum specialem modum quo est hominum, et habentium voluntatem. Secundum addit ex parte ipsius finis et eorum quae habentur ut promoventia ad finem; cum enim providentia respiciat ordinem uniuscujusque boni ad quemlibet finem, praedestinatio est tantum respectu eorum quae sunt elevata supra facultatem naturae, ut gloriae, quae est in perfecta Dei fruitione, et gratiae promoventis in ipsam; unde dicit Damascenus, quod praedestinatio est eorum quae non sunt in nobis. Tertium addit ex parte ipsius praedestinantis, ex cujus parte videtur duo addere: primo, quia providentia est idem quod ars gubernationis rerum, quae secundum rationem sui nominis potest salvari in speculatione tantum; sed praedestinatio importat providentiam, secundum quod est ordinata ad executionem operis per voluntatem; et ideo definitur per propositum et per praeparationem: secundo addit praescientiam exitus ex parte ejus quod providetur; unde potest aliquid ab ordine providentiae quantum ad id quod intentum est, exire; sicut Deus vult omnes homines salvos fieri, licet non omnes salventur: non autem ab ordine praedestinationis.

would have been unable to do this: as a section of the reality defined as to its form (dimension) by the position to the other subsections thereof. There are, however, no reasons to *believe in the idea* of God instead of God. God's will is so not so absolute that unpredictable.

There is a consequence in God's actions, because God's nature is unchangeable. The same consequence must be observed in human actions as far as human will should conform to the will of God. We return to God on the same way He came to us,[347] which might be called the mystery of predestination.[348]

God is not indebted to humans, but is indebted indeed to the fulfillment of the end intended by Him.[349] He "reacts" (so to say), not because compelled by us, but because the perfection of His nature demands a certain order of His actions (without compulsion normally so called).[350] The way out of the labyrinth of life is the way He showed us Himself. There is an Icon on the way. She can be intuited so as to not despair on the way.

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[347] Louis-Marie Grignon de Montfort, Treatise on the True Devotion to the Blessed Virgin , transl. by F. W. Faber, London 1863. Pt 5, Ch. 5. 2.
Access 2026-10-29 https://librivox.org/a-treatise-on-the-true-devotion-to-the-blessed-virgin-by-louis-marie-grignon-de-montfort/

[348] Traite de la vraie devotion a la Sainte Vierge (1) « preparation au regne de Jesus-Christ » Saint Louis-Marie Grignion de Montfort

[32] Il en est dans l'ordre de la grâce comme dans la nature. Marie met au monde la tête et les membres, la tête du Corps Mystique Jésus-Christ, et les membres les prédestinés.

[40] Beaucoup de Pères ont pensé que la dévotion à la Très Sainte Vierge était nécessaire au salut. Ne pas avoir cette dévotion est une marque infaillible de réprobation, l'avoir est une marque infaillible de prédestination.

St. Louis De Montfort, The Secret of Mary. Tan Books An Imprint of Saint Benedict Press, LLC Charlotte, North Carolina.
Introduction. A secret of sanctity. Conditions 1. Predestinate soul, here is a secret the Most High has taught me, which I have not been able to find in any book, old or new. I confide it to you, by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, on condition: 1° That you communicate it only to those who deserve it by their prayers, their alms-deeds and mortifications, by the persecutions they suffer, by their detachment from the world and their zeal for the salvation of souls.
A TREATISE THE TRUE DEVOTION TO THE BLESSED VIRGIN.
by the venerable servant of God, LOUIS-MARIE, GRIGNON DE MONTFORT.
translated from the original french by Frederick William FABER, D.D. priest of the Oratory.
London: 1863. Preface to the French edition.

God wishes that His holy Mother should now be more known, more loved, more honoured, than ever she has been ; and this will no doubt come to pass, if the predestinate will enter, by the grace and light of the Holy Ghost, into the interior and perfect practice which I will discover to them.

[349] Contra Gentiles, lib. 2 cap. 28 n. 15. Tertio, ut in unaquaque creatura sumatur conditionale debitum ex suis partibus et proprietatibus et accidentibus, ex quibus dependet creatura quantum ad esse vel quantum ad aliquam sui perfectionem: sicut, supposito quod Deus hominem facere vellet, debitum ex hac suppositione fuit ut animam et corpus in eo coniungeret, et sensus, et alia huiusmodi adiumenta, tam intrinseca quam extrinseca, ei praeberet. In quibus omnibus, si recte attenditur, Deus creaturae debitor non dicitur, sed suae dispositioni implendae.

[350] Summa Theologiae I-IIae q. 112 a. 3 c. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, praeparatio ad hominis gratiam est a Deo sicut a movente, a libero autem arbitrio sicut a moto. Potest igitur praeparatio

Philosophy is not absolutely indispensable on the way, but it might prove to be conditionally (actually) so. Some unwelcome circumstances might occur; facts not naked, but clad with false pretenses (interpreted this way). Some perverse statements happen to be uttered which threaten to disrupt the thread of our rational life. The errors of philosophers are more than just philosophical (Denzinger, 1642,3).

4. The total subjectivity. Intuition and particular reason

Had reality been a text – as Heidegger assumes in the spirit of Islam – some "key-words" normally to be found at the end of a book could of use in deciphering its contests ("the book of nature"). The "great" words are commonly called "ideas" creative of the human existence, which is to say: of humanity, because hostile for those "cynically" rejecting their grandiose purport (impervious to it). The ideas were supposed by some to be endowed with a demiurgic power (for building humanity), but proved powerless (or destructive) for individuals who were about to envisage them critically or with indifference. They are rather creative of the total subjectivity of humanity than of a personal beatitude of individuals. The two objectives in fact collide with each other.

Good is – according to Neo-Platonists – diffusive of itself (bonum est diffusivum sui). The formula does not specify the mode of diffusion and thus allow various interpretations, albeit it is mostly assumed that it is incompatible with how Bible describes creation: calling into existence out of nothing. In the spirit of Neo-Platonism, Kant places the good in the sphere of the "non-empirical". Striving for good is not (in Kant) a return to the source of existence.

Kant enumerates four great ideas, and the idea of God is but one of them. The very number might not be particularly relevant, but it is essential that they all cannot be creative in the way Bible says God is. According to Kant, they cannot (moreover) be intuited in the way the objects of science must be. Perhaps, they are intuited in some special way, anyhow.

Before Kant's reform, it had been accepted that no good is desired unless previously known (to be good). If understood this way, good might be called a value (bonum intellectum), because of the logical value of the theoretical statement which underpins it. The "modern paradigm" of values appeared in the moment this natural dependence was questioned. Anyhow, the "modern" values are not knowable in the way e.g. physical facts can be. They are supposed to be known intuitively.

The problem of the modernity consists in that the nature of intuition remained unsettled (and must so). Anyhow, the traditional sense attached to understanding (intelligere) was abandoned for the sake of a special kind of cognition called intuition, which always

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dupliciter considerari. Uno quidem modo, secundum quod est a libero arbitrio. Et secundum hoc, nullam necessitatem habet ad gratiae consecutionem, quia donum gratiae excedit omnem praeparationem virtutis humanae. Alio modo potest considerari secundum quod est a Deo movente. Et tunc habet necessitatem ad id ad quod ordinatur a Deo, non quidem coactionis, sed infallibilitatis, quia intentio Dei deficere non potest; secundum quod et Augustinus dicit, in libro de Praedest. Sanct., *quod per beneficia Dei certissime liberantur quicumque liberantur*. Unde si ex intentione Dei moventis est quod homo cuius cor movet, gratiam consequatur, infallibiliter ipsam consequitur; secundum illud Ioan. VI, *omnis qui audivit a patre et didicit, venit ad me*.

might be suspected of vagueness. At any rate, has been is fiercely opposed to the commonly abhorrent "abstractionism" espoused by Aristotle.

Intuition, in the modern sense of the word, is a substitute of the firm intellectual grip, which (according to the doctrine of Posterior Analytics) we are given through the conclusions of demonstrative syllogisms. To the contrary, "the transcendental philosophy should be accompanied by constant intellectual intuition. All concepts of reason are but some restrictions of this (supreme) intuition of (transcendental) philosophy".[351]

The act of acquiring of this intellectual content was called by Avicenna (*ittiṣāl*); a contact between the human intellect and the comic intelligence. The emanation of knowledge from this "superior" (ideal) world onto the human intellect was called divine (*al-fayḍ al-ilāhī*). The emanative language was inherited from the Neo-Platonic tradition. But in Avicenna too, both the divine and the human are deprived in fact of their specific natures. It is the process of acquisition of the knowledge that matters; not its starting point or its end.

This philosophical intuition was always a little suspicious for scientists, or the "philosophers of science".

> The majority of philosophers are convinced the intuition provides us with immediate knowledge…. They label as knowledge a mental activity totally different from the process of comparing, finding again and designating … [which] … can furnish only a surrogate, not genuine knowledge of the nature of things.[352]

Moritz Schlick says that it is savages or even dumb animals which are endowed with quite vivid intuition. They live more intensely, because the natural world engulfs their attention so that they feel (intuit) more intensely also.

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[351] Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, System des transzendentalen Idealismus. Erster Hauptabschnitt. Vom Prinzip des transzendentalen Idealismus Zweiter Abschnitt. Deduktion des Prinzips selbst Erläuterungen.g.
Das Ich ist reiner Akt, reines Tun, was schlechthin nichtobjektiv sein muß im Wissen, eben deswegen, weil es Prinzip alles Wissens ist. […] Dieses Wissen muß […] ein absolut-freies sein […]ein Wissen, dessen Objekt nicht von ihm unabhängig ist, also ein Wissen, das zugleich ein Produzieren seines Objekts ist – eine Anschauung, welche überhaupt frei produzierend, und in welcher das Produzierende mit dem Produzierten eins und dasselbe ist.
Eine solche Anschauung wird im Gegensatz gegen die sinnliche, welche nicht als Produzieren ihres Objekts erscheint, wo also das Anschauen selbst vom Angeschauten verschieden ist, intellektuelle Anschauung genannt.
Das transzendentale Philosophieren muß also beständig begleitet sein von der intellektuellen Anschauung
So wie ohne Anschauung des Raums die Geometrie absolut unverständlich wäre, weil alle ihre Konstruktionen nur verschiedene Arten und Weisen sind jene Anschauung einzuschränken, so ohne die intellektuelle Anschauung alle Philosophie, weil alle ihre Begriffe nur verschiedene Einschränkungen des sich selbst zum Objekt habenden Produzieren, d.h. der intellektuellen Anschauung sind (Vgl. Fichtes Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre im Philosophischen Journal.)

Access 2023-03-07
http://www.zeno.org/Philosophie/M/Schelling,+Friedrich+Wilhelm+Joseph/System+des+transzendenten+Idealismus

[352] Moritz Schlick, General Theory of Knowledge, transl. by A. E. Blumberg, Wien-Ney York 1974, p. 81,82.

> Uncivilized men, and animals as well, probably intuit the world in a more complete way than we do. They are much more absorbed in it; they live in it more intensively, since the senses are sharper and more alert.[353]

Thus, what Neo-Platonists deemed to be supremely human appears in Schlick to be subhuman. Schlick tries to prove that the intellectual in man must be something more than the sensual in animals, but equals the intellectual with reasoning. Intuitions are, according to him, indispensable after all. The reasoning might be specific for humans, but must be based on some intuitions nonetheless.

> In the case of intuition … we do not put two objects into relation to one another; *we confront just one object, the one intuited* … The intuited objects are only given, not understood.

> We would then distinguish between two kinds of knowing – conceptual and discursive, and intuitive. But the prophets of intuition also claim the right to give it the name of knowledge on the contention that immediate intuition provides in a more perfect way that which symbolizing cognition tries to supply through the inadequate instrumentality of concepts. But here they are very much mistaken … Intuition and conceptual knowledge do not at all strive for the same goal; rather, they move in opposite directions. In intuition objects are only given, not understood.[354]

> If fusion or full identity with things is not possible, there still seems to be a process that sets up *an exceptionally close relation between subject and object, namely, intuition; (die Anschauung). Through this process, the known entity appears to move into the knowing consciousness.*[355]

Apparently, a stone, for instance, can move into water (if thrown in it), but it is incomprehensible, how any "entity" can "move into" human mind even if we were to call the human mind "the knowing consciousness". There is, no doubt, an exceptionally close relation between a thing understood and the understanding intellect, but the relation is based on abstraction, which precludes the possibility of melting "the subject and object" into a totality. Physical movement happens to be believed to terminate in its privation (in Galileo's paradigm), but the "movement" of reason (if it be called so) cannot be understood in the terms of any privation.

Two complementary principles must be shown to exist so as to account for both the movement of reasoning and the rest in the truth (which originates reasoning or terminates it thereafter in the act of contemplation). Intuition (if the name be granted) *cannot be a privation of reasoning*; it must be as natural as reasoning is. Both principles must belong equally to human "biological" nature, because human bios (intellectual life) can only unfold by harmonizing them. They must be integrated so as to work effectively in science, but never opposed or confused, as the confusion and opposition alike hampers the intellectual work.

There are, according to Aristotle, two intellects in the human mind. The middle term of the demonstrative syllogism is grasped in the act of the "intellectual intuition" of the

[353] ibid, p. 83.

[354] ibid, p. 82, 83.

[355] ibid, p. 83.

intellectus agens abstracting the vicarious from (species intelligibilis) from phantasms. It is potential intellect (intellectus potentialis) which accepts the thus abstracted.[356] Concepts are more than just (ideal) concepts (symbols) as long as they can be defined. The intellectual grasp of definientia precedes the cognizance of the definable concepts (Physica, I, Ch. 1) (Anal. Post. I 34), but the *definientia are not words, ideas, symbols, or intuited objects.*

This applies to both the syllogism of the speculative science and to the syllogism of action.[357] The value of them both depends on the power of principles the conclusions are deduces from. The sensual cognition of an object is wholly subordinate to the intellectual intuition of the middle term of the syllogism. The intuition was, in Aristotle, given a considerably modest place; less important than in Schlick, not to mention Husserl and Bergson.

The intuition (anchinoia; eustochia) Aristotle speaks of allows integrating both concepts and sentences into some specific reasonable totalities. The middle term of a

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[356] Compendium theologiae, lib. 1 cap. 88 … non est inconveniens quod eadem anima intellectiva sit in potentia respectu omnium intelligibilium, prout ponitur in ea intellectus possibilis, et comparetur ad ea ut actus, prout ponitur in ea intellectus agens. Et hoc manifestius apparebit ex modo quo intellectus facit intelligibilia in actu. Non enim intellectus agens sic facit intelligibilia in actu quasi ab ipso effluant in intellectum possibilem. Sic enim non indigeremus phantasmatibus et sensu ad intelligendum; sed facit intelligibilia in actu abstrahendo ea a phantasmatibus, sicut lumen facit quodammodo colores in actu, non quasi habeat eos apud se, sed inquantum dat eis quodammodo visibilitatem. Sic igitur aestimandum est unam esse animam intellectivam quae caret naturis rerum sensibilium et potest eas recipere per modum intelligibilem, et quae phantasmata facit intelligibilia in actu abstrahendo ab eis species intelligibiles. Unde potentia eius secundum quam est receptiva intelligibilium specierum, dicitur intellectus possibilis; potentia autem eius secundum quam abstrahit species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus, vocatur intellectus agens, qui est quasi quoddam lumen intelligibile, quod anima intellectiva participat ad imitationem superiorum substantiarum intellectualium.

[357] Sententia Ethic., lib. 6 l. 8 n. 4. Si eubulia esset idem quod Eustochia, oporteret quod quicquid continetur sub Eustochia contineretur sub eubulia. Sed sollertia est quaedam species Eustochiae, est enim bona coniecturatio circa inventionem medii, differt tamen solertia ab eubulia, quia eubulia non est circa finem, qui se habet in operabilibus sicut medium in syllogismis: non enim est consilium de fine, ut dictum est in tertio. Ergo eubulia non est idem quod Eustochia.

Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 49 a. 4 c. Ita tamen ut solertia accipiatur pro Eustochia, cuius est pars. Nam Eustochia est bene coniecturativa de quibuscumque, solertia autem est facilis et prompta coniecturatio circa inventionem medii, ut dicitur in I Poster. Tamen ille philosophus qui ponit solertiam partem prudentiae, accipit eam communiter pro omni Eustochia, unde dicit quod solertia est habitus qui provenit ex repentino, inveniens quod convenit.

Super Sent., lib. 3 d. 33 q. 3 a. 1 qc. 4 c. Solertia autem eodem modo reducitur ad prudentiam, sicut eubulia: sed in hoc differunt, quia eubulia invenit medium conveniens ad opus ratiocinando et inquirendo, quia consilium quaestio est, ut dicitur in 3 Ethic. sed solertia invenit quasi subito: est enim habitus ex repentino inveniens quod convenit, vel ut in 1 posteriorum dicitur, *subtilitas quaedam in non prospecto tempore medii*; non tamen ponitur virtus, in 6 Ethic. sicut eubulia: tum quia eubulia se habet ad bonum tantum, solertia autem ad bonum et ad malum: tum quia solertia magis dependet ex naturali ingenio quam ex assuetudine. Sciendum etiam, quod solertia est inventio medii sine perspecto tempore tam in operativis quam in speculativis, tam in necessariis quam in contingentibus; sed Eustochia est tantum in operativis, quae est bona conjectatio de contingentibus. Si autem consideretur prudentia secundum quod ad alios se extendit, sic non assignantur ei integrales aliae quam etiam prudentiae absolute consideratae; subjectivae autem et potentiales aliae.

syllogism is grasped momentarily; "in no time at all" (literally speaking) because the immaterial act of the intellect cannot unfold in time (there is no special "inner time" of consciousness). The insight into the totality of the advocates of holism (Wertheimer; Köhler) is unworkable. A special (particular) insight only is feasible, and restricted to a special form of reasoning and defining. The insights into "specific totalities" (in plural) are specifically different, because various concepts are definable of various things and many forms of reasoning are possible also.

Some concepts seem so "great" that hardly understandable in the ordinary way. They are used and abused, because used without due circumspection (those en vogue must be so). "Spirit" and "soul" were catch-words in the 19th century. In the 21th century "liberty", "nature"; "science" and (first of all) "empathy" (moral intuition) are amongst those most popular. Those attempting to analyze them (critically) could be always suspected of cynicism and the (culpable) lack of the relevant intuition.

It is allegedly impossible to define what e.g. love is, because the "content" of that great idea should be "experienced" personally. But even if the intuition in question had been possible, the content of the intuition could not have been communicated: the private ceases to be private in the very moment it is communicated. The material medium words are transmitted through (the air or the books) impedes the "inwardly intuited" (alienated in the moment of speaking) from being "interiorized" without distorting it. We cannot be certain whether we "have the same idea in mind" when speaking or writing using material signs, which are outside our mind. Symbols are not exceptional sings. I cannot feel with the nerves of another person and thus intuit the same great idea the person has in mind. So as to share it anyhow, I have to resign from my "private point of view" and accept the objectively valid and definable one.

The intuition of the subjective totality demanded abandoning the language of scholasticism blamed for unnecessary distinctions and abstractionism. The tongue of existential intuition is full of (intended) contradictions, which are supposed to be all the more acceptable the more they are expressive of "spontaneity" irreconcilable with precise reasoning.[358]

[358] Pius XII, Humani generis 14. In theology some want to reduce to a minimum the meaning of dogmas; and to free dogma itself from terminology long established in the Church and from philosophical concepts held by Catholic teachers 15. Moreover, they assert that when Catholic doctrine has been reduced to this condition, a way will be found to satisfy modern needs, that will permit of dogma being expressed also by the concepts of modern philosophy, whether of immanentism or idealism or existentialism or any other system. Some more audacious affirm that his can and must be done, because they hold that the mysteries of faith are never expressed by truly adequate concepts but only by approximate and ever changeable notions, in which the truth is to some extent expressed, but is necessarily distorted. Wherefore they do not consider it absurd, but altogether necessary, that theology should substitute new concepts in place of the old ones in keeping with the various philosophies which in the course of time it uses as its instruments, so that it should give human expression to divine truths in various ways which are even somewhat opposed, but still equivalent, as they say. They add that the history of dogmas consists in the reporting of the various forms in which revealed truth has been clothed, forms that have succeeded one another in accordance with the different teachings and opinions that have arisen over the course of the centuries.

The material air our words are spoken in, and material signs books are written in, are not, apparently a part, of any "subjectivity", even if the subjectivity were to be called the "transcendental" one. In the act of communication, the non-mine is offered to a person I care for, because I cannot care for a person who is mine (a part of mine-ness) and thus subordinate to me and used as thralls can be. I can only *imagine* my Ego to be extending and annexing new territories of the supposedly "inferior" parts of humanity. In fact, however, the Ego imagined to work so, is rather shirking that extending, because confined to a particular part of reality. The *ideal* Hegelian Anerkennung decoys into believing that no one can be exempted from the all-encompassing intuition of the humanity. The *factual* Anerkennung is bought at the cost of rejecting those unwilling (or unable) to conform.

Material objects can be intuited if present. According to Marxists, man can get to know him/her self via material products he/she produces. They are a mirror in which the Ego is reflected. Ricœur, in the spirit of Neo-Platonism, accepts the existence of manifold mirrors the humanity of each one actually partaking can be reflected in. The reflection makes for the aforementioned Anerkennung. However, it is tacitly assumed that people are similar to material products.

The light Neo-Platonists speak of is an idealized object. In nature, light undergoes dispersion on material objects. The light of the intellect is, admittedly, predicated so per analogy to (compared with) the energy inherent in it. Thus, the original intuitions (if there were such) of the creators of great ideas would undergo dispersion too. The human imagination is not material, but can be a "distorting mirror" indeed. The imagination makes for the original intuition to be distorted and the phantasms meant to represent the original to be confused. The thus (inevitably) dispersed original intuitions happen to be embraced so as to satisfy the modern taste for novelty as well as the abhorrence for "abstract" thinking.

Undoubtedly, in the book of an acknowledged philosopher, some "intuitions" might be *originally* made out, because the great are likely to abstract the relevant from the irrelevant even if they shun the very name of abstraction. But in the process of reflection (Neo-Platonists speak of), or propagation (which is more often used nowadays) the original intuition can only be obfuscated and thus degraded; can never be improved. The degradation seems to be immanent to the thus constructed and shareable subjectivity.

The philosophy of Plato and Aristotle is that of substance. Substances are, to Aristotle's mind, manifold and the constructive interactions amongst those rational ones (humans) make for the progress of humanity, which would be impossible if the dialogue amongst them (communication) equaled sublation (Aufhebung) of the "biological" personality. But the sublation is pivotal for constructing the Hegelian collective consciousness.

The problem of the subject of cognizance might be envisaged from purely linguistic point of view. The German Gegenstand *cannot be translated into Greek at all*. There is an object of sensation (αἰσθανόμενον); of thinking; of volition and the like, but there no total objectivity devised by Hegel. The Greek terms are formed from corresponding verbs (as participles or adiectiva verbalia). There is, also, no "total" activity, but some particular ones only; there can be no total objectivity (envisaged by a transcendent philosophy), but specified objective truths known by special sciences.

The verbs are different (must be so) lest the tongue appear barbaric. Bar-bar is in Greek onomatopoeia for the inarticulate. Apparently, so as to speak distinctly, I must focus on a specific subject. There is no total objectivity or total subjectivity, but only an irrational drive for possessing them both without an effort to get to know the specified truth. There is, accordingly, no intuition of the whole reality. Totalities are manifold, because the subject matter of each particular science (as far as defined) can be called a totality indeed.

The principles of specific actions account for their variety (there is no unique principle of human actions as Descartes assumed), but for the intellectual wealth of those who accomplish them also. There is, at the starting point of the intellectual work, a habitual knowledge (an "intuition") with respect to specific causes. The habits of sciences (the knowledge seized as a virtue) originate therefrom. As, however, we "intuit" by senses various objects and various persons too, the habits must be manifold lest the objects (and persons) be confused.

The supreme of them in the natural order (metaphysics) is not the same as ontology Christian Wolf speaks of. Metaphysics is not the science on totality, but a science obtained by the all-encompassing reflection on the actually existing material world. No science is given a privileged position of a transcendental subjectivity with an insight into the whole reality in the way Schelling thought it possible.[359] The totality is in Aristotle the mode of cognition (the reflection on principles); not the mode of the objects of cognition. Ens inquantum est ens (the subject matter of metaphysics is expressed so) is not "everything possibly existing", but what results from the reflection on all modes of act existing. Neither, for that matter, the refection should be accomplished collectively in the act of social Anerkennung. It is apparently an act of the "biological" (personal; rational) life.

The subject matters of particular sciences are manifold and thus not to be confused with, or deemed to be parts of, Weltanschauung. Paradoxically, what is called the supreme science (metaphysics) is particular in a sense also, because it has not the "Absolute" for its subject matter (*God* is the subject matter of theology), because a particular instantiation of all possible modes of existence (they are inexhaustible for the humane intellect and "absolute knowledge" impossible).

God should be worshiped, because there is a good reason to submit to what transcends really the faculty of the human reason, but the totality of the human subjectivity can be only an object of idolatry. It bars the way to God (Who should only be worshiped), but results, moreover, in the moral and material debasement of those thus attached to it instead of God.

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[359] Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, System des transzendentalen Idealismus.
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http://www.zeno.org/Philosophie/M/Schelling,+Friedrich+Wilhelm+Joseph/System+des+transzendenten+Idealismus
Erster Hauptabschnitt. Vom Prinzip des transzendentalen Idealismus Zweiter Abschnitt.
Deduktion des Prinzips selbst Erläuterungen. b.
Das Selbstbewußtsein ist der Akt, wodurch sich das Denkende unmittelbar zum Objekt wird, und umgekehrt, dieser Akt und kein anderer ist das Selbstbewußtsein
Erläuterungen.d
Es ist hier also jene ursprüngliche Identität des Denkens und des Objekts.

Habit is defined by Aristotle as what can be freely used.[360] There is a margin of liberty in using no matter how great ones. Both freedom of actions and the wealth of those who consume their fruits result from natural diversity of the habits previously acquired. The good indented (a specific good) is the principle of both science and morally specific actions. In the moment, however, the totality of subjectivity were to replace them, a way to squandering the wealth opens.

The archetype of the word spoken aloud and written in a book appears in the intellect in the natural way by dint of abstraction.[361] The natural principles are "mine" in the full sense of the word, but what the principles originate from as well as what causes the indented perfection cannot be "mine" at all.

There is a principle in the practical reason of each man which prompts craving for good ("instinctively") and shunning the misery in the similar way. The habit is as private as the beatitude intended must be, but the *object* of beatitude must not be private; it must exist independently of what I actually think of it, and the particular obstacles on the way must be known in objective terms also. For children, the happiness seems to be at hand and it chances to be (in a happy family) a part/similitude of the perfect happiness. But in the adult life, the happiness must be fought for, which implies the necessity of opposing what/who can thwart it. Normally, the decision to act so is the effect of the syllogism of action. There is, amongst persons, a material medium the vital energy of principles can be dispersed on as well as the human "creative" imagination prone to do the same, although in a more refined way. The "empty space" to be fulfilled might open as a chasm of destruction also.

Avicenna accepts (in the place of manifold habits Aristotle speaks of) but one total habilitas (ability; aptitude) of mind (in singular).[362] It is not the effect of abstraction if it be taken as a vital and "biological" action, but the effect of illumination. The fundamental

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[360] Contra Gentiles, lib. 2 cap. 78 n. 6. Non autem intelligitur littera Aristotelis ut habitus dicatur esse effectus intellectus agentis, ut sit sensus: agens facit hominem intelligere omnia, quod est sicut habitus. Haec enim est definitio habitus, ut Commentator Averroes ibidem dicit, quod *habens habitum intelligat per ipsum quod est sibi proprium ex se et quando voluerit, absque hoc quod indigeat in eo aliquo extrinseco*. Expresse enim assimilat habitui non ipsum factum, sed intellectum quo est omnia facere.

[361] Contra Gentiles, lib. 4 cap. 11 n. 17. Intellectus enim noster aliqua naturaliter cognoscit: sicut prima intelligibilium principia, quorum intelligibiles conceptiones, quae verba interiora dicuntur, naturaliter in ipso existunt et ex eo procedunt. Sunt etiam quaedam intelligibilia quae non naturaliter intellectus noster cognoscit, sed in eorum cognitionem ratiocinando pertingit: et horum conceptiones in intellectu nostro naturaliter non existunt, sed cum studio quaeruntur. Manifestum est autem quod Deus seipsum naturaliter intelligit, sicut et naturaliter est: suum enim intelligere est suum esse, ut in primo probatum est.

[362] Summa Theol., Ia q. 79 a. 6 c. […] Posuit enim Avicenna [… quod] quam cito aliquis actu desinit intelligere aliquam rem, desinit esse illius rei species in intellectu, sed oportet, si denuo vult illam rem intelligere, quod convertat se ad intellectum agentem, quem ponit substantiam separatam, ut ab illo effluant species intelligibiles in intellectum possibilem. Et ex exercitio et usu convertendi se ad intellectum agentem, relinquitur, secundum ipsum, quaedam habilitas in intellectu possibili convertendi se ad intellectum agentem, quam dicebat esse habitum scientiae. Secundum igitur hanc positionem, nihil conservatur in parte intellectiva, quod non actu intelligatur. […] Repugnat etiam praedicta positio rationi. Quod enim recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo secundum modum recipientis. Intellectus autem est magis stabilis naturae et immobilis, quam materia corporalis. […] multo fortius intellectus immobiliter et inamissibiliter recipit species intelligibiles […].

intuition of self-existence is the actual token of mine-ness of all particular acts of cognition. There, to be sure, no subjectivity in the modern sense of the word in Avicenna, but an anticipation of what was about to be found some centuries later.

The influence of Avicenna on the thus quaintly "civilized" Europe had been unknown until some historians of philosophy made it out at the turn of the 20th century. Amelie-Marie Goichon wrote about La philosophie d'Avicenne (Ibn Sina) et son influence en Europe medievale. Gilson improved, too, greatly our knowledge on the Arab Mediaeval philosophy. The real founder of transcendental philosophy of subjectivity died in 1037 long before Schelling published his System in 1800.

There is, in the latter, the idea of the total subjectivity and the intuition of totality which underpins it. There is, allegedly, but one source of cognition encompassing all particular objects possibly known.[363] In this paradigm, a physicist, for instance, could feel free to utter both philosophical and theological statements just because being a great physicist, whereas if following the traditional (Socratic) one he/she should be rather expected not to do so just because being great. The great must, for a time at least, focus all his/her attention on a particular subject matter, which is *likely* to be to the detriment of the cognizance of all the others, although does not preclude the possibility to use the acquired knowledge *thereafter* (focusing next on *another specific* subject matter of science). The alleged "greatness", in the Arab paradigm, consists in *the extent* of knowledge; not in the *intensity* of concentration on the object to be known. The accuracy of reflection on a special object is not demanded.

According to Socrates, we could only get to know anything at all, if having known before that we had been actually deprived of a special knowledge. The "empty room" for it should be prepared before accepting the knowledge. No knowledge can be deduced from "subjectivity", but all must be deduced from the primitive habitual knowledge concerning a specific part of the transcendent reality. The success of cognition depends on awareness of *the restrictions* immanent to a particular type of knowledge. The contrary is the case with the philosophy of subjectivity: there is no "blank space" in it to be fulfilled with the desirable knowledge.

The principles in the classical philosophy are "intuited" before they happen to be clad with signs. No "ideas" can be intuited this way. The intuition" *precedes* verbalization.

As to morals, the intuition of beatitude (the inborn desire for perfection) might be compared to the animal instinct as far as it is not up to us to abnegate it. As to the other human actions, they are anything but animal, because all particular objects happen to be abnegated (rightly or not). Contrary to animals, people can undertake auto-destructive actions or, at least, despise dangers when obstinately pursuing some intended objectives. The animal

[363] De veritate, q. 10 a. 2 c. […] quia intelligentia agens aequaliter se habet ad influendum species convenientes omnibus scientiis. Unde si in intellectu possibili non conservarentur aliquae species, sed sola habilitas ad convertendum se ad intellectum agentem, aequaliter remaneret homo habilis ad quodcumque intelligibile; et ita ex hoc quod homo addisceret unam scientiam, non magis sciret illam quam alias. Et praeterea, hoc videtur expresse contrarium sententiae philosophi in III de anima, qui commendat antiquos de hoc quod posuerunt animam esse locum specierum quantum ad intellectivam partem.

in man is potentially subordinate to the intellectual in him, and the "instinct" ("intuitive") cognition regards the habitual principles only.

The nature of the subordination was blurred in the moment Descartes created the idea of the cognizant Ego. All human actions were believed to issue indiscriminately from the total subjectivity (Meditation II 28). Descartes was apparently wrong as the simple introspection testifies. If strongly focused on a particular act of e.g. hearing, a man is likely to ignore all other sources of cognition. If deeply absorbed by the play of imagination, he is unable to think soberly. There are, in animals, diverse principles of diverse animal actions too, albeit they are incomparably better harmonized than in humans. The instinctive in them dominates in the way it cannot in humans.

According to Descartes, sensation is proper to humans to the effect it cannot be ascribed to animals (Descartes calls them "machines"). Animals were equaled to "things" in order to safeguard the authenticity of the human sensations. Apparently however, from the same principles, another conclusion might be drawn. If "animals must not be things", the animal sensation is to be ascribed to humans and dumb animals alike. In this vein, Husserl speaks of the "animal consciousness", and it seems that consciousness must be animal if the uniform principle of all cognitive acts exists. Perhaps the human feelings differ to the animal anyhow, but they cannot be (in that paradigm) *qualitatively* different. Perhaps they can be "sublimated", but never assessed to be different principles of qualitatively different actions.

There is, in the world of transcendentalism, the total dependence of everything relevant on consciousness. A kind of dependence seems to define the animal world also: at the border of the human one. Domesticated animals depend on humans this way. For some, the felling that something/somebody is dependent on in him/her is pleasing (perhaps because testifying somehow to the inner worth of the person). Some call it love (the great word anyhow). Everything which appears in the field of that self-oriented consciousness is dependent on it as to its existence. Love, at best, would be defined as a mutual dependence ("we all need each other").

Traditionally, love (caritas) was defined as a sense of harmony which exists independently of who perceives it. Love was the interested gift for the sake of preserving the harmony; craving for the good of a person who is undoubtedly non-mine, and thus precious (carus) in herself. He/she is important for me just because not being subordinate to me. The act of love is exerted even at the expense of personal self-denial, ingratitude, or at least, at the cost of putting my own Ego in the shade so as to give a person concerned *full freedom* to pay back with love (redamare) my non egotist interest. Animals cannot love this way, but cannot not be loved for that matter too, because unable to reciprocate the disinterested gift. Neither, for that matter, can they understand the human love.

Animals do feel, but humans cannot be said to feel in the same manner, nor the human understanding expected to be underpinned by sensation (Stimmung as Heidegger describes it). Contrary to animals, man faces the objects animals are existentially engaged in with distance.

If I had been unaware of what is undoubtedly non mine, I could have never been able to obtain the good which is not yet mine nor offer it to a person I care for in the act of the love of benevolence. The principles of human ripe actions must be qualitatively different to the animal actions. The desire for happiness might be childish if not followed by reasoning.

There is something in mind which directly corresponds to the animal instinct. It was called by Thomas vis cogitativa or particular reason. It was, indeed, responsible for extending the scope of private (tribal; national) interest (existence) in history. The extending, however, went hand in hand with diminishing the scope of natural existence of those not actually defined by the relation to that particularly privileged existence. Schelling hoped that the international integration would put the end to the existence of these barriers. The integration, however, must be accomplished at the expense of destroying natural environments the yet "uncivilized" people live in. "Savages" torn out of the supposedly savage countries are alienated if tried to be introduced into a globalized society. Arguably, they do not feel fulfilled when living in rough home conditions, but might feel deeply depressed if deprived of their natural world nonetheless.

All animals whose power to choose goods is as simple as the good possibly accessible to them cannot live otherwise than feeling it. Human actions, to the contrary, must be specified (their variety acknowledged) and *eventually only* integrated into the good desirable for all. The judging intellect can do the job only. Justice, in general, consists in just assessment. The supreme justice consists in that we acknowledge our dependence on God. The community of civilized men cannot be built save on the ("sense of") dependence on God.

A child expects to be happy, and to hear "It shall be well with thee". But lest the desire in the adult life be childlike instead of infantile (as in those who claim to "love animals") the presence of the Father is needed: the Creator of the human happiness. There is nothing so easy as to yearn for good; there is nothing as difficult as to find the right (unique) way to the good (to discriminate the apparent ones). The more precious a good, the more arduous and variegated the ways to obtain it.[364]

The way towards the Sovereign Good leads through the potentially opened environment of human existence and is fraught with obstacles no "intuition" can cope with; nay, some intuitions are likely to waylay the progress just because being blind. Reasoning (devising the plan of life) is needed, but the practical reasoning must be preceded by the theoretical mapping of the structure of the world the plan is to be implemented in. So as to obtain the maximum no animal can ever dream of, specific actions are needed. It is impossible to deduce the consummation of the desire for good as such from mere expectation of well-being.[365]

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[364] Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 137 a. 1 c. Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, in II Ethic., virtus est circa difficile et bonum. Et ideo ubi occurrit specialis ratio difficultatis vel boni, ibi est specialis virtus. Opus autem virtutis potest habere bonitatem et difficultatem ex duobus. Uno quidem modo, ex specie ipsa actus, quae accipitur secundum rationem proprii obiecti. Alio modo, ex ipsa diuturnitate temporis, nam hoc ipsum quod est diu insistere alicui difficili, specialem difficultatem habet. Et ideo diu persistere in aliquo bono usque ad consummationem pertinet ad specialem virtutem. Sicut ergo temperantia et fortitudo sunt speciales virtutes eo quod altera earum moderatur delectationes tactus, quod de se difficultatem habet, altera autem moderatur timores et audacias circa pericula mortis, quod etiam secundum se difficile est; ita etiam perseverantia est quaedam specialis virtus ad quam pertinet in his vel in aliis virtuosis operibus diuturnitatem sustinere prout necesse est.

[365] Summa Theologiae I-IIae q. 56 a. 6 c. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum per habitum perficiatur potentia ad agendum, ibi indiget potentia habitu perficiente ad bene agendum, qui quidem habitus est virtus, ubi ad hoc non sufficit propria ratio potentiae. Omnis autem potentiae propria ratio attenditur in ordine ad obiectum. Unde cum,

The objects met on the way of a real person towards the realissimum of God's existence must be themselves real, and can never be endowed with a precarious existence of the objective being phenomenology speaks of. *Values must be real; not only realized in the moment they are witnessed*.

Allegedly however:

> Values require a witness: they only become real when embodied through choices and actions. Abstract morals remain purely theoretical until they demand a choice. The life serves as the "witness". When values are un-witnessed – kept only as thoughts or intentions – they remain theoretical. It is only when we face a decision and act that our values are truly verified. Values only really matter when you embody them and allow them to guide your actions.

Frankl says:

> "… values are those meaning universals which crystallize in the typical situations a society or even humanity has to face." The values are everywhere, waiting for the choice that makes them a meaning. (Will to Meaning 8).

Humanity Cicero speaks of is a mode of acting. Humanity Aristotle speaks of is the most general formality of the human existence. Anyway, it is not merely an object of intuition, empathy of whatever else of the sort.

Human actions are thus defined as to their principles, but aim at what naturally satisfies (as Thomas has it) the natural desire to be *sensed* in the human nature, but *not to be found* in it, but beyond it only. Actions are immanent to persons, but their objects must be transcendent (cannot be intuited).

If the principle of all human actions had been as simple as some great "philosophical systems" claim it to be, all human actions would have been as banal as bereft of deeper meaning. If fact, they might become irrelevant in the moment people believe in that the principles *should be* simple (only those proper to ideologies must be so). The way to the spiritual and material poverty (misery) opens.

Humans extend their environments in the way animal are unable to. In fact, some of them (called synanthropic) profit from the extension procured by the aforementioned particular reason (matched with the intuition of mine-ness). The species (rats, cockroaches, viruses) have to be tolerated as a price paid for the extension. The more globalized the world the more "inclusive" it is of manifold "exotic" diseases.

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sicut dictum est, obiectum voluntati sit bonum rationis voluntati proportionatum, quantum ad hoc non indiget voluntas virtute perficiente. Sed si quod bonum immineat homini volendum, quod excedat proportionem volentis; sive quantum ad totam speciem humanam, sicut bonum divinum, quod transcendit limites humanae naturae, sive quantum ad individuum, sicut bonum proximi; ibi voluntas indiget virtute. Et ideo huiusmodi virtutes quae ordinant affectum hominis in Deum vel in proximum, sunt in voluntate sicut in subiecto; ut caritas, iustitia et huiusmodi.

Summa Theologiae I-IIae q. 56 a. 6 ad 3Ad tertium dicendum quod quaedam virtutes ordinantur ad bonum passionis moderatae, quod est proprium huius vel illius hominis, et in talibus non est necessarium quod sit aliqua virtus in voluntate, cum ad hoc sufficiat natura potentiae, ut dictum est. Sed hoc solum necessarium est in illis virtutibus quae ordinantur ad aliquod bonum extrinsecum.

The extension of the natural environment prompted by *the universal* reason aims at the common weal. All are invited to participate because *all humans are equal with respect to their ultimate destiny* (happiness to be found in God), although *unequal as to the natural abilities* which mark the starting point of the craving for the ultimate. We both rationally and personally crave for beatitude, but if it is seized in general terms, no one can be excluded from the participation.

The statement: "all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness" is *directly contrary* to that they are *decreed "more equal"* due to the regulation of the positive law. They are not equal to each other but are equal to their end to be found in God the Creator of their happiness. Indeed, the only role of the positive law is to secure the nature law; "to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men" … and "whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles". The actual level of the development of the Civilization is measured by how intensely people yearn for their Creator.

The common good is, by definition, the commonly achievable. People are thus more than tolerated in the world which is a way towards it; they must be actively helped on the way. The way towards it must be described in both precise and in clear terms. The universal Cause of perfection (the human one included) is considerably more that the regulative idea Kant speaks of or even the creator of Descartes' thinking.

Descartes' Cogito is originally in Avicenna the so called "floating man argument". Let us imagine a man created in the adult age, but isolated from material objects (his own body included) which normally make up the environment of the human life. Avicenna claims that the man would be conscious of his mine-ness albeit deprived of the knowledge of objects people normally get to know in their childhood.

The adulthood Avicenna speaks of has a somehow equivocal character. On the one hand, Avicenna assumes the man to be created, but on the other, the thus created is unable to call the Creator his Father in the way children normally do. Anyhow, albeit deprived of the native country, the man is still supposed to be aware to be created "somewhere", although in a special manner.

The term of creation appears in Descartes, but plays considerably modest role. In those who followed suit it ceases to play any role at all. Husserl demands "bracketing" God's existence for the sake of the purity of self-consciousness. There was a good reason for that, and anticipated by Avicenna already.

Two objectives proved incompatible in history of this type of philosophy: proving the existence of God and proving the spirituality of the human mind. Practically, the former was always sacrificed for the sake of the latter. Thus, however, not the immortality of the human soul was demonstrated, but the autonomy of the human consciousness, which is likely to replace God for the mere fact of being just autonomous.

What Scholastics called synderesis (the desire for good in the most general terms) is but a principle. To realize it, manifold actions are to conditionally necessary. The necessity of the end is meant. On the way towards the end, some objects are pursued whereas the others shunned. Anyway, we are not lonely on the way, because we can be both helped and

hampered. Perhaps, the great philosophers pretend to be lonely, but even then they in fact crave for complicity. The great ideas happen to propagate some "private" desires nonetheless. The desire to subordinate the others happens to be called love, although it is furthest from genuine love.

Habits can both incline to, and disincline from, the Sovereign Good. They can be both virtues and vices. They must be thus neatly distinguished. A genuine good can only by procured by virtue, but if we were to give everything we have (vices and virtues alike) without a constructive discrimination, we would be culpable of harm done to the others. We cannot give them ourselves in total.

Plato, to Rudolph Hermann Lotze's mind, failed to understand "properly" what ideas must be. Lotze was right in a sense, because Plato failed to understand ideas as the "objective being" (Werthe) in the way Lotze deemed only acceptable. They are real in Plato and thus have no special mode of being (natura tertia Avicenna speaks of) between the real and logical being.

There is, to be sure, something of the natura tertia to be found in human affairs. Some things are for some time dependent on human acknowledgment. They are something-for-humans (for *some* humans), albeit bereft of substantiality which could make them accessible for *all* humans. Some ideas in statu nascendi appear to contain this "ideal" type of being. Before being commonly applied and used, they are rather acknowledged by those in know. They are more than logical beings (because propagateed and existing in a written or spoken form already), but not yet as real as to be applied in the common life. Ideas, in general, if not defined in clear terms must always have this character.

Lotze distinguishes between substances and relations, but claims the existence of the so called inner being relation also. The relation, however, cannot exist in reality, because substance is condivided to (set against) accidents (defined in opposition to them) and relations are accidents really. The inner being relation can only exist (in the material world) in what *appears to be* a substance, but is in fact an object "created" by humans: the produced one. The objects are no real, but artificially composed: the relation integrating the components (which are real) seems to be immanent to their existence.

Values cannot be "products", but must be the real stages on the way towards the ultimate. They must be as real as the starting point and the end is.

Products might be valuable, but are not values for that reason. Some of them are so because measured by money. They are expected to improve the wellbeing of a society. But it is not certain that they contribute, by the same token, to the common weal.

Some people are called valuable because improving the wellbeing of a society. Their professionality allows improving the wellbeing of those employed and it might seem that they might so with respect of a state they live in also. Still, the integration procured by professionality can never result in the wellbeing becoming the common weal.

The latter can only be effected by *moral* virtues, which are different to professionality. Professionals are specialized and thus valuable. Virtues cannot be so. They are, out of nature, solidary. One can be e.g. a good historian without knowing anything about physics. But one cannot be e.g. temperate without being, at the same time, prudent. The integrity of virtues is creative of the common weal, but of the beatitude to be found in God ultimately also. The integrating of particular professions cannot do the same.

When accomplishing particular professional activities we sometimes do not reason at all; we rather know "instinctively" what to do. But there must be, apart from the professional intuitions, a principle integrating the society which consists not only of professionals but of the people solitary in aiming at the same good. The intuition does not suffice for building a solidarity society. The discriminative judgment is needed. Justice bids to say that the best unitive force of humanity lies beyond the humanity itself: in its Transcendent Cause; in God.

5. The experience of time and the a-temporality of the intellection. Eidos and privation. Further remarks on Kant's Ich denke

On my writing the present words, my eyes scan the letters they are composed of, and it might be supposed that my mind runs over several points of time (objects of intuition) in a similar way when considering a philosophical problem. As yet, however, neither the nature of the flowing Now is known, nor the nature of the process (of the flowing). According to what phenomenologists say, the intended Now (a moment of time) is extended in two directions due to the acts of pretention and retention.

> Husserl uses the terms protentions and retentions for the intentionalities which anchor me to an environment. They do not run from a central I, but from my perceptual field itself, so to speak, which draws along in its wake its own horizon of retentions, and bites into the future with its protentions. I do not pass through a series of instances of now, the images of which I preserve and which, placed end to end, make a line. With the arrival of every moment, its predecessor undergoes a change: I still have it in hand and it is still there, but already it is sinking away below the level of presents; in order to retain it, I need to reach through a thin layer of time. It is still the preceding moment, and I have the power to rejoin it as it was just now; I am not cut off from it, but still it would not belong to the past unless something had altered, unless it were beginning to outline itself against, or project itself upon, my present, whereas a moment ago it was my present. When a third moment arrives, the second undergoes a new modification; from being a retention it becomes the retention of a retention, and the layer of time between it and me thickens. (Maurice Jean Jacques Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception).

This idea of intentionality appears in Husserl distinctly, although it was anticipated in Descartes (or even earlier). Descartes describes consciousness in terms of the actual cognizance (Med II, 27). The relations seem to be *symmetrical*, so that it is unclear whether the past events must be necessary (qualitatively different to the future contingent ones).

This temporality of consciousness makes up a reality of its own, but on the other hand, a reality endowed with a weak mode of existence if compared with that of the physical world. In the latter, time is a measure of motion of physical objects. The temporality of consciousness is more than just a measure; it is mode or even a vehicle of that existence. That is why Heidegger speaks of the Zeitigung (temporalization) of the human existence. We are, as it seemed, immerged in this inner time of consciousness and unable to get out of it.

It goes without saying that our bodily existence is immerged indeed in the physical time and our emotions are so perhaps to some extent too. But we are able to transcend the time and understand the past (factum) which can never become nonexistent (infectum) only

because not actually intuited. The understanding of the necessary past time is, in Aristotle's eyes, proper for science (as it deals with the necessary). Factum infectum fieri non potest (a deed done cannot be undone).

But on the other hand, the future is more than just an "expectation". It is (it should be) rather a "promise". They weight of words is a hostage to our rational attitude to temporality. The unnecessary might be silenced, but the important is to be vouchsafed by the word of promise.

It is impossible, according to Husserl, to doubt in the existence of the flow of consciousness. But it seems that, by the same token, all its objects must be (believed to be) fluid, since mutability is the immanent property of the flowing Now. In this changing consciousness, all sentences and values were deemed to be constituted, so that their alleged firmness became thus a hostage to the mutability of consciousness. Husserl himself was changing his opinions throughout all his philosophical life.

The inner consciousness of time originates directly from Kant's Ich denke (Das: Ich denke, muß *alle meine Vorstellungen begleiten* können; Critique, B134). The consciousness allows transcending the actual Now, although it does not allow transcending the temporality as such.

According to Ingarden, we have non-intentional (non-act; non-thetic) consciousness of what follows (like shade) everything actually thought of. Some prefer to speak about non-consciousness in this context. In those who followed Kant, it was about to assume various forms: of Tun (in Fichte); libido (in Freud) or the vivid intuition of the constant cosmic flux. Ingarden had examined critically the Bergsonian idea of intuition. Its object was "reality" and thus it succeeded in giving rise to modernism.

It seems to be obvious that it is impossible to live in the present time only. We must transcend it; the only problem is the scope and the mode of transcending. Scientists, as a rule, do not doubt in the existence of transcendent objects which are independent of the human temporality of consciousness (they are in accord with the common sense opinion there). The attitude of the philosophers to the scientific concept of time is variegated. The 20th century philosophers mostly reject it.

The notion of intuition plays the pivotal role in phenomenology, but it originates from the Kantian Anschauung, which was (by Kant) required for exact sciences. Husserl transcends this original stance. The deduction of pure categories (restricted in Kant to exact sciences) was replaced (and furthered) by the eidetic reduction. "Essences" and values were supposed to be its objects. In this vein, Lotze reinterprets the traditional notion of value. Good, before Kant's reform, had been granted to exist beyond consciousness (in reality), but was going to be immerged in the flux of consciousness thereafter.

The original intuition (in Kant) is productive of its objects in the way handworkers are of their handwork. But the weakness of the paradigm appeared in modern times with their "new modes of production" completely unknown to Kant. Modern science, too, developed on the principles totally different to the Kantian ones and new possibilities of producing have been created according to them. On the other hand, however, the influence Kant exerted upon "humanities" was huge. The Kantian values were modeled after the pattern of what used to be produced some two hundred years ago; after the pattern of *how* it used to be produced.

Kant tries to account for the specifics of the human cognition, but it might be doubted whether his quasi instinctive cognition of pure concept does account for it really. There were manifold "presentations" (Vorstellungen) of the *re-productive* imagination (which did not seem to differ from the animal ones), which all ought to be discernible from those proper to *productive* imagination. Still, Kant failed, after all, to account for the difference between the re-productive and the productive; to show the way the a priori judgments of Reason can be deduced from the posteriori judgments of imagination. Kant claimed that the deduction had been taking place in history before him, but it seems that it was not going to take place after him. Anyhow, no historical argument seems to justify theoretical investigations.

The history Kant speaks of should become my history to the effect I should be given a clue how to transcend the spatial temporal. If we speak of historical achievements of the past generations, we do not, apparently, suggest that they are merely historical and belong to the past in the sense of being outdated; we claim they are anything but evanescent. The value of e.g. Newtonian Mechanics is indubitable and the subsequent discoveries were rather modifications (specifications of the subject matter of the science) than "revolutions" Thomas Kuhn speaks of. The past tradition was always irrelevant for revolutionists ready destroy but unable to build anything valuable. Some live down their existence in the present Now indeed. The values of the past achievements seem unimportant for those who care but for the present. A new future full of vague "hope", but devoid of certitude, might be tried to be built.

Some two hundred years have passed since the Kantian reform. The history of the Kantian philosophy proved to be the history of the new "revolutionary" phenomena of thinking, bur indifferent to the real plights of the human life. The way of life (and of the Civilization also) is made up not of flowing Nows, but of significant steps towards the cognizance of the "inner" and the "Outer" side of the world. The way the classical philosophy tackles the problem of temporality might have appeared untenable for Kant and that is why he, most probably, ignored it on purpose. Still, it proves more valuable (for the same reason) for us nowadays.

Phenomenology tries to account for the continuity of consciousness, but proves unable to account for the discontinuity of the generation of science. Some might cherish the sense of inner and unshakable certitude (believed not to be preceded by reasoning and to be its conclusion), but can never, in that case, account for how it became his/her private ("experienced") certitude in a given point of time. In fact, this fake (subjective) certitude is but the effect of flawed reasoning. I normally come to a certain conviction in a *physical* time (when reading a book or listening to a lecture), and it always might be asked, whether I should have done so out of purely rational motives. In his Physics, Aristotle explains how the intellectual life is born out of the previously animal (physical) existence. "The terms «knowing» and «understanding» imply that the intellect has reached a state of rest and come to a standstill.[366]

[366] Physics by Aristotle, transl. by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye

Access 2026-10-29 https://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/physics.html
τῷ γὰρ ἠρεμῆσαι καὶ στῆναι τὴν διάνοιαν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ φρονεῖν λεγόμεθα (Phys. VII, c. 3. 247b 11-12).

> …the possession of understanding and knowledge is produced by the soul's settling down out of the restlessness natural to it. Hence, too, in learning and in forming judgements on matters relating to their sense-perceptions children are inferior to adults owing to the great amount of restlessness and motion in their souls.[367]

Facts are not contingent in the sense modern philosophy claimed them to be (there is no need to synthetize them in a form-giving consciousness like an amorphous entity must be). "Looking back" at the past events (reflecting upon them) we discover the conditional necessity of the real which makes for the absolute necessity of the scientific statements (for them not being temporal in any way). The future, accordingly, is to be mastered as far as the personal Now we actually live in proves to be but a transitory and *imaginable* Now from the necessary past into the free future in which some valuable objectives are intended (not merely dreamt of or fancied), because proved to be conditionally necessary for obtaining the real End of life.

According to Kant, the present events presented in his intuition are originally disconnected. It is his Verstand which makes them (alles Mannigfaltige) to appear to be connected anyway.

> Jede Anschauung enthält *ein Mannigfaltiges* in sich, welches doch nicht als ein solches vorgestellt werden würde, wenn das Gemüt nicht *die Zeit, in der Folge der Eindrücke aufeinander unterschiede*) (A 99).
>
> Every intuition contains in itself a manifold which can be represented as a manifold only in so far as the mind distinguishes the time in the sequence of one impression upon another; for each representation, in so far as it is contained in a single moment, can never be anything but absolute unity. In order that unity of intuition may arise out of this manifold (as is required in the representation of space) it must first be run through, and held together. This act I name the synthesis of apprehension because it is directed upon intuition, which does indeed offer a manifold, but a manifold which can never be represented as a manifold, and as contained in a single representation, save in virtue of such a synthesis.[368]

The category of the past Kant speaks of was, however, not capacious enough and the historicity of his existence not understood adequately too. The world of *the Arab* Asharites

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[367] τῷ γὰρ καθίστασθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῆς φυ-
σικῆς ταραχῆς φρόνιμόν τι γίγνεται καὶ *ἐπιστῆμον*.
[…] πολλὴ γὰρ ἡ ταραχὴ
καὶ ἡ κίνησις [ἀλλοιουμένων ὥστε]οὔτε μανθάνειν δύνανται (247b 17-248a 2). Ibid.

[368] I. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, transl. by Norman Kemp Smith London 1929

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Transcendental doctrine of elements. the deduction of the pure concepts of understanding [as in 1st edition] Section 2. The a priori grounds of the possibility of experience. I. The Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition.

was created by the whimsical will of Allah out of scattered moments (points of time and space). The co called experience data are synthetized in the Kantian consciousness in pretty much the same way, even if Kant himself was unaware of the historical bequest.

> Ich verstehe aber unter Synthesis in der allgemeinsten Bedeutung die Handlung, verschiedene Vorstellungen zueinander hinzuzutun, und ihre Mannigfaltigkeit in einer Erkenntnis zu begreifen[369].
>
> By the word synthesis, in its most general signification, I understand the process of joining different representations to each other and of comprehending their diversity in one cognition.[370]

Comprehending (Mannigfaltigkeit in einer Erkenntnis zu begreifen) consists in aligning the data of the (inner) time of consciousness; in being immerged in the constant flux of time. Understanding, according to Aristotle, is incomparably more, as it is effected in (so to say) indivisible point of time, the existence of which no transcendentalist can elucidate.

Within the flux of consciousness, a sound is enduring. There is "Beforehand" and "Afterward" and we are "still" conscious of it "for a while" in "retention". For the consciousness, points of temporal duration recede and sink back into emptiness [Leere]; vanish into the remoteness of consciousness. The sound constantly sinks back into the past and moves back into an ever more "distant" past. The close part of the duration has a little clarity; the whole disappears in obscurity, in a void retentional consciousness, and finally disappears completely. We immerse ourselves in the unity of the process.[371]

The Husserlian understanding is engulfed by the constant flux of time proper to this human consciousness. Husserl distinguishes between the physical time science speaks of and the "philosophical" one proper to consciousness. Apparently, he does not admit the possibility to transform the former into the latter (which Kant tried in a sense).

Aristotle defines time in the way the transition has been made visible. Time is just this: number of motion in respect of "before" and "after". (R. K. Gaye). (τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος, ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον; numerus motus secundum prius et posterius). (Phys. IV, c. 11, 218b 1-2).

> But neither does time exist without change; for when the state of our own minds does not change at all, or we have not noticed its changing, we do not realize that time has elapsed, any more than those who are fabled to sleep among the heroes in Sardinia do when they are awakened; for they connect the earlier "now" with the later and make them one (συνάπτουσι

[369] B 103; § 10 Von den reinen Verstandesbegriffen oder Kategorien

[370] Book I. Analytic of Conceptions. Chapter I. Of the Transcendental Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Conceptions of the Understanding. Section III. Of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding, or Categories § 6

The Critique of Pure Reason, by Immanuel Kant, translated by J. M. D. Meiklejohn.
Access 2026-10-29 https://www.gutenberg.org/files/4280/4280-h/4280-h.htm

[371] E. Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, transl. by James S. Churchill, Indiana University Press 1964. § 8. Immanent Temporal Objects [Zeitobjekte] and Their Modes of Appearance; § 9. The Consciousness of the Appearances of Immanent Objects [Objekte].

> γὰρ τῷ πρότερον νῦν τὸ ὕστερον νῦν καὶ ἓν ποιοῦσιν), cutting out the interval because of their failure to notice it. So, just as, if the "now" were not different but one and the same, there would not have been time, so too when its difference escapes our notice the interval does not seem to be time. If, then, the non-realization of the existence of time happens to us when we do not distinguish any change (ὅταν μὴ *ὁρίσωμεν* μηδεμίαν μεταβολήν), but the soul seems to stay in one indivisible state (ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ ἀδιαιρέτῳ φαίνηται ἡ ψυχὴ μένειν), and when we perceive and distinguish we say time has elapsed, evidently time is not independent of movement and change (ὅταν δ' αἰσθώμεθα καὶ ὁρίσωμεν, τότε φαμὲν γεγονέναι χρόνον). It is evident, then, that time is neither movement nor independent of movement (οὔτε κίνησις οὔτ' ἄνευ κινήσεως ὁ χρόνος). (Phys. IV, c. 11, 218b21-219a 2).[372]

The understanding of the motion (the change of the universe we live in) consists in liberating from the flux of time.

> Time, then, also is both made continuous by the "now" and divided at it. For here too there is a correspondence with the locomotion and the moving body. For the motion or locomotion is made one by the thing which is moved, because it is one-not because it is one in its own nature (for there might be pauses in the movement of such a thing) – but because it is one in definition: for this determines the movement as "before" and "after". Here, too there is a correspondence with the point; for the point also both connects and terminates the length – it is the beginning of one and the end of another. But when you take it in this way, using the one point as two, a pause is necessary, if the same point is to be the beginning and the end. The "now" on the other hand, since the body carried is moving, is always different.[373]

> συνεχής τε δὴ ὁ χρόνος τῷ νῦν, καὶ διῄρηται κατὰ τὸ νῦν·
> ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο τῇ φορᾷ καὶ τῷ φερομένῳ. καὶ
> γὰρ ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ φορὰ μία τῷ φερομένῳ, ὅτι ἕν (καὶ
> οὐχ ὅ ποτε ὄν—καὶ γὰρ ἂν διαλίποι—ἀλλὰ τῷ λόγῳ)· καὶ
> ὁρίζει δὲ τὴν πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον κίνησιν τοῦτο. ἀκολουθεῖ
> δὲ καὶ τοῦτό πως τῇ στιγμῇ· (Phys. IV, c. 11, 220a 5-10).

> In so far then as the "now" is a boundary, it is not time (πέρας τὸ νῦν, οὐ χρόνος, ἀλλὰ συμβέβηκεν), but an attribute of it; in so far as it numbers, it is number; for boundaries belong only to that which they bound (τὰ μὲν γὰρ πέρατα ἐκείνου μόνον ἐστὶν οὗ ἐστιν πέρατα), …time is "number of movement in respect of the before and after", and is continuous since it is an attribute of what is continuous (ὁ χρόνος ἀριθμός ἐστιν κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, καὶ συνεχής; συνεχοῦς γάρ) (Phys. IV, c. 11, 220a 21-26).[374]

Thomas explains what the relation between the "inner awareness of time" and the time of the physical reality consist in.

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[372] Physics by Aristotle, translated by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye; IV, Ch. 11

Access 2026-10-29 https://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/physics.html

[373] Physics by Aristotle, translated by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye; IV, Ch. 11

Access 2026-10-29 https://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/physics.html

[374] Ibid.

> The *now* of time is the same as regards its subject in the whole course of time, but it differs in aspect; for inasmuch as time corresponds to movement, its *now* corresponds to what is movable; and the thing movable has the same one subject in all time, but differs in aspect as being here and there; and such alteration is movement. Likewise the flow of the *now* as alternating in aspect is time. But eternity remains the same according to both subject and aspect; and hence eternity is not the same as the *now* of time.[375]

> **…**motion is related to time in a way different from the way other things are related to it. Motion is measured by time both as to what it is and as to its duration, that is, its existence. But other things, such as a man or a stone, are measured by time as to their existence or their duration insofar as they have a changeable existence; but, as to what they are in themselves, they are not measured by time. Rather, it is the now of time that corresponds to what they are in themselves, as was said above.[376]

The Aristotelian Now (τὸ νῦν) might be, then, more than just a point in a continuum. If understood, it is rather a unique moment called in Greek kairos. The human existence can be unique in the same way as far as the time is understood and not merely experienced.[377]

Neither the present Now nor the inner intuition thereof, but the discrimination between the "before and after" makes for the understanding of the present time we live in. The Nows of the phenomenological intuition might be separated by no matter how many "similar points", whereas the Aristotelian "before and after" precludes the possibility.

We are aware (ἐπίστημοι) of the binary structure of the object of the *rational* experience, which is, admittedly, wholly unconceivable for animals as well of for those deprived of knowledge.

The very structure of language testifies to the discontinuity of the flux of time as well as to the continuity of reasoning (its being composed of discrete elements). The "transcendental unity of experience" is apparently unable to make these necessary distinctions. Rather the opposite is the case: it is likely to conjoin incidental elements; to confuse objects to the point of them becoming casual. A significant change of meaning of the "casual" has occurred since the phenomenological stance was adopted.

All actual presentation must be accompanied by a principle indeed, but must not be accompanied by the sense of mine-ness. They must be accompanied by the actual use of the non-contradiction principle. There is no flux of time of continuity in the intellectual life, but the coherence of diverse concepts and sentences which make up syllogisms and definitions.

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[375] Summa Theologiae I, q. 10 a. 4 ad 2. nunc temporis est idem subiecto in toto tempore, sed differens ratione, eo quod, sicut tempus respondet motui, ita nunc temporis respondet mobili; mobile autem est idem subiecto in toto decursu temporis, sed differens ratione, inquantum est hic et ibi. Et ista alternatio est motus.

[376] In Physic., lib. 4 l. 20 n. 2. Motus enim mensuratur tempore et secundum illud quod est, et secundum suam durationem sive secundum esse suum. Res autem aliae, utpote homo aut lapis, mensurantur tempore secundum suum esse sive secundum suam durationem, prout habent esse transmutabile: secundum autem id quod sunt, non mensurantur tempore, sed magis eis respondet nunc temporis, ut supra dictum est. Dicit ergo quod tempus est mensura ipsius motus, et eius quod est moveri, per quod dat intelligere durationem motus.

[377] What Aristotle says about motion seems, to an extent, to chime in with the modern science ideas.

The Aristotelian Organon explains all mistakes possibly disintegrating the reasoning (Posterior Analytics, I. Ch. 9 in calce). The non-contradiction principle is a factual testimony (elenchos) of the human rationality (Metaph., IV, c. 4), and makes for the qualitative supremacy of the human mind to the "animal consciousness". Animals synthetize so as to live. Humans must *discriminate* so as live in the human manner.

The awareness of the time is not that of our being immerged in its flux, but that of transcending it. Time is the mode of existence of objects which are actually beyond my mind. Prior and posterior (τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον) are not the modes of our consciousness, but the modes of what is moved (physically) and is moving (the same way): movens et motum. In the effect of abstraction the binary structure of movens et motum is first known, even if the paired elements are not fully distinguished yet, whereas every verbalization of these principles consists in making distinctions proper to definitions and syllogisms.[378] The thus distinguished is considerably more than a continuum made up of Nows.

Husserl claims that the task of philosophy consists in knowing essences (apart from "facts" abhorrent for him). Hence his famous slogan: zurück zu den Sachen. The problem is, however, whether his Sachen (objects) might be identified with things we normally get to know to exist in the world we live in. The essences classical philosophy speaks of are, roughly speaking, these "ordinary" things. There were some attempts to reconcile Thomas with phenomenology,[379] but they were bound to come to nothing, because the notion in question was misunderstood.

According to Thomas, the proper object of the intellect is the quiddity of a material thing, which apparently no phenomenologist can admit. According to Husserl, we can "intuit" the essence of e.g. redness. The redness is a quality; an accident; which cannot exist without a proper substance, nor can be understood apart from it (even if it were intuited, the intuition would be worthless for science). The eidetic reduction must have been that of substance first of all, but of its accidents secondarily only: the order never accepted by who acknowledge sheer temporal order of objects. The very principles of phenomenology preclude the possibility to get to know substances. The redness as such can only exist in a vocabulary. Philosophy cannot be equaled to linguistics.

The "modern" might in fact mean the same as "passive". If not willing to succumb passively to the "unavoidable" flux of time, we would like to command the future, which is to say: to give a definite meaning to movens et motum experienced in some special circumstances. The events occurring in the world are perfectly ordained by the Divine Providence, which is perfect unlike our (feeble human) mind. Human providence is defective, but can partake of the Divine one nonetheless, provided it is not equaled to uniformed consciousness (with its own autonomous world).

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[378] Summa Theol., Ia q. 10 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod nunc temporis est idem subiecto in toto tempore, sed differens ratione, eo quod, sicut tempus respondet motui, ita nunc temporis respondet mobili; mobile autem est idem subiecto in toto decursu temporis, sed differens ratione, inquantum est hic et ibi. Et ista alternatio est motus. Similiter fluxus ipsius nunc, secundum quod alternatur ratione, est tempus. Aeternitas autem manet eadem et subiecto et ratione. Unde aeternitas non est idem quod nunc temporis.

[379] Arno Anzenbacher, Die Intentionalität bei Thomas von Aquin und Edmund Husserl. Vien; München1972.

The Divine Providence was given by Aristotle the name of the First Immovable Mover: the one ordering the sequence of cosmic events (and human thoughts and deeds, to Thomas' mind, in particular also).

The comprehensive knowledge of the divine intention in governing the universe (and human affairs) is inaccessible for humans. But the participation in/of it is possible by conforming the human intention (the general intention of life first of all) to the Divine one.

The Divine seems to be all the more authentically intended, the more surely it is conceived to be transcendent. A closer horizon of the human life (his consciousness) encompasses some easily obtainable objects only (the ones not required to be commanded by the providence). The more encompassing the intentions, the more valuable the human existence is.

The present *intellectual* Now is not defined by the relation to what immediately follows or precedes it only. It must be rather definable by what both transcends the flux of time, and *seems* to be immerged in it: the essence of a real thing. The truth is super temporal. In this vein, Gallus Manser wrote about the essence of Thomism (Das Wesen des Thomismus), and many other tried to prove the time Thomas lived in to be close to our present Now. Paradoxically, Thomas is much closer to us (*intellectually*) that the philosophy pretending to be modern.

The power to command (not to succumb) the future is considerably scarce for humans, but the whole value of the human existence consists in resisting the flux of time.

The desire to command the future (to be "unmodern" this way) is defined by what is rationally intended; all the more effectively the more the intentions are fostered out of rational motives. The validity of the past tradition is testified by the creative power of those actively participating in/of raising the edifice of science and Civilization.

Time is not a priori category of mind. The past and future can be comprehended (comprehendere; ἐπίστασθαι) and the movens et motum distinguished as the modes substances act (humans are rational substances acting this way).

The sense of being is not to be found in the human consciousness, but in what is in physical motion. The motion is preceded by a privation and followed by a form (εἶδος). Both notions concern the physical reality. The physical motion (or the motion of the human mind called reasoning) begins with a (sense of) privation, but ends in the perfection replacing the original privation. Human actions might be called movements also, but those original ones are called instantaneous movements by Aristotle.

Privations and forms (which "satisfy" them) are part of our ordinary existence. The privations are often suffered or endured only. Some privations are expected to be "alleviated", but are seldom effectively enough due to the weakness of the aforementioned human providence. Still, the power to live them down constructively would testify to its dignity.

If the original (Aristotelian) sense of privation (στήρεσις) were accepted, the hardships would be rather braved than suffered (the meek emotionality allows but suffering). Conversely, the eidos Aristotle speaks of is aimed at rather by the act of the intellectual abstraction than by an act of intuition. The consecutive Nows of our intellectual life are marked by forms (eide) subsequent on corresponding privations.

The books which claim to be philosophical contain manifold forms (εἶδη) of thinking, but the forms are rarely preceded by the privations understood as apories. The physical

privations cannot be easily alleviated by philosophy, but can be at least understood properly. The ideal philosophical book should contain both the starting point of an inquiry and its definite end, which is to say: to expresses both the sense of the intellectual privation and the intellectual certitude which could satisfy the primitive sense of being bereft of what is really precious.

Various books approach the idea to various extent. The forms of thinking are all the more accurate the more undoubtedly they bring to rest the movement of reasoning ("considerations") originating from the sense of being deprived of what really matters. The "reformists" deemed some privations not to matter at all (the scholastic investigations were "needless"). We experience nowadays the sense of being deprived of the past tradition; the sense of the lost heritage. Some prominent philosophers have contributed, nevertheless, in the 20th century, to the restoration of the lost bequest of the past, after the Encyclical Aeterni Patris of Pope Leo XIII (On the restoration of Christian philosophy) was published in 1879.

It is not indifferent whence the movement of reasoning departs. In Aristotle, it is the sense of intellectual privation which prompts human considerations. Difficulties (called by him apories) are all gathered in the book III of his Metaphysics. The same mode of philosophizing was adopted in Thomas' Disputed Questions as well as in his Summa.

Thomas' Summa consists of several thousand pages and the diligent reading demands a few years (the inner time thereof is not immediately given). Still, the privations (doubts; anxieties; the sense of despair) are painfully experienced in the present Now we live in. A browser might be of use in finding the interesting place, but using artificial devises interrupts the natural train of thinking.

The sense of a part I am deeply concerned for does not, apparently, (must not so) depend on the sense of the totality of the book I highly esteem. The totality, however, of it might have been integrated from "parts" by using what must accompany all human reasoning: the non-contradiction principle. It was precisely the case with Thomas' Summa. Manifold problems ("questions") have been solved therein by using the same principle which applies to all problems analogically; the principle of differentiating. Even if a particular problem I try to cope with is not solved on the page I actually read, I can, at least tear away my thought from the sense of a privation because being aware that the same principle if effective in solving in matter how intricate problems.

Same particular forms of privation might be sensed, and the notorious Unde malum (Where does evil come from) of philosophers seems to encapsulate them all. There are different principles of human actions and manifold privations connected with them consequently too. But there is a unique principle of all human actions called the intellect. The experience of the intellectual privation is called admiration. The actual εἶδη (forms) of thinking are (should be) responses to this sense of privation.

It is not about accepting this or that philosophical tradition, but about the accuracy of the responses the tradition provides for us *just now*. The "before and after" of our thinking might be understood either as a naked sequence of presentations, or as *the order* of eidos and steresis (εἶδος, στήρεσις). The "before" of philosophizing is a privation (admiration), but the end to be obtained should be its opposite: "… the acquisition of it must in a sense end in something which is the opposite of our original inquiries. For all men begin, as we said, by wondering that things are as they are … But we must end in the contrary and, according to

the proverb, the better state, as is the case in these instances too when men learn the cause …" (Metaph., i. c. 983a 18-19; D. Ross). We do not philosophize – according to *Aristotle* – so as to, ask questions, but so as to answer those no matter how awkward ones. In the naked sequence of the flux of the inner time, the "better" Plato demands of philosophy is scarcely noticeable.

Forms are incomparably easier to name than the respective privations they originate from, because our language is, first of all, the language of forms (eide), but of privations secondarily only. No total intuition of non-existence is possible, but a (so to say) special intuition of the non-existence corresponding to a special form of existence in the non-contradiction principle.

> … those who wish to get clear of difficulties it is advantageous to discuss the difficulties well; for the subsequent free play of thought implies the solution of the previous difficulties (ἔστι δὲ τοῖς εὐπορῆσαι βουλομένοις προὔργου τὸ διαπορῆσαι καλῶς), and it is not possible to untie a knot (λύειν τὸν δεσμόν) of which one does not know. But the difficulty of our thinking points to a "knot" in the object; for in so far as our thought is in difficulties, it is in like case with those who are bound; for in either case it is impossible to go forward (εὐπορία λύσις τῶν πρότερον ἀπορουμένων ἐστί) (Metaph. III, c. 1, 995a 27-30). Hence one should have surveyed all the difficulties beforehand ….[380]

Searching for liberation from what is "painfully" experienced (as a privation), people happen to reach for philosophical books. But some of them do not tend to "heal" the ailments (although Pythagoras thought it necessary for genuine philosophy), and admit openly the opposite (the desire to stir existential anxieties).

Neo-Platonists assumed the existence of the total privation. They called matter so. Heidegger is a realist in a sense, because assumes some ontological theses (alien to Husserl the idealist). There is (allegedly), in the flux of consciousness, an intuition of death (such an apperception thereof), and death is, no doubt, a physical fact. Being to death seemed thus to define the human existence.

Any realist trait in philosophy is to be acknowledged. It is highly advisable to seize philosophical problems in as plain and general terms as only possible. Still, some "intuitions" seem to aim at the impossible nonetheless. Natural order of the world change must be respected. Every change, according to Aristotle, is aimed at a form. It cannot be aimed at privation.

Various professionals are concerned with special needs, and physicians are concerned with special ailments indeed. There might a fundamental sentiment lying at the bottom of all other ones (that of privation included). But Heidegger's assumption that it is Angsts is contestable. The first sentiment is that of the harmony of the universe. Love consists in willing good for a person. Fear follows some difficulties in realizing the intention.

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[380] Metaphysics by Aristotle transl. by W. D. Ross

Access 2026-10-29 https://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics.3.iii.html

The direction of thinking Heidegger took on is not universal (not philosophical) enough. His fundamental intuition does not encompass all forms of suffering and, what is more important, does not name them all adequately. Fear is a specific love, in a sense, since Augustine calls all affects to be specified forms of love, as they all originate therefrom and terminate thereto also. But Angsts itself is a very specific kind of emotion (bearing a specific resemblance to fear).

There is a kind of fear at the beginning of the rational fundamental activity. It is called admiration. It is first of all characteristic for philosophy, but for all other sciences subsequently too. It is a fear before the unknown connected with the hope to attack it. Science begins with admiration (albeit the ordinary life begins with love), and if it had been able to cure all human ailments, it could only be afforded by the means of the most general principle connected with the sense of the intellectual privation.

Philosophy determines the starting point of the (intellectual) life, but is apparently unable to convince all that their life should be as intellectual as philosophy demands it to be, and the only problem of the human life consists in its not being philosophical enough. Hardly any layman is likely to grant the supposition, especially in our "industrialized" society. In antiquity, to be sure, the opinion was relatively widely spread amongst the cultural strata of the then society.

The intellectual in man is to be defined from the point of view of the perfection to be possibly obtained, but it cannot be defined in terms of a flux" without an end. The ultimate perfection consists in adhering to God (the source of all perfections), and is procured by the Divine Providence which is infallible: contrary to the human one. Conversely, the starting point of (the intellectual), life is to be defined, in the most general terms, as *not-being-yet-in-the-full-presence-of-God; not-being-yet-unconditionally-loved.* Bodily pain too is in fact just this: not being bodily present by God. God is not the supreme value; He is the Creator of all values, which realize in time.

God is the universal Cause of being and the universal Cause of goodness and all perfections also. The very notion of imperfection (privation) implies being severed from the universal form of goodness. Metaphysics is but a formal principle of liberation. It is called by Aristotle the "divine science", but its power in humans is curtailed to the faculty of the human reason.

There might be manifold privations science pretends to heal, but there is only one human science (philosophy) which can do its utmost in understanding them aright (this only). All philosophical statements should be responses to the fundamental sense of being lost in the material world not because being thrown (geworfen) into it by chance, but because being actually severed from God. The most general question philosophy can put forward is not that of the sense of being (only *sings* can have some meaning), but that of the *cause* of being in motion and ordaining the flux of the cosmic time adequately. The desire to know causes spurs the inquisition. The causes are to be known of what can possibly join and us and separate from God.

Everything can be called a "form of being" if comprised under the subject matter of metaphysics. Particular questions are answered by dint of analogy. Being is most commonly divided in being in act (being a form) and being in potency (to be actualized by the act).

The form of science (according to Aristotle) is abstracted from what might be deemed a continuum of time. But the very existence of the continuum might pose a threat to human life. The human intellect extracts the valuable forms from the originally known phenomena of motion (dividing it into significant momenta). The intuition phenomenology speaks of is that of absorption, whereas the philosophy of causes Aristotle speaks of is that of liberation. The classical philosophy is that of the distance towards the temporality. The modern one is that of the distance towards the transcendent cause of being. Debasing enthrallment to the evanescent follows.

The words spoken aloud and written down are signs, and can never pretend to form a reality of its own; to be "symbols". There are two sides of a sings: the intellectually grasped meaning devoid of matter, and the material clothing it assumes according to various languages and various times. The intellectual in them remains the same, although the outer (phenomenal) side varies in time really.

Chapter V. PRINCIPLES

1. The principle and freedom of doing and multiplying good

Human acting – so as to be rational and non-casual – must tend towards good, and eventually: towards the sovereign Good. The acting participates of good as far as rational, but is accidental (non-necessary). It does not participate necessarily of/in its proper (appropriate) act of being (e.g. being virtuous). Human actions happen to be virtuous, but are not, for that reason, virtue itself. They might be good, but are not the self-subsistent goodness. The *created* nature participates out of necessity in/of its own act of existence, but actions which accrue to this nature do not even participate of the form of their actions (their goodness) this way. The created nature cannot tend to non-existence, even if the tending is normally thwarted in the moment of its death. Actions *can* tend to non-existence, but the spiritual death is then postponed.

The action is different to the nature which acts. Neither does it always tend to what behooves it. The human will is unable to find in herself the source of its goodness. Life is not the end of life and the fact seems clear when it comes to the animal life. The question of the rational life, too, had seemed to be settled until it was proclaimed, in 1785, that "It is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that could be considered good without limitation except a good will" (Kant, Metaphysics of Morals).

The existence of God can be demonstrated ("thought of") and His will can be then "considered good without limitation", because God's will is identical will His essence. Still, it is not the case with humans (it cannot be so with any created being). The proof of the existence of God (the proof of His "absolute identity") presupposes knowledge about creatures (about their acting not being identical with their essence). We do not prove God's existence save indirectly; the conclusion metaphysics arrives at is rather modest: it is stated only that everything in the world depends on what-is-not-created: the creative presence of "The Outer Side" (which is called God in religion indeed). But a corollary of the proof reads: the human will should be directed to God (depend on Him so as to be what is should be). The conclusion is of utmost importance, because being not actually directed so equals in fact to being directed in a casual/incidental or downright wrong direction.

The difference between the created and the uncreated good is made out distinctly in metaphysics. Its subject matter is being qua being, and its objective consists in setting down the properties of being: its unity, reality, goodness (and other convertibles and properties of being). But, as acting is a being too (although non independent of a nature which sustains it) the properties (and non-properties) of human acting could be deduced from the conclusions of metaphysics too: it is applicable to ethics this way as long as it is the classical metaphysics (the one elaborated by Aristotle and Thomas). It is concerned with the reality and goodness of the created nature.

Aristotle's attitude to creationism is far from being clear. Mostly, he is assumed to not entertain creationism (although Thomas does not seem to agree wholeheartedly), but his ethics is, nonetheless, subordinate to metaphysics. It is because, according to him, striving for existence is the most common trait of the entire nature. The difference between him and Thomas consists in that the striving is, in Aquinas – so to say – more effective: a created thing participates out of necessity of his own act of existence (the striving for existence rests in it as long as it exists), whereas the same striving in Aristotle results in the perpetual generation of individuals of various species which try (in vain) to imitate the perfection of the First Being. The striving in creatures must be frustrated due to the imperfection of the particular nature. Anyhow, the classical ethics is "naturistic" in the sense of being dependent on the most common feature of the whole nature (be it created by God or merely craving for His assistance).

Man is unable to create anything: he cannot also produce good out of nothing.[381] (Esse est proprius effectus Dei[382]). He is able to preserve and to multiply the created good though,

[381] Summa Theologiae I, q. 63 a. 3 c. Peccaret vero si quis etiam appeteret secundum iustitiam esse similis Deo, quasi propria virtute, et non ex virtute Dei. Alio vero modo potest aliquis appetere similis esse Deo, quantum ad hoc in quo non natus est assimilari; sicut si quis appeteret creare caelum et terram, quod est proprium Dei; in quo appetitu esset peccatum. Et hoc modo Diabolus appetiit esse ut Deus.

[382] Quodlibet XII, q. 5 a. 1 c. Et sic dico quod esse substantiale rei non est accidens, sed actualitas cuiuslibet formae existentis, sive sine materia sive cum materia. Et quia esse est complementum omnium, inde est quod proprius effectus Dei est esse, et nulla causa dat esse nisi in quantum participat operationem divinam; et sic proprie loquendo, non est accidens. Et quod Hilarius dicit, dico quod accidens dicitur large omne quod non est pars essentiae; et sic est esse in rebus creatis, quia in solo Deo esse est eius essentia.

and the nature of love (the original affectual attitude to reality) consists therein: conservation and enhancing the harmony which already exists.

This is the fundament of the classical ethics, but this ethics did not appear in Athens in the 4th century BC in a complete form. Pythagoreans, ca two centuries earlier were concerned with ethics too, and their ethics was subordinate to what they thought to be the supreme science also. Still, metaphysics did not exist yet. The supreme was deemed mathematics. It occupied the place of metaphysics unduly so that a fatal mistake appeared: the unity (the property) of being was confused with the unity proper to number. The error was about to be reiterated throughout centuries to come. The mathematical principles were so highly esteemed that deemed applicable to the cognizance of the entire nature.

According to Aristotle, the subject matter of mathematics is comprised within the category of Quantity, which *is not the first* category of being. The conclusions of one science cannot be applied to the other without using analogy. Special categories are understandable in relation to the first one (the category of substance). Thus, they are mutually comparable indirectly only. No particular category can replace the first one (the category of substance), as they all are concerned with the accidents of substance only. The properties of one category cannot be predicated about the others, unless first attributed to substance. For instance, relations cannot be imagined to exist as axes joining objects; they have their proper mode of being, which does not need be that of spatial relations. But on the other hand, as the substance cannot be intuited directly, we must depend on the cognizance of accidents it is hidden beneath so as to get to know it. Not all accidents contribute in the same manner to the cognizance of substance; their cognizance must be ordained. The category of Quantity is of use no doubt, but the category of Quality is apt to reveal the essences hidden under phenomena better.

There are four species of the category of Quality, and the last one is, at the same time, the "border one": easily confusable with what is proper to the categories of Quantity and Substance. The *substantial* form is included in the first category (of Substance). The *outer* form (the fourth species of Quality) might be easily confused therewith. The outer shape of a human body is confusable with the humanity of the individual if presented on the artificial media devises. It might be imagined that humanity accepts its particular shape in this individual as if "poured into" that form. In the similar manner, fluids accept forms from what contains them. The "shape of humanity" is not, to be sure, defined, in that case, by its quantity directly, but is, nonetheless, defined by the "quality of quantity". It might be reshaped: doubled, trebled etc., albeit it is then impossible to *be singled out definitely*. The category of Quoties quantum answers the question, How many times an amount is taken. It might be: double/twofold; triple/threefold, or even single, but never as singular as substance must be. Human existence is, then, expressed in multiplicative numerals, whereas man, if acting, is "defined" as animal multiplicans (a multiplying being).

Man cannot be, properly speaking, defined by any of his accidents. The definition of substance reads: ens per se; whereas the definition of the accident: ens in alio.[383] Substances

[383] De virtutibus, q. 2 a. 1 ad 22. Ad vicesimumsecundum dicendum, quod nullum accidens est dignius subiecto quantum ad modum essendi; quia substantia est ens per se, accidens vero ens in alio. Sed in quantum accidens

exist on their own, whereas accidents exist in substances only (their existence is "borrowed" from them). We take into account the categories of Aristotle, but we can take into account predicating per se which is mentioned in the first book of Aristotle's Topics. Rationality is predicated per se of humans, although reason (being rational) is, properly speaking, an accident in humans. However, it is a *special* accident, because inseparable from substance. It follows it immediately (it cannot not to follow it). It is to be called its specific property, because the substance cannot exist without this property.[384] Consequently, the property of rationality (man's reason) defines man, because we trace down all phenomena of what is sensually perceived to their natural substrata: the rational substances (human actions, in general, are understandable as long as rational). For instance, man only can understand a joke (the sense of humor is inseparable from his nature like rationality is). No computer (no matter how "intelligent") can understand irony. Ethics, in Socrates, was born from his notorious irony. Compared in the category of Quantity both computer and human mind seem to process information at a certain rate. Still, *the end* of processing is *qualitatively different*.

Rationality is to be sought in all human actions; in all phenomena of human existence; because the cognition par excellence consists in retracing the essential under the phenomena. Accidents contribute to the cognizance of cognizance if analyzed.[385]

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est actus et forma substantiae, nihil prohibet accidens esse dignius substantia; sic enim comparatur ad ipsam ut actus ad potentiam, et perfectio ad perfectibile; et sic est caritas dignior anima.

[384] Summa Theol., Ia q. 77 a. 1 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod, si accidens accipiatur secundum quod dividitur contra substantiam, sic nihil potest esse medium inter substantiam et accidens, quia dividuntur secundum affirmationem et negationem, scilicet secundum esse in subiecto et non esse in subiecto. Et hoc modo, cum potentia animae non sit eius essentia, oportet quod sit accidens, et est in secunda specie qualitatis. Si vero accipiatur accidens secundum quod ponitur unum quinque universalium, sic aliquid est medium inter substantiam et accidens. Quia ad substantiam pertinet quidquid est essentiale rei, non autem quidquid est extra essentiam, potest sic dici accidens, sed solum id quod non causatur ex principiis essentialibus speciei. Proprium enim non est de essentia rei, sed ex principiis essentialibus speciei causatur, unde medium est inter essentiam et accidens sic dictum. Et hoc modo potentiae animae possunt dici mediae inter substantiam et accidens, quasi proprietates animae naturales. Quod autem Augustinus dicit, quod notitia et amor non sunt in anima sicut accidentia in subiecto, intelligitur secundum modum praedictum, prout comparantur ad animam, non sicut ad amantem et cognoscentem; sed prout comparantur ad eam sicut ad amatam et cognitam. Et hoc modo procedit sua probatio, quia si amor esset in anima amata sicut in subiecto, sequeretur quod accidens transcenderet suum subiectum; cum etiam alia sint amata per animam.

[385] De veritate, q. 1 a. 10 c. […] ad intellectum humanum invenitur interdum inaequalitas rei ad intellectum quae quodammodo ex ipsa re causatur; res enim notitiam sui facit in anima per ea quae de ipsa exterius apparent, quia cognitio nostra a sensu initium sumit, cui per se obiectum sunt sensibiles qualitates; unde et in I de anima dicitur, quod accidentia magnam partem conferunt ad cognoscendum quod quid est: et ideo quando in aliqua re apparent sensibiles qualitates demonstrantes naturam quae eis non subest, dicitur res illa esse falsa; unde Philos. dicit VI Metaph. quod illa dicuntur falsa quae nata sunt videri aut qualia non sunt, aut quae non sunt; sicut dicitur aurum falsum, in quo exterius apparet color auri, et alia huiusmodi accidentia, cum tamen interius natura auri non subsit. Nec tamen res est hoc modo causa falsitatis in anima, quod necessario falsitatem causet; quia veritas et falsitas praecipue in iudicio animae existunt, anima vero in quantum de rebus iudicat, non patitur a rebus, sed magis quodammodo agit.

Consequently, the "rational" appears to be specific difference of man; something which makes really him/her differ to dumb animals, albeit they can appear to be phenomenally similar to man.

Quality is, however, usually associated with being good or bad (morally first of all). Aristotle, accordingly, places the human faculty (potentia) of rationality in *the second* species of the category of Quality (ποίον). The first one is the firm disposition (habitus-ἕξις) to doing good or evil (and distinguished from the evanescent emotional disposition called διάθεισις; habitus incompletus).[386] These qualities are to be called habits. Virtues and vices are this.

There are no habits in the elementary bodies, because they cannot get used to anything, and they act in as uniform as predicable manner. Habits are proper to humans, and knowing them allows predictions about this or that man's possible future actions. They can be anticipated thus, although a margin of uncertainty remains nonetheless.[387] For instance, a liar

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[386] Super Sent., lib. 4 d. 4 q. 1 a. 1 c.; Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 49 a. 4 co. Unde qualitates simplices elementorum, quae secundum unum modum determinatum naturis elementorum conveniunt, non dicimus dispositiones vel habitus, sed simplices qualitates, dicimus autem dispositiones vel habitus sanitatem, pulchritudinem et alia huiusmodi, quae important quandam commensurationem plurium quae diversis modis commensurari possunt. Propter quod philosophus dicit, in V Metaphys. quod *habitus est dispositio, et dispositio est ordo habentis partes vel secundum locum, vel secundum potentiam, vel secundum speciem*; ut supra dictum est. Quia igitur multa sunt entium ad quorum naturas et operationes necesse est plura concurrere quae diversis modis commensurari possunt, ideo necesse est habitus esse.

[387] De virtutibus, q. 1 a. 1 c. Respondeo. Dicendum, quod virtus, secundum sui nominis rationem, potentiae complementum designat; unde et vis dicitur, secundum quod res aliqua per potestatem completam quam habet, potest sequi suum impetum vel motum. Virtus enim, secundum suum nomen, potestatis perfectionem demonstrat; unde philosophus dicit in I caeli et mundi, quod virtus est ultimum in re de potentia. Quia vero potentia ad actum dicitur, complementum potentiae attenditur penes hoc quod completam operationem suscipit. Quia vero operatio est finis operantis, cum omnis res, secundum philosophum in I caeli et mundi, sit propter suam operationem, sicut propter finem proximum; unumquodque est bonum, secundum quod habet completum ordinem ad suum finem. Inde est quod virtus bonum facit habentem, et opus eius reddit bonum, ut dicitur in II Ethic.; et per hunc etiam modum patet quod est dispositio perfecti ad optimum, ut dicitur in VII Metaph. Et haec omnia conveniunt virtuti cuiuscumque rei. Nam virtus equi est quae facit ipsum bonum, et opus ipsius; similiter virtus lapidis, vel hominis, vel cuiuscumque alterius. Secundum autem diversam conditionem potentiarum, diversus est modus completionis ipsius. Est enim aliqua potentia tantum agens; aliqua tantum acta vel mota; alia vero agens et acta. Potentia igitur quae est tantum agens, non indiget, ad hoc quod sit principium actus, aliquo inducto; unde virtus talis potentiae nihil est aliud quam ipsa potentia. Talis autem potentia est divina, intellectus agens, et potentiae naturales; unde harum potentiarum virtutes non sunt aliqui habitus, sed ipsae potentiae in seipsis completae. Illae vero potentiae sunt tantum actae quae non agunt nisi ab aliis motae; nec est in eis agere vel non agere, sed secundum impetum virtutis moventis agunt; et tales sunt vires sensitivae secundum se consideratae; unde in III Ethic. dicitur, quod sensus nullius actus est principium: et hae potentiae perficiuntur ad suos actus per aliquid superinductum; quod tamen non inest eis sicut aliqua forma manens in subiecto, sed solum per modum passionis, sicut species in pupilla. Unde nec harum potentiarum virtutes sunt habitus, sed magis ipsae potentiae, secundum quod sunt actu passae a suis activis. Potentiae vero illae sunt agentes et actae quae ita moventur a suis activis, quod tamen per eas non determinantur ad unum; sed in eis est agere, sicut vires aliquo modo rationales; et hae potentiae complentur ad agendum per aliquid superinductum, quod non est in eis per modum passionis tantum, sed per modum formae quiescentis, et manentis in subiecto; ita tamen quod per eas non de necessitate potentia ad unum cogatur; quia sic potentia non esset domina sui actus. Harum potentiarum virtutes non sunt ipsae potentiae; neque passiones, sicut est in sensitivis potentiis; neque qualitates de necessitate agentes, sicut sunt qualitates rerum naturalium; sed sunt habitus, secundum quos potest quis agere cum voluerit ut dicit Commentator in III de anima. Et Augustinus in Lib. de bono coniugali dicit, quod habitus est quo quis

is likely to lie and a coward to fly from danger, even if a strong intellectual impulse can change the hackneyed way of acting quite unexpectedly. There are manifold habits in an adult man, and actions follow them in the same, on average, manner. They are, however, the accidents (properties) of substances, and cannot be imagined to be separable from them; to be molecules (elements) manageable for the sake of well-being of humanity; to be thus determinative of human actions. The actions happen then to be deemed "unidimensional" if extremely simplified, or "multidimensional" if detailed, but "dimensional" nonetheless.

In the most simplistic paradigm, the direction of human actions was imagined to be determined by a vector calculus of sorts: as a sum of particular momenta of the parts of human body. Macroscopic bodies can be anticipated to act according to mathematical principles, and some might believe it to the case with humans too. But human existence cannot be believed to have any (no matter how many) dimensions either. The paradigm is more intricate, but flawed nonetheless. The general intention of life cherished throughout its whole length determines its parts *qualitatively* only.

According to Aristotle, the act (action) precedes the potency (faculty) in the order of being[388], albeit the opposite occurs in the order of time (the fact is known in physics as the so called retro causality; inconceivable in terms of the flux of consciousness, in which a cause must precede the effect). In special: the faculty to act in the rational manner in humans is preceded by Creative Act of God, whereas the faculty (habit) to act honestly is preceded in this or that man by a particular original (initiating) act. Habits are born from reiterated actions.

People try to live honestly and declare (no always hypocritically) the desire to make the others to do so also. There is, however, a difference to inanimate objects, which conform to our desires unreservedly, and the animated one which do so under some circumstances only. Humans are not submissive in the way inanimate bodies are. Animal emotions, to be sure, can be tampered with, and humans happen to be believed (hoped) to act in a similar ("desirable") way. Animals can be domesticated, because naturally inferior to men, but in "progressive" societies attempts are being made to domesticate humans similarly, because deemed inferior to the avant-garde of the society ("progress" means distancing the delayed). Animals cannot be educated, but can be deprived of liberty and crippled to some extent in

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agit, cum tempus affuerit. Sic ergo patet quod virtutes sunt habitus. Et qualiter habitus distent a secunda et tertia specie qualitatis, qualiter autem a quarta differant, in promptu est: nam figura non dicit ordinem ad actum quantum in se est. Ex his etiam potest patere quod habitus virtutum ad tria indigemus. Primo ut sit uniformitas in sua operatione; ea enim quae ex sola operatione dependent, facile immutantur, nisi secundum aliquam inclinationem habitualem fuerint stabilita. Secundo ut operatio perfecta in promptu habeatur. Nisi enim potentia rationalis per habitum aliquo modo inclinetur ad unum, oportebit semper, cum necesse fuerit operari, praecedere inquisitionem de operatione; sicut patet de eo qui vult considerare nondum habens scientiae habitum, et qui vult secundum virtutem agere habitu virtutis carens. Unde philosophus dicit in V Ethic., quod repentina sunt ab habitu. Tertio ut delectabiliter perfecta operatio compleatur. Quod quidem fit per habitum; qui cum sit per modum cuiusdam naturae, operationem sibi propriam quasi naturalem reddit, et per consequens delectabilem. Nam convenientia est delectationis causa; unde philosophus, in II Ethic., ponit signum habitus, delectationem in opere existentem.

[388] Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 9 l. 7 n. 7. Sicut quae acquiruntur per consuetudinem vel disciplinam. Et de his dicit hic quod etiam in eisdem secundum numerum, actus praecedit potentiam. Impossibile enim videtur quod aliquis fiat aedificator, qui non prius aedificaverit; aut quod fiat citharaedus, qui non prius citharizaverit.

return for the benefit of safe life. The similar actions, if adopted to humans, result in crippling their natural potencies (faculties). They cannot be totally destroyed, but can be seriously damaged nonetheless. The civilization diseases come hand in hand with the "progress" of the civilization. Man cannot be made to act well (to be good), unless the notion of goodness be reinterpreted. Humans can only be taught how to act according to reason.

The lawgiver aims at making people morally good[389], albeit the actual ability to do so is small. If confronted bluntly with the effects of his/her actions (if judged honestly) man (a culprit) can reflect, but cannot be made to reflect though. The social juridical power is not identifiable unreservedly with the personal power of reason (the former deepens on the latter). The power to do good is created in man immediately by God. The personal and state power can (under some circumstances) be provisionally identified in a particular action, but cannot be identified indiscriminately. The attempts to do so make for the rise of totalitarianism.

There is, among manifold phenomena of human existence, a special one called labor (work). Ethics (and philosophy in general too) treats the matter (of labor) from a universal point of view. Apart from working on e.g. roads or improving legislative system, man should, first of all, work on working itself, i.e. retrace the innermost principle enabling all men to work (to act in general) effectively. The principle is the intellect. Ethics is concerned with the use of the practical intellect.

Man can be tried to be coerced to working in a totalitarian system, but cannot be *coerced to will* to work ("desires" can be artificially roused, but the act of will cannot be so), because it implies contradiction: the co-existence of principles which clash with each other. For work to be what it must be, it must be, first of all, rational.

Some three centuries ago, in France, a slogan Laissez faire appeared. The principle seems sound, but can be, nevertheless, misinterpreted. The "faire" (acting) is not free because incidental/casual, even if such like stimuli have been believed to enhance "free movement of labor" in our days. Man cannot be made free at the expense of disintegrating his rational personality. Anarchy is never freedom. The root of liberty is the intellect.

Man cannot be deprived of the faculty of reason, because it has been created directly by God; but can be deprived of life, obviously enough. He/she, can be, moreover, deprived of the actual and effective use of this faculty in a society; he/she can be deprived of it "in some times in some places".[390] "To exist" means etymologically "to take place".

The advocates of materialist Weltanschauung take for granted the existence of mechanic stimuli quickening human life. "Freedom" would consist (according to the advocates of liberalism) in actions being "spontaneous" (unpredictable), even if the same stimuli enable the others to tamper with them (predict the train of actions in some way nonetheless). The same materialist principles (if advanced consequently enough) enable those in the know (socialists) to preclude (mechanically) as many possibilities of acting as only possible so as to force those deprived of freedom to choose, from the manifold directions of life, the only one which has remained. Liberalism thus goes hand in hand with socialism, because they are both materialist. Freedom (and free market in particular too) cannot be founded on materialist principles.

[389] Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 28 q. 1 a. 3 c.

[390] Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 9 l. 1 n. 17-18; Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 5 l. 14 n. 14-16.

Flowing water of a brook can be hampered in its natural progress and forced to form a new riverbed. Humans are qualitatively different to the elementary matter though: they cannot, to be sure, deprived of the faculty to act at all, but the power to use the faculty can be impaired from progressing into the social realm of existence: crippled so.

The material culture of our Civilization in the Middle Ages was created by Cistercian Monks, whereas the monastic movement itself began with first eremites in the 3rd century CE. Their freedom was authentic, albeit originally private only; it was going to become a social function in the centuries to come. Should our Civilization be destroyed someday by the advocates of the "social progress", it will end where in commenced: in the solitary striving for good and truth in opposition to the conventional lie.

The infantile emotivism (best visible in the "love of animals") goes hand in hand with the senile demise of the social power of the traditional society. The demise must have come after accepting materialist principles of education. The so called "violence prevention" is representative for this type of "education". Aggression is natural in man, and the problem with it consists in that it should be moderated by the personal act of prudence (the practical intellect), but cannot be "moderated" mechanically. Humans happen to act badly, but cannot be made to act honesty by precluding all possibilities of acting except the one institutionally sanctioned. They might be only be crippled so. The "violence prevention" occasions the opposite of the (publicly) declared: a violence *surge*. No one turns aggression against him/herself, and if he/she turns it against anybody, it is only because he/she has been persuaded first that the aggressed in "not-mine" (but, for instance, taken into social care).

The "modern" upbringing seems to aim at impairing all natural powers in man for the sake of creating a new "artificial" one. The right to live implies the right to defend oneself even at the expense of killing the aggressor. Manifold attempts have been made to "domesticate" humans (to make them tame and submissive). They all aim at stifling the natural in man so as to create a new one according to the progressive principles. Liberalism has been advocating freedom, but has opened the Pandora's Box, because propagating materialist principles.

Ideology might replace, imperceptibly, science too. Ideologies are not wicked because ill devised, but because they are what they are: ideologies: opposed to reasoning and rational judgment. Ideologies of modernity ignore the fundamental truth about the human rational nature. They are thus both anti-rational and anti-natural.

Socialism in its manifold forms is the most heinous ideology. But there is a "road to serfdom"' also, albeit von Hayek is unwilling to admit that it was materialist liberalism which paved the way for the materialist collectivism. Originally, capitalism was expected to necessitate the effectiveness of working, which might seem humane in comparison with other (brutal) forms of necessitating producing which followed. But the materialist principles have distorted the fundamental truth about man and his free will from the very outset. Not even a perspective of famine can compel man to work as effectively as he can (he can work slovenly only, i.e. make others to mend his mistakes).

A machine can be composed out of elements, but the human psyche cannot be composed of elementary sensations this ways so that the composite might act in a desirable way. Man is defined ("composed" by God only) by his rationality and free will. The latter follows the former in man. The order cannot be reversed; especially however, man cannot be

defined by his *inferior* appetite, because emotions do not make for the authenticity of human existence at all. The principle Laissez faire is not flawed, but not generalized consequently enough. The principles of free actions are *naturally distributed* along with the individuation of the intellectual principle in humans.

The effectiveness of work (and of acting also) depends on the natural hierarchy of powers in man. The somatic in man is naturally subservient to the emotional, whereas the emotional partake (in an adult personality) of the act of the will, which, in turn, depends on the intellect. The integral development of man (and the effectiveness of his work in particular too) depends on preserving this natural hierarchy.

The slogan Laissez faire is to be understood in terms of the real i.e. rational freedom: the act of the free will is to be informed by the act of the intellect. Economic actions are *some* actions indeed, but not the most important ones. It can be said only that the flawed ideological principles explode in economics first (their flawed nature is most plainly visible there).

There are habits and potencies discoverable under the phenomena of the human life. Habits are, as a rule, acquired, but some of them are acquired – so to say – immediately. They are called habitus principiorum: the habits of principles. They are "inborn" in the sense because following out of necessity every act of the intellect and the will. The first habit of practical intellect dictates to the will: do good; shun the evil.

Natural principles and what naturally follows them cannot be changed: they are all *originally* good because stemming directly from God. Still, the modes people realize the desire for good and happiness happen to be quaint indeed, and the objects they call good also. The good, however, must be defined in clear terms lest they trudge in a blind alley of an existential impasse. People cannot be forced to do good, but can be persuaded to do so (the intellect is then forced by the evidence of reasoning only). The scope of liberty is proportional to the force of persuasion the liberty is born of. No "new man" can be created, because that would entail destruction of the old one (the destruction is normal in the "progressive" society), but new forms of thinking can be "created" boosting the freedom.

"Do not strive for the impossible" says Chilon of Sparta (one of the Seven Sages of antiquity). It is impossible really to improve human nature (to "transcend" it), but it is possible; nay, advisable to allow developing it freely. This, however, does not amount to "self-realization". There are different principles possibly realizable in a man, and some of them (the flawed habits) do not deserve *their*-realization. What chimes in with human nature must be neatly distinguished from what is incompatible with this nature. Only the former must be realized unreservedly. Everything depends, in this case, on how the very human self is defined. Some "alien" (artificial) elements might appear therein and easily confusable with the natural ones. The problem of the post-Hegelian society consists in that "the human" has been identified with "the artificial", and unconditional reconciliation of all (no matter how artificial) desires recommended so as to make people "happy".

Everything which harmonizes with the *personal* reason is good in man, because *this* reason is a closer principle of acting. God is the ultimate principle, but not even God will violate the order He created. The advocates of the new brave world command violating the order by dint of the aforementioned unconditional reconciliation. The reconciliation, admittedly, with e.g. viruses or bacteria does not seem to improve human well-being at all. In the post-Hegelian society, however, people happen to be cheated into believing that

"emotions" are not similar to viruses or bacteria in the least. People can be cheated this way, but nature cannot. The "natural" of the "modern" (Schellingian) naturalism is hardly discernable from "artificial" (defining Hegelianism), because the natural principle of individuation has been abandoned.

People happen to be coerced to work this or that way, but not encouraged to work on working; to improve the principles (to define work in general terms): to the detriment, eventually, of work itself. It has been almost commonly assumed nowadays that the main (or even exclusive) objective of society consists in multiplying material goods. The morality is needed as long as improving the objective. The statement, however, was originally proclaimed some seven centuries ago. The Averroist Marsilius of Padua formulated it in his Defensor of Pacis in 1324. The ancient Greeks assumed that the state is natural for man and aimed at improving human good (happiness), because the social in man naturally follows the rational in him. The conviction was rejected in the 14th century, and the idea of the social oppression emerged instead. The state was (deemed) needed so as to improve the material wealth; to *necessitate* it.

Material goods are goods indeed, but the goods do not need not to be gods: cherished, but never assessed with distance. Nothing forbids clarifying their nature. According to Aristotle, the material goods are to be called *useful*: qualitatively different to the honest ones (not comparable therewith in one generic notion), and to the pleasurable ones also. The end of a way is to be distinguished from the very way leading to it as well as from the rest in this end. The useful is relative in respect of what is good per se (honestum). The honest, in turn, (or what is at least deemed to be honest) gives pleasure if obtained (the movement of the appetite rests therein). Bonum honestum of moral virtue is, however, "useful" in a sense too: as a means of obtaining happiness in God.

Freedom, for all its grandiose name, is concerned with the means to the end only. It is characteristic for the way; not for its end. It is impossible, according to Thomas, to intuit the essence of God (to obtain the happiness in Him) and be free to turn away from it. John Duns Scotus, however, advocated the contrary opinion and thus originated the modern style of thinking.

Many pretended to have an intuition of freedom, but no one ever managed to communicate it nonetheless. On the contrary, all feel quasi instinctively the depressing power of enslavement: the main source of life sorrow and anxiety. "Liberals" usually complain about being deprived of the freedom even if the freedom is as modest as Averroists expect it to be. In the socialist-run countries, however, people get accustomed to being treated as thralls and put up with the fact.[391] According to Thomas, the real source of (absolute) freedom is the

[391] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 36 a. 4, c. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, malum coniunctum est causa doloris vel tristitiae per modum obiecti. Id ergo quod est causa coniunctionis mali, debet poni causa doloris vel tristitiae. Manifestum est autem hoc esse contra inclinationem appetitus, ut malo praesentialiter inhaereat. Quod autem est contra inclinationem alicuius, nunquam advenit ei nisi per actionem alicuius fortioris. Et ideo potestas maior ponitur esse causa doloris ab Augustino.
Sed sciendum est quod, si potestas fortior intantum invalescat quod mutet contrariam inclinationem in inclinationem propriam, iam non erit aliqua repugnantia vel violentia, sicut quando agens fortius, corrumpendo corpus grave, aufert ei inclinationem qua tendit deorsum; et tunc ferri sursum non est ei violentum, sed naturale.

intellect. The best remedy, in turn, for sorrow is contemplation.[392] It is about a new and completely unknown perchance too possibility being opened to liberate from no matter how harsh a predicament. Ideologies preclude the possibilities; they "train" and cripple; wisdom opens them all. The root of the freedom is the intellect.[393] One of the cornerstones of our Civilization is free access to truth; the common weal,[394] not to be commercialized.

Energetic actions might seem to be free, and a certain property of the real freedom appears therein indeed. A strongly integrated (naturally good) personality is able to undertake both reasonable and free actions. But the same personality is able to squander the capital of the integrity of nature also in a both spectacular and imposing manner. Eventually however, in in the moment the capital is squandered the same phenomena which used to rouse admiration will be the viewed with abhorrence and disdain.

Humans action stem from different principles, because the human nature is not a monolith. Our body naturally gravitates, but the gravitation, obviously, does not account for the humanity of our actions. Thomas distinguishes between actions of man (actiones

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Sic igitur si aliqua potestas maior intantum invalescat quod auferat inclinationem voluntatis vel appetitus sensitivi, ex ea non sequitur dolor vel tristitia, sed tunc solum sequitur, quando remanet inclinatio appetitus in contrarium. Et inde est quod Augustinus dicit quod voluntas resistens potestati fortiori, causat dolorem, si enim non resisteret, sed cederet consentiendo, non sequeretur dolor, sed delectatio.

[392] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 38 a. 4, c. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in contemplatione veritatis maxima delectatio consistit. Omnis autem delectatio dolorem mitigat, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo contemplatio veritatis mitigat tristitiam vel dolorem, et tanto magis, quanto perfectius aliquis est amator sapientiae. Et ideo homines ex contemplatione divina et futurae beatitudinis, in tribulationibus gaudent; secundum illud Iacobi I, *omne gaudium existimate, fratres mei, cum in tentationes varias incideritis*. Et quod est amplius, etiam inter corporis cruciatus huiusmodi gaudium invenitur, *sicut Tiburtius martyr, cum nudatis plantis super ardentes prunas incederet, dixit, videtur mihi quod super roseos flores incedam, in nomine Iesu Christi.*

[393] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 17 a. 1 ad 2. Ad secundum dicendum quod radix libertatis est voluntas sicut subiectum, sed sicut causa, est ratio. Ex hoc enim voluntas libere potest ad diversa ferri, quia ratio potest habere diversas conceptiones boni.

De veritate, q. 24 a. 2 co. Iudicium autem est in potestate iudicantis secundum quod potest de suo iudicio iudicare: de eo enim quod est in nostra potestate, possumus iudicare. Iudicare autem de iudicio suo est solius rationis, quae super actum suum reflectitur, et cognoscit habitudines rerum de quibus iudicat, et per quas iudicat: unde totius libertatis radix est in ratione constituta. Unde secundum quod aliquid se habet ad rationem, sic se habet ad liberum arbitrium.

[394] M. Tulli Ciceronis De officiis liber primus [51] […]

Homo, qui erranti comiter monstrat viam,
Quasi lumen de suo lumine accendat, facit.
Nihilo minus ipsi lucet, cum illi accenderit.
Una ex re satis praecipit, ut quidquid sine detrimento commodari possit, id tribuatur vel ignoto.

[52] Ex quo sunt illa communia: non prohibere aqua profluente, pati ab igne ignem capere, si qui velit, consilium fidele deliberanti dare, quae sunt iis utilia, qui accipiunt, danti non molesta. Quare et his utendum est et semper aliquid ad communem utilitatem afferendum. Sed quoniam copiae parvae singulorum sunt, eorum autem, qui his egeant, infinita est multitudo, vulgaris liberalitas referenda est ad illum Ennii finem „nihilominus ipsi lucet", ut facultas sit, qua in nostros simus liberales.

humanae), and human actions (actiones hominis).[395] It is only the latter which deserve fully the name of the free ones. All actions are this as long as partaking (depending on) of/in the intellect and the will. The acts of the inferior appetite (emotions) are human by participation in the acts of supreme powers.

There is, thus, an order of dependence (participation). The first moving principle in the microcosm called a human person is the intellect,[396] whereas the will is both moved (by the intellect) and moving (the emotions and human limbs): movens motum.[397] The will must to be called human heart for this reason.

There is no accident of an accident, but there is the quality of reason which mediates really between the human (rational) nature and the phenomenally perceivable actions of man.

Human actions, if rational, are definitely describable in terms of good and evil (of whether they chime in, or jar with, reason). The speculative reason considers being and non being; the practical one: the being and non being (the proper and improper for) of the human nature. We discern them both using the first ("inborn") principle of the intellect: the non-contradiction principle.

Aristotle enumerates four species of the category Quality and they all might (albeit to various extent) serve as principles of humans actions. The fourth one, however, is of the least use.

The example of the "numeral quality" (quoties quantum) is a form of the human body seen on a picture, which is, admittedly, qualitatively different to the form that actuates human *living* body in reality. Figures, in the material world we are acquainted with, must have three dimensions (particular things cannot be imagined to have more than just three), albeit a material world (a totality) could be imagined to exist endowed with more than just three dimensions. The matter of the world could have been, then, quite different to the one we know from physics now.

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[395] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 1 a. 1 c. Illae ergo actiones proprie humanae dicuntur, quae ex voluntate deliberata procedunt. Si quae autem aliae actiones homini conveniant, possunt dici quidem hominis actiones; sed non proprie humanae, cum non sint hominis inquantum est homo. Manifestum est autem quod omnes actiones quae procedunt ab aliqua potentia, causantur ab ea secundum rationem sui obiecti.

[396] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 50 a. 5 ad 2. Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus agens est agens tantum, et nullo modo patiens. Sed voluntas, et quaelibet vis appetitiva, est movens motum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Et ideo non est similis ratio de utroque, nam esse susceptivum habitus convenit ei quod est quodammodo in potentia.

Super Sent., lib. 3 d. 27 q. 1 a. 3 c. In omnibus autem hoc invenitur quod motus procedit a primo immobili quieto: quod quidem patet in naturalibus: quia primum movens in quolibet genere est non motum illo genere motus, sicut primum alterans est non alteratum. Similiter patet de intellectualibus: quia motus rationis discurrentis procedit a principiis et quidditatibus rerum, quibus intellectus informatus terminatur.

Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 44 n. 3. Idem necesse est sequi si fiat reductio mobilium non in aliquod primum movens seipsum, sed in movens omnino immobile. Nam primum movens est universale principium motus. Oportet igitur, cum omne movens moveat per aliquam formam quam intendit in movendo, quod forma per quam movet primum movens, sit universalis forma et universale bonum.

[397] Super Sent., lib. 3 d. 27 q. 1 a. 1 c.

However, physics is not the philosophy of nature (Physica). The metaphysics elaborated by Aristotle comes after *his* Physics, and the four *universal* causes are presented in it and handed down to metaphysics. On the other hand, the ontology elaborated by Christian Wolff is not concerned with the actual, but the possible being (quod possibile est est ens). The notion had been handed over to Hegel and those who followed suit. Thus, the "modern shape of humanity" was believed to be endowed with more "dimensions"; "realms"; "spheres" etc. Some new "existential possibilities" seemed to open this way.

Primitive cultures were unable to name "great" numbers. Above, say, ten, there is only "plenty of" for them. The development of the material culture demanded applying great numerals. In Latin, "small" numerals end at mille (thousand), whereas in Greek, at μύριοι (ten thousand). So as to express greater numbers, mathematical operations are needed instead of simple names. For instance, million (10^6) must be expresses as "ten hundred thousand" ($10 \times 100 \times 1{,}000$).

The need for naming great numbers appeared in parallel with the development of the material culture, but it is not tantamount to that man and his perfection (culture as such) should be defined in terms of multiplying, and man as a functor of the number quantities.

We "reckon with conscience" according to the Ten Commandments in apparently different way we reckon numbers. The ten is, according to Thomas "the prefect number", but the reason for this is hardly visible in the experimentally knowable world. The natural logarithm (the logarithm to base *e*) is applicable better to describing material processes than the decimal one. Perhaps, the ten is "perfect" because we have ten fingers, and the human hand is the best instrument possibly existing in the world: just at the border of the immaterial, because actuated by the immaterial intellect. The relation of our existence to the Creator is defined by the Ten Commandments too, but it is scarcely conceivable in terms of a linear approach. Consciousness is *originally* the *practical* knowledge shared with others (and the One who gives Commandments, first of all). The exponential function explains best the material world we explore. But it is by means certain that we should live therein only; it is impossible to live therein forever: the exponential demise of life energy ends definitely with the death of our material body.

The name of Consciousness changed its original meaning after Hegel. It was believed to be an autonomous entity which had appeared at a certain level of the cosmic evolution. But even if it had appeared by the act of auto-creation, it was believed to evolve thereafter nonetheless. Needleless to say, the values found in it, must have undergone an "evolution" also. The evolution ended, originally, in 1807 (the moment the Absolute Spirit was believed to be born in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit), and the end of history was proclaimed. Still, the Hegelians themselves disavowed the claim and "reassumed" the train of evolution after the death of the founder of the "absolute philosophy".

Be that as it may, all actions of the "being" called Consciousness (subsequent upon the original self-creative one) would consist in multiplying the primitive (and measurable) value of humanity. Marx speaks of the added value in this context. The notion has been commonly adopted though, perhaps because used by the French Physiocrats earlier. Thus however, being conscious ceased to be what it had originally been: sharing practical knowledge with others (or The Other), because confronting the theoretical knowledge with the Other Side creative of

being; but was defined by multiplying ad infinitum. Consciousness is a hybrid of practical and theoretical reason.

Aristotle could have not anticipated the novelty, but foresaw the danger of confusing the first and the forth species of the category of Quantity nonetheless. In particular, we are concerned with confusing the notion of the "shape of humanity" with humanity itself. They are, according to him, easily confusable because both expressed in general terms.

There are material objects in nature, and mathematics allows ordaining them in quantitative terms. But the ordaining itself was in modernity substantiated, and man seized as a functor of the mathematical function. There are many functions mathematics speaks of, and manifold "dimensions of human existence" appeared also.

Mathematics speaks in plain terms, but the same terms if extrapolated beyond the category of Quantity are anything but plain. Anyway, natural reaction for scientism was bound to come. Pascal speaks of the rules of heart unknown to what he calls "reason" (concerned in Pascal with mathematics only). The heart Pascal speaks of is not the will (because the rational power cannot be opposed to the rational in man), but an abode of emotions, which may really oppose the reason (can rebel against it). The ebb and flow of life energy seems to be normal. Thus we come to the third species of the category Quality: a transient disposition. Emotions seemed to qualify human existence, and they do this in some respect indeed, but it is highly questionable whether they can so in absolute terms (whether they qualify it adequately).

There is a capital difference between stating that emotions are the matter of our moral development (and cannot be mechanically suppressed in the way Kant though it advisable), and the statement that they are *the essence* of the development. The latter stance is commonly known as emotivism: the last word of modernity in morals. Still, the last might be supposed to be imminent since the very outset of the paradigm, because anticipated by the phenomenological Erleben (life-experience) already. There was, *originally*, a difference between the "pure", and "ordinary" subjectivity, but the temptation also to blur the distinction, which was going to be fatal for ethics. The so called Empathy (Empfühlung) was about to serve as a principle. Thus, however, no action could have been judged from distance, but "sympathized" with only. The distance seems to be necessary for a judge (in court) lest he/she should identify his/her personally disinterested point of view with that of e.g. a criminal. Otherwise, the crime itself might appear justifiable in the end and connivance demanded for no matter how heinous transgression. The only plausible alternative seemed (to Hume) to "eliminate" instead of judging. Mathematical equations can be simplified this way indeed.

Number values must be simple, and the moral values were believed to be simple also (formally definable). Still, it seems that they cannot be formalized in the way mathematical beings must be, because so as to act morally it does not suffice to do *what* is good. The acting, in addition, must be performed *well*.[398] Moral quality might seem imposing and the shape of humanity it represents looked up to as "great". But the intention of accomplishing no matter

[398] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 3 a. 4 arg. 5. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in XIII de Trin. quod beatus est qui habet omnia quae vult, et nihil vult male. Et post pauca subdit, propinquat beato qui bene vult quodcumque vult, bona enim beatum faciunt, quorum bonorum iam habet aliquid, ipsam scilicet bonam voluntatem.

how grandiose deeds might be far from great (honest), even if not clearly visible first. The good quality is not the end as such (an autonomous being), but only a means to obtain the Sovereign Good.

> Since goodness depends upon the end, a will is said to be good with regard to its order toward the reason for willing, which is the end; but *an absolute comparison of the will to the thing willed does not make the act of the will to be good*, since the thing willed is related materially to the reason for willing, which is the correct end; *for one can desire one and the same thing well or badly inasmuch as it is ordered to different ends*; and contrarily, someone can will correctly different and contrary willed things by referring both to the correct end. Thus, even though God's will can only be good, and anything whatsoever that he wants he wants correctly, yet the goodness in the act of the divine will is considered from the reason for willing, that is, from the end to which he orders whatever he wills, which is his own goodness.[399]

All goods (not only the material ones) might be used amiss. The Enemy (of humans) can do good also so as to gain confidence and harm then more effectively. "Although Satan does good sometimes (aliquando aliquod *bonum* faciat), he does not good well (non tamen *bene* facit), when he tells the truth so as to deceive" (veritatem dicit ut decipiat)".[400]

Some human actions might be similar. Nonprofit (charitable) activities might serve a perverse purpose: propagating immoral contents under the cover of inclusivity.

The number values set on the axes of coordinates are supposed to be comprehended in one act of intuition (Kant calls it Anschauung). Kant says that it is impossible to intuit God this way, which is perfectly true, but the conclusions he draws therefrom are completely mistaken. We do not intuit the essence of God before the consummation of our life, but the proof of the existence of God is based not on the intuition of concepts, but on the "intuition" of what makes (mere) words to be (valuable) concepts (eustochia in Aristotle is the proper name for this intuition). Had we had any intuition of the objects supposed to lead to the end before obtaining the End, the intuition would rather tether our mind to the objects (the progress of reasoning would be hampered), and the intuition would do the opposite of what it was expected to do. Those who claim to have the intuition attach, in fact, special importance to some goods which they hope to be reconcilable with the End: the impossibility, because, the notion of the End is incompatible with the notion of what merely *leads* to the end.

It is practically impossible to obtain the Ultimate without determining the relation of the material objects to It in ethics and acting. The same, analogically, objects are considered in metaphysics: from a purely theoretical point of view.

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[399] De veritate, q. 23 a. 8 c. Cum autem bonum ex fine dependeat, voluntas bona dicitur secundum ordinem ad rationem volendi, quae est finis. Comparatio vero voluntatis ad volitum absolute non facit actum voluntatis esse bonum, cum ipsum volitum se habeat quasi materialiter ad rationem volendi, quae est finis rectus: potest enim unum et idem volitum bene vel male appeti, secundum quod in diversos fines ordinatur; et e contrario diversa et contraria volita potest quis bene velle, in finem rectum referendo utrumque. Quamvis ergo voluntas Dei non possit esse nisi bona, et omne quodcumque vult, bene velit; tamen bonitas in ipso actu voluntatis divinae consideratur ex ratione volendi, id est ex fine ad quem ordinat quidquid vult, qui est bonitas sua.

[400] Summa Theologiae I, q. 64 a. 2 ad 5.

Rational acting aims at what is conditionally necessary. It deduced conclusions (imperatives of acting too) from general principles. The latter however, are ultimately provided by the theoretical intellect. Principles are immovable and unchangeable, like human nature must be. It is accidents only (properties of human being not identical with the very being) which can only be meliorated due to the effective power of the principles. God is the final and efficient cause (principle) of the human existence. But there is also a closer formal principle of moral actions: the human nature created by God (in an integral form).

The existence of the Principle (God is the principle of being) is *the conclusion* of the supreme science (and the conclusions of metaphysics are the opposite of its principles). The very word of principle should be used cautiously. Plato, for all his ingenuity, failed to observe the difference. In effect, there is no formal proof of the existence of the God in Plato. Instead, he speaks of "unconditional principle" (Respublica, VI, 510B) and he is commonly supposed to do so in order to refute the relativism of Sophists.

The refutation was, at any rate, bought for a high price. If God is the measure (as principles must be in respect of the conclusions) the transcendence of the measure is in fact questioned. The measuring and the measure might interact in the way we know from experimenting. God, in consequence, would be regarded either as a quality which measures, and the object of His knowledge, as a quality which is measured. Thus however, he could be regarded anthropomorphically as a "multiplying animal" too. Anthropomorphisms are, generally, typical of the so called "modern theology".

The claim that God is the measure is not exact in Plato, but is not worthless nonetheless. Aristotle corrects rather (as Thomas has it) than attacks squarely the Platonian stance. Aristotle (in his Ethics) reached a constructive compromise with both Protagoras and Plato: "It is the virtuous man who is the measure" (1176a15; 1113a29) (his rational nature must be this: a closer principle of goodness). However, Aristotle does preclude the existence of the remote and peremptory measure (God) beside this closer one (which Protagoras seemed to do). Anyway, the relation of the both measures cannot be grasped otherwise than in qualitative terms (mathematics proves insufficient there). In fact, God is not only the measure, but *a cause* of the validity of any measuring.

The problem of Platonism became even more acute in Augustine, perhaps because in the face of incomparably more demanding data of Revelation. There are eternal paradigms of what things *should be* apart from what *they actually are*. They are called exemplary ideas. Gilson proves that Augustine never pretended to have an insight into the ideas (he did not advocate ontologism), but their role had remained not clear enough, until Thomas allotted them their proper place. The essence of God is identical with His acting, but respects to temporal effects of His actions are manifold and might be called ideas indeed.

Be that as it may, neither the Platonian nor the Augustinian ideas were what philosophers (especially Neo-Kantians) claimed them to be following Descartes: a being which is neither real nor logical (it is natura tertia in Avicenna). The world has been, according to both Augustine and Thomas, created in a certain order, and the order is somehow reflected in the exemplary ideas. But there is no trace of the traditional proof of the existence of the order in Locke, Kant, Husserl and the other advocates of the modern ideas. Moreover, the so called "idea of God", was about to replace the certain knowledge which can be obtained about Him by metaphysics. There is, in modernity, the profane of the ordinary life

contrasted to sacrum of ideas, albeit they are determined in a direct (privative) opposition to each other only.

There is no profane in Thomas. The point of departure of his metaphysics is as modest as it can possibly be. The proper object of the human intellect is the quiddity of a material thing, which is apparently not much to the taste of "modernity" with its lofty ideas. The starting point is inconspicuous, and that is why the conclusions are of great importance. The cognizance of the material world is not the end of our existence, but a means to get to know its transcendent Cause. Now, the less conspicuous a means is, the more certain the objective value of the conclusions.

It seems highly improbable to prove the existence of God using Kant's Critique (because contrary to what it was devised for), and nobody has succeeded *as yet*. Nor is anybody recommended to try, because using the tools of the traditional of classical philosophy serves better. No one has succeeded, but, perchance, somebody will so some-day. The staring point of the proof will be *quite* inconspicuous then, but (as Hieronymus says) an opponent's argument is more convincing (argumentum adversarii est efficacius) than the argument taken from the crude nature, which never contradicts, but opposes constructively only to our intellect.

Creature is not God, and that is why it has objective value in proving what is, at first, uncertain to be possibly proved. All the less can anyone believe in that what sometimes affects even his sense of decency in this world can be this. That is why the two notions: of the principle and the cause must be distinguished after all, which Thomas does in his De principiis naturae, and Aristotle in book V of Metaphysics. "Principles" and "causes" are absolutely identifiable in mathematics only.

A material object could not have been a means if perceived in the act of intuition (as Kant demands), but we do not need to "intuit" objects this way. We do not even are obliged to follow Kant's train of thinking in his Critique, because the *real* critique consists in challenging the validity of no matter how highly appreciated reasoning. The statements appear before our eyes indeed in the order the author deemed right, like e.g. images do in films or novels. Their sequence is not real, but might seem at least possible to occur. But on the other hand, the sequence might be as artificially as perversely arranged. The prospect of being a "small providence" (a "god") seems alluring.

The sequence of the events we see *with naked eye*s is *qualitatively* different. The objects of second and the fourth species of the category of Quality must be different also. The sequence is neither incidental (like the sensed must be), nor absolutely necessary (like the mathematical abstracts must be). The order of creation is conditionally necessary. The principle which serves to get to know it is called the intellect. The inborn habitual known principles direct its pathway.

The "spectacle and drama of human existence" (and the history of humanity too) has been perfectly planned. The sequence of events is not linear, nor is it given in the flux of consciousness. There is principle governing the sequence of them: the non-contradiction principle. God cannot violate the principle; He not so "almighty" that able to perform absurd actions (which Ockham imputed to Him nonetheless). Accordingly, the history of humanity as such has its end, which it is not essentially the end of time, but the consummation (the end-telos in the Aristotelian sense).

The principles of the theoretical and practical intellect allow deducing conclusions applicable either to a science or to decisions. Each of the premises has a binary value (is true or false), but secondarily and existential value also: as far namely as it happens to be more than just a dry statement, but seems relevant for obtaining the most (existentially) relevant conclusion: "there is a supreme value for you in store: the happiness in God".

The principles are formal in themselves, but effective nonetheless of the most vital conclusions, because it is due to them that the intellect and the will approach God, and not a phantom begotten in phantasy.

The first principles are called "immediate" by Aristotle. There are, besides, mediate ones: those deduced from the first principles as definitions of some properties of being are. They serve as principles for particular sciences and actions. They are to be called values.

All statements have originally but binary value (of veracity or falsity), but existential (variegated) value also as far as facing some threats posed on the way towards God.

The non-contradiction principle is juxtaposed by Aristotle in book IV of his Metaphysics to the subject matter of this science: substance. Substance is being without restriction, whereas other particular modes of being can be specified by nine other categories (Thomas analyses exhaustively the so called convertibles of being which cannot be categorized after all). Anyway, the existence of substance is pivotal for any further investigations, either as the first category of being or as thingness of things (a convertible of being).

Its existence was cast in doubt in the moment the corpuscular theory of matter seemed to endorse the philosophical agnosticism. "There is no substance, but atoms only, and what appears to be a substance is but an agglomerate of atoms". The statement seemed great (in e.g. Mach), but proved eventually rash (as the further development of quantum mechanics testified). It was "philosophical" rather the scientific, since it was Avicebron who introduced the co called form of corporeity (Descartes called it res extensa). The existence of elementary bodies does not entail out of necessity that they may not be composed in the way Aristotle thought it possible in some more perfect beings (e.g. in humans), i.e. integrated into the form of substance.

Nevertheless, many hurried to espouse the claim, because of the (aforementioned) "existential" value of the statement (its falsity or veracity counted less than its life importance). The rejection of the existence of substance chimes in with shrinking the responsibility for moral deeds. If no firm substratum, actions can be indubitably ascribed to, exists, no deeds can be subject to judgment also. Similarly, rejecting the dogma of transubstantiation amounts to keeping God "at a safe distance" from the ordinary life, whereas the belief in the substantiality of is what real ("pertains to me") does the opposite.

The mysteries of the human heart are inscrutable *for man* and it are charlatans only who pretend to explore "sub-consciousness". It is, consequently, impossible to state that some reject *in concreto* the existence of substance for those private motives. Still, it is indubitable that they *should not* reject it lest they imperil the safety of their way to God. Some *actions naturally tend* to some effects and not anticipating their results is culpable. "Private intentions" might be tried to guess, albeit the reasonableness of the surmises is questionable. People, however, are to be deemed responsible for actions which tend to certain effects out *their* ("a-personal") nature, even if the effects are ignored. Ignorance is culpable in this case.

Apart from being true of false statements might appear to be familiar or abhorrent: before their objective value has been checked. Not only those harbored in mind are so, but spoken aloud mostly too, and thus their effects must be anticipated even more carefully. Certain affectual dispositions determine (to some extent) the value of what is spoken aloud. The dispositions, however, are not unchangeable; nay, they are corrigible according to the first ("a-personal") principles.

Were we to suppose that values are what Augustine, most probably, could have called them: exemplary ideas, they could be neither harmed nor defended. The problem of modernity (of Kant, Lotze, Scheler and others), however, consists in that the ancients, in Lotze's eyes, "misunderstood" the true nature of ideas (values). Thus, the *right understanding* of ideas (or values) must be defended (the ideas determined as to what they really and objectively mean) against those who claim that the ideas (values) must be something *personally* valued so as to be vivid at all.

Nowadays, not only ethics, but the value of the entire heritage of the Civilization is imperiled by this subjectivism. The laws of physics exist, no doubt, apart from what we know about them, and our existence depends on knowing them what they really are: independent of how familiar or abhorrent they might appear to us. The same mutatis mutandis concerns the aesthetical and economic values. The future of the Civilization is at stake, because its very foundations have been shaken. We do not defend reality, but we should defend ourselves from being lost in *the unknown* reality.

The purity of faith, however, is to be defended as the most important good (truth is the good of the intellect). This truth is a means of liberation and salvation. Truth as such was always, in the Latin Civilization, deemed the good accessible to anybody. All are equal as to their ultimate destiny (the happiness in God), but unequal in all other respects; the ways to the End cannot be equal; they are manifold; the inequality is immanent for human nature. Nevertheless, the same inequality bids to use one's advantages to the benefit of all (the handicapped too): in respect to the ultimate End only. In respect to any other end, the abolishing of inequality is simply immoral. The fruits of labor are to be "equally" distributed in the perspective of the ultimate happiness in God only. All other redistribution of goods is idolatrous. The goods might be supposed to be freely "multiplied" then and freely redistributed too.

According to Roman Ingarden, man is being which incessantly transcends itself. The traditional quality of reason has been replaced by another one: the fourth species of the category of Quality. "I am a being which multiplies itself; builds itself and outdoes itself also". Ingarden, following Husserl, pays homage to mathematics (value are, allegedly, similar to mathematical beings). Facing those values man appears to be a kind of a numeral (the multiplying ones). A "new shape of humanity" appears along with its new "dimensions of existence".

Had all the created goods been measurable like quantities are, defining man as a multiplying animal would have been justified. Still, the rational in man is not restricted to counting. Counting is obviously accidental, because scarcely many are able to comprehend mathematical theorems fully. Still, the majority believes in that "multiplying of objects" is definitive of human existence even if the principle has not been *formally* known. According to what Ingarden says, man transcends himself in terms quantity of his existence.

Actions of material objects (those produced by man included) can be described (with a good approximation) by dint of vector calculus. It seems, however, preposterous to believe that human actions can be calculated in the similar way: as a sum of particular impulses (be it material or sensual). The human body and his emotions too are quickened by a qualitatively superior form: of rationality, but are being tried to be manipulated only by those simple stimuli. The belief in that man is "multiplying animal" instead of the being multiplied only seems less preposterous, because acting defines man better than being acted upon, but is nonsensical after all.

Descartes was at a loss trying to tell between "machines" and animated (human) bodies (Meditations, II, 32), and hardly anything else was to be expected after assuming, after Avempace, that all material beings agree in one "shape" of corporeity. Human body was described in those terms also (Meditations, II, 36). Animal were machines tout court, but those who followed suit (La Mettrie and others) hold the same about humans. In consequence (facing the specter of impeding materialism), the only way of development seemed to be left in opening more than just three (undauntedly physical) dimensions of life. Material goods/products (if complicated enough) are "multidimensional" in a sense, because of their mutual interactions.

It is undeniable fact that human body is composed of material particles and each of them has a certain momentum (the product of its mass and velocity) and energy (one-half the product of its mass and the square of its velocity). But the "momentum of the human bodily existence" is more than just sum of these particular momenta (which Empiriocriticts claim).

Had it not been the case, the human freedom would have been null and void. It may preserve a precarious existence of a "postulate" of reason (in Kant), but never inform the bodily existence of man. Emotions do inform the human body (are encoded in it), but the ultimate source of information is the intellect. The scanned brain of a scientist looks quite different to that of a handworker.

Medical actions, however, seem to depend on the "principles" of scientism, and the supposition that man's body is a "machinery of organs" seems (at least pragmatically) justified. Still, medicine itself is growing more and more conscious of the restrictions of the paradigm. The so called "holistic medicine" is obviously unscientific, but its popularity bears a testimony to that the mechanist one is insufficient. Alexis Carrell in his Man the Unknown pointed out to the restrictions of the materialist paradigm.

For an experiment to be carried out according to Galileo's principles some border conditions thereof $t_n; x_n; y_n; z_n;$ must imposed and its objects qualified accordingly in terms of time and space. Human body, no matter how complex, could be – at least in some its parts considered by the particular branches of medicine and be experimented on in the similar way. For the sake of the checkable efficacy of actions, the materialist claim (even if not certain) should be – as it seemed – accepted for pragmatic reasons. The principle of the economy of means seemed to justify it.

The value of a person would be, analogically, determined by the indices of the variables of time and space. Man would be an added value (a self-multiplying being). Originally (in the Arab medieval philosophy), it was the Giver of Forms which accounted for his value. Eventually (in the heirs to the Arab tradition) sheer modernity (approaching the horizon of the depersonalized infinity) accounts for this value. Everything signed by a lower

index of time and space would be "outdated" whereas, everything with a higher index – its opposite: modern and "good".

Kant fiercely believed in the irreversible progress, but felt obliged to accept the possibility of determinism espoused by Leibniz. The law of the preservation of energy precluded (in Leibniz) the possibility to disturb the amount of energy the human body "from without" and human will was supposed to conform to a pre-established "border conditions of the cosmic experiment" too. The validity of the physical principles was extrapolated unto the whole reality.

All these principles, however, hold true only within insolated systems: those not interacting with their surroundings, whereas the very extrapolating seems to violate the rule of isolating after all. Kant, in his Prologue to the Second Edition of his Critique, assumes that the systems might be isolated a whim. Accordingly, all parts of human body could have been dissected into pieces specific for particular branches of medicine and the accuracy of experimenting guaranteed this way. But Kant failed to observe that the very isolating (of objects) is real (is a being). If it were an object similar to e.g. a thermometer, the outcomes of the experiment could have never been accurate (a thermometer immerged into a glass of water does not measure the temperature of the water *before* it was immerged in it, but the temperature of water and the thermometer together). "Isolating", then, must not be a material object if the material objects are to be observed according to the very Kantian principles.

Measuring itself disturbs the state of energy of the measured objects (according to what modern physics says). If experimenting (as such) had been tantamount to measuring, its accuracy could have never been guaranteed. Kant thought it was guaranteed a priori, but only "humanists" believe in his "principles" nowadays. Values are believed to be "experienced" this way, even if the numerical values of experiments have been disbelieved to be knowable so.

The temperature of e.g. emotions can be "measured" this way: disturbing the state of the energy of the system and being disturbed by it also. It is psychologically evident that if e.g. a person I address myself to is arrogant or hostile to what I am talking about, the very energy of my speaking wanes. It must be so unless the person's reactions becomes indifferent/irrelevant for me and the arrogant or malicious person is treated with distance (or even disdained), although normally, the repressing feedback paralyzes the action. The shared emotional attitude (empathy) does the job.

Modern physics falsified the claim of scientism. The phenomenon of quantum entaglement is inexplicable in terms of mechanics. The parts of the human body are entangled indeed, and they might be treated as separate objects with some approximation only. If an object is isolated really, it must be so *by a principle*. A scientist takes care for preserving clear-cut border conditions of an experiment. Human soul, according to Augustine, does something of the sort with respect to the whole human body: it takes care for its integrity, which is apparently a metaphor for its being the formal cause of the body. The same however (Augustinian), paradigm applies (mutatis mutandis) to human (scientific) actions: they isolate objects as long as prompted by the immaterial principle (the intellect).

A scientist (and human reasoning in general too) must be placed outside the isolated system, otherwise it would have been unable to observe it in objective terms. It must be placed outside the flux of time also even if the flux of inner time of the consciousness is

meant. Otherwise, it would be unable to master the flux of time and the accuracy of experimenting would be questionable too.

Had man be defined as animal multiplicans, his line of existence would have been measurable also. But then he would be unable to master the future events (to anticipate them); i.e. to "measure" them from an objective coign of vantage.

The phenomena of the human existence are incomparably more intricate and manifold than those of the animal world, but are not to be deemed "mysterious" for that reason. The scientific attitude to them must be maintained, but the reductionist paradigm of science rejected for the same reason. The variety of the phenomena can be set down to some principles, but the principles themselves must not be simplified. Man is not a mathematical functor and his being cannot be defined in terms multiplying (quoties quantum). The principles human actions originate from are qualitatively different: there are various faculties (potencies) in man (the intellect; the will, the generative power, etc.), but even more habits of the will and emotions which partake of the will. That is why the human world is so different to the animal one. No instinct can explain the variety, as it works uniformly. There is but one quasi instinctive desire for beatitude, but it must be specified (informed) by the act of the reason which does it in manifold ways.

There are various professional habits and the wealth of a society depends on their specialization. But the common weal depends on the *solidarity of habits*, as was mentioned above. The alleged authenticity of emotions is a principle of disintegration, whereas "reshaping the form of humanity" is a principle of degradation. The substantial form is more than just a complex of accidental forms.

A stone cannot be happy and animals (contrary to what children think) cannot be also: they cannot adhere to God for eternity. A higher principle is need to obtain it; the intellect, which subordinates, with utmost difficulty, the inferior powers (Aristotle, II De Coelo, II, c. 12, 292b 2 ss).

All objects encountered on the way to the happiness might be called values or anti-values, depending on whether they promote or hamper the progress to the End; but understanding the anti-values is a value itself as it helps avoiding the imminent danger. The definitions science provides tell us what things really are (unless perchance the science is ideologized). As to the faith, the role is played by Denzinger's Enchiridion.

Before see ("intuit") God (in the afterlife) we must understand what precedes the intuition, which is to say: *resign from any particular intuition*. The "inborn" principles we come to existence with are scarce. There is a habit of the first principles of understanding as well as the habitual tending of the will to happiness. Between these two points, the drama of the human existence unfolds: a chasm of uncertainty yaws, which can only be bridged by the defining intellect.

2. The principles of the classical philosophy

In book VI of his Metaphysics, Aristotle enumerates three theoretical sciences: mathematics, physics (the philosophy of nature) and what is nowadays called metaphysics, but then "theologics" ("the divine science"). The last is supreme, as it avails itself fully of the

principles naturally knowable for man. The other sciences use the principles to a degree only (the more particular a science, the more restricted the scope of the principles). In other words: the principles are "categorized" in them. This concerns (in particular) mathematics. The unity of number (this principle in mathematics) is to be neatly distinguished from the unity of being: its integrity and undividedness. Still, the unity of being is not (in Thomas) the first principle of metaphysics. Before seizing being's integrity, we grasp being (ens) itself: sub quadam confusione ("under some confusion").[401] (The exact translation of the formula will be attempted below). This commonly known principle allows building real definitions (the principles of particular sciences and the principles of specific actions), and pass definitive judgments in metaphysics.

The being is thus seized habitually, but the seizing cannot be called the intuition of being, as it is the effect of the abstraction on the sense data. On the other hand, the explication of this simple (incomplex) principle is only possible by using the so called complex principle: the principle of non-contradiction (the advocates of the theory of the intuition of being and the primacy of the so called identity principle speak of "contradiction principle" instead). So as to "categorize") anything (to cloth the principle with words) an exemplary idea of non-being is needed, and its notion is included in the formula of the non-contradiction principle: "it is impossible to be and not to be at the same time" (simul). Everything is thus seized in decisive terms of being and non being; of good and evil, as good is the actuality of being, whereas evil is its privation. The categories cannot be relativized as they immediately follow the human rational nature (its rationality created by God). The way for the modern relativism, to the contrary, was paved in the moment the notion of good was separated from that of being and the primacy of the non-contradiction principle rejected.

Being is known first, but is not known to be known first nonetheless save by those who deeply reflect on the principles of knowledge. The being is not called by its own name save by metaphysicians. The other sciences use the principle, but do not treat it thematically. The words spoken aloud correspond to the principle, but cannot correspond directly to individuals (denote them) in the way nominalists though them to. In his Hermeneutics as well as in Posterior Analytics, Aristotle says that words (which should be defined and judged) are preceded by the habitual knowledge of principles. The latter are called "axiomata" in Greek and that is why distorting the nature of first principles might be called an "axiological error".

The notorious "Umwertung aller Werte" seems to be the most shocking and provocative attempt at undermining the universal character of truth and good (their status as the property of being). However, the other properties of being (e.g. beauty) were affected by this destructive Umwertung also. The nature of truth had happened to be reinterpreted in fact long before Nietzsche.

Since Kant, the correspondence theory of truth has been rejected, albeit mostly preserved at least in judiciary as it seemed really difficult to judge anybody adequately

[401] Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 8 q. 1 a. 3 c. Cujus ratio est, quia ens includitur in intellectu eorum, et non e converso. Primum enim quod cadit in imaginatione intellectus, est ens, sine quo nihil potest apprehendi ab intellectu; sicut primum quod cadit in credulitate intellectus, sunt dignitates, et praecipue ista, contradictoria non esse simul vera: *unde omnia alia includuntur quodammodo in ente unite et indistincte, sicut in principio*

without stating the real state of affairs independent of thinking (as Jan Łukasiewicz observes). But eventually judiciary too is being affected by a kind of "modernization".

The notion of beauty (by its being so close to the good that almost undistinguishable in Greek) has happened to be affected by a similar relativisation. The modern "music" would (most probably) have appeared to e.g. Mozart abhorrent cacophony.

There are several definitions of truth aberrant from the classical one, albeit they all pretend to be as modern as philosophical. There is a remarkable confusion of notions concerning the subject. The confusion might seem to be a deplorable fact, but cannot be denied to be a *naked* fact nonetheless and independent from "consciousness" (a "scandal of non-unanimity" appears in it). Thomas (following Aristotle) does not put up with stating the fact (which must have been visible to some extent then too). He proves that the fact issues from the very nature of the human cognition. Human notions *happen to* be vague, albeit they are originally non-distinct only because preceded by the imperfect cognition inherent in the first principles. As far as imperfect (e.g. in childhood) all intellectual acts must be "confused", albeit they do not need to be mushy for that reason, and must not be imperfect in the end. The confusion normally implies privation, but *originally* it implies only the habitual (both imperfect and naturally perfectible) knowledge of principles (principium naturalis cognitionis est est in quadam confusa cognitione omnium).[402] It seems to be rather obvious that some ideas are relatively easily correctible even if imperfect, whereas the other ones are rather stumbling blocks than stepping stones on the pursuit of truth. The former are so because closer to the naturally known principles.

At the beginning of his famous treaty De ente et essentia, Thomas quotes Aristotle saying parvus error in principio magnus est in fine (A small mistake in the beginning is a big one in the end). Nietzsche's sentiment was so "big" that almost imposing for those starving for strong emotions. Still, no matter how devoted to relativism, a philosopher must depart from the same principles and they are commonly known by everybody (no one is born a relativist). The only problem is how to explicate the principles without distorting them. It seems that the principles provided by Aristotle are most universal really, and thus explicative of the sentiments of those even who openly attack them. The reductive analysis provided by Aristotle is – as far as we know – the most comprehensive one.[403] Still, the possibility must not be precluded that others can be found and more universal than those provided by Aristotle and commented on by Thomas.

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[402] De veritate, q. 18 a. 4 c. Cuius quidem naturalis cognitionis est accipere principium et terminum. Principium autem eius est in quadam confusa cognitione omnium: prout scilicet homini naturaliter inest cognitio universalium principiorum, in quibus, sicut in quibusdam seminibus, virtute praeexistunt omnia scibilia quae ratione naturali cognosci possunt. Sed huius cognitionis terminus est quando ea quae virtute in ipsis principiis insunt, explicantur in actum: sicut cum ex semine animalis, in quo virtute praeexistunt omnia membra animalis, producitur animal habens distincta et perfecta omnia membra, dicitur esse terminus generationis animalis.

[403] Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 6 l. 1 n. 7. Et est idem sensus. Nam quod supponitur, quasi ex conditione accipitur: et quia principium demonstrationis est definitio, palam est ex tali inductione, quod demonstratio non est de substantia rei, idest de essentia eius; nec de definitione, quae significat quid est res; sed est aliquis alius modus, quo definitiones ostenduntur; scilicet divisione, et aliis modis, qui ponuntur in secundo posteriorum.

Philosophy is a science, but is a craft also as far as it instructs how to use (uti) the means naturally knowable to anybody. In the common day life, we normally use (utimur) e.g. tools; schemes; imagination; etc. We apply them (applicamus ea) to solving some problems. Still, the intellect can (and should be) used (applied to) in analogous manner too, albeit the very collocation sounds awkward. There is a philosophical need to use the phrase, even if the non-philosophical tongue shrinks from it. Normally, we use something which is in-between our inborn abilities and objectives meant to be tackled. However, philosophy demands to use the ("inborn") habit of the first principles of the intellect in the analogous way. In the first Chapter of his Physics, Aristotle analyses the "inborn" principles.

> Since, indeed, to understand and to know happen in all sciences of which there are principles, causes, or elements, it is through acquaintance with these that knowledge is attained. For we do not think that we know a thing until we know its first causes and first principles and have carried our analysis as far as its elements. Plainly, therefore, in the science of nature, as in other branches of study, our first task will be to try to determine what relates to its principles.
> The natural way of doing this is to start from the things that are more knowable and certain to us and proceed toward those that are clearer and more knowable by nature; for the same things are not "knowable relatively to us" and "knowable" without qualification.
> So, in the present inquiry, we must follow this method and advance from what is more obscure by nature but clearer to us toward what is more clear and more knowable by nature.
> Now, what is plain and obvious to us at first is confused masses (συγκεχυμένα), the elements and principles of which become known to us later by analysis. Thus we must advance from universals to singulars.
> For it is a whole that is best known to sense perception, and a universal is a kind of whole, comprehending many things within it, like parts.
> Much the same thing happens in the relation of the name to the formula. A name, such as "round," means vaguely a sort of whole: its definition divides into particular elements.
> Similarly, children begin by calling all men "father" and all women "mother," but later on distinguish each of them. (Fathers of the English Dominican Province).[404]

[404] 184a 10-184b 14᾽Επειδὴ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι συμβαίνει περὶ πάσας τὰς μεθόδους, ὧν εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ ἢ αἴτια ἢ στοιχεῖα, ἐκ τοῦ ταῦτα γνωρίζειν (τότε γὰρ οἰόμεθα γιγνώσκειν ἕκαστον, ὅταν τὰ αἴτια γνωρίσωμεν τὰ πρῶτα καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς πρώτας καὶ μέχρι τῶν στοιχείων), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμης πειρατέον διορίσασθαι πρῶτον τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς. πέφυκε δὲ ἐκ τῶν γνωριμωτέρων ἡμῖν ἡ ὁδὸς καὶ σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ ἡμῖν τε γνώριμα καὶ ἁπλῶς. διόπερ ἀνάγκη τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον προάγειν ἐκ τῶν ἀσαφεστέρων μὲν τῇ φύσει ἡμῖν δὲ σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα. ἔστι δ' ἡμῖν τὸ πρῶτον δῆλα καὶ σαφῆ τὰ συγκεχυμένα μᾶλλον· ὕστερον δ' ἐκ τούτων γίγνεται γνώριμα τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ διαιροῦσι ταῦτα. διὸ ἐκ τῶν καθόλου ἐπὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα δεῖ προϊέναι· τὸ γὰρ ὅλον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν γνωριμώτερον, τὸ δὲ καθόλου ὅλον τί ἐστι· πολλὰ γὰρ περιλαμβάνει ὡς μέρη τὸ καθόλου. πέπονθε δὲ ταὐτὸ τοῦτο τρόπον τινὰ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα πρὸς τὸν λόγον· ὅλον γάρ τι καὶ ἀδιορίστως σημαίνει, οἷον ὁ κύκλος, ὁ δὲ ὁρισμὸς αὐτοῦ διαιρεῖ εἰς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. καὶ τὰ παιδία τὸ μὲν πρῶτον προσαγορεύει πάντας τοὺς ἄνδρας πατέρας καὶ

The word συγκεχυμένα is hardly translatable into any language which is not as philosophical as the Aristotelian tongue of the original was. Let us then recall the historical context it had appeared in. The problem of the modern relativism is (partly) historical too, and the solution of them both might be expressed in analogous terms.

Anaxagoras speaks of the primitive mixture of elements from which the Intellect (νοῦς) extracts definite forms. Aristotle esteems Anaxagoras highly, but observes nonetheless that there are no reasons to look for the primitive mixture *in nature*, whereas there are convincing reasons to look for the primitive mixture in *the human understanding* of the nature (its mode). Although the unnamed precedes the named after all, the notion of the "mixed" and "confused" becomes clearer. Still, there is a serious problem, in general, how to name adequately that which must itself precede every naming.

Etymologically, συγκεχυμένα is the perfect participle of the compound verb συν-χύειν, which means: 1. to pour together, commingle, confound; 2. (of persons) to confound, trouble; 3. to scatter [objects] to the winds, set them at nought, violate them (Liddell-Scott; s.v.). To be exact, it might the passive participle, but Greek does not differentiate in this case between the passive and the middle voice. Consequently, the primitive data might *be thought* to be confused (by somebody) or simply confusable out of their very nature (the action expressed in the middle voice "returns" to who acts).

In the *natural* order, the συγκεχυμένα must be the effect of abstraction, and thus potentially explicable by anybody (the mode and end of the explication might vary though), even if in the common day tongue the notion of confusion implies privation. In *philosophy*, it should be deemed a natural habitual disposition to knowledge: neutral for the privation and any definitive form alike.

Thomas comments the text as follows:[405]

> Therefore, he first gives the following argument. ***In all sciences of which there are principles, causes, or elements*** (184a10), understanding and science proceed from a knowledge of the principles, causes, and elements. Now, the science that is about nature has principles, elements, and causes. Therefore, in that science it is necessary to begin with a determination of principles.
>
> When he says, ***to understand***, he refers to definitions, and when he says, ***to know***, he refers to demonstrations. For as demonstrations are from causes, so also are definitions, since a complete definition is a demonstration differing only by position, as is said in Posterior Analytics 1.8.
>
> When he speaks of ***principles*** or ***causes*** or ***elements***, however, he does not intend to signify the same thing by each. For "cause" is wider in meaning than "element." An element is a first component of a thing and is in the composed thing, as is said in Metaphysics 5. Thus, letters are elements of speech, but syllables are not. But those things are called "causes" upon which things depend for their existence or their coming to be.

μητέρας τὰς γυναῖκας, ὕστερον δὲ διορίζει τούτων ἑκάτερον.

[405] In Physic., lib. 1 l. 1 n. 5 Huic autem libro praemittit philosophus prooemium, in quo ostendit ordinem procedendi in scientia naturali. Unde duo facit: primo ostendit quod oportet incipere a consideratione principiorum; secundo quod inter principia oportet incipere a principiis universalioribus, ibi: innata autem et cetera. Primo ergo ponit talem rationem.

Thus, even that which is outside the thing or that which is in it—though the thing is not first composed of it—can be called a "cause," though it cannot be called an "element." But "principle" implies a certain order in any progression. Thus, something can be a principle that is not a cause, as that from which motion begins is a principle of motion but is not a cause, and a point is a principle of a line but not a cause.

Therefore, by ***principle*** he seems to mean moving causes and agents in which—more than in others—there is found an order of some progression. By ***causes*** he seems to mean formal and final causes upon which things most of all depend for their existence and their coming to be. By ***elements*** he means properly the first material causes.

Moreover, he uses these terms disjunctively and not conjunctively in order to point out that not every science demonstrates through all the causes. For mathematics demonstrates only through the formal cause. Metaphysics demonstrates principally through the formal and final causes, but also through the agent. Natural science, however, demonstrates through all the causes. (Fathers of the English Dominican Province).[406]

6. Next, at ***the natural way of doing this*** (184a16), he shows that, among principles, it is necessary to treat the more universal ones first. And first, he shows this by means of an argument; second, by an example, at ***for it is a whole*** (184a23). Therefore, he first gives the following argument. It is natural for us to proceed in knowing from those things that are better known to us to those that are better known by nature. But the things that are better known to us are confused, and such are the universals. Therefore, it is necessary for us to proceed from universals to singulars.[407]

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[406] In omnibus scientiis quarum sunt principia aut causae aut elementa, intellectus et scientia procedit ex cognitione principiorum, causarum et elementorum; sed scientia quae est de natura, habet principia, elementa et causas; ergo in ea oportet incipere a determinatione principiorum. Quod autem dicit *intelligere* (εἰδέναι), refertur ad definitiones; quod vero dicit *scire* (ἐπίστασθαι), ad demonstrationes. Nam sicut demonstrationes sunt ex causis, ita et definitiones; cum completa definitio sit demonstratio sola positione differens, ut dicitur in I Poster. Per hoc autem quod dicit *principia* ἀρχαὶ aut *causas* αἴτια aut *elementa* στοιχεῖα, non intendit idem significare. Nam causa est in plus quam elementum; elementum enim est ex quo componitur res primo et est in eo, ut dicitur in V Metaphys., sicut litterae sunt elementa locutionis, non autem syllabae: causae autem dicuntur ex quibus aliqua dependent secundum suum esse vel fieri; unde etiam quae sunt extra rem, vel quae sunt in re ex quibus non componitur res primo, possunt dici causae, non tamen elementa. Principium vero importat quendam ordinem alicuius processus; unde aliquid potest esse principium, quod non est causa: sicut id unde incipit motus est principium motus, non tamen causa; et punctum est principium lineae, non tamen causa. Sic igitur per *principia* (ἀρχαὶ) videtur intelligere causas moventes et agentes, in quibus maxime attenditur ordo processus cuiusdam; per *causas* (αἴτια) autem videtur intelligere causas formales et finales, a quibus maxime dependent res secundum suum esse et fieri; per *elementa* (στοιχεῖα) vero proprie primas causas materiales. Utitur autem istis nominibus disiunctim et non copulatim ad designandum quod non omnis scientia per omnes causas demonstrat. Nam mathematica non demonstrat nisi per causam formalem; metaphysica demonstrat per causam formalem et finalem praecipue, et etiam agentem; naturalis autem per omnes causas.

Primam autem propositionem rationis inductae probat ex communi opinione, sicut et in libro Poster.: quia tunc quilibet opinatur se cognoscere aliquid, cum scit omnes causas eius a primis usque ad ultimas. Nec oportet ut aliter accipiamus hic causas et elementa et principia quam supra, ut Commentator vult, sed eodem modo. Dicit autem *usque ad elementa* (μέχρι τῶν στοιχείων), quia id quod est ultimum in cognitione est materia. Nam materia est propter formam; forma autem est ab agente propter finem, nisi ipsa sit finis: ut puta dicimus quod propter secare serra habet dentes, et ferreos oportet eos esse ut sint apti ad secandum.

[407] In Physic., lib. 1 l. 1 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit: innata autem etc., ostendit quod inter principia oportet praedeterminare de universalioribus: et primo ostendit hoc per rationem; secundo per quaedam signa, ibi: totum enim et cetera. Circa primum ponit talem rationem. Innatum est nobis (πέφυκε) ut procedamus cognoscendo ab

It must be noted, however, that "what is known by nature" and "what is known simply" are the same. Those things are better known simply that are in themselves better known. But those things are better known in themselves that have more being, because each thing is knowable insofar as it is a being. However, those beings are greater that are greater in act. Thus, these are the most knowable by nature.

For us, however, the converse is true, because we proceed in understanding from potency to act. Our knowledge begins from sensible things, which are material and intelligible in potency. Thus, these things are known by us before the separated substances, which are better known according to nature, as is clear in Metaphysics 2.[408]

Therefore, he does not say ***knowable by nature*** as if nature knew these things, but because they are known better in themselves and according to their proper natures. And he says ***better known and more certain*** because, in the sciences, not just any kind of knowledge is sought, but certain knowledge.

Next, in order to understand the second proposition, it must be known that those things are here called ***confused*** that contain in themselves something potential and indistinct. And because knowing something indistinctly is a mean between pure potency and perfect act, therefore, while our intellect proceeds from potency to act, it knows the confused before it knows the distinct. But it has complete science in act when it arrives, through resolution, at a distinct knowledge of the principles and elements. And this is the reason why the confused is known by us before the distinct.[409]

That universals are confused is clear. For universals contain in themselves their species in potency, and whoever knows something in the universal knows it indistinctly. The knowledge, however, becomes distinct when each of the things contained in potency in the universal is known in act. For he who knows "animal" does not know "rational" except in potency. But

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iis quae sunt nobis magis nota, in ea quae sunt magis nota naturae; sed ea quae sunt nobis magis nota, sunt confusa, qualia sunt universalia; ergo oportet nos ab universalibus ad singularia procedere.

In Physic., lib. 1 l. 1 n. 7 Ad manifestationem autem primae propositionis, inducit quod non sunt eadem magis nota nobis et secundum naturam; sed illa quae sunt magis nota secundum naturam, sunt minus nota secundum nos. Et quia iste est naturalis modus sive ordo addiscendi, ut veniatur a nobis notis ad ignota nobis; inde est quod oportet nos devenire ex notioribus nobis ad notiora naturae.

[408] 7. Notandum autem est quod idem dicit nota esse naturae et nota simpliciter. Simpliciter autem notiora sunt, quae secundum se sunt notiora. Sunt autem secundum se notiora, quae plus habent de entitate: quia unumquodque cognoscibile est inquantum est ens. Magis autem entia sunt, quae sunt magis in actu: unde ista maxime sunt cognoscibilia naturae (τῇ φύσει). Nobis autem e converso accidit, eo quod nos procedimus intelligendo de potentia in actum; et principium cognitionis nostrae est a sensibilibus, quae sunt materialia, et intelligibilia in potentia: unde illa sunt prius nobis nota quam substantiae separatae, quae sunt magis notae secundum naturam, ut patet in II Metaphys. Non ergo dicit notiora naturae, quasi natura cognoscat ea; sed quia sunt notiora secundum se et secundum propriam naturam.

[409] Non ergo dicit notiora naturae, quasi natura cognoscat ea; sed quia sunt notiora secundum se et secundum propriam naturam. Dicit autem *notiora et certiora* (σαφέστερα καὶ γνωριμώτερα), quia in scientiis non quaeritur qualiscumque cognitio, sed cognitionis certitudo. Ad intellectum autem secundae propositionis, sciendum est quod *confusa* (συγκεχυμένα) hic dicuntur quae continent in se aliqua in potentia et indistincte. Et quia cognoscere aliquid indistincte, medium est inter puram potentiam et actum perfectum, ideo, dum intellectus noster procedit de potentia in actum, primo occurrit sibi confusum quam distinctum; sed tunc est scientia completa in actu, quando pervenitur per resolutionem ad distinctam cognitionem principiorum et elementorum. Et haec est ratio quare confusa sunt primo nobis nota quam distincta.

> knowing something in potency is prior to knowing it in act. Therefore, according to this order of learning, in which we proceed from potency to act, we know "animal" before we know "man."[410]

The theory presented above might seem to be incompatible with what Thomas often repeats (after Aristotle): unumquodque cognoscitur inquantum est actu (Each thing is known to the extent that it is in act): the latter statement *seems* to contradict the theory of the habitual cognition even if it has been expressis verbis adduced therein and thus set in its proper context. The advocates of the theory of intuition of reality are not likely to admit that it is the habitual knowledge of principles which precedes forming any language, but the immediate contact with the actuality of being in its stead must serve as a principle. Nominalists claim the intuition of individuals to ground all subsequent human cognizance.

The theory of the so called existential judgements was expected to settle the nature of the principle of cognition and, at the same time, to guarantee its philosophical realism. The theory happens to be often ascribed to Thomas, albeit he never uses the formula. Nay, it happened even to be ascribed to Aristotle, which is understandable to some extent, as the (alleged) warranty of realism seems to be duly ascribable to the father of the philosophical realism. However, a blind eye was turned to that the same theory appears in Husserl who is furthest from realism. Joseph de Tonquédec uses a vivid metaphor of the direct contact with reality: being grasps us by the throat in the very first cognitive contact with it. The more it is actual, the more fiercely it does so. As, however, God is the most actual being, it might seem hardly understandable why His existence does not ravish our intellect in the similar way. The contrary, in fact, is the case: God's existence (the fact the He exists) is known with utmost difficulty only. Facts are obvious indeed, but the factuality and reality of things were confused in the theory the existential judgements.

God is fully cognoscible for Himself, but scarcely cognoscible for us-humans. The principle of our cognizance is rather inconspicuous and it must be distinguished from the Cause of real things. The human intellect is real, no doubt, but actuated, nonetheless, in the order established by God. The real cognition was (in Krąpiec) more than just the cognition of reality. In fact however, our cognition is "real" because aright (and actuated by the First Cause); not because in close touch with reality.

Gilson claims that Thomas, in his Commentaries, puts up with explicating the principles set down by the authors he comments, even if does not solidarize with them unreservedly. As to the Commentary quoted above, the contrary proves to be the case, because the same thought was repeated in the best authorized Thomas' text: his Summa.

> Summa Theologiae I, q. 85 a. 3 c. Actus autem perfectus ad quem pervenit intellectus, est scientia completa, per quam distincte et determinate res cognoscuntur. Actus autem incompletus est scientia imperfecta, per quam sciuntur res indistincte

[410] Quod autem universalia sint confusa manifestum est, quia universalia continent in se suas species in potentia, et qui scit aliquid in universali scit illud indistincte; tunc autem distinguitur eius cognitio, quando unumquodque eorum quae continentur potentia in universali, actu cognoscitur: qui enim scit animal, non scit rationale nisi in potentia. Prius autem est scire aliquid in potentia quam in actu: secundum igitur hunc ordinem addiscendi quo procedimus de potentia in actum, prius quoad nos est scire animal quam hominem.

> sub quadam confusione, quod enim sic cognoscitur, secundum quid cognoscitur in actu, et quodammodo in potentia.
>
> The perfect act of the intellect is complete knowledge, when the object is distinctly and determinately known; whereas the incomplete act is imperfect knowledge, when the object is known indistinctly, and as it were confusedly. A thing thus imperfectly known, is known partly in act and partly in potentiality. (Fathers of the English Dominican Province).

Nevertheless, the theory of existential judgements became very popular amongst Neo-Thomists. Gilson goes as far as claiming that the theory is identical in Thomas and Scotus. The truth is, anyway, that the idea of the reality of cognizance (an oxymoron anyhow) is to be ascribable duly to Scotus, but ascribed unduly to Thomas by those who were under the (hidden) influence of the teachings of the Subtle Doctor. The critical edition of his works (newly provided) allows stating that (according to Scotus) we have, at the starting point of metaphysics, the indistinct (confusa) intellectual intuition of the actually existing individual being. Scotus seems thus to comment the Aristotelian text quoted above (Aristotle was an acknowledged authority in his times), albeit it might be doubted whether he comments adequately. According to Thomas, individuals are known directly by senses only, whereas by *the intellect indirectly only*: the first data of intellect are general and allow reflecting upon them so as to get to know individuals. Scotus does not use the term of the existential judgement, but those who followed his principles (Brentano, Husserl and others) do so indeed which is justifiable to the extent *his* intuition might identified with *their* judgement (which is a separate problem).

But there is no trace of the theory of the intuition of being in Thomas, and scarcely any traces of the theory of the existential judgements. Thomas seems to claim the opposite to the both theories: our *intellectual* cognition proceeds from potentiality to actuality; the habitual knowledge preceds the knowledge expressed in words. The full actuality of thinking is to be found in definitions and judgements of metaphysics. The cognition does not proceed from actuality to potentiality, but the other way round. Scotus seems to imply that it proceeds from what is actuality known and enters the "sphere of pure" (and possibly idealistic) thinking only because edging away from the ("benevolent") direct contact with the real being.

The rupture from the reality took place in the philosophical idealism indeed, but the cause was different to that pointed out by the advocates of the existential intuition/judgements. No principle accepted a priori is able to guarantee the reality of the a posteriori cognition (a blatant contradiction anyhow). According to Mieczysław Gogacz, all philosophers are originally realists, but become (mostly imperceptibly) idealists because wrongly explicating the first principles naturally known to everybody (the theory of the fundamental option between the two stances espoused by Fichte is apparently flawed). In the mind of an idealist, what was originally known indistinctly (confusa) becomes actually blurred (mushy). In the mind of a genuine philosopher, it becomes actually distinguished.

As had been said above, nothing precludes the possibility to use no matter how artificial mixture of half-truths as a principle, as "all men together do not fail, because each one is able to say something true about nature" (Metaph., II, Ch. 1); but some half-truths are of little use and the proceeding contrary to the principle of parsimony of intellectual effort. Idealists would have become realists, if they had taken pains to formulate real definitions

instead of creating symbols. Symbols represent rather (their) actions than essences (they should have described) and that is why they are hardly understandable.

Aristotle does not say that being is the first (confusedly) knowable for man, but puts up with stating that any "is" of a statement is preceded by the knowledge of the indistinctly known principles. It was Avicenna who claimed that being is the first knowable, albeit he fails to mention that it is known indistinctly (confusedly). It seemed that Thomas was indebted to them both, but the question of primacy remained to be settled nonetheless.

Thomas comments Aristotle's Metaphysics (as well are the majority of Aristotle's most important works), but fails to comment Avicenna's Metaphysics (Liber de Scientia Divina). The Arab philosophers were, in the 13th century, commonly acknowledged authorities, and it was normal to address them. Moreover, Avicenna had been exerting huge influence on the Western philosophy long before Aristotle was officially allowed to be studied at the Medieval Universities. The problem Thomas faced in the 13th century was how to purify Aristotelianism from this Arab intermediary. Thomas quotes freely Averroes many times, albeit he does not hesitate to call him, on one occasion, a Depraver of the original Aristotelianism (Depravator).[411] In particular, Averroes' Commentary to the Aristotelian text quoted above seemed highly unsatisfactory to Thomas.

Thomas quoted Avicenna many times, but, as it has been just mentioned, it is possible to use an instrument without using it in the way it has been originally meant to be used. To the contrary Descartes, Brentano, Husserl, Heidegger (and others) follow the principles set down by Avicenna, albeit ignoring the very name of the authority. Scotus knew the name, but in those who followed the name went into oblivion and that is why Avicenna's ideas were going to be so willingly accepted.

The very attempt to guarantee realism at the starting point of the realist philosophy seems to be highly objectionable to say the least of it. The essentials of philosophy consist in accepting principles potentially acceptable for anybody. Were we to assume that Plato and Aristotle originated two different philosophical traditions; we must nonetheless state that what Plato called "synoptic cognition" bears a striking resemblance to the συγκεχυμένα Aristotle speaks of.[412]

The term cognitio confusa occurs in Scotus too, and it was handed down to modernity so that it is mentioned even by Wittgenstein. A common basis of discussion appears with philosophical stances which *appear to* be *totally* different, but might be different only to the extent they exactly address (interpret) the original Aristotelian stance.

Aristotle solves the problem Plato tried to solve in vain in his Sophist, and that is why we prefer his συγκεχυμένα cognition to the synoptic cognition Plato speak of. In a statement *A is C*, the "is" is not expressive of any immediate existential contact with being (a privileged philosophical experience), but it originates from the first principle; the non-contradiction

[411] De unitate intellectus, cap. 2 c. 43 [aliqui] minus volunt cum ceteris Peripateticis recte sapere, quam cum Averroe oberrare, qui non tam fuit Peripateticus, quam philosophiae Peripateticae depravator.

[412] He uses, also, the phrase: συγχειν τὰ διακεκριμένα (Phil. 46 E); and: στήμονας συγκεχυμένους διακρίνομεν (Crat. 388 B). (Liddell-Scott; s.v.).

principle in which being is counter-divided to non-being and thus expressive of anything definite at all.

Being is most formal in things (maxime formale omnium, est ipsum esse),[413] and the "is" predicated about a thing in any language should be so also in respect to the other parts of speech: as long as it corresponds to the real state of matters.

The (allegedly) fundamental sense of being is not knowable in philosophy (and not relevant for that matter too), as the "is" of a scientific statement is expressive of four causes of being and not of being as such. "To be" means to have one of the four causes pointed out by Aristotle. The cognizance of causes allows building real definitions and pass definite judgments. There is no other gauge of the reality of a philosophical system.

The "reality" (should the name be granted) of a philosophical system, shows up in the relation of the parts of the definition to the definition itself must be settled.

> A part can be known in two ways. First, absolutely considered in itself; and thus nothing prevents the parts being known before the whole, as stones are known before a house is known. Second as belonging to a certain whole; and thus we must needs know the whole before its parts. For we know a house vaguely before we know its different parts. So likewise principles of definition are known before the thing defined is known; otherwise the thing defined would not be known at all. But as parts of the definition they are known after. For we know man vaguely as man before we know how to distinguish all that belongs to human nature.[414]

The statement that the cognition of totality is more important than the cognition of its parts sounds astonishingly familiar with what Gestalt Psychologie claims. Wertheimer writes:

> There are wholes, the behavior of which is not determined by that of their individual elements, but where the part-processes are themselves determined by the intrinsic nature of the whole.

The cognizance of the whole is more than just a sheer juxtaposition of its parts. Köhler adds:

> In psychology … we have wholes which, instead of being the sum of parts existing independently, give their parts specific functions or properties that can only be defined in relation to the whole in question. …The whole is something else than the sum of its parts, because summing is a meaningless procedure, whereas the whole-part relationship is meaningful.

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[413] Summa Theologiae I, q. 7 a. 1 c. Forma autem non perficitur per materiam, sed magis per eam eius amplitudo contrahitur, unde infinitum secundum quod se tenet ex parte formae non determinatae per materiam, habet rationem perfecti. Illud autem quod est maxime formale omnium, est ipsum esse, ut ex superioribus patet. Cum igitur esse divinum non sit esse receptum in aliquo, sed ipse sit suum esse subsistens, ut supra ostensum est; manifestum est quod ipse Deus sit infinitus et perfectus.

[414] Summa Theologiae I, q. 85 a. 3 ad 3. Uno modo [cognoscimus partem] absolute, secundum quod in se est, et sic nihil prohibet prius cognoscere partes quam totum, ut lapides quam domum. Alio modo, secundum quod sunt partes huius totius, et sic necesse est quod prius cognoscamus totum quam partes; prius enim cognoscimus domum quadam confusa cognitione, quam distinguamus singulas partes eius. Sic igitur dicendum est quod definientia, absolute considerata, sunt prius nota quam definitum, alioquin non notificaretur definitum per ea. Sed secundum quod sunt partes definitionis, sic sunt posterius nota, prius enim cognoscimus hominem quadam confusa cognitione, quam sciamus distinguere omnia quae sunt de hominis ratione.

Thus, even a vaster platform of discussion with no matter how "idealist" a stance appears. Nevertheless, neither philosophy nor a particular science can be as "holistic" as it has been implied. There in no one "universal totality" knowable at the beginnings (its existence cannot be demonstrated, but supposed only), but *many specific* totalities.

Similarly, the vague notion of the intuition (of being or of whatever else) is to be replaced by the exact Aristotelian eustochia. The "intuition" must be atemporal out of its very nature, lest the intellectual life be immerged in the constant flux of time. The Aristotelian eustochia *transcends* the flux of time.

The other concepts Aristotle elaborated on and passed on to Scholasticism proved to be atemporal also, i.e. endowed with universal over temporal value, whereas those based on the temporality of intuition prove fluid and evanescent.[415]

Principle (ἀρχή) in classical philosophy is more than just a beginning (of time or whatever else), because it transcends the time (encompasses times and places). Similarly, the term "simul" is not meant to imply that two acts are "simultaneous" in time, but that the two actions are formally comparable so. The same, analogically, is the case with the notion of part and totality.

> Parts can be understood in two ways. First, in a confused way, as existing in the whole, and thus they are known through the one form of the whole, and so are known together. In another way they are known distinctly: thus each is known by its species; and so they are not understood at the same time. (Fathers of the English Dominican Province).[416]

The "simul" does not imply a privation of motion, but the fact (which could be otherwise obvious) the e.g. between the beginning of a meaningful sentence and the full stop it ends with, an indivisible act of intellection encompasses all parts of the sentence making it a meaningful totality.

Aristotle's συγκεχυμένα means, first of all, what Thomas calls totum universale, but the so called totum integrale also, especially visible in the sense cognition.[417]

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[415] Encyclical Humani Generis of the Holy Father Pius XII concerning some false opinions threatening to undermine the foundations of catholic doctrine.

17. Hence to neglect, or to reject,or to devalue so many and such great resources which have been conceived, expressed and perfected so often by the age-old work of men endowed with no common talent and holiness, … so that these things may be replaced by conjectural notions and by some formless and unstable tenets of a new philosophy, tenets which, like the flowers of the field, are in existence today and die tomorrow; this is supreme imprudence and something that would make dogma itself a reed shaken by the wind. The contempt for terms and notions habitually used by scholastic theologians leads of itself to the weakening of what they call speculative theology, a discipline which these men consider devoid of true certitude because it is based on theological reasoning.

[416] Summa Theologiae I, q. 85 a. 4 ad 3. Ad tertium dicendum quod partes possunt intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, sub quadam confusione, prout sunt in toto, et sic cognoscuntur per unam formam totius, et sic simul cognoscuntur. Alio modo, cognitione distincta, secundum quod quaelibet cognoscitur per suam speciem, et sic non simul intelliguntur.

[417] In Physic., lib. 1 l. 1 n. 8 Contrarium autem huic videtur esse quod dicit philosophus in I Poster., quod singularia sunt magis nota quoad nos, universalia vero naturae sive simpliciter. Sed intelligendum est quod ibi

9. Next, at ***for it is a whole*** (184a23), he clarifies his position with three examples.

The first of these is taken from the integral sensible whole. He says that, since the sensible whole is better known to the sense, the intelligible whole is also better known to the intellect. But the universal is a sort of intelligible whole, because it comprehends many as parts—namely, its inferiors. Therefore, the universal is known better to us intellectually.

But it would seem that this proof is not effective, because he uses ***whole***, ***part***, and ***comprehension*** equivocally.

However, it must be said that the integral whole and the universal agree in that each is confused and indistinct. For just as he who apprehends a genus does not apprehend the species distinctly, but in potency only, so also he who apprehends a house does not yet distinguish its parts. Hence it is that a whole is first known to us as confused. This applies to both of these wholes. However, to be composed is not common to each whole. Thus, it is clear that Aristotle significantly said ***confused*** above, and not ***composed***. (Fathers of the English Dominican Province).[418]

The definite is an integral totality known before knowing its parts. Thus, e.g. a man or a circle can be understood apart/before enumerating his (its) pasts. In names, integral totalities are *implied*, but in definitions, the names are *proved* to be composed of parts defining them.

The problem of the relation of the definition to its parts (and vice versa) is not easy to solve, but solvable in the light of the quotations adduced above. Had it been easy, no mushy ideas could have ever appeared in history.

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accipit singularia ipsa individua sensibilia: quae sunt magis nota quoad nos, quia sensus cognitio, quae est singularium, praecedit cognitionem intellectus in nobis, quae est universalium. Sed quia cognitio intellectualis est perfectior, universalia autem sunt intelligibilia in actu, non autem singularia (cum sint materialia); simpliciter et secundum naturam universalia sunt notiora. Hic autem singularia dicit non ipsa individua, sed species; quae sunt notiores secundum naturam, utpote perfectiores existentes et distinctam cognitionem habentes: genera vero sunt prius nota quoad nos, utpote habentia cognitionem in potentia et confusam. Sciendum autem quod Commentator aliter exponit. Dicit enim quod ibi, innata autem est etc., vult ostendere philosophus modum demonstrationis huius scientiae, quia scilicet demonstrat per effectus et posteriora secundum naturam: ut sic quod ibi dicitur, intelligatur de processu in demonstrando, et non in determinando. Cum autem dicit, sunt autem nobis etc., intendit manifestare, secundum eum, quae sunt magis nota quoad nos et minus nota secundum naturam, scilicet composita simplicibus, intelligens composita per confusa. Ultimo autem concludit quod procedendum est ab universalioribus ad minus universalia, quasi quoddam corollarium. Unde patet quod eius expositio non est conveniens, quia non coniungit totum ad unam intentionem; et quia hic non intendit philosophus ostendere modum demonstrationis huius scientiae, hoc enim faciet in secundo libro secundum ordinem determinandi; iterum quia confusa non debent exponi composita, sed indistincta; non enim posset concludi aliquid ex universalibus, cum genera non componantur ex speciebus.

[418] In Physic., lib. 1 l. 1 n. 9. Deinde cum dicit: totum enim etc., manifestat propositum per tria signa. Quorum primum sumitur a toto integrali sensibili: et dicit quod totum sensibile est notius secundum sensum; ergo et totum intelligibile est notius secundum intellectum. Universale autem est quoddam totum intelligibile, quia comprehendit multa ut partes, scilicet sua inferiora; ergo universale est notius secundum intellectum quoad nos. Videtur autem haec probatio inefficax, quia utitur toto et parte et comprehensione aequivoce. Dicendum est autem quod totum integrale et universale conveniunt in hoc, quod utrumque est confusum et indistinctum. Sicuti enim qui apprehendit genus, non apprehendit species distincte sed in potentia tantum, ita qui apprehendit domum, nondum distinguit partes: unde cum ratione confusionis totum sit prius cognitum quoad nos, eadem ratio est de utroque toto. Esse autem compositum non est commune utrique toti: unde manifestum est quod signanter dixit supra confusa, et non composita.

> This, however, seems to be contrary to what he said above. For the things that define would seem to be more universal, and these, he said, were first known by us. Furthermore, if that which is defined were better known to us than the things that define, we would not grasp that which is defined through the definition, for we grasp nothing except through that which is better known to us.
>
> But it must be said that the things that define are in themselves known to us before that which is defined, but we know the thing that is defined before we know that these are the things that define it. Thus we know animal and rational before we know man. But man is known confusedly before we know that animal and rational are the things that define man (ibid.).[419]

The integral totality seems to be a property of the real definition, whereas the universal totality makes for its formal contents. Virtues and vices can be defined so: in clear-cut notions. Still, the integral totality is visible (as Aristotle has it) in the sensual cognition also. E.g. an object seen from distance might prove, if approached, to be an animated one, but further on, the one animated by the human form, and, eventually, to be a person known to the observer.

The process occurs in several minutes, but might be prolonged onto years if the cognition of children is concerned. Children do not draw distinctions in their childhood, but are expected do so in their adult life.[420] Thus, all living creatures might appear to them to be "lovable", and killing an animal in a child's presence might result in a trauma. There is *not yet* the principle of differentiating working in them efficiently enough as to tell between a dumb animal and the human being.

Children are what the must be, and their actions, similarly, must be childlike. But the adult people cannot reverse the current of their life time, and if they try to, they act in the infantile manner: a state typical for the senile debility. Animals are thus supposed to be "lovable" in the way only humans might be. Conversely, the lack of the infantilism is branded as "cynicism".

There are epochs in a person's life and perhaps in the society life too. The ancient Greece and Rome, as well as Judea of the first century of the Christian era were the childhood (the cradle) of Civilization. Maturity followed, but eventually a senile demise of reason also.

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[419] Videtur autem hoc esse contrarium ei quod supra dixit; nam definientia videntur esse universaliora, quae dixit prius esse nota nobis. Item si definitum esset notius nobis quam definientia, non notificaretur nobis definitum per definitionem: nihil enim notificatur nobis nisi ex magis notis nobis. Sed dicendum quod definientia secundum se sunt prius nota nobis quam definitum; sed prius est notum nobis definitum, quam quod talia sint definientia ipsius: sicut prius sunt nota nobis animal et rationale quam homo; sed prius est nobis notus homo confuse, quam quod animal et rationale sint definientia ipsius.

[420] In Physic., lib. 1 l. 1 n. 11 Deinde cum dicit: et pueri etc., ponit tertium signum sumptum ex universaliori sensibili. Sicut enim universalius intelligibile est prius notum nobis secundum intellectum, ut puta animal homine, ita communius sensibile est prius notum nobis secundum sensum, ut puta hoc animal quam hic homo. Et dico prius secundum sensum et secundum locum et secundum tempus. Secundum locum quidem, quia cum aliquis a remotis videtur, prius percipimus ipsum esse corpus quam esse animal, et hoc prius quam quod sit homo, et ultimo quod sit Socrates. Et similiter secundum tempus puer prius apprehendit hunc ut quendam hominem, quam ut hunc hominem qui est Plato, qui est pater eius: et hoc est quod dicit, *pueri primum appellant omnes viros patres et feminas matres, sed posterius determinant*, idest determinate cognoscunt, *unumquodque*. Ex quo manifeste ostenditur quod prius cognoscimus aliquid sub confusione quam distincte.

The old sink into their second childhood and are unable to *see distinctly* the exact meaning of the great words (e.g. "love") inherited from the past.

In his Metaphysics, Aristotle mentions Xenophanes (Metaph., I. (c. 5, 986b 24-25), but he does not esteem him very much ("he made nothing clear"). "But with regard to the whole heaven he says that the one is God". Indeed, Xenophanes was perhaps not that much a great philosopher, as rather a great example of the human (appreciable) attitude to reality. Admiration is, to Aristotle's mind, the beginning of philosophizing if matched with the desire to get to know causes, and the latter apparently was lacking in Xenophanes. The majority of people are just this: albeit not philosophers ex professo, able however, to contemplate the beauty of nature.

The two notions: of good and beauty are hardly distinguishable in the Greek idiom (καλός), but must be distinguished (defined) nonetheless.[421] The truth is the good of the intellect and without striving for this good philosophy is naught. Beauty, on the contrary, is rather perceived than analyzed (it is desired next in various ways, as e.g. a philosopher desires to get to know causes). The object of beauty is the aforementioned integral totality, which, however, is not yet analyzed (as it must be in philosophy), but rather sensed and admired (as it is the case a layman). The artist is in-between: the represented must be so within the frames of his art, but must remain representative of a totality nonetheless (albeit it seems hardly achievable to match those two).

A layman cannot be blamed for being indifferent to what occupies the attention of a philosopher, but the conclusions the philosopher arrives at are judged from his "unprofessional" point of view not without good reason. The ideas pretending to be philosophical might satisfy aesthetical taste to some degree indeed, but can never become universally valid for that reason, as their "beauty" might prove evanescent in the end.

Omnis repraesentatio est delectabilis (all representation is pleasing) says Thomas after Aristotle. The philosophical judgments are meant to represent the real state of matters and that is why the conclusions the classical philosophy arrives at might be contemplated even if not analyzed fully. The contemplation is the best solace for suffering. The modern consumerism is perhaps first of all a desperate craving for alleviating the depressing force of sorrow. Some ideas, however, do not represent save a private interests (advertisements must so); they might appear to be beautiful, albeit frustrating in the end.

People do not distinguish objects if contemplating the beauty of nature, but must distinguish if trying to contemplate the beauty of the representation of nature so as to tell between Kitsch and art. Normally children are taught to listen and observe carefully (should

[421] Summa Theologiae I, q. 5 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod pulchrum et bonum in subiecto quidem sunt idem, quia super eandem rem fundantur, scilicet super formam, et propter hoc, bonum laudatur ut pulchrum. Sed ratione differunt. Nam bonum proprie respicit appetitum, est enim bonum quod omnia appetunt. Et ideo habet rationem finis, nam appetitus est quasi quidam motus ad rem. Pulchrum autem respicit vim cognoscitivam, pulchra enim dicuntur quae visa placent. Unde pulchrum in debita proportione consistit, quia sensus delectatur in rebus debite proportionatis, sicut in sibi similibus; nam et sensus ratio quaedam est, et omnis virtus cognoscitiva. Et quia cognitio fit per assimilationem, similitudo autem respicit formam, pulchrum proprie pertinet ad rationem causae formalis.

be so) so as to appreciate music, literature and painting. Otherwise, the barbaric confusion of notions will follow.

3. The foundations of the personal humanity

The authenticity of the human existence happens to be gauged by the strength of emotions, the versatility of his actions as well as the volubility of speech. Still, its dignity (its inner worth) is gauged be the opposite thereof: the rest in the beloved and the thought through. The movement of the imagination happens to be stirred by incidental/casual stimuli. The intellect, to the contrary, is brought to actuality (which is the same as its rest) by beings superior to it. Aristotle calls them Separate Substances. Scripture calls them angels.

In his Summa (I q. 10, a. 6, c), Thomas addresses the problem of the nature of angels. The opinion of Origen is contrasted to that of Dionysius the Areopagite. The problem is of great importance for man, as angels – albeit more perfect in being – by the very fact of them being more perfect in understanding too, administer the human understanding.[422] They are equal to humans as to their life destiny: the beatific vision of God. God might be seen more or less perfectly, and the cognizance of His nature in the present condition of the human life is dim and instinct, but there is no other object of the genuine happiness of any creature endowed with the intellect save the vision of God.[423]

We go in the same direction, and a principle is needed so as to commence the way. The inborn habit of the first principles suffices to build metaphysics and, eventually, to

[422] Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 91 n. 5. Nos autem quidditates rerum ex accidentibus et effectibus coniectamus. Oportet ergo quod nostra intellectualis cognitio reguletur per Angelorum cognitionem.

Compendium theologiae, lib. 1 cap. 129 co. Intellectus igitur natus est perfici ab aliquo exteriori, quod comparatur ad ipsum sicut ad potentiam: unde homo ad actum intellectus adiuvari potest a quolibet exteriori, quod est magis perfectum secundum esse intelligibile, non solum a Deo, sed etiam ab Angelo, et etiam ab homine magis instructo, aliter tamen et aliter. Homo enim adiuvatur ab homine ad intelligendum per hoc quod unus eorum alteri proponit intelligibile quod non considerabat, non autem ita quod lumen intellectus unius hominis ab altero homine perficiatur, quia utrumque lumen naturale est unius speciei. Sed quia lumen naturale Angeli est secundum naturam sublimius naturali lumine hominis, homo ab Angelo potest iuvari ad intelligendum non solum ex parte obiecti quod ei ab Angelo proponitur, sed etiam ex parte luminis, quod per lumen Angeli confortatur.

[423] Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 57 n. 5. Hinc est quod Matth. 22-30, dominus hominibus repromittit gloriam Angelorum: *erunt*, inquit, de hominibus loquens, *sicut Angeli Dei in caelo*. Et Apoc. 20, eadem mensura hominis et Angeli esse perhibetur. Propter quod et fere ubique in sacra Scriptura Angeli in forma hominum describuntur: vel in toto, sicut patet de Angelis qui apparuerunt Abrahae in similitudine virorum, Gen. 18-2; vel in parte, sicut patet de animalibus, Ezech. 1-8, de quibus dicitur quod *manus hominis erant sub pennis eorum.*

Summa Theologiae I, q. 20 a. 4 ad 2. Ad secundum dicendum quod naturam humanam assumptam a Dei verbo in persona Christi, secundum praedicta, Deus plus amat quam omnes Angelos, et melior est, maxime ratione unionis. Sed loquendo de humana natura communiter, eam angelicae comparando, secundum ordinem ad gratiam et gloriam, aequalitas invenitur; cum eadem sit mensura hominis et Angeli, ut dicitur Apoc. XXI; ita tamen quod quidam Angeli quibusdam hominibus, et quidam homines quibusdam Angelis, quantum ad hoc, potiores inveniuntur. Sed quantum ad conditionem naturae, Angelus est melior homine.

contemplate God's magnificence seen through the veil of creature. The principle of the way towards the *full* happiness, however, is called grace: a supernatural gift created in the human (or angelic) nature. The achievement of this end surpasses the natural abilities of both humans and angels. Contrary to what Hegel and Marx say, man cannot transcend his own nature and build a supernatural structure called culture. It is artificial indeed, but not supernatural for that reason. People can only prepare themselves for the supernatural gift of God.

The tongue we use in naming the ultimate destiny of man is fashioned by the analogy of the ordinary physical movement. Some places are occupied on the way to an end. The places are proper for the material culture created by man, but accidental only in respect to the end which transcends time and space. The order of the means leading to *the ultimate* end is never accidental (albeit the sequence of events which end "abruptly" might seem to be so), as it is instituted by God. Our bodily existence is measured by approximately 70 years and by the places we occupy then also, but their sequence cannot account for its authenticity. A special measure of the in intellectual activity was called aevum (by Dionysius) in the Middle Ages. Instead, phenologists speak of the "inner time of consciousness".

The temporality (Zeitigung) Heidegger speaks of would have been the measure if the supreme in man had been his *particular* reason. The heirs to the nominalist tradition fail to acknowledge the existence of the universal reason (ratio universalis). We are similar to dumb animals due to the former, whereas we similar to angels due to the latter. They, however, who see the authenticity of human life in its emotions, deem the existence of angels a metaphor only.

The animal instinct integrates the animal existence because it "comprehends" it so that it proves what it must be: tethered to the earth. The human particular reason can be called "instinct" as far only as dealing with the concrete beings, but inferior to the animal one as it is organically unable to integrate the human existence peremptorily this way; it cannot "comprehend" it, because it is not the supreme faculty in man. Many a man craves in vain for being tethered to the earth, and to live without using the universal reason as well as without the assistance of our "spiritual friends",[424] but the human existence must prove disintegrated without them. The existence must be founded on a firm principle.

The foundation which makes e.g. this man different to nonbeing is called substance or hypostasis. Its existence has been questioned in the moment the nominalist movement took its roots in Europe. Substance (as its etymology suggests) sustains both its proper act of existence and its proper accidents. The actions which occur might be deemed accidental (in the ordinary sense of the word), but they are so only as far as actually not reduced to the *proper* accidents. Proper accidents mediate between the substance created by God and our actions which might seem to be created by us. Our "existential possibilities" are considerably vaster than commonly accepted, because the extent of the "common" has been curtailed by nominalists.

[424] Super Sent., lib. 3 d. 28 q. 1 a. 3 c. Una quae competit eis secundum naturam suam; et sic homines et Angeli non communicant in eadem vita; sed homines ad invicem, et Angeli ad invicem, quia convenit eis circa easdem operationes occupari. Alia vita utriusque est per gratiam, secundum quam fiunt participes divinae vitae; et in hac vita communicant et ad invicem, et cum Deo. Et ideo secundum hanc vitam potest esse amicitia eorum ad invicem, et haec amicitia est caritas.

Still, this does not amount to that their horizon is infinite. The horizon of the human particular reason might be *imagined* to be infinite so, but had it been so really, it would be as infinite as indefinite. No unchangeable objects could have been grasped, as the movement of "consciousness" lacks any firm and transcendent footing.

According to Ockham, it are individuals only which exist, but the individuals of his are furthest from what Aristotle says about individual *substances*. The latter can be called so, because the individual substrata sustain specific natures (human nature is this also). This or that man can be called humans, as substrata sustaining humanity; the human nature is sustained by their individual existence. Nominalists, however, cast doubt on the existence of any nature whatsoever. "Individuals" of theirs are not specified according to the qualitative differences of species. There is, in fact, but one "species" "individuals" must be comprised within. There is no metaphysics in pure nominalism, but there is no pure nominalism too in the history of human thought. Some ("metaphysical") "intuitions of reality" allow calling the "individuals" e.g. the elementary particles or elementary sensations. The human nature would be but an aggregate thereof.

The nominalist stance is at odds with the common sense, obviously enough. There are relations amongst individuals, but individualized only according to the type of their mutual (binary) interactions. The relation between two beings is both real and non-individual, as it is a pair being/object. There is "something" between, say, this man and his son: the human nature passed on in the moment of natural procreation. Their nature can be thus called universal, because potentially multipliable. The possibility to reproduce a substratum of the same specific nature makes for the cognoscibility of this nature. Concepts too are begotten in our minds like children happen in families. "A thing begets in our mid its own similitude"[425]

Relations might be *imagined* to exist like e.g. threads of a cobweb. But even this arachnid objet d'art is, originally, an effect of the spider's action on a material substratum susceptible of this action. The Browns or Smiths (for instance) are called so because joined with the bond of the corporal proximity and the action *creative of the bond*; parents are relatives in respect of the children they beget physically and imbue with *their* values (beget them spiritually).

Still, some relations might seem as undesirable as worth being denied positive existence. There is a relation of e.g. dominion and serfdom following the action of an-lord-to-be on his future serf.

There is a difference between Aristotelianism and Hegelianism in settling the nature of relations; viz. in acknowledging (or rejecting) the difference between the natural relations of biological or spiritual parenthood and the artificial one of "hominization" (serfdom) in the system of the social oppression. Individuals socialized in the progressive society are

[425] De veritate, q. 1 a. 10 ad s.c. 3. Ad tertium dicendum, quod duplex est perfectio; scilicet prima, et secunda: prima perfectio est forma uniuscuiusque, per quam habet esse; unde ab ea nulla res destituitur dum manet; secunda perfectio est operatio, quae est finis rei, vel id per quod ad finem devenitur et hac perfectione interdum res destituitur. Ex prima autem perfectione resultat ratio veri in rebus; ex hoc enim quod res formam habet, artem divini intellectus imitatur, et sui notitiam in anima gignit. Sed ex perfectione secunda consequitur in ipsa ratio bonitatis, quae consurgit ex fine; et ideo malum simpliciter invenitur in rebus, non autem falsum.

demanded/forced to disrupt the natural bonds of physical proximity (fatherhood, motherhood; traditional spiritual authority) for the sake of creating "a new man": an atomized individual meshed into the fabric of institutional relations of servitude.

Relations in general are effects of both good and evil actions. The procreation is good by nature, whereas some toxic relations might come to existence between people if imitative thereof, which, as a rule, stem from "the will to power" (*der Wille zur Macht*); to subjugate a victim. Natural relations are naturally born out of natural actions, but the unnatural ones are bound to lead to serfdom. Toxic relations might dominate if not spiritualized (overcome) by (heroic) love. Normally, they are effects of aggression: effective of the humiliating dependence on the wicked agents. The ancient system of serfdom gave way, over centuries, to a humane system of social solidarity in the Middle Ages. It is impossible to pray the same God sincerely and not to acknowledge the right of God to the human heart of one's neighbor. There is in humans a personal power to ennoble the natural in their actions; to "abstract" its wickedness from what is good because natural. An aggressor tramples both his own dignity and the dignity of his victim. But the heroic sacrifice of the thus humiliated can rescue them: to act *contrary to the wicked intention* of the aggressor, but *according to the good intention of nature*. Humans do not act "out of their entire nature". The principles of actions are specifically different, and are to be discriminated.

Arché in Greek means: 1. *beginning, first cause or occasion, origin*; next: 2. *a principle, element, esp. in plur.*, but then too: 3. *a sovereignty, empire, realm*, or even: 4. *a magistracy, office in the government*. The transition from the meaning (2) to the meaning (3) seems rather natural in Greek, because there is, between them: "the first place or power, hence: supreme power, sovereignty, dominion". (Liddell-Scott; s.v.). Anyway, the pathway of the Greek philosophy led from the immediately given (1) towards principles (2) so as, eventually, ascribe the sovereign power to the Supreme Principle (which is so called by Aristotle indeed, but otherwise is to be called the Supreme Cause). Hegel tries *to reverse this order*. It was going (some decades later) to be summarized in the notorious: Macht vor Recht: the principle total foreign to the tradition of Europe.

The actions should be in accordance with the human rational nature, but happen to be discordant therefrom also. They can issue from the intellect (can be desired so), but might issue from the principles actually emancipated from the *natural* dominion of the intellect. In this case, they are at least casual/incidental, but mostly simply immoral.

We are rarely aware of the spiritual kinship with angels, but we often happen to be convinced about our "spiritual kinship" with those entertaining the same (e.g. philosophical) ideas. The kinship might be real if the same values are shared. The natural begetting necessitates natural relations, whereas the other relations might be rather influential than commensurate to our rational nature. Some ideas might even necessitate a system of social oppression.

A son is that of his father, because sharing the same (immutable) human nature. The nature is not "approximately" the same. It cannot evolve (be meliorated), but can degenerate accidentally i.e. be stained with some privations. The ideas, however, of various philosophical systems could be "approximately" the same indeed.

It was only Neo-Platonists who believed in that relations exist before humans (before their actions) and form a kind of matrix the particular actions are introduced into. All forms

would have appeared on that matrix only. The forms of knowledge and values would have been relative in the same way. Indeed, some so called "theories", must be relative (e.g. the Darwinian theory of evolution); not, however, because of them being theories in the Aristotelian sense, but because them being theories approximating some desirable end.

In the Middle Ages, the integral deposit of faith was passed on from one generation to another. Perhaps, the temptation to "meliorate" the inherited (assessed as inferior by the mere fact of belonging to the past) was always characteristic for human hubris, and the desire to dominate by dint of the illegitimate power (over the bodily or emotional existence of others) too, but it used to be assumed (after Aristotle) that the intellect should dominate not by brutal force, but by the force of persuasion. The movement of reason (and imagination) stops at the firm foundation of knowledge.[426]

In the "new" postmodernist world, however, no such firm points of reference are permitted to exist: accessible for everybody. There is, to be sure, a *special* (privileged) point of reference, but *accessible only for the advocates of relativism*. *The dogma of total relativism* has to be accepted.

In the centuries preceding the "reform", people had been deemed responsible for their deeds and words alike; i.e. responsible for whether they harmonize or disharmonize with the same human rational nature. In the years following "the reform", people were going to be deemed responsible not for their personal actions, but for whether their actions harmonize or disharmonize with some progressive ideas.

Human reason (and human providence too) is a closer principle of (judging about) the righteousness or unrighteousness of human actions. The existence of this *personal* providence has been, however, rather commonly rejected. People could not be deemed responsible or expected to master their future. They can be "educated" only. The best that could be done for them is to treat them as dumb animals. In other words: the human providence could not participate in/of the Divine one. Individuals are rather coerced to submit to the absolutized providence of the modern institutional progress.

According to Calvin, the order of the Divine Predestination had been settled *before* this or that man even commenced to act. In the *modern* studies on the Scholastic philosophy an exploded error recurs with a grim obstinacy: the creation of the world implies (allegedly) that the Divine Act of creation preceded the existence of the world *in time*. It is easy to *imagine* that it might have been the case (there was a Divine Fiat before Big Bang), but the problem of creation is not to be solved by imagination. According to both Augustine and Thomas, the world might have lack the beginning in time, but must be created nonetheless. The fact is hardly imaginable indeed (grasped "vix intelligibili modo").

Thomas follows the line of reasoning of Augustine and Gregory the Great saying that creation is continuous; not a momentary act which can be ascribed to the (remote) past. Just one thought of God would be sufficient to annihilate the entire world in the twinkling of an eye *now*. Consequently, the fact that this or that man commences to act in time is being actually comprised under the order of the Divine Predestination (the Divine Providence concerning the human salvation). Human actions *do partake* of the Divine Predestination. They are free because of their nature and meritorious, because of them being given the power

[426] Physica, VII, c. 3, 247b.

from God to act so. To deny humans the possibility to be con-creative of their beatitude in God is the same as to derogate to the Divine Omnipotence. Contrasted in terms of *extension*, the two principles *seem to exclude each other*. But they *must not* be contrasted so, as set theory (which considers extension) *is not* the divine science. Participation is not about extension. Still, the participation the "reformers" speak of respects extension only.

"All men are created equal" or rather "all men are *being* created equal", because the act of the divine creation does not belong to a remote past. To the contrary, every positive being of our actions stems from the universal Cause of being acting just now (words and deeds are good and "real" only as far as quickened be the presence of the universally Creative Cause). "The pursuit of Happiness" is an "unalienable right" indeed, but, philosophically speaking, it more than just a right. The End and the Efficient Cause are both names of the same divine reality. If "all created equal" they must all solidarity ten to the same end.

The both properties of human acting (them being free and responsible) have been denied to man in modernity. Consequently, no Divine goods could be tried to be obtained, but the temporal only. Man has thus forgotten the elementary truth about his intellectual nature and was equaled to dumb animals. "Theology" and "philosophy" often acted upon each other.

Some domesticated animals are expected *nowadays* to be "lovable" and tame, because made totally dependent on man. The *natural* mode of dependence (the domestication of animals which occurred thousands years ago) was profitable for both the domesticated animals and for human well-being. The *contemporary* unnatural mode of domestication results in both animals and humans forfeiting their natural relations and creating some unnatural instead. Not only, however, dumb animals are tried to be domesticated this way. The problem concerns humans with respect to the progressive totality too. Persons are being given "social care" in return for the personal freedom.

If we-humans had been equal to dumb animal really, we would have never desired anything which is more than *just* particular, *just* emotional and experienced here and now. But the fact is that – quickened by the morbid idiosyncrasy towards the intellect – people are incessantly demanding the-more-particular (more attractive); the-more-emotional and the more-fiercely experienced, which is unnatural for any dumb animal. There is the inner principle (the intellect) in man which must be either followed or tried in vain to be suppressed.

There are certain truths knowable on the way towards the Ultimate, but some facts too which actually (now) elude the capacity of the human intellection. The difference between the civilized and uncivilized man consists in that the former deems them manageable in the end, even if the end is quite remote, whereas, the latter despairs to manage them at all. Facts are manageable for dumb animals to the extent only they mark the both immutable and restricted boundaries of their existence. The history of man testifies to that the boundaries were never settled; they happened to be breached, or furthered, but generally, deemed not confined to "here and now".

A part of the world might seem incidental/casual, but the totality must prove to be dependent on its Transcendent Cause. The world is not a sum of particles; it is an integral totality. Human deeds and words are *some* (modest) integral totalities also, and thus they can prove to be step stones on the way towards the Ultimate.

The universe is not ordered according to a necessity preexisting in time as Calvin and Leibniz imply. God is *above* time and is able to "intervene" at any time; to deduce good from no matter how perplexed or downright wicked actions. There is rather the conditional necessity to be found in the nature governed by God. This necessity bids (in ethics) to say; "do good if you desire the happiness in God".

Nor is the universe a rhapsody of disconnected facts. All human deeds and words are expected to be ordered too. The problem of the modernity (or postmodernity) consists in that people are demanded to act orderly with some pragmatic objectives in mind only, whereas the more ambitious ones are labeled as "fundamentalist", because (allergy) jeopardizing the idea of the "open" society. People are admonished to pay taxes and to preserve a minimum of conventional decency, but *demanded* not to strive for more, i.e. fundamental values. Still, the pragmatic concerns the means only, whereas the end is to be sought in the Transcendent Cause of the universe. Moreover, the means if sought for their own sake elude the grasp of those fiercely focused exclusively on them.

The state unification of the pragmatic objectives makes people enthralled to the prejudices of a given epoch, but despair to obtain what is only worth seeking to obtain. There is measure of human existence called aevum shared with those intending the end only worthy of a rational creature who might be really disinterested in sheer pragmatic objectives though.

Dionysius claims the existence of just one spiritual measure of spiritual life of angels and men alike. Humans (albeit existing in time) may partake to some extent thereof. Origen, to the contrary is a champion of "equality". The only cause of inequality is – to his mind – a personal guilt. The same was going to be reiterated some centuries later by Jean Jacques Rousseau.

The modern society has been built on the principle of equality, but that equality is quaint indeed. According to both Dionysius and Thomas, all people are equal with respect to the same ultimate destiny: the happiness in God (no one is excluded/prejudged by race, nation, "genes" or any accidents whatever). They *are born naturally unequal* and thus *obliged morally* to help those handicapped to obtain the end (to abrogate the prejudices). According to egalitarians, people are to be *institutionally equaled* lest the fundamental truth about the universe appear. The truth was expressed just at the end of (the main part of) Metaphysics.

> We must also inquire how the nature of the whole contains the good and the highest good, whether as something separate and self-subsisting or as the order of its parts.
>
> Or is it in both ways, as an army does? For the good of an army consists both in its order and in its commander, but mainly in the latter; for he does not exist for the sake of the order, but the order exists for him.
>
> For all things are ordered together to one end, but in the same way as in a household, where the children are not permitted to do just as they please, but all or most of the things done are arranged in an orderly way, while the slaves and livestock do little for the common good but act for the most part at random.
>
> For the nature of each of these constitutes such a principle—I mean that, by it, all must be able to be distinguished. And there are other activities that all participate in the whole. …
>
> And those who say that mathematical number is the primary reality and that there is always one substance after another, giving different principles for each, make the substance of the universe itself a group of substances unrelated to each other (for one substance confers

> nothing upon another, either by being or not being) and give us many principles. But beings do not want to be badly disposed. *But many rulers are not good. Therefore, let there be one ruler* (Dominican Fathers).

The last words quoted above (Metaphysics, XII, Ch. 10, 1076a 4) are themselves a quotation from Homer, (Iliad, II, 204). Aristotle *proves* that the world is a monarchy, whereas nobody ever managed to prove that all power does stem from the people ("a group of substances unrelated to each other").

The "divine" was supposed by "humanists" to exist in people, and the assumption proved (in history) to be more toxic than the naive relativism proclaimed by Protagoras. To be precise, the divine (or rather the absolute), was meant to exist *before and amongst* the people, as a matrix of humanity: a system of autonomous relations independent of individuals. There is real humanity between – say – this and that man, as far as the former it the father, and the latter is his son. But there was supposed to exist an institutionalized humanity before and apart of isolated individuals. The system aims at: 1) isolating individuals (breaking natural bonds of proximity) by the state regulations hypocritically preventing: "violence"; "intolerance"; "hatred" etc., etc.; 2) globalization (Gleichschaltung) of the form of humanity. Since 1789, a global reconstruction of human life has been carried out. The total relativism has proved, in the end, to be the totalitarian relativism. According to Jacob Talmon, the French Revolution marks the beginning of the totalitarian democracy.

Everything in the natural world stems from God in a certain order.[427] Everything in the progressive world drifts towards the totalitarian disorder.

4. Substance and accidents

Nature, "in the moment" it comes from God's hands, is good (it is good as long as in the real relation to God), but the act of dependence transcends the time after all. The nature is good as far as aimed at its proper act of existence.

Human body exists through its substantial form (the soul) in the relation to its individual act of existence. The physiologic processes and metabolism of nutrients is made possible due to the dependence.

The individual substrata of humanity are able to support the humanity (as well is the individual acts of existence) in the bodily form for, say, 70 years. They are not able, out of their nature, to sustain the Fullness of Being (God is to be called so). They are made actually able to do so by an accidental form created in them in the moment of Baptism called the sanctifying grace, and in the afterlife in the consummated form of lumen gloriae.

Diagnostics of human body make for sustaining human existence. The analogous diagnostics of human ethos is needed so as to prepare humans for sustaining the fullness of being; not only the corporeal being for some 70 years; but the Pure Being for eternity.

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[427] Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 172 a. 2 c. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut apostolus dicit, Rom. XIII, *quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt*. Habet autem hoc divinitatis ordo, sicut Dionysius dicit, ut infima per media disponat.

Apart of the act of the existence participation, other actions must exist in the human beings and they are to be called dispositions to accepting the gratuitous gift of God. They are accidental, because they might exist or not; but they are not incidental/casual for this reason, as they are conditionally necessary for obtaining the end. Their existence is mediated by the natural principles mentioned above.

Τὸ συμβεβηκός (accident) in Greek is counter-divided to substance. The latter however, is not the same as what is per se, because there are proper se accidents of humanity also: femininity and masculinity are this, but first of all, human rationality.

Some things might appear to be "purely incidental" (*κατὰ* συμβεβηκός), and counter-divided to the necessary but they are never so if considered from the point of view of the ultimate destiny of man. It is impossible to observe them from this point of view in the present life, but it is necessary to consider them from this point of view in the afterlife. The whole rational activity consists in ordaining the previously incidental and pouring it into more and more capacious forms of morality.

Some facts might appear disconnected, as far as discontinuous to their substances. There is (as far as we know) e.g. no necessary relation between being endowed musically and having a certain blood group. The relation might exist indeed, but for the time being, it is imperceptible. The contrary is the case with e.g. witnessing an accident, i.e. being personally present in the place it has occurred. Being so: being a person implies being a substance of a rational nature.

Some accidents are disconnected indeed at least for some time. Still, it is advisable to connect them as much as possible. Were it not for the existence of the human rational nature, the majority of what happens to us must have remained hopelessly disconnected. The accidents would have changed us, but never vice versa. The desirable change consists in rejecting of what-is-not-mine for the sake of what I expect advisable for me to be. Agnosticism (rejecting of the existence of substance), results in rejecting a person who but once proved to be such and such (qualified but once). Qualities are (to some extent) disposable. It is possible to get rid of them without auto-destruction, albeit it is not always easy to dispose of them. Sometimes, we imagine (without sufficient reason) to be hopelessly entangled in the life straits. Then, a help is expected from whom we deem real friends. Personal acting is, originally, that of reason, but secondarily it proves to belong to the social in man too, as far namely as the hand is needed to perform the acting. The bond of friendship *between* persons boosts the rational activity, whereas the yoke of "human bondage" (false friends) suppresses the rational in man. "What we can do through our friends, we can do in some way by ourselves."[428] Anyway, we expect of them (as the biblical Job) *genuine* friendship.[429]

> 116. So he first shows that he was destitute of the aforementioned remedies from his own part when he says, ***behold, I cannot help myself***. For even if he had lost some of his goods, he could have tolerated this without sadness if he could have helped himself to recover these lost

[428] Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 134 n. 3. Sicut enim *quod per amicos possumus, per nos aliqualiter possumus*, ut philosophus dicit, ita et quod ab amicis habetur, a nobis aliqualiter habetur.

[429] In Job, c. 6, lect. 2, nr 116, 117.

goods, and so revenge the injury inflicted. But he was not able to do this when he had lost all his riches, children, and even the health of his own body.

117. Further, many things which we cannot do ourselves we can do through friends. So Job shows in the second place that he was also bereft of the help of his friends when he says, ***those to whom I looked for help***, that is, family and servants, ***deserted me***. To show they are blameworthy for this, he continues, ***he who takes away mercy from a neighbor***; namely, in the time of sorrow, ***forsakes the fear of the Lord***; that is, the reverence due to God, because of whom and in whom one loves his neighbor. As John says, *whoever does not love his brother whom he does see, how can he love the God whom he cannot see?* (1 John 4:2) (Dominican Fathers).[430]

Many happen to be ready to instruct, but rarely to bear solitarily the same yoke of the life sorrow. Thomas *says* that we expect of friends consolation, but *does the work* of consolation in his Summa. The Questions gathered therein are not thought out of redundant minuteness. Thomas rather scans the most possibly vast spectrum of life difficulties so as to liberate his students from what is for them both incidental and undesirable. But first of all, he addresses the help which is infallible for all men. The Divine Relations (the Divine Persons) are for us the unerring bond of friendship.[431]

5. Individualism

Individualism seems to occupy the prominent place in the modern Weltanschauung. Still, as was mentioned above, the very term of the individual is far from being clear in the *nominalist* Weltanschauung. The Latin Civilization and the Latin Values are personalistic rather than individualistic, albeit not in the sense presented by Mounier (he was influenced by Hegel).

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[430] Super Iob, cap. 6. Et primo quidem ostendit se praedictis remediis destitutum esse ex parte sua, cum dicit *ecce non est auxilium mihi in me*: etsi enim bona eius aliqua direpta fuissent, posset hoc absque tristitia tolerare si se posset adiuvare ad recuperandum bona amissa et ad vindicandum iniuriam illatam, sed hoc non poterat, omnibus divitiis, filiis et proprii corporis sanitate destitutus. Rursus multa per nos ipsos non possumus quae possumus per amicos; et ideo Iob secundo ostendit se etiam auxilio amicorum destitutum esse, cum dicit et *necessarii quoque mei*, idest familiares et domestici, *recesserunt a me*. Et quod hoc non sine culpa illorum sit, ostendit subdens *qui tollit ab amico suo misericordiam*, scilicet in tempore miseriae, *timorem domini derelinquit*, idest reverentiam quam debet habere ad Deum, propter quem et in quo proximus diligendus est: *qui non diligit fratrem suum quem videt, Deum quem non videt quomodo potest diligere?*

[431] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 5 a. 5 ad 1. Sed dedit ei liberum arbitrium, quo possit converti ad Deum, qui eum faceret beatum. *Quae enim per amicos possumus, per nos aliqualiter possumus*, ut dicitur in III Ethic.

Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 109 a. 4 ad 2. Ad secundum dicendum quod illud quod possumus cum auxilio divino, non est nobis omnino impossibile; secundum illud philosophi, in III Ethic. *quae per amicos possumus, aliqualiter per nos possumus*. Unde et Hieronymus ibidem confitetur sic nostrum liberum esse arbitrium, ut dica mus nos semper indigere Dei auxilio.

Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 156 a. 2 ad 1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo potest vitare peccatum et facere bonum, non tamen sine divino auxilio, secundum illud Ioan. XV, *sine me nihil potestis facere*. Unde per hoc quod homo indiget divino auxilio ad hoc quod sit continens, non excluditur quin incontinentia sit peccatum, quia, ut dicitur in III Ethic. *quae per amicos possumus, aliqualiter per nos possumus*.

There is, first of all, not an opposition between the personal good and the common weal. Aristotle says:

> Even though the good be the same for one man and for the whole state, it seems much better and more perfect to procure and preserve the good of the whole state. It is admirable, indeed, to preserve the good of an individual, but it is better still and more divine to do this for a nation and for cities.(Dominican Fathers) [432].

The statement seems to be at odds with the idea of modern individualism. The latter was proclaimed as the only remedy for totalitarianism, although they both might prove, on closer examination, to be the Janus face of the same social phenomenon. The peaceful citizen is an Alter Ego of the murderous Leader of the totalitarian movement.

> "the Kingdom of *God is within man*" – not one man nor a group of men, but in all men! … You, *the people have the power* … to create happiness! You, the people, have the power to make this life free and beautiful, to make this life a wonderful adventure.
> Then – in the name of democracy – let us use that power – *let us all unite. Let us fight for a new world* – a decent world that will give men a chance to work – that will give youth a future and old age a security. … Let us fight to free the world – *to do away with national barriers – to do away with greed, with hate and intolerance. Let us fight for a world … where science and progress will lead to all men's happiness*.[433]

The Greek Arché was the first term used in the Greek philosophy and meant to signify the principle. But it was, also, the name of power. The question of primacy is of pivotal importance. Is man a social being because being rational, or vice versa: his rationality might only appear in the moment of "uniting"; "doing away with national barriers; with greed; with hate and intolerance"? Is the "real Kingdom of God is *within* man" – not one man or a group of men, but "in all men"? Or rather, is there in them some hardly eradicable desire to dominate; to *create systems* so as to mold individuals first of all? The "future and old age" will be given "a security" indeed: the security bought at the expense of "doing away with barriers", which marks the beginning of the senile decrepitude of a society.

According to Aristotle, man is defined by his natural rationality, whereas the society is defined by *some* humans rationally aiming at the common weal and the beatitude to be found in the Transcendent God, *Who is* in a human person (he actually loves), but *not* "within man"

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[432] Nic. Ethics, I, 1094a 28; Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 69 n. 16. Igitur eius est optime facere omnia. Melius autem est quod bonum alicui collatum sit multorum commune, quam quod sit proprium: quia bonum commune semper invenitur esse divinius quam bonum unius tantum. Sed bonum unius fit multis commune si ab uno in alia derivatur, quod non potest esse nisi inquantum diffundit ipsum in alia per propriam actionem: si vero potestatem non habet illud in alia transfundendi, manet sibi ipsi proprium.

Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 17 n. 6. Praeterea. Bonum particulare ordinatur in bonum commune sicut in finem: esse enim partis est propter esse totius; unde et bonum gentis est divinius quam bonum unius hominis. Bonum autem summum, quod est Deus, est bonum commune, cum ex eo universorum bonum dependeat: bonum autem quo quaelibet res bona est, est bonum particulare ipsius et aliorum quae ab ipso dependent.

[433] The final scene from the film "The Great Dictator" by Chaplin.

(as if circumscribed by him); and, all the less, "in all men" (as some of them happen to hate Him). He is *above* them all and that is why He is potentially as near to all as only possible.

The reason of acting is to be found in a unanimous striving for the common weal. But *the cause of existing* of both the unanimity of individuals and the individuals themselves is only to be found in their *Transcendent* Cause. Thus, the "power to create" stems from God. The statement is a corollary of the proof of the existence of God.

Human rationality consists in discovering more and more spacious realms of the word causality. In the end, the intellect arrives at the cognizance of the Ultimate Cause.

Chapter VI. DEFINITION

1. The full Logos of the verbal expression

According to Thomas, all philosophers always aimed at reducing the plurality of phenomena to the unity of principles (Communis intentio omnium fuit reducere multitudinem in unitatem),[434] provided impossibilities be avoided (secundum quod possibile esset). At least, they had aimed, because the situation changed in the moment the philosophy ceased to be what it had been before, and the postmodernists proclaimed the philosophy of the end of the philosophy. The plurality of the sources of cognition was highly estimated to the detriment of the universal source of cognition. Still, the "end of philosophy" (some people did not care for very much) proved eventually the end of the European rationality and science (all people do care for). The disinterested pursuit of truth had been replaced by material interests and science commercialized. The personal engagement in advancing subjective options has been deemed more valuable than the traditional ideal of the theoretical science.

Philosophy is not about philosophizing and not cultivated for existential/personal needs of those who claim to be philosophers. Humans are social beings and the philosophical statements (for the mere fact of being philosophical) cannot be addressed to philosophers more than to laymen. Their worth must be gauged. People consume philosophical ideas, even

[434] De veritate, q. 5 a. 9 co. Responsio. Dicendum, quod communis intentio omnium fuit reducere multitudinem in unitatem, et varietatem in uniformitatem, secundum quod possibile esset. Et ideo antiqui, considerantes
diversitatem actionum in istis inferioribus, tentaverunt ea reducere in aliqua principia pauciora et simpliciora, scilicet in elementa, multa aut unum, et in qualitates elementares.

if unable personally to analyze them with philosophical tools. The bread I eat must be digestible, even if I am personally unable to get to know the technology of bakery. The same must be the case with the "products" of the human mind. Perhaps they are more than just ordinary products, but they must, nonetheless, prove to be so.

Perhaps they are tested first from purely esthetical point of view. A rational expression should, first of all, be perspicuous enough so as to make it possible to focus on it (those who speak to fast or to slowly, as well as slovenly, are hardly understandable). Still, the "free market of thinking" (ideas might be tested in) is not the "exchange market". The idea of freedom was born in the ancient Greece; it was not invented in modernity. Metaphysis, to Aristotle's mind, is the freest science. The most perfect form of the verbal expression was called Logos therein. The most philosophical significance thereof is definition. It can be contemplated by a layman even if not actually analyzed.[435]

The anti-realist stance of postmodernists was anticipated several centuries earlier. Nominalists questioned the scientific status of the real definitions. Instead, nominal, *provisional* ones appeared aimed at approximating truth, but never able to comprehend it.

The problem might be presented in terms of the matter of the verbal expression. Are words juxtaposed in a sentence something more than a sum thereof? Is the only criterion of their significance to be sought in their grammatical and logic coherence (an elementary form organizing the matter of the verbal expression)? What makes a sentence so meaningful a totality that clearly distinguishable from those neighboring it in a philosophical book (no less meaningful totalities)? The neighboring sentences should be, as it seems, connected with each other causally, but how is it possible if (as Wittgenstein claims) they correspond to the "atomic facts" isolated from each other?

Sentences are sometimes denounced as trivial. Originally, the medieval trivium encompassed Grammatik, Dialectics and Rhetoric. But is there *anything more* to be expected of the verbal expression? There was no "Logic" in the modern sense in Aristotle, because the existence of substance grounds his Analytics instead. Now, the *Posterior* Analytics are of greater importance than the Prior (the "formal Logic"). In the former, the scientific *certitude* is sought.

The Artificial Intelligence can compose and discompose elementary self-coherent substructures, but the composing and discomposing does not, for that reason, cease to be mechanical. Human intellect composes and discomposes analytically; not mechanically. *The self-coherent substructures are but materials of authorized expressions*. Some forms are elementary/artificial only and presuppose the existence of the *common* elementary matter, but

[435] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 5 n. 5 Apparet etiam alia utilitas ex dictis philosophi in X Ethicor. Cum enim Simonides quidam homini praetermittendam divinam cognitionem persuaderet et humanis rebus ingenium applicandum, oportere inquiens humana sapere hominem et mortalia mortalem; contra eum philosophus dicit quod *homo debet se ad immortalia et divina trahere quantum potest*. Unde in XI de Animal. dicit, quod, quamvis parum sit quod de substantiis superioribus percipimus, tamen illud modicum est magis amatum et desideratum omni cognitione quam de substantiis inferioribus habemus. Dicit etiam in II Cael. et Mund. quod cum de corporibus caelestibus quaestiones possint solvi parva et topica solutione, contingit auditori ut vehemens sit gaudium eius. Ex quibus omnibus apparet quod de rebus nobilissimis quantumcumque imperfecta cognitio maximam perfectionem animae confert.

that "matter" is qualitatively different to the matter individualized in the moment a rational creature comes to existence and to voice in a dialogue too. It is *personalized* so. The definitions provided by the Artificial Intelligence might be self-coherent substructures, but do not, for that reason, correspond to what is most formal in beings: the real act of existence (personalized in humans). Their reality is "virtual" only.

The ancient Greek had been changing over centuries until it assumed a definite form in Athens in the fourth century BC. The language developed teleologically and proved to be the perfect philosophical tool in the end. The actual form a philosophy assumes in a cultural milieu can influence the form of the tongue used there too and vice versa. Sometimes, a language not only prepares the forms of thinking, but determines them too.

It is precisely the case with the German "denn" and the English "for" to some extent also. Two conjunctions are neatly distinguished in Greek (and Latin). The Greek ὅτι implies a causal relation of the neighboring sentences, whereas γάρ implies a sheer rewording of the preceding sentence (the same is the case with the Latin quia/quod and enim/nam respectively). Now, the German weil (dass) is translatable into Latin as quod/quia, but denn is meant to signify "Grund; Ursache" also (Georges, Deutsch Lateinisches Handwörterbuch, s. v.). The same inaccuracy affects the English "for" some existent also (it is not distinguished precisely enough from "because"). Are, then, the neighboring sentences meant to signify different complexes of facts connected causally or are they rather "matter" of the verbal expression only? A tongue might be used as a tool for expressing various forms of thinking, but not a "container" of the matter of the verbal expression for that matter only.

The difference is striking between the medieval Quaestiones Disputatae and Schelling's System. In the latter, the neighboring sentences are mostly just rewordings of the preceding ones. Apparently, it is not the case with the former. The order of the sentences is of pivotal importance in them. In an excessive manner, the order makes for the significance in Scotus' Ordinatio. It is the sequence of the sentences which makes it only possible to discern between the opinions adduced (quoted) and the authorized ones (they are otherwise hardly distinguishable). In Thomas, they are neatly distinguishable, and the mere sequence of Objections in his Questions or Summa *suggests* the possible solution of an aporia, but then an authorized opinion is passed. The authorized opinion is, nonetheless, peremptory and is the more than just *some* opinion.

The problem of the unity of the verbal expression (its diversity to the correlative unties) (quare unum non multa[436]) is of pivotal importance, but it is not the problem of

[436] Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 7 l. 12 n. 1 Postquam ostendit philosophus quae partes in definitione ponantur, hic inquirit quomodo definitio ex partibus existens, possit esse una: et circa hoc tria facit. Primo movet dubitationem. Secundo obiicit ad utramque partem, ibi, in hoc namque homo. Tertio solvit quaestionem, ibi, oportet autem intendere et cetera. Dicit ergo, quod nunc primum debet dicere de definitione id quod non est de ea dictum *in analyticis*, idest in libro posteriorum. Ibi enim mota est quaedam dubitatio de definitione, et non soluta, quam oportet hic solvere, *quia est praeopere rationibus de substantia*, idest quia solutio huius quaestionis est pernecessaria ad ea quae sunt de substantia determinanda, de qua est principalis intentio huius scientiae. Est autem ista dubitatio, quare illud, cuius definitio est ratio, *est unum*, scilicet quod quid est. Definitio enim ratio est significans quod quid est, sicut definitio hominis est animal bipes. Ponatur enim quod haec sit eius definitio: quare igitur hoc, quod dicitur animal bipes, est unum, et non multa?

language. It is *substance* which is defined, and it can be so only because indivisible in se. The perfect form of the verbal expression must be united to its matter in the analogical manner the substantial form is related to its matter. (Specifically different substances must be addressed).

Definitions consist of parts which are more than just elementary parts, because they are definientia of the definitum: the genus and the specific difference are this. They are more than just words and elements to be juxtaposed in a text. The totality is more than just a sum. According to Aristotle, whoever does not understand something to be one, does not understand anything at all. It is a specific substance which makes for the unity of the real definition.

Still, the existence of substance was denounced as a sheer philosophical (metaphysical) postulate. Consequently, some theorists of science ventured to doubt the reality of the world, even if scientists themselves did not treat the problem as serious. Some substance must exist after all; the problem is how to define it.

According to Aristotle, substance is tackled in metaphysics thematically, whereas indirectly only in particular sciences. It is so because the latter borrow their principles from the supreme science (metaphysics is called the first philosophy then), albeit the very fact of this dependence might go unnoticed. The basic notions of physics (time, space, matter) are obviously indefinable in physics itself. They have been actually defined in the Aristotelian Philosophy of Nature, but the definitions do not seem modern enough (the tongue is hardly translatable into that of the modern science). The same is the case with other sciences, ethics included: the notions of duty, justice, mercy etc. are to be defined in the supreme science, or in the science availing itself of the tongue of the supreme science.

Physics is nowadays not deemed dependent on metaphysics. It is undoubtedly dependent on mathematics. Were we to reject, e.g. mathematical analysis (calculi) the whole edifice of this science would lie in tatters.

Mathematics, however, seemed so unreservedly necessary that it occupied in fact the place of the architectonic and supreme science. As to physics, its supremacy cannot be taken for granted even if its necessity must be acknowledged. It is possible to write a book on physics (as Michel Faraday did) without a single mathematical equation in it, but it is impossible to write a book without using definable words. Real definitions must be provided in order to ascertain the reader that the real (not merely possible) world is being described.

The unity of the perfect sentence corresponds to the unity of the substance. In a sentence, the material part stems from material circumstances of objects, whereas the form (expressed mostly by verbs) stems from the formal (specific) in things. The formal in a sentence and the specific difference in a definition stem both from the substantial form, whereas the material in them from the "common matter" i.e. from what accounts for the forms existing "amongst" each other. Form and matter are actually joined in substances, but are potentially graspable in definitions, because originally conjoined in the primitive cognition of principles mentioned above. The previously "undistinguished" (confusa; συγκεχυμένα) principles are subsequently contrasted so that the matter and the form of the verbal expression appear clearly enough.

There is the *causal* relation between the "is" of the substance and the "is" of the sentence (and especially the "is" of its definition). Sentences do no "mirror" the reality in the way Marxists and phenomenologists though them to. The cognizance of reality is not immediate, but mediated by the principles given as συγκεχυμένα (confusa) only.

Matter and form should be taken into account in the perfect definition. Still, they were artificially separated in both materialist and formalist systems. Kantianism is the best example of the latter. Unity, to Kant's' mind, is but a priori concept of the human mind. The empiric (material) data are "synthetized" in what was called "consciousness".

The "parts" cannot be "synthetized" (according to Aristotle), because they are originally *integral* parts (as was mentioned above). They are not elements easily manageable. Still, were the very term of "synthesis" be granted, it must be added nonetheless that the "synthesis" must be preceded by an "analysis". Abstraction on the sense data must be this, whereas Kant's Analytics of pure concepts cannot be so. Concepts are purified ("denudated") in the moment they are abstracted. The "analysis" called the abstraction results in grasping the integral parts of a definition-to-be.

The integral parts account for the unity of meaningful sentences which enable us to manage the plurality of "forms" for the sake of the unity indispensable in science. There is no problem of "meta-narration" in Aristotle, because there is no "narration" first (a sheer juxtaposition of parts) in a meaningful sentence. The original knowledge of principles is perfectible so that it assumes the shape qualitatively different from any narration. Diverse types of "narration" happen, to be sure, to distort the original complexes the integral parts of the possible definitions, but the main problem of science is not that of integrating the previously awkwardly disintegrated. The Aristotelian Logos is – if you like – an anti-narration. In a narration (especially in a poetic one) words are skillfully juxtaposed, and the skillfulness makes for their value. In definitions, the juxtaposition is of little account. There is e.g., according to Thomas, a de facto definition of faith at the beginning of the Chapter 13, of the Epistle to Romans, albeit it lacks an accurate form. It is principles which are effective of the totality of a system.

"To narrate" might be translated into Greek as ἱστορεῖν. Now, the "history" is the least, to Aristotle's mind, philosophical of sciences. Phenomenology might well be called a description (narration), but metaphysics cannot be any "description". According to Paul Ricoeur narrative is the primary structure in phenomenology.

The historical facts might be roughly regarded as contingent (because stemming from the human free will), and the contingent (unnecessary) cannot be the object of science. Still, they might (or even must) prove necessary in the end (from a unique-Divine point of view essentially inaccessible for man in this life), because Divine Providence ordains them to this end. The human providence (in ethics) is not absolute, but necessary for us so as to determine the necessary mode of the contingent facts lest we miss the End; to determine their "goodness" in the relation to this End.

Facts must appear to be conditionally necessary in sciences, but history is (to Aristotle's mind) the least philosophical (i.e. scientific) of them all. Still, the history of the human (personal) salvation is elucidated by the presence of the Divine Persons (called missio) in this history. According to Augustine, in the natural order of acts of the personal memory, the intellect and the will, the image of Trinity appears. Still, there is but *a vestige* of Trinity in

the facts memorized, but not referred to the personal intellect and the will. The perfect image of Trinity appears in the human mind actually directed towards God. The Trinity acts then effectively for sake of the human salvation. The fact of this presence is by no means necessary, although the mode of the presence must be so nevertheless. The Divine Trinity is incomprehensible in philosophy, and the *instances* of Her temporal mission in the human history too, but God's mode of action is unchangeable (Mal 3. 6) (it behooves His utmost perfection). Philosophy is not the supreme science, but explicative of *this necessary fact* nonetheless.

Scripture (the Writ) bears a certain resemblance to "narration", perhaps because expected to be read personally, but there is theology (the absolutely supreme science availing itself of metaphysics) also which *demonstrates the con-sequence* of the sequence of Divine actions in the human history resulting from the Trinitarian Nature of God. Normally, history is not philosophical, but it can be "theological" in a sense.

The concepts we use are more than just elements (the ideas Locke speaks about) to be mechanically added.[437] Locke seems to imply that they add so, and there are "laws" in the mechanism (the principles which ordain them). Kant highly esteems Locke as an "analyst of the human mind", but accepts some other a priori principles organizing the matter of the data of experience. The ideas are considerably "nobler" in Kant than in Locke. They are in Kant regulative of the human thinking; not its elements, but immanent to it nonetheless. The humanity is in Kant consequently depersonalized (there is no material principle individualizing it). The humanity was expected to deduce its perfection from itself, which could not have been the case if it were individualized and thus expected to return to its Creator. The most formal is, at the same time, the most "ideal", but ideas are neither divine nor representative of the transcendent divinity. Concepts are "created" by man according to those purely formal ideas, which is incompatible with what Augustine says about the divine ideas creative of real things. In Kant, the forms of the verbal expression (for all their grandiose dedication) were separated from its matter in the way materials are normally from artificial forms.

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[437] Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 7 l. 12 n. 9 Genus enim non est praeter ea quae sunt species generis. Non enim invenitur animal, quod non sit nec homo, nec bos, nec aliquid aliud huiusmodi. Aut si inveniatur aliquid quod est genus praeter species, sic acceptum ut est praeter species, non accipitur ut genus, sed ut materia. Contingit enim aliquod et esse genus aliquorum, et materiam. Sicut vox est genus literarum, et est materia. Et quod sit genus, patet per hoc quod differentiae additae voci faciunt species vocum literatarum. Et quod etiam sit materia, patet; quia *ex hac*, scilicet ex voce *faciunt elementa*, idest literas, sicut aliquid fit ex materia.

Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 7 l. 12 n. 12 Et similiter est de voce. Si enim in intellectu vocis includatur ipsa vocis formatio in communi secundum formam quae distinguitur in diversas formas literarum et syllabarum, sic vox est genus. Si autem in intellectu vocis accipitur solum substantia soni, cui possibile est advenire praedictam formationem, sic vox erit materia literarum. Ex quo etiam patet quod vox, secundum quod est genus, non potest esse sine speciebus. Non enim potest esse sonus formatus, quin aliquam determinatam formam habeat huius vel illius literae. Sed si omnino careret forma literali prout est materia, sic inveniretur sine literis, sicut aes invenitur absque his quae fiunt ex aere.

There is, to be sure, some reason to compare the human cognition to producing (prodizieren) forms out of a shapeless matter, but there is a reason also to tell between them two as the producing must be preceded by cognition (cannot be identified therewith). In the Book VII of his Metaphysics, Aristotle adduces several examples of the definitions of handiworks. The products are not real, but "realized" only ("called into human existence"); they are artificially united by man, and that is why, probably, we can realize (imagine) relatively easily what the uniting of the *real* might be like. E.g. the house might be defined as a sum of bricks, stones, steel, etc., but the full ("real") definition of the house encompasses the end for which "bricks …etc." have been gathered; i.e. the order of gathering (the order of building). The house is for the sake of protecting from: cold, rain, noise, intruders. The objectives define it better the materials do.

Aristotle (despite using these examples) tells between the artificial products and the natural beings *begotten* in nature. Plato does not seem to see the difference clearly enough. In his Timaeus, the Demiurge is half-man and half-God: God creating in the human manner. In Kant, the difference was dropped completely. In Hegel, it was blurred on purpose: so as to identify the human and the divine (Anthropotheism is the word). Perhaps, the human producing, in Hegel's times, appeared already imposing enough to appreciate it to the point of deifying it.

Was the ancient world any different to the world we live in now? Its nature was the same, and the Philosophy of Nature Aristotle has built, as well as his Metaphysics transcends the human time. All the more does so the metaphysics and theology of Thomas. But the world we live in now is looked upon differently, because the products (handiworks) constitute a relatively huge part of *our* human existence (overshadow the nature). The produced seem to be more imposing than the natural, and that is why the Philosophy of Nature as well as Metaphysics might appear obsolete with respect to the philosophy which claims to be "scientific". Both Kant and Husserl boasted of their systems to be so, even if scientists himself failed to endorse the claim.

Husserl does not see in His Lebenswelt (the human environment) the difference between the artificial and the natural objects. Still, people half instinctively turn to nature, or even to the unscientific holism so as to regain the possession of the natural. The philosophical cognizance of nature has been jettisoned and the "humanities" claiming the right to be scientific have appeared in its stead. The natural world (untouched by the human hand) appears nowadays but on the outskirts of the industrialized world. The produced (in mind or in cities) is human in the Hegelian manner, but felt to be unauthentic for the same reason. In fact, the two "worlds" (the artificial and the natural) have coexisted since Homo Sapiens appeared on the Earth. The proportion of them both has been changing mainly to the detriment of the natural (natural disasters happened to reverse the clock of history for some time only). The nature without the classical Philosophy of Nature must be either hostile (for the Hegelians) or defied (for "naturalists").

The heirs to the Hegelian tradition are dearly attached to the artificial in the human history, whereas the "naturalists" try desperately to restore the bond with the naked nature. Added value defines the Hegelian tradition, but the inability to consume the added value inclines to seek for contact with naked nature. The both stances are one-sided, because there are e.g. houses needed for humans to live, but the houses must be built in our homeland and

thus become homes (individualized and personalized). People happen to be alienated amongst the artificial objects and tend to escape to pure nature, which is infeasible, because naked nature cannot sustain human life, especially if the human life is so hugely expanded on the Earth. People are alienated not because torn out of nature, but because unable to understand it (deprived of the cognizance of the Philosophy of Nature and Metaphysics). Abstraction is needed so as to "denude" the essential (the substance) from its artificial cover.

The "must-haves" replace the definitions of products. They are not shown to serve definite ends, but demanded to be unconditionally accepted. In effect, the relation to the Ultimate End of the human existence has been blurred too. These "must-haves" are the vulgar interpretation of the Kantian categorical impetrative. It is vulgar indeed, but perhaps inevitable, since the relation to the Ultimate has been dropped and God's existence "proved" to be indemonstrable. The artificial objects we live amongst were, originally, meant to improve human existence, but if not defined, they have proved both non-understandable and importunate.

There might be the Creator visible beyond the shroud of the created nature, and that is why the science on nature is more precious than the science on producing. There is the Creator *hardly visible* beyond the shroud of the products created by man. Nay, Man-the Demiurge might seem to be a deity of sorts. The produced by him is, thus, the object of the idolatrous worship. Defining it would add up to a sacrilege.

Kant spent almost all his life in city. In it, the natural relations are replaced by the "contextual" relations of artificial objects. They serve each other and thus form a kind of undistinguished totality. Beyond the cities, an agnostic would painfully suffer his/her indolence to reckon with the transcendence of objects, which, arguably, do not depend on him/her as to their existence. In cities, objects happen to be *defined operationally* only. For instance, "Go ahead some 100 yards, turn left and then *you will find the object*". Space is an accident, as we, apparently, chance to be in many places without ceasing to be what we are: persons. Persons might be *imagined* to exist in the three dimensional space, but their existence is in no way known this way. The individualized place of our origin makes for the place to be "personalized" too, and our place of origin, but is not definitive of our humanity by this token. Defining by pure accidents is insufficient for the cognizance of real substances,[438] but there cannot be save "pure" accidents in the three dimensional space.

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[438] Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 7 l. 12 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit oportet autem solvit praemissam quaestionem; ostendens quod definitio significet unum: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quomodo ex genere et differentia fit unum. Secundo quomodo ex pluribus differentiis fiat unum, ibi, at vero oportet dividi. Dicit ergo primo, quod ad investigandum unitatem definitionum oportet primum intendere de definitionibus quae dantur secundum divisionem generis in differentias. Istae enim sunt definitiones verae, in quibus non est aliud quam primum genus et differentiae. Dantur enim et quaedam definitiones per aliqua accidentia, vel per aliquas proprietates, vel etiam per aliquas causas extrinsecas, quae non significant substantiam rei. Et ideo huiusmodi definitiones non sunt ad propositum, cum hic agatur de definitionibus ad substantias rerum investigandas.

Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 7 l. 12 n. 24Deinde cum dicit si vero ostendit, quod hoc non potest dici si differentiae per accidens sumantur; dicens, quod si aliquis in dividendo et definiendo accipiat differentiam secundum accidens, sicut si dividatur quod habentium pedes, aliud est album, aliud est nigrum, tot erunt ultimae differentiae, quot factae sunt divisiones; quia una earum alteram non includet. Et de differentiis sic sumptis,

Natural resources, also, might be ignored to be what they really are: natural objects and independent of human producing (produzieren). They are defined operationally nonetheless, albeit despaired to be cognoscible as to their essence. They were expected to be manageable as if producing consisted in drawing and a new picture of humanity in the three dimensional space. The ecologists attempt desperately to question the claim, but they lack of understanding the nature (worship is not understanding obviously enough). In the post-Hegelian society, the human life has been believed to consist in composing and discomposing elements, be it the elements of thinking or the elements of the alleged "matter" of the universe. There are letters in a printed book and binary digits of information on a Web side. *Some* elements are manageable so. But are all natural elements manageable in the similar way? And more importantly, is (might be) the human nature manageable this way also?

Substance is "composed" of the form and matter, but there are (specifically) different substances in Aristotle, and that is why the mode of composing and discomposing varies in sentences and definitions. It is impossible to add e.g. two animals so as to obtain a new totality, as Chimeras and Centauri ("substances" composed so) exist in mythology only. Still, the advocates of the genetic engineering believe in that it is possible in humans. Human nature would have been redefined so: artificially manageable.

According to the medieval Arab philosopher, Avicebron, there is a common substratum ("matter") of all beings called corporeity. Descartes called it res extensa – the material substance. A "spiritual" substance (viz. Descartes himself) exists apart it, but they both are definable by what Descartes called essential attributes.

Body can be called a matter indeed[439] if treated in terms of the mathematical extension (corpus *mathematicum* habet tres dimensiones). Avicebron, however, believed in that "a body" exists on its own; a substance existing and definable without a specific form. Thus, artificial and natural objects alike would decomposable (in the moment of their destruction) into homogeneous "materials". Nowadays we know that the animal body decays into biotic matter, whereas the remnants of the artificial objects are hardly biodegradable. There is no common matter of them and definable by extension.

Some 200 elementary particles are known to exist nowadays, but they are not in physics what they were in Descartes: a corporeity. They mostly come to existence themselves, and thus cannot be matter of the universe as a whole.

Avicebron erred, but it is really interesting why he did so, and (even more interesting) why the others followed him so willingly. There is no corporeity in nature, but there is, in the human mind, according to Thomas, an *effect of the formal abstraction* called materia intelligibilis. It is manageable in mathematics really, and manageable to some extent also in

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procedebat ratio superius inducta contra unitatem definitionis. Huiusmodi enim differentiae sic per accidens acceptae non essent unum nisi subiecto; quod non sufficit ad unitatem definitionis.

[439] Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 7 l. 12 n. 11Et hoc in pluribus patet. Corpus enim potest accipi, et ut materia animalis, et ut genus. Si enim in intellectu corporis intelligatur substantia completa ultima forma, habens in se tres dimensiones, sic corpus est genus, et species eius erunt substantiae perfectae per has ultimas formas determinatas, sicut per formam auri, vel argenti, aut olivae, aut hominis. Si vero in intellectu corporis non accipiatur nisi hoc, quod est habens tres dimensiones cum aptitudine ad formam ultimam, sic corpus est materia.

technology, which uses mathematics. Mathematics facilitates producing. Still, the "mathematical" matter was identified with the matter of the universe in the moment the latter was hoped to be totally subject to the demiurgic power of man.

A producer introduces measurable forms in the substratum supposed to exist so, and might fall prey to the illusion that new beings are both created and defined so. A mathematician is not likely to call the forms he regards to ensue from his intellect in the way the forms of the products ensue from the mind of who produces them. Still, J. St. Mill admitted the case, and claimed that the mathematical objects evolve along with the evolution of the human species, which, however, sounds absurd.

The success of both scientific and technological progress was ascribed to the principles laid down above. But the mathematical thinking is but a part of the heritage of the Western Civilization. The principles of mathematics are what they really are: *immovable* principles, but originally given along with the principles of the conceptual knowledge.

In the first Chapter of Physics (adduced above) Aristotle tackles the nature of the *absolutely* first principles. The mathematical ones occupy some place amongst them. That is why we can define e.g. a circle as well as a man or a house. There is a "matter" of defining in the human mind (habitual cognition of principles), but no corporeity devised by Avicebron.

Avicebron, however, was not the first to fall the prey of mathematicism. The problem of the nature of definition vividly occupied Plato. Defining consisted, according to him, in "dividing" a continuum. He implied the existence of a substratum to be divisible this way. In nature, it was his χώρα (space), on which Demiurge operated.

The mass of the cosmos is estimated at ca 10^{53} kg. According to the advocates of scientism, each part of this universe would be but a chunk of this totality and defined (if ever) only this way. *The "definitions" could not, then, be but provisional ("nominal"), as division, in general, allows monotonic displacement of values*.

The "matter of the universe" is being imagined to be "poured into" various provisional forms and the particular effects of the process to be definable provisionally too. The natural resources were expected to be "poured into" artificial forms, and the process was optimistically expected to be possibly carried out ad infinitum, as rex extensa is bereft of termini by its very definition.

Still, a question arises as to who carried out the process before Homo faber appeared on the Earth. The history of our species is, obviously, but a tiny fraction of the history of the universe. The Demiurge might be identified with Homo Faber of the industrial society *now*, but his existence was projected beyond it into the past. In a highly industrialized society, Charles Darwin conceived the idea of a new "Demiurge" and called him "Evolution". It/he/she had operated before man appeared on the Earth. Anyway, the evolution had to operate in the human way. The forms of the material universe were, obviously, provisional only.

In his Meditations, Descartes bids us to imagine a piece of wax molded in hands. Apart from the wax-ness or wax and – say – clay-ness of clay, a what-ness of corporeity exists manageable at whim and introducible into various forms (defined provisionally so).

Descartes' rex exstensa was, in the decades to come, hypostasized and assumed the shape of the so called ether. Science falsified its existence at the turn of the 20th century much to the annoyance of the advocates of the materialist dialectics. Dialectics is about reversing

the natural order (novelty is always welcome) and a material was needed to carry out the process.

Marxists felt deeply indebted to Descartes for the attempt to "mold the lump of the universe". Nowadays, attempts are not lacking to "mold" human minds in a similar way. The human existence could be imagined to be definable as the coexistence of a sum of material particles (sensations, ideas or whatever else of the kind), even if a materialist hastens to add that man is "something more", he/she is deeply concerned with. Indeed, without that generous concern of his/her man would have been nothing more than a sum of material particles.

Anyway, the objective truth was deemed nothing; truth was provisionally obtained by means of working only. Acting (producing) was believed to precede thinking (according to the notorious: der Weg des Geistes ist ein Umweg; die Vermittlung).

"Modern" ideas are not real, but the majority of the thus "civilized" people have believed in them being valuable nonetheless. Children, to the contrary, are never simply gullible, perhaps because they are *simply trustful*. They might be tried to be "educated" (so as to conform), but do not cease asking as naive as awkward questions after all.

A man can be "trained" and his mind fashioned according to no matter how artificial set of notions. The way children get to know their mother language is essentially different to any such like "education". Aristotle , when explaining the origin of definitions, speaks about how children get to know things nigh for them.

Every special form of the verbal expression is naturally preceded by what can potentially become part of the real definition. Various types (species) of being are known this way. Various substrata of the participation of/in being are called nouns. Various modes of participation itself are called verbs – the most formal part of any language.

The original Logos of the human language is that of the integral parts of the real definition.

2. Syllogism and definition

Not often; nay, rarely do we realize that in a concrete situation – in choosing particular valuable objects – we must not be motivated by the sensual power of particular reason, but should use what Thomas (after Aristotle) calls the syllogism of action. The individual in it is not seized directly (it is not particular, properly speaking), but proves to be a conclusion of reasoning departing form the *general* principles. The action must be thus defined. Perhaps, we do not realize the fact clearly enough, if the syllogism actually used is corrupt to the point of even failing itself to present as a syllogism.

The syllogism used actually does not need to be reflected on as to what it really is: a syllogism, but used only. E.g. a violinist does not need to reflect on each particular stroke of the bow, albeit he/she must have done so when learning to play.[440] The effort to learn is pivotal for a civilized man.

[440] De principiis naturae, cap. 3. Sed in agentibus naturalibus sunt actiones determinatae: unde non est necessarium eligere ea quae sunt ad finem. Et ponit exemplum Avicenna de citharaedo quem non oportet de

Philosophy, apart from being concerned with the core of reality, is a craft of thinking also. Its discipline is irreconcilable with "emotionality" and "spontaneity" and thus proves abhorrent to many or "modernized" in order to spare them the effort of learning. Aristotle's Posterior Analytics (the methodology of his Metaphysics) has been regarded as one of his most difficult treatises.

Intuition has been believed to be able to replace the stringent reasoning. But emotivism, in the end, was to replace the rational ethics. Emotions were in Descartes already described as "the modes of thinking" on a par with the acts of the intellect and the will. Some "theorists" of modernity (Pascal, Libelt, Heidegger) entered the thus opened gates of emotivism.

Even if the intuition had been possible, it must, nonetheless, be asked how the particular acts of the intuition intertwine so as to make up a closed totality we always expect to find in a philosophical system. Bergson tried to subject reasoning (effective of the totality of the rationally planned life) to an all-encompassing intuition of the Urstoff of the Universe. Still, he (and anybody else for that matter too) cannot persuade anybody as to the value of his system otherwise than using a reasoning. The then actually used syllogism might be, to be sure, damaged to the point the author is "sympathized with" rather than regarded critically, but the general condition of the justification of no matter how "emotional" claims must belong to reason.

We do accomplish the act a special intuition called by Aristotle in his Posterior Analytics I, 34) anchinoia; eustochia: but this intuition is totally subordinate to building syllogisms (of science or acting). The bare intuition counts for nothing.

The possible conclusion of the syllogism-to-be is, originally, an aporia/question until it appears to be an actual conclusion of the complete syllogism. It is so due to the middle term thereof, in which four causes enumerated by Aristotle are seized.

There are 14 aporias listed in book VII of Metaphysics, but these questions are not what they were about to become in the middle of the 14th century: sheer hair-splitting. In fact, they are drawn from the Unwritten Doctrines (agrapha dogmata) of Plato[441]: they were as vivid as, perhaps, the polemics of Aristotle with his Master must have been.

In the 13th century, the High Scholasticism followed the pattern of reasoning elaborated by Aristotle. Disputed Questions are perhaps the most striking evidence of the presence of vivid dialogues which unfolded before the Questions were written down. They are – to some extent – stenographic records of the free discussions carried out in time of Lent and Advent. The praxis of a lecturer and the theory of a University's professor are joined in them.

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qualibet percussione chordarum deliberare, cum percussiones sint determinatae apud ipsum; alioquin esset inter percussiones mora, quod esset absonum. Magis autem videtur de operante voluntarie quod deliberet, quam de agente naturali.

[441] Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 1 l. 14 n. 2. Et quod ideae sint aequales numero, aut non pauciores sensibilibus, de quibus Platonici inquirunt causas (quibus Aristoteles se connumerat, quia Platonis discipulus fuit) et determinaverunt procedentes de his sensibilibus ad praedictas species, manifestum est si consideretur, qua ratione Platonici ideas induxerunt: hac, scilicet, quia videbant in omnibus univocis unum esse in multis. Unde id unum ponebant esse speciem separatam.

The aporias, originally, were rather a challenge than a jeu d'esprit of an acknowledged authority.

A *special intuition* allows solving *special* difficulties. The advocates, however, of the all-encompassing intuition (of being) turn a deaf ear to the special objections. An acknowledged authority may live in a safe seclusion of his/her imaginative world and is not likely to answer "naive" questions (nor even hark them).

The "matter" of a discussion does not, originally, exist on the pages of a book. The former being held preceded the latter having been written down, as the author is (should be) open to listening no matter how awkward questions.

The Kantian intuition (Anschauung) bears certain traits of science. It has a certain raison d'être in mathematics. But the problem arises in the moment the mathematical method has been extrapolated (onto the realm of philosophy first of all). The traits of science are scarcely noticeable therein.

The intuition of certain objects is possible in mathematics, and some problems might be hoped to be solved in the very moment the coexistence of the mathematical objects has been *visualized*. Two objects *A* and *C* can be "intuited" as a totality and the intuition seem to guarantee the comprehension of the totality. But the naked temporal sequence of objects (Kant speaks of) makes it that the infinite number of divisible objects can be placed between *A* and *C* in this imaginative world. The objects of this intuition can be relativized thus.

There is, however, but one immediate term *B* between the two objects *A* and *C* given in an aporia (the possible conclusion of a syllogism), and the way towards relativism is decidedly barred thereby.

As was said above, Kant tried to connect particular objects (Vorstellungen) with the all-encompassing intuition of his own Self. The history of philosophy after Kant showed that the connection is infeasible.

Intuition (if the very term be garneted) must be that of abstracting intellect. Syllogisms and definitions are formed this way. It is the abstracting intellect only which allows connecting effectively the objects. In fact, it is rather objects *coexisting in nature* which are connected so: without "blank spaces" amongst them. Kant's Vorstellungen cannot be integrated into a *vivid* totality. The vividness of a system is proved in the moment it is able motivate (spur) moral actions (which could nor have been the case in Kant).

The coexistence of objects is discovered by the abstracting intellect, but is actually effected by the Divine Creative Intellect. The medium term of the syllogism (μέσον) Aristotle speaks of is "a functor of coexistence" of objects.

The perfect syllogism and the shortening thereof too called the definition must take into account all four causes mentioned by Aristotle in his Physics.[442] An intuition of some of

[442] In Physic., lib. 2 l. 3 n. 7. […] hoc quod dictum est de diverso modo considerationis mathematici et physici, fiet manifestum si quis tentaverit dicere definitiones naturalium et mathematicorum, et accidentium eorum: quia mathematica, ut par et impar, et rectum et curvum, et numerus et linea et figura, definiuntur sine motu et materia; non autem caro et os et homo: sed horum definitio est sicut definitio simi, in cuius definitione ponitur subiectum sensibile, scilicet nasus; non autem sicut definitio curvi, in cuius definitione non ponitur aliquod subiectum sensibile. Et sic ex ipsis definitionibus naturalium et mathematicorum apparet quod supra dictum est de differentia mathematici et naturalis.

them only proves insufficient. Still, the perfect form the ancient philosophy assumed in Aristotle had been preceded by some "innovative insights" into the alleged "mystery of being". The insights must have remained as imperfect as alluring.

The Greek philosophy began with the "intuition" of what was supposed to be the Urstoff of the Universe. Philosophers called it hyle (ὕλη) per analogiam to the timber used in building. That is why they themselves were called hylozoists (Zoe-life was attributed to this matter). The great, however, were far from being self-complacent. Nature herself – as Aristotle has it – compelled them to search for more causes. The *particular* intuition was going to be eventually replaced by the *specific* ones. Thus, the principle of motion, form, and eventually: Telos (the end of things and of the Universe); the "cause of causes"; was discovered, but "intuited" first imperfectly before the syllogisms and definitions were made up.

There was a development, but a barbaric decay in the centuries the ancient Rome ceased to exist also. According to Aristotle, the cycle of birth, growth, the spate of activity and decline, follow in order not only in nature, but in "human world" too. The perpetual existence of the world can be (to Thomas' mind) neither proved nor denied in metaphysics, even if the perpetual existence of Homo Sapiens seems impossible. Anyway, Aristotle was right in this sense at least that no matter how grandiose a guise of the Civilization, the danger of decay is always imminent. What is worse, however, the very process of decay cannot be perceived *directly* by those undergoing the decaying. That a fact be realized, it must be viewed from a transcendent, unengaged and objective point of view. Idola fori and Idola theatri, Francis Bacon speaks of distort the sound personal judgment no less than Idola tribus and Idola specus. Still, we are not necessarily immerged in the flux of the cosmic time any more than we are so in the stream of consciousness. We might distance it, even if we happen to be blindfolded (to some extent) by a biased perspective. We are able, moreover, to scan our times from the perspective of the past; of the tradition of the classical philosophy passed on, but unjustly forgotten.

There are special realms of the correlation of objects discoverable in particular sciences, but there is, also, an all-encompassing correlation of objects discoverable in metaphysics. Some special realms of the correlation of objects are specific for particular sciences, but metaphysics hierarchizes (defines) them all. The actual source of the correlation of the totality called the world is God (it is, in Greek, "cosmos", i.e. an organized totality). The special pathways of man towards Him lead through special realms of life, but (no matter how complex) they are all equally definable.

Sciences are – according to Aristotle – hierarchically ordained. The supreme one defines the axioms of particular sciences (definitions are this). For instance,

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In Physic., lib. 2 l. 5 n. 7. Quorum primum est quod cum causae dicantur multipliciter, contingit unius et eiusdem esse multas causas per se et non per accidens; sicut causa statuae est ars statuifica ut efficiens, et aes ut materia. Et inde est quod aliquando unius rei assignantur plures definitiones secundum diversas causas; sed perfecta definitio omnes causas complectitur. Secundum est quod quaedam sibi invicem sunt causae secundum diversam speciem causae; sicut laborare est causa efficiens bonae habitudinis, bona autem habitudo est causa finalis laboris.

> … theorems in harmonics … are demonstrable by arithmetic. Such theorems are proved by the same middle terms as arithmetical properties, but with a qualification – the fact falls under a separate science (for the subject genus is separate), but the reasoned fact concerns the superior science, to which the attributes essentially belong.[443]

Originally, values must have been the firm steps of the human intellect on his pathway to God. The situation changed radically in the moment Descartes "defined" himself as a hypothesized thinking (consciousness) and everything else against this backdrop only. (Nominalists denied the possibility to get to know real definitions of substances before and after him).

The steps on the way to God must be as real as the End Himself is, but human actions happen to be helplessly absorbed by the flux of consciousness. The consciousness (as was mentioned above), does not need anything besides itself to exist. Especially it does not need God the Creator of the universe. His existence was not rejected in the West as brutally as it happened in the East, but it was "bracketed" nonetheless, i.e. seized as an idea (perhaps the supreme, but an idea nonetheless). The West civilized after the Hegelian fashion is not likely to be brutal, except on rare occasions (e.g. in Vandea), but no less hubristic nonetheless (the Nazi experiment was unique, because imitating and improving the Soviet one). The free access to the Supreme Good was denied out of some "humanist" reasons.

All possible objects of intuition were originally in Avicenna comprised in the notion of the so called Natura Tertia (the third mode of existence; neutral to both the logical and the real one). According to Scotus-the-theologian, the Nature is the object of the Divine Intellect (it emanates therefrom). The statement *cannot be proved* in philosophy, but was a cornerstone of Scotus' theology. The fact was mercilessly laid bare in those who tried (in vain) to remain philosophers in the way Scotus thought himself to be, but at the same time, were realizing more and more acutely the impossibility of the endeavor.

3. The coexistence of objects and the principle Simplex sigillum veri

Locke uses the terms of the real and nominal definition. Leibniz, in addition, speaks of the adequate definition (counter divided to the confused cognition). The adequate definition, to his mind, is possible for God's intellect only: in an act of intuition. It is unworkable for man, but known to him to exist nonetheless and a paradigm of all possible knowledge.

The claim is impossible to prove, although it seems to necessarily follow the theological principles laid down by Scotus (the "master of modernity"). The natural order of the human cognition was reversed. What was supposed to be the divine knowledge God has about Himself preceded the human knowledge we possibly have about Him (to legitimize it). The former, to be sure, is superior in dignity, but revealed in time (as the principles of theology) or known on the natural pathway of invention (as philosophy). No "divine point of view" can be surely adopted, because we cannot be positive whether the point of view we deem divine is not, in fact, our human only. Normally, we get to know the existence of God

[443] Aristotle Posterior Analytics, translated by G. R. G. Mure, Book I, Ch. 9 (Documenta Catholica Omnia).

construing the demonstrative syllogism. We do not prove God's act of existence (which is nonsensical), but the fact that He must exist out of necessity if anything is known to exist at all. The insight into the nature of God is impossible for a philosopher and, consequently, the mode of His cognition inscrutable also. God is the self-subsistent being and His actions are identical with His essence. The insight, however, is not at all necessary to get to know the "core" of reality.

No "naked existence" is, moreover, knowable for man. We can only get to know the coexistence of objects and define them in terms of this coexistence. It is impossible to get to know "the pure existence", but the whole value of the human cognition consists in getting to know the "paired existence" of objects originally indistinctly known. The cognition of existence is possible by dint of the perfect definition. "If the definition of a thing is taken as that which encompasses the thing's entire being, as constituted by all its causes, which is a perfect definition, then one thing can only have one definition".[444]

> … if one finds a definition that might signify the being of a reality according to its relation to all its proper causes, it would be the most perfect, and the only one; but one finds many definitions that make known the being of a reality according to diverse causes. This is why one definition is given through the final cause, another through the formal, and so on. There are also found other definitions that make it known based on properties consequent on the being of the reality, and such also can be many. [445]

The adequate definition is both infeasible and needless, but the perfect definition is workable due to harmonizing (in syllogisms and definitions) the four causes. The act of existence is known this way.

The so called "contingent existence" is of no account as a philosophical datum, and the Leibnizian proof of the existence of God ex contingentia mundi contains petitio principii. We get to know in metaphysics (not in "ontology") the necessary tending to existence: immanent to nature. Science is about the necessary only.

The naked existence of this or that object is contingent and cannot be proved to be absolutely necessary (Kierkegaard was right in claiming so in a sense), because it is the object of the free (not necessary) act of God's creation. But there is also, in the very act of creation, a self-consistency thereof to be made out: God cannot act against the order previously pre-established *in nature* and this conditional necessity suffices to build the genuine scientific proof of His existence. The order is, however, established not by time, but by the very mode of God's acting. In metaphysics, the necessary coexistence of the world with its "outer Side" is known only, but the "outer Side" is, then, identified subsequently with God.

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[444] Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 27 q. 1 a. 2 ad 9. Ad nonum dicendum, quod si accipiatur definitio rei quae complectitur totum esse rei, secundum quod ex omnibus causis constituitur, quae est perfecta definitio, tunc unius rei non potest esse nisi una definitio.

[445] Ergo de uti et frui non debent dari multae definitiones. Ad quod dicendum, quod si inveniretur aliqua definitio quae diceret esse rei secundum comparationem ad omnes causas ipsius proprias, esset perfectissima, et una tantum; sed inveniuntur definitiones notificantes esse rei plures secundum diversas causas. Unde aliqua datur per causam finalem, quaedam per formalem, et sic de aliis. Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 1 q. 4 a. 2 expos.

Imagine a stone dropped from above and the very act and the purpose of dropping being ignored. The motion (the necessary rules governing it) would hold true notwithstanding the lack of the possible knowledge about the very act of dropping. A particular intention of a man dropping the stone might be ignored, but the intention *of nature* Aristotle speaks of is knowable after all, because in God's acting the perfect consequence appears (which, to be sure, is not the case with humans). The consequence happens to be hardly visible in man's acting, but the Eminent Acting is divine, because dissimilar (as to its mode) to the human one.

The inability to get to know the perfect definition might be a deplorable fact, but it is a *contingent* fact nonetheless. More often than not, it happens that philosophers (or scientists) put up with using but one of the four causes. Idealists prefer the formal one, whereas the advocates of scientism favor the material one. Thus, however, the end and (the natural terminus) of motion of physical bodies happens to be ignored and the natural terminus of the motion of the intellect wanes. The cognizance of existence (of the act of being) is crippled not because of the lack of a privileged insight, but because of the lack of the proper conclusion.

An idealist prefers an eidos-form, which is isolated from the three other causes, and the eidos-form of his must be a form of pure thinking loosely connected only with the form which organizes the physical matter and is the effect of the natural generation. The advocates of the scientism, on the other hand, do not ignore natural motion, but fail to take into account the generation of *specific* forms. The real form organizes the real matter, but the form of cognition might be supposed to ordain the empiric data of cognition only.

The real form is "relatively simple": as far namely as it is relative to its proper matter. But if the natural properties of the real forms were ignored, the forms-εἴδη of the idealist philosophy would be bereft of the bearing the proper real forms have on nature. Consequently, not one "form of thinking" could be deemed "more proper" than another one: privileged thereto.

The situation was the effect of adopting the mathematical method in philosophy. Descartes called it "mathesis universalis". Principles are tools in particular sciences, but Descartes believed to have found a "universal tool", which seems to be contrary the very notion of the tool as such (is oxymoronic). The "existence", on the other hand, resulting from a "simple principle" must be as crippled as Heidegger's' Dasein.

The principle Simplex sigillum veri is a common patrimony of the modern mathematicism. Husserl and Wittgenstein are the best known champions of the paradigm. Indeed, mathematical objects might be treated provisionally as simple; as far namely as ignored to be abstracted[446] from the sense data. Those "simple" objects are arguably well cognoscible, but not real for the mere fact of being so. Their simplicity is irreconcilable with their reality. Philosophy is about the real. The "philosophical monads" (such simple

[446] Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 3 l. 8 n. 8. Et hoc probat tali ratione. Unius rei una est ratio definitiva manifestans eius substantiam, sicut et una est substantia uniuscuiusque: sed non est eadem ratio definitiva quae datur per genera et quae datur per partes ex quibus aliquid componitur: ergo non potest esse utraque definitio indicans substantiam rei. Ex principiis autem rei potest sumi ratio definitiva significans substantiam eius.; Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 3 l. 13 n. 3.

elements)[447] cannot replace the real. No real object can be intuitively known, even if some mathematical objects happen to be known if visualized.

The principle Simplex sigillum veri could be *conditionally* valid, provided the very nature of the simplicity in question is determined. No one essence – apart from the Divine One – is absolutely simple. Scotus copied this divine simplicity onto the multitude of "pure essences", which are not created, but emanate from God's intellect only. But no creature can be simple, because creation consists in calling *something* into *existence*; "something" which has not existed before. Nothing simple can stem from God; it implies contradiction.

The act of existence "rests" on the created nature more or less firmly (some objects are durable, whereas the others are easily destructible). The strength of a nature depends on intending strongly enough its own act of existence (supporting it). The main problem of metaphysics consists in that "giving existence" cannot be "visualized" like the ordinary objects might be in mathematics. That is why (probably) Avicenna thought the existence to be "superadded" to essence.

In special, the essence of a being composed of matter and form is less apt to sustain the act of existence than the simple essences of those whom Aristotle calls Separate Substances. Thomas adds that they (the angels) are relatively simple only: as far namely as their nature depends on their act of existence (is "qualified" so by its orientation). Some forms can be ("theoretically") deprived of their existence (can be annihilated by God) if the "absolute potency" of God is taken into account. But they cannot be deprived of it without violating the property of nature, and the violation does no behoove the decency of the act of creation.

The majority of the natural animate composita generating on the Earth can sustain their act of existence for several years only. Now, the human composite is in-between the angelic and the animal existence. Its form cannot sustain the existence of its corruptible body more than, say, 70 years, but it sustains the proper act of existence after the destruction of the body nonetheless.

The beings composed of form ad matter come to existence in the physical world and perish therein too, but only the former is the case with humans. The forms appear in the world (are created therein) in the way becoming the natural generation (the Creator makes the natural generation real; not merely possible). Similarly, they are only cognoscible for man because composed of form and matter. No matter and form is cognoscible separately on its own. Only the composite can be known; its being a composite is a "window" the being is seen through (Leibniz was right in observing that if the beings had been simple, they-monads could have had no "windows"). Analogically, no "intentions" are knowable apart from who entertains them (and reflects, which is proper to persons). The masters of suspicion pretend to

[447] Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 5 l. 4 n. 9. Hac autem ratione elementi constituta, per transumptionem contingebat eis ut duos modos elementorum adinvenirent; quorum primus est, ut ea quae sunt maxime universalia, dicerent elementa. Universale enim est unum secundum rationem, et est simplex, quia eius definitio non componitur ex diversis, et est in multis, et sic est ad multa utile, sive sit in omnibus, sicut unum et ens; sive in pluribus, sicut alia genera. Per eamdem vero rationem contingebat eis secundo, quod punctum et unitatem dicerent esse principia vel elementa, quia utrumque eorum est unum simplex et ad multa utile.

have the insight, but usurp, then, the unique prerogative of God. The insight is normally followed by an action. Still, no agent might be perceived ("felt") to influence my personal existence and to deprive it of the *natural right to resist* (debase it so), unless my mind is prone to acknowledge its strength notwithstanding its being one's (particular) strength. The ability to move (to impact the existence of others) is relative to (and dependent on) its essential counterparts: the form, matter and the end (it is not absolute, and not to be "defied" for that matter also). The four causes exist in the human mind (like they do in the human substance), but are, as a rule, not perfectly harmonized (like they must in an actually existing substance as long as it exists).

The Divine acting "assists" the act of the natural generation which is to say: makes it workable, which is considerably more than just making it possible, and it illuminates the human agent intellect in an analogous manner. Augustine's doctrine on the illumination is wholly compatible with the pure Aristotelianism, even if some (e.g. John Peckham) thought it wholly incompatible. They claimed the right to be Augustinians, but failed to understand the core of his doctrine: its difference to Avicenna's doctrine on the *general* illumination, which is really incompatible with Aristotelianism. Some followed Augustine without due discretion and tried to *replace* the human intellect by the divine illumination. Two bodies cannot exist in same place and two facts cannot take place at the same moment, but again: philosophy is not about the objects which can be "visualized" so. The Divine to "intrude" the human would be unbecoming the Divine. The divine illumination coincides with the human act of abstraction. The First Cause does not deprive the secondary causes of their efficacy. It would have been unbefitting the Divine Goodness. The exemplary ideas exist in God's intellect and are instilled in the angelic minds. The human mind, in turn, can be assisted by the angelic one and get to know "what things should be" apart from what they really are. The knowledge is shared so with humans. *Its objects are called values.*

No absolutely simple thing can be known by man. Them been composite makes for them being cognoscible. The genus of the definition stem from matter, whereas the specific difference of it from the substantial form.[448] A thing proves thus to be but conditionally simple, because indivisible in se (for "the time" it happens to be known). It is indivisible towards the other substance.[449]

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[448] Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 25 q. 1 a. 1 ad 2. Sed cum dicitur animatum, designatur forma per quam talem rationem recipit; quamvis etiam aliquid plus recipiat ab anima quam rationem corporis: et ita differentia est designans, et tunc species erit designatum. Sed verum est quod in compositis genus et differentia, quamvis non sint partes, tamen a partibus rei fluunt: quia genus fluit a materia, quamvis non sit materia: et differentia a forma, quamvis forma non sit differentia, sed forma sit principium illius; et sic definitio composita ostendit realem compositionem. In simplicibus autem, et praecipue in Deo, compositio quae est in definitione, non reducitur in aliquam compositionem rei: sed solum secundum rationem quae fundatur in veritate rei; sicut si aliquis definiens Deum diceret, quod est substantia intellectualis divina, vel aliquid hujusmodi.

[449] Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 5 l. 7 n. 23. Quartum modum ponit ibi, amplius autem dicit quod unum etiam dicuntur, quaecumque ita se habent quod definitio unius, quae est ratio significans quid est esse, non dividitur a definitione alterius, quae significat etiam quid est esse eius. Ipsa enim definitio, scilicet secundum se, oportet quod sit divisibilis, cum constet ex genere et differentia. Sed potest esse quod definitio unius sit indivisibilis a definitione alterius, quando duo habent unam definitionem; sive illae definitiones significent totum hoc quod est in definito, sicut tunica et indumentum: et tunc sunt simpliciter unum, quorum definitio est una: sive illa communis definitio non totaliter comprehendat rationem duorum, quae in ea conveniunt, sicut bos et equus

The elements of the structure of the universe cannot be separated from their "natural context" they can only exist in. But if tried to nonetheless, they leave behind them a "background": the indefinite; the tissue of relativism.

4. The problem of essentialism

Human cognition is not a line stretching out into infinity (into the indefinite). The real definition (according to Aristotle) terminates reasoning.[450] The end of cognition is

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conveniunt in una definitione animalis. Unde numquam sunt unum simpliciter, sed secundum quid, in quantum scilicet utrumque eorum est animal.

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[450] Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 5 l. 19 n. 5. Incipit enim cognitio rei ab aliquibus signis exterioribus quibus pervenitur ad cognoscendum rei definitionem; quo cum perventum fuerit, habetur perfecta cognitio de re. Vel dicitur terminus cognitionis definitio, quia infra ipsam continentur ea, per quae scitur res. Si autem mutetur una differentia, vel addatur, vel subtrahatur, iam non erit eadem definitio. Si autem est terminus cognitionis,[450] oportet quod sit rei terminus, quia cognitio fit per assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam.

Expositio Peryermeneias, lib. 1 l. 2 n. 10. Huiusmodi autem simplices conceptiones intellectus sunt, quas primo voces significant. Unde dicitur in IV metaphysicae quod ratio, quam significat nomen, est definitio. Et ideo signanter dicit: quorum primorum hae notae sunt, ut scilicet referatur ad primas conceptiones a vocibus primo significatas.

Expositio Peryermeneias, lib. 1 l. 4 n. 2. Circa primum considerandum est quod definitio ideo dicitur terminus,[450] quia includit totaliter rem; ita scilicet, quod nihil rei est extra definitionem, cui scilicet definitio [non] conveniat; nec aliquid aliud est infra definitionem, cui scilicet definitio non conveniat.

Expositio Peryermeneias, lib. 1 l. 2 n. 10. Huiusmodi autem simplices conceptiones intellectus sunt, quas primo voces significant. Unde dicitur in IV metaphysicae quod ratio, quam significat nomen, est definitio. Et ideo signanter dicit: quorum primorum hae notae sunt, ut scilicet referatur ad primas conceptiones a vocibus primo significatas.

Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 5 l. 4 n. 9. Hac autem ratione elementi constituta, per transumptionem contingebat eis ut duos modos elementorum adinvenirent; quorum primus est, ut ea quae sunt maxime universalia, dicerent elementa. Universale enim est unum secundum rationem, et est simplex, quia eius definitio non componitur ex diversis, et est in multis, et sic est ad multa utile, sive sit in omnibus, sicut unum et ens; sive in pluribus, sicut alia genera. Per eamdem vero rationem contingebat eis secundo, quod punctum et unitatem dicerent esse principia vel elementa, quia utrumque eorum est unum simplex et ad multa utile.

determinate, but the starting point must be its opposite: the cognition of what is not yet fully distinguished (confusa; συνκεχυμένα). The term of the confused cognition recurs throughout the entire history of philosophy, albeit it plays a different role in particular systems. Moreover, scarcely any of those who use it are fully aware of its ancient origin.

In Scotus, the confused cognition is equaled to the intuition of the actually existing particular being. The objective of the philosophy consists, to his mind, in grasping "simple essences" (quidditas simpliciter simplex, in singular). Still, until we arrive at what we know to be undoubtedly simple (the Divine Intellect), we cannot be absolutely ascertained as to the simplicity of the objects we face. The human intellect is, in Scotus, ascending to the principle of both existence and knowledge. Scotus tried to prove the existence of the Creator, but availed himself in fact of the cognizance of His essence. A vicious circle appears. In his Theoremata, he despairs to prove it at all.

The influence of Scotus on the modern philosophy cannot be doubted, albeit it happened to be assessed both as positive (inspiring) and downright destructive. In Bergson for instance, the intuitive cognition of existence is deemed more valuable than "an abstract" cognition of essences (the term "abstract" has got, probably the negative meaning from Bergson).

The same is, to same extent, the case with the so called existential Thomism. The very name might be somewhat misleading as Gilson (the founder) admits his spiritual kinship with Bergson rather with existentialists. Anyway, the cognition of essences (by defining them) would be "too poor" in comparison with that of the "unique" existence, because the former drops what seems to be most valuable in things. We might, allegedly, think of no matter how fantastic or incredible a thing: only because not taking into account the act of existence of this thing first. The "original sin" of essentialism is likely to lead to idealism.

The famous text of Thomas' De ente et essentia was hopped to substantiate the claim.

> Whatever is not in the concept of the essence or the quiddity comes from outside the essence and makes a composition with the essence, because no essence can be understood without the things that are its parts. But every essence or quiddity can be understood without understanding anything about its existence: I can understand what a man is or what a phoenix is, and nevertheless not know whether either has existence in reality. Therefore, it is clear that existence is something other than the essence or quiddity, unless perhaps there is something whose quiddity is its very own existence, and, if so, this thing must be one and primary. For there can be no plurification of something except by the addition of some difference, as the nature of a genus is multiplied in its species; or as the nature of the species is multiplied in diverse individuals since the form is received in diverse matters; or again as when one thing is absolute and another is received in something else, as if there were a certain separate heat that was other than unseparated heat by reason of its separation.[451]

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[451] De ente et essentia, cap. 3. Quicquid enim non est de intellectu essentiae vel quiditatis, hoc est adveniens extra et faciens compositionem cum essentia, quia nulla essentia sine his, quae sunt partes essentiae, intelligi potest. Omnis autem essentia vel quiditas potest intelligi sine hoc quod aliquid intelligatur de esse suo; possum enim intelligere quid est homo vel Phoenix et tamen ignorare an esse habeat in rerum natura. Ergo patet quod esse est aliud ab essentia vel quiditate, nisi forte sit aliqua res, cuius quiditas sit ipsum suum esse; et haec res non potest esse nisi una et prima, quia impossibile est, ut fiat plurificatio alicuius nisi per additionem alicuius differentiae, sicut multiplicatur natura generis in species, vel per hoc quod forma recipitur in diversis materiis,

The "existential" interpretation of this text is apparently at odds with the teachings of the so called traditional Thomism, which, for that reason perhaps, is called disparagingly "Paleo-Thomism". The intuition of existence was hoped to enliven the spirit of Thomism, but was bound rather to render the whole edifice thereof to rest of quick sands of subjectivism. It is *almost* impossible to summarize the value of Thomas' system in the way some philosophies hopped to: by a chosen catchword and (at the same tome) without prejudice to the accuracy of the whole. The sense, nonetheless, of the aforementioned "unum et multa" can be substantiated in Thomas works. There are detailed responses to special difficulties in his Summa, but they are all engrafted in the organic structure of the one and complete structure. No interpretation could disrespect the structure of the totality and its parts without prejudice to the value of them both.

In the text quoted above, the "Intelligere" is not tantamount to "Definire". *The essence of an error can be understood without sympathizing with the error* (without committing it). In some texts of his Organon, Aristotle adduces the sentiments of the ancient philosophizers in a self-coherent form without – to Thomas mind – endorsing them. The same is the case with Thomas' Questions. The "essential" train of reasoning is faithfully reproduced, but not solidarized with by the same token.

There is a formula "esse est aliud ab essentia", to be found in Corpus Thomisticum.[452] Basing on the text, it can be argued (and the argument might seem convincing) that grasping the essence could not guarantee the adequate cognition of a thing (the latter must be that of its existence). To the contrary, seizing the former apart/before the latter would open the gates for almost unanimously denounced essentialism. Idealism would naturally follow.

The danger would have been imminent and the snares of idealism unescapable if essence could be *seized really* apart from the act of existence. The possibility was implied, nay; it was believed to be gleaned from the text of Thomas quoted above.

True, there is, in Corpus Thomisticum, a statement to be found: "essentia est aliud ab esse", but the statement was not uttered by Thomas Aquinas, but by Thomas Sutton. The conclusion drawn by the latter reads: "the act of existence of every being apart from the First Being is accidental to it. Whatever belongs to the essence of as thing is comprised in its definition, but the act of existence does not pertain to the definition, because a thing can be defined even without having the existence". *Esse* autem cuiuslibet rei citra primum, *accidens est,* cum quidquid sit de essentia rei cadat in eius definitione; *esse* autem *non pertinet ad definitionem rei,* cum res definiri possit et si esse non habeat.[453]

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sicut multiplicatur natura speciei in diversis individuis, vel per hoc quod unum est absolutum et aliud in aliquo receptum, sicut si esset quidam calor separatus, esset alius a calore non separato ex ipsa sua separatione.

[452] Summa Theologiae I, q. 3 a. 4 c. Impossibile est autem quod esse sit causatum tantum ex principiis essentialibus rei, quia nulla res sufficit quod sit sibi causa essendi, si habeat esse causatum. Oportet ergo quod illud cuius esse est aliud ab essentia sua, habeat esse causatum ab alio. Hoc autem non potest dici de Deo, quia Deum dicimus esse primam causam efficientem.

[453] Thomas de Sutton (?), De natura generis, cap. 4 c. Cum autem omne quod est in genere ut completum existens, componatur ex genere et differentia; genus autem sumatur ab eo quod est in potentia, differentia vero a forma, sive ab actu; in substantiis vero separatis essentia est ut potentia, esse vero ut actus: sequi quibusdam

This statement openly contradicts the authentically Thomistic text of Sentences adduced above. The notion of the real (substantial) existence is involved in the cognizance of the four Aristotelian causes.

Scotus is fully entitled to be called an essentialist and this despite entertaining the idea of the intuition of the particular existence. Moreover, the "despite" can be (as it seems) safely replaced by "because". Scotus fails to get to know what the real act of existence must be, *because* he fails to understand the real "nature" of existence (the very term seems to be oxymoronic to his followers). Anyway, the possibility has been opened to reduce existence to "being there" (presence). In Scotus, the so called scientia quidditativa must replace the traditional metaphysics. The latter was blamed for "naturalism.", which is true in the sense it is furthest from the (anti-naturalistic) "ontology". The naturalist metaphysics was, allegedly, incapable of construing a "vision of the world" harmonizing with the Revelation. It is perfectly true, because, neither Aristotle nor Thomas aimed at "construing" *any* "vison" at all. Thomas did not aimed at "correcting Aristotle" "in the spirit of Christianity" (He must have been aware of the futility of the very idea of the project). The objective was rather modest: the cognizance of truth as such. But, at the same time, Thomas was deeply convinced (and adduced rational arguments for the conviction) that no truth written with the small "p" can contradict the Truth (of the Revelation). The principle is true in general, but, in particular circumstances, the human mind chances to face some hardy surmountable difficulties. Metaphysics of *discovery* is far more risky an enterprise than commonly accepted. But nowadays, we do not need to advance the pathway *discovery* alone any more.

Aristotle, to the contrary, has the least title to be called an essentialist (albeit he was commonly labeled so), because his intuition of the middle term of syllogisms accounts for the cognizance of the actual co-existence of things in nature. True, Aristotle fails to retrace the co-existence (called by him the generation of things) to *the individual existence* (the individual acts of existence), but the paradigm he had proposed facilitated the addition made by Thomas. God creates the individual existences in the moment they come to the co-existence in the world; in the moment they are generated.

The claim that existence is accidental for a thing stems, obviously, from Avicenna.[454] Some, however, speak of the contingency of being in the same vein (and the contingent means in fact the accidental). The contingency of things *as such* can be stated from purely *theological* point of view, but it cannot be accepted a priori in metaphysics. The general tending to being (discoverable in nature) is necessary (not contingent at all), although the tending is not necessarily crowned with a durable success. A thing tends to being as long as it exists – out of *its* necessity. The necessity is basic for the necessary proof of the existence of

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videtur genus in eis sumi ab essentia, differentiam vero ab esse. Sed hoc nihil est, quia essentia est aliud ab esse Angeli; sed illud unde sumitur differentia non est aliud ab essentia rei constitutae per differentiam, sicut intellectus unde sumitur rationale non est extra essentiam hominis. Esse autem cuiuslibet rei citra primum, accidens est, cum quidquid sit de essentia rei cadat in eius definitione; esse autem non pertinet ad definitionem rei, cum res definiri possit et si esse non habeat.

[454] Quodlibet IX, q. 4 a. 1 arg. 4. Contra, differentia cuiuslibet rei est de essentia, et intrat definitionem ipsius. Sed in omni creatura esse est aliud ab essentia eius, nec intrat definitionem eius, ut Avicenna dicit. Ergo differentia Angeli non potest sumi ex esse ipsius.

God. Things are contingent from the divine point of view, but nobody can be expected to adopt this perspective: we cannot see things in the way God does, although Hegel seems to think otherwise. We are obliged to conform *our will* to God's will (testified in the Commandments). We are not able to conform fully our intellect so.

Some venture to claim that the famous "real distinction" was introduced by Thomas only for the sake of demonstrating the existence of God. "A contingent being must have a cause of its existence beside itself". But that "proof" stems from Leibniz and involves petitio principii. The contingent is – by the definition of the term – opposed to the absolute. The mere content of words cannot afford a proof of the reality behind them (the meanings of the words are to be found in dictionaries, which do not pretend for that reasons to be philosophical). Thomas could have never committed such a gross error.

Still, the awry interpretation of Thomas' text has a certain reason. Thomas Sutton says that – when differentiating the existence and essence – we in fact compare the created and the uncreated, which is perfectly true, but not philosophical a claim for that reason. This is the point of view of theology, which cannot replace metaphysics.[455] Natural reasoning (in metaphysics) must, admittedly, provide some reasons to accept the possibility of the comparison in question. There are natural motives to accept the veracity of the Revelation, and metaphysics must summarize them. A theologian can "compare", but the metaphysician is not entitled thereto. Thomas, on the following page of De ente et essentia, adopts the guise of a theologian,[456] but his theology is not meant to replace metaphysics. Metaphysics is (in Thomas) a handmaid, but in rationalism theology was expected to be subservient to philosophy to the point it ceased to exist as a separate branch of knowledge.

The problem of essentialism arises, partly at least, from some terminological difficulties. Terminus essentia is, in Latin, almost the same as quidditas. The latter, however, is somewhat awkward translation of two separate Aristotelian terms. Aristotle is extremely unwilling to use terms ending with an equivalent of the Latin -itas (which correspond to the English endings -ity). "Quiddity" is commonly used in English but is, nonetheless, a translation of the Greek τὸ τί ἐστι and τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι alike (of two terms). The former is relatively easy to analyze. There is a question: "what it is" in it (τί ἐστι) preceded by the definite article (τὸ). In the Greek idiom, the articles might precede practically any phrase, which renders Greek so extremely "philosophical" and "abstract". In the latter term, a somehow enigmatic praeteritum ἦν of the Greek einai (εἶναι) and εἶναι itself appears in the

[455] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 42 n. 9. […] eius quod est necesse-esse, sua quidditas est suum esse, ut supra probatum est. Secundo, quia sic necesse-esse acquireret esse per aliquid aliud: quod est impossibile.

[456] But if we posit a thing that is existence only, such that it is subsisting existence itself, this existence will not receive the addition of a difference. For, if there were added a difference, it would be not only existence, but existence and also some form beyond this. Much less would such a thing receive the addition of matter, for then the thing would be not subsisting existence but material. Hence, it remains that a thing that is its own existence cannot be other than one, and so in every other thing, the thing's existence is one thing, and its essence or quiddity or nature or form is another. In the intelligences, therefore, there is existence beyond the form, and so we say that an intelligence is form and existence.

phrase preceded by the article. It is shifted into the formula: τὸ τί ἐστι in the way the exact translation seems hardly feasible.

The terms were original translated into Latin as: quod quid est and quid quid erat esse respectively, but there are no articles in Latin and no articles in the modern languages used in so flexible a way they were in Greek.

The terms: τὸ τί ἐστι and τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι; are not identical. The former, according to Bonitz, has mere logical meaning (notione definiendam).[457] The latter contains more.

Let us resort to Aristotle's terminology. What really exists in the category of substance, might be either a suppositum of e.g. humanity, or humanity itself sustained in existence by this suppositum (substrate). Substances exist really and thus e.g. humanity can be called the quiddity of men really sustained in nature by the substrate of a particular man. But the mere logical notion of τὸ τί ἐστι does not touch upon the real existence of the suppositum. The problem is far from being "abstract". Is, for instance, the humanity in the "modern" (Comtean) sense something more than a pure idea?

In Aristotle, Dativus (the case of the indirect object) happens to be added to the formula τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. "For the man" ἀνθρώπῳ to exist thus can be expressed as τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι.[458] A man sustains his humanity this way, even if it is commonly accepted that he does not (in Aristotle) sustain his act of existence by the same token. Still, it cannot be doubted that he at least – so to say – "commences" to sustain it in the moment he *comes to existence*.

According to Thomas, "What does not exist, cannot have the essence at all"[459]. There are, for instance, no Centaurs or Chimeras to be found in nature, because (as to the Chimera) no body of a goat can coexist with a loin's pate (can sustain it). It cannot be defined, albeit a poetical image thereof can be found in literature.

According to Empedocles, the evolutionist, some such like monsters had appeared in history, and the nature – by way of trial and error – had arrived at a perfect form he observed

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[457] H. Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, Graz 1955, s. 763b.

[458] 1031a 21-23 εἰ γὰρ τὸ αὐτό, καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι καὶ τὸ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ αὐτό

1038b 17-18 ἆρα οὕτω μὲν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ὡς τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἐνυπάρχειν, οἷον τὸ ζῷον ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἵππῳ;

1031b 26-28 ὥστ' ἔστι
μὲν ὡς ταὐτόν, ἔστι δὲ ὡς οὐ ταὐτὸ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ αὐτό·
τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ ταὐτό, τῷ
πάθει δὲ ταὐτό.

[459] Expositio Posteriorum, lib. 2 l. 6 n. 2 Dicit ergo primo quod non videtur esse possibilis aliquis modus, quo aliquis demonstret *quod quid est esse* hominis; et hoc ideo, quia necesse est quod quicunque scit quod quid est esse hominis, vel cuiuscunque alterius rei, quod sciat rem illam esse. Quia enim *non entis* non est aliqua quidditas vel essentia, de eo quod non est, nullus potest scire quod quid est; sed potest scire significationem nominis, vel rationem ex pluribus nominibus compositam: sicut potest aliquis scire quid significat hoc nomen *Tragelaphus* vel Hircocervus, quod idem est, quia significat quoddam animal compositum ex hirco et cervo; sed impossibile est scire quod quid est Hircocervi, quia nihil est tale in rerum natura.

then. The same – mutatis mutandis – could be (as it seems) said about its modern counterpart. But there are no traces of the "creative innovations" perceptible in nature now.

It is impossible, in a particular science, to both define its subject matter and to state the real existence thereof [460] [461]. But there is the supreme science (metaphysics) which can do the

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[460] Expositio Posteriorum, lib. 2 l. 6 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit: at vero si demonstrabit quid est etc., ex eo quod praemissum est, procedit ad propositum ostendendum. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, ostendit quod non potest ostendi *quod quid est* demonstratione; secundo, quod non potest ostendi definitione; ibi: si ergo et definiens demonstrat et cetera. Circa primum ponit tres rationes; quarum prima talis est. Sicut definitio inducitur ad manifestandum aliquid unum, in quantum scilicet ex partibus definitionis fit unum per se, non per accidens, ita etiam oportet quod demonstratio, quae utitur definitione tanquam medio, unum aliquid demonstret: oportet enim conclusionem esse medio proportionatam. Et ita patet quod per unam et eamdem demonstrationem non possunt diversa demonstrari. Sed aliud est *quod quid est homo*, et *esse hominem*: in solo enim primo essendi principio, quod est essentialiter ens, ipsum esse et quidditas eius est unum et idem; in omnibus autem aliis, quae sunt entia per participationem, oportet quod sit aliud esse et quidditas entis. Non est ergo possibile quod eadem demonstratione demonstret aliquis *quid est* et *quia est*.

Expositio Posteriorum, lib. 2 l. 6 n. 4 Secundam rationem ponit ibi: postea et per demonstrationem etc.; quae talis est. Secundum commune sapientum dictum, necessarium est quod *omne*, idest totum quod per demonstrationem demonstratur, sit ipsum *quia est*, nisi forte aliquis dicat quod hoc ipsum *quia est* sit substantia alicuius rei. Hoc autem est impossibile. Hoc enim ipsum quod est esse, non est substantia vel essentia alicuius rei in genere existentis. Alioquin oporteret quod hoc quod dico ens esset genus, quia genus est quod praedicatur de aliquo in eo quod quid. Ens autem non est genus, ut probatur in III Metaph. Et propter hoc etiam Deus, qui est suum esse, non est in genere. Si autem *quia est* esset substantia alicuius rei, simul cum aliquis ostenderet *quia est*, ostenderet *quid est*, et ita non totum quod demonstratio demonstrat, esset *quia est*. Illud autem est falsum. Ergo patet quod demonstratio solum demonstrat *quia est*. Demonstrat enim enunciationem aliquam, quae significat *esse* vel *non esse*. Et hoc etiam apparet in processu scientiarum. Geometra enim accipit quid significat hoc nomen *triangulus*, et demonstrat *quod sit*, puta cum demonstrat super lineam rectam datam triangulum aequilaterum constituere. Si igitur aliquis demonstraret solum *quid est* triangulus, praeter morem demonstrationum quibus utuntur scientiae, non demonstraret hoc totum quod est triangulum esse, sed demonstraret solum hoc quod dico triangulum. Sicut enim propter hoc quod *esse* non est substantia rei, ille qui demonstrat *esse*, hoc solum demonstrat; ita si aliquis demonstraret *quid est*, hoc solum demonstraret. Sequeretur igitur quod aliquis sciens per definitionem *quid est*, nesciret *an est*, quod est impossibile, ut ex praedictis patet.

[461] Expositio Posteriorum, lib. 2 l. 6 n. 5Tertiam rationem ponit ibi: manifestum autem est secundum nunc etc.; quae per exempla consuetarum definitionum manifestat idem, quod in praecedenti ratione est conclusum, scilicet quod monstrans *quid est* non monstrat *quia est*. Unde dicit manifestum esse non solum secundum praedicta, sed etiam secundum modos *terminorum*, idest definitionum, quae *nunc* sunt in usu, quod illi qui definiunt, non manifestant *quia est*. Puta qui definit circulum, dicens quod est aliquid ex cuius medio lineae ad circumferentiam ductae sunt aequales, adhuc restat quaestio *propter quid* oporteat poni esse id quod definitur; puta propter quid oporteat poni quod sit circulus, qui praedicto modo definitur. Convenit enim aliquam similem rationem dicere *montis aenei*, puta quod est corpus aeneum in altum et usquequaque diffusum; et tamen adhuc restat quaerere an sit aliquid tale in rerum natura. Et hoc ideo quia *termini*, idest rationes definitivae, non declarant quod illud de quo assignantur, aut *sit* aut *possibile* sit esse; sed semper, assignata tali ratione, licet quaerere quare oporteat tale aliquid esse. Sic igitur patet quod impossibile est quod simul demonstretur *quid est* et *quia est*.

Expositio Posteriorum, lib. 2 l. 6 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit: si ergo definiens demonstrat etc., ostendit quod non potest ostendi *quod quid est* definitione, ducendo ad inconveniens. Unde primo, ostendit quid ex hoc sequatur; secundo, ostendit illud quod sequitur esse inconveniens; ibi: sed inconveniens et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod, cum ille qui definit, possit ostendere vel *quid est*, vel tantum *quid significat nomen*, non propter hoc oportebit quod definitio sit manifestativa ipsius *quod quid est*, quod proprie ad definitionem pertinet: alioquin sequetur

job. The supreme science is, however, discriminative of the genuine science and its substitutes ("bold theories").

There is, however, a science superior to metaphysics itself and called theology. Gilson speaks of what he calls Exodusmetaphysik confusing the two. He fails to notice that the universally valid metaphysics must be addressed to unbelievers and believers alike. It must be "pagan" (in a sense) and cannot be tailored to the requirements of a religion sentiment. It must be existentially unengaged. No unbeliever can be demanded to accept its authority any more than the authority of Bible. But the latter cannot be accepted without rational proofs which substantiate the authority (the exactness of a given translation first of all). Some "translations" are rather "philosophical" (rationalist) than theological, which in no way ennobles this "philosophy". It does not become "Christian" only because dealing with Christianity.

Gilson claims that Avicenna was inspired by Al Quran, which might be the case. But Thomas solidarized, in his Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 4, with Aristotle the "pagan" *against* him and the People of the Book (Ahl al-Kitāb).

> **556**. But it must be noted that Avicenna felt differently about this; for he said that the terms "being" and "one" do not signify a thing's substance, but something added to it. He said this

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quod definitio significans quod quid est, nihil sit aliud quam ratio significans idem quod nomen: non enim super talem rationem addit aliquid definitio, nisi quia significat essentiam alicuius rei. Unde si non sit aliqua res, cuius essentiam definitio significet, nihil differt definitio a ratione exponente significationem alicuius nominis.

Expositio Posteriorum, lib. 2 l. 6 n. 7 Deinde cum dicit: sed inconveniens est etc., ostendit inconveniens esse quod definitio nihil sit aliud quam ratio exponens nominis significationem. Et hoc tribus rationibus. Quarum prima est, quia contingit etiam ea quae nec sunt substantia, nec sunt universaliter entia, aliquo nomine significare. Quodlibet autem nomen per aliquam interpretationem exponi potest. Si ergo nihil aliud esset definitio quam ratio interpretativa nominis, sequeretur quod definitio posset esse *non substantiarum* et totaliter *non entium*. Quod patet esse falsum. Ostensum est enim in VII Metaph. quod definitio principaliter quidem est substantiae, aliorum autem in quantum se habent ad substantiam.

Expositio Posteriorum, lib. 2 l. 6 n. 8 Secundam rationem ponit ibi: amplius omnes rationes etc.; quae talis est. Cuilibet *rationi*, idest orationi aliquid significanti, est imponere aliquod nomen ei correspondens, quod per illam rationem manifestatur. Si ergo nihil aliud sit definitio quam ratio interpretativa nominis, sequeretur quod omnes rationes essent definitiones: et ita sequetur quod, cum disputamus vel colloquimur ad invicem, ipsae disputationes vel collocutiones nostrae sint quaedam definitiones; et similiter sequetur quod *Ilias*, idest poema Homeri de bello Troiano, sit quaedam definitio.

Expositio Posteriorum, lib. 2 l. 6 n. 9 Tertiam rationem ponit ibi: amplius neque una scientia etc.; quae talis est. Nulla scientia demonstrat quod tale nomen significet talem rem. Nomina enim significant ad placitum; unde oportet hoc supponere secundum voluntatem instituentis. Manifestum est autem quod in qualibet scientia dantur aliquae definitiones. Manifestum est ergo quod definitiones non significant hoc, scilicet solam nominis interpretationem.

Expositio Posteriorum, lib. 2 l. 6 n. 10 Deinde cum dicit: ex his igitur neque definitio etc., epilogat quae disputative praemissa sunt. Et dicit quod ex praemissis videtur sequi quod definitio et syllogismus non sunt idem, neque de eodem; et quod definitio nihil demonstret, quia non est de eodem de quo est demonstratio. Et similiter videtur esse ostensum quod non est possibile cognoscere *quod quid est*, neque per definitionem, neque per demonstrationem; quia definitio solum ostendit *quid*, et demonstratio ostendit *quia est*. Sed ad cognitionem *quod quid est* requiritur cognitio *quia* est, ut dictum est.

of "being" because, in the case of anything that derives its existence from something else, the existence of such a thing must differ from its substance or essence. But the term "being" signifies existence itself. Hence it seems that being or existence is something added to a thing's essence.[462]

557. He spoke in the same way of "one," because he thought that the one which is interchangeable with being and the one which is the principle of number are the same. And the "one" which is the principle of number must signify a reality added to the substance; otherwise, number, since it is composed of ones, would not be a species of quantity, which is an accident added to substance. He said that this kind of "one" is interchangeable with "being," not in the sense that it signifies the very substance of a thing or being, but in the sense that it signifies an accident belonging to every being, just as the ability to laugh belongs to every man.[463]

558. But in regard to the first point he does not seem to be right, for even though a thing's existence is other than its essence, it should not be understood to be something added to its essence after the manner of an accident, but something established, as it were, by the principles of the essence. Hence the term "being," which is applied to a thing by reason of its very existence, designates the same thing as the term applied to it by reason of its essence.[464]

There is nothing "mysterious" or "miraculous" in the act of existence. The ultimate sense of existence (painstakingly urgent for an unbeliever) is deducible from the "sense of being" given in the perfect system of the demonstrative syllogism. It is impossible to provide a real definition of a non-existing being. Conversely, those proposed to us are real as long as they reveal the genuine trait of being (its unchangeableness).

There is, however, some reason to speak about beings which are not actually interwoven into the fabric of the universe. They do not need to be mythical, but might have existed indeed.

Some species never existed on the Earth, whereas some ceased to exist hundred millions years ago. In the era of Mesozoic, some species died out *so as to* render the ecosystem of the Erath susceptible of the most perfect body possibly existing in nature – the

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[462] **556**. Sciendum est autem quod circa hoc Avicenna aliud sensit. Dixit enim quod unum et ens non significant substantiam rei, sed significant aliquid additum. Et de ente quidem hoc dicebat, quia in qualibet re quae habet esse ab alio, aliud est esse rei, et substantia sive essentia eius: hoc autem nomen ens, significat ipsum esse. Significat igitur (ut videtur) aliquid additum essentiae.

[463] **557**. De uno autem hoc dicebat, quia aestimabat quod illud unum quod convertitur cum ente, sit idem quod illud unum quod est principium numeri. Unum autem quod est principium numeri necesse est significare quamdam naturam additam substantiae: alioquin cum numerus ex unitatibus constituatur, non esset numerus species quantitatis, quae est accidens substantiae superadditum. Dicebat autem quod hoc unum convertitur cum ente, non quia significat ipsam rei substantiam vel entis, sed quia significat accidens quod inhaeret omni enti, sicut risibile quod convertitur cum homine.

[464] **558**. Sed in primo quidem non videtur dixisse recte. Esse enim rei quamvis sit aliud ab eius essentia, non tamen est intelligendum quod sit aliquod superadditum ad modum accidentis, sed quasi constituitur per principia essentiae. Et ideo hoc nomen ens quod imponitur ab ipso esse, significat idem cum nomine quod imponitur ab ipsa essentia.

human one. The Creator must have *actively* controlled the process, because He was about to assume the human nature in its integrity in the Divine Suppositum of His Logos.
But on the other hand, some species of this perfect universe created by Him might happen to cease to exist nowadays, because of the inner *disharmony* (the lack of integrity) found in *the actually existing* human supposita of humanity. There is the perfect harmony to be found in the Perfect Man and inherited from His Mother, for which reason we might repeat after the ancients: "Man is said to be, as it were, a microcosm (a lesser world)" (Homo dicitur quasi minor mundus). The actual moral imperfection of the "modern humanity" is both a cause and a sign of the environment pollution taken in the broadest sense of the word.

Thomas writes about the abstract cognition which must prescind from the particular (act of existence). But the particular at the starting point of metaphysics is of a less importance than the universal to be found in this full-fledged theory, and the indirect cognition of (the reflection on) individuals carried out in the practical science (availing itself of the supreme science) more important than the (allegedly) direct contact with "reality". The individuals are then more than just particulars, because defined in the relation to their Ultimate Destiny. Generally, all things tend to the Fullness of Being, but humans should do so in a rational manner: should *reflect on the particulars*.

There are many "fantastic beings" "called into existence" by mere creative imagination of man: in books or films. They are at least deemed possible to exist (to be "in potentia proxima ad existendum" as Scotus would have it). Realism is the name. But no writer can be so "realistic" to reproduce the original co-existence of objects wrought by the *Divine* Artist.

The Prophet is to be believed when saying: vidi Dominum sedentem super solium excelsum et elevatum (I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne high and elevated),[465] because the veracity of the statement is vouchsafed by God and is not contrary to the normal mode of God's existence/presence in the world. But "visionaries" cannot be trusted for the very same reason. They cannot substantiate the veracity of what they say.

Some believed in that the so called "theory of transcendental properties of being" can abrogate the essentialism, which might be true in a sense. It must be noted, however, that the "properties of being" in question are never called by Thomas transcendental, but transcendent (sunt de transcendentibus) instead.[466] The properties of being, viz. unum, res, aliquid, bonum;

[465] Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 171 a. 3 c. Et ideo revelatio prophetica ad omnia huiusmodi se extendit. Sicut de his quae pertinent ad Dei excellentiam et Angelorum, spirituum ministerio revelatio prophetica facta est, ut Isaiae VI, ubi dicitur, *vidi dominum sedentem super solium excelsum et elevatum*. Eius etiam prophetia continet ea quae pertinent ad corpora naturalia, secundum illud Isaiae XL, quis mensus est pugillo aquas, etc.

[466] Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 2 q. 1 a. 5 ad 2. Ad secundum dicendum, quod res est de transcendentibus, et ideo se habet communiter ad absoluta et ad relata; et ideo est res essentialis, secundum quam personae non differunt, et est res relativa sive personalis, secundum quam personae distinguuntur.

Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 34 q. 1 a. 2 ad 1. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod genus dupliciter potest accipi. Uno modo proprie, prout praedicatur de pluribus in eo quod quid est; et sic neque bonum neque malum sunt genera; quia sunt de transcendentibus, quia bonum et ens convertuntur. Alio modo communiter, ut genus dicatur omne id quod sua communitate multa ambit et continet; et sic bonum et malum dicuntur genera omnium contrariorum: quia, ut in 1 Physic. dicitur, omnia contraria hoc modo se habent quod alterum est nobilius, et alter um vilius; ita quod vilius privationem in se includit, sicut nigrum in respectu ad album, et frigidum in respectu ad

are called so because they transcend all ten categories listed by Aristotle. To be precise however: they are inseparable properties of all beings. Moreover, there are some trans-categorial properties of the subject matter of metaphysics: being as such. Aristotle sates the fact himself.

Thomas normally prefers the noun: convertibilia and the verb: convertuntur, which is not opposed to the cognizance of essence; nay, the connection with the perfect guise of syllogism is plainly visible therein. The Latin converti is a literary translation of the Aristotelian ἀντιστρέφεσθαι. The terms (*A, B, C*) of the perfect syllogisms are convertible so (connected this way in the premises and the conclusion). But syllogisms are perfect because addressing the convertible proprieties of being. The cause of the unity (and of what-ness and goodness too) of the definition is the unity of what is to be found in nature.

There are, moreover, definitions of the convertibles possible in metaphysics. There is no genus in them (Aristotle argued convincingly against Plato that being cannot be a genus[467]), but what is "terminable" (terminabile) instead. There is no specific difference (for the same reason), but there is the terminating (terminans) in its stead. In other words: the parts of the definition of e.g. good are not what they are in e.g. in the definition of man (in which

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calidum: propter quod in 1 de Generat. dicitur, quod frigus est privatio caloris; et per hunc modum semper alterum contrarium pertinet ad bonum, et reliquum ad malum; unde etiam Pythagoras ponebat duos ordines rerum: unum boni, sub quo colligebat omnia perfecta, ut dextrum, triangulum, aequilaterum, et similia; et alterum mali, sub quo ponebat omnia quae imperfectionem implicant, ut sinistrum, feminam, et hujusmodi.

Summa Theologiae I, q. 93 a. 9 c. Respondeo dicendum quod similitudo quaedam unitas est, unum enim in qualitate similitudinem causat, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Unum autem, cum sit de transcendentibus, et commune est omnibus, et ad singula potest aptari; sicut et bonum et verum. Unde, sicut bonum alicui rei particulari potest comparari ut praeambulum ad ipsam, et ut subsequens, prout designat aliquam perfectionem ipsius; ita etiam est de comparatione similitudinis ad imaginem.

De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 8 ad 15. Ad decimumquintum dicendum quod numerus qui causatur ex divisione continui est species quantitatis, et est tantum in substantiis materialibus. Sed in substantiis immaterialibus est multitudo quae est de transcendentibus, secundum quod unum et multa dividunt ens; et haec multitudo consequitur distinctionem formalem.

De virtutibus, q. 1 a. 2 ad 8. Ad octavum dicendum, quod istud fallit in transcendentibus, quae circumeunt omne ens. Nam essentia est ens, et bonitas bona, et unitas una, non autem sic potest dici albedo alba.

In Physic., lib. 3 l. 8 n. 4. Addit enim numerus super multitudinem rationem mensurationis: est enim numerus multitudo mensurata per unum, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Et propter hoc numerus ponitur species quantitatis discretae, non autem multitudo; sed est de transcendentibus.

Thomas de Sutton (?), De natura generis, cap. 2 c. Sunt autem sex transcendentia, videlicet ens, res, aliquid, unum, verum, bonum: quae re idem sunt, sed ratione distinguuntur. Sicut enim in demonstrationibus resolvere oportet omnes propositiones usque ad principia ipsa, ad quae necesse est stare rationem, ita in apprehensione praedictorum oportet stare ad ens, quod in quolibet cognito naturaliter cognoscitur, sicut et principium in omnibus propositionibus quae sunt post principia continetur.

[467] Summa Theologiae III, q. 77 a. 1 ad 2. Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum ens non sit genus, hoc ipsum quod est esse, non potest esse essentia vel substantiae vel accidentis. Non ergo definitio substantiae est ens per se sine subiecto, nec definitio accidentis ens in subiecto sed quidditati seu essentiae substantiae competit habere esse non in subiecto; quidditati autem sive essentiae accidentis competit habere esse in subiecto.

terminabile is animal, and terminans – is rationale.[468] And it is as it must be: the ultimate sense of being is to be found beyond any specific being. Analogically, the substance as such (not just this or that one) can be defined.[469]

We have no intuition of being, so we cannot "divide" it into its species as Plato tried to do. But we have an indistinct cognizance of being (ens ut primo cognitum) at the starting point of metaphysics along with the principle which enables to differentiate.[470] They are called principium incomplexum and principium complexum, respectively. Not the naked existence is grasped so, but the co-existence of what is to be subsequently diversified.

A tacit supposition was made by those who followed Scotus. There is, allegedly, pure thinking on the one hand, and the intuition of the real existence on the other. They both are supposed to account for the worth of a philosophical system. Philosophical dualism was implied.

The object of our thinking transcends time and space indeed, but our thinking is no less real than e.g. trees and stones are (it is cannot be hypostasized as "consciousness" and opposed to "reality"). Consequently, the real and practical at the same time is far more strictly

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[468] Contra gentiles, lib. 2 cap. 95 n. 4. unde patet quod accidit generi et differentiae quod determinatio quam differentia importat, ex alio principio causetur quam natura generis, ex hoc quod natura quam significat definitio, est composita ex materia et forma sicut ex terminante et terminato. si igitur est aliqua natura simplex, ipsa quidem per seipsam erit terminata, nec oportebit quod habeat duas partes, quarum una sit terminans et alia terminata.

[469] Super Sent., lib. 4 d. 12 q. 1 a. 1 qc. 1 ad 2. Ad secundum dicendum, quod sicut probat Avicenna in sua Metaph. per se existere non est definitio substantiae: quia per hoc non demonstratur quidditas ejus, sed ejus esse; et sua quidditas non est suum esse; alias non posset esse genus: quia esse non potest esse commune per modum generis, cum singula contenta in genere differant secundum esse; sed definitio, vel quasi definitio, substantiae est res habens quidditatem, cui acquiritur esse, vel debetur, ut non in alio; et similiter esse in subjecto non est definitio accidentis, sed e contrario res cui debetur esse in alio; et hoc nunquam separatur ab aliquo accidente, nec separari potest: quia illi rei quae est accidens, secundum rationem suae quidditatis semper debetur esse in alio. Sed potest esse quod illud quod debetur alicui secundum rationem suae quidditatis, ei virtute divina agente non conveniat; et sic patet quod facere accidens esse sine substantia, non est separare definitionem a definito; et si aliquando hoc dicatur definitio accidentis, praedicto modo intelligenda est definitio dicta: quia aliquando ab auctoribus definitiones ponuntur causa brevitatis non secundum debitum ordinem, sed tanguntur illa ex quibus potest accipi definitio.

[470] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 59 n. 3. Amplius. Cum aliquod incomplexum vel dicitur vel intelligitur, ipsum quidem incomplexum, quantum est de se, non est rei aequatum nec rei inaequale: cum aequalitas et inaequalitas secundum comparationem dicantur; incomplexum autem, quantum est de se, non continet aliquam comparationem vel applicationem ad rem. Unde de se nec verum nec falsum dici potest: sed tantum complexum, in quo designatur comparatio incomplexi ad rem per notam compositionis aut divisionis.

Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 4 l. 6 n. 10. Ad huius autem evidentiam sciendum est, quod, cum duplex sit operatio intellectus: una, qua cognoscit quod quid est, quae vocatur indivisibilium intelligentia: alia, qua componit et dividit: in utroque est aliquod primum: in prima quidem operatione est aliquod primum, quod cadit in conceptione intellectus, scilicet hoc quod dico ens; nec aliquid hac operatione potest mente concipi, nisi intelligatur ens. Et quia hoc principium, impossibile est esse et non esse simul, dependet ex intellectu entis, sicut hoc principium, omne totum est maius sua parte, ex intellectu totius et partis: ideo hoc etiam principium est naturaliter primum in secunda operatione intellectus, scilicet componentis et dividentis. Nec aliquis potest secundum hanc operationem intellectus aliquid intelligere, nisi hoc principio intellecto.

connected with the "theoretical" than it happens to be commonly assumed. The theoretical and the practical in Thomas' Summa form an integral totality.

People happen to talk nonsense and to accept exploded errors for unshakable truths. They seemed to "depart" from reality this way (be "detached" from reality). But they might be entangled in the mesh of relations which are *supposed to be reality* without good reasons. Relations themselves are no less real than ordinary objects, and hardly bearable if forced upon. They cannot ground a firm totality, but can ground some provisionally valid substructures indeed. This yoke of the "human bondage" is representative for the Hegelian Objective Geist. Some relations are natural (in families first of all), but there are instances of humiliating servitude to be found in the human affairs also.

Each theoretical error has some practical consequences. The only the problem is, when and where they are about to appear. The consequences of e.g. Marxist theory were about to appear gruesomely in Russia indeed. "The word is the shadow of the deed" sometimes, but in some circumstances, the word is a deed itself. Ideologies can be no less murderous than ordinary criminals.

To exist (da-sein) is in some sense tantamount to "taking place". But Thomas' ipsum esse (the act of existence) is considerably more. The existence in a place full of hostility might seem unbearable and possibly provoke even a suicide. It is, then, of pivotal importance, to demonstrate the real significance of the personal act of existence (its bearing at what transcends the spatial temporal). The sense of being is to be ultimately defined in the relation to the Fullness of Being. One's existence is not just "an element" to be placed on the matrix of an idealist system.

Being in a place is a border condition of coming to existence, but nothing more. Albeit departing from a certain place, people can, nonetheless, tend to what transcends the time and space: to God; to "immigrate" to Him (to a "better land" they yearn for). The tending must, however, be precisely directed. When asked about e.g. the way to a city I cannot put up with an "approximation" or "probability". The tending, moreover, to well-being is considerably less than tending to the fullness of being.

A definition might be false either because of incoherence of its parts or because not corresponding to any real objects[471]. The latter, however, is not about "designating" of

[471] Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 19 q. 5 a. 1 ad 7. […] per quem etiam modum dicitur definitio vera. Sed huic veritati non adjungitur falsitas per se, quia intellectus habet verum judicium de proprio objecto, in quod naturaliter tendit, quod est quidditas rei, sicut et visus de colore; sed per accidens admiscetur falsitas, scilicet ratione affirmationis vel negationis annexae, quod contingit dupliciter: vel ex comparatione definitionis ad definitum, et tunc dicitur definitio falsa respectu alicujus et non simpliciter, sicut definitio circuli est falsa de triangulo; vel in respectu partium definitionis ad invicem, in quibus implicatur impossibilis affirmatio; sicut definitio vacui, quod est locus in quo nullum corpus est; et haec definitio dicitur falsa simpliciter, ut in 5 Metaphys. dicitur.

De veritate, q. 1 a. 12 c. Sed tamen per accidens potest ibi falsitas accidere, in quantum, videlicet, intellectus falso componit et dividit; quod dupliciter contingit: vel in quantum definitionem unius attribuit alteri, ut si animal rationale mortale conciperet quasi definitionem asini; vel in quantum coniungit partes definitionis ad invicem, quae coniungi non possunt, ut si conciperet quasi definitionem asini animal irrationale immortale; haec enim est falsa: aliquod animal irrationale est immortale. Et sic patet quod definitio non potest esse falsa, nisi in quantum implicat affirmationem falsam. Hic autem duplex modus falsitatis tangitur in V Metaph.

Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 5 l. 22 n. 12. Deinde cum dicit ratio vero ostendit quomodo est falsum in definitionibus: et dicit quod ratio, idest definitio, inquantum est falsa, est non entium. Dicit autem inquantum est

particular objects. Particulars are of no real importance. It are rather *individuals* (the particulars reflected upon) which/who do matter. Definitions are not meant to suppose (as Ockham says) for particulars, but (if ever) for the natural relations amongst individuals.

In the perfect definition[472] all four causes coincide: the material, formal, final and efficient. The complex is, however, not only "ready to exist" (in potentia proxima ad existendum) in the way Scotus imagined. The "parts" coexist really.

Two aspects coincide in Scotus' paradigm of science, which have been accepted nowadays: the intuition of the Urstoff of the universe and the self-coherence of reasoning explicative of this primitive intuition. I fact however, reasoning consists in both "intuitions" (Aristotle speaks of) and the movement of the intellect actually enlivened by them.

5. Logos; Wert; Umwertung

Values happen often to be contrasted with facts. However, people (and especially scientists) attach sometimes special importance to some of them (they are personally interested in). They deem them to be valuable, because expressing a special mode of being: relevant to those who observe them.

The Greek λόγος (logos) has, originally, at least 45 meanings, and "value" amongst them. Those who learn Greek notice that they all stem from the verb λέγειν (to gather; to speak), but those who read the most important Book ever – written in Greek – notice that Λόγος par excellence is the very subject of this Book (Scripture): the Second Person of Trinity.

In Aristotle's glossary, λόγος might mean the definition, as far namely, as a specific (perfect) λόγος is meant. But the generic notion prevails in the common day life. Not every particular logos opens the human mind to the real being hidden beyond the ordinary words[473].

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falsa, quia definitio dicitur falsa dupliciter. Aut secundum se; et sic non est definitio alicuius, sed penitus non entis. Aut est definitio vera in se, sed falsa est prout attribuitur alteri quam proprio definito, et sic dicitur falsa inquantum non est eius.

[472] Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 27 q. 1 a. 2 ad 9. […] si accipiatur definitio rei quae complectitur totum esse rei, secundum quod ex omnibus causis constituitur, quae est perfecta definitio, tunc unius rei non potest esse nisi una definitio. […] [Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 1 q. 4 a. 2 expos.] Inveniuntur etiam aliae notificationes sumptae ex proprietatibus consequentibus esse rei, et tales etiam possunt esse plures.

[473] Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 2 q. 1 a. 3 c. Et sic patet quod ratio sapientiae quae de Deo dicitur, est id quod concipitur de significatione hujus nominis, quamvis ipsa sapientia divina definiri non possit. Nec tamen hoc nomen ratio significat ipsam conceptionem, quia hoc significatur per nomen sapientiae vel per aliud nomen rei; sed significat intentionem hujus conceptionis, sicut et hoc nomen definitio, et alia nomina secundae impositionis. Et ex hoc patet secundum, scilicet qualiter ratio dicatur esse in re.

Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 25 q. 1 a. 1 ad 2. Ad secundum dicendum, quod, secundum Avicennam, dupliciter definitio potest considerari: vel secundum id quod significatur per definitionem, vel secundum intentionem definitionis. Si primo modo, tunc idem est significatum per definitum et definitionem: unde dicit philosophus, quod ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio: et sic definitio et definitum sunt idem, et hoc modo ea quae ponuntur in definitione in recto, non sunt partes definitionis, id est rei per definitionem significatae, sicut nec definiti.

There are exemplary ideas in the Divine Duration called eternity. There appear, in the human temporality, some concepts, which are, however, but dim vestiges of the divine. However, some acknowledged philosophical ideas appear to be more than just (transitory) concepts. Indeed, they might be this *if proved* to be universally valid signs. Symbols, however, pretend only to be the most important words. E.g. Jaspers spoke of the ciphers of transcendence without the Transcendent *Creator proved to exist* beyond them.

Some 20 centuries ago, however, the human time became "divine" by participation, because the Divine Logos assumed the human nature. "The Son of God became man so that we might become God." St. Athanasius, however, has in mind the participation of/in the inner life of God. He was not a monophysist. There is no "mixture" of two completely separate natures. Normally, "Creator" and "creature" must be opposed to each other like a cause and the effect are. The history of the so called rationalism begins in the moment the fundamental opposition was tried to be blurred. The human "ideas" were going to usurp the status of the Divine ones.

In Aristotle, εἶδος (eidos) is a formal principle of both defining and existing. In Plato, εἶδος evades the definitive grasp of the intellect. In his dialogues, εἴδη were tried to be defined, but failed to be peremptorily so. In Husserl, εἶδος is intuited *within consciousness* and endowed with some hardly understandable mode of being (neither logical nor real). In both Aristotle and Plato, εἴδη were undoubtedly real, whereas in Husserl it is impossible to determine what/where they actually are, and (perhaps most importantly) whether they exist (resp. come to existence) in the normal sense of the word.

To Lotze's mind, Plato "failed to understand" what εἴδη must be. The English "value" is the same as the German "Wert". According to the property of the German idiom, "Wert" is to be predicated about material values first of all, as the latter are undoubtedly acknowledged by all. Plato "failed" to "understand" the fact indeed. He failed to acknowledge the value of the cornerstone of the modern welfare state, which places the immaterial at the background of the material.

Shares happen to lose their value, and the same fate, as it seems, might befall the "modern" values. The Umwertung aller Werte seems as undesirable as necessary a consequence of their "nature". At least, it must seem so if we were to assume that "in eternal things, there is no difference between being and the ability to be" (in sempiternis non differt esse a posse). Aristotle claimed the perpetuity of the world. In the infinite spell of time, all "existential possibilities" (no matter how bizarre) must occur and perish both in nature and

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Si enim cum dicitur animal rationale mortale, animal esset pars hominis, non praedicaretur de toto, cum nulla pars integralis de toto praedicetur.

Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 53 n. 3. Ulterius autem considerandum est quod intellectus, per speciem rei formatus, intelligendo format in seipso quandam intentionem rei intellectae, quae est ratio ipsius, quam significat definitio. Et hoc quidem necessarium est: eo quod intellectus intelligit indifferenter rem absentem et praesentem, in quo cum intellectu imaginatio convenit; sed intellectus hoc amplius habet, quod etiam intelligit rem ut separatam a conditionibus materialibus, sine quibus in rerum natura non existit; et hoc non posset esse nisi intellectus sibi intentionem praedictam formaret.

culture. But nature and culture are in fact two separate principles, and the perpetual existence of Homo sapiens seems highly implausible. The monsters in nature are relatively rare (and the decay is the beginning of a new life), whereas they were abundant e.g. in the 20th century Europe. In a finite (but considerably protracted) spell of time, Umwertung is highly probable, but never necessary. Neither "progress" nor decay seems actually necessary.

According to Aristotle, in nature (no matter how durable) the existence of a privation (Umwertung might be called so) is justified only by the fact that some forms of being are to appear subsequently. The end is never to be identified with the privation. It has the positive meaning of the aim.

The paradox of the modern relativism consists in that those who oppose it succumb nonetheless to the conviction as to its inevitability. The conviction is tried to be fought with, but in the others begets despair and debasement (called in the newspeak "acceptation" and expressed in the notorious "Viens, oui, oui"). The end of the human history (Civilization) is not inevitable, but the end of relativity might be so in each moment the intellect puts the end to the unbridled play of imagination. The end and *consummation* of human history is, moreover, plainly stated in Scripture, even if, for the time being, the good is hardly perceptible, and the degradation inevitable.

Just indignation is born in the minds of those who "feel" some "innovative" statements likely to erode the tissue of the traditional values, whereas them being uttered without repression might incline to believing the fact inevitable (to putting up with it and labeling it "progress".

It is, however, not about personal convictions first of all. The problem is incomparably more serious. I ("personally") can "switch off" an importunate personage's speech, but I cannot be certain that the most vulnerable (I feel solidary with) can do the same: reject the "innovations". In the very essence of the valuable, a factual and vividly felt weak spot appears.

On the one hand, we could be as "existentially unengaged" in listening the importunate gibberish as the ancient Stoics claimed to be. But on the other, I cannot be totally indifferent to the plight of those who are not able to assume the posture of Stoics and are incapable of the desirable faculty of discretion and discrimination alike. Thus, for the sake of solidarity with the most vulnerable, definitive foundations are to be sought able to repel the onslaughts of relativism. The objective is hardly reconcilable with preserving the inner peace of mind (the supreme good in the natural order).

Sometimes, we try to find a safe refuge in the traditionally accepted literature. We identify ourselves with its heroes and thus a "we" besides atomized individuals shows up. We feel the same way as e.g. the heroes of Charles Dickens's The Old Curiosity Shop to the point of regarding them "real" in a sense. Still, the literary logos is not stringent enough to represent the real objects (to define them as the substructures of the real world). Overemotionality is likely to meet with cynicisms. "One would have to have a heart of stone to read the death of little Nell without dissolving into tears … of laughter".

The word "hero" stems from Greek. Iliad is the first memorial of the Greek literature and heroes in it are half-gods. For many Greeks, Iliad was a perfect logos, but for all of them it defined their national identity. Still, Aristotle asks what kind of logos Iliad really is.[474]

The unity of a literature masterpiece is tantamount to its integrity. Still, a meta-narration might appear at least in the form of a "commentary". Homer had his enemies in antiquity in pretty much the same way, the acknowledged masters of the modern classical literature have had now. No matter how compact the structure of the literature masterpiece, there can be always found a weak spot a treacherous stroke might be dealt in. The cynicism might be called Umwertung in this case.

According to Aristotle, there is but one human logos perfectly immune of the destructive criticisms: that of the scientific definition. Any other narration, to the contrary, might be susceptible of destructive criticism.[475] Plato pointed out the fact in his Phaedrus.

The beginnings of the modern relativism are marked by the moment the traditional definitions of good and evil were tried to be replaced by the Kantian Werte.

Is the logos of the Bible any safer from the onslaughts of "innovators" than the other ones? The Bible has but one subject matter: the Divine Logos, and He cannot be harmed in any way *directly*. But some perverse interpretations of Bible might distort the logos *immanent to the written word*. No one can successfully rebel against God. But some with whom the Divine Logos solidarizes can be successfully harmed *for the time being*. The solidarity, in general, bids reaction to the evil done to the wronged (deceived). The reaction is (if rational) comprised within the scheme of acting of the Divine Providence (Predestination). Some statements of the Bible might be distorted and torn out of their natural context. To prevent the abuse, the general truths were encapsulated in the peremptory form of the Definitions of the

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[474] Expositio Posteriorum, lib. 2 l. 6 n. 8 Secundam rationem ponit ibi: amplius omnes rationes etc.; quae talis est. Cuilibet rationi, idest orationi aliquid significanti, est imponere aliquod nomen ei correspondens, quod per illam rationem manifestatur. Si ergo nihil aliud sit definitio quam ratio interpretativa nominis, sequeretur quod omnes rationes essent definitiones: et ita sequetur quod, cum disputamus vel colloquimur ad invicem, ipsae disputationes vel collocutiones nostrae sint quaedam definitiones; et similiter sequetur quod Ilias, idest poema Homeri de bello Troiano, sit quaedam definitio.

[475] Expositio Peryermeneias, lib. 1 l. 8 n. 11. Excludit autem quamdam rationem huius unitatis, quam quis posset suspicari, ut scilicet propter hoc definitio dicatur unum, quia partes eius sunt propinquae, idest sine aliqua interpositione coniunctionis vel morae. Et quidem non interruptio locutionis necessaria est ad unitatem definitionis, quia si interponeretur coniunctio partibus definitionis, iam secunda non determinaret primam, sed significarentur ut actu multae in locutione: et idem operatur interpositio morae, qua utuntur rhetores loco coniunctionis. Unde ad unitatem definitionis requiritur quod partes eius proferantur: sine coniunctione et interpolatione quia etiam in re naturali, cuius est definitio, nihil cadit medium inter materiam et formam: sed praedicta non interruptio non sufficit ad unitatem definitionis, quia contingit etiam hanc continuitatem prolationis servari in his, quae non sunt simpliciter unum, sed per accidens; ut si dicam, homo albus musicus. Sic igitur Aristoteles valde subtiliter manifestavit quod absoluta unitas enunciationis non impeditur, neque per compositionem quam importat verbum, neque per multitudinem nominum ex quibus constat definitio. Et est eadem ratio utrobique, nam praedicatum comparatur ad subiectum ut forma ad materiam, et similiter differentia ad genus: ex forma autem et materia fit unum simpliciter.

Dogmas of the Catholic Church. The Tradition of these unchangeable truths makes the Scripture as vivid as it should be.

6. The logism of the human existence

"The same is the way up and down". We advance the pathway to the Source we came from: we return to It. "We become wise – Heraclitus says – ween breathing in the Divine Logos".[476]

The first sentence of the Gospel according to John Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος was translated into Latin as: "In principio erat Verbum". It is by no means oblivious that λόγος must have been always translated so: as "verbum". In the Greek philosophy, logos had manifold meanings, and in a pseudo-philosophy it can have infinitely many ones. Anyway, λόγος was not translated as "ratio". If it had been so, the so called rationalism would have contaminated the source from the very beginning. Several centuries were about to pass when the attempts at destroying the original sense of logos succeeded to some extent.

The most commanding achievements of the human spirit are striking in what might be called ratiocinatio; cogitatio: the *movement* rather than a simple act of adhering to God. Volubility of speech happens to be appreciated, contrary to silence. The contemplation of truth happens to treated, at best, with some condescension.

The Divine Logos is the Second Person of Trinity. In the human logos, the image of Trinity reflects, whereas the Second Person is the Image really. But in the sensual faculties (imagination, memory, etc.) a vestige of Trinity is visible only.

There is, in the old editions of Corpus Thomisticum, a treaty (opusculum) entitled De differentia verbi divini et humani. In the modern editions, it is not listed amongst the undoubtedly genuine works of Thomas. In fact, it is but an excerpt from Thomas Commentary to the Gospel according to John, and Thomas himself did not draw the excerpt. It is a genuine text, but not a separate treaty. Anyhow, the purpose of the separation seems clear: the manner in which man can apply human words to explaining the mystery of Trinity is a special problem and this cannot be solved save by philosophical tools.

God speaks out but One Unique Word encompassing everything possibly knowable and realizable. Man tries to express many thoughts by means of several words. Human thoughts could have been relatively simple if the human mind had been a disembodied spirit. Our thoughts are manifold, but not precious for this reason; quite the contrary, we must laboriously gather the intelligible contents, which are otherwise dispersed. The inferior sensual powers are created so as to facilitate the objective, but can obstruct it if not subordinate to the intellect. Thus, in the human mind (in his imagination), led astray from God, only a vestige of Trinity remains.

There is, in the human intellect, what is relatively simple (verbum intellectus) "spoken out" without letters and sounds (Verbum cordis sine voce prolatum).[477] But the thus spoken in

[476] Diels-Kranz, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 22 A 16.

[477] De veritate, q. 4 a. 1 c. […] sicut aliorum artificiatorum praeexistit in mente artificis imago quaedam exterioris artificii, ita in mente proferentis verbum exterius, praeexistit quoddam exemplar exterioris verbi. Et ideo, sicut in artifice tria consideramus, scilicet finem artificii, et exemplar ipsius, et ipsum artificium iam productum, ita et in loquente triplex verbum invenitur: scilicet id quod per intellectum concipitur, ad quod

the depths of the human heart must be, subsequently, clothed with material signs (letters; sounds). They can represent faithfully the original, but can distort is also.

People are (nowadays) rarely praised for the intimate adhering to God. The volubility of speech is a commonly acknowledged good. At least, it can be sold, which cannot be the case with what is so innermost that almost unutterable. The power to return to God stems in us from God himself. The way we *use* the power depends on our discretion. In fact, the power happens to be often abused.

No scientist as such (i.e. concerned with the cognizance of truth for its own sake) can contradict the faith (the Supreme Truth). "Everything that is true, no matter by whom it is said, is from the Holy Spirit" (Omne verum a quocumque dicatur a Spiritu sancto est).[478] Nevertheless, some authorities acknowledged in particular sciences happen, more often than not, to abuse their authority (the power) and advocate e.g. the materialistic Weltanschauung.

The elementary justice bids to pay back for the gratuitously given. We should return from whence we came. But the "pathways of the human freedom" happen to be perplexed

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significandum verbum exterius profertur: et hoc est verbum cordis sine voce prolatum; item exemplar exterioris verbi, et hoc dicitur verbum interius quod habet imaginem vocis; et verbum exterius expressum, quod dicitur verbum vocis. Et sicut in artifice praecedit intentio finis, et deinde sequitur excogitatio formae artificiati, et ultimo artificiatum in esse producitur; ita verbum cordis in loquente est prius verbo quod habet imaginem vocis, et postremum est verbum vocis.

[478] Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 19 q. 5 a. 2 ad 5. […] veritas quae consistit in commensuratione intellectus ad privationem existentem extra animam, bona est, et a Deo; et ideo dicit Ambrosius, quod omne verum, a quocumque dicatur, a spiritu sancto est.

Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 109 a. 1 ad 1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omne verum, a quocumque dicatur, est a spiritu sancto sicut ab infundente naturale lumen, et movente ad intelligendum et loquendum veritatem. Non autem sicut ab inhabitante per gratiam gratum facientem, vel sicut a largiente aliquod habituale donum naturae superadditum, sed hoc solum est in quibusdam veris cognoscendis et loquendis; et maxime in illis quae pertinent ad fidem, de quibus apostolus loquebatur.

Super Io., cap. 1 l. 3. Licet autem aliquae mentes sint tenebrosae, idest sapida et lucida sapientia privatae, nulla tamen adeo tenebrosa est quin aliquid lucis divinae participet. Quia quidquid veritatis a quocumque cognoscitur, totum est ex participatione istius lucis, quae in tenebris lucet, quia omne verum, a quocumque dicatur, a spiritu sancto est. Et tamen tenebrae, idest homines tenebrosi, eam non comprehenderunt, secundum veritatem.

Super Io., cap. 8 l. 6. Veritas enim est illuminatio intellectus; Deus autem est ipsum lumen, et ab ipso omnes illuminantur, supra I, 9: *erat lux vera, quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum*: unde et est ipsa veritas, et alii non loquuntur veritatem nisi inquantum ab ipso illuminantur. Unde, sicut Ambrosius dicit, omne verum a quocumque dicatur, a spiritu sancto est. Sic ergo Diabolus cum loquitur ex propriis, loquitur mendacium; homo etiam, cum ex propriis loquitur, mendacium loquitur; sed cum a Deo loquitur, tunc loquitur veritatem; Rom. III, 4: *est autem Deus verax, omnis autem homo mendax*, quantum est in se.

Super II Tim., cap. 3 l. 3. Iob XXXII, 7: *inspiratio omnipotentis dat intelligentiam*. Sed dices: quomodo non alia omnis Scriptura divinitus inspiratur, cum secundum Ambrosium, omne verum, a quocumque dicatur, a spirit u sancto est? Dicendum est quod Deus dupliciter aliquid operatur, scilicet immediate, ut proprium opus, sicut miracula; aliquid mediantibus causis inferioribus, ut opera naturalia, Iob X, 8: *manus tuae, domine, fecerunt me*, etc. quae tamen fiunt operatione naturae.

Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 46 q. 1 a. 4 expos.; Super Io., cap. 14 l. 4.;Super I Cor., cap. 12 l. 1.; Super Io., cap. 7 l. 2.

indeed. It is possible to capitalize materially the immaterial gift of God, and to pretend, at the same time, that nothing has been given.

Verbum cordis is the word of the intellect. The greatness of God can be contemplated privatissime when the immediate effects of His actions are imprinted in our minds. But in the moment the contemplated is about to be communicated with others so as to edifice both them and science, the purely spiritual content must be clothed with ordinary words ("profane" so to speak). The original in the human mind is, at the same time, the most imperfect. So as to "extend" it into space and time material carriers are needed. The words written down are of great use to draw our attention to the previously meditated.

Material organs and instruments are, obviously, needed so as to make the primitive "word of heart" to appear in the "ordinary" world. The hand and a pen are needed, but first of all, the particular reason (vis cogitativa), memory and imagination. They are all meant to be subservient to the intellect, because they are sensual powers only. This natural dependence was tried to be abrogated in the moment Descartes, in his Mediations (II, 28), equaled the sensual powers to the immaterial intellect and the will. Instead of an organic structure with the intellect at the top, the so called consciousness appeared. "The integral vision of man" resulted in the actual disintegration of human personality.

Verbum in humans should be as perfect as only possible. It should be rather faithful than innovative. Some expressions, to the contrary, lack the desirable characteristics of this logos. Huiusmodi dictiones negantur esse verba, quia deficiunt a perfecta ratione verbi.[479]

Verba are, first of all, expressed by verbs (as the very etymology suggests), because actions express more fittingly being than what but partakes of/in the actions. In sentences, the describable is adjacent to the describing and thus they are called nouns and verbs respectively. Now, and contrary to what Husserl suggests in his Ideas, "a mere noun cannot make up a perfect utterance".[480]

Thomas' treaty De verbo cordis is not, obviously, verbum cordis itself, but a reflection on it. The original verbum cordis passes (through time and space) into the forms of the sensually perceptible dictio; enuntiatio. There are several parts thereof, but organized by the unity of their exemplar.[481]

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[479] Expositio Peryermeneias, lib. 1 l. 5 n. 11. Si quis autem obiiciat: si praedictis dictionibus convenit definitio verbi; ergo sunt verba; dicendum est quod definitio verbi supra posita datur de verbo communiter sumpto. Huiusmodi autem dictiones negantur esse verba, quia deficiunt a perfecta ratione verbi.

[480] Expositio Peryermeneias, lib. 1 l. 8 n. 8. Manifestat autem quod dixerat per hoc, quod non solum nomen unum sine verbo non facit orationem perfectam enunciativam, sed nec etiam oratio imperfecta. Definitio enim oratio quaedam est, et tamen si ad rationem hominis, idest definitionem non addatur aut est, quod est verbum, aut erat, aut fuit, quae sunt casus verbi, aut aliquid huiusmodi, idest aliquod aliud verbum seu casus verbi, nondum est oratio enunciativa.

[481] Expositio Peryermeneias, lib. 1 l. 8 n. 11. Excludit autem quamdam rationem huius unitatis, quam quis posset suspicari, ut scilicet propter hoc definitio dicatur unum, quia partes eius sunt propinquae, idest sine aliqua interpositione coniunctionis vel morae. Et quidem non interruptio locutionis necessaria est ad unitatem definitionis, quia si interponeretur coniunctio partibus definitionis, iam secunda non determinaret primam, sed significarentur ut actu multae in locutione: et idem operatur interpositio morae, qua utuntur rhetores loco coniunctionis. Unde ad unitatem definitionis requiritur quod partes eius proferantur sine coniunctione et interpolatione: quia etiam in re naturali, cuius est definitio, nihil cadit medium inter materiam et formam: sed

The words I am putting down now on a sheet of paper differ as to their shape, but their basis (verbum cordis) cannot be thought of as "shapeless" for the mere fact of preceding the shaped. The utterance can be relatively easy "authorized" in the spoken language (as it is close to the exemplar), but can be relatively easily tampered with and manipulated in the moment it is "alienated".

Slovenly made notices as well as the slovenly mode of speaking (too fast, too slow, indistinct) make it that the original unity of expression is less perceptible. The words written so do not point out distinctly enough to the source they stem from. Actors (such like professionals) must speak distinctly. But it is only a minimum to be observed. Not without good reason, the actor is called "hypocrites" in Greek.

The parts of a given diction should be integrated into totalities (bearing on verba cordis). In them a beginning and the suggested direction of the return to God is given. Thus, we are endowed (at least potentially) with a primitive knowledge shared with the Other, which is expressed in the Latin "con-scientia" ("the knowledge shared with"). Alas, the term of consciousness was about to assume different meaning after Descartes. In Husserl, it is an autonomous entity.

Contrary to what the ordinary collocations suggest, cognitio confusa is not a mixture of error and uncertainty of the one hand and of an insight into the hardly conceivable mystery of being on the other. It is a quite natural state of the human intellect; the habitual one and preceding the perfect cognition. In does not need to be mingled with error. In it, "parts" of being coexist (not error and truth), but not yet distinguished, and about to be distinguished subsequently. There is no reason, then, to treat it with the distrust Descartes exhibits in his Meditations.

Still, what is below "the threshold of consciousness", might be evaluated by the advocates of the so called "naturalism", which is superficially only opposed to rationalism. Many have believed that a mixture of clearness and uncertainty exists called subconsciousness: opposed to the consciousness. Originally however, we are really conscious, because co-responsible; sharing the same values and knowing things indispensable for the fullness of life. But there occurs, in history, also an "altruistic" (empathetic) need for sharing some debauched ideas, i.e. to find some accomplices in the debauchery. The explicit notion of the unconsciousness stems from Schelling, albeit it was popularized by Freud and New Age (Sigmund Freud replaced his original term "subconscious" preferring later the terms "unconscious" and "preconscious" instead). Anyway, here is no place for the work of the intellect in the realm of the subconscious. The Ursprache of the masters of suspicion (Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Sigmund Freud) is full of envy, resentment and hate towards those who tend to the Source.

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praedicta non interruptio non sufficit ad unitatem definitionis, quia contingit etiam hanc continuitatem prolationis servari in his, quae non sunt simpliciter unum, sed per accidens; ut si dicam, homo albus musicus. Sic igitur Aristoteles valde subtiliter manifestavit quod absoluta unitas enunciationis non impeditur, neque per compositionem quam importat verbum, neque per multitudinem nominum ex quibus constat definitio. Et est eadem ratio utrobique, nam praedicatum comparatur ad subiectum ut forma ad materiam, et similiter differentia ad genus: ex forma autem et materia fit unum simpliciter.

The first poem of the Greek literature (and the European literature also) appears at the border of the spoken and the written word. That is, perhaps, why it (The Iliad) is so unique.

In the 19th century, German philologists initiated the so called Homeric Question and the problem of the unity of the work was raised. The same, analogically, was about to be done some centuries later by modernists with respect to Scripture.

The Iliad is a closed integral unity for anyone keen on discovering it. The discovery, to be sure, must be matched by the personal humility. The original is not "known better" for the mere fact of interpreting it in a bizarre way.

The wrath of Achilles ties together the story of forty days of heroism, sacrifice and vengeance, albeit the latter, in the end, gives way to forgiveness. In the last book, Priam kisses the homicide hands of Achilles and the latter pities Priam, recalling the memory of his own father he was never to see again (XXIV, 482-508).[482]

Iliad was a perfect poem, but was it – asks Aristotle – a definition for the same reason? Apparently, ordinary definitions are scarce in words, whereas Iliad consists of roughly 110,000 words. Why, then, Aristotle, raised the question? Apparently, it is not about *how many* words have been used, but *how* they have been used.

The number of the words is but a token of what is hidden beneath. Just two words, e.g.: "line" and "pain" cannot be combined so as to make a sensible totality, whereas no matter how huge number of them impairs in no way the strictness of the expression provided the words are carefully ordained[483] (which is formally only more difficult in poems than in

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[482] "Think of your father, O Achilles like unto the gods, who is such even as I am, on the sad threshold of old age. It may be that those who dwell near him harass him, and there is none to keep war and ruin from him. Yet when he hears of you being still alive, he is glad, and his days are full of hope that he shall see his dear son come home to him from Troy; but I, wretched man that I am, had the bravest in all Troy for my sons, and there is not one of them left. I had fifty sons when the Achaeans came here; nineteen of them were from a single womb, and the others were borne to me by the women of my household. The greater part of them has fierce Mars laid low, and Hector, him who was alone left, him who was the guardian of the city and ourselves, him have you lately slain; therefore I am now come to the ships of the Achaeans to ransom his body from you with a great ransom. Fear, O Achilles, the wrath of heaven; think on your own father and have compassion upon me, who am the more pitiable, for I have steeled myself as no man yet has ever steeled himself before me, and have raised to my lips the hand of him who slew my son."

Thus spoke Priam, and the heart of Achilles yearned as he bethought him of his father. He took the old man's hand and moved him gently away. The two wept bitterly - Priam, as he lay at Achilles' feet, weeping for Hector, and Achilles now for his father and now for Patroclous, till the house was filled with their lamentation.

Translated by Samuel Butler.

Access 2026-07-09 https://classics.mit.edu/Homer/iliad.html

[483] Expositio Peryermeneias, lib. 1 l. 8 n. 11.

Expositio Peryermeneias, lib. 1 l. 6 n. 4. Quia enim Aristoteles frequenter ponit dicere pro affirmare, ne dictio pro affirmatione sumatur, subdit quod pars orationis significat ut dictio, et addit non ut affirmatio: quasi diceret, secundum sensum Porphyrii, non accipiatur nunc dictio secundum quod idem est quod affirmatio. Philosophus autem, qui dicitur Ioannes grammaticus, voluit quod haec definitio orationis daretur solum de oratione perfecta, eo quod partes non videntur esse nisi alicuius perfecti, sicut omnes partes domus referuntur ad domum: et ideo secundum ipsum sola oratio perfecta habet partes significativas. Sed tamen hic decipiebatur, quia quamvis

novels). For the unity of the perfect logos words must be spoken out so as to make a whole "without gaps and additions" (proferantur sine coniunctione et interpolatione).

Digressions are usual in novels, but in poems perhaps too. They are very likely to disrupt the original unity of narration. The unity, however, can be disrupted, paradoxically enough, by words too. The so called "freedom of expression" might in fact amount to license to offend anybody without rational motives. A hypocrite is likely to shout down the unwelcome truth.

There is no "freedom of the word" in English (such a collocation does not exist), but it does exist in Polish and Norwid dedicated a special poem to the theme. The Polish idiom corresponds more exactly to the original Greek Parrhesia.

Definition is considerably more than a sheer juxtaposition of the words understandably enough,[484] but the problem arises of the unity of the juxtaposed words nonetheless. Now, the real unity cannot be exist unless between two parts related to each other as act and potency, and the thus composite might be in potency in respect to the other (formal) part of the complex composite. The potential actual structure of the being makes for the analogical structure of what is meant to represent it and is built on the same principles.[485] The act (of being) makes this or that being diverse to the others, but undivided in se, because it is most formal. The verbs (in sentences) make for the unity thereof too. The sentences begin with the capital latter and end with full stop so as to form meaningful totalities. The most striking token of The Lingua Tertiae Imperii (described by Victor Klemperer) was that the full stop often lacked at the end of its sentences. Definition is the most concise form of the perfect expression. Still, some expressions might be blurred on purpose.

The aforementioned principle: Simplex sigillum veri, might be true or false: all depending on the meaning of the simplicity in question. Diverse objects are simple indeed, because identified and to be not confusable with others. Still, there is but one Object which is *absolutely* simple. God is simple, and thus not directly cognoscible for us humans, whereas the material things are cognoscible because not simple (they are "opened", because composite). The way to the Absolutely Simple can never itself be absolutely simple.

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omnes partes referantur principaliter ad totum perfectum, quaedam tamen partes referuntur ad ipsum immediate, sicut paries et tectum ad domum, et membra organica ad animal: quaedam vero mediantibus partibus principalibus quarum sunt partes; sicut lapides referuntur ad domum mediante pariete; nervi autem et ossa ad animal mediantibus membris organicis, scilicet manu et pede et huiusmodi.

[484] Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 8 l. 5 n. 2 Manifestum autem est quod definitiva ratio est una ex pluribus constans. Nec est una per solam coacervationem partium sicut Ilias, idest poema factum de historia Troiana, quod per solam aggregationem est unum. Definitio autem est unum simpliciter. Est enim significativa unius. Unde merito dubitatur quid est quod faciat definitionem hominis esse unam, et hominem cuius ratio est definitio. Cum enim homo sit animal et bipes, quae videntur esse duo, merito dubitatur quare homo est unum et non plura.

[485] Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 25 q. 1 a. 1 ad 2. Sed cum dicitur animatum, designatur forma per quam talem rationem recipit; quamvis etiam aliquid plus recipiat ab anima quam rationem corporis: et ita differentia est designans, et tunc species erit designatum. Sed verum est quod in compositis genus et differentia, quamvis non sint partes, tamen a partibus rei fluunt: quia genus fluit a materia, quamvis non sit materia: et differentia a forma, quamvis forma non sit differentia, sed forma sit principium illius; et sic definitio composita ostendit realem compositionem.

7. Formalism

There were – in the history of philosophy – spates of growth and the spells of the time of decay after them. Before Thomas and Aristotle respectively, philosophy had been developing. Afterwards, the time of degradation was about to come. The full system of four causes had been developed before, but the heritage was going to be squandered in the centuries to come. The most important cause is the final one (Phaedon, 99AB; Metaph., I, c. 7, 988b 6-16). Leaving it out has proved pregnant with consequences.[486]

According to Descartes, the very attempt to grasp the final cause smacks of an "impious insolence" (Meditations IV, 55). In the spirit of the modern "rationalist piety", a reductionist mode of philosophy developed. The formal cause was acknowledged, but the form was separated from the natural process of becoming (generation). It was in fact but the form of quantity.

Kant speaks of the Reich of Zwecke (Kingdom of Ends). His Reichtum is an archetype of the idea of modern hierarchy of values which are ordained in *the linear quantitative* sequence only. Kant rejects the validity of the rational proof of the existence of God, which has been based on the analysis of the final (teleological) hierarchy of forms existing in the universe.[487] According to Scheler, this formalism renders ethics a crippled science.[488] The separate problem is whether Scheler himself had rejected the principles espoused by Kant consequently enough.

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[486] Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 9 q. 1 a. 1 ad 1. […] finis est causa causarum: et ideo definitio quae sumitur ex fine, formalior est inter omnes definitiones, et medium demonstrans eas […]

[487] Expositio Posteriorum, lib. 2 l. 8 n. 3 Alio modo potest intelligi secundum ordinem causarum eiusdem rei. Manifestum est enim in rebus habentibus quatuor causas, quod una causa est quodammodo causa alterius. Quia enim materia est propter formam et non e converso, ut probatur in II Physic., definitio quae sumitur ex causa formali, est causa definitionis, quae sumitur ex causa materiali eiusdem rei. Et quia generatum consequitur formam per actionem generantis, consequens est quod agens sit quodammodo causa formae et definitio definitionis. Ulterius autem omne agens agit propter finem; unde et definitio quae a fine sumitur, est quodammodo causa definitionis quae sumitur a causa agente. Ulterius autem non est procedere in generibus causarum: unde dicitur quod finis est causa causarum. Potest tamen in singulis causarum generibus a posterioribus ad priora procedi; sed definitiones debent dari per causas proximas. Et secundum hunc sensum in quibusdam libris interponitur, quod definitiones secundum speciem factae nullum habent medium quo demonstrentur: definitiones autem secundum materiam factae possunt habere medium: quia scilicet definitiones quae dantur secundum causam materialem possunt demonstrari per definitiones quae dantur secundum causam formalem. Definitio autem quae datur secundum causam formalem, non potest ulterius demonstrari per aliquod principium intrinsecum rei, quod proprie pertinet ad quod quid est, utpote intrans essentiam rei. Sed etsi demonstretur per causam efficientem et finalem, dicendum erit quod semper causa superior se habet ut formalis respectu inferioris. […]

[488] Sentencia De anima, lib. 1 l. 11 n. 10. […] Non igitur est congrua definitio, cum non ducat, in cognitionem accidentium. Et quod non ducat in cognitionem accidentium animae, manifestum est si quis ex huiusmodi [Platonica] definitione conabitur passiones et operationes animae assignare, puta ratiocinationes, delectationem, tristitiam, et huiusmodi.

The problem of formalism was anticipated by both Thomas and Aristotle. The perfect definition (definitio perfecta), is contrasted with the dialectical one, which is nowadays called the nominal one. It is notorious for dropping the both material and natural aspect of the real world.[489]

The general feature of the dialectical argumentation is its probabilism.[490] By dint of the "universal and logical" definition we do not come to the cognizance of the principles of a thing. This definition might have some heuristic value, and thus some general conditions of coming to existence might be known, but the thing itself is not.[491] The perfect definition should encompass (comprehendere) the whole process of natural generation (totum processum naturalis generationis).[492]

In the dialectical definition, the material in it is identical with the otherwise scattered empiric data of cognition. The data are supposed to be not theologically ordained beyond the human intellect. The connection of the form of thinking with its matter does not, thus, correspond to that of the form of being to the generic matter of life. The relation of "consciousness" to "reality" must remain undetermined.

The life of consciousness is nothing if the matter of the intellectual cognition (the sense data) is not sustained by nature and then physiologically processed in the sense organs. It is impossible to conceive any idea if the sense organs are bound (e.g. when under the liquor). On the other hand, a conception of new life (the implanting of embryo) is (probably) possible due to a certain emotional disposition. The positive emotional disposition is fostered towards what is as undoubtedly real as precious.

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[489] Sentencia De anima, lib. 1 l. 2 n. 9. Et circa hoc investigat differentiam, quae invenitur in istis definitionibus. Aliquando enim datur aliqua definitio, in qua nihil est ex parte corporis, sicut quod ira est appetitus vindictae; aliquando assignatur aliqua definitio, in qua est aliquid ex parte corporis seu materiae, sicut quod ira est accensio sanguinis circa cor.

[490]Expositio Posteriorum, lib. 1 l. 5 n. 4 Secundo, ibi: dialectica etc., ponit differentiam inter dialecticam propositionem et demonstrativam, dicens quod cum propositio accipiat alteram partem enunciationis, dialectica indifferenter accipit quancunque earum. Habet enim viam ad utranque partem contradictionis, eo quod ex probabilibus procedit. Unde etiam et in proponendo accipit utramlibet partem contradictionis et quaerendo proponit. Demonstrativa autem propositio accipit alteram partem determinate, quia nunquam habet demonstrator viam, nisi ad verum demonstrandum. Unde etiam semper proponendo accipit veram partem contradictionis. Propter hoc etiam non interrogat, sed sumit, qui demonstrat, quasi notum.

[491]Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 7 l. 2 n. 11 […] nunc dictum est quid sit substantia solum typo, idest dictum est solum in universali, quod substantia est illud, quod non dicitur de subiecto, sed de quo dicuntur alia; sed oportet non solum ita cognoscere substantiam et alias res, scilicet per definitionem universalem et logicam: hoc enim non est sufficiens ad cognoscendum naturam rei, quia hoc ipsum quod assignatur pro definitione tali, est manifestum. Non enim huiusmodi definitione tanguntur principia rei, ex quibus cognitio rei dependet; sed tangitur aliqua communis conditio rei per quam talis notificatio datur.

[492] In Physic., lib. 2 l. 15 n. 6. Nihil enim prohibet in definitione poni quasdam partes materiae, non quidem partes individuales, ut has carnes et haec ossa; sed partes communes, ut carnes et ossa; et hoc necessarium est in definitione omnium rerum naturalium. Sicut igitur definitio quae colligit in se principium demonstrationis et conclusionem est tota demonstratio; ita definitio colligens finem et formam et materiam, comprehendit totum processum generationis naturalis.

The Husserlian consciousness is notorious for being an autonomous entity (which nulla re indiget ad existendum). That however, adds up to that the statements of an idealist are practically uncheckable unless by those commonly acknowledged to share them. The stance seems to compromise philosophy as a science, because the algorithm of verification is the organic part of the generally acknowledged pattern of science. Scientists do not, generally, doubt into existence of the world. The Controversy over the Existence of the World (Ingarden) seems to be "specifically" philosophical one.

"Realism" has a different meaning nowadays than it used to have in the Middle Ages, but those who opposed realism in the Middle Ages (in the dispute over universals) and those who in modernity advocate for philosophical idealism have much in common. Not without a good reason Husserl lists – amongst the precursors of phenomenology – David Hume – a notorious nominalist. As far as the dispute about universals is concerned, it was rather nominalists who anticipated the modern idealism than those who – like William of Chapeaux – advocated for the real existence of universals. The medieval and the contemporary realism alike might be understood as a standpoint in the theory of cognition.

In religion, in the moment Ockham's nominalism was matched by the "mysticism" of Master Eckhart (and his contemporaries), a "reform" appeared: without definitions of faith, but satisfied with the naked wording of Scripture, as anyone could be (as it seemed) be a "mystic" of sorts in reading out in the words of Scripture anything he/she pleases to. The stance was about to "inspire" philosophy in turn (in Kant, Hegel and Schleiermacher).

Husserl's philosophical stance presented in his Logische Untersuchungen happens to be compared with Plato's realism. The comparison, however, in completely unjustified, as the universals in Plato are real, which is not the case with Husserl. The word "idea" has quite different a meaning in Plato and Husserl.

Perhaps, the extreme realism, as harbored by e.g. William of Chapeaux, occasioned equally excessive a polemic of nominalists. But the way Augustine understood ideas opens the way to the interpretation furthered by Thomas Aquinas and not liable to such like critique at all. A modest realist theory of cognition in the dispute about universals guarantees realism in metaphysics (real things exist outside the human mind).

The stance in the theory of cognition espoused by Husserl is rather inspired by Scotus than by Plato. In Augustine, ideas are identical with the divine essence. In Scotus, they are identical "formally" only. In Husserl, they are not identical at all. But Scotus is, at the same time, an acknowledged predecessor of Ockham. If "heacceitas" (thisness) must exist *besides* universal forms, perhaps the "heacceitas" could exist even *without* universal forms.

In nominalists' stance, ideas exist in consciousness only, whereas in both Plato and Augustine they exist undoubtedly beyond the human mind. In Locke and Hume, they exist in the *sensual* powers: something unthinkable for Plato. The situation changes but little in the moment Kant and Husserl try to "ennoble" the somehow vulgarized term "idea". The core of the subjectivist stance remains untouched.

Husserl speaks about "somatic self-presentation" of ideas in consciousness and the "somatic" and "immaterial" seem irreconcilable indeed. What is, however, even more important, they are all the objects of the consciousness which is common to all people (at least those worth mentioning of). This common consciousness *contains* them.

In Augustine, it was God's intellect which contained the ideas, and thus they were as unchangeable as God must be. To the contrary, the human consciousness in its actual shape cannot be proved not to evolve. Husserl says that "only the Spirit is immortal", but he does not have God in mind, but the human "spirit" instead. The idea of evolving consciousness paves the way for the modern relativism. The word Umwertung was used by Husserl himself.

According to what "extreme realists" (like William of Chapeaux) say, God's intellect is the absolute measure of the objects existing in the world, but a catch in the notion of the "absolute" appears. As to us-humans, the "absolute" cannot be (deemed to be) known directly (except by staunch ideologists who reinterpret the sense of the "absolute"). We can only get to know the absolute after analyzing the teleological structure of the changeable universe. Thus, the modest realism in the theory of cognition (universals exist in mind with relation to immutable species of the changeable world) proves to be the only acceptable stance.

It might be granted that we get to know the "phenomena" of things first, but it is by no means certain that we should make do with knowing the phenomena (even if "purified" they always remain but an Ersatz). According to John Paul II, philosophy must not content itself with the cognizance of phenomena, but must become again the philosophy of being (Fides et ratio).

Phenomena might be called accidents which manifest substances beneath them. But the very notion of the accident does not imply the fact that it is that of a substance.[493] (Phenomena, according to the advocates of phenomenalism, "should not" belong to what is supposed to be beneath them). Moreover, not all accidents are equally important for the cognizance of substances. There are, amongst them, the so called "properties" (propria), which demonstrate almost infallibly substances hidden beneath them: contrary to those "transitory" ones.[494] According to Aristotle, the accidents must be discerned (discriminated) so, although the very defining cannot be called diaresis (of an intelligible continuum) for that reason (as it was in Plato).

It is not impossible; nay, it seems to be acceptable that all objects are somehow connected in the physical world. But it is, at the same time, certain that, for a particular human reason (the intellect of this or that man), the comprehensive cognizance of the totality is infeasible. The very existence of the totality comes but as a corollary of the proof of the existence of God, which is itself based on a representative part of the totality only, but never on the cognizance of the totality as such (the cognizance is not comprehensive). "Everything is connected in the world" not in the sense proposed by holism, but in the sense of the

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[493] Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 7 l. 1 n. 10 Licet autem modus essendi accidentium non sit ut per se sint, sed solum ut insint, intellectus tamen potest ea per se intelligere, cum sit natus dividere ea quae secundum naturam coniuncta sunt. Et ideo nomina abstracta accidentium significant entia quae quidem inhaerent, licet non significent ea per modum inhaerentium. Essent autem significata per huiusmodi nomina non entia, si non inessent in re.

[494] Sentencia De anima, lib. 1 l. 1 n. 15. E converso etiam accidentia, si praeaccipiantur, multum conferunt ad cognoscendum quod quid erat esse, ut dictum est. Si quis ergo assignet definitionem, per quam non deveniatur in cognitionem accidentium rei definitae, illa definitio non est realis, sed remota et dialectica. Sed illa definitio per quam devenitur in cognitionem accidentium, est realis, et ex propriis, et essentialibus rei.

hierarchy of objects/objectives being necessarily acknowledged so as to come to the cognizance of God.

By "dividing" the proper ("representative") accidents of things we come to the cognizance of the essence of things.[495] The last specific difference contains in itself all previously known.[496] Thus, however, our cognizance comes to a definite end[497] (terminus). To the contrary, leaving out the propria results in having only the cognizance of what is but loosely connected with their substrates.[498]

> It should be noted in relation to defining the name that a definition is said to be a limit because it includes a thing totally, so that nothing of the thing is outside of the definition (that is, there is nothing of the thing to which the definition does not belong); nor is any other thing under the definition, namely, the definition belongs to no other thing.[499]

The problem of the nominal definition is not mainly the problem of the theory of cognition. Some make do with multiplying words without any firm point of reference beyond them. The words being acknowledged (and *a provisional* point of reference found) does not avail much,

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[495] Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 7 l. 12 n. 25 […] quamvis in definitione ponatur genus et differentia, tamen definitio est ratio ex differentiis tantum, quia genus non est praeter differentias, ut supra dictum est. Et quamvis ponantur multae differentiae in definitione, tamen tota definitio dependet et constituitur ex ultima, quando fit divisio secundum rectum, idest a communiori ad minus commune descendendo secundum per se differentias, et non accipiendo quasi a latere differentias per accidens.

Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 7 l. 12 n. 16 […] quandoque aliquis dividens differentias facit hoc ut scilicet dividat per ea quae sunt secundum accidens, propter hoc quod non potest invenire proprias et per se differentias. Aliquando enim necessitas cogit, ut utamur, loco per se differentiarum, differentiis per accidens, inquantum sunt signa quaedam differentiarum essentialium nobis ignotarum.

[496] Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 7 l. 12 n. 19 […] Primo ostendit quomodo ex multis differentiis fit unum, si differentiae per se sumuntur. Secundo, quod hoc non potest esse si sumantur per accidens, ibi, si vero secundum accidens. Dicit ergo primo, quod si sic se habent differentiae acceptae in definitione sicut dictum est, scilicet quod semper sumantur per se differentiae et non per accidens, palam est quod ultima differentia erit tota substantia rei, et tota definitio. Includit enim in se omnes praecedentes particulas.

[497] Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 7 l. 12 n. 18 Et ita semper procedendum est in divisione differentiarum, donec dividens veniat ad non differentia, idest ad ultimas differentias, quae non dividuntur ulterius in alias differentias; et tunc tot erunt species pedis quot differentiae: et species animalium habentium pedes aequales differentiis. Quaelibet enim individualis differentia constituet unam speciem specialissimam.

[498] Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 7 l. 12 n. 24 Deinde cum dicit si vero ostendit, quod hoc non potest dici si differentiae per accidens sumantur; dicens, quod si aliquis in dividendo et definiendo accipiat differentiam secundum accidens, sicut si dividatur quod habentium pedes, aliud est album, aliud est nigrum, tot erunt ultimae differentiae, quot factae sunt divisiones; quia una earum alteram non includet. Et de differentiis sic sumptis, procedebat ratio superius inducta contra unitatem definitionis. Huiusmodi enim differentiae sic per accidens acceptae non essent unum nisi subiecto; quod non sufficit ad unitatem definitionis.

[499] Expositio Peryermeneias, lib. 1 l. 4 n. 2. Circa primum considerandum est quod definitio ideo dicitur terminus, quia includit totaliter rem; ita scilicet, quod nihil rei est extra definitionem, cui scilicet definitio non conveniat; nec aliquid aliud est infra definitionem, cui scilicet definitio conveniat.

because the acknowledgement might accompany that which is produced by way of trial and error only. A mere convention of using the "objects" cannot replace defining them. The very producing cannot dispense of a firm natural basis which is not itself producible. It seems that words, after all, must be something more than sheer "products" of the human mind.[500]

Materials are composed (only this) in the products. There is however, above them, an intentional unity which permits to call e.g. this object "a car" and that one "a computer". This unity is, however, dependent wholly on humans. The unity of natural things cannot be defined that way. That is why, perhaps, some deem this "natural reality" unworthy of the civilized man.

The true unity of the real definition does not stem from the human mind.[501] The definition and the defined are naturally united.[502] This unity is something more than just the artificial unity of e.g. a poem[503] (such a product anyhow). The unity of the definition corresponds to the unity of the thing defined. The defined thing is complex and its definition cannot be complete unless encompassing all constituent parts of the thus existing thing.[504]

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[500] Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 8 l. 5 n. 1 […] omnia, quae habent plures partes, et totum in eis non est solum coacervatio partium, sed aliquid ex partibus constitutum, quod est praeter ipsas partes, habent aliquid, quod facit in eis unitatem. In quibusdam enim corporibus sic unitatem habentibus, causa unitatis est contactus, in quibusdam viscositas, aut aliquid aliud huiusmodi.

[501] Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 25 q. 1 a. 1 ad 2. […] Si autem consideretur definitio secundum suam intentionem, sic definitio non est definitum, sed ductivum in cognitionem ejus; et sic etiam definitio est composita ex pluribus intentionibus, quarum nulla praedicatur de ipsa, nec e converso, quia intentio generis non est intentio definitionis; sed hoc non est nisi secundum intellectum qui adinvenit has intentiones.

[502] Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 25 q. 1 a. 1 ad 2. […] dupliciter definitio potest considerari: vel secundum id quod significatur per definitionem, vel secundum intentionem definitionis. Si primo modo, tunc idem est significatum per definitum et definitionem: unde dicit philosophus, quod ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio: et sic definitio et definitum sunt idem, et hoc modo ea quae ponuntur in definitione in recto, non sunt partes definitionis, id est rei per definitionem significatae, sicut nec definiti.

[503] Metaphysicae, lib. 7 l. 4 n. 10 Non tamen sufficit quod sit unum in continuitate illud quod per rationem significatur, ad hoc quod sit definitio. Sic enim Ilias, idest poema de bello Troiano esset definitio, quia illud bellum in quadam continuitate temporis est peractum. Aut etiam non sufficit quod sit unum per colligationem; sicut haec ratio non esset definitio domus, si dicerem, quod domus est lapides et cementum et ligna. Sed tunc ratio significans unum erit definitio, si significet unum aliquod illorum modorum, quorum quoties unum per se dicitur. Unum enim dicitur multipliciter sicut et ens. Ens autem hoc quidem significat hoc aliquid, aliud quantitatem, aliud qualitatem, et sic de aliis; et tamen per prius substantiam et consequenter alia. Ergo simpliciter unum per prius erit in substantia, et per posterius in aliis.

Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 8 l. 5 n. 2 Manifestum autem est quod definitiva ratio est una ex pluribus constans. Nec est una per solam coacervationem partium sicut Ilias, idest poema factum de historia Troiana, quod per solam aggregationem est unum. Definitio autem est unum simpliciter. Est enim significativa unius. Unde merito dubitatur quid est quod faciat definitionem hominis esse unam, et hominem cuius ratio est definitio. Cum enim homo sit animal et bipes, quae videntur esse duo, merito dubitatur quare homo est unum et non plura.

[504] Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 7 l. 9 n. 1 […] omnis definitio est quaedam ratio, idest quaedam compositio nominum per rationem ordinata. Unum enim nomen non potest esse definitio, quia definitio oportet quod distincte notificet principia rerum quae concurrunt ad essentiam rei constituendam; alias autem definitio non

The formal coherence of termini is but a minimum. Definition, in addition, must bear on a certain specific nature, which is, at the same time, distinct from the others (specified in the analogical way). [505] Notifications (notificationes) might be manifold, but the quite prefect definition can be one only.[506]

In the middle term of a syllogism (and the in the definition consequently too), any of four causes might be given, but the final is the most important one.[507] It is so, because, in the natural becoming of things, the becoming ends with acquiring natural form which is intended first. Analogically, in the generation of knowledge in the human mind, the generic cognition of matter is specified by the form, because nature intends, according to Aristotle, to beget it in the human mind. The matter is thus conditionally necessary to get to know the form indented

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sufficienter manifestaret essentiam rei. Et propter hoc dicitur in primo physicorum, quod definitio dividit definitum in singulare, idest exprimit distincte singula principia definiti. Hoc autem non potest fieri nisi per plures dictiones: unde una dictio non potest esse definitio, sed potest esse manifestativa eo modo, quo nomen minus notum manifestatur per magis notum. Omnis autem ratio partes habet, quia est quaedam oratio composita, et non simplex nomen. Et ideo videtur quod sicut se habet ratio rei ad rem, ita se habent partes rationis ad partes rei. Et propter hoc dubitatur, utrum oporteat rationem partium ponere in ratione totius, aut non.

[505] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 59 n. 3. Intellectus tamen incomplexus, intelligendo quod quid est, apprehendit quidditatem rei in quadam comparatione ad rem: quia apprehendit eam ut huius rei quidditatem. Unde, licet ipsum incomplexum, vel etiam definitio, non sit secundum se verum vel falsum, tamen intellectus apprehendens quod quid est dicitur quidem per se semper esse verus, ut patet in III de anima; etsi per accidens possit esse falsus, inquantum vel definitio includit aliquam complexionem, vel partium definitionis ad invicem, vel totius definitionis ad definitum. Unde definitio dicetur, secundum quod intelligitur ut huius vel illius rei definitio, secundum quod ab intellectu accipitur, vel simpliciter falsa, si partes definitionis non cohaereant invicem, ut si dicatur animal insensibile; vel falsa secundum hanc rem, prout definitio circuli accipitur ut trianguli. Dato igitur, per impossibile, quod intellectus divinus solum incomplexa cognosceret, adhuc esset verus, cognoscendo suam quidditatem ut suam.

Sentencia De anima, lib. 3 l. 11 n. 18. Sciendum tamen est, quod in cognoscendo quod quid est, contingit esse deceptionem per accidens, dupliciter, ratione compositionis intervenientis. Uno modo prout definitio unius rei est falsa ad aliam rem, sicut definitio circuli est falsa ad triangulum. Alio modo, prout partes definitionis non cohaerent sibi invicem; et tunc definitio est falsa simpliciter; ut si aliquis ponat in definitione alicuius animalis insensibile; unde in illis in quorum definitione nulla est compositio, non contingit esse deceptionem; sed oportet ea, vel intelligere vere, vel nullo modo, ut dicitur in nono metaphysicorum.

[506] Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 1 q. 4 a. 2 expos. Ergo de uti et frui non debent dari multae definitiones. Ad quod dicendum, quod si inveniretur aliqua definitio quae diceret esse rei secundum comparationem ad omnes causas ipsius proprias, esset perfectissima, et una tantum; sed inveniuntur definitiones notificantes esse rei plures secundum diversas causas. Unde aliqua datur per causam finalem, quaedam per formalem, et sic de aliis.
[…] Inveniuntur etiam aliae notificationes sumptae ex proprietatibus consequentibus esse rei, et tales etiam possunt esse plures.

[507] Expositio Posteriorum, lib. 1 l. 16 n. 5Ad intellectum autem huius literae sciendum est quod contingit definitiones diversas dari eiusdem rei, sumptas ex diversis causis. Causae autem ad invicem ordinem habent: nam ex una sumitur ratio alterius. Ex forma enim sumitur ratio materiae: talem enim oportet esse materiam, qualem forma requirit. Efficiens autem est ratio formae: quia enim agens agit sibi simile, oportet quod secundum modum agentis sit etiam modus formae, quae ex actione consequitur. Ex fine autem sumitur ratio efficientis: nam omne agens agit propter finem. Oportet ergo quod definitio, quae sumitur a fine, sit ratio et causa probativa aliarum definitionum, quae sumuntur ex aliis causis.

so.[508] This way only, the formally correct knowledge is generated in the human mind. The conditional necessity of the thus theologically ordained nature accounts for the absolute necessity of the scientific cognition.

8. Properties (propria)

Human behavior happens to be called proper or improper from a phenomenal point of view. However, the human *conduct* (the acting independent of whether it happens to be observed) is proper (or improper) *really* if in accordance (resp. in discordance) with the human nature hidden *beneath the phenomena*.

Properties are naturally predicated about e.g. elementary bodies in physics, and the term is quite stringent in them (nobody believes in that they are mutable only because known in mutable life conditions). The properties of languages are natural for them also. The convention (if any) touches upon a relatively narrow scope of their use. The natural in any language is more than the accepted by a social contract. Something is predicated as proper or improper in them because of being known so as to its essence, and not because agreed to be so. The fact that they are translatable at all issue from that any language naturally addresses essences of things, even if it does so in the manner proper to a given idiom.

Each science demonstrates what is essential (per se) in it. Some facts might by duly deemed accidental (for the time being), and the features predicated about the objects might appear accidental too. However, the incidental/casual cannot be "formalized" to the point of becoming a rule, because it are sophists only who are busied with the incidental. According to Plato, they dwell in the dim, murky "not-being" space of mere appearances. The thus accidentally connected must be called a non-being. Everything is what it must be due to its essential causes. Some "apparent beings" show up in the human opinions only due to the mode of predicating (the confusion of notions).

Proprium is to be called an essential feature of a thing. Per se (what is proper) might be predicated in four ways. First, the defining is predicated so about the defined. Secondly, a proper accident is predicated about a specific nature, e.g. risible (the ability to laugh) about man, or "male" and "female" (and nothing more) about the individuals of the human nature. The properties are thus indissolubly connected with the nature. Thirdly, a per se cause is the one which is sufficient. Fourthly, e.g. a person is per se, because existing independently of others.[509]

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[508] In Physic., lib. 2 l. 15 n. 6. Deinde cum dicit: et finis, quod est etc. assimilat necessitatem naturalis generationis necessitati scientiarum demonstrativarum, quantum ad id quod est necessitatis principium. Manifestum est enim quod in scientiis demonstrativis, principium demonstrationis est definitio: et similiter finis, qui est principium et ratio necessitatis in iis quae fiunt secundum naturam, est quoddam principium sumptum a ratione et definitione; finis enim generationis est forma speciei, quam significat definitio.

[509] Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 5 l. 19 n. 11 Deinde cum dicit quare secundum concludit ex praedictis, quatuor modos dicendi per se, vel secundum se. Quorum primus est, quando [1] definitio significans quid est esse uniuscuiusque, dicitur ei inesse secundum se, sicut Callias et quod quid erat esse Calliam, idest et essentia rei, ita se habent quod unum inest secundum se alteri. Non autem solum tota definitio dicitur de definito secundum se; sed [1a] aliquo modo etiam quaecumque insunt in definitione dicente quid est, praedicantur de definito

Each science considers its properties (propria)[510] of its own subject matter (generis subiecti) departing from proper axioms; principles (dignitates; axiomata). In each science (apart from metaphysics), the principle is, at the same time, the definition of its subject matter (it is also the major premise of the syllogisms used in it).[511] In the conclusions, however, we

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secundum se, sicut Callias est animal secundum se. Animal enim inest in ratione Calliae. Nam Callias est quoddam animal; et poneretur in eius definitione, si singularia definitionem habere possent. Et hi duo modi sub uno comprehenduntur. Nam eadem ratione, definitio et pars definitionis per se de unoquoque praedicantur. Est enim hic primus modus per se, qui ponitur in libro posteriorum; et respondet primo modo eius quod dicitur secundum quod, superius posito.

Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 5 l. 19 n. 12 Secundus modus est, quando [2[aliquid ostenditur esse in aliquo, sicut in primo subiecto, cum inest ei per se. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter: quia [2a] vel primum subiectum accidentis est ipsum totum subiectum de quo praedicatur (sicut superficies dicitur colorata vel alba secundum seipsam. Primum enim subiectum coloris est superficies, et ideo corpus dicitur coloratum ratione superficiei). Vel etiam [2b] aliqua pars eius; sicut homo dicitur vivens secundum se, quia aliqua pars eius est primum subiectum vitae, scilicet anima. Et hic est secundus modus dicendi per se in posterioribus positus, quando scilicet subiectum ponitur in definitione praedicati. Subiectum enim primum et proprium, ponitur in definitione accidentis proprii.

Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 5 l. 19 n. 13 Tertius modus est prout secundum se esse dicitur [3] illud, cuius non est aliqua alia causa; sicut omnes propositiones immediatae, quae scilicet per aliquod medium non probantur. Nam medium in demonstrationibus propter quid est causa, quod praedicatum insit subiecto. Unde, licet homo habeat multas causas, sicut animal et bipes, quae sunt causae formales eius; tamen huius propositionis, homo est homo, cum sit immediata, nihil est causa; et propter hoc homo est homo secundum se. Et ad hunc modum reducitur quartus modus dicendi per se in posterioribus positus, quando effectus praedicatur de causa; ut cum dicitur interfectus interiit propter interfectionem, vel infrigidatum infriguit vel refriguit propter refrigerium.

Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 5 l. 19 n. 14 Quartus modus est, prout illa dicuntur [4] secundum se inesse alicui, quae ei soli inquantum soli insunt. Quod dicit ad differentiam priorum modorum, in quibus non dicebatur secundum se inesse ex eo quod est soli inesse. Quamvis etiam ibi aliquid soli inesset, ut definitio definito. Hic autem secundum se dicitur ratione solitudinis. Nam hoc quod dico secundum se, significat aliquid separatum; sicut dicitur homo secundum se esse, quando solus est. Et ad hunc reducitur tertius modus in posterioribus positus, et quartus modus dicendi secundum quod, qui positionem importabat.

[510]In Physic., lib. 4 l. 5 n. 3. Secundo, ut solvantur quaecumque opposita sunt circa locum: nam cognitio veritatis est solutio dubitatorum. Tertium est, quod ex definitione data manifestentur proprietates loci, quae insunt ei: quia definitio est medium in demonstratione, qua propria accidentia demonstrantur de subiectis. Quartum est, quod ex definitione loci erit manifesta causa, quare aliqui discordaverunt circa locum; et omnium quae sunt opposita circa ipsum.

Expositio Posteriorum Analyticorum, lib. 1 l. 31 n. 13. Nisi solum quod potest esse talis differentia, quod unum eorum praedicatur ut accidens, et aliud praedicatur sicut praedicamentum, idest sicut substantiale praedicatum. Et haec est differentia proprii et definitionis, quorum utrumque est convertibile; et tamen definitio est praedicatum essentiale, et propter hoc est prius naturaliter proprio, quod est praedicatum accidentale. Et inde est quod in demonstrationibus utimur definitione quasi medio ad demonstrandum propriam passionem de subiecto.

[511] Expositio Posteriorum, lib. 1 l. 5 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit: immediati autem etc. dividit immediatum principium. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo dividit; secundo subdividit; ibi: positiones autem quaedam et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod immediatum principium syllogismi duplex est. Unum est quod dicitur positio, quam non contingit demonstrare et ex hoc immediatum dicitur; neque tamen aliquem docendum, idest qui doceri debet in demonstrativa scientia, necesse est habere, idest mente concipere sive ei assentire. Aliud vero est, quod dicitur dignitas vel maxima propositio, quam necesse est habere in mente et ei assentire quemlibet, qui doceri

predicate the aforementioned proprium about the subject matter of this science. There are, accordingly, three definitions to be found in science. 1) The one which serves as a principle. 2) The other given in the conclusion of the syllogism. 3) The third which is in fact the syllogism itself, but rearranged into the form of a definition (sola positione differens).[512] [513]

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debet. Et manifestum est quod quaedam principia talia sunt ut probatur in IV metaphysicae de hoc principio, quod affirmatio et negatio non sunt simul vera, cuius contrarium nullus mente credere potest etsi ore proferat. Et in talibus utimur nomine praedicto, scilicet dignitatis vel maximae propositionis, propter huiusmodi principiorum certitudinem ad manifestandum alia.

Expositio Posteriorum, lib. 1 l. 5 n. 7 […] huiusmodi principia omnes scientiae accipiunt a metaphysica, cuius est considerare ens simpliciter et ea, quae sunt entis. […] Sunt enim quaedam propositiones, quae non possunt probari nisi per principia alterius scientiae; et ideo oportet quod in illa scientia supponantur, licet probentur per principia alterius scientiae. Sicut a puncto ad punctum rectam lineam ducere, supponit geometra et probat naturalis; ostendens quod inter quaelibet duo puncta sit linea media.

[512]In Physic., lib. 2 l. 15 n. 6. […] Contingit autem quandoque in scientiis demonstrativis triplicem esse definitionem. Quarum una est demonstrationis principium, ut haec: tonitruum est extinctio ignis in nube: quaedam vero demonstrationis conclusio, ut haec: tonitruum est continuus sonus in nubibus: quaedam vero complectitur utrumque, ut haec: tonitruum est continuus sonus in nubibus propter extinctionem ignis in nube; et haec comprehendit in se totam demonstrationem absque demonstrationis ordine: unde in I Poster. dicitur quod definitio est demonstratio positione differens. Quia igitur in iis quae fiunt propter finem, finis se habet ut principium in demonstrativis, et ea quae sunt ad finem sicut conclusio; etiam in definitione rerum naturalium invenitur id quod est necessarium propter finem.

Super Sent., lib. 4 d. 3 q. 1 a. 1 qc. 2 c. Ad secundam quaestionem dicendum, quod definitio illa Hugonis complectitur et materiam Baptismi in hoc quod dicit, aqua, et finem in hoc quod dicit, diluendis criminibus, et formam per hoc quod dicit, per verbum vitae sanctificata; unde est definitio composita ex materiali et formali, quasi demonstratio positione differens: et complete essentiam Baptismi complectitur, excepto quod actus ablutionis intermittitur, qui facit materiam proximam Baptismo; quamvis ex aliis quae ponuntur, intelligi possit.

In Physic., lib. 1 l. 1 n. 5. Quod autem dicit intelligere, refertur ad definitiones; quod vero dicit scire, ad demonstrationes. Nam sicut demonstrationes sunt ex causis, ita et definitiones; cum completa definitio sit demonstratio sola positione differens, ut dicitur in I Poster. Per hoc autem quod dicit principia aut causas aut elementa, non intendit idem significare.

Expositio Posteriorum Analyticorum, lib. 1 l. 16 n. 4. Deinde cum dicit: similiter se habet etc. ostendit quod etiam definitio est non corruptibilium, sed sempiternorum, tali ratione. Demonstratio quantum ad principia et conclusiones est sempiternorum et non corruptibilium; sed definitio vel est principium, vel conclusio demonstrationis, vel demonstratio positione differens; ergo definitio non est corruptibilium, sed sempiternorum.

Expositio Posteriorum Analyticorum, lib. 1 l. 16 n. 5. Potest tamen utraque coniungi, ut sit una definitio, hoc modo: domus est cooperimentum constitutum ex dictis, defendens a pluvia, frigore et calore. Talis autem definitio continet totum quod est in demonstratione, scilicet medium et conclusionem. Et ideo talis definitio est demonstratio positione differens; quia in hoc solo differt a demonstratione, quia non est ordinata in modo et figura.

Expositio Posteriorum Analyticorum, lib. 1 l. 26 n. 3. Secundam rationem ponit; ibi: postea ipsius quod quid est etc. quae talis est. Quod quid est potissimum locum in demonstrativis scientiis habet, quia, sicut dictum est, definitio aut est principium demonstrationis, aut conclusio, aut demonstratio positione differens. Ad investigandum autem definitionem sola prima figura convenit.

Aristotle says that the first "figure is the most scientific of all" and the reasons he adduces are of pivotal importance for the present considerations.

> 214. He shows the first with three reasons, the first of which (79a17) is this.
> In whatever figure the '*propter quid*' syllogism is best made, that figure is the best for causing scientific knowledge and for that reason is most suitable for demonstrations, since demonstration is a syllogism which causes scientific knowledge. But a syllogism '*propter quid*' is best made in the first figure, and this is evidenced by the fact that the ***mathematical sciences*** of ***arithmetic and geometry and all*** other ***sciences*** which demonstrate **'*propter quid*'** employ the first figure in most cases. Therefore, the first figure is the one which first and ***foremost causes scientific knowledge*** and is most suitable for demonstrations.
> But the reason why demonstration '*propter quid*' is best made in the first figure is this: in the first figure the middle term is both subjected, to the major extreme, which is the predicate of the conclusion, and predicated of the minor extreme, which is the subject of the conclusion. Now, in demonstrations '*propter quid*' the middle must be the cause of the proper attribute which is predicated of the subject in the conclusion. Furthermore, one of the modes of "saying *per se*" is when the subject is the cause of the predicate, as "being butchered, he died," as has been explained above; and this is verified in the first figure in which the middle is subject to the major extreme, as has been said.
> 215. The second reason, at: ***third, the first is the only figure*** (79a23) is this: the *quod quid est* [that is, the definition as signifying the essence] plays a most important role in demonstrative sciences because, as has been said, a definition is either the principle of a demonstration or the conclusion or a demonstration differing in the position of its terms. Now, when it is a question of formulating a definition the first figure alone is suitable. For that is the only figure in which a universal affirmative is concluded, which alone produces science of the *quod quid est*. (For the *quod quid est* is known through an affirmation. Furthermore, the definition is predicated affirmatively and universally of the defined: for it is not some man that is a two-legged animal, but every man.) Therefore, the first figure is foremost in causing scientific knowledge and is best accommodated to demonstrations.
> 216. Then, at: ***finally, the first figure*** (79a30) he gives the third reason which is this: For purposes of demonstration the other figures need the first, but the first does not ***need*** them. Therefore, the first figure is better equipped for causing scientific knowledge than the others. That the others need the first is evidenced by the fact that if complete scientific knowledge is to be had, the mediate propositions present in demonstrations must be reduced to immediate ones. But this reduction is made in two ways, namely, by condensing middles [that is, by inserting fresh middles, the movement proceeding from the extremes toward the middle first employed] and by expanding outwards [that is, by going from the middle toward the remote extreme]. It is done by condensing when the middle actually employed is joined mediately to each of the extremes or only to the minor extreme. Hence when other middles are introduced between the first middle and the extremes, the middles, as it were, close in. Thus, if someone

[513] Super Sent., lib. 4 d. 3 q. 1 a. 1 qc. 1 c. Quaedam enim sunt definitiones materiales, quas dicimus demonstrationis conclusiones: quaedam formales, quae sunt principia demonstrationis: quaedam materiales et formales simul, quae sunt demonstrationes positione differentes: quia habent medium demonstrationis, inquantum continent definitionem formalem, et conclusionem, inquantum continent materialem; sed deest solus ordo terminorum. Sentencia De anima, lib. 2 l. 3 n. 3.

> first says, "Every E is C," [minor], "Every C is A," [major], and then a middle, say D, is introduced between C and E, and a middle B between C and A. It is done by expanding when the middle is immediate to the minor extreme and mediate to the major: for then it is necessary to introduce several other middles more general than the middle first taken. Thus, if one says, "Every E is D," "Every D is A," and the later other middles more general than D are introduced [between D and A]. Now, these processes of condensing and expanding can be performed only in the first figure, both because the first figure is the only one which yields a universal affirmative conclusion, and because it is only in the first figure that the middle lies between both extremes. For in the second figure the middle lies outside the extremes, as being predicated of them; in the third figure [the middle] is below each of the extremes, as being subjected to them.

In the human acting, the principles are as immutable as the nature itself must be (it cannot evolve). The actions themselves, to the contrary, might *seem* contingent to the moment only they are analyzed sufficiently enough to appear to stem form the principles (to be rational). The human actions are not determined (they are free). There is, however, the conditional necessity to be found in them, as nobody can desire *rationally* what is contrary to his/her personal well-being. (No one can be as "free" as to act against his/her personal freedom and able to undertake irrational actions). The properties, in general, are analyzable in science. In special, propria hominis; *the properties of man; the values of humanity* can be known this way.

The Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle begins with the definition of good ("it has correctly been proclaimed that good is what all desire"). There are manifold actions in man (and some odd indeed), but they are all reducible to the definition in question. It is impossible for a person not to desire his/her one happiness (the supreme good), albeit the good happens to be assessed awry indeed.

The Aristotelian (and generally accepted before) eudemonism was subjected to the Kantian critique, apparently because of the notorious "autonomy of practical reason". In the notion of the Greek eudemonia, the telos of the human life and the teleological structure of the universe are combined. Kant's ethics was meant to be autonomous, but had been, in fact, isolated from the entire edifice of science, and the "practical reason" became a quaint "reason" indeed, as all sciences use *the unqualified* reason, obviously enough.

The human nature can be defined and its ultimate end, consequently, too in the supreme science: metaphysics. Kant rejected the traditional metaphysics and, in consequence, the human freedom was bereft of its natural foundation. It was about to become quite a vague notions in those who followed suit.

The human nature is *a* nature. It shares in common with all the natures the general tending to being (esse; existence). Each nature intends out of necessity to its own act of existence (and it partakes of it), albeit the tending finishes someday in the natures deprived of the immaterial intellectual principle (the intellect). The existence (esse) has been freely given by the Creator to all creatures, but the human tending to the fullness of existence (beatitude) can be satisfied really and the Source of existence found. The Principle of all being can be appropriately identified by the rational being only.

We cannot reciprocate the gratuitously given us by God, but we can render justice to the fact that life has been gratuitously given. Metaphysics is about justice broadly speaking,

because “everything is ordained in the world” by the best Provider and metaphysics is about retracing the order.

Justice is a property of man. In the definition of it (and in any definition of a human property for that matter too), the definition of what naturally sustains it must be implicitly given.[514] Injustice is, on the other hand, to be called an “impropriety” of the human nature. The definition of man includes immediately what is per to the human nature as such[515], but indirectly the properties (values) of the humanity too.

The word “justice” is a totality of sorts (totum quoddam) and contains indistinctly (indistinctum) what is potentially definitely included in it. The definition should posit distinctly (distincte ponere) the principles of the definition (principia definiti).[516] Without it, every definition is liable to a redefinition/reinterpretation and values attached to them consequently too.

Definitions, in addition, posit the properties which are indissolubly connected with the subjects sustaining them.[517] Thus, science (with its predicating per se) proves to be superior to sheer sophistry.

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[514] Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 7 l 1 n. 14 […] in definitione cuiuslibet accidentium oportet ponere definitionem substantiae. Sicut enim in definitione simi ponitur nasus, ita in definitione cuiuslibet accidentis ponitur proprium eius subiectum; et ideo sicut animal est prius definitione quam homo, quia definitio animalis ponitur in definitione hominis, eadem ratione substantia est prior definitione accidentibus.

[515] Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 7 l 3 n. 14 Quod autem aliquid dicatur alteri esse unum per accidens, est dupliciter, ut uno modo homo est albus, et alio modo album est homo. Horum enim aliud quidem est ex additione, aliud vero non. In definitione enim hominis non est necessarium quod addatur definitio albi, vel nomen eius; in definitione vero albi necesse est quod ponatur homo, vel nomen hominis, vel eius definitio, si homo proprium subiectum eius est, vel aliquid aliud quod est eius proprium subiectum.

In Physic., lib. 1 l. 6 n. 10. Et hoc est accidens in cuius definitione ponitur subiectum cui accidit: sicut simum est per se accidens nasi quia in definitione simi ponitur nasus; est enim simum nasus curvus. Secundum quod supponit est quod si aliqua ponuntur in definitione alicuius definiti, aut in definitione alicuius eorum ex quibus constat definitio, impossibile est quod in definitione alicuius horum ponatur definitio totius definiti. Sicut bipes ponitur in definitione hominis, et quaedam alia ponuntur in definitione bipedis vel animalis, ex quibus definitur homo: impossibile est autem quod ponatur homo in definitione bipedis, aut in definitione alicuius eorum quae cadunt in definitione bipedis vel animalis; alioquin esset definitio circularis, et esset idem prius et posterius, et notius et minus notum; omnis enim definitio est ex prioribus et notioribus, ut in VI Topic. dicitur. Et eadem ratione, cum in definitione hominis albi ponatur album, non est possibile quod in definitione albi ponatur homo albus.

[516]In Physic., lib. 1 l. 1 n. 10. Deinde cum dicit: sustinent autem etc. ponit aliud signum de toto integrali intelligibili. Definitum enim se habet ad definientia quodammodo ut totum integrale, inquantum actu sunt definientia in definito; sed tamen qui apprehendit nomen, ut puta hominem aut circulum, non statim distinguit principia definientia; unde nomen est sicut quoddam totum et indistinctum, sed definitio dividit in singularia, idest distincte ponit principia definiti.

[517] Expositio Posteriorum, lib. 1 l. 13 n. 3. Sciendum autem est quod cum in demonstratione probetur passio de subiecto per *medium*, quod est definitio, oportet quod prima propositio, cuius praedicatum est passio et subiectum est definitio, quae continet principia passionis, sit *per se* in quarto modo; secunda autem, cuius subiectum est ipsum subiectum et praedicatum ipsa definitio, in primo modo. Conclusio vero, in qua praedicatur passio de subiecto, est *per se* in secundo modo.

Departing from the definition of man, we can, subsequently, define his/her humanity in manifold realms of his/her existence, e.g.: economics, society, politics, art, etc. They are all characterized by their proper values. Man cannot create any of them, but is able to build e.g. science or art basing on the uncreated values. They are created by God only, whereas the word "creation" applies to the human acting in the analogical sense only. We create something firm, because basing on the principles uncreated by us (created by God).

These values are, first of all, those of the Latin Western Civilization, not because they are immanent to it (had it been the case there would cease to be what they must be: objective and independent of the human creativity), but because it was unique in the Latin Western Civilization to search for the Transcendence beyond the immanent. The searching had been its dominant feature, before a "modern reform" attached a special importance to the immanent (to humanity). It was Aristotle who taught Europe to contemplate the Transcendence. The Latins (Romans) proved the most docible disciples, even if not, originally (in antiquity) concerned very much with theoretical philosophy. It was unique for the Latin Western Civilization to look for the absolute (possibly achievable for all man) freedom to be found beyond the actual boundaries of the civilization development (and even more: beyond the very boundaries of the human nature). It was unique to look for the objective ("dogmatic") truth beyond the transitory forms of "provisional truths". The latter can "create new jobs" for researchers, but cannot create anything valuable for the community.

The real definitions are "windows" which open the possibility to realize what is proper for man: to adhere to the Transcendent God.

The natural properties of elementary bodies must be immutable, as no one can reasonably suppose that e.g. the electric permeability constant might vary only because the accuracy in settling its value varies. Neither can the values of e.g.: justice, honor, faith, etc. assume any other forms than those traditionally settled (they can be known better, but never created). It is due to defining them all peremptorily that the human existence can develop and reach to the utmost fullness to be found in the Transcendence.

The civilization development is marked by the subsequent stages reached on the pathway to the Transcendence. The actual scope of the human civilization development was always broadened by the objective values (transcendent in the narrow sense of the word) on the pathway towards the absolutely Transcendent.

Laying down properties is normal for every science.[518] If, however, metaphysics is any special in this respect, it is because it considers the properties of being as such,[519] which is, however, not to say: of the absolute *possibilities* being (it is not "ontology").

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[518] Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 10 l. 11 n. 5. Secundo adaptat generalem solutionem ad speciales terminos, in quibus primo moverat quaestionem, ibi, *masculus vero et femina*. Dicit ergo, quod ideo contingit quod quaedam contrarietas facit differre specie et quaedam non, quia quaedam contraria sunt propriae passiones generis, et quaedam sunt minus propriae. Quia enim genus a materia sumitur, materia autem per se habet ordinem ad formam; illae propriae sunt differentiae generis, quae sumuntur a diversis formis perficientibus materiam.

[519] Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 4 l. 2 n. 12. Si enim unum est proprium et per se accidens entis, oportet quod ex principiis causetur entis in quantum ens, sicut quodlibet accidens proprium ex principiis sui subiecti. Ex principiis autem communibus entis inquantum est ens, non intelligitur causari aliquod particulariter ens sufficienter. Unde non potest esse quod ens aliquod determinati generis et speciei sit accidens omnis entis.

The categorical properties of the human-being-in-the-world, e.g.: community, science, leisure, wealth, etc., are ultimately defined by the supra-categorical properties of being as such. Things are described to be related to the Fullness of Being by them. Anything which partakes only of/in the existence must search for the plentitude of existence beyond itself. Being self-centered is morbid both for both individuals (obviously enough) and communities (which happens to be questioned by those interested), but for "humanity" as such too (which practically went into oblivion due to the "modern" reform).

In the transcendent perspective, all traditional values of the Latin Western Civilization have been defined only. They might have been defined elsewhere, and possibly could be so in the future, but nowadays they are to be preserved therein notwithstanding attempts of the "reformers".

9. The supra categorical properties of being

On defining man (his humanity) as the "rational animal" we obtain the major premise of the syllogism; the immediate principle which allows (after assuming the minor premise of the syllogism and the middle term-μέσον common to them both) define the properties (values) of humanity. The Latin Western Civilization is unique because sensible for the cognizance of the objective values, which are, indeed, superior to any particular type of civilization, but paradoxically, acknowledged actually to be superior in this civilization only. Beyond the actual scope of its influence, the disinterested pursuit for truth is hardly perceptible, even if the pursuit is natural for man as such. The effects of the pursuit for truth are no one's private property. The must be commonly accessible, and The Latin Western Civilization has been built on the principle of the accessibility. In the days of trial, these traditional values of the Latin Western Civilization have been exposed to relativization. The universal values are related, indeed, to the human nature out of necessity and thus might be known and accepted commonly beyond any special cultural context, but it is to be desired, first of all, lest they cease to exist where they original appeared.

It is impossible to join a dialogue with a person who refuses to accept the common ("neutral") ground for discussion (communication), i.e. who rejects the natural principles

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Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 4 l. 4 n. 18. Et est considerativa eorum quae dicta sunt, scilicet eiusdem et diversi, similis et dissimilis, aequalis et inaequalis, negationis et privationis, et contrariorum; quae supra diximus esse per se entis accidentia. Et non solum est considerativa istorum, de quibus ostensum est singillatim propriis rationibus, quae cadunt in consideratione huius scientiae; sed etiam considerat de priori et posteriori, genere et specie, toto et parte, et aliis huiusmodi, pari ratione, quia haec etiam sunt accidentia entis inquantum est ens.

Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 5 l. 1 n. 1. Primo determinat distinctiones nominum quae significant causas, secundo, illorum nominum quae significant subiectum huius scientiae vel partes eius, ibi, unum dicitur aliud secundum accidens. Tertio nominum quae significant passiones entis inquantum est ens

Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 11 l. 3 n. 11. Secundo ibi, huic enim ostendit cuius scientiae sit praedicta considerare: dicens, quod considerare accidentia entis inquantum est ens, non est alterius scientiae, quam huius philosophiae. Si enim esset alterius, maxime videretur esse naturalis scientiae et dialecticae, quae videntur maxime inter scientias esse communes.

(contra negantem principia non est disputandum)[520]. As long as the principles are acknowledged, the actually undertaken actions might be judged appropriately according to them. The deplorable fact is, however, that the principles happen to be questioned, and, consequently, the very possibility to communicate without hatred (or any other emotional engagement for the matter too) precluded.

People agree with each other when working together and meet in the same workplace. Otherwise, the work would be practically impossible. But the rules accepted in a particular workplace are in fact specific values and thus comparable to the more general ones. Values and principles in the universal sense might be supposed to organize the "workplace" of humanity as such. The very fact of expansion of the Western Civilization seems to bear a testimony to the fact, although the very core of its values might have been wrongly identified.

In the moment the Latin Western Civilization is imperiled (Toynbee), the existence of all "workplaces" is imperiled too. The need for architectonics of the "common workplace of humanity" is no less urgent than the need for those who can organize ordinary workplaces.

Some think that the problem of relativism and the danger of destruction from within might be averted in the moment the Divine (absolute) point of view (such like architectonics of human life) is assumed, which might be true, but some no less serious problem arises how to assume infallibly this point of view, and, even more importantly, how to be certain that the actually accepted point of view is that of God and is not an illusion. Over centuries, Scripture (the Word of God) happened to be interpreted in many (and sometimes bizarre indeed) ways, and the claim that "Sacred Scripture is its own interpreter" (Sacra Scriptura sui ipsius interpres) seems, at best, to be a poetical metaphor. Even the staunchest advocates of the "principle" happen, in particular questions, entertain diametrically opposed opinions. Scripture *seems to be* a narration, because it is not, apparently, a scientific treaty. But the Scripture should be acknowledged *to be more* than just an ordinary narration if it is to be treated as seriously as it deserves to. Theologians are deadly serious in systematizing the content of the Scripture, but they happen to err nonetheless. The perfect outcome is unachievable unless a perfect tool has been used. The systematization is infeasible unless the "handmaid" of theology has been used: metaphysics.

Metaphysics, as the first philosophy, provides principles-definitions of particular sciences with dull pedantry. The same dull pedantry, however, is at work in the definitions of faith. In the Enchiridion of the Symbols of Faith the definitions are gathered, which are but a tiny fraction of what can be read in Scripture, but indispensable nonetheless to get to know any deeper meaning of the Scripture.

There is, in the ordinary definition, a genus (e.g. "animal") and the specific difference (e.g. "rationality", in the definition of man). Some categories of being or species of these categories are known this way. This knowledge suffices until some attempts at "meliorating" or "modernizing" principles are made. Then, the need for the architectonics of the edifice of science appears clearly. Metaphysics must be about the supra categorical properties of being.

Each science (metaphysics included) must have a specific subject matter different to others. The subject matter of metaphysics is being qua being, but being cannot be a genus.

[520] In De divinis nominibus, cap. 2 l. 1. […] in scientiis philosophicis ita est quod nullus sapiens disputat contra negantem principia suae artis.

There terminable in it (terminatum) and the terminating (terminans), but they are not a genus and specific difference respectively.

The subject matter is the terminable and the predicates used in it terminate it. They are "specifically universal" in metaphysics, but must be specified nonetheless. Metaphysics is unique for the reason its subject matter cannot be defined and shown to exist as a specific (or particular) being. Being is specified in it in a special way, but not demonstrable for that reason. The absolutely first principles cannot be demonstrated. They can be known along with the universal content of what has been abstracted from the sense data.

The manner they are known is presented in the first Chapter of Physics by Aristotle. It is so because the "physical" (natural) of man is engaged in getting to know the "metaphysical". Anyway, metaphysics cannot prove its own principles (it is no different in this respect to the other sciences), but the way the principles are naturally known by man can be roughly described in the treaty on nature as such. The human nature is rational, and thus predictable.

Thomas disagrees with Averroes in the interpretation of the text. There is no processus in demonstrando (process of demonstration), but the process of de-terminanation (processus in determinando).[521] The subject matter of metaphysics is specified this way.

The problem of the principles of metaphysics is addressed in the Book IV of Metaphysics, but the principles themselves are not demonstrated. The opponents of the principles (Heraclitus, Hegel) can be proved to err, but cannot be compelled to assume any positive statement. The error can be proved by means of a "philosophical dialogue"; called by Aristotle elenchus. The rational animal is expected to be a social (communicating) animal then. We get to know the immaterial in metaphysics by means of material sings. If the material world we live in had been different, the mode we get to know the immaterial would have been different and signs we use also. The mode, however, would remain undoubtedly rational, even if the natural mode of abstraction would be different.

If Averroes had been right, and a syllogism had been presented in the first Chapter of Physics, we would have a petitio principii there,[522] because there is nothing more in it at its

[521] In Physic., lib. 1 l. 1 n. 8. Sciendum autem quod Commentator aliter exponit. Dicit enim quod ibi, *innata autem est etc*. vult ostendere philosophus modum demonstrationis huius scientiae, quia scilicet demonstrat per effectus et posteriora secundum naturam: ut sic quod ibi dicitur, intelligatur de processu in demonstrando, et non in determinando. Cum autem dicit, *sunt autem nobis etc*. intendit manifestare, secundum eum, quae sunt magis nota quoad nos et minus nota secundum naturam, scilicet composita simplicibus, intelligens composita per confusa.

[522] Expositio Posteriorum, lib. 2 l. 3 n. 12 Tertio, ibi: non enim si consequitur etc., probat propositum, scilicet quod talis probatio contineat petitionem principii; et dicit quod non sequitur quod maior extremitas, quae est a, sit *quod quid est* minoris extremitatis, quae est c, ex hoc quod a sequitur ad b et b sequitur ad c; sed sequitur simpliciter quod a insit c. Et si ulterius detur quod ipsum a sit quod quid est alicuius, et praedicetur universaliter de b, non adhuc sequitur quod a sit quod quid est ipsius c: manifestum est enim hoc quod est animali *esse*, idest quod quid est animalis, praedicari de hoc quod est homini *esse*, idest de eo quod est *quod quid est* hominis. Sicut enim verum est quod animal universaliter praedicatur de homine, ita verum est quod definitio animalis universaliter praedicetur de definitione hominis, non tamen ut sint omnino unum et idem. Sic igitur patet quod si aliquis non sic accipiat terminos, ut primum sit omnino unum et idem medio, et medium ultimo, non poterit syllogizari quod a, quod est primum, sit quod quid est ipsi c, quod est ultimum, et essentia eius. Si vero

starting point of the than at the end of it. We have the same content, but presented eventually more distinctly; de-terminated but not demonstrated (proved).

The properties of being are called by Thomas the convertibles of being. In an ordinary syllogism, the convertibles are coextensive[523], but the suggestion must be avoided that they are similar to the elements of the set theory. If trying to define substance as such (not just *a* substance), which is then to be called "res"; the property of being as such; we have the terminable and the terminating, albeit we do not have a genus and specific difference, nor any reasoning which could clarify them both. The perfect syllogism (and the perfect definition too) is this, because it perfectly corresponds to the natural properties of being (is convertible therewith).

Thomas adduces an incorrect definition of substance: substantia est quod per se est; vel: accidens est quod est in alio. It is flawed because being was assumed in it as a genus (esse non potest poni in definitione alicuius generis et speciei).[524] Aristotle is well known for the polemic with Plato's way of defining. The specific difference cannot participate of the genus, but it must have been the case in Plato (they are both beings alike). There is, according to Plato, a "matter of the cognoscible" and defining consisted in dividing (diaresis; διαίρησις) the stuff. Mathematical objects are divisible this way, and Plato reduced being as such to a "mathematical being".

There is no διαίρησις (dividing a continuum) in defining, but there is διαίρησις in the determining of the originally abstracted from the sense data. Being is not a genus, but is to be determined in the way presented in Physics. Some special modes of being (supra categorical properties of being) can be grasped so as well as ordinary definitions (categorical properties of being). The former are called the convertibles of being, because they express more distinctly what has been included in the indistinct notion of being grasped first. The term of

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accipiantur termini modo praedicto, sequitur quod priusquam concludatur, accipiatur in praemissis quod quid est ipsius c, scilicet ipsum b. Ex quo sequitur quod non sit demonstratio, sed petitio vel acceptio principii.

[523] Expositio Posteriorum, lib. 2 l. 3 n. 12 Tertio, ibi: non enim si consequitur etc., probat propositum, scilicet quod talis probatio contineat petitionem principii; et dicit quod non sequitur quod maior extremitas, quae est a, sit *quod quid est* minoris extremitatis, quae est c, ex hoc quod a sequitur ad b et b sequitur ad c; sed sequitur simpliciter quod a insit c. Et si ulterius detur quod ipsum a sit quod quid est alicuius, et praedicetur universaliter de b, non adhuc sequitur quod a sit quod quid est ipsius c: manifestum est enim hoc quod est animali *esse*, idest quod quid est animalis, praedicari de hoc quod est homini *esse*, idest de eo quod est *quod quid est* hominis. Sicut enim verum est quod animal universaliter praedicatur de homine, ita verum est quod definitio animalis universaliter praedicetur de definitione hominis, non tamen ut sint omnino unum et idem. Sic igitur patet quod si aliquis non sic accipiat terminos, ut primum sit omnino unum et idem medio, et medium ultimo, non poterit syllogizari quod a, quod est primum, sit quod quid est ipsi c, quod est ultimum, et essentia eius. Si vero accipiantur termini modo praedicto, sequitur quod priusquam concludatur, accipiatur in praemissis quod quid est ipsius c, scilicet ipsum b. Ex quo sequitur quod non sit demonstratio, sed petitio vel acceptio principii.

[524] Quodlibet IX, q. 3 ad 2. Ad secundum dicendum, quod secundum Avicennam in sua Metaph. esse non potest poni in definitione alicuius generis et speciei, quia omnia particularia uniuntur in definitione generis vel speciei, cum tamen genus vel species non sit secundum unum esse in omnibus. Et ideo haec non est vera definitio substantiae: substantia est quod per se est; vel: accidens est quod est in alio. Sed est circumlocutio verae descriptionis, quae talis intelligitur: substantia est res cuius naturae debetur esse non in alio; accidens vero est res, cuius naturae debetur esse in alio.

the convertible is, thus used in both syllogisms and metaphysics (if the determination of the supra categorical properties of being analogically is concerned), but more properly in the latter. The Latin converti is the translation of the Greek Aristotelian ἀντιστρέφεσθαι.

The definition of unity (another convertible of being) reads: unum est ipsum esse indivisum.[525] Avicenna shirked from admitting the validity of the definition[526], and he had good reasons for that. He, first, identified the unity mathematics speaks of (a categorical property after all) with the unity of being (it is, in fact, its undividedness). Secondly, he rejected the primacy of the non-contradiction principle. But in fact, it can be assumed that he rejected the distinction in question, *because* undermining the primacy of the non-contradiction principle. He accepts the primacy of the principle of the third excluded instead. The principle is mentioned by Aristotle in Book IV of his Metaphysics, beside the non-contradiction principle. But in the centuries to come, the non-contradiction principle was about to be replaced by the so called identity principle. It is valid in determining the convention of using sings, but invalid in explaining *why* people use sings at all. The Aristotelian elenchus (a "proof" of the non-contradiction principle) elucidates the problem). In metaphysics, the identity principle: $1 \equiv 1$ counts for naught.

In the process of determination of what has been originally confusedly given (the effect of abstraction), Thomas distinguishes the following convertibles of being: ens, unum aliquid, res. There is, however, a convertible amongst them which is privileged in building science. "Aliquid" ("being-the-other") expresses the mode of the diversity of being. It is contained, in fact, in a verbalized form, in the non-contradiction principle. It is impossible to ordain the spoken out and the written down without using this principle.

Words are more than just "words, words, words …", because pregnant with the meaning imparted to them by the convertibles of being. There are, amongst them, good (bonum) and truth (verum). The both notions are commonly used, but they are, at the same time, abused for the same reason. All human truths and goods happen to be "diminished", because curtailed to some particular requirements (or petty interests). Originally, however, they are contained in the supra-categorical properties of being. They are not produced (called into existence) by man, but by God only.

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[525] Quaestio de anima, a. 3 c. Unde quod sit unibilis huic aut illi corpori, multiplicat animam secundum numerum non autem secundum speciem; sicut et haec albedo differt ab illa numero per hoc quod est esse huius et illius subiecti. Sed in hoc differt anima humana ab aliis formis, quod esse suum non dependet a corpore, nec hoc esse individuatum eius a corpore dependet; unumquodque enim, in quantum est unum, est in se indivisum, et ab aliis distinctum.

[526] Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 24 q. 1 a. 3 ad 3. Ad tertium dicendum, quod haec est vera definitio unius: unum est ens quod non dividitur; quamvis Avicenna, nitatur eam improbare ratione inducta. Est enim duplex divisio: scilicet divisio secundum quantitatem; et talis divisio consequitur rationem multitudinis, eo quod rationem multitudinis communiter acceptae sequitur ratio numeri, prout est species quantitatis, secundum quod addit rationem mensurae: unde dicit philosophus, quod numerus est multitudo mensurata per unum; et rationem numeri sequitur intellectus divisionis continui: ratio enim divisionis et quantitatis et mensurae, secundum Commentatorem, prius invenitur in quantitate discreta quam in quantitate continua: et talis divisio non ponitur in definitione unius quod convertitur cum ente.

Everything which stems directly from God must be true and good. The human goods, to the contrary, happen to be genuine as far as advancing along the pathway of the return to God. Human words (truths) happen to express, similarly, more than just private sentiments as far as delineating the universally passable pathway of the Return. The human nature as such is good. It is good as far as issuing from the hands of God. It is, however, especially good if assumed in the integral (Immaculate) form by the Divine Logos. There is, in the Gospel, the unique mode of the assumption described and imitable, consequently, by all.

Metaphysics is exceptional in delineating the pathway of the Return, because its principles are closest to its conclusions. It begins with the notion of being qua being (originally indistinctly given), but ends with stating the existence of the Pure Being.

Essences of things are known by specific definitions, but the cognition of what "transcends" specific essences is of pivotal importance in metaphysics. The categories of being "specify" our human modes of action, but the specification, if not counterbalanced by the cognition of supra-categorical properties of being might tether out existence to the earth. The cognizance of substances in general is necessary for our rational being in the world, but it is by no means certain that this being is the only reasonable.

According to Plato, the cognizance of what is "above substance" is pivotal for setting down the position of Arché towards the world.[527] The issue of the convertibles of being took this form before Aristotle. But it appeared in such a guise that proved to be liable to arbitrary interpretations. Unity is a convertible of being similarly as good must be. Still, in Plato, they are rather opposed to substance, than expressing its mode in general terms. The unity and good was supposed to be *above* substance ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας (or beyond it). By some "interpreters" they were supposed to be "supernatural".

The interpretation of Plato's teachings provided by Aristotle is commonly deemed "too difficult" for modernity. Neo-Platonists of old and now, advocate the idea of the supernatural and the rationalized in philosophy at the same time. Consequently, the science which can only be competent in identifying the supernatural (the rational theology) happens to be subject to resentful critique.

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[527] Plat. Rep. 6.508e

[…]
τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχον τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γιγνώσκοντι τὴν δύναμιν ἀποδιδὸν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν φάθι εἶναι: αἰτίαν δ᾽ ἐπιστήμης οὖσαν καὶ ἀληθείας, ὡς γιγνωσκομένης μὲν διανοοῦ, οὕτω δὲ καλῶν ἀμφοτέρων ὄντων, γνώσεώς τε καὶ ἀληθείας, ἄλλο καὶ κάλλιον ἔτι τούτων ἡγούμενος αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς ἡγήσῃ: ἐπιστήμην
[509α] δὲ καὶ ἀλήθειαν, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ φῶς τε καὶ ὄψιν ἡλιοειδῆ μὲν νομίζειν ὀρθόν, ἥλιον δ᾽ ἡγεῖσθαι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀγαθοειδῆ μὲν νομίζειν ταῦτ᾽ ἀμφότερα ὀρθόν, ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἡγεῖσθαι ὁπότερον αὐτῶν οὐκ ὀρθόν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι μειζόνως τιμητέον τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕξιν.
[…]
509β]
[…]
τὸν ἥλιον τοῖς ὁρωμένοις οὐ μόνον οἶμαι τὴν τοῦ ὁρᾶσθαι δύναμιν παρέχειν φήσεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ αὔξην καὶ τροφήν, οὐ γένεσιν αὐτὸν ὄντα.
[…]
καὶ τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις τοίνυν μὴ μόνον τὸ γιγνώσκεσθαι φάναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος.

The supernatural for man is natural for God. Grace perfects the nature, does not abolish it. Philosophy as such can never be opposed to any rational mode of cognition, albeit a unique (superior) mode of cognition is possible also.

Chapter VII.
THE PATHWAY OF THE HUMAN INTELLECT TOWARDS GOD

1. The proof of the existence of God from motion and the vital motion of man

In manifold ways and in manifold places, can a man experience privations connected with the places and the conditions of life which might be as unwelcome as unbearable. The privations, however, are not essential features (the per se accidents; proprieties) of the human life. The proprieties are rather forms of being (the opposite of the privations), although they stem from potentialities which happen to be stamped with some privations indeed.

The privations can be vividly felt, but not always called by their right name. So as to name (identify) the privations aright, a reflection is needed and philosophy eventually too. The philosophy itself is a perfection (a habit) of the faculty (potency) of reason in man. But the existence of this perfection is preceded by a special privation; not just the privation of e.g. food or fresh water (which are best perceptible), but the privation of the ultimate form of the human existence. At the very beginning of the human rational life, a special privation appears: admiration, which is the awareness of ignorance matched with the desire to know causes. The desire is, ultimately, fulfilled by the cognizance of the Ultimate Cause; the Cause of the ultimate perfection of man called happiness. The science-generating admiration (the consciousness of not being fully aware of the causal relations of the world we live in) plays a pivotal role in metaphysics, as the contemplation of its subject matter and its Principle is most formal in it, but is essential for acquiring any particular form/type of knowledge also.

The first philosophy (metaphysics) begins with the sense of the "total privation"; with the sense of being deprived of the most desirable cognition of the world. It is not culpable

save indirectly only. The ignorance is culpable only if natural requirements are being ignored of obtaining the knowledge. These privations might be effects of moral or intellectual errors.

Ignorance is a privation and might issue from a bad disposition of the will (from its not being subject to the intellect). In the natural train of events, however, the science-generating admiration is *followed* by the disposition of the will (the desire to get to know causes), and the admiration is not preceded by any act of the will: the whole role of the will consists in setting aside the influence of the inferior sensual powers exerted on the intellect. Socrates was right in retracing the very beginnings of knowledge; in ascribing them to awareness of ignorance; but was wrong in failing to distinguish the both faculties: of the intellect and the will.[528]

The fundamental (philosophical) ignorance is fully healed by the cognizance of the Supreme Cause of everything, although particular privations might occur on the pathway of the human intellect towards God as effects of the culpable ignorance concerning *the means* to the Ultimate End.

Metaphysics in Plato and Aristotle begins with the desire to get to know the order of the universe and the desire is preceded by the awareness of the ignorance of the order. The moral disorder, on the other hand, to be found in the human mind (the intellect and the will) is a special (particular) instantiation of the general condition of the natural world, in which forms (perfections) and privations alike accrue to what is in potency to them both. The human existential privations are, thus, to be set in a broader context of the potentiality (non-sufficiency) of the natural world. After discovering this general condition of the natural world, man is able to identify his/her special role in it and search for the Fullness of Being never to be found in the world itself stamped with the mark of potentiality and privation. The Source of being must be search for, and it can be found beyond the actual scope of the human existence only.

There are, between man and God, manifold objects which can be both means and obstacles posed on pathway of the man to God, all depending on how they are known and treated. Each thing has its trans-categorial properties indissolubly connected with its being (convertible with it).[529] Still, it has a nature beside the proper act of existence and some

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[528] Summa theologiae, Ia-IIae q. 6 a. 8 c. […] ignorantia tripliciter se habet ad actum voluntatis, uno modo, concomitanter; alio modo, consequenter; tertio modo, antecedenter. [1] Concomitanter quidem, quando ignorantia est de eo quod agitur, tamen, etiam si sciretur, nihilominus ageretur. […] [2] cum aliquis ignorare vult ut excusationem peccati habeat, vel ut non retrahatur a peccando […] et haec dicitur ignorantia affectata. […] cum aliquis actu non considerat quod considerare potest et debet, quae est ignorantia malae electionis [3], vel […] ignorantia universalium iuris [4], quae quis scire tenetur, voluntaria dicitur, quasi per negligentiam proveniens. […] Antecedenter autem se habet ad voluntatem ignorantia, quando non est voluntaria, et tamen est causa volendi quod alias homo non vellet. Sicut cum homo ignorat aliquam circumstantiam actus quam non tenebatur scire [5], et ex hoc aliquid agit, quod non faceret si sciret, […] Et talis ignorantia causat involuntarium simpliciter.

[529] De veritate, q. 1 a. 1 c. […] Illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quod conceptiones omnes resolvit, est ens […] Unde oportet quod omnes aliae conceptiones intellectus accipiantur ex additione ad ens. Sed enti non possunt addi aliqua quasi extranea per modum quo differentia additur generi, vel accidens subiecto, quia quaelibet natura est essentialiter ens; […] ita quod modus expressus sit modus generalis consequens omne ens; et hic modus dupliciter accipi potest: uno modo secundum quod consequitur unumquodque ens in se; alio modo secundum quod consequitur unum ens in ordine ad aliud [… :] secundum

properties in it also. The particular natural properties of things happen to conflict with each other, and the reconciliation is only to be found in what Heraclitus calls Logos; in the totality (as Thomas says) indented by the first Author of the world order. Particular ecosystems might be dissonant, until they are harmonized in the system of totality called universe (cosmos). Man is, however, a special being (a microcosms), because God intended his being as such and the properties which are otherwise dispersed and dissonant in nature are reconciled in him viz. in the science on nature. His nature is (or at least can be) a harmony existing beside the harmony of the universe.

Good is either a super-categorical property of being or a categorical property of *these* or *those* beings. What is undoubtedly good of a nature happen to be an apparent good for the other one. The super-categorical property of being stems directly from God (things proceed *from* God so), whereas the categorical property of being opens the pathway of the "return" towards God (things proceed *towards* God so). Some beings (viz. those bereft of reason) are naturally incapable of the full return (unable to realize their proper good in the end), and some happen people to fail to return too if led astray by some apparent goods (those not harmonized with their rational nature), which is, however, accidental only, because man, out of his/her nature, naturally tends to God.

We have no intuition of being and the pathway of the human intellect towards God is to be carefully analyzed and measured. The intuition of being is impossible, because things themselves are not simple and no "fractions" of the Fullness of Being also. They are composed of their specific natures and the acts of existence commensurate to their natures. If they are to be aids on pathway of the humans towards God, their properties are to be analyzed: composed and discomposed by the intellect proportionally to how they are so beyond it (in nature).

"The same is measure of the angel and man" (Rev 21:17), because there is the same end of them both.[530] But the measure of the e.g. a plant or a horse and the man is different as the former cannot "return" to God in the way man is in a position to. All beings endowed with the intellectual nature can attain happiness (can "return"), whereas dumb animals cannot be happy, unless, by the extension of meaning. Emotional satisfaction cannot be called happiness save metaphorically only.

The natural means of the return must be analyzed, but there are also other means devised, authorized and intended by God Himself called sacraments. *The fact* of the authorization can be known by the natural power of the human intellect even if *the nature* of

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convenientiam unius entis ad aliud; et hoc quidem non potest esse nisi accipiatur aliquid quod natum sit convenire cum omni ente: hoc autem est anima, quae quodam modo est omnia, ut dicitur in III de anima. In anima autem est vis cognitiva et appetitiva. Convenientiam ergo entis ad appetitum exprimit hoc nomen bonum, unde in principio Ethicorum dicitur quod *bonum est quod omnia appetunt*. Convenientiam vero entis ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen verum.

[530] Summa Theologiae I, q. 62 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra, Apoc. XXI, dicitur quod mensura Angeli, in illa caelesti Ierusalem, est mensura hominis. Sed homo ad beatitudinem pertingere non potest nisi per meritum. Ergo neque Angelus.

the authorization cannot be. The supernatural pathway of the return is then outlined by God Himself.

The being of things is directly intended by God. The particular natures, on the other hand, intend their own acts of existence only (and thus they partake of it), but the intention can be frustrated, because of the natural incapability to sustain the existence firmly enough. They must act so as to live; the acting (even if it is called life) is not identical with their existence. The identity takes place in the Supreme Cause only. The things created by Her must search for the Source of life beyond themselves. In the act of the ultimate beatitude, the human intellect (enforced by the lumen gloriae; the light of glory) will sustain the Fullness of Being for eternity.

The things we live amongst have specific natures and can be defined accordingly. The definition of the subject matter of a science is its principle. The definition of what is proper or improper to this or that nature will be known after building syllogisms based on the aforementioned participle. What is defined to be proper (or improper) to humanity is to be called value or anti-value respectively (albeit the theoretical knowledge of the anti-value is a value itself).

The activity of both the will and the intellect is not aimed at being as commonly participated by different natures (an impossibility anyhow). The activity should be aimed at the *transcendent* Fullness of Being only to be found beyond the discriminated structure of the totality of being (The activity cannot be inclusive if it is to be human). It seems preposterous to search for the being without restrictions in things which cannot exist otherwise than with restrictions.

Some particular beings sustain their existence at the expense of the others (the death of an herbivore is the life of a carnivore. Privations (e.g. death) are named by man as, for instance, in the sentence "he is dead". But can we conclude that "he *is*" before "he is *dead*"? The inference smacks of nonsense. The "is" of some statements does not correspond to any positive state of affairs in nature. Language does not mirror the reality. Discriminative judgments must be passed so as to sustain life; all the more so, the more perfect form of it.

There is nothing "mystical in the existence of things", but there is something bizarre in the way some try to call into "virtual existence" some objects using the "magical" copula "is". The "is" added to any idea (predicate, complement) seemed to call into a special ("human") existence the otherwise apparent beings. Man is decoyed, this way, into taking some apparent goods for those commensurate to his natural existence. They must be called apparent, because they lead astray from the Fullness of Being.

Thomas tells carefully between the "is" (esse; being) participable by a nature and the "is" predicated about this nature. The latter does no mirror the former in the way Brentano supposed. Human knowledge is not "a mirror of reality" but a reality of sorts. Its whole nature consists in being related to the universal structures of the reality. But on the other hand, the nature cannot be its own principle. The principle of being a nature is only to be found beyond the nature. But it cannot be found unless precisely known first.

Being related is, according to Aristotle, a species of the genus "being opposed" (ἀντικείσθαι). There are four species of the genus and "the relative" is the last of them. The next one is called "the contrary". Contraries are considered in every science (e.g. good and evil in ethics, or health and illness in medicine). But the contraries subject to the consideration

cannot be principles of the consideration (they must be defined, i.e. shown in the light of some principles). E.g. evil itself might be defined as a privation of good and thus the next species of ἀντικείμενα: the form and privation, appears. But, on the other hand, privations and forms are inherent to natures, and a cause they are so is to be accounted for first. There is, namely, another species of the ἀντικείμενα and the fundamental one. The "is" and "is not" are contradictory. The "is" is first predicated about what is opposed i.e. to be severed from non-being. The science is a relative, but scientists *as such* are not relativists, because the science, the rules of which they are obliged to follow, is founded on the first principle: the non-contradiction principle, which bids to tell uncompromisingly between being and non-being; between truth and falsehood; between good and evil. Each science uses the principle, but not all who claim to be scientists admit the fact. It is metaphysics only which treats the principle thematically.

Some believed that a mirror correspondence exists between objects and ideas conceived about them in the human mind and the "is" is a bridge between "reality" and "consciousness". In fact, however, the sense of the "is" of a scientific statement might be found in a syllogism only. The sense of being can only be elucidated by the content of the middle term of the syllogism, in which one of four causes is grasped. This way, in the conclusions of syllogisms, some objectively valid facts might be stated, i.e. the existence the properties/proprieties and improprieties of natures.

Some concepts happen to be believed to contain knowledge only because sophisticated ("profound") enough. But they do contain knowledge only if defined, and the definitions used in the major premises of demonstrative syllogisms (the definitions of subjects) allow defining the properties of the subjects. We get to know the properties of things by means of reasoning, but we cannot do so by a special type of cognition called intuition *contrasted to* reasoning. Human ideas might be commanding, if admired, but are useful if analyzed only. They cannot be admired save in the perspective of the fullness they are expected to demonstrate (to be found beyond them only). They must not be adhered to (be cherished) for this very reason.

The intuition (if the term be granted) is that of a cause only. And, as God is the Supreme Cause, the intuition of His essence will undoubtedly satisfy the human intellect in the afterlife. But, for the same reason, no other intuition of essence can satisfy the human intellect *now*.

The ideas of God are identical with His essence. No judgment about the Supreme Essence is possible for man, but judgments are actually needed about things which are composed of their what-ness and existences: they are composed so and might be means of the cognizance of the Non-Composed. The Divine ideas are expressive of what is realized in the act of creation.[531] If we had had any insight into the ideas, the insight might have been called

[531] Summa Theologiae, Ia q. 15 a. 1 c. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est ponere in mente divina ideas. Idea enim Graece, Latine forma dicitur, unde per ideas intelliguntur formae aliarum rerum, praeter ipsas res existentes. Forma autem alicuius rei praeter ipsam existens, ad duo esse potest, vel ut sit exemplar eius cuius dicitur forma; vel ut sit principium cognitionis ipsius, secundum quod formae cognoscibilium dicuntur esse in cognoscente. Et quantum ad utrumque est necesse ponere ideas […]. Quia igitur mundus non est casu factus, sed est factus a Deo per intellectum agente, ut infra patebit, necesse est quod in mente divina sit forma, ad similitudinem cuius mundus est factus. Et in hoc consistit ratio ideae.

the intuition of being. Plato seemed to think so (Phaedo, X 65C). But the intuition is impossible in the natural order and is perhaps reserved to mystics only, who, as long as mystics, cannot be scientists, i.e. cannot communicate their "intuition" (as Mieczysław Gogacz observes).

In the natural course of life, the "is" predicated about a thing does not mirror the real being (the created act of existence). The "is" can be predicated about both a perfection, e.g. "the world is a beauty", and a privation, even if a perfection is suggested, e.g. "he is consummate rogue". All judgments concerning particular/special realms of the real world must be harmonized into some systems (a science must be a system), but eventually, into the all-encompassing system of the supreme science. The existence of the Pure Being (and the possibility to know the Being in the afterlife "intuitively") is properly stated in this knowledge. The ideas intuited in this life, to the contrary, could *pretend* only to be God-like objects.

The desire to adhere immovably to God is preceded by the cognizance of the fact that everything in the world is movable: is similar to God as to some sharable perfection, but dissimilar as to the mode of possessing the perfection. The existence is participated deficiently and thus possibly destructive of the other modes of defective participation. The task of the supreme science consists in "extricating" the Immovable from the movable. Thus, the proof of the existence of God from motion is formed. The contraries are "reconciled" in the human abstracting intellect. Then, a possibility opens to find the common weal beyond the contraries.

Things (creatures) are similar to God as far as cooperating with Him in bestowing special perfections on the other creatures. Still, they are dissimilar as long as unable to create anything. The existence they bestow (e.g. in procreation) is not created because bestowed. It is rather deduced from the potency of the already created nature. The forms of particular existence are communicated this way; the more perfectly, the more perfect a source. But the natural generation might be frustrated after all, as some incidental particular causes might intervene.

All sciences are generally about nature (about the movable). Even if mathematics is believed to be exempted (and "opposed/contrasted" to nature) it is, in fact, about the formally abstracted from the movable nature. The mode, however, of the abstraction used in the philosophy of nature is different, because conceptual. The concepts, in turn, are judged metaphysics. It is about the moveable grasped in terms of its being and non-being (about the ultimate Source of being in motion).

The proof of the existence of God from motion assumes, thus, the following form:

1. Everything which is moved has a cause of its motion beyond itself;
2. The chain of the moving and the moved is finite (because the infinite cannot exist in nature; it is a mathematical abstract);
3. The conclusion reads: all changing thing are related to what makes the chain of causes finite; to a Transcendent Cause that exists beyond the chain of the moving causes and effects.

The syllogism belongs to the first figure (A-A-A). Aristotle calls it perfect, because it is built entirely out of general affirmative statements. (Major premise: All *M* are *P*: All middle terms are a major term; Minor premise: All *S* are *M*: All subject terms are a middle term; Conclusion: All *S* are *P*; Therefore, all subject terms are a major term).

The proof – called also the kinetic proof, as "kinesis" (κίνησις) means motion in Greek – is about motion in general; not about the motion unfolding against the background of a mathematical pattern (which is, in fact, the formally abstracted). The Aristotelian Physics is that of the changeable world, not about the world set against a mathematical backdrop. Perhaps, it could become the "theory of everything" in the moment the motion analyzed in it were described in the terms compatible with those of the contemporary physics. Metaphysics, in turn, comes after seizing the motion in terms of being as such.

Aristotle's definition of motion reads: "the act of that which is in potentiality, as such".[532] The definition is to be found in Physics, which uses the method different to that of mathematics, but elaborates on the concepts which can be judged by the supreme science (it is proper to metaphysics to judge). Mathematical ideas, to the contrary, cannot be expected to define the real state of matter (cannot be judged so also).

Inanimate things change in the way which is relatively easily analyzable. But the human body is animated by the human soul (the principle of life) and changes in manifold ways. However, no matter how intricate and complex, its motions might be proved to issue directly from specific principles immanent to this nature.

However, the motion of the body happened to be believed (according to the principles of scientism) to be triggered by the human brain only and the neural/brain processes analyzable in the exact (mathematical) sciences: set in the backdrop of the mathematical pattern/matrix (simplified so). Even the movement of the imagination might be believed to be testified (albeit indirectly only) by the extent the works of art and literature are actually consumed (can be measured so). The "creative" imagination might be well at work in them, according to some, but the "creativity" unfolds in time (which is measured too), and might be as "infinite" as numbers are. In the eyes of some modern philosophers (Heidegger), mathematics was about to replace metaphysics.

In the classical philosophy, the motion of imagination is proved to be caused and consummated by what *transcends time*: the act of the intellect and the will (the will, on its part, is moved by the intellect). Otherwise, the works of art could have a market value (be measured) indeed, but could have no *definite* value.

Ordinary objects move in time, and the time they move in might be "idealized" in mathematics indeed. The more complex, however, an object is (especially if living one), the less apt to the idealization. It is especially the case with the most perfect form of life: the life of the intellect. If mathematics had been the sum of wisdom, it could have explained the nature of its proceedings too, which it is, apparently unable to do (nobody is likely to succeed if adopting mathematical principles only). The movement of the intellect in mathematics must be both immaterial and finite; otherwise it could have not reached definite conclusions. But

[532] Physica, III, c. 1, 201a 9-11: διῃρημένου δὲ καθ'
ἕκαστον γένος τοῦ μὲν ἐντελεχείᾳ τοῦ δὲ δυνάμει, ἡ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἐντελέχεια, ᾗ τοιοῦτον, κίνησίς ἐστιν […].

on the other hand, mathematical forms are only one aspect of the intellectual activity, as mathematics itself uses concepts which are not mathematical at all (no one ever succeeded in writing a book on mathematics without conceptual language). Moreover, the concepts must be judged (not only juxtaposed) and the proper place for metaphysics appears there. The motion is measured therein in the way it affords the conclusion on the Immovable Principle of motion.

Aristotle and Thomas speak about the "instantaneous motion" (motus instantaneus) of the intellect and the will. The instantaneous motion of abstraction allows setting down a pattern/matrix of mathematical ideas, the ordinary motion is supposed to unfold in, but allows extracting the immovable from the movable also (mathematics uses only one type of abstraction, which is of a restricted value). The philosophy of nature and metaphysics "define" motion in more general terms than mathematics does. The definition allows building the syllogism adduced above.

The term of motion can have both generic and specific meaning. Motion in the narrow sense of the word is that of inanimate bodies and measured by time (like the effects of the motion of imagination can), whereas the motion taken generically might be that of the intellect and the will also. The latter is then called operation (operatio) and counter-divided to the motion defined in Physics.

The instantaneous motion of the intellect, however, cannot be subject of the proof in question; cannot seized in the major premise of the syllogism adduced above. It is at work *in building* the syllogism and cannot be, at the same time, *the subject matter* of the syllogism, as no cause can be identified with its effect. The argument from striving for the absolute truth cannot be, consequently, called a proof of the existence of God. The motion it implies cannot be, at the same time, exerted and reflected upon.

When construing the syllogism in question, we, apparently, use imagination (the fact can be known by sheer introspection), and material signs (as well as e.g. hands to write them down). The *effects* of the construing are measurable by e.g. the number of copies of a printed book, or the number of the visitors of a website. Human thinking has, thus, two aspects: the one phenomenal and measurable at least indirectly; the other immaterial and conjoined to the "intuition" (eustochia) of the middle term of the syllogism.[533] The syllogisms written on a sheet of paper have a certain imaginable form (similarly as the ones visualized mentally), but what enlivens it from within is not imaginable at all. Grasping the middle term of the syllogism is real, but not imaginable, and all the less: measurable.

In the "intuition", however, we seize the co-existence of objects in the physical world rather than a "naked" existence of separate objects. Them being separated (or being separable) is consequent only upon them being undivided in se and dividable from others (which cannot be known save by reflection only).

There is, in the conclusion of the syllogism in question, the fact of the existence of "Something" above the world stated. Still, Thomas says that the "Something" must be identified with God;[534] i.e. with what people commonly think to be the Providence governing

[533] Analytica Post., I c. 34.

[534] Summa Theologiae I, q. 2 a. 3 c. [...] Ergo necesse est devenire ad aliquod primum movens, quod a nullo movetur, et hoc omnes intelligunt Deum.

their lives. There is, however, no consensus as to this corollary of the proof (even amongst scholastics). Some are reluctant to identify them both, perhaps because of Kant's critique of the proof of the existence of God. Kant takes pains to prove its opposite: that the existence of God cannot be proved by the analysis of the physical world. Ca one fourth of his Critique is dedicated to what he called "transcendental dialectics". Metaphysics, to his mind, was just this: an apparent science. Kant did not call God "Something", but an "idea" instead. A capital shift of the philosophical stance occurred. Before Kant, the ideas had been commonly assumed to exist *in God's intellect*. After Kant, the philosophical ideas were about *to contain* the reality of God.

Philosophical concepts might be called "ideas", but must not be supposed (for that reason) to exist in a place "sacred" by philosophers. Their content might be well beyond the capability of a layman's intellect, but the reality they are obliged to represent must not. The proof of the existence of God is but a precise form of reasoning, which, otherwise, might be carried out unsystematically by a non-philosopher.[535] A man might get to know God in some elementary manner, without using philosophical ideas at all. In the end, however, this "unscientific" concept of God might prove compatible with the exact notion of God presented by Thomas.

Everybody must be compelled to admit the validity of the proof in question if reading it carefully enough. However, no one can be compelled to use *his/her own* intellect. Scarcely any do admit (nowadays) unreservedly the philosophical concepts ("ideas") used therein to describe real things. They are deemed (usually) to be "dry and abstract", but *not abstracted intellectually from real things* by this token; not relative to nature.

Philosophical ideas, in general, are often denied to describe any real things, and treated as pure phenomena of thinking (without bearing on what transcends them). Nietzsche could not have said that "God died" if he had not identified "God" as a social phenomenon. Living beings die in the normal sense of the word, whereas "ideas die" if not en vogue. The phenomenal in one's mind might easily perish (e.g. come into oblivion), and the same might befall the ideas harbored in many minds. But Nietzsche claims in fact that no mind worth his attention is able to entertain the idea. The ordinary atheism is "naïve" in comparison with the sophisticated "theology of the death of God". An atheist is sincere enough to admit openly his hostility towards religion (the openness is to be praised, even if the hostility is not so). Not "theologians" (Thomas Altizer; William Hamilton, Paul Van Buren) so. If there is no rigid boundary between God's creative thought and man's thought meant to represent the creation adequately, the chasm of absurd and despair opens ("created" by the human imagination). The

[535] Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 38 n. 1. Est enim quaedam communis et confusa Dei cognitio, quae quasi omnibus hominibus adest: sive hoc sit per hoc quod Deum esse sit per se notum, sicut alia demonstrationis principia, sicut quibusdam videtur, ut in primo libro dictum est; sive, quod magis verum videtur, quia naturali ratione statim homo in aliqualem Dei cognitionem pervenire potest. Videntes enim homines res naturales secundum ordinem certum currere; cum ordinatio absque ordinatore non sit, percipiunt, ut in pluribus, aliquem esse ordinatorem rerum quas videmus. Quis autem, vel qualis, vel si unus tantum est ordinator naturae, nondum statim ex hac communi consideratione habetur: sicut, cum videmus hominem moveri et alia opera agere, percipimus ei inesse quandam causam harum operationum quae aliis rebus non inest, et hanc causam animam nominamus; nondum tamen scientes quid sit anima, si est corpus, vel qualiter operationes praedictas efficiat.

(Kantian) ideal does not need to be good, only because "created" by the human mind. In fact, the "idealized" world can turn against humans (their biological existence).

The proof happened to be rejected, i.e. denied to be a *necessary* proof of the existence of *transcendent* God, but granted with condescension a modest place in the human culture/history. "Perhaps God exists (somewhere), but we should not be so intolerant to not admit that the opposite might be the case". A "tame" and "weak" deity of transcendentalism appeared after Kant.

That the identification of "Something" with God the Providence be possible, the motion of imagination (the phenomenal in the human thinking) must be "synchronized" (as Plato puts it) with the "instantaneous motion" of the intellect. The imagination must be subject to the intellect. Dumb animals are wholly satisfied with the life of imagination and instinct, but the human rational life cannot be satisfied therewith. The lack of subjection results, first of all, in questioning the objective value of the proof, but subsequently in disintegration of the whole life. A layman can be persuaded to "believe" that no *universal* providence governs the physical world. The belief is contrary to the normal (almost spontaneous) activity of his intellect. The subtle philosophical reasoning might elude the grasp of his intellect, but a general (indistinct) notion of Providence might not. If the ideas are successfully used *against* God (not for the sake to get to know Him), the depressing sense of the lost life bearings is vividly felt.

The existence of God must be eventually admitted by all who experience actually (in every moment they try to reason at all) the presence of the order of the physical world (the Providence is to be called so). The "philosophical ideas" can exist in a safe abode of the professorial cabinets, but "naive" laymen are concerned rather with the possibility whether God can intervene in the course of the natural events. The possibility is commonly rejected by the advocates of the so called "rationalism". The god of rationalists is, at best, granted but a precarious existence of a philosophical idea.

The "creative" ("productive" as Kant has it) imagination must rebel, sooner or later, against the Providential Presence of God in the universe, as the presence hampers its "spontaneity". A writer "creates" a "virtual world" with characters in it whose existence is not real, but rather "agreed upon" by the way of convention ("Some such like persons could have existed in reality"). The characters, however, can represent both values and anti-values, which is to say: there is no objective criterion to tell the former from the latter. The privation of good might be depicted even more plastically than the good itself, and thus pretend to have some value ("good" because impressing). "A vividly felt privation" might be witnessed and set against what seems to be a value, only because suggestively depicted. It is deemed a value because felt (experienced) so. The ideas of the life privation happen attract imagination this way in e.g. Beckett or Sartre.

The human will (heart) is naturally moved by the human intellect, but accidentally and unnaturally by imagination also. The movement of imagination must be subject to the intellect. However, so as to think at all (to reason) we must first will (desire) to reason. It can be, consequently asked, whether Aristotle had willed (indented) to prove the existence of God in the moment he had commenced writing his Metaphysics.

He did not. The opposite, albeit not the contrary, was the case. "The opposed" is a generic notion mentioned above and broader than "the contrary" which is its species. It was

not the case that Aristotle entertained the idea of proving the existence of God, albeit it is not the case too that he indented to prove the impossibility of the proof (which was the case in Kant's Prolegomena). In fact, at the very starting point of Metaphysics, Aristotle *fails to entertain any such like general ideas* at all. It is staunch atheists only who entertain the ideas contrary to religious believes, but the belief that all their opponents intend the contrary, is simplistic indeed. Aristotle was no atheist, obviously enough, but, at the starting point of his Metaphysics, he must have admitted theoretically the possibility of the atheist stance. He was not a "declared opponent" of atheism, and that is why his Metaphysics is such efficient a means to refute the atheist stance.

Aristotle, generally, in his Metaphysics failed to intend anything except knowledge as such. By admiration, the science-generating attitude, avoiding the ignorance is intended first only, and the cognizance of causes subsequently. But in the end, the conclusion is met as to the existence of Immovable Mover and the notion is confronted with the commonly accepted notions about the possible Author of the order of the universe. In his Metaphysics, to be sure, the ordinary notions about "gods" (particular providences) are criticized, but no matter whether people speak about God, Gott, Bóg, Dieu, Deus or Θεός (even in plural), the spoken so cannot correspond save to one and unique Immovable Mover of the universe. The plurality of ideas does not impair the uniqueness of God if He contains them all, which *cannot be* rejected a priori (polytheists might correct their original stance, after given convincing arguments).

We are doomed to using imagination and imperiled, consequently, to abuse it or even to desire preposterously the kinship with dumb animals, which live rightly by imagination and senses: cannot be immoral because following the supreme in their minds. The animal imagination cannot be perverse, whereas the human can be so, because imagination *is not* the supreme in the human mind. We-humans *cannot live rightly save by the force of the intellect*. Moreover, we could (and should, as Thomas says) be open to the assistance of some purely intellectual beings superior to us in the Providential plan of God.[536] They are called Angels in the Scripture.

If we were unreservedly open to their benevolent assistance, the sequence of the material signs we use when reasoning (at all) would correspond to the immaterial/intellectual purport of the proof of the existence of God. This or that act of reasoning would be part of *the universal* reasoning. Obviously, the contrary is, more often than not, the case: because of the obstruction of the "creative imagination", which is unnatural for man; but not only because of it. Not all intellectual beings are voluntarily subject to the order of the Divine providence. Those who rebel inspire uneasiness, despair and hatred so as to drive out hope for the fullness of being.

The conclusion of the syllogism in question is accompanied by the rest in God. The ancients spoke about otium (schole; σχολή) in this context, and the notion is hardly translatable, perhaps because the ancient frame of mind was so different to the modern

[536] Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 91 n. 5. Oportet ergo quod nostra intellectualis cognitio reguletur per Angelorum cognitionem.

utilitarian one. Vacare Deo[537] can be identified with the rest in God the Epistle to Hebrews speaks of.[538] Still, the rest happen to be regarded nowadays as a privation of activity. In fact, it is the most intense activity.

It might have been expected that Aristotle, after formulating the proof, would say, after the Psalmist, "I shall never be moved" (Non movebor in aeternum),[539] because of adhering to the Immovable and thus finding the source of real tranquility of mind[540]. But Aristotle does not say "forever" in his Ethics, but "for a brief time only" (X, c. 7). According to him, the contemplation of the magnificence of God is possible for us humans to a restricted extent only. At least, it must be so in this life. In must have been so in the heathen times.

The corollary of proof of the existence of God, "this (the Immovable) is called by all God", must be expressed in the words we normally use, but the words we actually use happen to be affected by vagueness or even tampered with their meaning. In effect, albeit "theoretically" ascertained as to the validity of the conclusion, we might "forget" about the validity if confronted with the commonness of life or the evil will of the masters of manipulation. Not only should God by "called by all"; He should be called (summoned) so too in every hour, minute and second of one's personal life. But the world we live in is stamped with manifold privations, which are likely to hamper the most precious activity. An ordinary headache can render us unable to focus on a valuable object. Especially, however, the privation of spiritual order (the "modern ideas") is likely to disturb the firmness of our cleaving to God.

Thus, the corollary of the proof in question enters the realm of the praxis of the human life (albeit being itself theoretical), because connected with the vital motion of the body, senses and imagination, which all should be subject to the dominion of the intellect, but happen to be emancipated therefrom nonetheless. They should be subject to the intellect via

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[537] Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 188 a. 2 c. Ad dilectionem autem Dei directe pertinet vita contemplativa, quae soli Deo vacare desiderat, ad dilectionem autem proximi pertinet vita activa, quae deservit necessitatibus proximorum. Et sicut ex caritate diligitur proximus propter Deum, ita etiam obsequium delatum in proximos redundat in Deum, secundum illud Matth. XXV, *quod uni ex minimis meis fecistis, mihi fecistis.*

[538] Super Io., cap. 5 l. 2. Ipse consummavit per perfectae iustitiae instructionem; Matth. V, v. 48: *estote perfecti, sicut et pater caelestis perfectus est*. Ipse introduxit in veram requiem; Hebr. IV, 3: *nos qui credimus, ingrediemur in requiem, quemadmodum dixit: sicut iuravi in ira mea, si introibunt in requiem meam*. Ipsi ergo competit in die sabbati operari, qui, quae ad sabbatum pertinent, perficere potest, a quibus lex impotens quiescebat.

[539] Psalmus 30 (29). 6. […] Ad vesperum demoratur fletus, ad matutinum laetitia. 7. Ego autem dixi in securitate mea: " Non movebor in aeternum ".

[540] Augustinus, In Psalmum 89 Enarratio. 3. [v. 2.]
a saeculo et usque in saeculum tu es. Quod convenientius diceretur: Ab aeterno in aeternum: non enim a saeculo Deus, qui est ante saecula; aut usque in saeculum, cuius est finis, cum sit ille sine fine. Sed ex ambiguo verbo graeco fit plerumque in Scripturis ut vel saeculum pro aeterno, vel aeternum pro saeculo ponat latinus interpres. Optime autem non ait: A saeculo tu fuisti, et usque in saeculum tu eris: sed praesentis significationis verbum posuit, insinuans Dei substantiam omni modo incommutabilem, ubi non est: Fuit, et Erit; sed tantum: Est. Unde dictum est; *Ego sum qui sum;* et: *Qui est, misit me ad vos*; et: *Mutabis ea, et mutabuntur; tu autem idem ipse es, et anni tui non deficient*. Ecce quae aeternitas facta est nobis refugium, ut in ea mansuri, ad eam de hac temporis mutabilitate fugiamus.

human will. The will rests in the truth contemplated by the intellect. The "dry and abstract" considerations of the theoretical science are thus translated into a private tongue of the existential experience.

The superiority of the theory over praxis in the human life (its usefulness) appears thus distinctly enough. Paradoxically, even from the point of view of "pure praxis", vacere Deo is an existential necessity, because an activity bereft of its natural consummation (rest) must beget frustration. Some rest is necessary after work in order to consume its fruits. Still, modern "consumerists" are poor at consuming, because the *nature* of consuming has been ignored. The complete rest metaphysics speaks of is that of the "work of life" and definitive of consuming as such (more necessary than any particular instantiation thereof). Any rest is in fact an anticipation of the perfect rest to be found in God. "The will of the just man rests in God while on the earthly path".[541]

The genuine philosopher (a theorist) does not harbor the intention of proving anything in advance (although Heidegger seems to be of a different opinion). Apparently, the philosopher may not advocate ideological atheism and vent out his/her resentment this way. Atheism can be a possibility, but cannot be an objective.

Neither, for that matter, can the philosopher claim the name of a Christian one until proving that his/her philosophy is worthy of the name and is the "handmaid" of theology indeed.

Many theologians tried to cultivate philosophy, but (perhaps because of being firm believers first) failed to acknowledge the value of philosophy for unbelievers (could no step into their shoes). St Anselm wanted to prove the existence of God so much that the demonstration proved to be wanting of validity. The same is to be said about Scotus and his Treaty on the First Principle. The philosopher must, at least for the time being, forget about him being a theologian, which was apparently not the case with Scotus. In the crucial moment of his Treaty, a logical mistake was committed (3.19; 3. 20). All doubts, in this matter, are "heathen" by their very nature and to be treated in objective terms. *The reasoning must not be existentially engaged; it must be universally cogent.*

Some people do not want (do not desire; do not harbor the intention) to accept the validity of the proof in question without a sufficient reason. It *must always be* the case if they cherish the downright contrary intention (their will is oriented so), but *it might be the case* too, if the will is simply disobedient to the intellect. Since Descartes, a special importance has been attached to what *he* called the human will. Man, by Descartes, was believed to be created in the image of God "according to his will". The intellect was believed to be finite, contrary to the will. "The image" is, in rationalism, Unitarian, whereas originally (in Augustine) it was Trinitarian. Neo-Platonism dominates. In Sartre and Nietzsche, voluntarism (the emancipation

[541] Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 1 q. 4 a. 1 ad 5. Ad quintum dicendum, quod est duplex quies, scilicet quies desiderii, et quies motus. Quies desiderii est quando desiderium sistit in aliquo propter quod omnia facit et quaerit, et non desiderat aliquid ulterius; et hoc modo voluntas justi quiescit in via in Deo. Quies autem motus est quando pervenitur ad terminum quaesitum; et ista quies voluntatis erit in patria. Haec autem quies facit perfectam fruitionem, sed prima imperfectam.

of the will from the dominion of the intellect) leads to irrationalism, but eventually to the open atheism. The ancient Neo-Platonism was theistic, but the notion of the Supreme *above* existence might easily change into that of what *outside* existence. Aristotle himself does not speak about Trinity (which must be obvious), but Aristotelians are permitted to speak about Her using the tools of his philosophy. The tools of the Neo-Platonist philosophy are useless there, and sometimes facilitate even atheism (no proof of the existence of God is possible in Neo-Platonism).

God should be called by His proper name "by all" (thinking people), the majority of whom are not philosophers. They happen to read philosophical books, but understand them in their own (and perhaps "naive") way. They cannot be blamed, but rather praised for their naivety. Still, some philosophical books (in the 20th century) were believed to be tailored to the mentality of the so called "modern man", whereas the "dry and abstract" considerations of scholasticism were labeled to be hopelessly "unmodern" and hardly understandable for the "contemporary man". The man was in fact defined by his alleged modernity (contemporaneousness). The ambience of the modern irrationalism and intuitionism (the milieu the "contemporary man" was supposed to be confined to) discredited the reasoning to the point it was disdained (which might be called "modern" or whatever else, because words do not matter much).

Philosophical books used to be read, but not understood "by all" as to their core meaning. Moreover, no philosophical books are commonly read in the 21th century. The philosophy as such has been discredited by the co called "modern philosophy". The core meaning of the "modern philosophy" proved to be simply anti-philosophical. The "majority" educated this way has been expected (not without some outlooks) to entertain opinions contrary to those traditionally accepted in metaphysics. In the 21th century, however, scholasticism might in the end appear to be more modern than ever.

The conclusions of science can and should be popularized, but the scientific asceticism cannot be expected to be a common pattern of life. Nicolai Tesla slept 2 hours a day, and all the rest dedicated to strenuous work. The science activity demands self-denial people are usually unable to practice.

Still, the "majority" is to be given free access to the common weal and uncontaminated truth first of all. The fruits of the genuine intellectual heritage of the West must be permitted to be safely consumed.

Thomas notes the paradox that the most sublime science happens to be the most disrespected at the same time. The existence of God could be always willingly accepted by "the majority", even if the detailed reasoning of proof is not likely to be so. *"The majority" has the right to demand of philosophers definite conclusions, so as to consume them. The conclusions are to be called values.*

The proof, as presented in Thomas' Summa, has rather simple and inconspicuous guise. It is generally acceptable by the average man, but unlikely to be accepted by those who expect of philosophy ideas ravishing and refined. Between the two opposite poles; between those who desire to get know God by a kind of natural impulse; and those who managed to fulfill the desire by providing stringent reasoning, a "majority" of those who are not able to undertake the intellectual work (for various reasons) is placed. The social solidarity demands of philosophers to work for them. There are, between the primitive desire of the perfection

and the consummation of the desire, manifold desires and manifold objectives pursued in the ordinary life. The "majority" happens to be led astray by them from the most important Objective of life.

The corollary of the proof in question has no market value; it is *priceless*, but not "worthless" for this reason. The ordinary activity happens to be restless and bereft of both its natural beginning (if the desire for fulfillment has been stifled) and the consummation: if the design of the fulfillment of the desire has been destroyed. Moreover, some claim that the very restlessness is in a position to drive economic growth, which is absurd indeed, as any goods (the material ones included), if not consumable *in peace*, are worthless. The artificially stirred economic growth might be an object of the idolatrous worship, but is not boosted for this reason, because it is downright unnatural. It lacks both the natural foundation and the consummation to be found in God.

Each of us is, in turns, a contemplating and an acting creature. There is some rest needed after any kind of work (acting), but, on the other hand, the activity cannot be reasonably triggered (ordered) unless calmly premediated. Leisure is not the same, however, as schole Greeks spoke of. The latter (vacere Dei) is necessary with respect to the ultimate, and not only with respect to a particular end.

A believer might aim at the defense of faith, but if the believer is about to do this efficiently enough, he must be more than just a believer. Some effective tools are needed for any work, and philosophy proved to be the most effective a means for theology and apologetics. The testimony to fact has been borne since the very beginnings of the new religion (in Justin Martyr, Irenaeus of Lyons and Athenagoras). "The doctors of old … had been heathens themselves, or at least had lived among heathens and were conversant with their teachings",[542] and thus they felt bound by solidarity with those who faced the New Religion with some distrust, suspicion or even resentment.

Perhaps the most striking feature of Thomas Dispute Questions and his Summa is the mode of their composition. Personal opinions of the Author are preceded by Objections which form a separate part of the text, different even as to the tongue used in them. There are, in Summa, 8687 Objections (apart from the Arguments Sed contra). It always might be asked, why Thomas gathered the objections.

Had he been living the life of contemplation, the philosophy and theology would have been for him pure pleasure only. Still, he took into consideration some opinions which might have disturbed the tranquility of the contemplation. He shared solidarily the doubts of others (his contemporaries). From the formal point of view, Summa is a perfect theoretical treaty. From the point of view of the praxis of life, it is the work of the most compassionate mercy.

Manifold "naïve" questions might be asked and various problems might appear on the pathway of the intellect towards God. They happened be looked down disdainfully and ignored by "theorists" intuiting their grandiose ideas and dismissive of any questions in the Podsnappian manner. Objections, especially if verbalized awkwardly, are likely to be treated with condescension. Thomas, however, has been called Doctor Communis, because treating them all with due seriousness. Moreover, he was called so, because universally valid conclusions (universal values) have been settled after anticipating practically all objections.

[542] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 2 n. 2.

His master therein was Aristotle. The Book III of Metaphysics is dedicated to "apories" (problems). They pose a *challenge* for an active intellect. Consuming (contemplating) ready-made conclusions (values) is but a pleasure.

A creative mind might be dismissive of any awkward questions, and thus not likely to deliver those entangled in real problems (life predicaments). Still, according to Plato, the way to the plenitude should be as straight only possible" (Phaedo, LVII; 108A), and the naïveté (such a sincerity) is a virtue; not a vice (XVIX 100D).

We have no intuition of being, but we do have the cognizance of the first principles[543], which allow building the proof of the existence of God (to be intuited in the afterlife). Without, however, the absolutely first one; the non-contradiction principle; ordaining both theory and praxis of life would is impossible.[544] The future events are not necessary as long as not ordained (διελόντα γε). They seem contingent, because the human will is free. Still, they are not indeterminate for that reason, as Wittgenstein assumes (Tractatus, 5. 1362). The indetermination cannot be a token of the authenticity of the human existence (as in Sartre). It is but an Ersatz of the real freedom.

The problem of the uncertainty of the future events might seem new, but was in fact deeply rooted in the Arab mediaeval philosophy. Avicenna assumes a third mode of being: neutral for both logical and real one. Both things and thinking would be preceded by mere

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[543] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 53 a. 1 c. Unde si aliquis habitus sit in intellectu possibili immediate ab intellectu agente causatus, talis habitus est incorruptibilis et per se et per accidens. Huiusmodi autem sunt habitus primorum principiorum, tam speculabilium quam practicorum, qui nulla oblivione vel deceptione corrumpi possunt, sicut philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic. de prudentia, quod non perditur per oblivionem.

De veritate, q. 16 a. 1 c. Oportet etiam hanc cognitionem habitualem esse, ut in promptu existat ea uti cum fuerit necesse. Sicut igitur humanae animae est quidam habitus naturalis quo principia speculativarum scientiarum cognoscit, quem vocamus intellectum principiorum; ita etiam in ea est quidam habitus naturalis primorum principiorum operabilium, quae sunt universalia principia iuris naturalis; qui quidem habitus ad synderesim pertinet.

[544] De interpretatione, c.9 [19a23] Τὸ μὲν οὖν εἶναι τὸ ὂν ὅταν ᾖ, καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν μὴ εἶναι ὅταν μὴ ᾖ, ἀνάγκη· οὐ μέντοι οὔτε τὸ ὂν ἅπαν ἀνάγκη εἶναι οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὂν μὴ εἶναι· —οὐ γὰρ ταὐτόν ἐστι τὸ ὂν ἅπαν εἶναι ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὅτε ἔστιν, καὶ τὸ ἁπλῶς εἶναι ἐξ ἀνάγκης· ὁμοίως [a27] δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος.— καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος· εἶναι μὲν ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἅπαν ἀνάγκη, καὶ ἔσεσθαί γε ἢ μή· οὐ μέντοι διελόντα γε εἰπεῖν θάτερον ἀναγκαῖον. λέγω δὲ οἷον ἀνάγκη μὲν ἔσεσθαι ναυμαχίαν αὔριον ἢ μὴ ἔσεσθαι, οὐ μέντοι γενέσθαι αὔριον ναυμαχίαν ἀναγκαῖον οὐδὲ μὴ γενέσθαι· γενέσθαι μέντοι ἢ μὴ γενέσθαι ἀναγκαῖον.
[18b. 26] Τὰ μὲν δὴ συμβαίνοντα ἄτοπα ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦθ' ἕτερα, εἴπερ πάσης καταφάσεως καὶ ἀποφάσεως, ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν καθ-όλου λεγομένων ὡς καθόλου ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα, ἀνάγκη τῶν ἀντικειμένων εἶναι τὴν μὲν ἀληθῆ τὴν δὲ ψευδῆ, μηδὲν δὲ ὁπότερ' ἔτυχεν εἶναι ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις, ἀλλὰ πάντα εἶναι καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἐξ ἀνάγκης. ὥστε οὔτε βουλεύεσθαι δέοι ἂν οὔτε πραγματεύεσθαι, ὡς ἐὰν μὲν τοδὶ ποιήσωμεν, ἔσται τοδί, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ τοδί, οὐκ ἔσται.

possibility of being and thinking.[545] According to those who follow Descartes, "pure" (supra-lunar; transcendental) thinking must be eventually bereft of substantiality and Descartes, (Meditation II, 27) follows suit. According to Verbeke, Avicenna tried so to solve the paradox formulated by Diodorus Cronos in antiquity: "The Master Argument" designed to link time and modality. Those three theses seemed to be irreconcilable:

1. Every past truth must be necessary (what has happened cannot be undone or changed).
2. An impossibility does not follow from a possibility (a valid or possible sequence of events cannot result in something impossible).
3. Something is possible which neither is nor will be true (there are unfulfilled possibilities).[546]

In fact, "something is (merely) possible" *now*, might be necessary in the future, because of the necessity of the end to be obtained in the future. The conditional necessity of the (allegedly "contingent") facts makes for the absolute necessity of the proof of the existence of God. Alas, Avicenna failed to both understand the nature of the conditional necessity and the absolute validity of the proof in question. A bizarre idea of "freedom" followed.

The Arab notion of the absolute possibility (reduced to indeterminateness) differs utterly from the potency (δύναμις) Aristotle speaks of. The latter is to be found in nature only. The former is expected to be found in the sphere of the transcendental ("supernatural") ideal.

The indeterminate was, originally in Avicenna, bereft of evil, but proved in modernity to be bereft of any positive characteristics; the abyss of uncertainty which yawns anxiety:

> Pascal had his abyss, it followed him.
> But the abyss is All—action and dream,
> language, desire!—and who could count the times
> the wind of Fear has made my blood run cold!
>
> Each way I turn, above me and below,
> tempting and terrible the silence, the space. . .
> By night God traces with a knowing hand
> unending nightmares on unending dark.

The future time was believed to be the realm the unknown one, and (according to Kępiński) the unknown is the main source of anxiety. The anxiety before the unknown seems inevitable for those unable to rule the future indeed.[547]

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[545] M. A. Krąpiec, Byt i istota, Lublin 1994. Rodz. V: Jana Dunsa Szkota koncepcja bytu; Rozdz. VI: Dziedzictwo Jana Dunsa Szkota; Rodz. VII: G. W. F. Hegla rozumienie bytu; Rodz. VIII: Niektóre postheglizmy współczesności.

[546] Avicenna Latinus, Introduction doctrinale par G. Verbeke, I, Louvain-Leiden 1977, s. 44* (nn).

(a) Tout ce qui appartient au passé, est nécessairement vrai;
(b) L'impossible ne peut être une conséquence du possible;
(c) Le possible est ce qui n'est pas vrai maintenant et ne le sera pas à l'avenir.

[547] A. Kępiński, Lęk, s. 6 oraz: 8, 10, 13, 47, Kraków 2002.

I balk at sleep as if it were a hole
filled with horror, leading God knows where;
my windows open on Infinity,

and haunted by its vertigo my mind
envies the indifference of the void:
will Numbers and Beings never set me free![548]

The sustenance of the human existence might seem fragile and the humans themselves similar to "thinking reeds". The sustenance, however, is to be otherwise (etymologically) called substance. The real substance is created by God, contrary to Selbsbewusstsein creative (according to Hegel) of itself (but possibly destructive of nature). The arrogant self-confidence seems pivotal for creative thinking (and self-creating too). The "personal" self-confidence must be enforced on the others so as to become "common consciousness". It might be enforced so, because the substantiality of each person has been questioned (according to the very principles of agnosticism).

The Psalmist addresses God with the words: *substantia mea tamquam nihil ante te*.[549] It might seem nothing against He-Who-Is in the full sense of the word. But on the other hand, human substance faces God (*substantia mea ante te est semper*),[550] Who sustains it (and never destroys). Substance is *something* even if frail. Divine Providence sustains it, and the human providence (part of the life wisdom) is invited to partake. Thus, however, every step into the future, i.e. sustaining some activities in it, is a rational proceeding: reasonable and responsible. It is not a step into the unknown. From all allegedly merely possible facts, some relevant pairs of them (the acting and the acted upon) might be confronted and analyzed.

A passage from Aristotle's "Hermeneutics") happens to be adduced as a possible exemption from the universality of the non-contradiction principle (the notorious Naval Battle) and the conditional necessity of the future events. But Aristotle himself says that it *is necessary* for the battle to occur or not either in presence or in the future (*εἶναι* μὲν ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἅπαν ἀνάγκη, *καὶ ἔσεσθαί* γε ἢ μή). The *isolated* facts only might seem to lack the necessity (οὐ μέντοι *διελόντα γε* εἰπεῖν θάτερον ἀναγκαῖον) (De interpretatione, c.9, 19a 28-9). Now, for a cognizant creature they must not be isolated; they must be matched in relevant pairs. Even

[548] Charles Baudelaire, Abyss, translated by Richard Howard
Access 2026-10-29 https://www.theparisreview.org/poetry/6838/the-abyss-charles-baudelaire

[549] Augustinus, In Psalmum 38 Enarratio, Sermo.
9. [v 6.] *Notum,* inquit, *Domine, fac mihi finem meum, et numerum dierum meorum qui est, ut sciam quid desit mihi.* Ecce trahit adhuc Adam, et sic festinat ad Christum. *Ecce,* inquit, *veteres posuisti dies meos.* Veteres dies ex Adam, veteres illos posuisti: veterascunt quotidie; et sic veterascunt, ut aliquando etiam consumantur. *Et substantia mea tamquam nihil ante te.* Ante te, Domine, tamquam nihil substantia mea, ante te qui vides hoc: et ego cum hoc video, ante te video, ante homines non video. Quid enim dicam? quibus verbis ostendam, nihil esse quod sum in comparatione eius quod est? Sed intus dicitur, intus utcumque sentitur. *Ante te,* Domine, ubi oculi tui sunt, non ubi oculi humani sunt: quid ubi oculi tui sunt? *Substantia mea tamquam nihil.*

[550] Ibidem. 13. [v 8.] *Et substantia mea ante te est semper.* Iam proficiens, iam ad ipsum tendens, et esse aliquantum incipiens: *ante te est semper substantia mea.* Substantia autem ista et ante homines est. Aurum habes, argentum habes, mancipia, praedia, arbores, pecora, servos; haec videri et ab hominibus possunt: est quaedam substantia ante te semper. *Et substantia mea ante te est semper.*

animals “associate” them according how their instinct requires. A fortiori, they must be ordained rationally by humans. The major premise of the proof in question describes the fact.

The proof of the existence of God is necessarily valid and the human pathway to God is marked by the necessity of end. The necessity concerns the connection of facts; not facts themselves isolated from each other as presented by phenomenology and encapsulated in the idea of the so called “logical atomism”. The facts originally given are not “contingent”, but the objects coupled like the moving and the moved must be. The phenomenon of motion is, subsequently, analyzable by dint of the non-contradiction principle (the principle of differentiation). The common denominator of facts occurring in the physical world is to be called potency (δύναμις); not just sheer possibility of being; but being in potency to act (δεκτικόν).[551] The Naval Battle happened to be misinterpreted indeed.

The possibility of being and non-being is but an effect (δύναμις) of being in potency to act in the physical world, which can be reflected upon. Avicenna reversed the natural order and the modernity follows suit. There are potencies in nature and habits in the natural faculties of man, which all make the future predictable and quite dissimilar to the “holes filled with horror, leading God knows where” the Poet speaks of. The future can be understood and mastered; can lead to the Fullness of Being.

There is no “pure thinking” Fichte speaks of and no pure possibility of being which founds the ontology of Christian Wolff. Our being and non-being is founded first on our natural potency and the habit of first principles. No insight in the totality of possible being is feasible for man. The possible totality as a whole is of no concern for the philosopher. A theologian (basing on the Revelation) might assume (to certain extent) the “absolute” point of view (God intuits the totality of possible being indeed), but the philosopher as such must be content with the representative part of the totality. It is addressed in minor premise of the syllogism in question.

Stepping into the future must be both rational and free. The indeterminateness of the future events (if real) would undermine the very foundations of ethics (Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 6.24; 6.241, 6.422).

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[551] Catheg., c. 11, 14 a 15-21 Δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ περὶ ταὐτὸν ἢ εἴδει ἢ γένει πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι τὰ ἐναντία· νόσος μὲν γὰρ καὶ ὑγίεια ἐν σώματι ζῴου, λευκότης δὲ καὶ μελανία ἁπλῶς ἐν σώματι, δικαιοσύνη δὲ καὶ ἀδικία ἐν ψυχῇ. ἀνάγκη δὲ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία ἢ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει εἶναι ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις γένεσιν, ἢ αὐτὰ γένη εἶναι· λευκὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ μέλαν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει […]
De Interp., c. 13, 22a 39
Metaph., V c. 10, 1018 a 20-31
᾽Αντικείμενα λέγεται ἀντίφασις καὶ τἀναντία καὶ τὰ πρός τι καὶ στέρησις καὶ ἕξις καὶ ἐξ ὧν καὶ εἰς ἃ ἔσχατα αἱ γενέσεις καὶ φθοραί· καὶ ὅσα μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἅμα παρεῖναι τῷ ἀμφοῖν δεκτικῷ, ταῦτα ἀντικεῖσθαι λέγεται ἢ αὐτὰ ἢ ἐξ ὧν ἐστίν. φαιὸν γὰρ καὶ λευκὸν ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ οὐχ ὑπάρχει· διὸ ἐξ ὧν ἐστὶν ἀντίκειται. ἐναντία λέγεται τά τε μὴ δυνατὰ ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ παρεῖναι τῶν διαφερόντων κατὰ γένος, καὶ τὰ πλεῖστον διαφέροντα τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει, καὶ τὰ πλεῖστον διαφέροντα τῶν ἐν ταὐτῷ δεκτικῷ, καὶ τὰ πλεῖστον διαφέροντα τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν, καὶ ὧν ἡ διαφορὰ μεγίστη ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ κατὰ γένος ἢ κατ' εἶδος. […]

The stepping into the future might be called approaching God. However, the exact meaning of the phrase: "Draw nigh to God, and he will draw nigh to you" (Appropinquate Deo, et appropinquabit vobis; Jac. 4.8) must be elucidated. God must not be in any place to the effect of not being in all others at the same time.

God's being cannot be understood anthropomorphically.[552] The idea of "approaching" should not write off the transcendence and immutability of God.[553]

Should a "radical" mode of disposing of anthropomorphism be adopted, God must be supposed to "be everywhere". Thus, however, no matter in which direction we turned, we would found Him in the end after all. But in the common sense of the word, God is another way e.g. in the Lateran Basilica than He was in Auschwitz. The latter appeared to many "the hell on the earth".

In his last letter to his mother St Maximillian consoled her writing "God is everywhere". The problem is, however, that it is saints only who can be sure of the fact, whereas the predominant majority of people "feel well" in a traditionally built temple, but feel discomfort in a place where Sacrum is trampled upon, even if so out of some "humanist" motives. We must approach God, in the common sense of the word, in a certain definite direction lest the end of the pathway be lost.[554]

In the New Testament, some prepositions are used so as to describe our approaching God. In the classical Greek, πρὸς mean almost the same as εἰς.[555] They are called (praepositiones aemulae);[556] "competing prepositions". An example is given at the beginning of the Chapter VIII of the Gospel according to St John: [1] Ἰησοῦς δὲ ἐπορεύθη *εἰς* τὸ Ὄρος τῶν Ἐλαιῶν. [2] Ὀρθρου δὲ πάλιν παρεγένετο *εἰς* τὸ ἱερόν, καὶ πᾶς ὁ λαὸς ἤρχετο *πρὸς* αὐτόν, καὶ καθίσας ἐδίδασκεν αὐτούς (J. 8). Still, in the same Gospel, εἰς has a special meaning besides. Thomas (in his Commentary) says that: "It is the same to come to Christ and to believe in Him"[557]. For "to believe in" means "to direct the life" to this end: the communion with the Plenitude of Being. "To believe in Christ" is the same as to acknowledge that the Old Testament's Tetragrammaton JHWH (He Who Is) is Christ's proper name.

> He says, ***I am he***, and not what I am, to recall to them what was said to Moses: *I am who am* (Exod 3:14), for existence itself is proper to God. For in any other nature but the divine nature,

[552] Summa Theologiae I, q. 9 a. 1 arg. 3. Praeterea, appropinquari et elongari motum significant. Huiusmodi autem dicuntur de Deo in Scriptura, Iac. IV, appropinquate Deo, et appropinquabit vobis. Ergo Deus est mutabilis.

[553] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 14 n. 4 Ad procedendum igitur circa Dei cognitionem per viam remotionis, accipiamus principium id quod ex superioribus iam manifestum est, scilicet quod Deus sit omnino immobilis. Quod etiam auctoritas sacrae Scripturae confirmat. Dicitur enim Malach. 3-6: *ego Deus, et non mutor*; Iac. 1-17: *apud quem non est transmutatio*; et Num. 23-19: *non est Deus quasi homo, ut mutetur*.

[554] Super Heb. [rep. vulgata], cap. 11 l. 2. *Nullus enim potest Deo placere, nisi accedat ad ipsum*. Iac. IV, 8: appropinquate Deo, et appropinquabit vobis. Ps. XXXIII, 6: *accedite ad eum et illuminamini.*

[555] A. T. Robertson, A Grammar of the Greek New Testament, p. 596.

[556] A. Piwowar, Składnia Nowego Testamentu, s.240.

[557] In Joan. c. 7., lect. 5, nr 1114.

> existence and what exists are not the same: because any created nature participates its existence from that which is being by its essence, that is, from God, who is his own existence, so that his existence is his essence. Thus, this designates only God. And so he says, ***for if you do not believe that I am he***, that is, that I am truly God, who has existence by his essence, ***you will die in your sin***.[558]

From this point of view; of the end of the pathway; all our deeds and thoughts might be appropriately judged because anyone who knows, by love and understanding, where he comes from and where he is going can speak only the truth, for he comes from God and is going to God.[559] But the situation is exceptional: we speak about the Perfect Man here: "the Son of God … who knows perfectly where he comes from and where he is going".

Commonly, our pathway to God is measured with a considerably modest yardstick. The starting point of our pathway is our present here and now: in the mutable world. We are not "aware of being created by God" (as the latter might come but as a conclusion of theology), and all the less are we "beings in the presence of God" (as it is expected but in the afterlife). The main problem of metaphysics consists in how to find the way to the Immovable departing from the movable (no matter how "profane") world.

We approach God not by physical steps (treading on the earth is but accidentally connected with *moral proceeding*), but by the acts of the intellect and the will. They normally direct our physical treading when the intended end is being executed. It is proper to man to approach God by affects and desires".[560]

> We draw near to God by no corporeal steps, since He is everywhere, but by the affections of our soul, and by the actions of that same soul do we withdraw from Him; thus, to draw near to or to withdraw from signifies merely spiritual actions based on the metaphor of local motion.[561]

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[558] In Joan. c. 8., lect. 3, nr 1179.

Joan. c. 8.

[24] εἶπον οὖν ὑμῖν ὅτι ἀποθανεῖσθε ἐν ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις ὑμῶν· ἐὰν γὰρ μὴ πιστεύσητε ὅτι ἐγώ εἰμι, ἀποθανεῖσθε ἐν ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις ὑμῶν.[25] ἔλεγον οὖν αὐτῷ, Σὺ τίς εἶ; εἶπεν αὐτοῖς ὁ Ἰησοῦς, Τὴν ἀρχὴν ὅ τι καὶ λαλῶ ὑμῖν; [26] πολλὰ ἔχω περὶ ὑμῶν λαλεῖν καὶ κρίνειν· ἀλλ' ὁ πέμψας με ἀληθής ἐστιν, κἀγὼ ἃ ἤκουσα παρ' αὐτοῦ ταῦτα λαλῶ εἰς τὸν κόσμον.[27] οὐκ ἔγνωσαν ὅτι τὸν πατέρα αὐτοῖς ἔλεγεν.28 εἶπεν οὖν [αὐτοῖσ] ὁ Ἰησοῦς, Ὅταν ὑψώ σητε τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τότε γνώσεσθε ὅτι ἐγώ εἰμι, καὶ ἀπ'ἐμαυτοῦ ποιῶ οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ καθὼς ἐδίδαξέν με ὁ πατὴρ ταῦτα λαλῶ.29 καὶ ὁ πέμψας με μετ'ἐμοῦ ἐστιν· οὐκ ἀφῆκέν με μόνον, ὅτι ἐγὼ τὰ ἀρεστὰ αὐτῷ ποιῶ πάν τοτε.30 Ταῦτα αὐτοῦ λαλοῦντος πολλοὶ ἐπίστευσαν εἰς αὐτόν.

[559] In Joan. c. 8., lect. 2, nr 1149.

[560] Super Sent., lib. 4 d. 17 q. 1 a. 2 qc. 2 c. Sed proportio ad Deum per naturae similitudinem non est in potestate voluntatis; similiter nec proportio capacitatis gratiae, quia haec ei praeexistunt a creatione; unde relinquitur quod in ipsa voluntate sit appropinquare Deo per affectum et desiderium, et ordinari ad gratiam per remotionem impedimenti, quod quidem impedimentum est peccatum; et ideo per displicentiam peccati et affectum ad Deum se aliquis ad gratiam praeparat; et quando haec duo efficaciter facit, dicitur facere quod in se est; et gratiam recipit. De primo horum dicitur Jac. 4, 8: *appropinquate Deo, et appropinquabit vobis*; de secundo Apoc. 3, 20: *si quis aperuerit mihi, intrabo ad eum*.

[561] Summa Theologiae, Ia q. 3 a. 1 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod ad Deum non acceditur passibus corporalibus, cum ubique sit, sed affectibus mentis, et eodem modo ab eo receditur. Et sic accessus et recessus, sub similitudine localis motus, designant spiritualem affectum.

The Abyss the Poet speaks of does not exist for a rational and free creature.[562] [563] Even the heathen philosophers approached God according to the requirements of the right reason and will. They failed, to be sure, to set the last step on the pathway towards the Plenitude of Being. Hence, from both the awareness of the incapability and the desire to overcome it at any expense, the famous angustia philosophorum[564] arose. They were extremely anxious to get to the Ultimate, albeit not anxious of "the tempting and terrible silence, the space. . . unending nightmares on unending dark".

Aristotle says that God is eternal and most perfect being, and His life is extremely admirable (Metaph., XII, c. 7, 1072b 24-30). He lives so forever, whereas "we live so for a short spell of time only" (Metaph., XII, c. 7, 1072b 13-15). No pagan could sustain the presence of God in the way Christians are able to. There is a special faculty called grace (in this life) or light of glory (in the afterlife) needed which makes it possible. But the abyss of centuries which yawed between Aristotle and Aquinas was bridged by their everlasting friendship. This way, Aristotle became "a true Knight of Christ".

The rest in God is the supreme value. God is not a value, but He is the creator of them all, and the creator of the human happiness first of all.

Values in logic are binary (a statement must be either true or false). But the same statement spoken out aloud and in the perspective of the End to be obtained gets a more eminent value. "Actions speak louder than words", but words are – in some situations – actions themselves. In this sense (and only in this sense) thinking (and science) might be called an activity and the "logic of life" might be multi-valued. Some words count for little in some situations, but sometimes are deadly serious.

If Augustine was right in stating that we humans "gravitate" towards God, it must be, nonetheless, stated that we do not so with equal intensity. There is not even constant intensity of the gravitational field of the earth. It varies according to how much we rise above its surface. If a material object had been aware of the intensity of the gravitation, the awareness would be accessory to the very gravitation only, which is, apparently, not the case with the relation of humans to God. According to Thomas, the desire for God increases in us humans proportionally as we approach Him (S. Thomae In Joan. c. 4, lect. 2, nr 586).

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[562] Compendium theologiae, lib. 2 cap. 6 c. 22 Et propter hoc, ut supra dictum est, in Psal. XXXV, 8, dicitur: *filii hominum in tegmine alarum tuarum sperabunt*. Et quamvis propter specialem curam omnibus hominibus Deus dicatur propinquus esse, specialissime tamen dicitur esse propinquus bonis qui ei fide et dilectione appropinquare nituntur, secundum illud Iac. IV, 8: *appropinquate Deo et appropinquabit vobis*; unde in Psal. CXLIV, v. 18, dicitur: *prope est dominus omnibus invocantibus eum, omnibus invocantibus eum in veritate*. Nec solum eis appropinquat, sed etiam eos per gratiam inhabitat, secundum illud Ier. XIV, 9: *tu in nobis es domine*.

[563] Super Philip., cap. 4 l. 1. Item est prope per inhabitantem gratiam. Iac. IV, 8: appropinquate Deo, et appropinquabit vobis. Item per exauditionis clementiam.

[564] Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 48 n. 16. In quo satis apparet quantam angustiam patiebantur hinc inde eorum praeclara ingenia. A quibus angustiis liberabimur si ponamus, secundum probationes praemissas, hominem ad veram felicitatem post hanc vitam pervenire posse, anima hominis immortali existente in quo statu anima intelliget per modum quo intelligunt substantiae separatae, sicut in secundo huius operis ostensum est.

An elementary body posed in the gravitational field moves with the acceleration which is nearly constant, albeit the intensity of the gravitation is proportional to how distant is the object from the center of the Earth. But "complex" bodies cannot be described to move the way a "point mass" can. If the gradient of the gravitational field were extremely huge (as in Black Holes) the body would be torn to pieces. We do not approach God monotonically (not even our body could so). Our steps towards Him are measured by the discrete acts of the intellect and the will. The discrimination is essential for life.

The discrete values of approaching the fullness being are to be found in the supreme science (metaphysics), but the discrete values of approaching God along the Pathway delineated by the Perfect Man are to be found in the Enchiridion of Symbols of Faith. Each of the 3928 Definitions of Faith (each of the properties of the Christian life) might be called value, albeit not measurable with an ordinary yardstick.

The rungs of the Jacobs Scale must: (1) rest on the substance created so as to sustain it, and (2) rest on the top of the scale. Without the supreme value (the rest in God) and the elementary one (the desire for good as such) all other values (discovered in particular sciences) might be potentially exposed to relativisation.

Each thing is moved by its proper mover.[565] The same, mutatis mutandis applies to the human heart (the will). Albeit its closer mover is the human intellect,[566] the ultimate Mover is God Himself.[567] The will *cannot be moved* save by the good which has been understood. The will *cannot rest* peremptorily save in the Sovereign Good.

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[565] Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 10 n. 15. Dictum est autem quod in ordine actionum moralium duo principia voluntatem praecedunt: scilicet vis apprehensiva; et obiectum apprehensum, quod est finis. Cum autem unicuique mobili respondeat proprium motivum, non quaelibet vis apprehensiva est debitum motivum cuiuslibet appetitus, sed huius haec, et illius alia. Sicut igitur appetitus sensitivi proprium motivum est vis apprehensiva sensualis, ita voluntatis proprium motivum est ratio ipsa.

[566] Contra Gentiles, lib. 2 cap. 76 n. 20. Unde animalia irrationalia magis aguntur ad operandum quam seipsa agant, quia omnis operatio eorum dependet a principio extrinseco movente: sensus enim, motus a sensibili exteriori, imprimit in phantasiam, et sic per ordinem procedit in omnibus potentiis usque ad motivas. Operatio autem propria hominis est intelligere: cuius primum principium est intellectus agens, qui facit species intelligibiles, a quibus patitur quodammodo intellectus possibilis, qui factus in actu, movet voluntatem.
Si igitur intellectus agens est quaedam substantia extra hominem, tota operatio hominis dependet a principio extrinseco.

Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 26 n. 22. Quod autem quinta ratio proponit, voluntatem esse altiorem intellectu, quasi eius motivam, falsum esse manifestum est. Nam primo et per se intellectus movet voluntatem: voluntas enim, inquantum huiusmodi, movetur a suo obiecto, quod est bonum apprehensum. Voluntas autem movet intellectum quasi per accidens, inquantum scilicet intelligere ipsum apprehenditur ut bonum, et sic desideratur a voluntate, ex quo sequitur quod intellectus actu intelligit.

Summa Theologiae I, q. 82 a. 3 ad 2. Sed illud quod est prius simpliciter et secundum naturae ordinem, est perfectius, sic enim actus est prior potentia. Et hoc modo intellectus est prior voluntate, sicut motivum mobili, et activum passivo, bonum enim intellectum movet voluntatem.

[567] Summa Theologiae I, q. 106 a. 2 c. Ex parte quidem obiecti, movet voluntatem et ipsum bonum quod est voluntatis obiectum, sicut appetibile movet appetitum; et ille qui demonstrat obiectum, puta qui demonstrat aliquid esse bonum. Sed sicut supra dictum est, alia quidem bona aliqualiter inclinant voluntatem; sed nihil

2. The intentionality of nature as the foundation of the return to God

According to Scotus, Brentano and Scheler (who follow Avicenna), intentionality is the act of consciousness. Values could be grasped as its objects.

The intentionality is, according to *Aristotle*, the *general feature of natural actions*. Even if the action of the human will is exceptional, it is, nonetheless, natural (the will has its own nature). In cognition, to the contrary, it is rather the quiddity of a material thing that acts on the knower than vice versa[568]. Aristotle distinguishes the intellect and the will, whereas they are hopelessly confused in the idea of consciousness, so that the "intentional spiritual dispositions" are (in Hildebrandt) object-directed acts and believed to be capable of cognition.

The Latin word "natura" (similarly as the Greek Physis) stems from a verb (nascitur, φύεται; respectively). The existence of the intellectual concepts in the human mind might be accounted for in the similar way as the existence and generation of animals can be, because the concepts are conceived in the intellect like animals are in their natural environment, rather than produced in it mechanically. The latter mode of production results often in the *damage* of the natural environment. The intellectual concepts are opposed to nature constructively: being related to it. The contrary is the case with consciousness. It is a privation of the original animal existence. Its coming to existence is veiled with the shroud of mystery and a myth only concerning its appearance in the human history is adduced in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit.

The impact of Hegelianism on the modernity might be gauged by the variety of threads deduced from the system rather than by its direct influence. Moreover, an alternative (complementary) version of the Absolute Philosophy was elaborated by Schelling and it has worked hand in hand with the Hegelianism. According to Husserl, there is animal consciousness apart from the human one[569]. Moreover, some attempts have been made at

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sufficienter movet voluntatem, nisi bonum universale, quod est Deus. Et hoc bonum solus ipse ostendit, ut per essentiam videatur a beatis, qui dicenti Moysi, ostende mihi gloriam tuam, respondit, *ego ostendam tibi omne bonum*, ut habetur Exod. XXXIII.

[568] Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 38 q. 1 a. 3 tit. Utrum intentio sit actus voluntatis.

Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 12 pr. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Primo, utrum intentio sit actus intellectus, vel voluntatis secundo, utrum sit tantum finis ultimi. Tertio, utrum aliquis possit simul duo intendere.

De veritate, q. 22 pr. 13. Tertiodecimo utrum intentio sit actus voluntatis.

[569] Edmund Husserl, Ideas General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. With a new foreword by Dermot Moran
Translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson; § 39, 53.
Access 2025-12-27. https://dokumen.pub/ideas-general-introduction-to-pure-phenomenology-online-ausgnbsped-9780203120330-0203120337-9780415519038-0415519039.html

showing the rudimentary guise of consciousness in plants also. The tendency chimes in with the System of Schelling. According to him, the nature is the latent spirit (an unconscious spiritual process that strives toward full self-consciousness in the human mind). There is, accordingly, consciousness in humans, but sub/non-consciousness also. Some one hundred years after the System was published Freud's the Lectures of Psychoanalysis appeared.

Since its very beginnings, the modern philosophy (of "liberty") has grappled with mechanicism, the spirit of which was carelessly evoked by Descartes. There are, according to him, "two substances", and "bodies" were defined in terms of privation of the properties of "spiritual substance", which was about to be called consciousness later on. The bodies were bereft of what is characteristic for consciousness only. The bodies interact mechanically, and cannot be supposed to be animated by the souls.

Hermann Lotze, so as to cope with the problem of mechanism (in the way different to that of Hegel and Schelling) coins a new idea of teleomechanism. He argued that teleology (purpose) and mechanism (physical laws) are fully compatible in nature. Mechanical laws are universal and provide the strict "how" of natural events, while teleology provides the ultimate "why" or meaning, functioning under a supreme world mind. The complete meaning of the world system points toward the Divine.

Lotze's finality (teleology) is that of a totality (a coherent, unified system the universe), but the totality does not seem to be directly conceivable, whereas we see with naked eyes *special* ecosystems in which finality is apparently at work. A *representative part* of the totality is grasped in the syllogism/proof of the existence of God.

According to Aristotle, *special* natures intend *special* ends. The existence of the totality of the world ecosystem is only to be affirmed after integrating those particular/special ones.

Fermat's principle testifies to the existence of finality in the elementary bodies, and no biologist (unless ideologically biased) will deny a more prominent guise of it in the animated nature.

Still, the existence of finality in nature appeared barley reconcilable with the principles of the Newtonian Mechanics. There are no "privileged" places in the three dimensional space, the motion of mechanism is supposed to unfold in. The position of mechanicism had appeared settled until, at the turn of the 20th century, new discoveries in physics proved the mechanist paradigm to be but an approximation of the motion of what is *really elementary* in nature.

The continuity of the function $y=x^2$ is evident. The *dis*-continuity of the displacement of the cosmic energy is a proved fact. The movement of an elementary particle is aimed at its natural rest to be found in the complexes of particles called atoms. According to Pauli's exclusion principle, the place of each electron in an atom is determined (to some special value). The values of the energy states are not directly measurable, but do not cease, for that reason, to be discrete (discontinuous) values the natural motion is aimed at. The rectilinear motion cannot aim at any privileged place, but the *actual* motion is never rectilinear in the real world. The acting of nature is intentional in this sense and the state of energy the motion tends to what might be called a value: not measurable, but real nevertheless.

According to Aristotle, species are "like numbers" but are not numbers really (as Plato suggested at least as to the ten ideal ones). The specific of a nature is "numbered" (if you like)

by its perfection[570]. Consequently, the human soul is not opposed to nature, but rather shown to be its utmost perfection. In it, the intentionality of nature appears most distinctly.

No ordinary man doubts in that his action must aim at a definite end. We act, arguably, for the sake of an end, until, perchance, we happen to be persuaded (by the advocates of mechanicism) that the objective is infeasible (is bogus). The persuasion is likely to beget frustration and despair. If the intended end seems unobtainable, no actions will follow.

Phenomenology was a reaction for the pedagogics of mechanicism. Supposedly, besides "bodies" a special being exists called consciousness. In Descartes, "soul" and "body" exist beside each other and unable to interact. However, either of them was about to be denied existence (the one "substance" annexed by the other) in those who followed suit. The simplest antithesis of mechanicism is idealism. Still, the whole, which had been called human person before Descartes, was disintegrated and attempts at reintegrating it thereafter would prove futile.

According to Aristotle, the intention of "God and nature" (God's intention is providential) makes it that all natural actions are aimed at their appropriate ends. There is, however, a special being able to "decipher" the intention and the plan: man. Augustine is in accord with Aristotle in assuming that "Immovable" is the proper name of God. There are, beside mutable things, exemplars (patterns) of what things should be: in the Immovable. According to St Bonaventure, no genuine philosopher can reject the existence of ideas. But the ideas of pure phenomenology are not exemplary in the sense those Augustinian are. They might be well a pattern of human producing, but cannot be compared with the Divine Ones. Creation is the exclusive prerogative of God. No man, arguably, can reintegrate (recreate) a

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[570] Summa Theologiae I, q. 50 a. 2 ad 1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod differentia est quae constituit speciem. Unumquodque autem constituitur in specie, secundum quod determinatur ad aliquem specialem gradum in entibus, quia species rerum sunt sicut numeri, qui differunt per additionem et subtractionem unitatis, ut dicitur in VIII Metaphys. In rebus autem materialibus aliud est quod determinat ad specialem gradum, scilicet forma, et aliud quod determinatur, scilicet materia, unde ab alio sumitur genus, et ab alio differentia.

Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 52 a. 1 c. Ut igitur huius rei veritas manifestetur, considerandum est quod illud secundum quod sortitur aliquid speciem, oportet esse fixum et stans, et quasi indivisibile, quaecumque enim ad illud attingunt, sub specie continentur; quaecumque autem recedunt ab illo, vel in plus vel in minus, pertinent ad aliam speciem, vel perfectiorem vel imperfectiorem. Unde philosophus dicit, in VIII Metaphys. quod species rerum sunt sicut numeri, in quibus additio vel diminutio variat speciem. Si igitur aliqua forma, vel quaecumque res, secundum seipsam vel secundum aliquid sui, sortiatur rationem speciei; necesse est quod, secundum se considerata, habeat determinatam rationem, quae neque in plus excedere, neque in minus deficere possit.

Metaph., VIII, c. 3, 1043b 33-1044a2

—φανερὸν δὲ καὶ
διότι, εἴπερ εἰσί πως ἀριθμοὶ αἱ οὐσίαι, οὕτως εἰσὶ καὶ οὐχ
ὥς τινες λέγουσι μονάδων· ὅ τε γὰρ ὁρισμὸς ἀριθμός τις·
διαιρετός τε γὰρ καὶ εἰς ἀδιαίρετα (οὐ γὰρ ἄπειροι οἱ
λόγοι), καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς δὲ τοιοῦτον. καὶ ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἀπ'
ἀριθμοῦ ἀφαιρεθέντος τινὸς ἢ προστεθέντος ἐξ ὧν ὁ ἀριθμός
ἐστιν, οὐκέτι ὁ αὐτὸς ἀριθμός ἐστιν ἀλλ' ἕτερος, κἂν τοὐλά-
χιστον ἀφαιρεθῇ ἢ προστεθῇ, οὕτως οὐδὲ ὁ ὁρισμὸς οὐδὲ τὸ τί
ἦν εἶναι οὐκέτι ἔσται ἀφαιρεθέντος τινὸς ἢ προστεθέντος.

destroyed human organ. The human creativity is taken in a metaphorical sense when producing or the art activity is meant.

The natural things in general, but the living things in particular, find the rest of their actions in their natural places. The rest is intended by God and to be called the value of this motion. The vital motion of man is, however, exceptional in this respect. The values are immanent to the created world, but partake, nonetheless, of the similitude of the immovable exemplary ideas present in God's intellect and the fact can be both understood and applauded by man.

The view had been commonly accepted until Scotus, at the turn of the 14th century, claimed that the objects of the Divine Intellect are *formally* only (not really) identical with God's essence. This way, the transcendent and the immanent ceased to be radically opposed. They were really relatives in Thomas (relativa secundum esse), because the sense of their being consists in being opposed so. In Husserl, who developed the Scotian doctrine in the way probably quite unexpected to Scotus himself, a strange hybrid: "transcendence in immanence" appears.

The transcendent and the immanent might be called a principle and the principled respectively, or: the commencing and the commenced.[571] E.g. the whole meaning of "being a father" is related to that of "being a son".

According to Thomas, humans actions in general and the consummation of all human acting in special called happiness, are immanent to human nature, but the end of the actions must be transcended (at least in weaker sense of the word adopted in particular actions). The creature and the Creator are related really, but there is no reason to suppose that a separate relation exists between them. The relation of the dependence on (the Source of) being is immanent to creature. There can be no real relations to creatures in God, although the Third Person of Trinity (the Holy Spirit) is a Self-Subsisting Relation really. The Holy Spirit (the Self-Subsistent Relative) is present this way in the human history (of persons and communities). The human history is related to God this way.

Scotus' esse diminutum (the object of the intellect of God) was in fact assumed to exist "between" Creator and the created. On the map of the history of philosophy, the

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[571] Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 30 q. 1 a. 2 c. Si primo modo, hoc contingit dupliciter: aut enim propria praedicatione praedicatur aliquid de Deo ex tempore, quod designat habitudinem principii ad principiatum; aut aliquid quod designat ipsum principiatum a Deo, sicut quando est praedicatio per causam, ut cum dicitur, Deus est spes nostra. Si primo modo, hoc contingit dupliciter: aliquando enim nomen imponitur ad significandum ipsam habitudinem; sicut hoc nomen dominus, et hujusmodi, quae sunt relativa secundum esse, et alia dicta de Deo, sunt quidem relativa, quia etiam significant ex primo suo intellectu habitudinem quae secundum rationem est in Deo; sed ex consequenti faciunt intellectum essentiae, secundum quod talis habitudo fundatur in aliquo essentiali. Aliquando autem nomen imponitur ad significandum illud supra quod fundatur habitudo, sicut hoc nomen scientia, qualitatem, quam consequitur respectus quidam ad scibile.

Summa Theologiae I, q. 13 a. 7 ad 1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod relativa quaedam sunt imposita ad significandum ipsas habitudines relativas, ut dominus, servus, pater et filius, et huiusmodi, et haec dicuntur relativa secundum esse. Quaedam vero sunt imposita ad significandas res quas consequuntur quaedam habitudines, sicut movens et motum, caput et capitatum, et alia huiusmodi, quae dicuntur relativa secundum dici.

influence of Scotus' idea is marked by the names of: Suarez, Descartes, Ch. Wolff, Brentano, Husserl, Scheler, Ingarden.[572]

In Husserl, a privileged mode of cognition is that of the intuition of the Scotian esse diminutum (what is possible to exist). The history of philosophy showed this being to be considerably less commanding than previously assumed ("diminished" indeed). In Husserl, the intuition (Intuition),[573] or insight (Anschauung)[574], should be first of all (as the principle of principles[575]) the intuition of essence (*Wesen*intuition),[576] (*Wesen*anschauung).[577] No mention is made about the real existence, or the Fullness of Being beyond it.

The Aristotelian analysis of motion is that of the co-existence of things in nature, and Thomas cannot to be supposed to "correct" the stance by addressing the naked existence of things. The correction" would be in fact tantamount to destruction. The cognizance of co-existing thing should lead to the cognizance of the Transcendent Cause. The chain of causes and the effects is stated to coexist in the Minor Premise of the proof of the existence of God, Who is separate indeed, whereas all the means leading to its cognizance cannot be separated for the same reason. The modern intuitionism (with its cognizance of naked existence) proves in fact to be a hindrance to the cognizance of this unique Being.

Aristotle says nothing about coming to existence in the sense of being so out of nothing. Still, he regards motion as the way to coming to a *specific* existence. Anyway, both existence as such (in Thomas) and the specific existence Aristotle focuses on are sharply distinguished from non-being. This way, by distinguishing them both, Aristotle comes to stating the fact of the existence of God: the author of the universal becoming of things. By the "is" of philosophical statements, the substances known and defined are "linked" so as to form a totality dependent on the Transcendent Cause. No "isolated" objects can exist; neither can they be supposed to be known as such by dint of the "identity principle".

A thing, according to Thomas, is intentionally directed to its being (esse), whereas in Aristotle the generation is intentionally directed at this or that being only.[578] In Thomas, the

[572] Por. L. Honnefelder, Scientia transcendens, Hamburg 1990.

[573] Edmund Husserl, Ideas, § 59, 67, 69, 78, 79.

[574] Ibid., § 149, 150.

[575] Ibid., § 24.

[576] Ibid., § 79, 135, 152.

[577] Ibid., § 20, 21.

[578] Summa Theologiae I , q. 44 a. 2 c. Respondeo dicendum quod antiqui philosophi paulatim, et quasi pedetentim, intraverunt in cognitionem veritatis. A principio enim, quasi grossiores existentes, non existimabant esse entia nisi corpora sensibilia. Quorum qui ponebant in eis motum, non considerabant motum nisi secundum aliqua accidentia, ut puta secundum raritatem et densitatem, congregationem et segregationem. Et supponentes ipsam substantiam corporum increatam, assignabant aliquas causas huiusmodi accidentalium transmutationum, ut puta amicitiam, litem, intellectum, aut aliquid huiusmodi. Ulterius vero procedentes, distinxerunt per intellectum inter formam substantialem et materiam, quam ponebant increatam; et perceperunt transmutationem fieri in corporibus secundum formas essentiales. Quarum transmutationum quasdam causas universaliores ponebant, ut obliquum circulum, secundum Aristotelem, vel ideas, secundum Platonem. Sed considerandum est quod materia per formam contrahitur ad determinatam speciem; sicut substantia alicuius speciei per accidens ei adveniens contrahitur ad determinatum modum essendi, ut homo contrahitur per album. Utrique igitur

existence rests on a thing "more firmly" than in Aristotle. The intention proves to be "stronger" in Thomas, but remains the immanent property of nature nonetheless.

Analogically, the effect of quiddity's (nature) acting on the human intellect rests more firmly on it also. The first concept of the intellect is that of being[579]; not only this or that being. The act of being (esse) rests on a thing and the adequate cognizance of the thing must take the fact into account.

Anyway, we cannot come to the cognizance of the Fullness of Being save by analyzing the ordinary modes of being. The cognition of naturally known principles serves as the principle of this demonstration.[580]

2. 1. The intention of nature

Nature intends propagating its similitude both in material nature and in the human intellect.[581] Human intentions are, in fact, born from the thus intellectually grasped good (intention) of nature and God, who operates behind it. The nature and the cognizance of nature are opposed as relatives[582] in Aristotle, although such a coexistence of them both seemed hardly thinkable

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consideraverunt ens particulari quadam consideratione, vel inquantum est hoc ens, vel inquantum est tale ens. Et sic rebus causas agentes particulares assignaverunt. Et ulterius aliqui erexerunt se ad considerandum ens inquantum est ens, et consideraverunt causam rerum, non solum secundum quod sunt haec vel talia, sed secundum quod sunt entia. Hoc igitur quod est causa rerum inquantum sunt entia, oportet esse causam rerum, non solum secundum quod sunt talia per formas accidentales, nec secundum quod sunt haec per formas substantiales, sed etiam secundum omne illud quod pertinet ad esse illorum quocumque modo. Et sic oportet ponere etiam materiam primam creatam ab universali causa entium.

[579] Summa Theologiae I, q. 5 a. 2 c. Respondeo dicendum quod ens secundum rationem est prius quam bonum. Ratio enim significata per nomen, est id quod concipit intellectus de re, et significat illud per vocem, illud ergo est prius secundum rationem, quod prius cadit in conceptione intellectus. Primo autem in conceptione intellectus cadit ens, quia secundum hoc unumquodque cognoscibile est, inquantum est actu, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys. Unde ens est proprium obiectum intellectus, et sic est primum intelligibile, sicut sonus est primum audibile. Ita ergo secundum rationem prius est ens quam bonum.

[580] De veritate, q. 1 a. 1 c. Dicendum, quod sicut in demonstrabilibus oportet fieri reductionem in aliqua principia per se intellectui nota, ita investigando quid est unumquodque; alias utrobique in infinitum iretur, et sic periret omnino scientia et cognitio rerum. Illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quod conceptiones omnes resolvit, est ens, ut Avicenna dicit in principio suae metaphysicae. Unde oportet quod omnes aliae conceptiones intellectus accipiantur ex additione ad ens.

[581] De veritate, q. 1 a. 10 ad s.c. 3. Ad tertium dicendum, quod duplex est perfectio; scilicet prima, et secunda: prima perfectio est forma uniuscuiusque, per quam habet esse; unde ab ea nulla res destituitur dum manet; secunda perfectio est operatio, quae est finis rei, vel id per quod ad finem devenitur et hac perfectione interdum res destituitur. Ex prima autem perfectione resultat ratio veri in rebus; ex hoc enim quod res formam habet, artem divini intellectus imitatur, et sui notitiam in anima gignit. Sed ex perfectione secunda consequitur in ipsa ratio bonitatis, quae consurgit ex fine; et ideo malum simpliciter invenitur in rebus, non autem falsum.

[582] Super Sent., lib. 4 d. 44 q. 2 a. 1 qc. 3 ad 2. Ad secundum dicendum, quod omne passivum recipit actionem agentis secundum suum modum. Si ergo aliquid sit quod natum sit immutari ab activo, naturali et spirituali immutatione, immutatio naturalis praecedit immutationem spiritualem, sicut esse naturale praecedit

in the Cartesian tradition. Intentions are granted to be harbored by all men, but there is a reason to advance the broader notion of intentionality after all[583]. It might be difficult to define in nature, as there is action and reaction supposed to exist in macroscopic bodies only. Nothing of the sort can be supposed to exist between the knower and the known. The good intended by the human will is that of the form interiorized in the intellect without "acting and reacting". Still, "intentions" cannot be so "private" that existing apart from nature. Their effects must be as real as material objects are.

We act reasonably if understanding first a (part of) nature we focus on; i.e. after identifying the state of the energy of an object, without, however, measuring it. The energy is, normally (in "acting and reacting" bodies), dispersed because measurable, and the measuring is, for this reason, approximate only. The human cognizance, however, does not consist in measuring, but in abstracting (grasping the potential of the field without dispersion of its energy). The potential of the electromagnetic field is known this way.

The divine intention (the providential plan) permeates the whole universe, and even a quite ordinary (as it might seem) motion is intentional as far as part of the all-encompassing totality. The difference between the ordinary motion and the human one consists in that the former is executive *directly* of the Divine Providence, Which must be, for this reason readily decipherable beyond it, whereas latter is executive of the Divine Providence *indirectly* only, Which is, for this very reason *hardly decipherable* beyond it. The human action is triggered by the human cognition (and execution of the Divine Plan mediated so). It follows identifying objects, but the identification happens to be wrong. At least a representative part the structure of the universe should be adequately known for the action to be what it should be. Human actions are representative of the Divine in saints, but generally they are this by identifying the existence of the Author of the order of the universe. The "natural ecosystem" of man is "broader" than any particular (and normally so called) one.

2. 2. The primomota and the proof of the existence of God from motion

The generalization of the notion of intentionality is needed for deeper understanding the line of the argumentation presented in Summa Contra Gentiles; so as to cope with a special

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esse intentionale. Si autem natum sit immutari tantum spiritualiter, non oportet quod immutetur naturaliter; sicut est de aere, qui non est receptivus coloris secundum esse naturale, sed solum secundum esse spirituale; et ideo hoc solum modo immutatur; sicut e converso corpora inanimata immutantur per qualitates sensibiles solum naturaliter, et non spiritualiter.

[583]Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 7 l. 6 n. 23. […] Non enim calor, qui causat putredinem, intendit naturali appetitu generationem huius vel illius animalis, quae ex putrefactione sequitur, sicut virtus, quae est ex semine, intendit productionem talis speciei. Sed si referatur ad virtutem caelestem, quae est universalis regitiva virtus generationum et corruptionum in istis inferioribus, non est per accidens, sed per se intenta; quia de eius intentione est ut educantur in actu omnes formae quae sunt in potentia materiae. Et sic recte assimilavit hic Aristoteles ea quae fiunt ab arte, his quae fiunt a natura.

Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 7 l. 7 n. 16 […] Et dicitur ista generatio praeter naturam, quia est praeter intentionem naturae particularis.

difficulty present in it. Not only is the chain of causes and the effects necessary to exist in the ordered universe. There can be, in addition, no objects exempt from the chain. There can be no objects which have the source of their energy entirely within themselves (primomota). The Minor Premise of the proof addresses the problem. The impossibility of the existence of such like "blank spots" on the map of the universe is perhaps all the less obvious, the more complex a structure and the relation of the moving and the moved in them is less perceptible also.[584] It is the case with the animal organisms (which might seem to "move all by themselves" until "scientifically" dissected), but especially in the bodies (organisms) animated by the reason.

Avicenna questioned the validity of the Aristotelian argumentation and the aforementioned primomota (their desirable existence) were the case.[585] There are, according to him, some exceptional substructures of the universe, but there is, to his mind, no stringent proof of the existence of God possible: the one integrating all possible substructures of the universe. Human soul is such a substructure. The spirituality (existence) of the human soul can be, to his mind, proved, but the existence of God cannot be proved just because of *the way* the existence of the human spirituality (called consciousness in modernity) has been proved.

The Aristotelian definition of motion (sensu stricto): actus existentis in potentia inquantum huiusmodi,[586] is of no account unless the primacy of the non-contradiction

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[584] Quorum primum probat philosophus tribus modis. Primo, sic. Si aliquid movet seipsum, oportet quod in se habeat principium motus sui: alias, manifeste ab alio moveretur. Oportet etiam quod sit primo motum: scilicet quod moveatur ratione sui ipsius, et non ratione suae partis, sicut movetur animal per motum pedis; sic enim totum non moveretur a se, sed sua pars, et una pars ab alia. Oportet etiam ipsum esse divisibile, et habere partes: cum omne quod movetur sit divisibile, ut probatur in VI Physic. (lib. 1 cap. 13 n. 5).
His suppositis sic arguit. Hoc quod a seipso ponitur moveri, est primo motum. Ergo ad quietem unius partis eius, sequitur quies totius. Si enim, quiescente una parte, alia pars eius moveretur, tunc ipsum totum non esset primo motum, sed pars eius quae movetur alia quiescente. Nihil autem quod quiescit quiescente alio, movetur a seipso: cuius enim quies ad quietem sequitur alterius, oportet quod motus ad motum alterius sequatur; et sic non movetur a seipso. Ergo hoc quod ponebatur a seipso moveri, non movetur a seipso. Necesse est ergo omne quod movetur, ab alio moveri. (lib. 1 cap. 13 n. 6).

[585] Nec obviat huic rationi quod forte aliquis posset dicere quod eius quod ponitur movere seipsum, pars non potest quiescere; et iterum quod partis non est quiescere vel moveri nisi per accidens; ut Avicenna calumniatur. Quia vis rationis in hoc consistit, quod, si aliquid seipsum moveat primo et per se, non ratione partium, oportet quod suum moveri non dependeat ab aliquo; moveri autem ipsius divisibilis, sicut et eius esse, dependet a partibus; et sic non potest seipsum movere primo et per se. Non requiritur ergo ad veritatem conclusionis inductae quod supponatur partem moventis seipsum quiescere quasi quoddam verum absolute: sed oportet hanc conditionalem esse veram, quod, si quiesceret pars, quod quiesceret totum. Quae quidem potest esse vera etiam si antecedens sit impossibile: sicut ista conditionalis est vera, si homo est asinus, est irrationalis. (lib. 1 cap. 13 n. 7).

[586] In Physic., lib. 3 l. 2 n. 3 Et ideo omnino impossibile est aliter definire motum per priora et notiora, nisi sicut philosophus hic definit. Dictum est enim quod unumquodque genus dividitur per potentiam et actum. Potentia autem et actus, cum sint de primis differentiis entis, naturaliter priora sunt motu: et his utitur philosophus ad definiendum motum. Considerandum est igitur quod aliquid est in actu tantum, aliquid vero in potentia tantum, aliquid vero medio modo se habens inter potentiam et actum. Quod igitur est in potentia tantum, nondum movetur: quod autem iam est in actu perfecto, non movetur, sed iam motum est: illud igitur movetur, quod medio modo se habet inter puram potentiam et actum, quod quidem partim est in potentia et partim in actu; ut patet in alteratione. Cum enim aqua est solum in potentia calida, nondum movetur: cum vero est iam calefacta,

principle is accepted: the one able to ordain the moving and the moved. The primacy of this principle was rejected by Avicenna and those who followed. There was, according to them, no necessary distinction of the moving and the moved to be found in the human consciousness. Plato *seemed to suggest* that the soul is moved all by itself, but it was Avicenna who formed his "floating man argument" so as to substantiate the claim. The primacy of the so called identity principle is naturally matched by the advocates of the medieval Via Moderna with the notion of self-consciousness of who gets to know it. The identity principle might be supposed to idealize motion (to schematize it), but the non-contradiction principle accounts (as the specific movement of the intellect) for the motion being analyzable.

The vital motion of consciousness was understood to be "free" and in fact opposed to the Principle which *excludes* the existence of any such like primomota in the universe. Even if the human intellect and his will move in a specific way, God can move them immediately (although He, normally, does so in a definite order only). The "authenticity" of the "human freedom" happened to be opposed to the existence of the Transcendent Cause by those unable to grasp the fact, perhaps because gauging "freedom" by the yardstick of the set theory. Some felt compelled to choose between a boundless "liberty" and the objective/necessary rules governing the universe *in modernity*. Moreover, many understood Plato this way, and believed that he cannot be understood in any other way, the contrary of which was, however, was proved by Thomas.[587] This modern stance was absolutely alien to the Greek ancient philosophy.

It goes without saying that the analysis of the vital motion of animals in general, and the vital motion of the human will in special, poses a special difficulty. It is easier (paradoxically) to prove the existence of God than the immortality of the soul. (Scotus tried

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terminatus est motus calefactionis: cum vero iam participat aliquid de calore sed imperfecte, tunc movetur ad calorem; nam quod calefit, paulatim participat calorem magis ac magis. Ipse igitur actus imperfectus caloris in calefactibili existens, est motus: non quidem secundum id quod actu tantum est, sed secundum quod iam in actu existens habet ordinem in ulteriorem actum; quia si tolleretur ordo ad ulteriorem actum, ipse actus quantumcumque imperfectus, esset terminus motus et non motus, sicut accidit cum aliquid semiplene calefit. Ordo autem ad ulteriorem actum competit existenti in potentia ad ipsum. Et similiter, si actus imperfectus consideretur tantum ut in ordine ad ulteriorem actum, secundum quod habet rationem potentiae, non habet rationem motus, sed principii motus: potest enim incipere calefactio sicut a frigido, ita et a tepido. Sic igitur actus imperfectus habet rationem motus, et secundum quod comparatur ad ulteriorem actum ut potentia, et secundum quod comparatur ad aliquid imperfectius ut actus. Unde neque est potentia existentis in potentia, neque est actus existentis in actu, sed est actus existentis in potentia: ut per id quod dicitur actus, designetur ordo eius ad anteriorem potentiam, et per id quod dicitur in potentia existentis, designetur ordo eius ad ulteriorem actum. Unde convenientissime philosophus definit motum, dicens quod motus est entelechia, idest actus existentis in potentia secundum quod huiusmodi.

[587] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 13 n. 10 Sciendum autem quod Plato qui posuit omne movens moveri, communius accepit nomen motus quam Aristoteles. Aristoteles enim proprie accepit motum secundum quod est actus existentis in potentia secundum quod huiusmodi: qualiter non est nisi divisibilium et corporum, ut probatur in VI Physic. Secundum Platonem autem movens seipsum non est corpus: accipiebat enim motum pro qualibet operatione, ita quod intelligere et opinari sit quoddam moveri; quem etiam modum loquendi Aristoteles tangit in III de anima. Secundum hoc ergo dicebat primum movens seipsum movere quod intelligit se et vult vel amat se. Quod in aliquo non repugnat rationibus Aristotelis: nihil enim differt devenire ad aliquod primum quod moveat se, secundum Platonem; et devenire ad primum quod omnino sit immobile, secundum Aristotelem.

the former, but despaired to prove the latter). The complexity of the vital motion of the human soul makes it that the motion is quite inconvenient a point of departure for the proof of the existence of God. But it is not tantamount to that the motion of "consciousness" or (whatever its name) is excluded from the general rules governing the universe. The angels get to known the existence of God by "intuiting" their own essences (the discourse of their intellect is scarce). Still, (dato per impossible) that the intuition of an angel's essence had been unachievable for a moment, but the "intuition" of the essence of human soul achievable in its stead, the angel could, no doubt, get to know the existence of God by "intuiting" the human soul; just because the object of the cognition would be known as perfectly as it can never be known by man himself (man is a riddle for himself, whereas a "problem" only of angels as the object of providential care, the duty of which is imposed on him by God). There is a great difference between stating that the essence of the soul is hardly cognoscible *for man* and thus this cognizance not convenient a means for the proof of the existence of God; and the stating that some "blank spots" exist in the world (or "beside" it) uncertain whether created by God or stemming from any cause.[588]

Sensing, thinking and willing is not an ordinary motion, but a motion nonetheless.[589] The motion as defined in Physics, is measured by time, whereas the motion of the principle animating some bodies is not.[590] [591] The latter is rather to be called perfect than perfectible.[592] Still, it is not indeterminate for that reason.

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[588] In Physic., lib. 8 l. 4 n. 6. Et quia hoc videtur esse contra id quod est proprium animalis, scilicet quod moveat seipsum; ideo subiungit, quod cum dicimus animal movere seipsum, non intelligimus hoc de quolibet motu, sed de motu locali, secundum quem animal movet seipsum per apprehensionem et appetitum. Sic igitur nihil prohibet, immo necessarium est, quod in corpore animalis fiant multae transmutationes a continente, scilicet aere et corpore caelesti; quarum quaedam movent intellectum aut appetitum, ex quo ulterius iam totum animal movetur.

[589] Summa Theologiae I, q. 59 a. 1 ad 3. Ad tertium dicendum quod voluntas dicitur movens motum, secundum quod velle est motus quidam, et intelligere; cuiusmodi motum nihil prohibet in Angelis esse, quia talis motus est actus perfecti, ut dicitur in III de anima.

[590] Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 1 q. 1 a. 1 c. 1 Felicitas autem non est in habitu, sed in operatione, secundum philosophum. Optima autem operatio hominis est operatio altissimae potentiae, scilicet intellectus, ad nobilissimum objectum, quod est Deus: unde ipsa visio divinitatis ponitur tota substantia nostrae beatitudinis, Joan. 17, 3: *haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te solum Deum verum*. Ex visione autem ipsum visum, cum non videatur per similitudinem, sed per essentiam, efficitur quodammodo intra videntem, et ista est comprehensio quae succedit spei, consequens visionem quae succedit fidei, sicut spes quodammodo generatur ex fide.

Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 1 q. 1 a. 1 ad 2. Et similiter etiam patet solutio ad secundum: quia visio non habet perfectam rationem felicitatis, nisi secundum quod est operatio perfecta per ea quae sequuntur. Perficit enim delectatio operationem, sicut pulchritudo juventutem, ut dicitur 10 Ethic.

Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 4 q. 1 a. 1 ad 1. Et per hoc jam patet solutio ad primum: quia generatio, secundum suum genus, quod est mutatio, in divinis non invenitur; unde in Deo non est mutatio, sed operatio divinae naturae, secundum Damascenum. Differt autem operatio a motu, secundum philosophum, quia operatio est actus perfecti, sed motus est actus imperfecti, quia existentis in potentia.
Arist., De anima III, c. 7, 431a 4-7

—φαίνεται δὲ τὸ μὲν αἰσθητὸν ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος τοῦ

The *immediate* object of the proof of the existence of God is the world moving and moved in general (and thus depending on The Outer Side). The pathway of the Return is delineated in science (by the act of the intellect building the proof in question), whereas the act of the will which follows is rather the Return itself than a mere design. The first principles of the intellect and the will stem immediately from God. The consummation of the motion originating from the principles is only to be found in God also. Everything which is between the principle and the end might seem uncertain for the time being, but is at least potentially elucidatable by the power of the intellect.

Thomas argues the impossibility of existing any isolated sources of motion in the universe, and the motion of the intellect and the will is not to be excluded from the rule. The human mind is not a self-deriving process ("consciousness"), but a complex structured of its natural parts. Beside the material parts of his body, there are, in man, the so called "potential parts" (partes potentiales).[593] Human powers are to be called so: they act on each other. The primitive impulse given to the mind by "nature and God" must be transformed in the human

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αἰσθητικοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ ποιοῦν· οὐ γὰρ πάσχει οὐδ' ἀλλοιοῦται.
διὸ ἄλλο εἶδος τοῦτο κινήσεως· ἡ γὰρ κίνησις τοῦ ἀτελοῦς
ἐνέργεια, ἡ δ' ἁπλῶς ἐνέργεια ἑτέρα, ἡ τοῦ τετελεσμένου. —

[591] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 113 a. 7 ad 4. Ad quartum dicendum quod in eodem instanti in quo forma acquiritur, incipit res operari secundum formam, sicut ignis statim cum est generatus, movetur sursum; et si motus eius esset instantaneus, in eodem instanti compleretur. Motus autem liberi arbitrii, qui est velle, non est successivus, sed instantaneus.

[592] Super Sent., lib. 4 d. 17 q. 1 a. 5 qc. 3 ad 1. Est enim quidam motus qui est actus imperfecti, qui est exitus de potentia in actum; et talis oportet quod sit successivus, quia semper expectat aliquid in futurum ad perfectionem suae speciei, eo quod pars motus est alterius speciei a toto motu, ut dicitur in 10 Ethic. sicut patet in alteratione de motu qui est ad albedinem, cujus pars est motus ad medium colorem specie differens, si divisim accipiatur. Alius motus est actus perfecti, qui magis operatio dicitur, qui non expectat aliquid in futurum ad complementum suae speciei, sicut sentire; et talis motus non est successivus, sed subitus; et si contingat quod talis motus sit in tempore, hoc erit per accidens, quia mensuratur in quolibet instanti illius temporis in quo dicitur esse; sicut esse hominem, in tempore est et in instanti; et talis motus est motus liberi arbitrii, de quo loquimur; et ideo est in instanti. Secus autem esset, si esset motus collativus; quia tunc non posset esse in instanti, propter discursum de uno in aliud.

Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 31 a. 2 ad 1. Alius autem motus est actus perfecti, idest existentis in actu; sicut intelligere, sentire et velle et huiusmodi, et etiam delectari. Et huiusmodi motus non est successivus, nec per se in tempore.

Summa Theologiae III, q. 34 a. 2 c. Talis autem est operatio voluntatis et intellectus, in qua consistit usus liberi arbitrii. Subito enim et in instanti perficitur operatio intellectus et voluntatis, multo magis quam visio corporalis, eo quod intelligere, velle et sentire non est motus qui sit actus imperfecti, quod successive perficitur; sed est actus iam perfecti, ut dicitur in III de anima.

[593] Summa Theologiae I-IIae q. 57 a. 6 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod memoria, intelligentia et providentia, similiter etiam cautio et docilitas, et alia huiusmodi, non sunt virtutes diversae a prudentia, sed quodammodo comparantur ad ipsam sicut partes integrales, inquantum omnia ista requiruntur ad perfectionem prudentiae. Sunt etiam et quaedam partes subiectivae, seu species prudentiae, sicut oeconomica, regnativa, et huiusmodi. Sed praedicta tria sunt quasi partes potentiales prudentiae, quia ordinantur sicut secundarium ad principale. Et de his infra dicetur.

mind. It happens be transformed, to be sure, to the point of being distorted, but the source of transforming is analyzable nonetheless.

Human potencies (powers) are manifold, but not isolated for that reason. There is, to the contrary, only one actually intended action possible. Man cannot intend many things (which are not ordered) at the same time, similarly as he is unable to step simultaneously in different directions: the one excludes all the others.

There are, in Descartes, no potencies, but attributes (of substance) and modes (modi) of "cogitation" only.[594] Descartes fails to account for the fact that one act of a special potency (especially if intense) impedes the other, as e.g. strong emotion impedes thinking, and the physical pain can make it even impossible. The potencies of material organs are connected so with those of the soul also. The potencies are closer principles of actions.[595] Man cannot act by his whole self (as primomotum).

The phantasms move, as Thomas says, the possible intellect if abstracted from material conditions.[596] There is always a principle of abstraction and its end, because the motion in a vicious circle as impossible as perpetuum mobile is.[597]

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[594] Meditation III, 37; Principles of Philosophy, I, 56.

[595] Summa Theologiae I-IIae q. 49 a. 2 c.[…] Proprie enim qualitas importat quendam modum substantiae. Modus autem est, ut dicit Augustinus, super Gen. ad litteram, quem mensura praefigit, unde importat quandam determinationem secundum aliquam mensuram. Et ideo sicut id secundum quod determinatur potentia materiae secundum esse substantiale dicitur qualitas quae est differentia substantiae; ita id secundum quod determinatur potentia subiecti secundum esse accidentale, dicitur qualitas accidentalis, quae est etiam quaedam differentia, ut patet per philosophum in V Metaphys. Modus autem sive determinatio subiecti secundum esse accidentale, potest accipi vel in ordine ad ipsam naturam subiecti; vel secundum actionem et passionem quae consequuntur principia naturae, quae sunt materia et forma; vel secundum quantitatem. Si autem accipiatur modus vel determinatio subiecti secundum quantitatem, sic est quarta species qualitatis. Et quia quantitas, secundum sui rationem, est sine motu, et sine ratione boni et mali; ideo ad quartam speciem qualitatis non pertinet quod aliquid sit bene vel male, cito vel tarde transiens. Modus autem sive determinatio subiecti secundum actionem et passionem, attenditur in secunda et tertia specie qualitatis. Et ideo in utraque consideratur quod aliquid facile vel difficile fiat, vel quod sit cito transiens aut diuturnum. Non autem consideratur in his aliquid pertinens ad rationem boni vel mali, quia motus et passiones non habent rationem finis, bonum autem et malum dicitur per respectum ad finem. Sed modus et determinatio subiecti in ordine ad naturam rei, pertinet ad primam speciem qualitatis, quae est habitus et dispositio, dicit enim philosophus, in VII Physic., loquens de habitibus animae et corporis, quod sunt *dispositiones quaedam perfecti ad optimum; dico autem perfecti, quod est dispositum secundum naturam. Et quia ipsa forma et natura rei est finis et cuius causa fit aliquid*, ut dicitur in II Physic. ideo in prima specie consideratur et bonum et malum; et etiam facile et difficile mobile, secundum quod aliqua natura est finis generationis et motus. Unde in V Metaphys. philosophus definit habitum, quod est dispositio secundum quam aliquis disponitur bene vel male. Et in II Ethic. dicit quod *habitus sunt secundum quos ad passiones nos habemus bene vel male*. Quando enim est modus conveniens naturae rei, tunc habet rationem boni, quando autem non convenit, tunc habet rationem mali. Et quia natura est id quod primum consideratur in re, ideo habitus ponitur prima species qualitatis.

[596] Contra Gentiles, lib. 2 cap. 60 n. 8. Posse autem intelligere est posse pati: cum intelligere quoddam pati sit, secundum philosophum. Non igitur dicitur puer potens intelligere ex eo quod phantasmata in eo possunt esse intellecta in actu: cum hoc pertineat ad posse agere; phantasmata enim movent intellectum possibilem.
Contra Gentiles, lib. 2 cap. 60 n. 15. Impossibile est quod perfectio superioris substantiae dependeat ab inferiori. Perfectio autem intellectus possibilis dependet ab operatione hominis: dependet enim a phantasmatibus, quae movent intellectum possibilem. Non est igitur intellectus possibilis aliqua substantia superior homine.

From the Cartesian principles, some conclusions might be deduced perhaps quite unintended by Descartes himself. If human soul is a primomotum, it can in fact perform an act of auto-creation in the very moment man begins to think. Apparently, no one can call into existence e.g. his damaged leg or hand, but according to Descartes' principles "the leg" and "the hand" are of no real importance for man. It is consciousness which counts, or more precisely, a surplus of it to be found in its new act and to be called "added value": constitutive of a specific level of the human consciousness. No biological life matters. For the sake of increasing "added value" all naturally existing values must be revalued. For Marxists, man is the supreme value in the sense the "added value" must be. The biological in man is transcended to the point of being exterminated by the advocates of the "progress". Contrary to what libertarians say, it is, for Marxists, social care (not material products) which is a special, i.e. social added value. People value precisely as much as the Nany State deigns to care for them.

Aristotle says that, in the entire nature, the moving and the moved exist, and the human mind is an instantiation of the rule.

> Since in every class of things, as in nature as a whole, we find two factors involved, (1) a matter which is potentially all the particulars included in the class, (2) a cause which is productive in the sense that it makes them all (the latter standing to the former, as e.g. an art to its material), these distinct elements must likewise be found within the soul. And in fact mind as we have described it is what it is what it is by virtue of becoming all things, while there is another which is what it is by virtue of making all things: this is a sort of positive state like light; for in a sense light makes potential colours into actual colours.[598]

By dint of sheer introspection, imagination can be known to be rather a movement than a picture (pictures are reproducible ad infinitum indeed). But generally, in the whole human mind, an intricate complex of the moving and moved (movens and motum) principles can be found.[599]

Contra Gentiles, lib. 2 cap. 67 n. 4. Impossibile est idem esse movens et motum. Sed phantasmata movent intellectum possibilem sicut sensibilia sensum: ut Aristoteles dicit, in III de anima. Impossibile est igitur quod sit idem intellectus possibilis et imaginatio.

[597] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 13 n. 19 Nisi forte aliquis dicat quod fiat reflexio hoc modo quod, completis omnibus generibus et speciebus motus, iterum oporteat redire ad primam: ut, si movens secundum locum alteretur et alterans augeatur, iterum augens moveatur secundum locum. Sed ex hoc sequetur idem quod prius: scilicet quod id quod movet secundum aliquam speciem motus, secundum eandem moveatur, licet non immediate sed mediate.

[598] Aristotle, On the Soul, transl. by J. A. Smith
Access 2025-12-27 https://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/soul.html

[599] De veritate, q. 27 a. 3 c. Alia vero obiecta voluntatem non ex necessitate movent. Sed intellectum movent ex necessitate non solum prima principia naturaliter cognita, sed conclusiones, quae non sunt naturaliter notae, propter necessariam habitudinem earum ad principia; quae scilicet necessaria habitudo non invenitur ex parte voluntatis aliorum bonorum respectu boni naturaliter desiderati, cum multipliciter, saltem secundum existimationem, ad illud bonum naturaliter desideratum perveniri possit. Unde intellectum sufficienter aliqua creatura potest movere ex parte obiecti, non autem voluntatem.

The anthropological proof of the existence of God is impossible (primomota are rather a problem than a means), and that presented by Descartes cannot be called otherwise. Marxists felt deep indebted to Descartes not because he proved the existence of God, but because his "proof" appeared, in the end, to be quite contrary to what it had been originally meant to be.

2. 3. The primomotum of phenomenology

The human will is moved by a thing understood i.e. by its quiddity abstracted from this material thing. As, however, the material things are extremely changeable, the objective of abstraction seemed (to many) unachievable and the foundations of knowledge (if any at all) to be sought in a separate (autonomous) sphere of being.

Any possibility of a causal relation between the known and the knower is vehemently impugned by Husserl, and the "independence" of consciousness stipulated. Still, although ideas seemed to dwell in consciousness immovably, the very existence of consciousness (with its "ideas") *in history* appeared a special problem after the Hegelian Myth had been rejected. Appearing of the relativist stance proved almost inevitable.

> § 53. Animalia and psychological consciousness. … *on the one hand consciousness should be the Absolute, within which everything transcendent is constituted, and in the last resort the whole psychological world; and on the other hand consciousness should be a subordinate real event within this world. How does this tally?*[600]

Obtaining the phenomenological attitude is meant to legitimize the "absolute" by means of the phenomenological epoché. "That goal we could also refer to [is] the winning of a new region of Being … [of] «pure experiences (Erlebnisse)», «pure consciousness» with its «pure correlates of consciousness», but the distinctive character of [it is] a region of individual Being, like every genuine region".[601] Husserl's consciousness is in fact the same as Thomas' primomotum; an autonomous being, a world in which no causal relations can exist; but an individual being anyhow, and quaintly separated from the natural world.

> Consciousness, considered in its "purity", must be reckoned as *a self-contained system of Being, as a system of Absolute Being, into which nothing can penetrate, and from which nothing can escape*; which has no spatio-temporal exterior, and can be inside no spatio-temporal system; which *cannot experience causality from anything nor exert causality upon anything*, it being presupposed that *causality bears the normal sense of natural causality as a relation of dependence between realities*.[602]

Epoché is a way out of the natural attitude, but must consist in opening to an infinite tissue of objects which are not connected like causes and effects must be.

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[600] Ibid., § 53

[601] Ibid., § 33.

[602] Ibid., § 49

"The statement «It is there» means rather that … possible series of perceptions lead up under motives that are constant and continuous and girt about (as unnoticed backgrounds) with ever-changing fields of things (§ 45). "I am aware of *a world, spread out in space endlessly, and in time becoming and become, without end* (§ 27). "*The zone of indeterminacy is infinite. The misty horizon that can never be completely outlined remains necessarily there.* As it is with the world in its ordered being as a spatial present—the aspect I have so far been considering—so likewise is it with the world in respect to its ordered being in the succession of time. This world now present to me, and in every waking 'now' obviously so, has its *temporal horizon, infinite in both directions, its known and unknown, its intimately alive and its unalive past and future* (§ 27).

"All actual experience refers beyond itself to possible experiences, which themselves again point to new possible experiences, and so in infinitum" (§ 47). The absolute character of consciousness does not prevent its objects from being indeterminate in the relation to the physical world, because "*every physical property draws us on into infinities of experience*; and that every multiplicity of experience, however lengthily drawn out, still leaves the way open to closer and novel thing-determinations; and so on, in infinitum". [603]

"The pure consciousness … is not concrete actuality (Faktum) in general, but concrete actuality as the source of possible and real values extending indefinitely, which compels us to ask after the «ground»—which of course has not then the meaning of a substantive cause".[604] The last words appear in the Paragraph entitled § 58. The transcendence of God suspended.

Another (more sophisticated) guise of relativism appeared; no less toxic because more refined.

2. 4. The knowledge about the coexistence of things

Consciousness is, according to its etymology, a knowledge shared with others (quasi cum alio scientia), and by no means an absolute being. Still, the objects of the world we get to know must be as complex as what represents them is. When grasping the causes we grasp the coexistence of things. The conclusion of proof of the existence of God is opposite to its starting point "formally" as it were. The existence of a Separate Being is proved after departing from the analysis of things which cannot be "separate", because, then, they would be unanalyzable, and if obstinately clung to: some particular "gods".

Human existence in the world is a coexistence with things or persons which/who can either foster or endanger the personal existence, but obtaining its Ultimate End first of all. The absolute foundation of this existence is to be sought beyond the co-existence with the "ordinary" things; in the co-existence with/participation of, the Divine Life (to be found in the end). The Providence, a somehow vague notion of which is "sensed" at the beginning of our pathway, actually leads us and directs our steps through the maze of ordinary objects.

[603] Ibid., § 3.

[604] Ibid., § 58.

The variety of religions and opinions about God does not affect the nature of Providence, but does affect the efficacy of Her assistance in our life (obstacles to Her efficacy might be posed on the part of a man). God's "nominal definition" (if it be called so) reads: "Who my whole life depends on". In special, the Providence might be the strength of delivering man from the power of evil.[605]

Homo religiosus affirms the existence of Providence, and the genuine philosopher ought to give a hand in describing it precisely. As, however, philosophy is deficient in this respect, other helpers are given us by the Providence. They are called Angles in Scripture.

Each step of our pathway to God is fostered by the benevolent presence of Pure Intellects.[606] If our will were subordinate fully to this providential aid, no step into the future would be false. The steps happen to be wrongly directed by the "creative imagination" though. The general source of error is, according to Thomas, our imagination not being subject to intellect. The human intellect is a closer principle, but there are too some persons regulative of this closer principle.

2. 5. The instinctive presence of objects in the "animal" consciousness

Animals do not err, because there is, in them, no potency to err. There is, however, in them no potency to assess the objective state of affairs quite adequately either, which does exist in humans. The animal imagination is totally subject to the animal instinct and cannot suggest any auto-destructive actions, opposite of which is clearly visible in humans (if the objective state of affairs is assessed inadequately). Humans can voluntarily turn away from the source of life (or even ultimately from the Source Itself), because the human instinct (if it be called

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[605] The Iliad says about the Providence (II vv. 26-27):
νῦν δ' ἐμέθεν ξύνες ὥκα· Διὸς δέ τοι ἄγγελός εἰμι,
ὃς σεῦ ἄνευθεν ἐὼν μέγα κήδεται ἠδ' ἐλεαίρει.
I am a messenger from Jove, who, though he be not near, yet takes thought for you and pities you.

Homer. The Iliad, Transl. by Samuel Butler.
Access 2025-12-27. https://classics.mit.edu/Homer/iliad.html

The phrase with participium coniunctum: ἄνευθεν ἐὼν, can be understood: "*because* He is afar (is transcendent)".

[606] Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 91 n. 5. Nos autem quidditates rerum ex accidentibus et effectibus coniectamus. Oportet ergo quod nostra intellectualis cognitio reguletur per Angelorum cognitionem.

Compendium theologiae, lib. 1 cap. 129 co. Intellectus igitur natus est perfici ab aliquo exteriori, quod comparatur ad ipsum sicut ad potentiam: unde homo ad actum intellectus adiuvari potest a quolibet exteriori, quod est magis perfectum secundum esse intelligibile, non solum a Deo, sed etiam ab Angelo, et etiam ab homine magis instructo, aliter tamen et aliter. Homo enim adiuvatur ab homine ad intelligendum per hoc quod unus eorum alteri proponit intelligibile quod non considerabat, non autem ita quod lumen intellectus unius hominis ab altero homine perficiatur, quia utrumque lumen naturale est unius speciei. Sed quia lumen naturale Angeli est secundum naturam sublimius naturali lumine hominis, homo ab Angelo potest iuvari ad intelligendum non solum ex parte obiecti quod ei ab Angelo proponitur, sed etiam ex parte luminis, quod per lumen Angeli confortatur.

so) is what it can never be in animals: a power to multiply its objects infinitely and indefinitely.

God is "known" by an animal as an anonymous principle of the order of objects which form its natural environment. In its "own" environment, the animal expects to find whatever is necessary to its existence, and the expectation is never frustrated, save accidentally, by man, who destroys the environment i.e. tries to impede the influence of the Divine Providence.

The human "instinct" is not infallible, and thus not to be called instinct in the proper sense of the word. Its whole value consists in being subject to the universal reason and thus it should be called the particular reason (ratio particularis). Still, because of the inner disharmony in man (never to be found in the rest of the material world) a dissonance in the acts of special powers exists also. The particular reason can break free from under control of the universal reason (ratio universalis) and can rebel against the Supreme Intellect also.

The order of values might be always questioned if the possibility to commence, and to advance along, the pathway to God is precluded. The artificial goods can be multiplied ad infinitum, and artificial ideas too can obstruct the natural pathway to God.

The thus emancipated imagination can pose a threat, but imaginatio proterva[607] is a threat itself. Some ideas might be suggested which ultimately abduct the human intellect from God. They are not "spontaneously" associated as the animal "ideas" (in Locke) were supposed to. They are directed rather. There are, beside Pure Intellects who pave our way to God, the other ones and malignant (ill-disposed towards both to men and its End). The Revelation says a great deal about them, but even the natural reason can advance arguments as to their presence in the material world (Summa contra gentiles, III cc. 103-109). Their presence is real albeit not sensed directly; not "symbolic". Symbols are but some means the

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[607] Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 7 q. 2 a. 1 ad 1. Omnis enim defectus animae qui in nobis accidit, vel est ex phantasia quantum ad cognitionem, cujus proprium est falsitas, secundum philosophum, vel ex passionibus irascibilis et concupiscibilis quantum ad affectionem: et ideo voluntas Daemonum inordinate detestans et appetens aliquid, dicitur furor et concupiscentia; et intellectus suus deordinatus, dicitur phantasia. Haec autem deordinatio intellectus est ex prava voluntate: et ideo dicitur phantasia proterva, quia protervus est qui pertinaciter verum impugnat. Irrationalitas autem et amentia, furor et concupiscentia important obliquitatem voluntatis a recto judicio intellectus vel rationis; et ignorantiam non speculationis, sed electionis, secundum quam omnis malus est ignorans.

De substantiis separatis, cap. 20 c. 31 Et hoc idem in pluribus aliis locis dicit. Sed et Dionysius videtur in Daemonibus ponere ea quae ad sensibilem animam pertinent: dicit enim quarto capite de divinis nominibus, quod *est in Daemonibus malum, furor irrationabilis, demens concupiscentia et phantasia proterva*. Manifestum est autem phantasiam et concupiscentiam et iram sive furorem, non ad intellectum, sed ad sensitivae partem animae pertinere.

In De divinis nominibus, cap. 4 l. 19. In nobis autem malum est per hoc quod pars sensitiva non regulatur ratione; et hoc quantum ad tria, scilicet: quantum ad irascibilem quae, dum non regulatur ratione, irrationabiliter furit vel irascitur; et quantum ad concupiscibilem quae, dum non regulatur ratione, stulte concupiscit; et quantum ad phantasiam sive imaginativam quae, dum non regulatur ratione, contra veritatem protervit. Secundum ergo praedictam opinionem, malum in Daemonibus non est aliud quam *furor irrationabilis et demens concupiscentia et phantasia proterva*. Dicit autem: *demens concupiscentia, furor irrationabilis*, quia concupiscentia nihil attendit ad rationem; furor autem attendit, sed imperfecte, ut supra dictum est.

malevolent spirits use to accomplish their proterve (proud and insolent) objectives; to instigate them.

2. 6. The place of the consciousness in the world and Individualism

According to Whitehead, all modern philosophical systems are but commentaries to Plato's dialogues. But a commentary is not adequate for this reason only that it is modern. The "commentary" Cicero provides in his De natura deorum is not at all similar to those modern ones. "Now we observe that the parts of the world (and nothing exists in the world which is not a part of the whole world) possess sensation and reason" (Videmus autem in partibus mundi (nihil est enim in omni mundo, quod non pars universi sit) inesse sensum atque rationem).[608]

No matter whether Christian or pagan an interpreter, he – if faithful – must come to the conclusions which otherwise Plato advanced himself (which is not the case with "an innovative" interpretation). Even if Plato was deemed a master, it seemed that Plato's original views must have been "corrected" some way, as he was acknowledged to be an "enemy of the open society" emblematic for modernity.

Aristotle (his disciple) is an "enemy" also as he say the "the common weal is more divine than a good of an individual".[609] (Cicero argues that reason and cognition is most perfect in nature,[610] and the energy; calor, ardor; of a part can never be greater than that of the totality.[611]) Aristotle proves in his Metaphysics the general principle of ethics: the principle of the motion of the universe is more important than the principle of any particular motion (the consciousness included).

Husserl vehemently denies the allegations that his Logische Untersuchungen contain the same ideas as those known from Plato's dialogues (§ 22), and he was quite right. The subject matter of phenomenology and the Platonian science is different. Plato advocates the primacy of universals, whereas Husserl defends the concreteness of the objects of experience.

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[608] Cicero, De natura deorum, II. xi. 30; transl. by H. Rackham, London 1967.
Access 2026-08-04 https://archive.org/details/denaturadeorumac00ciceuoft/page/n5/mode/2up

[609] Ethica Nic., I, c. 1, 1094b 7-11.

[610] II, [29] Natura est igitur, quae contineat mundum omnem eumque tueatur, et ea quidem non sine sensu atque ratione. Omnem enim naturam necesse est, quae non solitaria sit neque simplex sed cum alio iuncta atque conexa, habere aliquem in se principatum, ut in homine mentem, in belua quiddam simile mentis, unde oriantur rerum adpetitus; in arborum autem et earum rerum, quae gignuntur e terra, radicibus inesse principatus putatur, principatum autem id dico, quod Graeci ἡγεμονικόν vocant, quo nihil in quoque genere nec potest nec debet esse praestantius, ita necesse est illud etiam, in quo sit totius naturae principatus, esse omnium optumum omniumque rerum potestate dominatuque dignissimum.

[611] [31]Atque etiam mundi ille fervor purior perlucidior mobiliorque multo ob easque causas aptior ad sensus commovendos quam hic noster calor, quo haec, quae nota nobis sunt, retinentur et vigent. absurdum igitur est dicere, cum homines bestiaeque hoc calore teneantur et propterea moveantur ac sentiant, mundum esse sine sensu, qui integro et libero et puro eodemque acerrimo et mobilissimo ardore teneatur, praesertim cum is ardor qui est mundi non agitatus ab alio neque externo pulsu sed per se ipse ac sua sponte moveatur; nam quid potest esse mundo valentius, quod pellat atque moveat calorem eum, quo ille teneatur.

Contrary to Plato, Husserl speaks (in his Ideas) about "conscious experiences in the concrete fullness and entirety with which they figure in their concrete context" (§ 34); and about "cogitationes actual and potential taken in their full concreteness); about "intentional unities" (§ 36; §47). "*All real unities are "unities of meaning*" (§ 55). The objective of phenomenology is "a new region of Being; …a region of individual Being, like every genuine region)" (§33). "Every perceiving consciousness has this peculiarity, that it is the consciousness of the embodied (leibhaftigen) self-presence of an individual object" (§39).[612]

The principles of the modern individualism are easily deducible from the Husserl's stance, but are not deducible from Plato at all (they are compatible with the phenomenological stance, but jar with the Platonian ones). The source of life of an individual is to be sought in the universal cause of all individuals. Not even the sense of his/her individuality can be sought (found) in the universal cause. Aristotle and Thomas are in accord when saying that the good of an individual should give way to the good of the community.[613] The cause of the

[612] Op. cit.

[613] De veritate, q. 5 a. 3 c. Responsio. Dicendum, quod providentia Dei, qua res gubernat, ut dictum est, est similis providentiae qua paterfamilias gubernat domum, aut rex civitatem aut regnum: in quibus gubernationibus hoc est commune, quod bonum commune est eminentius quam bonum singulare; sicut bonum gentis est divinius quam bonum civitatis vel familiae vel personae, ut habetur, in principi o Ethicorum. Unde quilibet provisor plus attendit quid communitati conveniat, si sapienter gubernat, quam quid conveniat uni tantum.

Quodlibet I, q. 4 a. 3 c. Unde et secundum hanc naturalem inclinationem, et secundum politicam virtutem, bonus civis mortis periculo se exponit pro bono communi. Manifestum est autem quod Deus est bonum commune totius universi et omnium partium eius. Unde quaelibet creatura suo modo naturaliter plus amat Deum quam seipsam: insensibilia quidem naturaliter, bruta vero animalia sensitive, creatura vero rationalis per intellectivum amorem, quae dilectio dicitur.

Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 17 n. 6. Bonum particulare ordinatur in bonum commune sicut in finem: esse enim partis est propter esse totius; unde et bonum gentis est divinius quam bonum unius hominis. Bonum autem summum, quod est Deus, est bonum commune, cum ex eo universorum bonum dependeat: bonum autem quo quaelibet res bona est, est bonum particulare ipsius et aliorum quae ab ipso dependent. Omnes igitur res ordinantur sicut in finem in unum bonum, quod est Deus.

Summa Theologiae I, q. 60 a. 5 ad 5. Ad quintum dicendum quod, cum in Deo sit unum et idem eius substantia et bonum commune, omnes qui vident ipsam Dei essentiam, eodem motu dilectionis moventur in ipsam Dei essentiam prout est ab aliis distincta, et secundum quod est quoddam bonum commune. Et quia inquantum est bonum commune, naturaliter amatur ab omnibus; quicumque videt eum per essentiam, impossibile est quin diligat ipsum. Sed illi qui non vident essentiam eius, cognoscunt eum per aliquos particulares effectus, qui interdum eorum voluntati contrariantur.

Summa Theologiae I, q. 60 a. 5 ad 5. Sed illi qui non vident essentiam eius, cognoscunt eum per aliquos particulares effectus, qui interdum eorum voluntati contrariantur. Et sic hoc modo dicuntur odio habere Deum, cum tamen, inquantum est bonum commune omnium, unumquodque naturaliter diligat plus Deum quam seipsum.

Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 90 a. 2 ad 3. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut nihil constat firmiter secundum rationem speculativam nisi per resolutionem ad prima principia indemonstrabilia, ita firmiter nihil constat per rationem practicam nisi per ordinationem ad ultimum finem, qui est bonum commune. Quod autem hoc modo ratione constat, legis rationem habet.

perfection of each individual must be sought beyond the individual, but the cause of affirming the individuality unconditionally cannot be sough there.

In the moment Hegel published (in 1807) his Phenomenology of Spirit, he claimed himself to be a porte-parole of the unified human consciousness (called "Spirit") and the claim was as uncanny as unshakable was the compactness of his system. Husserl's Ideas (published in 1913) might have appeared (for a time), the last word of phenomenology (and somehow similar to that of the predecessor), but Husserl himself continued to modify his stance all his life. Postmodernism (the system of the lack of any system) too, seems to be a continuation also. The evolution of consciousness was, in fact, on the way all the time.

If the actual shape of consciousness evolves, all values evolve along with it, and the notorious Umwertung seems inevitable. It is not Nietzsche's stance only. "This transvaluing is a concern of our full freedom and is opposed to all cognitive attitudes that would set themselves up as co-ordinate with the thesis" (Ideas, § 31).

Cicero argues that the more perfect a being, the more closely fitting into the fabric of the natural universe (II, 29). Now, the eminent guise of motion is the vital one, and, especially, the human one; to be found in social realm too. The mind of a teacher "moves", whereas the mind of the disciple is "moved" (in a special aspect).[614]

Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 26 a. 3 c. Unde multo magis hoc verificatur in amicitia caritatis, quae fundatur super communicatione donorum gratiae. Et ideo ex caritate magis debet homo diligere Deum, qui est bonum commune omnium, quam seipsum, quia beatitudo est in Deo sicut in communi et fontali omnium principio qui beatitudinem participare possunt.

[614] De veritate, q. 11 a. 1 c. Similiter etiam dicendum est de scientiae acquisitione; quod praeexistunt in nobis quaedam scientiarum semina, scilicet primae conceptiones intellectus, quae statim lumine intellectus agentis cognoscuntur per species a sensibilibus abstractas, sive sint complexa, sicut dignitates, sive incomplexa, sicut ratio entis, et unius, et huiusmodi, quae statim intellectus apprehendit. In istis autem principiis universalibus omnia sequentia includuntur, sicut in quibusdam rationibus seminalibus. Quando ergo ex istis universalibus cognitionibus mens educitur ut actu cognoscat particularia, quae prius in universali et quasi in potentia cognoscebantur, tunc aliquis dicitur scientiam acquirere. Sciendum tamen est, quod in rebus naturalibus aliquid praeexistit in potentia dupliciter. Uno modo in potentia activa completa; quando, scilicet, principium intrinsecum sufficienter potest perducere in actum perfectum, sicut patet in sanatione: ex virtute enim naturali quae est in aegro, aeger ad sanitatem perducitur. Alio modo in potentia passiva; quando, scilicet, principium intrinsecum non sufficit ad educendum in actum, sicut patet quando ex aere fit ignis; hoc enim non poterat fieri per aliquam virtutem in aere existentem. Quando igitur praeexistit aliquid in potentia activa completa, tunc agens extrinsecum non agit nisi adiuvando agens intrinsecum, et ministrando ei ea quibus possit in actum exire; sicut medicus in sanatione est minister naturae, quae principaliter operatur, confortando naturam, et apponendo medicinas, quibus velut instrumentis natura utitur ad sanationem. Quando vero aliquid praeexistit in potentia passiva tantum, tunc agens extrinsecum est quod educit principaliter de potentia in actum; sicut ignis facit de aere, qui est potentia ignis, actu ignem. Scientia ergo praeexistit in addiscente in potentia non pure passiva, sed activa; alias homo non posset per seipsum acquirere scientiam. Sicut ergo aliquis dupliciter sanatur: uno modo per operationem naturae tantum, alio modo a natura cum adminiculo medicinae; ita etiam est duplex modus acquirendi scientiam: unus, quando naturalis ratio per seipsam devenit in cognitionem ignotorum; et hic modus dicitur inventio; alius, quando naturali rationi aliquis exterius adminiculatur, et hic modus dicitur disciplina. In his autem quae fiunt a natura et arte, eodem modo ars operatur, et per eadem media, quibus et natura. Sicut enim natura in eo qui ex frigida causa laborat, calefaciendo induceret sanitatem, ita et medicus; unde et ars dicitur imitari naturam. Et similiter etiam contingit in scientiae acquisitione, quod eodem modo docens alium ad scientiam ignotorum deducit sicuti aliquis inveniendo deducit seipsum in cognitionem ignoti. Processus autem rationis pervenientis ad cognitionem ignoti inveniendo est ut principia communia per se nota applicet ad

There is no possibility of teaching visible in phenomenology. Consciousness is an individual being not be "moved" or "moving" anything beyond itself. Its self-compactness must not be infringed.

The ancient polytheism was a relatively weak form of idolatry (claiming the plurality of "gods" is less idolatrous than cherishing images of them believed to be "gods"). The modern idolatry is more sophisticated. There are manifold individual ideas and they all are supposed to be visualizable. There were manifold "gods" in Cicero, but they all included (at least potentially) in the one divine order. Cicero even hesitated whether to use plural or singular when speaking about the divine nature.

The transcendental consciousness is founded on the principle of rejecting the existence of the transcendent God. The Paragraph 58 of Husserl's Ideas bears a meaningful title: The transcendence of God suspended.

> a "divine" Being beyond the world … would thus be an "Absolute" in a totally different sense from the Absolute of Consciousness … We naturally extend the phenomenological reduction to this "Absolute" and to this "Transcendent".

The consciousness was about to replace God, because it has remained the only "residuum after the nullifying of the world" (§ 49).

2. 7. Experiencing the authenticity of life versus directing the life to God

The German Erleben (experience) stems from Leben (life). Still, notwithstanding is glamorous symbolism, this experience proves to be in fact the most precarious guise of life.

There are, according to both Aristotle and Thomas, three degrees of life, but not to be called "levels" of consciousness to be found "somewhere". The vegetative life is the least perfect, but to be preserved in the sublimed guise in those more perfect ones, and especially in the life of the intellect. Socrates understood the fact well, because his philosophical (intellectual) activity was that of delivering thoughts in the way analogous to delivering

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determinatas materias, et inde procedat in aliquas particulares conclusiones, et ex his in alias; unde et secundum hoc unus alium dicitur docere quod istum decursum rationis, quem in se facit ratione naturali, alteri exponit per signa et sic ratio naturalis discipuli, per huiusmodi sibi proposita, sicut per quaedam instrumenta, pervenit in cognitionem ignotorum. Sicut igitur medicus dicitur causare sanitatem in infirmo natura operante, ita etiam homo dicitur causare scientiam in alio operatione rationis naturalis illius: et hoc est docere; unde unus homo alium docere dicitur, et eius esse magister. Et secundum hoc dicit philosophus, I posteriorum, quod demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire. Si autem aliquis alicui proponat ea quae in principiis per se notis non includuntur, vel includi non manifestantur, non faciet in eo scientiam, sed forte opinionem, vel fidem; quamvis hoc etiam aliquo modo ex principiis innatis causetur. Ex ipsis enim principiis per se notis considerat, quod ea quae ex eis necessario consequuntur, sunt certitudinaliter tenenda; quae vero eis sunt contraria, totaliter respuenda; aliis autem assensum praebere potest, vel non praebere. Huiusmodi autem rationis lumen, quo principia huiusmodi nobis sunt nota, est nobis a Deo inditum, quasi quaedam similitudo increatae veritatis in nobis resultans. Unde, cum omnis doctrina humana efficaciam habere non possit nisi ex virtute illius luminis; constat quod solus Deus est qui interius et principaliter docet, sicut natura interius et principaliter sanat; nihilominus homo et sanare et docere proprie dicitur modo praedicto.

children. He might well have been misunderstood or even ridiculed by Aristophanes in "Clouds", perhaps because of the bluntness of the comparison. In his Apology, Socrates says that the misunderstanding was about to be the cause of his death.

The "forms of thinking" rest not only in libraries, but much more so in the minds of those who teach, and are taught to understand the written books. The books are produced (printed). The words of the intellect which motivate the printed are rather begotten.

The intention of nature permeates, according to Aristotle, the entire world, but it is the human intellect only which can decipher a specific value of the cosmic energy present in a given object. The objects appear thus chords of the providential plan of God, but audible to a "trained ear" only. The intellect can identify them, but never "experience"; feel or intuit them.

The imagination suggests both existing (real) and apparent goods. The apparent, however, do not cease to be imaginary only because refined.

The problem of the spiritual refinement was addressed in Sienkiewicz's Without Dogma. Its main character, Płoszowski, lives the life of aesthetical experience disdaining the ordinary forms of life. But this existence ends fatally to both his loved ones and himself. Dreams cannot eventually lead to anything else than death.

The "spiritual heritage of Europe" has this ambiguous character (of both refinement and idealism). There are undoubted values in it, but the germs of destruction too which lead directly to death.

God cannot be identified with any "idea" (supposed to exist in the "humane" world): "tame" and "tolerant". "I have never put my hope in any other but in You, O God of Israel who can show *both anger and graciousness, and who absolves all the sins of suffering man* Lord God, Creator of Heaven and Earth be mindful of our lowliness".[615] No one can reasonably expect to be delivered from a life predicament by an idea (he or anybody else produced).

The "tame deity" of transcendentalisms is a deadly illusion. God is what he is and this independently of whether and what we think about Him. In special, God is really present in the Sacrament of Altar, and this notwithstanding whether we "experience" the fact or not. Attempts have been made at questioning the Real Presence (independent of the human consciousness, but totally dependent on the valid liturgical action). They are characteristic of the Civilization of Death. The source of the real life has been denied to those who have been given a precarious life of experience instead.

2. 8. Evil as an argument against Creationism

Had but only one of the objects of the physical world emancipated from the order of causal relations leading to the Outer Side of the world, the proof of the existence of God would have been irretrievably destroyed. Some "great ideas" (if vividly experienced) as well as some

[615] Spem In Alium (Thomas Tallis) - Tallis Scholars
Access 2026-08-04 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iT-ZAAi4UQQ

"great" personages (defying the order of Providence) provided, to some minds, a "vivid argument" against the existence of God.

Auschwitz has become such an argument for many people. God should have "intervened" – according to the "humanist" principles – although it is uncertain *when* He should have so. Should He have intervened in the moment Shoah was planned at the Wannsee Conference, or earlier, viz. in the moment when Rosenberg was writing his "Myth of the 20th Century"? Or rather should He have intervened even earlier, when Nietzsche, in his Genealogy of Morals, was blaming ancient Jewish for initiating a "slave revolt in morality" by inverting "master values"? But perhaps He should have done so even earlier, when Marx, Feuerbach, Hegel, Kant were formulating their "breaking ideas". They all seem to belong to the "Spiritual heritage of Europe", but the "spiritual" is not tantamount to "intellectual" there. The "evil spirit" is oxymoronic for those only who have followed Fichte.

The presence of the great criminals is a challenge and a trial, but their impunity is a scandal. But on the other hand, the presence of saints restores the foundations of the shattered order.

St Maximillian was an uncompromising champion of God's economy of salvation and payed the highest price for his stance. However, we vanquished the iniquity of his "enemies" (they were so in a strange way though, because could not brook him looking at them without hate but with silent reproach). He declared, in Auschwitz, the willingness to die "for the other" and to die also as to give the others the courage to live. The most astonishing fact is, however, why Commandant Fritzsch agreed to his plea. There must have been some reasons, because the intention of St Maximillian's sacrifice ran counter the perverse intention of Nazis.

The actual and effective presence of the Divine Province in the human life is shown in the moments of trial. The human ideas die, whereas the Divine Ones live forever.

3. The plainness of the pathway of the human intellect to God

Humans happen to be actually lost in the maze of the ordinary events until the facts (they are lost amongst) are proved to be a representative part of the totality of the pathway leading to God. God "cannot" create a universe without a rational plan, immanent to it and legible for a rational being. Each part of the ordained structure must be adequately assessed.

An inadequate judgment concerning a given state of affairs, and all the more so the suspension of necessary judgments, directs a person in the wrong direction (allow blundering in the wrong and to be wronged). Necessary judgments are not "inhuman"; they are valuable for humans, but secondarily only discriminative of the evil which befalls them. Incriminating all judgments as "inhumane" is tantamount to leaving the handicapped to their own devices. Special judgments are necessary, but showing the right direction of the entire human life is of pivotal importance.

It is impossible e.g. to decree a more "humane" gravitational constant so as to prevent people from falling from height. The objective is apparently infantile. Still, the "constants" (values) of the human life have been believed to be improvable ("modernized") after all. The constants of nature are what they are and cannot be "improved" in the spirit of "progress". The progress will, ultimately, endanger the human life itself.

It is quite obvious that the way e.g. to London (one is asked for) is different to that leading to Cambridge. No Parliament (no matter how "progressive") can change the fact and make all ways "equally inclusive".

Simple and ordinary facts are practically known to obey unreservedly the non-contradiction principle. The situation seemed to change in the moment some "complex" facts had been taken into consideration. The "human world" had seemed to be composed of those "extraordinary" facts: defying the blunt rules governing the crude nature. The human rules were supposed be "tolerant"; "inclusive" and indulgent to the human weakness.

Facts might be more complex, but do not cease to be (for the reason) to be what they have always been: facts quite independent of what/whether we think about them. If asked for the way to London one gives the wrong information, he/she is a fraudster or a liar. If asked for the right direction of the entire life, one adduces some mushy ideas instead if stringent reasoning, he/she is an impostor (or a villain).

The rules regulating the traffic are quite simple are checkable "empirically" by the amount of fine for breaching them. They are so because quite schematic. The problem of the proof of the existence of God from motion consists in that the motion analyzed in it is not schematic all. Human vital motion, too, cannot be expected to be that (it is no immediately tackled by metaphysics, but analyzable in general terms nonetheless). The adequate analysis of the motion in question is a challenge, but the challenge is to be faced. So as to master the cognizance of the motion in general we resort to the first ("inborn") intellectual principles. However, because "inborn" they are not likely to be reflected on, whereas the proof of the existence of God is based on the very reflection. The conclusions of the supreme science (metaphysics) are closest to its natural principles.[616]

The conclusion metaphysics arrives at is, at the same time, the principle of a science subordinate to it: ethics. Ethics is ("etymologically") about customs (ethe). In the ordinary life, we experience manifold privations (being lost this or that way is customary in a sense), but they are potentially elucidable in the light of the first principles and the privations can be overcome.

Experiencing privations might be painful, but never understandable only because painful. The power to understand them is unemotional at all. It is, however, only the most uncompromising scientists and the most naive children who dare to ask "why" about the otherwise contemptuously dismissed.

The starting point of the Aristotelian proof is as inconspicuous as "mundane". But that is why its conclusions are everything but mundane. All "mundane" human actions are proved to be "extraordinary" in the relation to the Supreme Cause, Who gives them all their proper meaning.

[616] Super De Trinitate, pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 ad 21. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intellectualiter procedere non attribuitur scientiae divinae, quasi ipsa non ratiocinetur procedendo de principiis ad conclusiones, sed quia eius ratiocinatio est intellectuali considerationi propinquissima et conclusiones eius principiis.

Chapter VIII. ADHERING TO GOD

"The end of the human life consists in adhering to God", because God is the end of the life journey: the immutable Good above the mutability of the life events. Cleaving to God by the intellect and the will (adhaere Deo)[617]; is such a dependence; a proper good of man.[618] The dependence is, however, furthest from emotional addiction. The latter is the affect "of turning back from the Sovereign Good" (aversio ab incommutabili bono) whilst turning to some commutable goods (bonum commutabile)[619]: with the inferior powers of the soul.[620] In Psalm LXXII (v. 28) we read: "… it is good for me to adhere to my God" (*mihi autem adhaerere Deo bonum est*; ἐμοὶ δε□τὸ προσκολλᾶσθαι τῷ θεῷ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν; LXX). This concerns the ultimate and supernatural end of man, although the "philosophical happiness" Aristotle speaks of [621] is its anticipation.

> …the activity of reason, which is contemplative, seems both to be superior in serious worth and to aim at no end beyond itself, and to have its pleasure proper to itself (and this augments the activity), and the self-sufficiency, leisureliness, unweariedness (so far as this is possible for man), and all the other attributes ascribed to the supremely happy man are evidently those connected with this activity, it follows that this will be the complete happiness of man, if it be allowed a complete term of life (for none of the attributes of happiness is incomplete).

The greatest are, perhaps such because aware of the limits of their greatness. Aristotle was aware of the natural limits of the philosophical happiness. Anyway, the supernatural is not to be sought in philosophy, which cannot prescind from the natural.

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[617] Super Sent., lib. 3 d. 33 q. 1 a. 3 qc. 4 ad 2.; Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 115 n. 3.; Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 116 n. 2.; Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 109 a. 6 c.; Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 114 a. 10 c.; Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 17 a. 6 c.; Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 23 a. 7 c.; Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 27 a. 6 ad 3.; Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 82 a. 3 c.; De veritate, q. 24 a. 1 ad 16.; Quodlibet V, q. 10 a. 1 c.; De regno, lib. 1 cap. 9 c.; Compendium theologiae, lib. 2 cap. 9 c.; Super De Trinitate, pars 1 q. 2 a. 1 c. 1.

[618] Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 115 n. 3. Per legem igitur divinitus datam homo ad suum finem praecipue ordinatur. Finis autem humanae creaturae est adhaerere Deo: in hoc enim felicitas eius consistit, sicut supra ostensum est. Ad hoc igitur principaliter lex divina hominem dirigit, ut Deo adhaereat.

Summa Theologiae I, q. 108 a. 8 c.

[619] Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 116 n. 2. Quod autem per amorem homo maxime Deo adhaereat, manifestum est. Duo enim sunt in homine quibus Deo potest adhaerere, intellectus scilicet et voluntas: nam secundum inferiores animae partes Deo adhaerere non potest, sed inferioribus rebus. Adhaesio autem quae est per intellectum, completionem recipit per eam quae est voluntatis: quia per voluntatem homo quodammodo quiescit in eo quod intellectus apprehendit.

[620] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 73 a. 3 ad 2. Ad secundum dicendum quod ex ipsa indebita conversione ad aliquod bonum commutabile, sequitur aversio ab incommutabili bono, in qua perficitur ratio mali. Et ideo oportet quod secundum diversitatem eorum quae pertinent ad conversionem, sequatur diversa gravitas malitiae in peccatis. (W. Bednarski; op.cit.).

[621] Super De Trinitate, pars 1 q. 2 a. 1 c. 1.

> But such a life would be too high for man; for it is not in so far as he is man that he will live so, but in so far as something divine is present in him; and by so much as this is superior to our composite nature is its activity superior to that which is the exercise of the other kind of virtue. If reason is divine, then, in comparison with man, the life according to it is divine in comparison with human life. But we must not follow those who advise us, being men, to think of human things, and, being mortal, of mortal things, but must, so far as we can, make ourselves immortal, and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us; for even if it be small in bulk, much more does it in power and worth surpass everything. This would seem, too, to be each man himself, since it is the authoritative and better part of him. It would be strange, then, if he were to choose not the life of his self but that of something else. And what we said before will apply now; that which is proper to each thing is by nature best and most pleasant for each thing; for man, therefore, the life according to reason is best and pleasantest, since reason more than anything else is man. This life therefore is also the happiest.[622]

Contemplating God is the end, whereas all other goods can be but means to the end. No other goods might be clung to, because it is impossible to be satisfied with a means and to strive for the end at the same time.

> 25. "My soul cleaveth to the pavement: O quicken Thou me according to Thy word" … If we look upon the whole world as one great house, we see that the heavens represent its vaulting, the earth therefore will be its pavement. He wisheth therefore to be rescued from earthly things, and to say with the Apostle, "Our conversation is in heaven."
>
> ***To cling therefore to earthly things is the soul's death***
>
> the contrary of which evil, life is prayed for, when he saith, "O quicken Thou me."
> 26. …The body itself also, because it is of the earth, is reasonably understood by the word pavement; since, because it is still corruptible and weigheth down the soul, we justly groan while in it, and say unto God, "O quicken Thou me." For we shall not be without our bodies when we shall be for evermore with the Lord; but then because they will not be corruptible, nor will they weigh down our souls, if we view it strictly, we shall not cleave unto them, but they rather unto us, and we unto God.…[623]

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[622] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, X Ch. 17, translated by W. D. Ross Access 2026-10-29 https://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.html

[623] Expositions on the book of psalms by saint Augustin, Bishop of Hippo. Edited, with brief annotations, and condensed from the six volumes of the oxford translation by A. Cleveland Coxe, d.d., editor of the Ante-Nicene Fathers, etc. Psalm CXIX. Daleth.

Access: 2026-10-28

Philip Schaff: NPNF1-08. St. Augustine: Exposition on the Book of Psalms - Christian Classics Ethereal Library

Augustinus, In eumdem Psalmum 118, Sermo 10, 1;2. Si tamquam unam quamdam domum magnam universum mundum velimus accipere, videmus velut eius cameram coelum: terra erit igitur pavimentum. Vult itaque terrenis erui, et cum Apostolo dicere: *Conversatio nostra in coelis est*. Proinde terrenis adhaerere mors animae est; cui malo contraria poscitur vita, cum dicitur: *Vivifica me*.... Unde et corpus ipsum, quia ex terra est, non

We happen to adhere to incidental/casual goods whereas the unique one consists in adhering to the Immovable Good.

1. The problem of participation

We happen to participate in e.g. activities, communities; share the same convictions; values. The participation makes for the "us": a community, whereas peoples who "have nothing in common" are alienated from each other.

Etymologically speaking, "to partake" means to "take part": of a greater whole. Μετέχειν (ματαλαμβάνειν) means "to have (to take) together". Still, parts and totalities are, normally, predicated about the (sets of) numbers. A one-dimensional man could have been an individual (an element of a set), but never a person aware of the true nature of the object of the participation.

The problem of participation appeared distinctly in Plato (in his Phaedo). Humans (and all things for that matter too) partake of/in their proper species/ideas (humanity is this for humans). This way they come to existence, but to the knowledge also: as far as "assimilating" to the ideal objects. When getting to know anything they partake intellectually in/of the proper idea of this thing.

However, there is "something" above ideas too and to be called the Sovereign Good in Plato's Republic. The Good seems to be "separated" from the universe, but the Source of its existence nonetheless. The two notions seemed, however, irreconcilable.

Aristotle is, generally, sceptical about the value of the Platonian concept of participation, but in his Ethics (I, Ch. 6), he assesses critically Plato's idea of the Sovereign Good also. There is (to his mind) the good immanent to nature (the immediately shareable one), and the acts of virtues are to be called this in ethics, but the Sovereign Good above (χωριστόν) too. Aristotle does not (as Thomas comments) attack directly what Plato says about the Sovereign Good as such, but underscores the fact that God is transcendent, and no one can become "a part of God" (or become "a god" for that matter also).

The transcendence of the Sovereign Good was excessively underscored by Plotinus, and this because he did not differentiate between what the unity of number and the Sovereign Unity must be.[624] Anyhow, God cannot (as Cicero says) have the form of e.g. humans,

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absurde intellegitur pavimentum; quod adhuc quia corruptibile est et aggravat animam, recte in illo congemiscitur et dicitur Deo: *Adhaesit pavimento anima mea, vivifica me secundum verbum tuum.* Neque enim non cum corporibus nostris semper cum Domino erimus; sed tunc quia non erunt corruptibilia nec animas aggravabunt, si diligenter consideremus, non eis nos, sed ipsa nobis potius adhaerebunt, nos autem Deo. Unde alterius psalmi verba illa sunt: *Mihi autem adhaerere Deo bonum est*: ut vivant corpora ex nobis, adhaerendo nobis; nos autem vivamus ex Deo, quia nobis *adhaerere Deo bonum est.* Adhaesio quippe ista de qua dictum est: *Adhaesit pavimento anima mea*, non coniunctionem carnis et animae, quamvis et ipsam quidam intellexerint; sed carnalem magis animae affectum, quo caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, significare mihi videtur

[624] Super De causis, l. 6. Et, quamvis non possint perfecte cognosci vel dici ab inferioribus, aliqualiter tamen capi et cognosci possunt a participantibus, id est per participantia, sicut per ea quae participant vitam aliquid cognoscitur de ipsa vita. Sed illud quod est primum simpliciter, quod, secundum Platonicos, est ipsa essentia bonitatis, est penitus ignotum, quia non habet aliquid supra se quod possit ipsum cognoscere; et hoc significat

because, in this case, the "god" would have been similar to humans, and the divine would cease to be what it must be: creative of humans ("gods" would replace God).[625] Epicureans were right in observing that the human body is the best possibly existing in the material universe,[626] but this is not tantamount to that God should "exist in the universe" in any way at all, this corporeal mode of existence included.

In his On the Soul, Aristotle presents his own concept of participation (De Anima II, Ch. 4, 415a 27-415b7). Each thing tends to partake of the similitude of "the divine", because it is more than just a sum; it is an *integral* totality. The universe is, in this respect, no different to any other *genuine* totality, but the *artificial* totalities might be different if not representative of the perfection of the universe. The Sovereign Good was deemed (a cause of) the common weal in the past centuries, whereas the very notion of the common weal (its existence too) was questioned in the moment the idea of "the welfare society" replaced (in Marsilius of Padua) the idea of the spiritual happiness to be found in the Sovereign Good. Material goods, if possessed by some, are prevented from being possessed by the others (they are rivalrous goods). The good of the intellect is not rivalrous provided the intellect is more than just an mental agility (endowed with a certain market value anyhow), but is what it must be: the spiritual *above* the material and the sensed.

The paradox of the Sovereign Good is not solvable in economic or mathematical terms, but in metaphysics only. There is a twofold end: the one immanent to created things (and inalienable to some extent only): the direct object of participation; and the transcendent One partakeable in as much as creative of any shareable good (De anima, 415b20-21). Still, they are, according to Thomas, not that much two separate ends, but rather two aspects of the same reality.[627]

Economics and democracy is about counting shares. Some goods and some (political) ideas happen to be acknowledged to be precious (no matter how odd a cause of the acknowledgement) to the detriment of those vanquished in the race. However, goods are not real for the mere fact of them being acknowledged. In history, some really strange ideas and

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quod dicitur *amethectum*, id est non post existens alicui. Et, quia auctor huius libri non concordat cum Platonicis in positione aliarum naturarum separatarum idealium, sed ponit solum primum, ut supra dictum est, ideo praetermissis aliis de hac causa prima dicit quod est *superior narratione*.

[625] M. Tulli Ciceronis De natura deorum, I.

[46] Ac de forma quidem partim natura nos admonet, partim ratio docet. Nam a natura habemus omnes omnium gentium speciem nullam aliam nisi humanam deorum; quae enim forma alia occurrit umquam aut vigilanti cuiquam aut dormienti? Sed ne omnia revocentur ad primas notiones, ratio hoc idem ipsa declarat.

[626] [48] quod si omnium animantium formam vincit hominis figura, deus autem animans est, ea figura profecto est, quae pulcherrimast omnium. Quoniamque deos beatissimos esse constat, beatus autem esse sine virtute nemo potest nec virtus sine ratione constare nec ratio usquam inesse nisi in hominis figura, hominis esse specie deos confitendum est.

[627] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 11 a. 3 ad 3. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est finis dicitur dupliciter, uno modo, ipsa res; alio modo, adeptio rei. Quae quidem non sunt duo fines, sed unus finis, in se consideratus, et alteri applicatus. Deus igitur est ultimus finis sicut res quae ultimo quaeritur, fruitio autem sicut adeptio huius ultimi finis.

some equally strange enterprises appeared. They were fostered by some ardent advocates, but the ardency did not make for the ideas to be good for that reason. Plato says that "trifle goods" are not shareable, but non-philosophers are not likely to assess goods in the way philosophers recommend them.

An heir to the dualist Pythagorean tradition, Plato himself says that the opposite of the Sovereign Good "exists" in the universe and is to be called matter. Plato (in fact) and Neo-Platonists (expressis verbis) identified it with evil and privation. According to Sextus Empiricus, Plato claimed that ideas partake of the Supreme Unity (the Sovereign Good), and "of something else" (κατὰ σύλληψιν δὲ ἑτέρας) besides.[628]

> There are, then, two principles of things: (1) the Monad (Unity), by participation of which all countable monads are intelligible as monads, and (2) the indefinite duality (ἡ ἀόριστος δυάς), by participation of which (ἧς κατὰ μετοχὴν) all dualities are definite dualities.

The "Indefinite Duality" is matter, privation and evil. It is to be called "instable, shapeless and non-existing" (Simplikios, In Arist. Phys., 248, 13-16). The problem is that it was Pythagoras; *not Plato*, who spoke (in Sextus) about the participation in/of the "Indefinite Duality".[629]

The possibility to partake in/of the "instable, shapeless and non-existing" might have appeared appalling to Plato himself, but it was always an open possibility for the mathematically styled philosophy. Participation – in this "neutral" sense of the word – can have even evil for its object. Evil can be clung to also.

The theme of participation appears in Scripture too: *the Lord is my chosen portion* (Ps 16:5); *the Lord is my portion, says my soul* (Lam 3:24), and the term has been used in Septuagint[630]. Thomas, commenting the Epistle to Romans, notices the difficulty connected with the right understanding of the notion. A good cannot – as it seemed – to be bequeathed unless at the expense of the death of the bequestor:

> **647**. Second, he shows what that inheritance is. First, he describes it in relation to God the Father, saying, ***heirs indeed of God***. Now one's heir is a person who receives or gets his chief

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[628] Adv. Mathem., X, 258, 4-10 ἰδοὺ γὰρ καὶ αἱ ἰδέαι ἀσώματοι οὖσαι κατὰ τὸν Πλάτωνα προϋφεστᾶσι τῶν σωμάτων, καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν γινομένων πρὸς αὐτὰς γίνεται· ἀλλ' οὔκ εἰσι τῶν ὄντων ἀρχαί, ἐπείπερ ἑκάστη ἰδέα κατ' ἰδίαν μὲν λαμβανομένη ἓν εἶναι λέγεται, κατὰ σύλληψιν δὲ ἑτέρας ἢ ἄλλων δύο καὶ τρεῖς καὶ τέσσαρες,

[629] Adv. Mathem., 261,1-262, 5 ἔνθεν κινηθεὶς ὁ Πυθαγόρας ἀρχὴν ἔφησεν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων τὴν μονάδα, ἧς κατὰ μετοχὴν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἓν λέγεται· καὶ ταύτην κατ' αὐτότητα μὲν ἑαυτῆς νοουμένην μονάδα νοεῖσθαι, ἐπισυντεθεῖσαν δ' ἑαυτῇ καθ' ἑτερότητα ἀποτελεῖν τὴν καλουμένην ἀόριστον δυάδα διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν τῶν ἀριθμητῶν καὶ ὡρισμένων δυάδων εἶναι τὴν αὐτήν, πάσας δὲ κατὰ μετοχὴν αὐτῆς δυάδας νενοῆσθαι, καθὼς καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς μονάδος ἐλέγχουσιν. δύο οὖν τῶν ὄντων ἀρχαί, ἥ τε πρώτη μονάς, ἧς κατὰ μετοχὴν πᾶσαι αἱ ἀριθμηταὶ μονάδες νοοῦνται μονάδες, καὶ ἡ ἀόριστος δυάς, ἧς κατὰ μετοχὴν αἱ ὡρισμέναι δυάδες εἰσὶ δυάδες.

[630] Ps. 118. 63 μέτοχος ἐγώ εἰμι πάντων τῶν φοβουμένων σε; Particeps ego sum omnium timentium te (VN; 119. 63).

goods and not some small gifts. … **648**. But since the child does not obtain the inheritance unless the father dies, it seems that man cannot be an heir of God, who never dies.

… temporal goods which cannot be possessed by many at the same time; hence one must die, if another is to inherit. But spiritual goods can be held by many at the same time; therefore, it is not necessary that the Father die in order that the children become heirs.

Yet it can be said that God dies for us inasmuch as he is in us by faith: but he will be our inheritance, insofar as we will see him through form.

649. Second, he describes this inheritance on the part of Christ, saying, ***joint heirs with Christ***, because just as he is the chief Son with whom we share sonship, so he is the chief heir, to whom we are united in the inheritance: *this is the heir* (Matt 21:38); *yet will I bring an heir to you* (Micah 1:15).[631]

In the society built on the basis the principle of Christian solidarity, the principle of the social justice (the equality of redistribution) is not needed. Goods are what they really are with respect to the Sovereign Good. An energetic and wise entrepreneur contributes, at the same time, to his own wealth and to the well-being of his employees. A good is measured by how much it approaches to the Good itself (the "how much" is an adverb and does not necessary imply quantity).

All temporal goods are real, but not equally valuable for this reason. Anyway, there is no "absolute opposite" of the Sovereign Good which would account for them not being equally precious.

24. …***To be partakers of the lot of the saints***. All men are good in their very nature; consequently, they somehow partake of God. But those who are wicked take pleasure in temporal things as their portion: *this is our portion and this our lot* (Wis 2:9), while those who are holy have God himself as their portion: *the Lord is my portion* (Lam 3:24); *the Lord is my chosen portion* (Ps 16:5). And so he says, ***who has made us worthy***.

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[631] Super Rom., cap. 8 l. 3. **647**. Secundo ostendit quae sit ista haereditas. Et primo describit eam quantum ad Deum Patrem, dicens ***haeredes quidem Dei***. Dicitur autem aliquis haeres alicuius existere, qui principalia eius bona percipit seu adipiscitur, non autem qui aliqua munuscula recipit, sicut legitur Gen. XXV, 5 quod Abraham dedit cuncta quae possedit Isaac, filiis autem concubinarum largitus est munera. Bonum autem principale quo Deus dives est, est ipsemet. Est enim dives per seipsum, et non per aliquid aliud, quia extrinsecorum bonorum non indiget, ut dicitur in Ps. XV, 2. Unde ipsum Deum adipiscuntur filii Dei pro haereditate. Unde Ps. XV, 5: *Dominus pars haereditatis meae*. Thren. III, 24: *pars mea Dominus, dixit anima mea*. **648**. Sed cum filius haereditatem non adipiscatur nisi patre defuncto, videtur quod homo non possit esse haeres Dei, qui numquam decidit. Dicendum est autem, quod illud habet locum in bonis temporalibus, quae simul a multis possideri non possunt, et ideo necesse est unum decedere ut alius succedat: sed bona spiritualia simul a multis haberi possunt, et ideo non oportet Patrem decedere ut filii sint haeredes. Potest tamen dici quod Deus decedit nobis inquantum est in nobis per fidem: erit autem nostra haereditas, inquantum videbimus eum per speciem. **649**. Secundo describit hanc haereditatem ex parte Christi, dicens ***cohaeredes autem Christi***, quia ipse cum sit principalis Filius a quo nos filiationem participamus, ita est principalis haeres, cui in haereditate coniungimur. Matth. XXI, 38: *hic est haeres*, et cetera. Mich. I, 15: *adhuc haeredem adducam tibi*.

> **25**. He says, ***of the lot of the saints*** … A lot consists in entrusting something to God's judgment. And there are three types of lot: consultative, divining, and apportioning. The first is not evil when dealing in temporal matters; the second is useless and evil, and the third is sometimes allowed in cases of necessity. The portion of the saints is the possession of the light: *he dwells in unapproachable light* (1 Tim 6:16); *in his hands he hides the light and commands it to come again* (Job 36:32).[632]

God is to be said to be "a part" in the sense only He is a reward of the just.[633]

According to Thomas, man (and all creatures) partakes, first of all, in/of his own act of existence.[634] Possessing the existence can be called life, but the mode of fostering the possession of life, too. Thus we can speak of e.g. contemplative or active life. There are different principles in man which enable him to undertake specific life activities, but the intellectual one is most precious (ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ, Plato, Apologia, 38A 5-6). The beatific vision of God (the contemplation of His essence) is the supreme reward. The genuine community (Civitas Dei) is constituted only by the relation to this End. If people acknowledge the Sovereign Good they form the real community ("the people of God").

2. The sense and the end of the human existence

"The sense of life" is commonly deemed its core reality. However, according to Bocheński, the word "sense" is properly applicable to what is spoken; not to *what is* simply speaking. "Sense" must be (as it seems) that of a sentence not of nature. Philosophers normally contrasts the spoken out to what exists in nature, and the two are opposed really, but not in the way those who followed Descartes thought them to be. Knowledge (expressed in sentences) is relative to nature. There is no reason to doubt that the intellect is a nature itself (albeit Descartes claims the contrary). The phrase "the sense of life", can, then, upon deeper consideration, include some definite meaning.

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[632] Super Col., cap. 1 l. 3. **24**. … Omnes homines de mundo secundum naturam sunt boni. Et ideo iustum est eos aliquam partem habere Dei. Mali quidem partem habent voluptates et temporalia. Sap. c. II, 9: *haec est pars nostra, et haec sors nostra*. Sancti vero habent ipsum Deum partem. Thren. III, 24: *pars mea Dominus*. Ps. XV, 5: *Dominus pars haereditatis meae*. Et ideo dicit ***qui dignos***, et cetera. **25**. … Sors enim nihil aliud est, quam committere aliquid divino iudicio. Sors autem triplex est, scilicet consultoria, divinatoria, et divisoria. Prima autem in temporalibus non est mala; secunda vana est et mala; tertia in necessitatibus aliquando permittenda. Sed haec per se est possessio luminis. I Tim. ult.: *lucem habitat inaccessibilem*. Iob c. XXXVI, 32: *in manibus abscondit lucem*, et cetera.

[633] Super Mt., cap. 5 l. 2 …Circa primum autem notandum, quod Deus est praemium eorum qui ei serviunt; Thren. III, 24: *pars mea dominus, dixit anima mea, propterea expectabo eum*; Ps. XV, 5: *dominus pars haereditatis meae et calicis mei*;

[634] Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 19 q. 5 a. 2 c. […] quaelibet res participat suum esse creatum, quo formaliter est […]

In Physic., lib. 8 l. 21 n. 14. Omne enim quod non est suum esse, participat esse a causa prima, quae est suum esse.

First of all, the notion of life must be analysed. According to Aristotle, "life" means either the act of existence (living in abstract), which , for a man, spans over ca 70 years on the Earth; (2) the act of his/her powers and in this sense we may speak about e.g. the scientific; political or social life. Nobody acts unless existing first, and the two senses (1) and (2) cannot be confused. They *were* confused really in Descartes, to the effect of identifying man with what he/she acts.

Human actions might be bereft of the apollonian means of reason and thus "senseless", but they might foster the existence, and this is (according to Mieczysław Gogacz) the genuine yardstick of their morality. False statements might have some heuristic value, and falsity is – generally – incomparably less toxic for life (its sustenance) than absurdity (ideologies only renounce the algorithm of verification). Good actions sustain life *directly*, and the bad ones can so *indirectly*: if reflected to be wrong.

Being-Sein, in which the two senses (1) and (2) are confused, is not real, but not harmless for this reason. The ideas harboured in the intellect might endanger the human existence: not directly, but facilitating some destructive actions which are undoubtedly real (or justifying downright felony). There are no "harmless theories", because it always might be tempting to check them out. A *particular* statement might be checked and proved to be valuable even if false, because denouncing the evil; but "systems" en bloque are only checked at the expense of the *entire* human life. (The *parts* of a system are rightly checked at the expense of renouncing some particular actions only). "Ergo erravi" spoken at the brink of the grave has a "dramatic value", but not a real one.

Hermeneutics is about determining the sense of every statement *A is C*. *Aristotle's* Hermeneutics is the second part of His Organon (which is nowadays called logic). It follows Categories (the science about the highest predicates), and is about joining the predicates (*C*) to some subjects (*A*). It is followed by Analytics, however, as sentences in science are not only uttered, but formally justified to be self-coherent too. Science differs at this point from literature, as in the latter the aesthetic rules of joining sentences prevail. If illogical, a sentence; a line of reasoning; is, first, "felt" to be "unbecoming". It seemed that the non-contradiction principle is used only so as to guarantee the self-coherence of a system, but it is not the case.

There are *two* parts of Analytics. In the first, purely formal rules as to how join sentences are given. Paradoxically however, The Second Analytics is more important than the First. It is possible to utter a self-coherent sentence, but deprived of the bearing on real objects. A definition might be self-coherent too, but bereft of objects it really can be applied to. There are no real definitions analysed except in The Second Analytics. Some sentences (definitions first of all) are related to the objective states of matter. The general rules of this "relativeness" are provided in The Second Analytics, but are substantiated in particular sciences only. The highest science (metaphysics) is not exempted from the rule; nay, it is, as we read in Thomas' Commentary, rather paradigmatic than exceptional. The words can never become real, but can, nonetheless, correspond to the real, because the rule of correspondence; the intellectual abstraction; is real rather than "logical".[635]

[635] Organon is followed up by two Treatises, which regard what chances to be uttered in special circumstances.

A sentence might be “pregnant with meaning” in different sense in literature and science. No stringent reasoning is to be expected of the former, but it must be expected of the latter. Accordingly, life does need to be beautiful (as visualised in art) so as to be honest.

A sentence – in the sense presented in Posterior Analytics we are concerned with just now – demands checking its validity in particular sciences and its position in the whole edifice of science in metaphysics (in the end). For instance, the sentence: “man is an animal” makes sense (is logical), because checkable in the science on nature. Moreover, it will prove true provided a broader meaning of the “animal” (the Aristotelian zóon) has been adopted. To the contrary, the sentence: “man is a symbol” (Jung), or “man is a response” (Frankl) is senseless, because uncheckable. “Symbols” and “responses” are part of the human reality, but do not define the human nature for that reason. On the other hand, a bold statement: “man is a microcosm” (Democritus; Aristotle) conveys both a definite and deep meaning if set against the backdrop of the philosophy of nature.

It seems extremely difficult to assed unemotionally the value (the sense) of the sentence: “man is the highest value”. In has been attempted, however, above, to prove that the sentence might be meaningful and completely false at the same time. The problem with such like sentences consists, however, in that some are so dearly attached to them (being widely proclaimed) that unwilling to think them over soberly. The same is the case with: “the human life is the highest value”. Lofty-mined people relish in utterings the sentence, but not bestow on it, by the same token, the truth. The sense of life can only be defined by what is not life itself (by what is its objective criterion). It is impossible to measure e.g. heat by being heated him/herself. We do not asses adequately any sentences if emotionally engaged in uttering them. Some people sacrificed their lives for some higher values (truth might be this or honor). They do not seem to act without reason.

Some sentences can be denounced as “objectless” because not bearing on any definite objects. The Second Analytics is a science about sciences being necessarily related to the real state of affairs, although it cannot replace special sciences in determining special modes of being they must address. It is about “relativeness” not about “objectiveness” as such. It can never become supreme in the sense ontology claimed to be (the science cultivated in the Scotian tradition by Christian Wolff).

Sciences, in general, regard some special modes/types of being, and ethics is not exceptional in this respect, save by relating to some very special nature (being): dissimilar to the others. The statement *A is C* is descriptive in every other science except in ethics, because the value of the statement *A is C* in ethics is conditioned (and the content workable) by the relation to the end to be obtained, which is never workable itself, especially if written with the capital “E”. Ethics is about nature too, but the human rational and free nature is specific as its existence depends on the end (and eventually on the End) in a special manner. The factual (descriptive) sentences obtain a special significance if related to the end (as the means must be). They might be, thus, called “normative” because corresponding to the “ideal” (exemplars) existing in the End (God’s ideas are not directly perceptible, but are a criterion of human actions nonetheless).

Man can be a creator of the *realization* of truth of the “principal statement” in ethics: “I am happy in God”, but never a creator of the sense of the “principal statement”: “there is

happiness for *everyone* in store in God". Still, phenomenologists seem to understand creativity in this vein.

> Roman Ingarden, after recalling manifold senses of "norm", focuses on the norm taken in the logical sense, viz. on the sentences like: "it ought be that …" (that S is p) or "it ought not to be that …" (that S is p). The notion of ought-ness is pivotal. It is about demanding bringing about a given state of affairs. It is necessary to take into account obligations or duties which appeal to something which is – out it its nature – active; nay, creative. The obligation is expressed in what is commonly called the norm.[636]

The objective value of the ethical statement *A is C* seemed to be dependent on its "denotation", but practically, on *the act of* denotation, or even on a person who witnesses the values of the statements only, but never grasps the nature of the relation of the objective states of matters to What (Who) conditions the existence of these objects. Phenomenologists say that the sense is *created rather that assessed* in a disinterested manner ("Values are «powerless» unless «witnessed»").

An obvious problem arises, how far the human creativity is permitted (if ever) to contribute to the value of a normative statement. Is the measure of this humanity definitely settled, or it "evolves"? But if so, can it "evolve" towards its degradation also? It seems that an "evolution" is possible (and even more natural) towards the growth of the "moral entropy" if the principle of "inclusivity" dominates. *Absolute* equality is only possible in terms of *the lack* of quality. Can the sense of humanity be open to "innovative interpretations", but safeguarded from sheer relativity? If man acts by his/her whole self (if the actions were identical with the humanity) a "non-human" criterion of human actions will seem unhuman.

Since Kant, many philosophers have despaired to get to know the definite "measure of humanity". There were manifold actions in humans, but never reducible to the natural substratum called human nature (substance). Kant reduced them to a privileged judgment only. The categorical imperative was a meta-normative statement.

Manifold actions should be (as will be shown below; and had been accepted before Kant) integrated as to both their principle (the human nature) and their End (God). There is unity to be found in them both. The evolution (of the "entire shape of the universe"; as well as of morals) appears an open possibility after rejecting theoretical science which must be about the unchangeable. The ultimate sense of statements is to be sought in the relation to its principle and the end. "Pluralism" might be desirable as far as contributing to clearer perspective of the principles and the End. People are equal with respect to them both (ultimate end is to be found in God only, from "the first" to "the last man" on the Earth, contrary to what Averroists of old and of new claimed), but are naturally unequal as to the personal endowments to get there. Those better endowed are (by the very endowment) morally obliged to help those worse off to find a clearer perspective (the "sense"). We are not equal "partners of the dialogue". We are naturally unequally endowed, and the inequality poses a moral obligation.

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[636] Władysław Stróżewski, W kręgu wartości, Kraków 1992, s. 67.

Since Descartes, a quaint science (about everything) has appeared: mathesis universalis. The fact has been ignored that a specialist must renounce all but one science; otherwise he/she is unable to become a specialist. There is no mathesis universalis in Aristotle, but the supreme science, which governs the particular ones "politically", i.e. respecting the validly of their statements relative to their subject matters. There are manifold particular ends in the human life (and many activities connected with them), but the One Unique only (and the "absolute activity" called happiness to be found there). In the view of the Ultimate End, we must "sell all pearls" so as to purchase the unique one (happiness in God).

God governs the universe "politically" also: "reacheth … from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly (Attingit ergo a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter (Wisdom 8.1), but in the moment His gentle power is rejected, two (equally acceptable) possibilities appear: the unification (Gleichschaltung) in the Kantian (Prussian) manner, and "pluralisms" equal to anarchy.

There is, in Kant, a sphere "totally independent" of the factual world and to be called morality. Sciences, in Kant, vary *monotonically* in how far distant from the direct experience (Anschaung). There is, at the top of them a – so to say – "general praxis of science" (contained in transcendental ideas). Their very existence, however, was (in Kant) a sheer postulate. The postulate was about to be rejected by "pluralists", and no reasons can be (as it seems) given that it should not have so.

The unification in Kant was matched with rigid differentiating between "what is" and "what should be", but the unification itself might be furthered by renouncing either the latter or the former.

Immediately after Kant (in Fichte, Hegel and Schelling) an attempt was made to replace the "is" by the "is should be" and the universal sense of being (Sinn des Seins) searched in it. In Fichte, each thinkable object (phenomenon; Vorstellung) is preceded by "pure deed": which is moral out of its very nature (reines Thun). In Schopenhauer, the irrational Will motivates speaking and is placed at the top of all statements, which seem to have any objective value. The same mutatis mutandis holds true in Marx, Freud, Nietzsche and Heidegger. The problem of this paradigm consists in that "the top" might eventually prove to "the bottom" (in Freud). (It does not matter much which term is preferred).

The advocates of pragmatism reject the Kantian dualism too, but without (to Putnam's mind) a "democratic dialogue" unbiased by any "metaphysical principles". Descriptive facts and normative values were (allegedly) entangled and a strict separation between objective facts and subjective values seemed untenable. Metaphysics has been rejected indeed, but its place occupied by ontology created in its stead.

The detailed structure of science elaborated by Aristotle was (shortly after his death) about to be replaced by a simple tripartition of: ethics, physics and logic. There was no place for metaphysics in the paradigm, albeit yearning for its grandiose name remained. It seemed "ennobling" in Heidegger and Strawson who were furthest from Aristotelianism. Moreover, some speak of "metaphysical feelings", which already smacks of nonsense, as metaphysics is "purely intellectual/theoretical". The loss of the sense of existence might be painfully experienced (felt), but not understood by this token.

Schelling's System, in turn, is metaphysical in a stretched sense of the word only, as no one can be a metaphysician following the principles laid down by Christian Wolff.

Contrary to what Kant says (an open enemy of the traditional metaphysics anyhow), a metaphysician is not a "Geisterseher" (ghost-seer). The Aristotelian metaphysics is related to physics not by the mere prefix "meta-" (en vogue also and abused in e.g. "meta-narration"), but by the system of four causes, in which the ultimate sense of being (of any statement) is given. Aristotle does not himself use the term "metaphysics", but defines it as "the divine science". It is not because God is its subject matter (it is not theology), but because God is the Cause of its subject matter: of all beings, the manifold forms of whom are to be found in nature.

The Aristotelian ethics is "naturalistic" without, however, espousing the "naturalist principles" laid down by Schelling and Freud, which are in fact ontological rather than natural. Nature as such is diversified as to the levels of perfection to be found in it (they are discrete only). The levels are thematically regarded in metaphysics, so that the sense of the human being cannot be engrossed by the sense of being as uniform as in the aforementioned systems. The truth about a part is to be sought in the relation of the part (of the universe) to its Transcendent Cause rather than in the part itself or in relation to an *imaginable* "totality" (the one distorted and inadequately presented). The sense of the human existence is that of its unchangeable nature with respect to its Cause. Metaphysics is not about the possible being (Wolff). *Sinn de Seins is not the sense of human existence*.

While observing the natural world we formulate some statements in the form *A is C*. There is some reason to assess some of them as valuable and rejecting the others as unacceptable. The reason might be different when describing ordinary facts and the facts expected to be realized in the (human) future, but a reason must exist nonetheless.

When reading Kant's Critique, one might be left with the impression that the main cause of the validity of the statements to be found in the book is the author himself. As, however, the authority of the author is not automatically my personal authority (until, at least, I espouse the line of reasoning presented there) I can always question the authority, and the right to question any authority seems to be unalienable and not to be rashly labelled as "cynicism". Is the author of the Critique a porte parole and Avatar of the collective consciousness of humanity really? There is no reason to grant the fact unless the authority had been acknowledged to be supernatural despite being rationalistic (impossibility anyhow).

The Greek philosophy was about nature first of all. In originated in the moment myths (which claimed the right to be supernatural) had been rejected. The natural state of matter can be (in Aristotle) explained in four ways, and thus we speak (in Physics) about four causes. They are real causes which make any statement *A is C* valuable. The cause is grasped as the middle term of the syllogism in which *A is C* is a conclusion. The syllogism presented in Posterior Analytics is generative of necessary knowledge.

Greeks in general and Aristotle in particular saw nothing "mystical" in nature. The nature might be rationally analysed, and the scope of "intuition" in it curtailed to the requirements of Analytics. The human nature might be complex, but is a nature nonetheless. This fact has been almost commonly rejected in modernity.

A purely descriptive statement might be assumed in the form of e.g.: "a theft was committed" and judged appropriately thereafter. The judgment will then assume a normative form: "it ought not to be done".

A sentence, however, presumed to have a normative sense, e.g. "the theft shall not be committed" might be reworded into the form: "the theft is not to be committed". The phrase: "to be to" is about the future events which are, in fact, conditionally necessary: they are so with respect to their ends. In the sentence; "the theft is not to be committed" the conditionally necessary judgment is implied (included) concerning the necessary future consequences of the fact which has been accomplished. The judgment is the conclusion of the syllogism of action.

There is, between the Latin factum and faciendum (what is done; what is about to be done) the difference of the present and future tenses (they are participles of these tenses). But the future events are not "contingent" and "unpredictable" to the point the positive law is needed to validate them. The *natural* law *expressed in the syllogism of action* suffices. The "to be to" is assessed *personally* as a fact necessary to obtain the personal beatitude.

A specific nature acts in a predictable manner, because endowed with special natural properties. A thing must be distinguished from its actions. The absolute identity of: (1) action; (2) the principle of acting; (3) the being source of acting; occurs in God only. To the contrary, all created things (3) undertake some actions (1) if endowed with principles (2) apt to spawn them. Things we see appear before our eyes in a sequence, although it is not the linear sequence of measurable objects (Kant's Anschauung), but the sequence of predictable causal relations. We anticipate some facts. The command can be expressed in the form "do not steel" as well as in the form "thou shalt not steel". The future tense expresses what is to be done, and not only what is expected (hoped or feared) to be done. The relation to the rationally anticipated future renders the fact normative.

The forms of beings are different as to their perfection (and the human animality is the most perfect one to be found in nature). We take it for granted when feeding on the meat of dumb animals or at least on plants (which live, although their life is the least perfect).

The perfection of an animal existence depends on its ability to sustain its individual and generic (specific) life. A "happy" animal leaves progeny, whereas the one secluded in the artificial environment is not likely to do so.

The depopulation of the entire countries is the effect of the sentiment of the lack of the sense of life; of not finding natural conditions to foster both personal and family life; of the life environment felt to be entirely artificial.

The air pollution is but a sample. Apart from suspended particulates, there is noise pollution also, which affects significantly the quality of the human existence. The problem, however, is not restricted to airports with their deafening noise, but concerns mass media buzz too, because it (and the so called "music") prevents collect one's thoughts no less efficiently. Absurd ideologies, however, undermine the sense of both personal and community existence first of all. If *attacked* by senseless gibberish oozing from the omnipresent speakers, humans are unable to tell between what is (true; good) and what is not so. They are deprived of peace they necessarily need.

Contrary to animals, men anticipate even quite distant future, but it is not distance which matters, by the way they do this. The anticipation might be both rational (as it is the case with the human providence) and emotional as it is the case with anxiety. Neither of them

can be experienced by an animal. The latter (in humans) is being experienced as the depressing loss of bearings in the life, which is irrational after all. No matter how absurd a life condition, the Creator is more powerful than any anxiety-generative ideology: "God moves the mind of the wayfarer in matters of action, by soothing the pre-existing anxiety of doubt".[637]

The founders of our Civilization anticipated the future plights when passing down traditional values to be cherished. Any checkable sentence *A is C* must have the same meaning in the past, in the present and in the future, and this independent of the "innovations". The ideologies of "social progress" do not dare, mostly, to attack the traditional values openly. They attack rather underhandedly the very possibility to utter the truth bluntly.

Nobody is likely to leave progeny if anticipating the situation that a "progressive social institution" will take care of his/her children so as to "educate" them, i.e. to sift into their minds an absurd ideology. The progeny – in a civilized society – belongs entirely to the parents (filius est aliquid patris).

The expropriation in the socialist states of old concerned mainly material goods, albeit the "most radical" socialists did not hesitate to deprive millions of people of their lives too (Totalitarianism was quite open in the Nazi Germany). The Soviet Russia was a unique embodiment of absurdity (the lack of sense and hope). In modernity, socialists aim at depriving of life the most vulnerable (unborn; terminally ill), perhaps because lacking nerve to attack the strong. But they aim at depriving people of the right to upbringing their progeny just *as they please to do* (which parents have the natural law to) also. Human life is of no account for socialists. Severe crimes, too, are not severely punished, but "humanly" pardoned. The ambience of impunity creates the sense of despair.

Not even God can infringe the order He has established in the world; not because He is not "almighty" enough to do so, but because He cannot undertake senseless actions. The attempts at subverting the order of the created world might seem ridiculous, but gruesome for their immediate victims nonetheless.

> « la grande conception de l'Humanité, qui vient éliminer irrévocablement celle de Dieu, pour constituer une unité définitive plus complète et plus durable que l'unité provisoire du régime initial. […] À ce seul véritable Grand-Être, dont nous sommes sciemment les membres nécessaires, se rapporteront désormais tous les aspects de notre existence, individuelle ou collective, nos contemplations pour le connaître, nos affections pour l'aimer, et nos actions pour le servir » .[638]
>
> … the grand idea of Humanity has just irrevocably eliminated that of God in order to establish a definitive unity; more complete and enduring than the temporal unity of the initial order. […] To this sole true Great Being, of which we are conscious and necessary members, all

[637] Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 52 a. 3, c.

[638] Michel Bourdeau, Auguste Comte et la religion positiviste : présentation
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https://www.cairn.info/revue-des-sciences-philosophiques-et-theologiques-2003-1-page-5.htm#no21

> aspects of our existence, whether individual or collective, will henceforth be directed: our thoughts to know it, our affections to love it, and our actions to serve it.

The animal instinct accounts for the uniformity of the animal actions. People, if tried to be "domesticated" ("educated") like animals are, can undertake actions which *phenomenally* resemble those animal ones. Still, the sense of every statement *A is C* applied to an animal and to a man is different. A language not always reflects the fact that e.g. eating is different in animals and in men (in the German: essen-fressen; or in the Polish: jeść-żreć), and dying should be acknowledged to be different too. In Polish, it is only a honeybee which "dies" ("umiera"), whereas other animals end their lives brutally (the Polish "zdychają" sounds not as vulgar as the Germen verrecken). A language, moreover, might be tried to be "modelled" so as to blur the distinctions.

Some "behaviours" might seem desirable from the point of view of what has been institutionally sanctioned, because relatively well controllable. Moral conduct is not controllable this way, because it must be free and rational. People are responsible for their actions, but do not respond to stimuli like animals do. Animals cannot be moral or immoral, albeit they can be "trained" to "behave" as expected. The term of "behavior" has successfully replaced that of the moral conduct in modernity. "Moral behavior" seems oxymoronic.

There is (and always will be) an astonishing variety of actions in humans (contrary to those animals ones), which all ideologists are unwilling to admit. However, we know them to be considerably more variegated in the past indirectly at least, because the fact has been testified in novels (e.g. in Dickens). No matter how "carefully educated", a person might always act against an artificially enforced order.

The variety of actions is directly proportional to the place a nature occupies in the universe. There is natural diversity in the world and to be reflected in the language in which checkable (meaningful) sentences are expressed.

The scope of the animal existence is relatively narrow. The scope of the human existence is potentially infinite, but the problem consists in determining the nature of the infinity. The infinite must not be equalled with the indefinite. Neither the infinitely extended, nor the indefinite can lull the natural desire for happiness in humans. The Infinitely Perfect Being can do so only.

The infinite of mathematics has been replaced by the indefinite in the "mathematicized" philosophy. In consequence, "a transcendental idea of God" has replaced (in the minds of those "educated" by the "philosophy") the precise notion of the Transcendent God.

The shift of meaning affected even the language of the traditional philosophy. Manifold books appeared with the canonical: "in the writings of St Thomas" in their titles. The paradigm is that of postmodernism, albeit the direction was hinted by Scotus already.

Thomas would have never written a book about e.g. "Augustine's views on creation". He commented Augustine (in his Sentences), but *confronts* the Augustinian opinions with the transcendent reality. The problem of modernity consists in that "truth exists in the books", whereas the books themselves say nothing about what exists in reality (outside them), and independently of whether thought of or not. The sense has been deemed to be immanent to what has been created/said by man.

Kant "identifies" God as a "holy will" opposed to the human will. He contradicts this way the Writ, which says (in Lev 19. 2): Be ye holy, because I the Lord your God am holy; Sancti estote, quia ego sanctus sum, Dominus Deus vester; 1 Pt 1. 16; and (in Hbr 12. 14): Follow peace with all men, and holiness: without which no man shall see God; … sanctimoniam, sine qua nemo videbit Deum. Man, to his mind, cannot partake of God's sanctity. He and his actions are end unto themselves.

Rationalists (and Averroists in general) think their systems to be superior to "religious sentiments" and the "philosophical hope" must replace them. Still, those "expectations" cannot be confronted with any definite reality. There is, for a believer, an objective criterion available of the validity of opinions and life stances,[639] but no such like gauge for those who try to replace the religion with a "philosophy".

Classical philosophy says that God's actions are identical with His nature, and any statement *A is C* concerning His nature is absolute too. God's actions cannot be but good. Human actions *happen* to be good. They *should* to be good so as to adhere to God as closely as possible for a creature (after conforming the human will with the will of God, because "desires" cannot be conformed but fulfilled only). All (rashly so assessed) "banal" actions of the ordinary life obtain unique significance in the face of this ultimate perspective.

Man is created so as to participate in/of the life of God[640]. All other creatures partake deficiently only of the similitude to God (they approach God to some restricted degree only).

> For the most natural of the works of living beings, whatever ones are complete and not defective or spontaneously generated, is to produce others like themselves: an animal an animal, and a plant a plant. To this extent they participate, as far as they are able, in being always, and the immortal, and the divine (ἵνα τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θείου μετέχωσιν). For all things seek this, doing whatever things they do by nature for the sake of this. Now, that for the sake of which anything takes place is twofold: one, the end of which; the other, the end by which. Since, then, they cannot share by a continuous being in the divine and everlasting (since nothing corruptible remains forever numerically one and the same), each shares in this as far as it is able to participate in it, but one does so more, and another less. And thus it endures, not the same, but as the same; one indeed but in species, not numerically. The soul is the cause

[639] Compendium theologiae, lib. 2 cap. 8 c. Sic autem per nos Deus sanctificatur in mentibus aliorum, inquantum nos sanctificamur per ipsum: unde dicendo, *sanctificetur nomen tuum*, optamus, sicut dicit Cyprianus, ut nomen eius sanctificetur in nobis. Quia enim Christus dicit, sancti estote, *quia ego sanctus sum*, id petimus ut qui in Baptismo sanctificati sumus, in eo quod esse coepimus perseveremus. Quotidie etiam deprecamur ut sanctificemur, ut qui quotidie delinquimus, delicta nostra sanctificatione assidua purgemus. Super Col., cap. 3 l. 3. I Cor. VI, 11: *abluti estis, sed sanctificati estis*. Lev. XI, 44 et XIX, 2: *sancti estote, quia ego sanctus sum dominus Deus vester*. Quod dicit *dilecti*, pertinet ad praeparationem futurae gloriae.

[640] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 62 a. 1 c. Una quidem proportionata humanae naturae, ad quam scilicet homo pervenire potest per principia suae naturae. Alia autem est beatitudo naturam hominis excedens, ad quam homo sola divina virtute pervenire potest, secundum quandam divinitatis participationem; secundum quod dicitur II Petr. I, quod per Christum facti sumus consortes divinae naturae. Et quia huiusmodi beatitudo proportionem humanae naturae excedit, principia naturalia hominis, ex quibus procedit ad bene agendum secundum suam proportionem, non sufficiunt ad ordinandum hominem in beatitudinem praedictam.

> and principle of the living body. …. a cause for the sake of which. … But "for the sake of which" is a phrase used in two ways, as "that of which," and "that by which."[641]

Aristotle speaks here about naturalissimum (φυσικώτατον). The problem of the "modern" philosophy consists in that – to some minds – God is not as real as e.g. trees are. The idea of God has replaced it, but the ideas might always be, as known, vague (if human only).

There can be no "happy" or "evil" animals, because an animal presumed to be unhappy dies on the spot, whereas the "evil" one is only in so far as imitating (deficiently) human actions. But there is – midway between God and the purely material beings – a quaint reality: the human one, in which both is possible to occur, and the sentence *A is C* has a special meaning: of a fact and a problem at the same time.

Aristotle says:

> 331. We must, then, think of the action of the lower stars as similar to that of animals and plants. For on our earth it is man that has the greatest variety of actions—for there are many goods that man can secure; hence his actions are various and directed to ends beyond them—while the perfectly conditioned has no need of action, since it is itself the end, and action always requires two terms, end and means. The lower animals have less variety of action than man; and plants perhaps have little action and of one kind only. For either they have but one attainable good (as indeed man has), or, if several, each contributes directly to their ultimate good.
>
> 332. One thing then has and enjoys the ultimate good, other things attain to it, one immediately by few steps, another by many, while yet another does not even attempt to secure it but is satisfied to reach a point not far removed from that consummation. Thus, taking health as the end, there will be one thing that always possesses health, others that attain it, one by reducing flesh, another by running and thus reducing flesh, another by taking steps to enable himself to run, thus further increasing the number of movements, while another cannot attain health itself, but only running or reduction of flesh, so that one or other of these is for such a being the end. For while it is clearly best for any being to attain the real end, yet, if that cannot be, the nearer it is to the best the better will be its state. It is for this reason that the earth moves not at all and the bodies near to it with few movements. For they do not attain the final end, but only come as near to it as their share in the divine principle permits. But the first heaven finds it immediately with a single movement, and the bodies intermediate between the

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[641] […] φυσικώτατον γὰρ τῶν ἔρ-
γων τοῖς ζῶσιν, ὅσα τέλεια καὶ μὴ πηρώματα ἢ τὴν γένεσιν
αὐτομάτην ἔχει, τὸ ποιῆσαι ἕτερον οἷον αὐτό, ζῷον μὲν ζῷον,
φυτὸν δὲ φυτόν, ἵνα τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θείου μετέχωσιν ᾗ δύναν-
ται· πάντα γὰρ ἐκείνου ὀρέγεται, καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα πράττει
ὅσα πράττει κατὰ φύσιν (τὸ δ' οὗ ἕνεκα διττόν, τὸ μὲν οὗ, τὸ
δὲ ᾧ). ἐπεὶ οὖν κοινωνεῖν ἀδυνατεῖ τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θείου τῇ συν-
εχείᾳ, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι τῶν φθαρτῶν ταὐτὸ καὶ ἓν
ἀριθμῷ διαμένειν, ᾗ δύναται μετέχειν ἕκαστον, κοινωνεῖ
ταύτῃ, τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον τὸ δ' ἧττον, καὶ διαμένει οὐκ αὐτὸ
ἀλλ' οἷον αὐτό, ἀριθμῷ μὲν οὐχ ἕν, εἴδει δ' ἕν.

[…] τὸ δὲ ζῆν τοῖς ζῶσι τὸ εἶναί ἐστιν, αἰτία δὲ
καὶ ἀρχὴ τούτου ἡ ψυχή. […] τρέφεται δ' οὐθὲν ὃ μὴ κοινωνεῖ ζωῆς. (De anima, II, c. 4, 215a 26-215b 27).

first and last heavens attain it indeed, but at the cost of a multiplicity of movement. (De caelo, II, Ch. 12, 292a 22-292b 1-18).

Thomas comments as follows:

458. …For the diversity and number of the motions is to be taken more in terms of a relation to the final good, which is the principle in all things able to be done [i.e., voluntary actions], as is plain from the words of the Philosopher in *Ethics* VII and *Physics* II….

461. Then, at ***we must, then, think*** (292b1), he gives examples of this principle. And he says that, in view of the foregoing, we must reckon that the action of the stars, so far as the multitude or fewness of their actions is concerned, is akin to the action of animals and plants. For we observe among these lower things that man, possessing perfect power of soul, has many operations, because he is able to attain to many goods—for which reason, he can do many things, not only absolutely, but according to the order of one thing to another, as, for example, when he plans a long series of actions all directed to one end. This does not mean, however, that man is the best thing in the universe—for that which is best in the universe, namely, God, needs no action in order to attain his own appropriate good. For he has no end outside himself which must be obtained by some action, but he is his own end and the end of all other things. Now action which is for the sake of an end always involves two things, since it is necessary to consider the end for the sake of which something is done and that which is directed to the end, which is done for the sake of this, i.e., of the end. But animals other than man have fewer actions than man, both because they do not have actions of the intellectual part and because in their exterior actions they have a set pattern predetermined for them by nature—for example, a swallow always builds its nest in the same manner. But plants have perhaps one operation, namely, the nutritive and this ***small***, i.e., imperfect, in comparison to sentient and intellectual operation. The explanation of this diversity is that the end which is reached is either some one perfect good, for example, the end which man reaches, namely, beatitude, which he acquires through many operations, or else the many things pre-requisite to the perfect good, to some one of which plants and animals attain through one or a few operations. For example, beatitude presupposes, first of all, the preservation of life, then knowledge of sensible things, and finally the apprehension of the universal truth, in which final beatitude lies. This last, man alone obtains, but preservation of life plants attain through the act of the nutritive part, while irrational animals, in addition to this, attain the knowledge of individual things.

462. Therefore, it is plain from all the above that there are five orders of things. For the highest among beings is that which possesses perfect good without acting; the second is that which has perfect good through one or a few actions; the third is that which acquires perfect good through many actions, as does man. The fourth grade is that which cannot attain perfect good in any way, but acquires something preliminary to it by a few actions or just one, as is true of animals and plants. There remains for that to be the lowest which can acquire none of these, and because of this does not have as a property the participation in any motion.

Thus that a thing entirely lack motion can occur in two ways: in one way, because it is most perfect; in another, because it is most imperfect. Likewise, that a thing have one or a few motions can occur in two ways: in one way, because it is near to the most perfect; in another, because it is near to the most imperfect. But that a thing have many actions or motions is due to its being in a mediate position.

463. Then, at ***one thing then has*** (292b10), he adapts the aforesaid principles to his purpose.

And he says that in the order of things, that which is supreme has and participates in the best without any motion—which indeed happens with the separated substances, which are wholly

> immobile. Now he says ***has*** on account of the highest of the causes, which is the most high God, Who is the very essence of goodness; but he says ***participates*** on account of the lower separated substances, which receive being and goodness from another—for to participate is nothing other than to receive from another partially. This, therefore, is the first and supreme order of beings.
>
> He distinguishes a second order and says that it is something which from nearby attains that best thing by a few motions—thus, the highest sphere is said to approach that best thing to the extent that it attains to being the universal cause of bodily things as well as the cause of their permanence.
>
> Then he sets down a third degree, saying that something approaches the supreme good through many motions, as do the higher planets, which are also universal causes of effects in the world, and of the permanence and stability of things.
>
> After that he sets down a fourth degree, saying that there is something which cannot participate that perfect good but it suffices if it approach it in any way at all. (Lecture 18).

Aristotle presents a gradation of beings in the universe. The Treaty quoted above is about nature, but "naturalistic" in the sense different to that we have been accustomed to. Aristotle is aware of the architectonic character of the supreme science (metaphysics), which is called for this reason the first philosophy and prevents from tethering human destiny to the purely material world.

An alternative version of the structure of the universe was presented by Plotinus in III AC, and has been commonly accepted ever since. There is a structure with Unity (resp. the transcendental unity of experience) at the top and all beings are "defined" by the distance from the unity (Kant's non-sanctity").

The Neo-Platonic paradigm is easily visualizable, but unable to account for the simple fact that the actions of elementary bodies are *quite* simple, whereas the actions of the Supreme Being are *absolutely* simple (are simple in a qualitatively different manner). The actions of God are identical with His essence, which cannot be the case with any created beings. A Neo-Platonist is not likely to admit that God has a nature (is identical with it), and the perfections of the universe stem from God in a way premediated by Him (the notion of emanation or evolution excludes the possibility).

The variety of human actions is due to him being placed just in the mid position between the elementary and the Absolutely Simple. Angels (the persons more perfect than humans) can attain God by a simple act of the will and the intellect (not however simple to the point of being identical with their essence). The beings inferior to man (e.g. animals) cannot attain Him at all, and they cannot be called happy save metaphorically only. The emotional satisfaction might seem to be happiness, but it is infinitely less that the unshakable quietude of mind. Man can obtain happiness, but with utmost difficultly and abnegation from inferior actions only.

Hence, the objective meaning of the statement *A is C* (e.g.: "it hurts") is different in a man and an animal, notwithstanding apparent similarities of their actions (expressed in the statements). Animal can "feel" and "imagine", but both emotions and imagination is not subject to the (politic) dominion of the intellect (which is the case in humans).

The life of an animal might be simple, but is, by the same token, plain; whereas the human life can be never simple without being simplified. The materialist Weltanschauung

might try to explain the sense of the human existence in these plain terms, and the platitude might satisfy the taste for simplicity, but never the inquisitiveness of mind. Put on the Procrustean Bed of the materialist Weltaschsuung man can be only crippled.

The sense of the allegedly simple *A is C* in humans is as complex as the closer principles (potencies) which spawn specific actions are. The act of the human intellect is not quite simple, because the object of the intellect is presented to it in phantasms (which are themselves the effect of the dematerialization of the empirical data). The act of the will is never simple, because emotions are a material to work upon.

Thomas says much about the complexity of the human nature:

> Of necessity we must place several powers in the soul. To make this evident, we observe that, as the Philosopher says (*De Coelo* ii, 12), the lowest order of things cannot acquire perfect goodness, but they acquire a certain imperfect goodness, by few movements; and those which belong to a higher order acquire perfect goodness by many movements; and those yet higher acquire perfect goodness by few movements; and the highest perfection is found in those things which acquire perfect goodness without any movement whatever. Thus he is least of all disposed of health, who can only acquire imperfect health by means of a few remedies; better disposed is he who can acquire perfect health by means of many remedies; and better still, he who can by few remedies; best of all is he who has perfect health without any remedies.
>
> We conclude, therefore, that things which are below man acquire a certain limited goodness; and so they have a few determinate operations and powers. But man can acquire universal and perfect goodness, because he can acquire beatitude. Yet he is in the last degree, according to his nature, of those to whom beatitude is possible; therefore the human soul requires many and various operations and powers. But to angels a smaller variety of powers is sufficient. In God there is no power or action beyond His own Essence.
>
> There is yet another reason why the human soul abounds in a variety of powers—because it is on the confines of spiritual and corporeal creatures; and therefore the powers of both meet together in the soul. [642]

[642] Summa Theologiae I, q. 77 a. 2 c. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est ponere plures animae potentias. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod, sicut philosophus dicit in II de caelo, quae sunt in rebus infima, non possunt consequi perfectam bonitatem, sed aliquam imperfectam consequuntur paucis motibus; superiora vero his adipiscuntur perfectam bonitatem motibus multis; his autem superiora sunt quae adipiscuntur perfectam bonitatem motibus paucis; summa vero perfectio invenitur in his quae absque motu perfectam possident bonitatem. Sicut infime est ad sanitatem dispositus qui non potest perfectam consequi sanitatem, sed aliquam modicam consequitur paucis remediis; melius autem dispositus est qui potest perfectam consequi sanitatem, sed remediis multis; et adhuc melius, qui remediis paucis; optime autem, qui absque remedio perfectam sanitatem habet. Dicendum est ergo quod res quae sunt infra hominem, quaedam particularia bona consequuntur, et ideo quasdam paucas et determinatas operationes habent et virtutes. Homo autem potest consequi universalem et perfectam bonitatem, quia potest adipisci beatitudinem. Est tamen in ultimo gradu, secundum naturam, eorum quibus competit beatitudo, et ideo multis et diversis operationibus et virtutibus indiget anima humana. Angelis vero minor diversitas potentiarum competit. In Deo vero non est aliqua potentia vel actio, praeter eius essentiam. Est et alia ratio quare anima humana abundat diversitate potentiarum, videlicet quia est in confinio spiritualium et corporalium creaturarum, et ideo concurrunt in ipsa virtutes utrarumque creaturarum.

Without the help of the classical philosophy, the allegedly simple objects of our ordinary life can be hardly known as to their value (meaning). In the "modern" philosophy, they could not have been *subject* to scientific scrutiny, because they were deemed the *object* of consciousness rather the subject matter of a special science. In consciousness, all actions (which had been carefully analysed before Descartes) were hopelessly confused.

In this vein (of confusion), we happen to be persuaded that our actions should be "spontaneous" instead of being premeditated. It seems, however, that an action cannot be good unless the statement about it is integrated into the system of judgments the last of which reads: "I am at the Source". All others prepare this unique (last) one: they condition it.

The cause of the validity of a statement lies not in the consciousness, but in transcendent reality. The object of the will is presented to it by the intellect, but intellect itself must abstract (dematerialize) so as to know. Man can soar as high as this potency permits it. But the potency must be (so as to be active) perfected by a habit which can elicit the appropriate act.

Elementary bodies cannot have habits (they cannot get used to anything). Animals can do so as far as domesticated. Now, the human action is never as mechanical as the Hook's Law demands it of elements. They cannot be "necessitated" by any "must-haves", albeit the human psyche can be damaged really by being exposed to those "necessary imperatives" of advertisements. Neither, for that matter, should people be tried to be "domesticated" (be as "tame" as domesticated animals are demanded to be). They must not be "trained" or "educated" this way. The human dignity (him/her being a rational animal) is to be respected:

> In the agent there is sometimes only the active principle of its act: for instance in fire there is only the active principle of heating. And in such an agent a habit cannot be caused by its own act: for which reason natural things cannot become accustomed or unaccustomed, as is stated in *Ethic.* ii, 1. But a certain agent is to be found, in which there is both the active and the passive principle of its act, as we see in human acts. For the acts of the appetitive power proceed from that same power according as it is moved by the apprehensive power presenting the object: and further, the intellective power, according as it reasons about conclusions, has, as it were, an active principle in a self-evident proposition. Wherefore by such acts habits can be caused in their agents; not indeed with regard to the first active principle, but with regard to that principle of the act, which principle is a mover moved. For everything that is passive and moved by another, is disposed by the action of the agent; wherefore if the acts be multiplied a certain quality is formed in the power which is passive and moved, which quality is called a habit: just as the habits of moral virtue are caused in the appetitive powers, according as they are moved by the reason, and as the habits of science are caused in the intellect, according as it is moved by first propositions.[643]

[643] Summa Theologiae I-II q. 51, a. 2, c. Respondeo dicendum quod in agente quandoque est solum activum principium sui actus, sicut in igne est solum principium activum calefaciendi. Et in tali agente non potest aliquis habitus causari ex proprio actu, et inde est quod res naturales non possunt aliquid consuescere vel dissuescere, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Invenitur autem aliquod agens in quo est principium activum et passivum sui actus, sicut patet in actibus humanis. Nam actus appetitivae virtutis procedunt a vi appetitiva secundum quod movetur a vi apprehensiva repraesentante obiectum, et ulterius vis intellectiva, secundum quod ratiocinatur de conclusionibus, habet sicut principium activum propositionem per se notam. Unde ex talibus actibus possunt in agentibus aliqui habitus causari, non quidem quantum ad primum activum principium, sed quantum ad principium actus quod

Natural processes unfold in the natural order, which is certain even if as plain as presented in mathematics. But man "gravitates" to God in a metaphorical sense only. To "gravitate" is to will the same good God wills.

The beginning of the way is as certain as its consummation. Only facts describable generally in the form: *A is C* are problems. The possibility to lose the way to the Ultimate is a problem indeed.

All statements are meaningful if corresponding to facts. The "is" of a statement represents the "is" of a fact, which partakes of the being as far as approaching the One WHO IS – out of His nature.

What stems from God is a structure; whereas the Principle of the structure must not be structured itself (cannot be the cause of itself, albeit Descartes thought it about God). The structured must undertake manifold actions because of being both not simple and not self-reliant as to the foundations of its existence.

The difference was blurred in Hegel blatantly, but anticipated in Descartes already, who considered "theoretically", *for the time being*, the possibility of identifying himself with God: by bestowing upon himself all possible perfections (Mediations, III, 48).

Descartes must have taken into consideration the possibility, because he does not, in fact, draw a sharp dividing line between *his* actual cogitation and Res Cogitans *he* was supposed to be. A specific substance was identified with its attribute. It seemed that we might become anything we think of.

Paradoxically however, the attempts at auto-deification ended in the contrary of auto-degradation. Bestialization has been rehabilitated in the contemporary critical theory, whereas animality is a virtue highly recommended by Marcuse (Neo-Marxists). Dreams happen, really, to be about odd things. Let us repeat:

> … man's … actions (πράξεις) are various (πλεῖσται) and directed to ends beyond them—while the perfectly conditioned (ὡς ἄριστα ἔχοντι) has no need of action, since it is itself the end, and action (πρᾶξις) always requires two terms (ἀεί ἐστιν ἐν δυσίν), end and means. … to their ultimate good (πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον) One thing then has and enjoys the ultimate good (ἔχει καὶ μετέχει τοῦ ἀρίστου), other things attain to it ….[644]

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movet motum. Nam omne quod patitur et movetur ab alio, disponitur per actum agentis, unde ex multiplicatis actibus generatur quaedam qualitas in potentia passiva et mota, quae nominatur habitus. Sicut habitus virtutum moralium causantur in appetitivis potentiis, secundum quod moventur a ratione, et habitus scientiarum causantur in intellectu, secundum quod movetur a primis propositionibus.

[644] Καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα
αἱ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου πλεῖσται πράξεις· πολλῶν γὰρ τῶν εὖ δύ-
ναται τυχεῖν, ὥστε πολλὰ πράττειν, καὶ ἄλλων ἕνεκα. (Τῷ
δ' ὡς ἄριστα ἔχοντι οὐθὲν δεῖ πράξεως· ἔστι γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ οὗ
ἕνεκα, ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις ἀεί ἐστιν ἐν δυσίν, ὅταν καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ᾖ
καὶ τὸ τούτου ἕνεκα). Τῶν δ' ἄλλων ζῴων ἐλάττους, τῶν δὲ
φυτῶν μικρά τις καὶ μία ἴσως· ἢ γὰρ ἕν τί ἐστιν οὗ τύχοι
ἄν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄνθρωπος, ἢ καὶ τὰ πολλὰ πάντα πρὸ ὁδοῦ
ἐστι πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον. Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχει καὶ μετέχει τοῦ ἀρίστου,
τὸ δ' ἀφικνεῖται [ἐγγὺς] δι' ὀλίγων, τὸ δὲ διὰ πολλῶν, τὸ
δ' οὐδ' ἐγχειρεῖ, ἀλλ' ἱκανὸν εἰς τὸ ἐγγὺς τοῦ ἐσχάτου ἐλ-
θεῖν· οἷον εἰ ὑγίεια τέλος, τὸ μὲν δὴ ἀεὶ ὑγιαίνει, τὸ δ'
ἰσχνανθέν, τὸ δὲ δραμὸν καὶ ἰσχνανθέν, τὸ δὲ καὶ ἄλλο τι

Aristotle does not use the term "poiesis", but the term "praxis" (πρᾶξις). The latter concerns, first of all, the action immanent to the human nature. Contrary to poiesis (creating), praxeis (in plural) are totally subject to our free will. We can be thwarted in producing: houses, cars, books, even progeny, but we cannot be forced to submit willingly to the forced.

The human praxeis are immanent, but directed, nonetheless, to the Transcendent End. The end intended is to be distinguished from the Thing indented.[645]

The latter is ultimately God; the former is ultimately happiness; but the sense, in general, is that of thoughts, and the thoughts must concern the objective state of affairs (of *what is* simply speaking).

Happiness, because of our "proximity" to animals is extremely hard to achieve, but achievable nonetheless due to the benevolent assistance of the Intellects more perfect than the human ones (Angels).

The way to God is never as simple as it might be dreamt of. We must cope with quite mundane facts so as to get to the Fullness of Being. We can never become "god" (as Hegel promises), but we can really adhere to God forever. The objective is exceptionally arduous to achieve, but most highly valuable for this very reason. Easily achievable objectives are unworthy of man. "To cling to earthly things is the soul's death".

3. The hermeneutics of emotions

The human life is (should be) directed to the definite end. The latter might seem to be a privation of the linear local motion only, because a point terminates a line this way. The end of the life journey is, however, rather a perfection (telos; finis) than a privation. Human life must be directed beyond itself, as no perfection totally immanent to it can satisfy it. The consummation is to be expected from Without.

πρᾶξαν τοῦ δραμεῖν ἕνεκα, ὥστε πλείους αἱ κινήσεις· ἕτερον
δ' ἀδυνατεῖ πρὸς τὸ ὑγιᾶναι ἐλθεῖν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ δραμεῖν
μόνον ἢ ἰσχνανθῆναι, καὶ τούτων θάτερον τέλος αὐτοῖς. Μά-
λιστα μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνου τυχεῖν ἄριστον πᾶσι τοῦ τέλους· εἰ δὲ
μή, ἀεὶ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ὅσῳ ἂν ἐγγύτερον ᾖ τοῦ ἀρίστου. 292b 2-18.

[645] Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 3 q. 4 a. 1 ad 4. Ad quartum dicendum, quod finis est duplex: quidam proportionatus rei, receptus in ipsa ut perfectio inhaerens sibi, sicut sanitas in operationibus medicinae; et quia iste finis non est secundum esse nisi in eo cui acquiritur, ideo absolute non amatur ab aliquo supra se; sed se esse sub tali perfectione, amatur supra se esse simpliciter. Sed est quidam finis per se subsistens non dependens secundum esse a re quae est ad finem; et iste finis desideratur quidem acquiri; sed amatur supra id quod acquisitum est ab illo; et talis finis est Deus, ut supra dictum est.

Summa Theologiae I, q. 26 a. 3 ad 2. Ad secundum dicendum quod finis est duplex, scilicet cuius et quo, ut philosophus dicit, scilicet ipsa res, et usus rei, sicut avaro est finis pecunia, et acquisitio pecuniae. Creaturae igitur rationalis est quidem Deus finis ultimus ut res; beatitudo autem creata ut usus, vel magis fruitio, rei.

People aim often at both firm and intense experience, albeit the both objectives must prove, in the end, to be incompatible. Life experience is highly vulnerable and happens to be deprived of the desirable firmness even out of commercial or ideological motives, because the desire for good in general can have a market or political value (can be discounted this way). Thus, e.g. marital bliss chances to be commercialised (in "films") or hypocritically "protected" ("from violence") by politicians. The full mutual bodily gift, essential for matrimony, happens to be infringed upon this way.

Generally, we tend to the Immovable, albeit the tending itself is usually the opposite of its end. According to both Aristotle and Augustine, immutability is the proper name of God. We tend to adhere immovably to God, although the tending of the will is accompanied by the movement of the senses, imagination and memory, which all move in the way furthest from perfection. Our being towards the immovable is stamped with the mark of imperfection. We tend, however, to not be moved forever (Psalm 112. 6) in the communion with God.

Metaphysics is a general science on the being towards God, because whatever exists tends to Him, according to the mode of its nature and everything which *has* being stems from *Pure* Being (Summa theol., I, q. 44, a. 2). Metaphysics is not, though, an absolute knowledge. It provides us with the knowledge about God, but the perfect knowledge about God is His unique property (Metaph., I, c.2, 983a 5-10). That is why – according to Thomas – God cannot be the subject matter of metaphysics (Summa theol., I, q. 1, a. 7). God is the subject matter of theology, which is not absolute to be sure, but its principles (the Writ) are revealed in the way which enables humans to participate of this perfect knowledge. It is clemently (graciously) bestowed to man besides his natural endowment.

Metaphysics has neither right nor possibility to utter absolute statements, although it has both right and duty to explain the Revelation in the human tongue – as a handmaid of theology. The events and actions presented on the pages of the Scripture are characterized in terms of tending to the fulfilment, because the created is (out of its nature) a being through participation and the participation the Scripture promises stems from recreation (justification).

However, the main the subject matter of the Scripture (presented therein directly or indirectly) is Christ, who is both the perfect man and the True God. According to Thomas, it was unique for Christ to be both a wayfarer and the comprehensor ("it belongs to a wayfarer to be moving toward the end of beatitude, and to a comprehensor it belongs to be resting in the end").[646] He was (is) immovable as God, but allowed willingly (as man) emotions to arise

[646] Summa Theologiae IIIa q. 15 a. 10 c. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquis dicitur viator ex eo quod tendit in beatitudinem, comprehensor autem dicitur ex hoc quod iam beatitudinem obtinet, secundum illud I Cor. IX, *sic currite ut comprehendatis*; et Philipp. III, *sequor autem, si quo modo comprehendam*. Hominis autem beatitudo perfecta consistit in anima et corpore, ut in secunda parte habitum est, in anima quidem, quantum ad id quod est ei proprium, secundum quod mens videt et fruitur Deo; in corpore vero, secundum quod corpus *resurget spirituale, et in virtute et in gloria et in incorruptione*, ut dicitur I Cor. XV. Christus autem, ante passionem, secundum mentem plene videbat Deum, et sic habebat beatitudinem quantum ad id quod est proprium animae. Sed quantum ad alia deerat ei beatitudo, quia et anima eius erat passibilis, et corpus passibile et mortale, ut ex supra dictis patet. Et ideo simul erat comprehensor, inquantum habebat beatitudinem animae propriam, et simul viator, inquantum tendebat in beatitudinem secundum id quod ei de beatitudine deerat.

in his mind.[647] The two natures (human and divine) exist in him separately (joined in one Person only). The dogma (the conclusion of the rational theology sanctioned by the Magisterium of the Church) was attacked by the advocates of monopsychism. Ancient as the sentiment might appear, it reappeared in modernity in a special guise in the moment the human emotionality was raised to the plinth of the spiritual perfection.

Emotivism (in religion and ethics) was paradoxically both a continuation (of the rationalist tradition visible in Pascal) and the oppressive ethics devised by Kant in the same spirit of rationalism. To all appearances, Kant seemed to follow the footsteps of the ancient Stoics. Indeed, some threads of ethics are similar, albeit the general philosophical stance is different.

Stoics regarded the lack of emotional disturbance (ταρράσσειν) as an ideal and called it ἀταρράξια for this reason (a privation of the disturbance). There was (is) some reason indeed to regard emotions as "the ailments of the soul", because, under a strong emotional impulse, humans happen to be mentally unhinged. The problem is, however, how to cure the "ailment" without hurting the patient.

Instead of the Stoic apatheia, those who followed Aristotle postulated metriopatheia (mesótes), which was realistic anyhow. The golden means is to be observed in sensing, imagining and feeling. Anyhow, the "reason" must not bully the emotions (in the way Kant thought it advisable), but should get on with them instead. Civil power (principatus politicus) regards its inferiors as free and endowed with some unalienable rights, contrary to the despotic power (principatus despoticus) which treats them like serfs.[648]

Emotions are called in Greek pathe and many modern words borrowed from Greek reflect the pejorative connotation of the word. The morbidity of the felt is implied and the influence of Stoicism is visible at least in this respect. Still, we take it for granted that it is excessive emotions alone which happen to be morbid and harmful for our body.

The immobility of the Stoic mind lies on the opposite pole of the "authenticity of emotions". The Stoic stance was not unique in antiquity, because the immobility of mind was deemed characteristic, in general, for free man, whereas thralls only were forced to busy themselves about necessary affairs, which disturb the desired tranquillity of mind. The "lords" relished the undisturbed peace, which, however, was not a leisure, but a special activity called otium (schole), in which reading, discussing and contemplating were carried out. "Serfs" were doomed to be "emotional".

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[647] Super Io., cap. 11, l. 5.Voluit etiam Christus se turbare et tristari ex triplici causa. Primo quidem ad probandum conditionem et veritatem humanae naturae. Secundo ut dum tristatur et cohibet seipsum, doceat modum servandum esse in tristitiis. […] Tertia ratio est ut insinuet quod nos pro mortuis corporaliter tristari et plorare debemus.

[648] Summa Theologiae I, q. 81 a. 3 ad 2. Principatus autem politicus et regalis dicitur, quo aliquis principatur liberis, qui, etsi subdantur regimini praesidentis, tamen habent aliquid proprium, ex quo possunt reniti praecipientis imperio. Sic igitur anima dicitur dominari corpori despotico principatu, quia corporis membra in nullo resistere possunt imperio animae, sed statim ad appetitum animae movetur manus et pes, et quodlibet membrum quod natum est moveri voluntario motu. Intellectus autem, seu ratio, dicitur principari irascibili et concupiscibili politico principatu, quia appetitus sensibilis habet aliquid proprium, unde potest reniti imperio rationis.

Immanuel Kant took on (selectively) some motives of the Stoic philosophy. Still, at the end of his own life Kant regarded, perhaps with disgust and dismay, a reaction and a continuation at the same time, he was completely unwilling to endorse. There was, in Kant, an unknown substratum of the universe, on which the perceptible phenomena were founded. In Fichte, Hegel and Schelling, the substratum was proclaimed to be knowable intuitively, albeit the scope of the intuition was broadened and its object was the opposite of the rational in man. The irrational was, in the "Absolute Systems", a cosmic principle too and originally called "will", albeit the term was no longer equivalent to the traditional appetitus rationalis (the *personal* intellectual desire). There is, in Hegel, a deplorable rupture in the human psyche educated according to the Kantian principles, which makes for man's unhappiness (unglückliche Bewusstsein). The task of philosophy consists in "reconciliation" (Versöhnung). There was neither need nor possibility to work on the moral character in the way the ascetic theology (or even the pagan philosophy) had advised. The highest virtue of modernity consisted in succumbing to the irrational and emotional. The "will" was identified with the practical reason (denied to be a special intellectual power) in Kant, but with an irrational drive in those who followed (and criticized his dualism).

Irrationalism is present in Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Bergson and Libelt, but most excessively in Freud. Freud followed (unawares) Schelling, who introduced the term of unconsciousness. The term might imply a privation, but according to Schelling, it is rather a hidden part of the absolute. There exists, in the deepest strata of the world, a dormant "spirit".

The drama of the modernity unfolds between the consciousness (invented by Cartesians) and unconsciousness ("discovered" by those who deemed the classical rationalism incomplete); and the drama might never end, as neither of the two has been proved to exist. Ideas cannot live on their own, but they might prove deadly for those who believe them and try to ordain their lives according to them. Science, art and morals must eventually lie in tatters under the influence of those ideas. Hermeneutics of suspicion is about to replace them all.

Hermeneutics *in Aristotle* is a part of his Organon and subordinate to the "art of thinking" called Analytics, but eventually to the cognizance of what exists undoubtedly *outside* the human mind, which is to say: outside the consciousness, albeit never, for that reason, in a "unconsciousness".

The *modern* hermeneutics of suspicion addresses the unconscious in the human mind. There is no need, for the masters of suspicion, (nor possibility for that matter also) to justify their "breaking" ideas. Instead, they hurry to "discover" (but dint of their intuitive hermeneutics) some "shamefully hidden" principles. Some newly discovered ideas seem to contradict the old ones, but this lack of consistency in the bosom of irrationalism does not seem bother very much its advocates. Their intuitions are so "deep" that incomprehensible.

The irrational libido (in Freud) was supposed to motivate human activities and investigations, which only seem to be rational. Still, Bergson, Adler, Jung and Schopenhauer "discover" quite different principles. The contrary statements normally occasion the restlessness of the mind in those who believe them, but the restlessness itself was proclaimed another great "virtue" of modernity.

According to *Thomas*, actions and opinions might differ considerably, but they all stem (in the end) from the same "inborn" principles of reasoning and willing (concreated with

man). There is rest to be found in God for the human intellect and the will which adheres to God, but some buds of virtues and knowledge too, which appear in the moment we come to existence, and await an opportunity to ripen. The variety of opinions and actions is unavoidable in humans who interact with each other (and a problem too), but it is recommendable as long as people interact *constructively*. The effects of *incidental/casual* interactions cannot be expected to foster human existence.

The human nature is complex (structured) and cannot be "freed from its complexity" without being crippled. According to Aristotle, there is one unique and exceptional principle of the "psychological integration" called the intellect. It is immaterial and thus able to govern "politically" the material in man.

First of all, the (personal) intellect suggests the good to the human will, which is then intended by it. The will is to be called the human heart. *The heart is not the abode of emotions*. It is an immaterial principle of intending good as such. Without the integrating principle, all human actions would be as "spontaneous" as chaotic; casual/random to the point of being possibly downright wicked.

Emotions are "important" in the sense they should not be tyrannized in the way Kant thought it morally befitting. The vulnerable in man is to be patiently tolerated, but never pampered for that reason. Emotions must be intellectually e-ducated (i.e. de-duced from the state of immaturity). Children are treated seriously if both demanded to be obedient and excusable for not being mature yet.

There are – in the human soul – some naturally "innate" principles, but some "new existential possibilities" opened (created) some two thousand years ago. In the moment of baptism, the so called character is created in man (in his/her soul), but in those in actual communion with the Catholic Church, the sanctifying grace in addition. The character is a potency (faculty) God Himself operates in; the grace is a habit (a substratum) of "theological virtues" (faith, hope and love), which all have God for their object. Still, the virtues cannot reach to God unless actually spurred by the Holy Spirit via his Gifts. Instinctus is the name of His action, but this "instinctive impulse" cannot be directly sensed (contrary to what the very name suggests). It is God only how can move the human will from within, not violating, at the same time, its freedom.[649] [650] [651] This way, by God's acting, those endowed with the potency of character only are led to the full communion with the Church.[652]

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[649] Summa Theologiae I, q. 83 a. 1 arg. 3. Quod ergo movetur ab alio, non est liberum. Sed Deus movet voluntatem, dicitur enim Prov. XXI, *cor regis in manu Dei, et quocumque voluerit vertet illud*; et Philipp. II, Deus est qui operatur in nobis velle et perficere. Ergo homo non est liberi arbitrii.

[650] Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 88 n. 6 Adhuc. Violentum opponitur naturali et voluntario motui: quia utrumque oportet quod sit a principio intrinseco. Agens autem exterius sic solum naturaliter movet, inquantum causat in mobili intrinsecum principium motus: sicut generans, quod dat formam gravitatis corpori gravi generato, movet ipsum naturaliter deorsum. Nihil autem aliud extrinsecum movere potest absque violentia corpus naturale: nisi forte per accidens, sicut removens prohibens; quod magis utitur motu naturali vel actione quam causaret ipsum. Illud igitur solum agens potest causare motum voluntatis absque violentia, quod causat principium intrinsecum huius motus, quod est potentia ipsa voluntatis. Hoc autem est Deus, qui animam solus creat, ut in secundo ostensum est. Solus igitur Deus potest movere voluntatem, per modum agentis, absque violentia. [n. 7] Hinc est quod dicitur Prov. 21-1: *cor regis in manu domini, et quocumque voluerit inclinabit illud*. Et Philip. 2-13: *Deus est qui operatur in nobis velle et perficere, pro bona voluntate.*

Summa Theologiae I, q. 111 a. 2 s.c. Sed contra est quod immutare voluntatem est proprium Dei; secundum illud Prov. XXI, cor regis in manu domini; quocumque voluerit, vertet illud.

Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 6 a. 4 ad 1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus, qui est potentior quam voluntas humana, potest voluntatem humanam movere; secundum illud Prov. XXI, *cor regis in manu Dei est, et quocumque voluerit, vertet illud.* Sed si hoc esset per violentiam, iam non esset cum actu voluntatis nec ipsa voluntas moveretur, sed aliquid contra voluntatem.

Quodlibet I, q. 4 a. 2 c. Sed ad hoc quod homo praeparet se ad habitum consequendum, non indiget alio habitu, quia sic esset procedere ad infinitum. Indiget autem divino auxilio non solum quantum ad exteriora moventia, prout scilicet ex divina providentia procurantur homini occasiones salutis, puta praedicationes, exempla, et interdum aegritudines et flagella; sed etiam quantum ad interiorem motum, prout Deus cor hominis interius movet ad bonum, secundum illud Prov. XXI, 1: *cor regis in manu Dei; quocumque voluerit, vertet illud.*

[651] Super Iob, cap. 12. Ostenso igitur quod in Deo sit fortitudo, sapientia et consilium, ultimo ostendit quod in eo sit intelligentia, quam diximus pertinere ad cognitionem occultorum, quae maxime videntur esse ea quae in corde latent: haec autem Deum cognoscere ostendit per hoc quod in cordibus hominum operatur, et sic occulta cordium quasi suos effectus cognoscit. Dicit ergo *qui immutat cor principum populi terrae*, quantum scilicet ad voluntatem, unde et Prov. XXI 1 dicitur *cor regis in manu domini, quocumque voluerit inclinabit illud*; et licet omnium hominum voluntates Deus inclinet, tamen specialis mentio fit de regibus et principibus quia eorum voluntates maius pondus habent, utpote quorum voluntatem multi sequuntur. Quantum vero ad intellectum subiungit et decipit eos, quod quidem dicitur non quod in falsitatem eos inducat, sed quia lumen suum eis subtrahit ne veritatem cognoscant, et eorum rationem obnubilat ne ad mala quae proponunt consequenda vias idoneas invenire possint, unde sequitur *ut frustra incedant per invium*, idest ut procedant per vias non convenientes quibus ad finem suum pervenire non possint.

[652] Vaticanum II, Unitatis redintegratio. I. De catholicis oecumenismi principiis; 2. […] Spiritus Sanctus, qui credentes inhabitat totamque replet atque regit Ecclesiam, miram illam communionem fidelium efficit et tam intime omnes in Christo coniungit, ut Ecclesiae unitatis sit Principium. Ille divisiones gratiarum et ministrationum operatur, variis muneribus Ecclesiam Iesu Christi ditans «ad consummationem sanctorum in opus ministerii, in aedificationem corporis Christi» (*Eph*. 4, 12). Ad hanc autem sanctam suam Ecclesiam ubique terrarum usque ad consummationem saeculi stabiliendam, Christus munus docendi, regendi et sanctificandi Collegio Duodecim concredidit. Inter eos Petrum elegit […] Iesus Christus […] populum suum crescere vult eiusque communionem perficit in unitate: in confessione unius fidei, in divini cultus communi celebratione […] 3. […] Hi enim qui in Christum credunt et baptismum rite receperunt, in quadam cum Ecclesia catholica communione, etsi non perfecta, constituuntur. Profecto, ob discrepantias variis modis vigentes inter eos et Ecclesiam catholicam tum in re doctrinali et quandoque etiam disciplinari tum circa structuram Ecclesiae, plenae ecclesiasticae communioni opponuntur impedimenta non pauca, quandoque graviora, […] Nihilominus, iustificati ex fide in baptismate, Christo incorporantur […] 4. […] Attamen divisiones Christianorum impedimento Ecclesiae sunt, quominus ipsa ad effectum deducat plenitudinem catholicitatis sibi propriam in iis filiis, qui sibi quidem baptismate appositi, sed a sua plena communione seiuncti sunt. […]; Caput III. […] 22. Baptismi sacramento, quandocumque iuxta Domini institutionem rite confertur ac debita animi dispositione accipitur, homo vere Christo crucifixo et glorificato incorporatur atque ad vitae divinae consortium regeneratur iuxta illud Apostoli: «consepulti ei in baptismo, in quo et resurrexistis per fidem operationis Dei, qui suscitavit illum a mortuis (*Col*. 2, 12). Baptismus igitur vinculum unitatis sacramentale constituit vigens inter omnes qui per illum regenerati sunt. Attamen baptismus per se dumtaxat initium et exordium est, quippe qui totus in acquirendam tendit plenitudinem vitae in Christo. Itaque baptismus ordinatur ad integram fidei professionem, ad integram incorporationem in salutis institutum, prout ipse Christus illud voluit, ad integram denique in communionem eucharisticam insertionem.

C.I.C. Can. 845 § 1Sacramenta baptismi, confirmationis et ordinis, quippe quae characterem imprimant, iterari nequeunt. Can. 869 — § 2. Baptizati in communitate ecclesiali non catholica non sunt sub condicione baptizandi,

We approach God this way and are morally obliged to imitate the virtues of the Founder of our religion: as far as it is possible for our nature. We are, however, morally obliged too, not to try to imitate the exclusive prerogatives of God (his own properties) (e.g. the infinity of His perfection or His almightiness). No one is permitted to try to "create" or to "justify" (albeit they both are undoubtedly good). No one is permitted to intrude into the innermost of the human psyche (soul) so as to try to manipulate with the primitive movements of the human heart. Pure and authentic motions of passion issue from the human heart only (from the will), and it is God only who knows the mysteries of the human heart and can move it as gently as the creator only may.

There were many strange off-roads of the human life between the moment of coming to existence and the end of this existence. Still, the most bizarre of them seems the attempt at auto-deification, because it precludes the very possibility to get to the ultimate end. Following the principles of the "absolute philosophy", many believed that there was part of deity hidden in their minds and identifiable with the irrational principle motivating (allegedly) the motion of the human psyche (and the motion of the universe possibly too).

Ascribing the divine attributes to the creatures is an act of idolatry. The divine attributes happened (in the history of man) to be attributed to e.g. trees or sculptures. However, there is a difference between what has been created by God (e.g. trees) and what has been "created" by man (sculptures or the like). The name of idolatry is more properly applied to the latter. Implicitly however, if what has been actually produced by man is worshipped (cherished), humans or humanity becomes the actual object of the idolatrous worship also.

In his Metaphysics, Aristotle dismisses with contempt the ancient polytheism. The genuine philosopher looks down upon popular "pluralistic" opinions, because the genuine philosophy (metaphysics) is purely intellectual and does not allow the plurality of principles to emancipate from the dominion of the intellect.

The opposite is, obviously, the case with the "absolute philosophy". The "divine" seemed to be hidden therein. The pluralism of contradictory statements was "reconciled" in Hegel, who saw a "pantheon of divine images" looking at his predecessors. "History ended" in the moment his monopsychism replaced monotheism, but the end marked "the beginning of absurdity" extremely unlikely to be "reconciled" anew. The pluralism of contradictory statements does not bother modern philosophers much, because "the Infinite assumes the infinite forms" and "the highest worship of the Infinite [God] consists in uttering contradictory statements". This way, the Modernists' doctrines were described by Pius X. Their sentiments are – so to say a – a résumé of the rationalist tradition. They were presented in the encyclical Pascendi domini gregis.

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nisi, inspecta materia et verborum forma in baptismo collato adhibitis necnon attenta intentione baptizati adulti et ministri baptizantis, seria ratio adsit de baptismi validitate dubitandi.

14. [The Modernist as Believer: Individual Experience and Religious Certitude] … For the Modernist, Believer, on the contrary, it is an established and certain fact that the divine reality does really exist in itself and quite independently of the person who believes in it. If you ask on what foundation this assertion of the Believer rests, they answer: In the *experience of the individual*. On this head the Modernists differ from the Rationalists only to fall into the opinion of the Protestants and pseudo-mystics. This is their manner of putting the question: In *the religious sentiment* one must recognise a kind of intuition of the heart which puts man in immediate contact with the very reality of God, and infuses such a persuasion of God's existence and His action both within and without man as to excel greatly any scientific conviction. …10. Therefore the *religious sentiment*, which through the agency of *vital immanence* emerges from the lurking places of the subconsciousness, is the germ of all religion, and the explanation of everything that has been or ever will be in any religion. The *sentiment*, which was at first only rudimentary and almost formless, gradually matured, under the influence of that mysterious principle from which it originated, with the progress of human life, of which, as has been said, it is a form. This, then, is the origin of all religion, even supernatural religion; it is only a development of this *religious sentiment*. 11. [The Origin of Dogmas]… In that *sentiment* of which We have frequently spoken, since sentiment is not knowledge, God indeed presents Himself to man, but in a manner so confused and indistinct that He can hardly be perceived by the believer. It is therefore necessary that a ray of light should be cast upon this sentiment, so that God may be clearly distinguished and set apart from it. This is the task of the intellect, whose office it is to reflect and to analyse, and by means of which man first transforms into mental pictures the vital phenomena which arise within him, and then expresses them in words. Hence the common saying of Modernists: that the religious man must *ponder* his faith. - The intellect, then, encountering this sentiment directs itself upon it, and produces in it a work resembling that of a painter who restores and gives new life to a picture that has perished with age. The simile is that of one of the leaders of Modernism. The operation of the intellect in this work is a double one: first by a natural and spontaneous act it expresses its concept in a simple, ordinary statement; then, on reflection and deeper consideration, or, as they say, *by elaborating its thought*, it expresses the idea in *secondary* propositions, which are derived from the first, but are more perfect and distinct. These *secondary* propositions, if they finally receive the approval of the supreme *magisterium* of the Church, constitute dogma. 13. … the object of the *religious sentiment*, since it embraces that *absolute*, possesses an infinite variety of aspects of which now one, now another, may present itself. In like manner, he who believes may pass through different phases. Consequently, the formulae too, which we call dogmas, must be subject to these vicissitudes, and are, therefore, liable to change. Thus the way is open to the intrinsic *evolution* of dogma. An immense collection of sophisms this, that ruins and destroys all religion. Dogma is not only able, but ought to evolve and to be changed. This is strongly affirmed by the Modernists, and as clearly flows from their principles. For amongst the chief points of their teaching is this which they deduce from the principle of *vital immanence*; that religious formulas, to be really religious and not merely theological speculations, ought to be living and to live the life of the religious sentiment. … it is necessary that the primitive formula be accepted and sanctioned by the heart; and similarly the subsequent work from which spring the secondary formulas must proceed under the guidance of the heart. 21. [Dogma and the Sacraments] Dogma is born of the species of impulse or necessity by virtue of which the believer is constrained to elaborate his religious thought so as to render it clearer for himself and others. This elaboration consists entirely in the process of penetrating and refining the primitive *formula*, not indeed in itself and according to logical development, but as

> required by circumstances, or *vitally* as the Modernists more abstrusely put it. Hence it happens that around the *primitive* formula *secondary* formulas gradually continue to be formed, and these subsequently grouped into bodies of doctrine, or into doctrinal constructions as they prefer to call them, and further sanctioned by the public *magisterium* as responding to the common consciousness, are called dogma. … for the Modernists the Sacraments are mere symbols or signs … this is condemned by the Council of Trent: *If anyone say that these sacraments are instituted solely to foster the faith, let him be anathema*.[653]

The classical philosophy is a handmaid of rational theology. The modern philosophy dreads the very suspicion of this stewardship. Rationalists prefer domination to servitude (they follow Averroes there). There is no room for rational theology in the paradigm, but a precarious room for the "tabular theology" (theologia fabularis) left only. Pius X says that it leads to the destruction of the genuine religion. Polytheism of the ancients resulted (for all we know) from contaminating (destroying partly) the original monotheism, but immanentism (with its modern and progressive idolatry) is destruction itself.

The modernity boasts of "religious pluralism" and allows cherishing "idols" e.g. in mass media. There seems to be something "attracting" (enticing) in the plurality, but the effects of the "attracting" are furthest from being attracting themselves. The inner spiritual disharmony of mind (its disobedience to God) results in the psychological disintegration and prompts the actions which debase human dignity. The relation of *this* cause to *that* effect is plainly shown in the Epistle to Romans (1. 18-27). Thomas comments as follows.

> **113**. … wise men among the gentiles knew the truth about God [but] they have suppressed the truth about God. **115**. … man is capable of knowing God from such creatures … [1] through causality. For since these creatures are subject to change and decay, it is necessary to trace them back to some unchangeable and unfailing principle. … [2] by the way of excellence. For all things are not traced back to the first principle as to a proper and univocal cause, as when man produces man, but to a common and exceeding cause. …[3] by the way of negation. For if God is a cause exceeding his effects, nothing in creatures can belong to him And in this way, we say that God is unchangeable and infinite; and we use other negative expressions to describe him…. [Lecture 7] **123**. … they were guilty of the sins of ungodliness and injustice. … **124**. … it should be noted that ignorance excuses from guilt, when it precedes and causes guilt in such a way that the ignorance itself is not the result of guilt; … But <u>if the ignorance is caused by guilt, it cannot excuse one from a fault that follows</u>. Thus, if a person commits murder, because he is drunk, he is not excused from the guilt, because he sinned by intoxicating himself; indeed, according to the Philosopher, he deserves a double

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[653] Pascendi Dominici Gregis, Encyclical of Pope Pius X On the Doctrines of the Modernists

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Pascendi Dominici Gregis, Summi Pontificis Pius PP. X, De modernistarum doctrinis

Access 2026-08-27 https://www.vatican.va/content/pius-x/la/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-x_enc_19070908_pascendi-dominici-gregis.html

penalty….**127**. …. although they possessed knowledge of God, they failed to use it unto good … ***because that, when they knew God, they have not glorified him as God***, either because they failed to pay him due worship or because they put a limit to his power and knowledge by denying certain aspects of his power and knowledge … [They] **129**. … ***became vain***. For something is futile when it lacks stability or firmness. But God alone is changeless: *I, the Lord, do not change* (Mal 3:6). Consequently, the human mind is free of futility only when it leans on God. But when God is rejected and the mind rests in creatures, it incurs futility: *for all men who were ignorant of God were foolish and could not know God from the good things which are seen* (Wis 13:1); *the Lord knows the thoughts of man, that they are vain* (Ps 94:11). ***In their thoughts they became vain***, because they put their trust in themselves and not in God, ascribing their blessings not to God but to themselves, as the Psalmist says: *our lips are with us; who is our master?* (Ps 11:4). **130**. Second, he mentions the ignorance which followed, when he says ***was darkened***, i.e., by the fact that ***their foolish heart*** was darkened, i.e., deprived of the light of wisdom, through which man truly knows God. For just as a person who turns his bodily eyes from the sun is put in darkness, so one who turns from God, presuming on himself and not on God, is put in spiritual darkness …**131**. … ***professing themselves to be wise, they became fools***. ***Professing themselves***, i.e., ascribing wisdom to themselves as of themselves … ***they became fools*** to the point of acting contrary to divine wisdom … **134**. … ***and they changed the glory***. This can be interpreted in two ways: first, as referring to the glory with which man gives glory to God by rendering him the worship of latria: *to the only God be honor and glory* (1 Tim 1:17). They exchanged this, when they paid to others the worship due to God. Second, as referring to the glory with which God is glorious, which is incomprehensible and infinite: *he that is a searcher of majesty shall be overwhelmed by glory* (Prov 25:27). This glory, of course, is nothing less than the brilliance of the divine nature; *for he dwells in unapproachable light* (1 Tim 6:16). This glory they exchanged, when they attributed it to other things, for *men gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood* (Wis 14:21). Second, his immortality is noted when he says ***incorruptible***. For he alone is perfectly incorruptible who is entirely unchangeable; for every change is a form of ceasing to be. Hence, it is said: *he alone has immortality* (1 Tim 6:16). Third, he notes the sublimity of his nature, when he says ***God***, for it is said: *great is the Lord* (Ps 48:1). **135**. On the part of that into which they exchanged it, three corresponding things are mentioned. For in contrast to glory he says ***into the likeness of the image***, i.e., for a likeness of something produced in the form of an image. For it is plain that the likeness in an image is subsequent to the thing whose image it is. But God's glory or brilliance is the principle of every nature and form; consequently, when they exchanged God's glory for images, they put the first being in last place … But what is more abominable, man exchanged God's glory not only for man, who is made to the image of God, but even for things inferior to man. Hence, he adds ***of birds***, things that fly, ***and of fourfooted beasts***, things that walk, ***and of creeping things***, things that crawl. He omits fish as being less familiar to ordinary human life. Now all these things were put under man by God … **137**. Then when he says ***wherefore, God gave them up*** he mentions the punishment for such a sin. Here it should be noted that man holds a place midway between God and the beasts and has something in common with both: with God, intellectuality; with animals, sensibility. Therefore, just as man exchanged that which was of God for what is bestial, so God subjected the divine in man, namely reason, to what is of the beast in him, his sensual desire, as it is stated: *man cannot abide in his pomp* (Ps 49:20), i.e., understand the likeness of the divine image in him through reason, *he is like the beasts that perish*. This, therefore, is why he says ***wherefore, God gave them up to the desires of their heart***, so that their reason would be ruled by the desires of the heart, namely, lustful affections, about which

he says below: ***make not provision for the flesh in its concupiscences*** (Rom 13:14). But this is contrary to man's natural order, in which reason dominates the sense appetites: *its desire is under you and you must master it* (Gen 4:7). Consequently, he releases men to the desires of the heart as to cruel masters: *I will give over the Egyptians into the hand of a hard master* (Isa 19:4). **138**. It is chiefly with respect to the sense appetite that a certain bestial derangement is present in carnal sins. For the pleasures of touch, which delight gluttony and lust, are common to us and to beasts. Hence, they are more detestable, being more brutish, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* III. This is designated when he says ***unto uncleanness***, which refers to sins of the flesh, as is clear from Ephesians: *every fornicator or impure man* (Eph 5:5); because it is especially through such sins that man turns to and is drawn to what is beneath him. For a thing is said to be impure or tainted from being mixed with something base, as silver mixed with lead. Hence, in explanation he continues: ***to dishonor***, by base and unclean acts, ***their own bodies among themselves***, i.e., not as though compelled by others, for example, by savages, but they do this among themselves spontaneously. Below: ***has the potter no right over the clay, to make out of the same lump one vase for honor and another for dishonor?*** (Rom 9:21). Namely, for menial use. **139**. But since impurity of this kind is a sin, it seems that God would not give men over to it: *God himself tempts no one to evil* (Jas 1:13). The answer is that God does not give men over to impurity directly, as though inclining a man's affection toward evil, because God ordains all things to himself: *the Lord has made everything for himself* (Prov 16:4), whereas something is sinful through its turning from him. But he gives men over to sin indirectly, inasmuch as he justly withdraws the grace through which men are kept from sinning, just as a person would be said to cause another to fall, if he removed the ladder supporting him. In this way, one's first sin is a cause of the next, which is at the same time a punishment for the first one. To understand this it should be noted that one sin can be the cause of another directly or indirectly: directly, inasmuch as from one sin he is inclined to another in any of three ways. In one way, when it acts as a final cause; for example, when someone from greed or envy is incited to commit murder. Second, when it acts as a material cause, as gluttony leads to lust by administering the material. Third, when it acts as a moving cause, as when many repetitions of the same sin produce a habit inclining a person to repeat the sin. Indirectly, when the first sin merits the exclusion of grace, so that once it is removed, a man falls into another sin. In this way the first sin is the cause of the second indirectly or incidentally, inasmuch as it removes the preventative. **140**. It should be borne in mind, however, that sin as such cannot be a punishment, because we suffer punishment against our will, whereas sin is voluntary, as Augustine says. But because sin has certain features contrary to the will of the sinner, it is by reason of them that a sin is called a punishment of a previous sin. One of these features is something preceding the sin, as the withdrawal of grace, from which it follows that a man sins. Another is something that accompanies the sin either interiorly, as that the mind is disarranged; hence Augustine says in *Confessions* I: *you have commanded it, O Lord*, and so it comes to pass that every disarranged mind is a punishment to itself; or in regard to its outward acts, which involve difficulties and labors, as sinners aver: *we journeyed through trackless deserts* (Wis 5:7). The third feature is something that follows the sin, such as remorse of conscience, bad reputation, and so on. **141**. Then, when he says, ***who changed the truth***, he mentions the sin of ungodliness committed against the truth of the divine nature… **142**. The divine nature can be considered in two ways: in one way, as being the first truth. In this respect he says that they ***changed the truth of God into a lie***. This can be taken in two ways: first, that they changed the true knowledge they received from God into false dogmas with their perverse reasoning; for example when they claimed that certain idols are gods or that God is not all-powerful or all-knowing: *they have taught their tongue to speak*

lies (Jer 9:5). In another way, they exchanged the truth about God for a lie, because they attributed the nature of divinity, which is truth itself, to an idol, which is a lie, inasmuch as it is not God: *our fathers have inherited nothing but lies; worthless things in which there is no profit. Can man make for himself gods? Such are no gods!* (Jer 16:19). The divine nature can be considered in another way as being the source of existence for all things though creation. Consequently, men owed him worship: inwardly, the worship of a pious love: *if anyone is a worshiper of God and does his will, him he hears* (John 9:31); outwardly, the service of latria: *the Lord, your God, shall you adore and him alone shall you serve* (Deut 9:13). **143**. … ***they worshipped and served the creature rather than the creator***. … With these words he censures the wise men of the gentiles who, although they never believed that anything divine was present in images, as the followers of Hermes believed, or that the fables created by poets concerning the gods were true, nevertheless paid divine worship to certain creatures, thus lending support to the fables. Thus, Varro supposed that the universe was God on account of its soul and taught that divine worship can be paid to the whole universe, namely, to the air, which they called Juno, to the water, which they called Liaeus, and to other things. Even the Platonists taught that divine worship was owed to all the rational substances above us; for example, to demons, to the souls of the heavenly bodies, and to the intelligences, i.e., the separated substances. Now, although we should show some reverence to those above us, it should never be the worship of latria, which consists chiefly in sacrifices and oblations, through which man professes God to be the author of all good things. Similarly, in any kingdom certain honors are due the supreme ruler and it is not lawful to transfer them to anyone else. … **145**. It seems that the Apostle touches on the three theologies of the gentiles. First, the civil, which was observed by their priests adoring idols in the temple; in regard to this he says: ***they changed the glory of the incorruptible God***. Second, the theology of fables, which their poets presented in the theater. In regard to this he says: ***who changed the truth of God into a lie***. Third, their natural theology, which the philosophers observed in the world, when they worshipped the parts of the world. In regard to this he says: ***and worshipped and served the creature rather than the creator***. [Lecture 8] … **147**. Therefore, he says ***for this cause***, i.e., because they exchanged the truth about God for a lie, ***God delivered them up*** not, of course, by impelling them to evil but by abandoning them ***to shameful affections***, i.e., sins against nature, which are called passions in the sense that a passion implies that a thing is drawn outside the order of its own nature, as when water becomes hot or when a man becomes sick. Hence, because man departs from the natural order, when he commits such sins, they are fittingly called passions, as in Romans: ***the passions of sins*** (Rom 7:5). They are called ***shameful affections***, because their acts are not worthy of man: *it is a shame even to speak of the things that they do in secret* (Eph 5:12). For if sins of the flesh are shameful, because through them man is lowered to what is bestial in him, much more so are sins against nature, through which man sinks below the bestial: *I will change his glory into shame* (Hos 4:7). …**149**. He says therefore first: the reason why I say that they have been given up to dishonorable passions is that ***their women have changed the natural use into that use which is against nature***. *Does not nature itself teach you?* (1 Cor 11:14); *they have transgressed the laws, broken the everlasting covenant*, i.e., the natural law (Isa 24:5). It should be noted that something is against man's nature in two ways: in one way, against the nature of what constitutes man, i.e., rationality. In this way, every sin is said to be against man's nature, inasmuch as it is against right reason. Hence, Damascene says that an angel in sinning was turned from what is according to nature into what is contrary to nature. In another way, something is said to be against man's nature by reason of his general class, which is animal. Now it is obvious that according to the intent of nature, sexual union in animals is ordained to

the act of generation; hence, every form of union from which generation cannot follow is against the nature of animal as animal. In line with this it is stated in the Gloss that *the natural use is that a man and a woman come together in one copulation, but it is against nature that a man pollute a man and a woman a woman*. The same is true of every act of intercourse from which generation cannot follow. **150**. Then when he says ***and, in like manner***, he explains in regard to males, who ***leaving the natural use of the women, have burned***, i.e., lusted for something beyond the intent of nature: *they blazed like a fire of thorns* (Ps 118:12); and this ***in their lusts***, i.e., carnal desires, ***men with men, working that which is filthy***: *I will uncover your shame before them and they will see all your baseness* (Ezek 16:37). **151**. … It should be noted that the Apostle very reasonably considers vices against nature, which are the worst carnal sins, as punishments for idolatry, because they seem to have begun as idolatry, namely, at the time of Abraham, when idolatry is believed to have begun. That seems to be the reason why they are first recorded to have been punished among the people of Sodom (Gen 19). Furthermore, as idolatry became more widespread, these vices grew. Hence it is written that Jason *founded a gymnasium right under the citadel, and he induced the noblest of the young men to wear the Greek hat* (2 Macc 4:12), i.e., put them in brothel houses. Now this was not the beginning, but an increase and progression of the heathenish and foreign manners.[654]

Everything which stands midway between humans and God in such a way that is obstructs God is an idol. Apparently, the unbecomingness of the idolatry is not sensed as acutely as its effects. Still, the deep wound dealt to the human dignity is a plainly visible testimony that something infinitely more precious has been lost and forgotten to be lost.[655]

4. Representation and its attractiveness

Thinking, even in its vaguest form, is attractive (pleasing), because it is basically the representation, and the representation is all the more attractive the more plastic it is.

[654] The Summa Theologiæ of St. Thomas Aquinas, Second and Revised Edition, 1920, Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, MARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ.
Access 20126-1029 https://aquinas.cc/la/en/

[655] Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 94 a. 3 ad 3. Ad tertium dicendum quod quia de ratione poenae est quod sit contra voluntatem, peccatum per quod aliud punitur oportet esse magis manifestum, ut ex hoc homo sibi ipsi et aliis detestabilis reddatur, non autem oportet quod sit gravius. Et secundum hoc, peccatum contra naturam minus est quam peccatum idololatriae, sed quia est manifestius, ponitur quasi conveniens poena peccati idololatriae, ut scilicet, sicut homo per idololatriam pervertit ordinem divini honoris, ita per peccatum contra naturam propriae naturae confusibilem perversitatem patiatur.

Super Rom., cap. 1 l. 8. Dicuntur autem passiones ignominiae quia non sunt nomine digna, secundum illud

Eph. c. V, 15: *quae aguntur in occulto ab eis turpe est dicere*. Si enim peccata carnis communiter exprobrabilia sunt quia per ea homo deducitur ad id quod est bestiale in homine, multo magis peccatum contra naturam, per quod etiam homo a natura bestiali decidit. Os. IV, 7: *gloriam eorum in ignominiam commutabo*.

According to Aristotle, "every representation is pleasurable" (omnis repraesentatio est delectabilis, in Latin). It is impossible – as St Gregory has is – to live without pleasure.[656] Still, pleasures differ significantly and are unequally able to lull the human desire for the permanent rest. Contrary to what may appear, pleasures stemming from the contemplating of God's essence; nay, even a dimmest foreboding of this consummation are (as Aristotle has it) more pleasurable than anything else.

Historical novels are meant to represent "the image of an epoch", but science (history) is significantly more demanding as to the adequacy of the representation. Science in general is about representation, but history – according to Aristotle – is "the least philosophical" (i.e. the least rigorous) of all sciences after all.

Historical events (e.g. battles) are described usually in terms furthest from those required in the exact sciences. The death of a hero could be described in exact terms, but heroism itself is not describable this way. The exact representation is rigorous, but happens to be, for this very reason, too poor (or even banal).

Historical novels happen to be read for pleasure. Scientific knowledge is, to Schlick's mind – the most pleasurable, but perhaps a little "elitist" nonetheless.

The fact that both science and literature is about representation is not always reflected on, which should not come as a surprise, because phenomenologists say they *ought not to* be reflected upon, and phenomena taken in their naked *self*-presentation. "Phenomenology means description", and it is, by its definition, not concerned with things beside phenomena. The "naked facts" seem too poor to satisfy the "thirst for experience". However, we cannot judge appropriately unless comparing facts with their representations. Otherwise judiciary could be e.g. "politically correct", but never a right (just) power.

The plan of a literary work is devised in the author's mind. The characters of the novel seem to live their own life, but they live in fact the life of the author's imagination. The characters could be vividly depicted, although escaping from "reality" which happens to be "annoying", "brutal" or simply dull. The "artificial reality" of novels might be that of escapism.

The blunt reality must be, however, faced sooner or later, and the human providence (a moral virtue) is about facing the future. Moreover, in the personal life, the fact must be faced squarely also that the human providence is defective and a flimsy participation of the absolute Divine Providence only. In literature only, one is "permitted" ("for a moment") to forget

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[656] Ignotus auctor, De beatitudine, cap. 3. Ibi anima fruetur Deo ad Deum. Omnis quippe delectatio quam percipit anima in creaturis in hac vita quamplurimum elongat a Deo, quia non tota revertitur in Deum, sed haeret aliquantulum in creaturis, juxta illud Gregorii: *anima sine delectatione nequaquam esse potest. Aut enim delectatur in infimis, aut in summis: et quanto acriori cura inardescit ad infima, tanto torpore damnabili frigescit a summis*.

Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 114 a. 2 ad 1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, quia homo naturaliter est animal sociale, debet ex quadam honestate veritatis manifestationem aliis hominibus, sine qua societas hominum durare non posset. Sicut autem non posset vivere homo in societate sine veritate, ita nec sine delectatione, quia sicut philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic. *nullus potest per diem morari cum tristi, neque cum non delectabili*. Et ideo homo tenetur ex quodam debito naturali honestatis ut homo aliis delectabiliter convivat, nisi propter aliquam causam necesse sit aliquando alios utiliter contristare.

about the fact. However, the author himself might forget about the fact also as well as about the duty of his ministry (the spiritual mission of art): "to lick the wounds of the sick Lazarus";[657] to spiritualize the factual and painful. Often, he/she does the opposite.

The problem of the creativity was addressed in Plato's Republic. "Homer and Hesiod created gods for Greeks", and the creation seemed only possible in poetry. In science (as such) such a creation is impossible. The sentences in it are joined in the way their truth cannot eventually obstruct the Truth itself. The aesthetic requirements (even those of versification) might facilitate (prompt) such an obstruction, because what is essential for poetry is accidental for knowledge. Thus e.g. the will of Poseidon (such a poetry character after all) could appear to be different to the will of Athena or Hera, only because the dramatism of action demands it. The aesthetic values, if pursued for their own sake, can contradict the religious or moral values. The authentic providence (God's nature) might evolve into many particular subjects of providence (deities).

Plato seems to claim that aesthetic values were pursued in Homer at all expense, which is obviously unjust. It is about discrimination between good (which happen to be pleasing when represented) and truth which must consist in the representation and the fact reflected upon. They both (truth and good) are fused in the idea of beauty. Usually people shirk from analyzing it. The aesthetic values in Homer are hardly analyzable, and that is why they are appreciated by laymen. Philologists who must analyze are likely to lose the sense of beauty.

It seems to be extremely difficult to set down objective criteria of beauty (to analyze it), but Aristotle did it successfully in his Poetics. The "logic of the poetic narration" – if deprived of what it has unjustly usurped – would be, by the same token, bereft of the appearance of the creativity proper to God. The Deity (God's nature) would never become "deities" *in plural*.

The modern philosophy is in fact hardly distinguishable from literature (Sartre was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature). There is not – according to Husserl – anything beside the actual content of "consciousness" to be known for a philosopher; nothing which might compel to check whether the represented in the mind corresponds undoubtedly to what exists beside it. Philosophy – so as to be what it must be – must become anew the philosophy of the being; not of phenomena.[658]

The authentic life demands differentiating between e.g. the smell of bread and bread itself, as no one can live on the phenomenon of smell, but must live on the real nutrients (factual after all). The problem of modernity consists, however, in that the refined life of the man civilized after "rationalistic" manner was supposed to be "essentially different" to the animal life. It had been regarded in those terms for some time, until the (inevitable) reaction of "naturalism" came and proved the futility of the (Cartesian) assumption. Human life is *at least as real* as e.g. dog's life, albeit it proves (eventually) nobler than it. It is a life and not a "thinking" bereft of the transcendent object.

Humans live on truth, which is more than just a metaphor, because the very human intellectual creativity manifests itself originally as its fertility. The human mind bears fruits

[657] John Paul II, Letter to Artists (1999).

[658] John Paul II, Fides et Ratio, 44; 97.

(the words conceived in intellect),[659] in the analogous way an apple tree bears apples. The fact is completely inexplicable in terms of the philosophy of subject (of phenomena).

It is impossible for a physician to nurse the sick and his/her own feelings towards them at the same time (no matter how generous the feelings). Science, in general, is about things, not about what people think they are or should be so as to satisfy their hunger for thrills.

A scientist (to be sure) peruses a desire of sorts too, but the desire is, admittedly, characteristic of man's reason; not senses. Aristotle defines pleasure as: "an unimpeded activity of a habit that is natural, harmonizing with the nature of the one having it" (delectatio est operatio non impedita habitus qui est secundum naturam, idest qui naturae habentis).[660] The activity of the intellect suits best the definition. The undisturbed activity affords pleasure, and the activity of the intellect is least apt to be disturbed in its essence, even if some preconditions of this exceptional activity might be destroyed (the activity is highly vulnerable).

Acting as such is pleasurable, but sensual pleasures are durable to a modest degree only: as far as unimpeded, which is altogether difficult for the sensible (that is why the institution of *indissoluble* marriage is most humane of all). The very apperception of the possible loss makes them elusive. Especially, the act of creating representations is more pleasing than the act of consuming them.

The mass media production happens to be consumed, but the consumption causes indigestion, and sometimes even the intoxication of the consumers. Chaotic movements of imagination happen to intoxicate the memory.

People try to participate actively in/of the creativeness of representations at least dimly aware of the presence of the dehumanizing manipulation. Computer games give an illusion of creativity. But the activity unfolds within frames set down previously only, and is as schematic as any pattern must be.

Nietzsche, in his Will to Power, presents his own idea of creativity. It is, to his mind, preceded by the "inner tension", and in the moment the tension appears unbearable, it erupts into the form of the created-to-be.

Emotions (especially if destructive) can be exteriorized this way, no doubt. A person can vent out his/her envy or anger and *pretend* to have created something valuable this way.

According to Augustine, "a disordered mind is its own punishment" (inordinatus animus sibi ipsi est poena). Healing as it might appear, the expression of e.g. envy, hatred or anger happens to be unworkable in some situations: in solitude first of all. A wicked man

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[659] Summa Theologiae I, q. 30 a. 2 ad 2. Ad secundum dicendum quod id quod procedit per modum intellectus, ut verbum, procedit secundum rationem similitudinis, sicut etiam id quod procedit per modum naturae, et ideo supra dictum est quod processio verbi divini est ipsa generatio per modum naturae.

De veritate, q. 4 a. 4 ad 7. Ad septimum dicendum, quod verbum est alicuius multipliciter: uno modo ut dicentis, et sic procedit ab eo cuius est verbum; alio modo ut manifestati per verbum, et sic non oportet quod procedat ab eo cuius est, nisi quando scientia ex qua procedit verbum, est causata a rebus […].

[660] Sententia Ethic., lib. 7 l. 12 n. 11. […] sit haec diffinitio delectationis: delectatio est operatio non impedita habitus qui est secundum naturam, idest qui naturae habentis congruit. Impedimentum autem operationis difficultatem causat in operando, quae delectationem excludit.

“hateth his own soul”, because, according to Aristotle, if bereft of any imaginable opportunity to exteriorize this “negative emotions” he/she must turn to the only object he/she cannot leave: him/herself.

Contemplation is, according Aristotle, best performed in solitude, and creating valuable works might follow. The world is this – with respect to His creator. The life of God is the uninterrupted contemplation of His own essence, and it would have been no less intense, if the world had not been created. Human happiness consists in/of the participation of His life.